



ENCYCLOPEDIA OF *India*



editorial board

Editor in Chief

Stanley Wolpert

Stanley Wolpert is a distinguished professor emeritus of History at the University of California, Los Angeles. His publications include *Tilak and Gokhale: Revolution and Reform in the Making of Modern India* (1962); *Morley and India, 1906–1910* (1967); *Roots of Confrontation in South Asia* (1982); *Jinnah of Pakistan* (1984); *Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan* (1993); *Nehru: A Tryst with Destiny* (1996); *Gandhi's Passion: The Life and Legacy of Mahatma Gandhi* (2002); *A New History of India* (7th edition, 2003); and *India* (3d edition, 2005) as well as his forthcoming *Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India*.

Board Members

Robert Brown

Robert Brown is a professor in the Department of Art History at the University of California, Los Angeles and

the curator of Southeast Asian Art at the Los Angeles County Museum of Art.

Deena Khatkhate

Deena Khatkhate is the former assistant director of the Monetary and Financial Systems Department at the International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C. He is also the former managing editor of *World Development*, a monthly journal of development studies published by Elsevier. He has authored several articles on economics in academic journals, including *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, *Review of Economics and Statistics*, and *Oxford Economic Papers*.

Raju G. C. Thomas

Raju G. C. Thomas is the Allis Chalmers Distinguished Professor of International Affairs, Marquette University. Among his dozen books, edited and co-edited, are *Indian Security Policy* (1986); *Perspectives on Kashmir* (1994); *Democracy, Security and Development in India* (1996); and *India's Nuclear Security* (2001).



ENCYCLOPEDIA OF *India*

VOLUME 1

A–D

Stanley Wolpert

Editor in Chief

CHARLES SCRIBNER'S SONS

An imprint of Thomson Gale, a part of The Thomson Corporation

THOMSON
—★—™
GALE



Encyclopedia of India
Stanley Wolpert, Editor in Chief

© 2006 Thomson Gale, a part of The Thomson Corporation.

Thomson and Star Logo are trademarks and Gale and Charles Scribner's Sons are registered trademarks used herein under license.

For more information, contact
Thomson Gale
27500 Drake Rd.
Farmington, Hills, MI 48331-3535
Or you can visit our Internet site at
<http://www.gale.com>

ALL RIGHTS RESERVED

No part of this work covered by the copyright hereon may be reproduced or used in any form or by any means—graphic, electronic, or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, taping, Web distribution, or information storage retrieval systems—without the written permission of the publisher.

For permission to use material from this product, submit your request via Web at <http://www.gale-edit.com/permissions>, or you may download our Permissions Request form and submit your request by fax or mail to:

Permissions

Thomson Gale
27500 Drake Rd.
Farmington Hills, MI 48331-3535
Permissions Hotline:
248-699-8006 or 800-877-4253 ext. 8006
Fax: 248-699-8074 or 800-762-4058

Since this page cannot legibly accommodate all copyright notices, the acknowledgments constitute an extension of the copyright notice.

While every effort has been made to ensure the reliability of the information presented in this publication, Thomson Gale does not guarantee the accuracy of the data contained herein. Thomson Gale accepts no payment for listing; and inclusion in the publication of any organization, agency, institution, publication, service, or individual does not imply endorsement of the editors or publisher. Errors brought to the attention of the publisher and verified to the satisfaction of the publisher will be corrected in future editions.

LIBRARY OF CONGRESS CATALOGING-IN-PUBLICATION DATA

Encyclopedia of India / Stanley A. Wolpert, editor in chief.
p. cm.

Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-684-31349-9 (set hardcover : alk. paper)—ISBN 0-684-31350-2
(v. 1)—ISBN 0-684-31351-0 (v. 2)—ISBN 0-684-31352-9 (v. 3)—ISBN
0-684-31353-7 (v. 4)
1. India—Encyclopedias. I. Wolpert, Stanley A., 1927–
DS405.E556 2005
954'.003—dc22

2005019616

This title is also available as an e-book.
ISBN 0-684-31512-2
Contact your Thomson Gale representative for ordering information.

Printed in the United States of America
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1



Executive Vice President and Publisher

Frank Menchaca

Director, New Product Development

Hélène Potter

Project Editors

Andrea Kovacs Henderson

Sarah Turner

Contributing Editors

Dana Barnes

Shawn Corridor

Anjanelle Klisz

Editorial Technical Support

Mark Springer

Additional Editorial Support

Ken Wachsberger

Copyeditor

Dorothy Bauhoff

Proofreader

Amy Unterburger

Indexers

Jennifer Burton

Marianna Wackerman

Product Design

Jennifer Wahi

Imaging

Lezlie Light

Christine O'Bryan

Graphic Art

GGs Information Services

Meridian Mapping

Rights Acquisition and Management

Margaret Chamberlain-Gaston

Leitha Etheridge-Sims

Susan Rudolph

Composition

Evi Seoud

Mary Beth Trimper

Manufacturing

Wendy Blurton



table of contents

Volume 1

List of Maps	ix
Preface	xi
List of Articles	xv
Thematic Outline of Contents	xxiii
Directory of Contributors	xxxiii
Chronologies	xlvii

A–D

Color Insert: Art, Architecture, and Sculpture

Volume 2

List of Maps	vii
List of Articles	ix

E–J

Color Insert: Contemporary Life

Volume 3

List of Maps	vii
List of Articles	ix

K–R

Color Insert: Handicrafts

Volume 4

List of Maps	vii
List of Articles	ix

S–Z

Color Insert: Physical Environment

Primary Source Documents	261
Glossary	287
General Bibliography	295
Index	299



list of maps

Volume 1

The Mughal Empire, 1525–1707	30
The Empire of Alexander the Great	35
The Bengal Partition and Related Changes, 1905–1912	132
The Revolt of 1857–1859	170
The Advance of British Power, 1766–1857	178

Volume 2

Guptan Empire, c. 300–550	163
Invasions from the Northwest, 330–1 B.C. . . .	209
Indus Valley Civilization, c. 2800–1600 B.C. . . .	260

Volume 3

Jammu and Kashmir	12
The Marathas, 1646–1819	95
Mauryan Empire, 321–185 B.C.	104
Muslim Expansion, 8th–15th Centuries	199
Territorial Changes, 1947–1955	304
Territorial Changes, 1956–2000	305
European Commercial Contacts, 16th–18th Centuries	321



India's strategic power and economic prosperity have grown so swiftly since the 1990s that no one will wonder why the vast country is the subject of this four-volume encyclopedia. Countless Americans who have had their computer problems solved by young Indians—at work for General Electric, Microsoft, or Dell, “outsourced” in air-conditioned offices in Bangalore, Pune, Mumbai, and Kolkata—will hardly be surprised to learn of the precocious mathematical brilliance and scientific genius of India's civilization. So many of us have read books by Salman Rushdie, V. S. Naipaul, Rohinton Mistry, and Arundhati Roy, and delighted in watching the movies of Satyajit Ray, Mira Nair, and Merchant-Ivory, as well as musicals or films about “monsoon weddings” and “Bombay nights,” that none will be amazed to learn that America's some 2 million Indians are, in fact, the best educated, wealthiest minority in the United States. India has not only erased its former stereotypical global image as a land of poverty and snake charmers, but has surpassed its old superpower patron, Russia, in gross national product as well as average life expectancy. India's nuclear-powered modern army is second in size and might only to those of the United States and China.

As one of the world's greatest and oldest civilizations, India has also been the source of several major religious systems, giving birth to Buddhism, Jainism, and Hinduism, the multifaceted faith to which some 80 percent of India's more than 1 billion people adhere today. The Sikh faith, which emerged from northwest India's Punjab in the sixteenth century, has also now grown to global dimensions. Yoga and Vedānta, two of India's ancient systems of philosophy, have of late acquired millions of adherents throughout the United States and in Europe as well as in other parts of Asia and Africa. Hinduism's noblest doctrine of nonviolence (*ahimsa*) has—thanks to Mahatma Gandhi, who equated it to “God”—won respect and admiration for India from countless millions.

All of us who enjoy playing chess or gaming with dice, moreover, are indebted to India's ancient wit as well as wisdom. There are, indeed, at least as many reasons for wanting to learn more about India as there are articles, nearly 600, and pages, some 1,400, in this new encyclopedia. More tourists fly into New Delhi and Mumbai every year, or sail into one of India's beautiful ports, from Mumbai to Goa to Trivandrum on the west coast, and from Pondicherry to Chennai to Kolkata on the east coast. More American and multinational corporate businesses have opened offices in hundreds of Indian cities, hiring bright English-speaking Indians, and more Indian doctors, nurses, and scientists work as heart and brain surgeons in our best hospitals, and on pure research in university as well as industrial laboratories, than any other Asian-born residents. India has thus arrived as our global partner, in so many more ways than the best-publicized “strategic” one, that we might well

ask why it has taken so long for our *Encyclopedia of India* to be published? I am perhaps most to blame for being so slow to master my computer, without which, however, a project as large as this one might have taken fifty years, rather than five.

I must first of all thank Thomson/Gale executive vice president Frank Menchaca, whose persistence persuaded me five years ago to accept his invitation to tackle this job, after having just refused a similar invitation from another publisher. It was a tempting challenge, for if done properly it could be a most useful educational tool, one I should certainly be proud of helping to produce for the use of students and adults throughout the world interested in learning about India's remarkable civilization.

Frank persuaded me to fly to New York to meet with him and developmental director Hélène Potter in their Scribners/Macmillan office in 2000, and by the end of our lunch I tentatively said yes. But first I had to put together my editorial team of experts in those fields of Indian scholarship of which I knew much less than I did about Indian history. Happily, I was able to convince Distinguished Professor Raju ("George") Thomas to work with me, and he agreed to recruit scholars to write on India's government, politics, and military strategy. Soon after Raju joined, we were able to get Dr. Deena Khatkhate, who had served on the Board of the Reserve Bank of India and had worked for the World Bank, to cover the important fields of economics and finance. Professor Robert Brown, who teaches Indian art history at the University of California, Los Angeles, and is also a curator of Indian art at the Los Angeles County Museum of Art (LACMA), kindly agreed last year to write several key articles himself and to recruit some of America's finest Indian art history scholars, such as Professor Walter Spink of the University of Michigan and Dr. Stephen Markel, curator at LACMA, who, despite urgent and pressing prior commitments, agreed to help us. Let me thank them, since without their selfless assistance this project could not have been completed.

I must also thank each of the other fine author-scholars, numbering more than 200, who have written the 580 articles published in these four volumes. Organized alphabetically from Abdul Kalam to Zoroastrianism, the topics embrace all of India—not just its history of over 4,000 years, or its geography and ethnography, but its Buddhist art and Deccani painting, the economic burden of its defense and external debt policy, its Hindu Tantric deities, human rights, industrial growth, judicial system, languages and scripts, medical science education, modern and contemporary art, nuclear programs and policies, planning commission, Rāmāyaṇa, Mahābhārata, *satyagraha*, scheduled tribes, secularism, theater, trade liberalization, women's education, and Yoga. We have tried our best to fill these volumes with the most accurate, comprehensive, readable series of articles on India, each of which is signed by its author and includes a bibliography and cross-references to related pieces for readers eager to delve deeper into any topic, all of which are ultimately related, each but a facet of India's singularly scintillating, remarkable civilization. More than 300 images illustrate the articles and there are four unique color inserts, one per volume, highlighting Indian art, architecture and sculpture; contemporary life; handicrafts; and the physical environment. Readers will also find supplementary materials to aid their research: The front matter includes a thematic outline of contents and chronologies detailing India's long history, and the back matter in volume four includes a selection of primary source documents, a general bibliography, a glossary of terms, and a comprehensive index.

Not all the scholars with whom we started this educational journey long years ago have remained with us till the end. Several old friends were unable to write the pieces they contracted for, and I regret that they could not be with us at the finish line. Dr. Pran Chopra—who together with his brilliant wife, Dr. Prabha Chopra, kindly agreed to write the important article on Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, whose papers they both so carefully edited—died last year in New Delhi, before he could see a final copy of their biography. Dr. Prabha Chopra courageously worked on to complete the task they had begun together,

and I thank her for her karma-yogic cooperation, as I regretfully posthumously thank her dear husband, my good friend, Doctor Pran.

I want specially to thank all my former students, now dear colleagues and friends, who so generously gave of their energies and talents in writing many articles for this encyclopedia. Some were more prompt than others in completing their pieces, yet all did at last finish, and each article was well done. Our publisher's first editor, Sarah Turner, was most helpful for two years, when she had to fly home to England. I thank Sarah for her hard work and hope she finds time to read these final versions of articles she helped launch. For the past two years, Andrea K. Henderson, our brilliant and efficient senior editor at Thomson/Gale, who replaced Sarah, has been so diligent, kind, and helpful in every aspect of this arduous, time-consuming job of contracting for and editing 1 million words, that I can hardly thank her enough. I must also thank our meticulous copyeditor, Dorothy Bauhoff, proofreader Amy Unterburger, and senior editors Dana Barnes, Shawn Corridor, and Jan Klisz, who all helped us to finish on schedule.

Hélène Potter has been deeply committed to this *Encyclopedia of India* from its conception to completion, and her brilliant creative intellect and wealth of practical experience have been invaluable to us at every stage in this process.

Finally, let me thank my dearest wife, Dorothy, without whose confidence, unfailing support, and ever-cheerful love throughout the last five years, I should never have undertaken or been able to complete this most challenging job of my life.

Stanley Wolpert
28 July 2005



list of articles

A

Abdul Kalam, Avul Pakir Jainulabdeen (A.P.J.)
Advani, Lal Krishna
Aesthetics
Afghani, Jamal-ud-din
Afghanistan
Afghanistan, Military Relations with, 1994–2001
Agni
Agra
Agricultural Growth and Diversification since 1991
Agricultural Labor and Wages since 1950
Agricultural Prices and Production, 1757–1947
Agricultural Wages, Labor, and Employment since 1757
Ahmedabad
AIDS/HIV
Ajanta
Akbar
Akkamahādēvi
Ālāp
Albuquerque, Afonso de
Alexander the Great
Allahabad
All-India Muslim League
Ambedkar, B. R., and the Buddhist Dalits
Amritsar
Anand, Mulk Raj
Āndāl
Andhra Pradesh
Andrews, C. F.
Andy, S. Pulney
Anglo-Afghan Wars: War One (1838–1842)
Anglo-Afghan Wars: War Two (1878–1880)
Anglo-Afghan Wars: War Three (May–August 1919)
Armed Forces

Artha Shāstra
Arunachal Pradesh
Āryabhata
Āryabhatīya
Ārya Samāj
Ashtādhyāyī
Ashvamedha
Asian Development Bank (ADB), Relations with
Asiatic Societies of Bengal and Bombay
Assam
Astronomy
Auckland, Lord
Aurangzeb
Aurobindo, Sri
Avatāras of Vishnu, Images of
Ayodhya
Āyurveda
Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam
Azariah, Vedanayakam Samuel

B

Babur
Bactria
Bahadur Shah I
Balance of Payments: Exchange Rate Policy
Balance of Payments: Foreign Investment and the
Exchange Rate
Bālasarasvati, T.
Ballistic and Cruise Missile Development
Ballistic Missile Defenses
Baluchar Sari
Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier
“Bande Mataram”
Bandhani

LIST OF ARTICLES

Banerjea, Surendranath N.
 Bangalore
 Bangladesh
 Bank and Non-Bank Supervision
 Banking Sector Reform since 1991
 Barahmasa
 Baroda
 Bene Israel
 Bengal
 Bentinck, Lord William
 Bhabha, Homi
 Bhagavad Gītā
 Bhāgavata Purāṇa
 Bhajan
 Bhakti
 Bharat
 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
 Bhave, Vinoba
 Bhopal
 Bhubaneswar
 Bhūta
 Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali
 Bihar
 Bimbisara
 Biotechnology Revolution
 Bombay
 Bonnerji, Womesh C.
 Bose, Subhas Chandra
 Brahmacharya
 Brāhmaṇas
 Brahmo Samaj
 Brazil–India Relations
 British Crown Raj
 British East India Company Raj
 British Impact
 British India Office, The
 Brocade
 Bronzes: Early Images
 Bronzes: South Indian
 Buddha, Life of the
 Buddhism in Ancient India
 Buddhist Art in Andhra up to the Fourth Century
 Burma

C

Cabinet Mission Plan
 Calcutta
 Capital Market
 Caste and Democracy
 Caste System
 Central Banking, Developmental Aspects of
 Chaitanya
 Chalcolithic (Bronze) Age
 Chandigarh

Chatterji, Bankim Chandra
 Chaudhuri, Nirad C.
 Chelmsford, Lord
 Chidambaram
 China, Relations with
 Chola Dynasty
 Christian Impact on India, History of
 Cinema
 Civil-Military Relations
 Clive, Robert
 Commodity Markets
 Common Property Resources, Past and Present
 Congress Party
 Contract Farming
 Cornwallis, Lord
 Cripps, Sir Richard Stafford
 Curzon, Lord George

D

Dalhousie, Marquis of
 Dalits
 Dance Forms: An Introduction
 Dance Forms: Bharata Natyam
 Dance Forms: Kathak
 Dance Forms: Kathakali
 Dance Forms: Koodiyattam
 Dance Forms: Kuchipudi
 Dance Forms: Manipuri
 Dance Forms: Mohini Attam
 Dance Forms: Odissi
 Das, Chitta Ranjan
 Debt Markets
 Deccani Painting
 Demographic Trends since 1757
 Demography and Census-taking
 Desai, Morarji
 Development of Commercial Banking 1950–1990
 Development Politics
 Devī
 Devi, Siddheshvari
 Dharma Shāstra
 Dhrupad
 Diaspora: Economic Impact
 Diaspora: History of and Global Distribution
 Dīkshitar, Muttusvāmi
 Dīvālī
 Dravidian Parties
 Dubois, Jean-Antoine
 Dufferin, Lord
 Dundas, Henry
 Dupleix, Joseph François

E

Early Maritime Contacts

Economic Burden of Defense
 Economic Development, Importance of Institutions in
 and Social Aspects of
 Economic Policy and Change, 1800–1947
 Economic Policy Under Planning, Aspects of
 Economic Reforms and Center-State Relations
 Economic Reforms of 1991
 Economy Since the 1991 Economic Reforms
 Educational Institutions and Philosophies, Traditional
 and Modern
 Elephanta
 Ellenborough, Earl of
 Ellora (Elura)
 Elphinstone, Mountstuart
 Employment Structure
 Energy Politics and Policy
 Environmental Consciousness since 1800
 Ethnic Conflict
 Ethnic Peace Accords
 European Union, Relations with
 External Debt Policy, 1952–1990

F

Family Law and Cultural Pluralism
 Famines
 Federalism and Center-State Relations
 Feminism and Indian Nationalists
 Feudalism
 Filmīgīt
 Film Industry
 Finance Commission
 Fiscal System and Policy from 1858 to 1947
 Fiscal System and Policy since 1952
 Fitch, Ralph
 Folk Art
 Folk Dance
 Food Security
 Foreign Resources Inflow since 1991
 Forster, E. M.
 French East India Company
 French Impact
 Fundamental Rights

G

Galbraith, John Kenneth
 Gama, Vasco da
 Gandharan Art and Architecture
 Gandhi, Indira
 Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.
 Gandhi, Rajiv
 Gandhi, Sonia
 Gandhinagar
 Ganesha
 Gat-Tora

Gender and Human Rights
 General (National) Elections
 Geography
 Globalization
 Goa
 Goddess Images
 Gokhale, Gopal Krishna
 Government of India Act of 1919
 Government of India Act of 1935
 Gujarat
 Gujral, Inder Kumar
 Guptan Empire
 Guptan Period Art
 Guru Nanak

H

Haq, A. K. Fazlul
 Harappa
 Hardinge, Lord
 Harsha
 Hastings, Warren
 Health Care
 Health Care for Tourists
 Hindu Ancestor Rituals
 Hindu and Buddhist Thought in Western Philosophy
 Hinduism (Dharma)
 Hindu Nationalism
 Hindu Nationalist Parties
 Hindu Tantric Deities
 Hindutva and Politics
 History and Historiography
 Human Development Indicators
 Human Rights
 Humayun
 Hyderabad

I

Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs)
 India Office and India Office Library
 India's Impact on Western Civilization
 Indo-U.S. Relations, Cultural Changes in
 Indra
 Industrial Change since 1956
 Industrial Growth and Diversification
 Industrial Labor and Wages, 1800–1947
 Industrial Labor Market, Wages and Employment, since
 1950
 Industrial Policy since 1956
 Indus Valley Civilization
 Informal Credit Markets
 Information and Other Technology Development
 Infrastructure and Transportation, 1857–1947
 Infrastructure Development and Government Policy
 since 1950

LIST OF ARTICLES

Insurance Industry
 Insurgency and Terrorism
 Intellectual Property Rights
 Internal Public Debt, Growth and Composition of
 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Relations with
 Iqbal, Muhammad
 Irwin, Lord
 Islam
 Islam's Impact on India
 Israel, Relations with
 Ivory Carving

J

Jahangir
 Jain and Buddhist Manuscript Painting
 Jainism
 Jain Sculpture
 Jamdani
 Jammu and Kashmir
 Jammu and Ladakh
 Jamshedpur
 Japan, Relations with
 Jewelry
 Jews of India
 Jinnah, Mohammad Ali
 Jodhpur
 Judicial System, Modern

K

Kabir
 Kālidāsa
 Kāma Sūtra
 Kanpur
 Karachi
 Karaikkāl Ammaiyār
 Kargil Conflict, The
 Karnataka
 Kashmir
 Kashmir Painting
 Kashmir Shawls
 Kayasths
 Kerala, Coalition Politics
 Kerala, Model of Development
 Kerkar, Kesarbai
 Khajuraho
 Khan, Abdul Ghaffar
 Khan, Ali Akbar
 Khan, Liaquat Ali
 Khan, Vilayat
 Khayal
 Khusrau, Amir
 Kipling, Rudyard
 Kīrtana
 Krishna in Indian Art

Krishnamurti, Jiddu
 Kriti

L

Land Tenure from 1800 to 1947
 Land Tenure since 1950
 Languages and Scripts
 Lansdowne, Lord
 Large-scale Industry, 1850–1950
 Leaders, Christian
 Liberalization, Political Economy of
 Linlithgow, Lord
 Literature: Modern
 Literature: Tamil
 Love Stories

M

Macaulay, Thomas Babington
 Mādhaviah, A.
 Madras
 Madurai
 Magadha
 Mahābhārata
 Maharashtra
 Maldives and Bhutan, Relations with
 Mandal Commission Report
 Mangeshkar, Lata
 Manipur
 Maritime Commerce, 1750–1947
 Mauryan Empire
 Media
 Medical Science Education
 Medieval Temple Kingdoms
 Meghalaya
 Menon, V.K. Krishna
 Metalware
 Military Interventions in South Asia
 Miniatures: Bikaner
 Miniatures: Bundi
 Miniatures: Central India
 Miniatures: Harem Scenes
 Miniatures: Kishangarh
 Miniatures: Kotah
 Miniatures: Marwar and Thikanas
 Minto, Lord
 Mīrabai
 Mizoram
 Modern and Contemporary Art
 Mohenjo-Daro
 Monetary Policy from 1952 to 1991
 Monetary Policy since 1991
 Money and Credit, 1858–1947
 Money and Foreign Exchange Markets
 Montagu, Edwin S.

Monuments: Eastern India
 Monuments: Mughal
 Monuments: Southern India
 Monuments: Western India
 Morley, John
 Mountbatten, Lord
 Mughal Painting
 Mughal Painting, Later
 Music: An Introduction
 Music: Karnātak
 Music: South India
 Muslim Law and Judicial Reform
 Muslims
 Mutual Funds, Role of
 Mysore

N

Nabob Game
 Nagas and Nagaland
 Naidu, Sarojini
 Nainsukh
 Naoroji, Dadabhai
 Narayan, Jaya Prakash
 Narayan, R. K.
 Narayanan, K. R.
 National Security Decision-Making
 Nātya Shāstra
 Nehru, Jawaharlal
 Nehru, Motilal
 Neolithic Period
 Nepal
 Nepal, Relations with
 New Delhi
 Nightingale, Florence
 Nizam of Hyderabad
 Nobili, Robert de
 Non-banking Financial Institutions, Growth of
 Northeast States, The
 Nuclear Programs and Policies
 Nuclear Weapons Testing and Development
 Nyāya

P

Paithani
 Pakistan
 Pakistan and India
 Palaeolithic Period
 Pandit, Vijaya Lakshmi
 Pandita Ramabai
 Pānini
 Pant, Govind Ballabh
 Papermaking
 Paramilitary Forces and Internal Security
 Parsis

Patanjali
 Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai
 Patna
 Patola
 Paul, K. T.
 Pension Funds and Social Security
 Peshwai and Pentarchy
 Pillai, Samuel Vedanayakam
 Pingala
 Planning Commission
 Political System: Cabinet
 Political System: Constitution
 Political System: Parliament
 Political System: President
 Political System: Prime Minister
 Population, Gender Ratio of
 Portuguese in India
 Poverty and Inequality
 Prasad, Rajendra
 Premchand
 Presidents of India
 Price Movements and Fluctuations since 1860
 Prime Ministers of India
 Princely States
 Private Industrial Sector, Role of
 Public Debt of States, since 1950
 Public Expenditures
 Punjab

Q

Qawwālī

R

Rabban, Joseph
 Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli
 Rāga
 Rāgamālā
 Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur
 Rajagopalachari, Chakravarti
 Rajneesh, Osho
 Rajput (Western, Central, and Hill) Painting
 Ramananda
 Rāmānuja
 Rāmāyaṇa
 Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata Paintings
 Ranade, Mahadev Govind
 Rangōli
 Ray, Satyajit
 Reading, Lord
 Reddi, Muthulakshmi
 Reserve Bank of India, Evolution of
 Ripon, Lord
 Rishi
 Rock Art

LIST OF ARTICLES

Roy, Ram Mohan
Rural Credit, Evolution of since 1952
Russia, Relations with

S

Sabhas and Samitis
Saṃskāra
Sāṅkhya
Sarod
Sassoon, David
Satyagraha
Saving and Investment Trends since 1950
Sayyid Ahmed Khan and the Aligarh Movement
Scheduled Tribes
Science
Scientists of Indian Origin and Their Contributions
Sculpture: Buddhist
Sculpture: Kushana
Sculpture: Mauryan and Shungan
Sculpture and Bronze Images from Kashmir
Secularism
Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI)
Selected Macroeconomic Models
Shah Bano Case
Shah Jahan
Shankar, Ravi
Shankara
Shiva and Shaivism
Shivaji Bhonsle and heirs
Shiv Sena
Shore, Sir John
Shrauta Sūtras
Shreni
Shulba Sūtras (Vedāṅgas)
Shyāma Shāstri
Sikh Institutions and Parties
Sikhism
Simla
Sind
Singh, Bhagat
Singh, Maharaja Ranjit
Singh, Manmohan
Singh, Sadhu Sundar
Sirohi School Painting
Sitar
Size and Capital Intensity of Indian Industry since 1950
Small-Scale and Cottage Industry, 1800–1947
Small-Scale Industry, since 1947
Soma
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
South Asian Economic Cooperation
Southeast Asia, Relations with
Space Program

Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka, Relations with
State Finances since 1952
State Formation
State-Level Performance since Reforms of 1991
Step-Wells of India
Stock Exchange Markets
Strategic Thought
Subbalakshmi Ammal, R.S.
Subbulakshmi, M. S.
Subsidies in the Federal Budget
Sultanate Painting
Sultante-Period Architecture of South Asia

T

Tabla
Tagore, Rabindranath
Tāla
Tanchoi
Tansen
Tantric Buddhist Images
Tapas
Tata, Jamsetji N.
Taxation Policy since 1991 Economic Reforms
Technical Change in Agriculture, 1952–2000
Temple Types (Styles) of India
Textiles: Block-Printed
Textiles: Early Painted and Printed
Textiles: Karuppur
Theater
Theosophical Society
Thumrī
Tibetan Buddhists of India
Tilak, Bal Gangadhar
Trade Liberalization since 1991
Trade Policy, 1800–1947
Tribal Peoples of Eastern India
Tribal Politics
Tripura
Tyāgarāja

U

Underground Economy, Dimensions of
United States, Relations with
Upanishadic Philosophy
Urbanism

V

Vaisheshika
Vajpayee, Atal Bihari
Varanasi
Varuṇa
Vedāṅga Jyotisha

Vedic Aryan India
Vina
Vishnu and Avatāras
Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)
Vivekananda, Swami

W

Wars, Modern
Wavell, Lord
Weapons Production and Procurement
Wellesley, Richard Colley
Women and Political Power
Women's Education
Women's Indian Association

World Bank (WB), Relations with
World Trade Organization (WTO), Relations with

X

Xavier, Francis

Y

Yajña
Yājñavalkya
Yajur Veda
Yoga

Z

Zoroastrianism



thematic outline of contents

ARTS

Aesthetics
Jewelry
Papermaking
Subbalakshmi, M.S.
Tanchoi
Tansen
Theater

Buddhist

Buddha, Life of the
Buddhism in Ancient India
Buddhist Art in Andhra up to the Fourth Century
Sculpture: Buddhist
Tantric Buddhist Images

Caves

Ajanta
Elephanta
Ellora (Elura)
Monuments: Western India
Rock Art
Sculpture: Mauryan and Shungan

Dance

Dance Forms: An Introduction
Dance Forms: Bharata Natyam
Dance Forms: Kathak
Dance Forms: Kathakali
Dance Forms: Koodiyattam
Dance Forms: Kuchipudi
Dance Forms: Manipuri
Dance Forms: Mohini Attam
Dance Forms: Odissi
Folk Dance

Nāṭya Shāstra
Reddi, Muthulakshmi

Fabrics

Baluchar Sari
Bandhani
Barahmasa
Brocade
Jamdani
Kashmir Shawls
Paithani
Patola
Textiles: Block-Printed
Textiles: Early Painted and Printed
Textiles: Karuppur

Literature

Kāma Sūtra
Literature: Modern
Literature: Tamil
Narayan, R.K.
Tagore, Rabindranath

Modern Cinema

Cinema
Film Industry
Media
Ray, Satyajit

Music

Ālāp
Bande Mataram
Bhajan
Dhrupad
Filmīgīt
Gat-Tora

Khayal
Kīrtana
Kṛiti
Music: An Introduction
Music: Karnātak
Music: South India
Nāṭya Shāstra
Pīṅgala
Qawwālī
Rāga
Sarod
Sitar
Subbalakshmi Ammal, R.S.
Tabla
Tāla
Thumrī
Vina

Paintings

Deccani Painting
Jain and Buddhist Manuscript Painting
Kashmir Painting
Miniatures: Bikaner
Miniatures: Bundi
Miniatures: Central India
Miniatures: Harem Scenes
Miniatures: Kishangarh
Miniatures: Kotah
Miniatures: Marwar and Thikana
Modern and Contemporary Art
Mughal Painting
Mughal Painting, Later
Nainsukh
Rāgamālā
Rajput (Western, Central, and Hill) Painting
Sirohi School Painting
Sultanate Painting
Sultanate-Period Architecture of South Asia

Palaces

Monuments: Mughal
Monuments: Southern India

Religious

Jain and Buddhist Manuscript Painting
Jain Sculpture
Krishna in Indian Art
Mangeshkar, Lata
Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata Paintings
Rangōli
Step-Wells of India

Sculpture

Bronzes: Early Images
Bronzes: South Indian
Guptan Period Art

Gandharan Art and Architecture
Goddess Images
Ivory Carving
Jain Sculpture
Metalware
Sculpture: Kushana
Sculpture: Mauryan and Shungan
Sculpture and Bronze Images from Kashmir

Temples

Chidambaram
Guptan Period Art
Khajuraho
Medieval Temple Kingdoms
Monuments: Eastern India
Monuments: Southern India
Monuments: Western India
Temple Types (Styles) of India

Tribal

Baluchar Sari
Folk Art

BIOGRAPHIES

Florence Nightingale
Ray, Satyajit
Roy, Ram Mohan
Shyāma Shāstri
Tata, Jamsetji N.

Authors

Anand, Mulk Raj
Chatterji, Bankim Chandra
Chaudhuri, Nirad C.
Forster, E.M.
Kālidāsa
Kipling, Rudyard
Naidu, Sarojini
Narayan, R.K.
Nehru, Jawaharlal
Premchand
Tagore, Rabindranath

British Cabinet Ministers

Montagu, Edwin S.
Morley, John

Governors-General

Auckland, Lord
Bentinck, Lord William
Chelmsford, Lord
Cornwallis, Lord
Curzon, Lord George
Dalhousie, Marquis of
Dufferin, Lord
Ellenborough, Earl of

Hardinge, Lord
 Hastings, Warren
 Irwin, Lord
 Lansdowne, Lord
 Linlithgow, Lord
 Minto, Lord
 Mountbatten, Lord
 Reading, Lord
 Ripon, Lord
 Shore, Sir John
 Wavell, Lord
 Wellesley, Richard Colley

Great Mughal Emperors

Akbar
 Aurangzeb
 Babur
 Bahadur Shah I

Kings

Bimbisara
 Harsha
 Humayun
 Khusrau, Amir
 Nizam of Hyderabad
 Shah Jahan
 Singh, Maharaja Ranjit

Martial Heroes

Albuquerque, Afonso de
 Alexander the Great
 Clive, Robert
 Dupleix, Joseph François
 Elphinstone, Mountstuart
 Fitch, Ralph
 Gama, Vasco da
 Jahangir
 Nizam of Hyderabad

Musicians

Akkamahādēvi
 Bālasarasvati, T.
 Devi, Siddheshvari
 Khan, Ali Akbar
 Khan, Vilayat
 Shankar, Ravi

Philosophers

Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli
 Vivekananda, Swami

Politicians

Abdul Kalam, Avul Pakir Jainulabdeen (A.P.J.)
 Advani, Lal Krishna
 Ambedkar, B. R., and the Buddhist Dalits
 Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam
 Banerjea, Surendranath N.

Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali
 Bonnerji, Womesh C.
 Bose, Subhas Chandra
 Das, Chitta Ranjan
 Desai Morarji
 Dikshitar, Muttusvāmi
 Galbraith, John Kenneth
 Gandhi, Indira
 Gandhi, Rajiv
 Gandhi, Sonia
 Gokhale, Gopal Krishna
 Gujral, Inder Kumar
 Haq, A.K. Fazlul
 Jinnah, Mohammad Ali
 Khan, Abdul Ghaffar
 Khan, Liaquat Ali
 Macaulay, Thomas Babington
 Menon, V.K. Krishna
 Montagu, Edwin S.
 Morley, John
 Naidu, Sarojini
 Naoroji, Dadabhai
 Narayan, Jaya Prakash
 Narayanan, K.R.
 Nehru, Jawaharlal
 Nehru, Motilal
 Pandit, Vijaya Lakshmi
 Pant, Govind Ballabh
 Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai
 Prasad, Rajendra
 Presidents of India
 Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli
 Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur
 Rajagopalachari, Chakravarti
 Ranade, Mahadev Govind
 Sayyid Ahmed Khan and the Aligarh Movement
 Shivaji Bhonsle and heirs
 Singh, Bhagat
 Singh, Manmohan
 Tilak, Bal Gangadhar
 Vajpayee, Atal Bihari

Religious Figures

Afghani, Jamal-ud-din
 Andrews, C. F.
 Andy, S. Pulney
 Aurobindo, Sri
 Azariah, Vedanayakam Samuel
 Bhave, Vinoba
 Dubois, Jean-Antoine
 Gandhi, Mahatma M.K.
 Indra
 Iqbal, Muhammad
 Kabir

Karaikkāl Ammaiyār
Kerkar, Kesarbai
Krishnamurti, Jiddu
Mādhaviah, A.
Mīrabai
Nobili, Robert de
Pandita, Ramabai
Paul, K.T.
Pillai, Samuel Vedanayakam
Rabban, Joseph
Rajneesh, Osho
Sassoon, David
Singh, Sadhu Sundar
Vivekananda, Swami
Xavier, Francis

Scientists

Āryabhata
Bhabha, Homi
Chaitanya
Guru Nanak
Pānini
Patanjali

BRITISH RAJ

Company Era

British East India Company Raj
Cripps, Sir Richard Stafford
Dundas, Henry

Imperial Crown

British Crown Raj
British India Office, The
Cabinet Mission Plan
India Office and India Office Library
Princely States
Roy, Ram Mohan
Wellesley, Richard Colley

DEMOGRAPHY

Demographic Trends since 1757
Demography and Census-taking
Population, Gender Ratio of

ECONOMY

Agricultural Growth and Diversification since 1991
Agricultural Labor and Wages since 1950
Agricultural Prices and Production, 1757–1947
Agricultural Wages, Labor, and Employment since 1757
Common Property Resources, Past and Present
Contract Farming
Diaspora: Economic Impact
Economic Development, Importance of Institutions in
and Social Aspects of
Economic Policy and Change, 1800–1947

Economic Policy Under Planning, Aspects of
Economic Reforms of 1991
Economy Since the 1991 Economic Reforms
Energy Politics and Policy
Famines
Food Security
Globalization
Industrial Change since 1956
Industrial Growth and Diversification
Industrial Labor and Wages, 1800–1947
Industrial Policy since 1956
Information and Other Technology Development
Infrastructure and Transportation, 1857–1947
Infrastructure Development and Government Policy
since 1950
Intellectual Property Rights
Jamshedpur
Kerala Model of Development
Land Tenure from 1800 to 1947
Land Tenure since 1950
Large-scale Industry, 1850–1950
Liberalization, Political Economy of
Maritime Commerce, 1750–1947
Planning Commission
Poverty and Inequality
Price Movements and Fluctuations since 1860
Private Industrial Sector, Role of
Public Expenditures
Rural Credit, Evolution of since 1952
Size and Capital Intensity of Indian Industry since 1950
Small-Scale and Cottage Industry, 1800–1947
State Finances since 1952
State-Level Performance since Reforms of 1991
Subsidies in the Federal Budget
Technical Change in Agriculture, 1952–2000
Trade Liberalization since 1991
Underground Economy, Dimensions of

EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTIONS

Educational Institutions and Philosophies, Traditional
and Modern
Indian Institutes of Technology (ITTs)
Information and Other Technology Development
Medical Science Education
Women's Education

FEUDALISM

Feudalism

FINANCES AND FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

Asian Development Bank (ADB), Relations with
Balance of Payments: Exchange Rate Policy
Balance of Payments: Foreign Investment and the
Exchange Rate

Bank and Non-Bank Supervision
 Banking Sector Reform since 1991
 Capital Market
 Central Banking, Developmental Aspects of
 Commodity Markets
 Debt Markets
 Development of Commercial Banking 1950–1990
 Employment Structure
 External Debt Policy, 1952–1990
 Finance Commission
 Fiscal System and Policy from 1858 to 1947
 Fiscal System and Policy since 1952
 Foreign Resources Inflow since 1991
 Globalization
 Industrial Change since 1956
 Industrial Growth and Diversification
 Industrial Labor and Wages, 1800–1947
 Industrial Labor Market, Wages and Employment, since 1950
 Industrial Policy since 1956
 Informal Credit Markets
 Infrastructure Development and Government Policy since 1950
 Insurance Industry
 Internal Public Debt, Growth and Composition of
 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Relations with
 Monetary Policy from 1952 to 1991
 Monetary Policy since 1991
 Money and Credit, 1858–1947
 Money and Foreign Exchange Markets
 Mutual Funds, Role of
 Non-banking Financial Institutions, Growth of
 Pension Funds and Social Security
 Price Movements and Fluctuations since 1860
 Private Industrial Sector, Role of
 Public Debt of States, since 1950
 Public Expenditures
 Reserve Bank of India, Evolution of
 Rural Credit, Evolution of since 1952
 Saving and Investment Trends since 1950
 Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI)
 Selected Macroeconomic Models
 Size and Capital Intensity of Indian Industry since 1950
 Small-Scale and Cottage Industry, 1800–1947
 Small-Scale Industry, since 1947
 State Finances since 1952
 Stock Exchange Markets
 Subsidies in the Federal Budget
 Taxation Policy since 1991 Economic Reforms
 Technical Change in Agriculture, 1952–2000
 Trade Liberalization since 1991
 Trade Policy, 1800–1947
 Underground Economy, Dimensions of
 World Bank (WB), Relations with
 World Trade Organization (WTO), Relations with

GEOGRAPHY

Geography

Countries

Afghanistan
 Bangladesh
 Bharat
 Burma
 Nepal

Provinces or States

Andhra Pradesh
 Arunachal Pradesh
 Assam
 Bactria
 Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier
 Baroda
 Bengal
 Bihar
 Chola Dynasty
 Goa
 Hyderabad
 Jammu and Kashmir
 Jammu and Ladakh
 Jodhpur
 Karnataka
 Kashmir
 Kerala, Coalition Politics
 Kerala, Model of Development
 Madurai
 Magadha
 Maharashtra
 Manipur
 Meghalaya
 Mizoram
 Mysore
 Nagas and Nagaland
 Northeast States, The
 Patna
 Princely States
 Punjab
 Sind
 State Formation
 Tribal Peoples of Eastern India
 Tripura

Urban Cities

Agra
 Ahmedabad
 Allahabad
 Amritsar
 Ayodhya
 Bangalore
 Bhopal
 Bhubaneswar

Bombay
Calcutta
Chandigarh
Gandhinagar
Gujarat
Jamshedpur
Kanpur
Karachi
Madras
New Delhi
Simla
Urbanism
Varanasi

GOVERNMENT OF INDIA

Abdul Kalam, Avul Pakir Jainulabdeen (A.P.J.)
Civil-Military Relations
Federalism and Center-State Relations
Government of India Act of 1919
Government of India Act of 1935
National Security Decision-Making
Nuclear Programs and Policies
Nuclear Weapons Testing and Development
Paramilitary Forces and Internal Security
Pension Funds and Social Security
Planning Commission
Political System: Cabinet
Political System: Constitution
Political System: Parliament
Political System: President
Political System: Prime Minister
Presidents of India
Prime Ministers of India
Secularism
Singh, Manmohan
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
South Asian Economic Cooperation
Sri Lanka, Relations with
State Formation
Tribal Peoples of Eastern India
United States, Relations with
Wars, Modern
Weapons Production and Procurement

HISTORY

Chidambaram
Guptan Empire
History and Historiography
Magadha
Maharashtra
Mauryan Empire
Medieval Temple Kingdoms
Nabob Game

Neolithic Period
Paleolithic Period
Peshwai and Pentarchy
Portuguese in India
Sayyid Ahmed Khan and the Aligarh Movement
Sculpture: Mauryan and Shungan
Shivaji Bhonsle and heirs
Vedic Aryan India

HEALTH AND MEDICINE

AIDS/HIV
Āyurveda
Health Care
Health Care for Tourists
Medical Science Education

INDUS VALLEY CIVILIZATION

Chalcolithic (Bronze) Age
Harappa
Indus Valley Civilization
Mohenjo-Daro

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Afghanistan
Asiatic Societies of Bengal and Bombay
Brazil-India Relations
British Impact
China, Relations with
Diaspora: History of and Global Distribution
Early Maritime Contacts
European Union, Relations with
French East India Company
French Impact
Hindu and Buddhist Thought in Western Philosophy
India's Impact on Western Civilization
Indo-U.S. Relations, Cultural Changes in
Israel, Relations with
Japan, Relations with
Maldives and Bhutan, Relations with
Maritime Commerce, 1750-1947
Money and Foreign Exchange Markets
Nepal
Nepal, Relations with
Pakistan
Pakistan and India
Russia, Relations with
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC)
South Asian Economic Cooperation
Southeast Asia, Relations with
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka, Relations with
Trade Liberalization since 1991
Trade Policy, 1800-1947

United States, Relations with
Wars, Modern
World Bank (WB), Relations with
World Trade Organization (WTO), Relations with

LANGUAGES

Languages and Scripts
Literature: Tamil
Pānini
Patanjali
Premchand

MILITARY AND WARFARE

Afghanistan, Military Relations with, 1994–2001
Anglo-Afghan Wars: War One (1838–1842)
Anglo-Afghan Wars: War Two (1878–1880)
Anglo-Afghan Wars: War Three (May–August 1919)
Armed Forces
Ballistic and Cruise Missile Development
Ballistic Missile Defenses
Economic Burden of Defense
Insurgency and Terrorism
Jammu and Kashmir
Kargil Conflict, The
Kashmir
Military Interventions in South Asia
National Security Decision-Making
Nuclear Programs and Policies
Nuclear Weapons Testing and Development
Paramilitary Forces and Internal Security
Space Program
Strategic Thought
Wars, Modern

NATIONALIST MOVEMENT

Aurobindo, Sri
Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam
Bande Mataram
Banerjea, Surendranath N.
Bhave, Vinoba
Bonnerji, Womesh C.
Bose, Subhas Chandra
Chatterji, Bankim Chandra
Congress Party
Desai Morarji
Gandhi, Mahatma M.K.
Gokhale, Gopal Krishna
Gujral, Inder Kumar
Hindu Nationalism
Hindu Nationalist Parties
Jinnah, Mohammad Ali
Menon, V.K. Krishna
Naidu, Sarojini
Naoroji, Dadabhai

Narayan, Jaya Prakash
Nehru, Jawaharlal
Nehru, Motilal
Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai
Prasad, Rajendra
Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli
Rajagopalachari, Chakravarti
Ranade, Mahadev Govind
Satyagraha
Secularism
Singh, Bhagat
Tilak, Bal Gangadhar

PARTIES AND POLITICS

All-India Muslim League
Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
Congress Party
Development Politics
Dravidian Parties
Hindu Nationalism
Hindu Nationalist Parties
Hinduvta and Politics
Kerala, Coalition Politics
Liberalization, Political Economy of
Political System: Cabinet
Political System: Parliament
Political System: Prime Minister
Shiv Sena
Sikh Institutions and Parties
Tribal Politics
Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)
Women and Political Power

RELIGION

Bene Israel
Bhakti

Buddhist

Ajanta
Ellora (Elura)
Tantric Buddhist Images
Tibetan Buddhists of India

Christian

Andrews, C. F.
Andy, S. Pulney
Christian Impact on India, History of
Leaders, Christian
Nobili, Robert de
Paul, K.T.
Pillai, Samuel Vedanayakam
Singh, Sadhu Sundar
Xavier, Francis

Hindu

Āṇḍal

Ashvamedha
 Avatāras of Vishnu, Images of
 Bhuta
 Chidambaram
 Hindu Ancestor Rituals
 Hinduism (Dharma)
 Hindu Nationalism
 Hindu Nationalist Parties
 Hindu Tantric Deities
 Khajuraho
 Love stories
 Rishi
 Saṃskāra
 Shankara
 Shiva
 Step-Wells of India
 Tyāgarāja
 Upanishadic Philosophy
 Vaisheshika
 Varanasi
 Vedānga Jyotisha
 Vedic Aryan India
 Yajur Veda
 Yajña
 Yājñavalkya
 Yoga

Ashramas

Brahmacarya

Gods

Agni
 Ārya Samāj
 Devī
 Gaṇesha
 Shiva
 Soma
 Varuṇa
 Vishnu and Avatāras

Holidays

Dīvālī

Societies

Ārya Samāj
 Brahmo Samaj
 Sabhas and Samitis
 Shiv Sena
 Shreni
 Theophysical Society
 Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)

Texts

Artha Shāstra
 Bhagavad Gītā
 Bhāgavata Purāṇa
 Brāhmaṇas

Dharma Shāstra
 Kāma Sūtra
 Mahābhārata
 Nāṭya Shāstra
 Rāmāyaṇa
 Shrauta Sutras
 Shulba Sūtras (Vedāngas)

Islamic

Islam
 Islam's Impact on India
 Muslim Law and Judicial Reform
 Muslims
 Sayyid Ahmed Khan and the Aligarh Movement
 Shah Bano Case

Jain

Ajanta
 Ellora (Elura)
 Jain and Buddhist Manuscript Painting
 Jainism

Jewish

Jews of India
 Sassoon, David

Parsi

Parsis
 Zoroastrianism

Sikh

Sikh Institutions and Parties
 Sikhism
 Singh, Maharaja Ranjit

PHILOSOPHY

Nyāya
 Ramananda
 Rāmānuja
 Sāṅkhya
 Shankara
 Tapas
 Upanishadic Philosophy
 Vaisheshika
 Yājñavalkya
 Yoga

SCIENCE

Āryabhatīya
 Ashtādhyāyī
 Astronomy
 Biotechnology Revolution
 Indian Institutes of Technology (ITTs)
 Information and Other Technology Development
 Patanjali
 Science

Scientists of Indian Origin and Their Contributions
Vedānga Jyotisha

SOCIAL RELATIONS

Environmental Consciousness since 1800
Fundamental Rights
Human Development Indicators
Human Rights
Intellectual Property Rights
Kayasths
Poverty and Inequality

Caste System

Caste and Democracy
Caste System

Dalits

Ambedkar, B. R., and the Buddhist Dalits
Dalits
Mandal Commission Report
Scheduled Tribes

Ethnic Conflict

Ethnic Conflict

Ethnic Peace Accords
Kashmir

Family Law

Muslim Law and Judicial Reform
Family Law and Cultural Pluralism

Judicial System

Judicial System, Modern

WOMEN

Feminism and Indian Nationalists
Gender and Human Rights
Goddess Images
Mirabai
Naidu, Sarojini
Pandit, Vijaya Lakshmi
Pandita, Ramabai
Population, Gender Ratio of
Women and Political Power
Women's Education
Women's Indian Association



directory of contributors

Amitav Acharya

*Nanyang Technological University, Singapore
Professor, Institute of Defence and Strategic Studies
Southeast Asia, Relations with*

Shankar Acharya

*Indian Council for Research on International Economic
Relations
Member, Board of Governors and honorary professor
Economy Since the 1991 Economic Reforms*

Yashodhara Agarwal

*Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi, India
Assistant curator, textile and decorative arts, Bharat Kala
Bhavan
Brocade*

Isher Ahluwalia

*Director, Indian Council for Research on International
Economic Relations, New Delhi, India
Industrial Policy since 1956*

Montek Ahluwalia

*Government of India
Deputy chairman, Planning Commission
Banking Sector Reform since 1991
State-Level Performance since Reforms of 1991*

Akbar Ahmed

*The American University, Washington, D.C.
Ibn Khaldun Chair of Islamic Studies, School of
International Service
Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier
Islam's Impact on India*

Rajeev Ahuja

*Indian Council for Research on International Economic
Relations*

Senior research fellow

Insurance Industry

Daud Ali

*University of London, School of Oriental and African Studies
Senior lecturer in Indian history, Department of History
Feudalism
Guptan Empire
Harsha
Kāma Sūtra
Literature: Tamil
Mauryan Empire
Medieval Temple Kingdoms*

Pravin Anand

*Anand and Anand Law Firm, New Delhi, India
Intellectual Property Rights*

Walter Andersen

*Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International
Studies
Associate director, Department of South Asia Studies
Hindu Nationalism*

Shridhar Andhare

*Honorary director, Lalbbhai Dalpatbhai Museum
Barahmasa
Miniatures: Bundi
Miniatures: Kotah
Sirohi School Painting*

Prema-chandra Athukorala

*Australian National University
Professor of Economics, Division of Economics and Australia
South Asia Research Centre
Saving and Investment Trends since 1950*

Amaresh Bagchi

National Institute of Finance and Public Policy, New Delhi
Emeritus professor
 Finance Commission
 Fiscal System and Policy since 1952

Gopalan Balachandran

Graduate Institute of International Studies, Geneva
Professor, Department of International History and Politics
 Maritime Commerce, 1750–1947

Dipankar Banerjee

Retired major general of the Indian army
Former specialist of the U.S. Institute of Peace
 Civil-Military Relations
 Insurgency and Terrorism

Debashish Banerji

Culver City, California
Independent scholar
 Modern and Contemporary Art

Poonam Sethi Barua

Director, Public Affairs Management, New Delhi
 South Asian Economic Cooperation

Dilip Basu

University of California, Santa Cruz
Director, Satyajit Ray Film and Study Collection
 Aurobindo, Sri
 Banerjee, Surendranath N.
 Chaudhuri, Nirad C.
 Das, Chitta Ranjan
 Haq, A. K. Fazlul
 Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur
 Ray, Satyajit
 Tagore, Rabindranath

Kaushik Basu

Cornell University
Professor, Department of Economics
 Economic Development, Importance of Institutions in
 and Social Aspects of

Chandi Batliwalla

Reserve Bank of India
Consultant to Reserve Bank of India History Project
 International Monetary Fund (IMF), Relations with

Kurt Behrendt

Temple University
Department of Art History
 Gandharan Art and Architecture

Douglas L. Berger

Oakton College, Des Plaines, Illinois
Assistant professor, Department of Humanities and
Philosophy
 Hindu and Buddhist Thought in Western Philosophy

Surjit Bhalla

Oxus Research and Investments, New Delhi, India
 Poverty and Inequality

Vinayak Bhatt

Bethesda, Maryland
 Economic Policy and Change, 1800–1947

Gouriswar Bhattacharya

Free University Berlin
Institute of Indian Philology and Art History
 Tantric Buddhist Images

Pia Brancaccio

Drexel University, Philadelphia
Assistant professor, Department of Visual Studies
 Elephanta
 Ellora (Elura)

Robert L. Brown

University of California, Los Angeles
Professor, Department of Art History
 Buddha, Life of the
 Guptan Period Art

Rani Day Burra

Mumbai, India
Freelance film magazine editor and animation filmmaker
 Cinema

Gerald Carney

Hampden-Sydney College
Professor of religion
 Chaitanya

Maya Chadda

William Paterson University of New Jersey
Professor, Department of Political Science
 Ethnic Conflict

R. Champakalakshmi

Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi, India
Former professor of history
 Monuments: Southern India

Rupa Chanda

Indian Institute of Management, Bangalore
Professor, Department of Economics and Social Sciences
 World Trade Organization (WTO), Relations with

Anand Chandavarkar

Washington, D.C.
Independent scholar
 Money and Credit, 1858–1947

Padmanabha R. Chari

Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi
Research professor
 Economic Burden of Defense
 Weapons Production and Procurement

Saumen Chattopadhyay

Jawaharlal Nehru University

Associate professor, School of Social Sciences

Underground Economy, Dimensions of

Raja J. Chelliah

Chairman, Madras School of Economics, Chennai, India

Economic Reforms and Center-State Relations

Prabha Chopra

New Delhi, India

Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai

Pran Chopra

deceased

Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai

Stephen P. Cohen

The Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.

Senior fellow, Foreign Policy Studies Program

Pakistan and India

Daniel Consolatore

Johns Hopkins University, School of Advanced International Studies

Research assistant, South Asia studies

Hindu Nationalism

Rosemary Crill

Victoria & Albert Museum, London

Senior curator, South Asia, Asian Department

Miniatures: Marwar and Thikanas

Vasudha Dalmia

University of California, Berkeley

Professor, Department of South and Southeast Asian Studies

Premchand

D. R. Das

Dt. Hooghly, West Bengal, India

Monuments: Eastern India

Pramoda N. Das

Patna University

Associate professor, Department of History

Judicial System, Modern

Sunil Dasgupta

Georgetown University

Visiting assistant professor, Security Studies Program,

Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service

Paramilitary Forces and Internal Security

Jayati Datta Mitra

Bethesda, Maryland

Independent scholar

Population, Gender Ratio of

Bibek Debroy

Director, Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies

Human Development Indicators

Private Industrial Sector, Role of

Robert DeCaroli

George Mason University

Professor, history and art history

Sculpture: Buddhist

Ashok V. Desai

Business World, New Delhi

Consultant editor

Information and Other Technology Development

Devangana Desai

Journal editor, The Asiatic Society of Mumbai

Khajuraho

Kalpana S. Desai

Director, Chhatrapati Shivaji Maharaj Vastu Sangrahalaya

(formerly Prince of Wales Museum of Western India, Mumbai)

Baluchar Sari

Love stories

Miniatures: Harem Scenes

Rāgamālā

Tanchoi

Tansen

Mahendra Dev

Director, Centre for Economic and Social Studies,

Hyderabad, India

Agricultural Labor and Wages since 1950

Contract Farming

Jasleen Dhamija

New Delhi, India

Independent scholar

Bandhani

Folk Art

Paithani

Patola

Textiles: Early Painted and Printed

Amarendra Dhaneshwar

Mumbai, India

Devi, Siddheshvari

Kerkar, Kesarbai

Mangeshkar, Lata

Subbulakshmi, M. S.

Joseph Elder

University of Wisconsin—Madison

Professor, Sociology/Languages and Cultures of Asia

Caste System

Dalits

Mandal Commission Report

Sabhas and Samitis
Scheduled Tribes
Shreni

Ainslie T. Embree

Columbia University
Professor emeritus of history
Bentinck, Lord William
British Crown Raj
British East India Company Raj
British Impact
Curzon, Lord George
India's Impact on Western Civilization
Narayan, R. K.
Pandit, Vijaya Lakshmi
Shore, Sir John
Wellesley, Richard Colley

Harald Fischer-Tine

Humboldt University, Berlin
Assistant professor, Department of South Asian History
Ārya Samāj

Rajmohan Gandhi

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Visiting professor, Program in South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies
Khan, Abdul Ghaffar
Rajagopalachari, Chakravarti

Prabhu Ghate

New Delhi, India
Informal Credit Markets

Marc Jason Gilbert

North Georgia College & State University
Professor of history
Anglo-Afghan Wars: War One (1838–1842)
Anglo-Afghan Wars: War Two (1878–1880)
Anglo-Afghan Wars: War Three (May–August 1919)
Auckland, Lord
Clive, Robert
Cornwallis, Lord
Dufferin, Lord
Dundas, Henry
Ellenborough, Earl of
Hastings, Warren
Irwin, Lord
Lansdowne, Lord
Manipur
Nightingale, Florence

B.N. Goldar

Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, New Delhi
Industrial Growth and Diversification

Brijinder Goswamy

Panjab University, Chandigarh
Professor emeritus, Department of History of Art
Nainsukh

J. Andrew Grieg

United States Department of State Foreign Service Officer, South Asia Bureau
Dupleix, Joseph François
French East India Company
French Impact
Nabob Game

Sumit Guha

Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey
Professor of history
Demographic Trends since 1757

Ashok Gulati

International Food Policy Research Institute, Washington, D.C.
Director, Markets Trade and Institutions
Agricultural Growth and Diversification since 1991

Asha Gupta

Bharati College, University of Delhi
Reader, Department of Political Science
Gender and Human Rights
Jainism

Sonika Gupta

National Institute of Advanced Studies, Bangalore, India
Postdoctoral fellow, International Strategic and Security Studies Program
China, Relations with

Katherine Harper

Loyola Marymount University
Associate professor, Department of Art History
Hindu Tantric Deities

Douglas Haynes

Dartmouth College
Associate professor, Department of History
Industrial Labor and Wages, 1800–1947

Santhi Hejeebu

Cornell College
Assistant professor, Department of Economics and Business
Trade Policy, 1800–1947

Alfred Hildebeitel

George Washington University
Professor, Department of Religion
Mahābhārata
Rāmāyāna

Graham Houghton

South Asia Institute of Advanced Christian Studies, Bangalore, India

Principal emeritus

Andrews, C. F.
 Andy, S. Pulney
 Azariah, Vedanayakam Samuel
 Christian Impact on India, History of
 Dubois, Jean-Antoine
 Nobili, Robert de
 Pandita Ramabai
 Paul, K. T.
 Singh, Sadhu Sundar
 Xavier, Francis

David Isby

Senior analyst, SPARTA Inc., Arlington, Virginia
 Afghanistan

Javed Jabbar

Karachi, Pakistan
 Nizam of Hyderabad

Happymon Jacob

University of Jammu
Lecturer, Centre for Strategic and Regional Studies
 AIDS/HIV

Narendra Jadhav

Reserve Bank of India
Principal adviser, Department of Economic Analysis and Policy
 Central Banking, Developmental Aspects of
 Industrial Change since 1956
 Size and Capital Intensity of Indian Industry since
 1950

Rajeev Jain

Physician, Advanced Healthcare, Milwaukee, Wisconsin
 Medical Science Education

K. S. James

University of Kerala
Deputy director, Population Research Centre
 Demography and Census-taking

E. H. Rick Jarow

Vassar College
Associate professor, Department of Religion
 Kālidāsa

Laura Dudley Jenkins

University of Cincinnati
Associate professor, Department of Political Science
 Ambedkar, B. R., and the Buddhist Dalits

Rob Jenkins

University of London, Birkbeck College
Professor of political science
 Liberalization, Political Economy of

Manoj Joshi

New Delhi, India
 Wars, Modern

Rajesh Kadian

Washington, D.C.
Independent scholar
 Armed Forces
 Health Care
 Health Care for Tourists
 Strategic Thought

Subhash Kak

Louisiana State University
Professor, Department of Electrical and Computer
Engineering
 Āryabhata
 Āryabhatīya
 Ashtādhyāyī
 Ashvamedha
 Astronomy
 Āyurveda
 Jammu and Kashmir
 Nyāya
 Pānini
 Patanjali
 Pingala
 Sāṅkhya
 Science
 Shulba Sūtras (Vedāngas)
 Vaisheshika
 Vedānga Jyotisha
 Yājñavalkya
 Yoga

Ravi Kalia

The City College of the City University of New York
Professor, Department of History
 Ahmedabad
 Allahabad
 Ayodhya
 Baroda
 Bhubaneswar
 Bombay
 Calcutta
 Chandigarh
 Gandhinagar
 Madras
 New Delhi
 Urbanism

Padmanabh M. Kamath

University of Mumbai
Professor of politics (retired), Department of Civics and
Politics
 National Security Decision-Making

Mira Kamdar

The New School
Senior fellow, World Policy Institute
 Indo–U.S. Relations, Cultural Changes in

Arnold P. Kaminsky

California State University, Long Beach
Professor, Asian studies and history
 British India Office, The
 Government of India Act of 1919
 Government of India Act of 1935
 India Office and India Office Library

Devesh Kapur

University of Texas at Austin
Associate professor, government and Asian studies
 Balance of Payments: Exchange Rate Policy
 Diaspora: Economic Impact
 World Bank (WB), Relations with

Nikki Keddle

University of California, Los Angeles
Professor emerita, Department of History
 Afghani, Jamal-ud-din

Mark Kenoyer

University of Wisconsin—Madison
Professor of anthropology
 Chalcolithic (Bronze) Age
 Harappa
 Indus Valley Civilization
 Mohenjo-Daro
 Neolithic Period
 Palaeolithic Period
 Rock Art

Rochelle Kessler

Los Angeles County Museum of Art
Assistant curator, South and Southeast Asian Art
 Deccani Painting
 Mughal Painting
 Rajput (Western, Central, and Hill) Painting

Prafulla Ketkar

Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, India
Research officer
 Advani, Lal Krishna
 European Union, Relations with

Sultanat Aisha Khan

Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, India
Research officer
 Russia, Relations with

Daljeet Khare

National Museum, Janpath, New Delhi
Curator-Incharge, Department of Painting
 Miniatures: Central India

Deena Khatkhate

International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.
Former assistant director, Monetary and Financial System Department
 Economic Policy Under Planning, Aspects of

Monetary Policy from 1952 to 1991
 Reserve Bank of India, Evolution of

Jinah Kim

University of California, Berkeley
Ph.D. candidate, history of art
 Jain and Buddhist Manuscript Painting

David M. Knipe

University of Wisconsin—Madison
Professor emeritus, languages and cultures of Asia
 Agni
 Bhūta
 Devī
 Hindu Ancestor Rituals
 Indra
 Rishi
 Saṃskāra
 Shiva and Shaivism
 Shrauta Sūtras
 Soma
 Tapas
 Varuṇa
 Vishnu and Avatāras
 Yajña
 Yajur Veda

Sunil Kothari

New Delhi, India
Independent scholar
 Dance Forms: An Introduction
 Dance Forms: Bharata Natyam
 Dance Forms: Kathak
 Dance Forms: Kathakali
 Dance Forms: Koodiyattam
 Dance Forms: Kuchipudi
 Dance Forms: Manipuri
 Dance Forms: Mohini Attam
 Dance Forms: Odissi

K. L. Krishna

Indian Council for Research on International Economic Relations, New Delhi
 Size and Capital Intensity of Indian Industry since 1950

Manu Krishna

Varanasi, India
 Miniatures: Kishangarh

Naval Krishna

Varanasi, India
 Miniatures: Bikaner
 Miniatures: Kishangarh

Jayasankar Krishnamurty

Geneva, Switzerland

Independent scholar

Employment Structure

K. Krishnamurty

Administrative Staff College of India

Honorary professor, economics

Selected Macroeconomic Models

Gopa Kumar

University of Kerala

Professor and chairman, Department of Political Science

Kerala, Coalition Politics

Kerala, Model of Development

Mohinder Kumar

Reserve Bank of India

Non-banking Financial Institutions, Growth of

Y. Vincent Kumaradoss

Madras Christian College, Chennai, India

Professor, Department of History

Leaders, Christian

P. R. Kumaraswamy

Jawaharlal Nehru University

Associate professor, Centre for West Asian and African Studies, School of International Studies

Israel, Relations with

Ananda Lal

Jadavpur University

Professor, Centre for Advanced Studies in English

Theater

Peter R. Lavoy

Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California

Director, Center for Contemporary Conflict

Kargil Conflict, The

Nuclear Programs and Policies

Karen Leonard

University of California, Irvine

Professor of anthropology and Asian American studies

Hyderabad

Kayasths

John Listopad

Stanford University

Curator of Asian art, The Iris and B. Gerald Cantor Center for the Visual Arts

Bronzes: South Indian

Roger D. Long

Eastern Michigan University

Professor, Department of History and Philosophy

Agra

Akbar

All-India Muslim League

Arunachal Pradesh

Assam

Aurangzeb

Babur

“Bande Mataram”

Bangladesh

Bengal

Burma

Humayun

Jahangir

Kabir

Khan, Liaquat Ali

Madurai

Magadha

Meghalaya

Mizoram

Music: Karnātak

Nagas and Nagaland

Pant, Govind Ballabh

Ramananda

Shah Jahan

Tripura

Dilip Loundo

Goa University

Visiting professor, sociology

Brazil–India Relations

Hafeez Malik

Villanova University

Professor of political science

Iqbal, Muhammad

Sayyid Ahmed Khan and the Aligarh Movement

Arvind-Pal S. Mandair

Hofstra University

Assistant professor, Department of Religion

Sikh Institutions and Parties

Sikhism

Kirit Mankodi

Franco-Indian Pharmaceuticals Pvt. Ltd., Mumbai

Consultant, Project for Indian Cultural Studies

Gaṇesha

Monuments: Western India

Step-Wells of India

Stephen Markel

Los Angeles County Museum of Art

Curator and department head, South and Southeast Asian Art

Ivory Carving

Metalware

Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata Paintings

Mandavi Mehta

Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

Independent scholar

Hindutva and Politics

Northeast States, The

Dinshaw Mistry

University of Cincinnati
Assistant professor, Department of Political Science
 Parsis
 Space Program
 Zoroastrianism

Kanakalatha Mukund

Centre for Economic and Social Studies, Hyderabad, Andhra Pradesh, India
Fellow (retired)
 Small-Scale and Cottage Industry, 1800–1947

Eve Mullen

Mississippi State University
Assistant professor, Department of Philosophy and Religion
 Tibetan Buddhists of India

Sudipto Mundle

Asian Development Bank, Manila, Philippines
Adviser, Strategy and Policy Department
 Asian Development Bank (ADB), Relations with

Dilip M. Nachane

Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India
Senior professor, Department of Economics
 Money and Foreign Exchange Markets

R. Nagaraj

Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India
Associate professor
 Industrial Labor Market, Wages and Employment, since 1950

B. R. Nanda

Chairman, National Gandhi Museum, New Delhi, India
Founder director, Nehru Museum and Library, New Delhi, India
 Nehru, Jawaharlal

Aditya Narain

International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.
Senior financial sector expert, Monetary and Financial Systems Department
 Bank and Non-Bank Supervision

Ram Nath

University of Rajasthan
Professor (retired), Department of History and Indian Culture
 Monuments: Mughal

P. Jayendra Nayak

Chairman and managing director, UTI Bank, Mumbai, India
 Capital Market

Brenda J. Ness

Santa Monica College
Professor, Department of History
 Bene Israel
 Jews of India
 Rabban, Joseph
 Sassoon, David

Jennifer Noyon

United States Department of State
Senior analyst for Nepal
 Nepal

Amina Okada

Musée Guimet, Paris, France
Curator of Indian art
 Mughal Painting, Later

Irfan Omar

Marquette University
Assistant professor, Department of Theology
 Azad, Maulana Abul Kalam
 Islam
 Muslims

Arvind Panagariya

Columbia University
Professor of economics and Indian political economy, School of International and Public Affairs
 Trade Liberalization since 1991

Kirit S. Parikh

Government of India, New Delhi
Member, Planning Commission
 Food Security

Asko Parpola

University of Helsinki
Professor emeritus of Indology, Institute for Asian and African Studies
 Vedic Aryan India

Alka Patel

University of Manchester, United Kingdom
Professor, art history and visual studies
 Kashmir Painting
 Sultante-Period Architecture of South Asia

Ujit R. Patel

Executive director, Infrastructure Development Finance Co. Ltd., Chennai, India
 Balance of Payments: Exchange Rate Policy
 Infrastructure Development and Government Policy since 1950

Ramchandra H. Patil

Chairman, Clearing Corporation of India Limited, Mumbai
 Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI)
 Stock Exchange Markets

Michael Debabrata Patra

*Reserve Bank of India
Adviser, Department of Economic Analysis and Policy
Foreign Resources Inflow since 1991*

Ludwig Pesch

*Bern College of Arts, Switzerland
Researcher, Department of Music
Bālasarasvati, T.
Dīkshitar, Muttusvāmi
Kīrtana
Kṛiti
Music: South India
Shyāma Shāstri
Tyāgarāja
Vina*

Indira Viswanathan Peterson

*Mount Holyoke College
Professor of Asian Studies
Literature: Modern*

Rashmi Poddar

*University of Mumbai
Professor, Department of Philosophy
Aesthetics*

Michel W. Potts

*India-West Newspaper
Southern California contributing editor
Film Industry*

W. Lawrence S. Prabhakar

*Madras Christian College, Chennai, India
Associate professor, Department of Political Science
Ballistic Missile Defenses*

Joseph Prabhu

*California State University, Los Angeles
Professor, Department of Philosophy
Educational Institutions and Philosophies, Traditional
and Modern
Rāmānuja
Shankara
Upanishadic Philosophy*

A. Prasad

*International Monetary Fund
Adviser to executive director, Office of Executive Director for
India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, and Sri Lanka
External Debt Policy, 1952–1990*

Yuvaraj D. Prasad

*Patna University
Professor and chairman (retired), Department of History
Bihar
Judicial System, Modern*

Patna
Prasad, Rajendra

Arigapudi Premchand

*International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C.
Retired assistant director, Department of Fiscal Affairs
Public Expenditures*

Neeta Premchand

*Zurich, Switzerland
Independent scholar
Papermaking*

Sonya Quintanilla

*San Diego Museum of Art
Curator, Asian art
Jain Sculpture
Sultanate Painting*

Raman Radhakrishnan

*Institute of Peace and Conflict Studies, New Delhi, India
Research officer
Tata, Jamsetji N.*

Rajendran Raja

*Fermi National Accelerator Laboratory, Batavia, Illinois
Senior scientist, Department of Experimental Physics
Nuclear Weapons Testing and Development
Scientists of Indian Origin and Their Contributions*

Rohini Rajagopalan

*Ngee Ann Polytechnic, Singapore
Principal lecturer (retired), School of
Interdisciplinary Studies
Rangōli*

Jagada Rajappa

*Hyderabad, India
Natural dye and textile consultant
Jamdani
Textiles: Karuppur*

M. T. Raju

*Securities and Exchange Board of India
Mutual Funds, Role of*

Sita Anantha Raman

*Santa Clara University
Associate professor, Department of History
Akkamahādēvi
Āndāl
Feminism and Indian Nationalists
Karaikkāl Ammaiyār
Mādhaviah, A.
Mīrabai
Naidu, Sarojini
Pillai, Samuel Vedanayakam
Reddi, Muthulakshmi
Shah Bano Case*

Subbalakshmi Ammal, R.S.
Theosophical Society
Women and Political Power
Women's Education
Women's Indian Association

Barbara N. Ramusack

University of Cincinnati
Professor, Department of History
Princely States

Haripriya Rangarajan

New Delhi, India
Independent scholar
Avatāras of Vishnu, Images of

Govinda Rao

Director, National Institute of Public Finance and Policy,
New Delhi, India
Internal Public Debt, Growth and Composition of
Public Debt of States, since 1950
State Finances since 1952

Maithili Rao

Mumbai, India
Film critic
Cinema

Himanshu Prabha Ray

Jawaharlal Nehru University
Associate professor, Center for Historical Studies
Buddhism in Ancient India
Early Maritime Contacts

Jayita Ray

Flinders University, Australia
Faculty of Social Sciences, School of Political and
International Studies
State Formation

J. Mahender Reddy

Principal, The ICEAI Institute for Management Teachers
Selected Macroeconomic Models

Janet Rizvi

Haryana, India
Kashmir Shawls

Dietmar Rothermund

University of Heidelberg, South Asia Institute
Professor emeritus, Department of History
Amritsar
Andhra Pradesh
Bactria
Bahadur Shah I
Bangalore
Bhabha, Homi
Bhave, Vinoba

Bhopal
Bimbisara
Dalhousie, Marquis of
Gujarat
Guru Nanak
Jamshedpur
Jodhpur
Kanpur
Karnataka
Mysore
Naoroji, Dadabhai
Rajneesh, Osho
Simla
Singh, Maharaja Ranjit
Varanasi
Vivekananda, Swami

Tirthankar Roy

Gokhale Institute of Politics and Economics, Pune, India
Professor
Agricultural Prices and Production, 1757–1947
Agricultural Wages, Labor, and Employment since
1757
Balance of Payments: Foreign Investment and the
Exchange Rate
Famines
Fiscal System and Policy from 1858 to 1947
Infrastructure and Transportation, 1857–1947
Large-scale Industry, 1850–1950
Price Movements and Fluctuations since 1860

K. Sabapathy

International Monetary Fund, Washington, D.C. (on
deputation from the Reserve Bank of India)
Senior adviser to executive director
Monetary Policy since 1991

Sachchidananda

Chairman, A.N. Sinha Institute of Social Studies, Patna,
India
Tribal Peoples of Eastern India

Ponmoni Sahadevan

Jawaharlal Nehru University
Associate professor, School of International Studies
Ethnic Peace Accords
Maldives and Bhutan, Relations with
Military Interventions in South Asia
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC)
Sri Lanka

Jasvantlal C. Sandesara

University of Mumbai
Professor emeritus, Department of Economics
Small-Scale Industry, since 1947

D. R. SarDesai

University of California, Los Angeles
Professor emeritus, Department of History
 Albuquerque, Afonso de
 Asiatic Societies of Bengal and Bombay
 Gama, Vasco da
 Goa
 Maharashtra
 Peshwai and Pentarchy
 Portuguese in India
 Shivaji Bhonsle and heirs

Hartmut E. Scharfe

University of California, Los Angeles
Professor emeritus, East Asian languages and cultures
 Bhagavad Gītā
 Bhāgavata Purāṇa
 Bhakti
 Bharat
 Brahmacharya
 Chidambaram
 Chola Dynasty
 Dharma Shāstra
 Dīvalī

Joseph E. Schwartzberg

University of Minnesota
Professor emeritus, Department of Geography
 Geography

Gautam Sen

London School of Economics
 Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP)
 Hindu Nationalist Parties
 Nepal, Relations with
 Shiv Sena
 Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)

Kunal Sen

University of East Anglia, Norwich, United Kingdom
Reader in economics, School of Development Studies
 Economic Reforms of 1991
 Saving and Investment Trends since 1950

Tapas K. Sen

National Institute of Public Finance and Policy, New Delhi, India
Senior fellow
 Subsidies in the Federal Budget

Ajay Shah

Consultant, Ministry of Finance, New Delhi, India
 Pension Funds and Social Security

Jagdish Sharma

Government of India
Ministry of External Affairs
 Diaspora: History of and Global Distribution

Ramesh Chandra Sharma

Jnana-Pravaha, Varanasi
Professor/Acharya, Cultural Studies and Research
 Bronzes: Early Images
 Sculpture: Kushana
 Sculpture: Mauryan and Shungan

Shalendra D. Sharma

University of San Francisco
Professor, Department of Politics
 Biotechnology Revolution
 Globalization

Amita Shastri

San Francisco State University
Professor and chair, Department of Political Science
 Sri Lanka, Relations with

Ben Sheppard

King's College, London
Research associate, King's Centre for Risk Management
 Afghanistan, Military Relations with, 1994–2001
 Ballistic and Cruise Missile Development

Sadanand L. Shetty

Economic and Political Weekly Research Foundation, Mumbai, India
Director of research
 Development of Commercial Banking 1950–1990

Partha Shome

International Monetary Fund
Singapore Regional Training Institute
 Taxation Policy since 1991 Economic Reforms

Manu Shroff

Vadodara, India
 Planning Commission

Damanjit Singh

The World Bank, Washington, D.C.
Consultant, Environment Department
 Environmental Consciousness since 1800

Ujjwal Kumar Singh

University of Delhi
Reader, Department of Political Science
 Human Rights

Aseema Sinha

University of Wisconsin—Madison
Assistant professor, Department of Political Science
 Development Politics
 Federalism and Center-State Relations

Richard Sisson

The Ohio State University
Professor emeritus, Department of Political Science
 Congress Party

John Siudmak

London, England

Sculpture and Bronze Images from Kashmir

Walter Spink

University of Michigan

Professor emeritus of Indian art, Department of the History of Art
Ajanta

Elizabeth Rosen Stone

New York City

Independent scholar

Buddhist Art in Andhra up to the Fourth Century

Mary Storm

Jawaharlal Nehru University

Associate professor, School of Arts and Aesthetics
Goddess Images

Narendra Subramanian

McGill University

Associate professor, Department of Political Science

Caste and Democracy

Dravidian Parties

Family Law and Cultural Pluralism

Muslim Law and Judicial Reform

Nandini Sundar

Delhi School of Economics, Delhi University

Professor, Department of Sociology

Tribal Politics

Gary Michael Tartakov

Iowa State University

Professor, Department of Art and Design

Temple Types (Styles) of India

Ramesh Thakur

United Nations University, Tokyo, Japan

Senior vice-rector

Japan, Relations with

Political System: Cabinet

Political System: Constitution

Political System: Parliament

Political System: President

Political System: Prime Minister

Raju G. C. Thomas

Marquette University

Professor, Department of Political Science

Abdul Kalam, Avul Pakir Jainulabdeen (A.P.J.)

Desai, Morarji

Energy Politics and Policy

Fundamental Rights

Gandhi, Rajiv

Gandhi, Sonia

General (National) Elections

Media

Menon, V.K. Krishna

Narayan, Jaya Prakash

Narayanan, K. R.

Presidents of India

Prime Ministers of India

Radhakrishnan, Sarvepalli

Secularism

Singh, Manmohan

United States, Relations with

Vajpayee, Atal Bihari

Susan Thomas

Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, Mumbai, India

Assistant professor

Commodity Markets

Debt Markets

Gordon R. Thompson

Skidmore College

Professor, Department of Music

Ālāp

Bhajan

Dhrupad

Filmīgīt

Folk Dance

Gat-Tora

Khan, Ali Akbar

Khan, Vilayat

Khayal

Khusrau, Amir

Music: An Introduction

Nāṭya Shāstra

Qawwālī

Rāga

Sarod

Shankar, Ravi

Sitar

Tabla

Tāla

Thumrī

Lingareddy Thulasamma

Economic and Political Weekly Research Foundation, Mumbai, India

Researcher, agriculture

Land Tenure since 1950

Technical Change in Agriculture, 1952–2000

Thomas R. Trautmann

University of Michigan

Professor, Department of History

Artha Shāstra

Reeta Chowdhari Tremblay

Concordia University, Montreal, Canada
Professor, Department of Political Science
 Jammu and Ladakh
 Kashmir

Oppi Untracht

Porvoo, Finland
Independent scholar
 Jewelry

Lotika Varadarajan

New Delhi, India
 Textiles: Block-Printed

Siddharth Varadarajan

Deputy editor, The Hindu, New Delhi, India
 Singh, Bhagat

Kapila Vatsyayan

New Delhi, India
 Krishna in Indian Art

Prem Vrat

Director, India Institute of Technology, Roorkee
 Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs)

Vijay S. Vyas

Institute of Development Studies, Jaipur, India
Professor emeritus
 Rural Credit, Evolution of since 1952

Marvin G. Weinbaum

University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
Professor emeritus, Department of Political Science
 Karachi
 Pakistan
 Punjab
 Sind

Michael Witzel

Harvard University
Professor, Department of Sanskrit and Indian Studies
 Brāhmaṇas
 Hinduism (Dharma)
 Languages and Scripts

Stanley Wolpert

University of California, Los Angeles
Professor emeritus, Department of History

Alexander the Great

Anand, Mulk Raj

Bhutto, Zulfikar Ali

Bonnerji, Womesh C.

Bose, Subhas Chandra

Brahmo Samaj

Cabinet Mission Plan

Chatterji, Bankim Chandra

Chelmsford, Lord

Cripps, Sir Richard Stafford

Elphinstone, Mountstuart

Fitch, Ralph

Forster, E. M.

Galbraith, John Kenneth

Gandhi, Indira

Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.

Gokhale, Gopal Krishna

Gujral, Inder Kumar

Hardinge, Lord

History and Historiography

Jinnah, Mohammad Ali

Kipling, Rudyard

Krishnamurti, Jiddu

Linlithgow, Lord

Macaulay, Thomas Babington

Minto, Lord

Montagu, Edwin S.

Morley, John

Mountbatten, Lord

Nehru, Motilal

Ranade, Mahadev Govind

Reading, Lord

Ripon, Lord

Satyagraha

Tilak, Bal Gangadhar

Wavell, Lord

Haruka Yanagisawa

Chiba University

Professor, Department of Economics

Common Property Resources, Past and Present

Land Tenure from 1800 to 1947

Lynn Zastoupil

Rhodes College

Professor, Department of History

Roy, Ram Mohan



chronology: India

EARLY HISTORY

c. 500,000–10,000 B.C.	Paleolithic culture	<i>Homo Sapiens Sapiens</i> emerge in Africa, c. 100,000 B.C.
10,000–4000	Mesolithic culture	
c. 4000	Neolithic period	Sumerians establish first civilization, c. 3200 b.c.
c. 3000–2600	Beginning of Harappa civilization	
c. 2600–2500	Harappa civilization at its most developed	Chinese civilization emerges, c. 2200 B.C.
c. 2000–1900	Collapse of Harappa civilization	
c. 2000–1500	Aryan invasion of northwest India	
c. 1500–500	Vedic age	
c. 1200–900	Composition of the four Saṁhitās: Atharva Veda, Rig Veda, Sāma Veda, Yajur Veda	Hebrew civilization emerges, c. 1200 B.C.
c. 1000	Aryan migration to Ganges Valley	
8th–7th centuries	Composition of the Upanishads	
c. 600	Earliest date for written form of the Rig Veda	

CHRONOLOGY: INDIA

NORTH INDIA AND MAURYAN DYNASTY

c. 600	Rise of sixteen great states (<i>mahājanapadas</i>)	
c. 563–483	Life of the Buddha	
c. 540–493	Reign of Bimbisara	Roman Republic founded, 509 B.C.
c. 540–c. 468	Life of Mahāvīra, twenty-fourth Jain Tīrthāṅkara (teacher)	
c. 527	Preaching of First Sermon by the Buddha	
c. 517	Achaemenid empire of Persia captured Gandhara	
c. 500	Rise of Magadha at Pataliputra	
c. 490–459	Reign of Ajātasatru	
c. 400	Composition of the Mahābhārata and Rāmāyaṇa	
c. 362–321	Rule of the Nanda dynasty in north and central India	
326	Alexander crosses the Indus Battle of Hydaspes	
321–297	Reign of Chandragupta, founder of the Mauryan dynasty	
321–296	Composition of <i>Artha Shāstra</i>	
c. 302	Greek Ambassador Megasthenes at the court of Chandragupta	Great Wall of China erected, c. 3rd century B.C.
297–272	Reign of Bindusāra	
268–231	Reign of Ashoka	
c. 260	Conquest of Kalinga	
257–256	Ashoka's 14 Rock Edicts, Kalinga Edicts	
c. 251	Buddhist mission of Mahendra to Ceylon	
c. 250–240	Third Buddhist Council at Pataliputra	
242	Ashoka's 7 Pillar Edicts	
240–232	Minor Pillar Edicts	

184 Death of Brihadratha, the last Mauryan king
Accession of Pushyamitra of the Shunga dynasty

73 Devabhuti, the last Shunga king killed

INDO-BACTRIANS AND NORTHWEST INDIA

c. 250 Bactrian Greeks establish kingdom on Oxus River plains

c. 200–190 Demetrius "King of the Indians"

c. 166–155 Rule of Menander, the most famous Indo-Greek ruler

c. 150 Gandhara art flourishes

c. 140–130 Heliokles, last of the Indo-Bactrian kings

c. 94 Maues, the Shaka or Indo-Parthian in northwest India

c. 78 Kanishka establishes Kushan power as "King of Gandhara"

72 Foundation of Kanvayana dynasty by Vasudeva Kanva

SOUTH AND CENTRAL INDIA

c. 50 B.C.–A.D. 50 Height of trade with Roman Empire Life of Jesus and rise of Christianity, 5 B.C.–A.D.29

27 B.C.–2nd century A.D. Satavahana (Andhra) dynasty

c. 68 Martyrdom of St. Thomas at Mylapore, Madras

150 Rudraman establishes Shaka power in western India

c. 174–203 Height of Andhra kingdom under Yajña

c. 225 End of Satavahana dynasty

c. 255–mid-6th century Vakatakas of Bundhelkhand

c. 325 Foundation of Pallava dynasty

GUPTA DYNASTY

320–335 Chandragupta I establishes Gupta empire

c. 320 Origin of Purāṇas

335–375 Reign of Samudragupta

CHRONOLOGY: INDIA

375–415	Golden age of the Guptas under Chandragupta II Kālidāsa at court of Chandragupta II
405–411	Chinese pilgrim Fahsien in India at the Gupta court
454	Council of Vallabhi
455–467	Reign of Skandagupta when Hunas invade northwest

SOUTH INDIA

543–566	Chalukyas of Badami established under Pulakeshin I (r. 535–566)	
c. 560–574	Simhavishnu establishes Pallava power at Kanchi	
600–630	Pallava power develops under Mahendravarman	Life of Mohammed 570–632, rise and spread of Islam 7th–8th centuries
609–642	Chalukya power extends under Pulakeshin II (r. 610–642) and struggle for dominance of the south with the Pallavas begins	
752–10th century	Rashtrakutas at Ellora	
c. 756–757	Creation of Kailasanatha Temple at Ellora	

NORTH INDIA

606–647	Harsha Vardhana of Kanauj
629–645	Chinese Buddhist Hsien Tsang pilgrimage in India
c. 630	Defeat of Harsha Vardhana by Chalukyas
711	Arab conquest of Sind establishing Islam in India
736	Delhi first established as “Dhillika”
c. 750–770	Gopala establishes Pala dynasty in Bengal
c. 752	The Pallava king defeats Chalukyas
c. 780	Gurjara-Pratiharas established at Ujjain
c. 788–836	Life of Shankaracharya
814–840	Reign of Amoghavarsha, the most powerful Rashtrakuta king
c. 836–885	King Bhoja establishes Pratihara empire

885–910	King Mahendrapal extends Pratihara empire	
1077–1120	Pala kingdom becomes powerful under Ramapala	Crusades result in greater East–West contact, 11th–13th centuries
1148	<i>Rajatarangini</i> written by Kalhana	
SOUTH INDIA		
c. 897	King Āditya establishes Chola kingdom	
c. 907	Cholas become powerful under Parantaka I	
939–968	Rashtrakutas dominate Deccan	
c. 973	Taila, a Chalukya of Kalyani, defeats Rashtrakutas and establishes later Chalukya dynasty	
985–1016	Rajaraja I establishes Chola empire	
1016–1044	Reign of Rajendra Chola	
1025	Cholas conduct naval raids in southeast Asia	
c. 1025–1137	Life of Rāmānuja, Vaishnava teacher	
1077	Chola merchants travel to China	
c. 1100	Rāmānuja leads <i>bhakti</i> movement	
1246–1279	Rule of Rajendra III, the last Chola king	
GHAZNAVIDS AND GHURIDS IN NORTH INDIA		
971–1030	Reign of Mahmud of Ghazni	
973–1048	Life of Alberuni Firdawsi	
997–1014	Mahmud of Ghazni in Afghanistan invades northern India in annual plundering raids	
	Muhammad Ghuri defeats Ghaznavids and captures the Punjab	
1175	Muhammad Ghuri's first raid into India	
1179	Capture of Peshawar by Muhammad Ghuri	
1186	Capture of Lahore by Muhammad Ghuri	

CHRONOLOGY: INDIA

1192 Muhammad Ghuri defeats Rajputs under Prithviraja Chauhan at Battle of Tarain

1193 Muhammad Ghuri captures Delhi and north India

1206 Muhammad Ghuri assassinated in Lahore

DELHI SULTANATE

1206–1210 Qutb-ud-Din Aibak found Mamluk (Slave dynasty, or Delhi Sultanate)

1211–1136 Reign of Shams-ud-din Iltutmish

1221–1222 Mongol raids begin in northwest

1231 Capture of Gwalior

1235 Capture of Ujjain

1236–1240 Reign of Raziyya

1240–1246 Rule of “the Forty”

1246–1286 Rule of Balban

1266–1286 Balban establishes Delhi as center for Muslim arts and scholarship

1290 Khalji dynasty established

1290–1296 Reign of Jalal-ud-Din Firuz Shah, the first Khalji ruler
Mongol invasions repelled

1296–1326 Reign of Ala'-ud-Din Muhammad Khalji

c. 14th century Emergence of Chishti, Suhrawardi, and Firdawsi Sufi sects Height of Aztec civilization, c. 1300

1301 Ala'-ud-Din Khalji captures Rajput fort Ranthambhor

1303 Ala'-ud-Din Khalji captures Rajput fort Chitor

1309–1311 Ala'-ud-Din Khalji captures south India

1316 Reign of Shihab al-Din Umar

1316–1320 Reign of Qutb-al-Din Mubarak Shah

1320 Tughluqs replace Khaljis as sultans of Delhi

1320–1324	Reign of Ghiyas al-Din Tughluq I Shah	
1324–1351	Reign of Muhammad Tughluq Shah	
1334	Malabar breaks free of Tughluqs	
1336–1646	Vijayanagar empire	
1337	Bengal under Malik Shams-ud-din breaks free of Tughluqs	
1347–1526	Bahmani dynasty	
1351	Reign of Ghiyas al-Din Mahmud Shah	
1351–1388	Reign of Firuz Shah	
1388–1389	Reign of Ghiyas al-Din Tughluq II Shah	
1389–1390	Reign of Abu Bakr Shah	
1390–1394	Reign of Nasir al-Din Muhammad Shah	
1394	Reign of Ala al-Din Sikandar Shah	
1394–1412	Reign of Nasir al-Din Mahmud Shah	
1398–1399	Tamburlaine's sack of Delhi	
1414–1450	Sayyids rule as sultans of Delhi	
1440–1518	Kabir preaches the unity of all religions	
1450	Lodis replace Sayyids at Delhi	
1469–1539	Life of Guru Nanak, founder of Sikhism	
1480–1564	Life of Karnataka music composer Purandara Dasa	
1482–1673	Deccani Sultanates of Ahmadnagar, Berar, Bijapur, Bidar, and Golconda	
1486–1533	Life of Chaitanya, <i>bhakti</i> Hindu teacher	Columbus makes first voyage to the Americas, 1492
1498	Vasco da Gama establishes Portuguese presence in India	
1509–1529	Reign of Krishna Deva Raya at Vijayanagar	
1510	Afonso de Albuquerque captures Goa for the Portuguese	

CHRONOLOGY: INDIA

MUGHAL DYNASTY

1526	Babur (1483–1530) defeats the Delhi sultan Ibrahim Lodi at first battle of Panipat	
1530	Death of Babur and accession of Humayun	
1532–1623	Life of Tulsi Das	
1540	Defeat of Humayun by Sher Shah and exile in Persia	
1551–1602	Life of Abu'l Fazl	
1555	Return of Humayun and recapture of Delhi	
1556	Death of Humayun and accession of Akbar	
	Second battle of Panipat	
1556–1605	Reign of Akbar	Elizabeth I ascends the throne of England, 1558
1563	Abolition of pilgrimage tax on Hindus	
1564	Abolition of <i>jizya</i> (poll tax on non-Muslims)	
1571	Building of new capital at Fatehpur Sikri	
1573	Conquest of Gujarat	
1575	Building of <i>'Ibādat Khāna</i> (House of worship)	
1576	Conquest of Bengal	
1581	Conquest of Kabul	
1582	Creation of <i>Dīn-i-Ilāhī</i> (Divine religion)	
1584	Abandoning of Fatehpur Sikri	
1592	Conquest of Orissa	
1595	Conquest of Baluchistan	
1600	Charter given by Queen Elizabeth I to East India Company	
1605–1627	Reign of Jahangir	
1612	East India Company establishes trading post at Surat	

1616–1618	Sir Thomas Roe's embassy to Jahangir; East India Company receives permission to trade in India
1619	Establishment of British “factory” at Surat
1628–1658	Reign of Shah Jahan
1630–1680	Life of Shivaji, founder of Maratha dynasty
1642	Establishment of British trading post at Fort St. George, Madras
1643	Taj Mahal completed
1658–1707	Reign of Aurangzeb
1664	Establishment of La Compagnie perpétuelle des Indes (French East India Company)
1674	Shivaji crowned Chatrapati (Lord of the universe)
1679	Aurangzeb reinstitutes <i>jizya</i> on non-Muslims
1681	Aurangzeb begins conquest of the Deccan
1686	Bijapur conquered
1689	Golkonda conquered Shambuji captured and executed
1690	Job Charnock establishes British trading post at Calcutta
1699	Sikh <i>Khalsa</i> established by tenth Guru, Gobind Rai

MUGHALS IN EIGHTEENTH AND NINETEENTH CENTURIES

1707–1712	Reign of Bahadur Shah
1713–1719	Reign of Farrukshiyar Domination of Sayyid brothers, Hussain Ali and Abdullah, the “king makers”
1714	Rise of Maratha power under <i>pesbwa</i> Balaji Vishwanath
1719	Reign of Rafi-ud Darajat, Rafi-ud Daulat, and Nekusiyar
1719–1748	Reign of Muhammad Shah

CHRONOLOGY: INDIA

1723	Creation of Nizami of Hyderabad by Nizam al-Mulk (1669–1748)	
1739	Battle of Karnal Sack of Delhi by Nadir Shah of Iran	
1748–1754	Reign of Ahmad Shah	Industrial Revolution, c. 1750
1754–1759	Reign of Alamgir II	
1759–1806	Reign of Shah Alam II	
1806–1837	Reign of Akbar II	
1837–1857	Reign of Bahadur Shah II	

BRITISH IN EIGHTEENTH- AND NINETEENTH-CENTURY INDIA

1742–1763	British and French fight for domination of south India as part of global war
1746	Joseph François Dupleix (1697–1764) captures Madras
1746–1794	Life of Sir William Jones
1748	Madras restored to the British
1751	Robert Clive (1725–1774) captures Arcot
1756	Black Hole of Calcutta
1757	Clive wins Battle of Plassey
1760	British defeat French at Battle of Wandiwash
1761	Haidar Ali establishes Muslim power at Mysore
1764	British win Battle of Buxar
1765	East India Company granted the <i>diwani</i> of Bengal
1772–1785	Warren Hastings (1732–1818), 1772–1773 governor-general of Bengal; 1784–1785 governor-general of India
1774	Rohilla War
1778	First Maratha War
1784	Bengal Asiatic Society founded

1786–1793	Charles Cornwallis (1738–1805), governor-general of India
1793	Cornwallis establishes the permanent <i>zamindari</i> settlement
1789–1805	Richard Colley Wellesley (1760–1842), governor-general
1799	Tipu Sultan of Mysore defeated by British at Seringapatam
1801–1839	Ranjit Singh (1780–1839) establishes Sikh empire
1802	Treaty of Bassein
1803	Second Anglo-Maratha War
1805	July–October, Charles Cornwallis, governor-general
1805–1807	George Hilario Barlow (1762–1846), acting governor-general
1807–1813	Gilbert Elliott, 1st earl of Minto (1751–1814), governor-general
1813	Entrance of Christian missionaries
1813–1823	Francis Rawdon Hastings, 1st marquis of Hastings, 2nd earl of Moira (1754–1826), governor-general
1814–1816	Anglo-Gurkha War
1818	Defeat of Marathas in Third Maratha War
1817–1898	Life of Sayyid Ahmed Khan
1823–1828	William Pitt Amherst (1773–1857), governor-general
1826	Treaty of Yandabo with Burmese
1827	Simla first established as summer retreat
1828	Ram Mohan Roy (1772–1833) founds the Brahmo Samaj
1828–1835	William Cavendish Bentinck (1774–1839), governor-general
1829	<i>Sati</i> becomes illegal

1835–1836	Charles Theophilus Metcalfe (1785–1846), acting governor-general	
1836–1842	George Eden, earl of Auckland (1784–1849), governor-general	
1838–1842	First Afghan War	Opium War, 1839–1842
1842–1844	Edward Law, 1st earl of Ellenborough, 1st viscount Southam (1790–1871), governor-general	
1843	Sind annexed by East India Company	
1844–1848	Henry Hardinge, 1st viscount Hardinge (1785–1856), governor-general	
1845	First Sikh War	
1848–1856	James Andrew Broun Ramsey, 10th earl and 1st marquis of Dalhousie (1812–1860), governor-general	
1848–1849	Second Anglo-Sikh War	
1849	Annexation of Punjab by East India Company	
1852	Second Burmese War	
1853	First railway line opens between Bombay and Thane Telegraph between Calcutta and Agra	
1856	Annexation of Oudh	
1856–1861	Charles John Canning, 1st earl Canning (1812–1862), governor-general and viceroy	
1856–1920	Life of Bal Gangadhar Tilak	
1857	10 May, Indian mutiny	
1858	Queen's proclamation	
1862–1863	James Bruce, 8th earl of Elgin and 12th earl of Kincardine (1811–1863), governor-general and viceroy	
1864–1869	John Laird Mair Lawrence, 1st baron Lawrence (1811–1879), governor-general and viceroy	
1865	Telegraph connection between England and India	
1866–1915	Life of Gopal Krishna Gokhale	

1867	Press and Registration of Books Act
1869–1872	Richard Southwell Mayo, 6th earl of Mayo (1822–1872), governor-general and viceroy
1869–1948	Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi
1872	First census of India
1872–1876	Thomas George Baring, 1st earl of Northbrook (1826–1904), governor-general and viceroy
1875	Muhammad Anglo-Oriental College founded at Aligarh
1875	Mayo College opens at Ajmer
1875–1950	Life of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel
1876	Royal Titles Act makes Queen Victoria (r. 1837–1901) empress of India
1876–1880	Edward Robert Bulwer Lytton, 1st earl of Lytton (1831–1891), governor-general and viceroy
1876–1948	Life of Mohammad Ali Jinnah
1878	Vernacular Press Act Second Afghan War
1880–1884	George Frederick Samuel Robinson, 1st marquis of Ripon (1827–1909), governor-general and viceroy
1880	Battle of Maiwand and Lord Roberts's march to Kanadahar
1882	Foundation of headquarters of Theosophical Society near Madras
1883–1884	Ilbert Bill controversy
1884–1888	Frederick Temple Hamilton Temple, 1st marquis of Dufferin and Ava (1826–1902), governor-general and viceroy
1885	Indian National Congress founded at Bombay Third Burmese War
1886	Burma annexed
1888–1894	Henry Charles Keith Petty-Fitzmaurice, 5th marquess of Lansdowne (1845–1927), governor-general and viceroy

CHRONOLOGY: INDIA

1889	Ahmadiya sect founded in the Punjab
1889–1964	Life of Jawaharlal Nehru
1891	Age of Consent Act
1892	Indian Councils Act
1894–1899	Victor Alexander Bruce, 9th earl of Elgin and 13th earl of Kincardine (1849–1917), governor-general and viceroy
1895–1951	Life of Liaquat Ali Khan
1899–1905	George Nathaniel Curzon, Marquess Curzon of Kedleston (1859–1925), governor-general and viceroy

TWENTIETH CENTURY TO 1947

1900	North-West Frontier province created
1904	Younghusband expedition to Tibet
1905	Bengal partitioned
1905–1910	Gilbert John Murray Kynynmond, 4th earl of Minto (1845–1914), governor-general and viceroy
1906	Foundation of All-India Muslim League
1907	Congress split between “moderates” and “extremists” at Surat
1908	Newspapers Act
1909	Tilak convicted of sedition Councils of India Act (Minto-Morley reforms) Lord Sinha appointed to governor-general's council
1910	Sri Aurobindo (Aurobindo Ghose, 1872–1950) establishes ashram at Pondicherry
1910	Newspapers (Incitement to Offences) Act
1911	Delhi Durbar Capital of India moved from Calcutta to Delhi Partition of Bengal revoked
1911–1916	Charles Hardinge, 1st Baron Hardinge of Penhurst (1858–1944), governor-general and viceroy

1913	Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) wins Nobel Prize for literature	
1915	Defence of India Act	World War I, 1914–1918
1916	Lucknow Pact between All-India Muslim League and Indian National Congress Home Rule movement	
1916–1921	Frederic John Napier Thesiger, 3rd baron and 1st viscount Chelmsford (1868–1933), governor-general and viceroy	
1917	Montagu Declaration	
1917–1984	Life of Indira Gandhi	
1918	Government of India Act (Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms)	
1919	Rowlatt Acts Amritsar (Jallianwala Bagh) Massacre	
1920	Ravi Shankar born Mahatma Gandhi begins first noncooperation movement	
1920–1924	Khilafat movement	
1921–1926	Rufus Daniel Isaacs, 1st marquess of Reading (1860–1935), governor-general and viceroy	
1921–1992	Life of Satyajit Ray	
1922	Chaura Chauri incident Gandhi sentenced to six years' imprisonment Swaraj Party formed	
1924	Gandhi released from prison	
1925	Muddiman Committee Report Sikh Gurdwaras Act	
1925–1931	Edward Frederick Lindley Wood, 1st earl of Halifax (1881–1959), governor-general and viceroy	
1927	Simon Commission appointed	
1928	Nehru Report Death of Lala Lajput Rai (1865–1928) at Lahore	
1929	Mohammad Ali Jinnah's Fourteen Points	

1930	26 January, Independence Day proclaimed by Indian National Congress Salt March Simon Commission Report submitted First Round Table Conference Sir Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938) calls for creation of Muslim state	
1931	First Indian film made at Bombay Gandhi-Irwin Pact Second Round Table Conference Indian Press (Emergency Powers) Act	
1931–1936	Freeman Freeman-Thomas, 1st marquess of Willingdon (1866–1941), governor-general and viceroy	
1932	16 August, Communal Award Third Round Table Conference	
1935	Government of India Act	
1936–1943	Victor Alexander John Hope, 2nd marquess of Linlithgow (1887–1952), governor-general and viceroy	
1937	General elections Indian National Congress formed government in seven provinces	
1939	Defence of India Act Indian National Congress resigned from provincial governments 22 December, All-India Muslim League “Deliverance Day”	World War II, 1939–1945
1940	August Offer	
1941	23 March, All-India Muslim League moved Pakistan Resolution	
1942	Cripps mission Indian National Congress “Quit India” campaign	
1943	Bengal famine Subhash Chandra Bose (1897–1945) organizes Indian national army	
1943–1947	Archibald Percival Wavell, 1st earl Wavell (1883–1950), governor-general and viceroy	

- 1944** Gandhi-Jinnah talks
- 1945** Desai-Liaquat Pact
27 June–14 July, first Simla Conference
General elections
- 1946** Cabinet mission
16 August, All-India Muslim League “Direct Action Day”
Noakhali riots
Second Simla Conference
Interim government formed
- 1947** Prime Minister Clement Attlee's 20 February statement
Louis Francis Albert Victor Mountbatten (1900–1979),
governor-general and viceroy
3 June plan announces independence and partition of India
14 August, independence of India and Pakistan

INDIA SINCE 1947

- 1947–1948** Louis Mountbatten, governor-general
- 1947–1964** Jawaharlal Nehru serves as prime minister of India
- 1948** 30 January, assassination of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi
Invasion and annexation (“Police Action”) of Hyderabad
- 1948–1950** Chakravarti Rajagopalachari (1878–1972), governor-general of India
- 1950** 26 January, Indian Constitution comes into force
Rajendra Prasad (1884–1963), first president of India
National Planning Commission established
Death of Vallabhbhai Patel
Mother Teresa (1910–1997) founded Missionaries of Charity
- 1951** First Five-Year Plan
- 1952** First general election
- 1955** Bandung Conference
- 1956** India's first nuclear reactor begins operation
States Reorganization Act
Second Five-Year Plan

1957	Jammu and Kashmir incorporated into India Second general elections
1959	Dalai Lama flees to India from Tibet
1960	Doordashan broadcast from Delhi Indus Waters Treaty with Pakistan
1961	Goa invaded and annexed
1962	State of Nagaland formed Border war with China in northeast India
1962–1967	Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan (1888–1975), president
1964	24 May, death of Jawaharlal Nehru
1964–1966	Lal Bahadur Shastri (1904–1966), prime minister
1965	War with Pakistan
1966	Tashkent Agreement with Pakistan Indira Gandhi becomes prime minister
1967	Fourth general elections
1967–1969	Zakir Husain (1897–1969), president of India
1968	“Green Revolution” begins
1969–1974	Varahagiri Venkata Giri (1894–1980), president of India Man walks on the moon, 1969
1971	Princes’ privy purse abolished Indo–Soviet Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation 4 December, war with Pakistan in East Pakistan
1974	5 May, India explodes nuclear device
1975	26 June, “National Emergency” declared by Indira Gandhi
1977–1979	Morarji Desai (1896–1995), prime minister
1980	Indira Gandhi reelected prime minister
1984	June, “Operation Bluestar” in Amritsar 31 October, Indira Gandhi assassinated by Sikhs Rajiv Gandhi (1944–1991), prime minister

1985	New Economic Policy	
1987	Mizoram, Arunachal Pradesh, and Goa became states July, Indian–Sri Lankan treaty signed	
1989	Vishwanath Pratap Singh (b. 1931) becomes prime minister	
1990	Chandra Shekar becomes prime minister	
1991	21 May, Rajiv Gandhi assassinated P. V. Narasimha Rao becomes prime minister	
1992	October, Babri mosque demolished	
1996	Atal Bihari Vajpayee prime minister for thirteen days H. D. Deva Gowda becomes prime minister	
1997	Inder Kumar Gural becomes prime minister	The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) invites Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic to join the alliance, 1997
	Kocheril Raman Narayanan, president of India 29 September, India launches space rocket	
1998	20 March, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, prime minister 11–13 May, India explodes first nuclear devices 13 May, United States imposes economic sanctions on India Violence against Christians begins	
2004	General elections return Congress to power	
2005	India and Pakistan agree to give advance warning of missile tests	



chronology: Pakistan

1947	14 August, Mohammad Ali Jinnah becomes governor-general; Liaquat Ali Khan becomes prime minister 1947	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) is signed by major world powers, 1947
1947–1948	War with India in Kashmir	
1948	11 September, death of Mohammad Ali Jinnah Khawaja Nazimuddin (1894–1964), governor-general	
1949	7 March, Objectives Resolution	
1951	16 October, assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan	
1951–1953	Khawaja Nazimuddin, prime minister	
1951–1955	Ghulam Mohammad (1895–1956), governor-general	
1953–1955	Mohammad Ali Bogra (1909–1963), prime minister	
1954	Pakistan joins Southeast Asia Treaty Organization 24 October, dissolution of Constituent Assembly	
1955	West Pakistan Act Pakistan joins Central Treaty Organization	
1955–1956	Choudhry Mohammad Ali (1905–1980), prime minister	
1956	Syed Iskander Ali Mirza (1899–1969), first president Constitution of Pakistan promulgated	

CHRONOLOGY: PAKISTAN

1956–1957	Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy (1893–1963), prime minister	
1957	October–December, Ismail Ibrahim Chundrigar (1897–1960), prime minister Foundation of the Awami League Party	
1957–1958	Malik Firoz Khan Noon (1893–1970), prime minister	
1958	7 October, military coup by General Ayub Khan (1907–1974), chief martial law administrator	
1960	Indus Water Treaty	
1962	Promulgation of Constitution	
1963	Pact with China	
1965	War with India	World population reaches 3.3 billion, 1965
1966	January, Tashkent Declaration	
1967	Pakistan People's Party founded by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto (1928–1979)	
1969–1971	Agha Muhammad Yahya Khan (1917–1980), president	
1970	First national elections	
1971	Secessionist war with East Pakistan Bangladesh created from East Pakistan	
1971–1977	Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, prime minister	
1977–1988	Zia-ul-Haq (1924–1988), president	
1985–1988	Mohammad Khan Junejo, prime minister	
1986	Foundation of Mohajir Qaumi Movement	
1987	Siachen Glacier incident	
1988–1990	Benazir Bhutto (b. 1953), prime minister	
1990	August–November, caretaker government of Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi	Hubble Space Telescope is launched into outer space, 1990
1990–1993	Mian Nawaz Sharif (b. 1949), prime minister	

1993	April–May, Balakh Sher Mazari, prime minister May–July, Mian Nawaz Sharif, prime minister July–October, Moeen Qureshi, prime minister	
1993–1996	Benazir Bhutto, prime minister	
1997–1999	Nawaz Sharif, prime minister	
1998	May, detonation of six nuclear devices	
1999	June–July, Kargil War	
1999–2001	Pervez Musharraf (b. 1943), chief executive	
2001	Pakistan becomes a frontline state after 11 September Agra Summit	
2001–	Pervez Musharraf, president	
2002	Referendum, Legal Framework Order, general elections	
2002–2004	Zafarullah Khan Jamali (b. 1944), prime minister	North Korea withdraws from the Nonproliferation of Nuclear Weapons Treaty, 2003
2004	Chaudhry Shujaat Hussain (b. 1946), prime minister	
2004–	Shaukat Aziz (b. 1949), prime minister	
2005	Pakistan and India agree to give advance warning of missile tests; Pakistan fires its first cruise missile	



chronology: Bangladesh

- 1971** 26 March, independence of East Pakistan as Bangladesh First microprocessor introduced, 1971
- 4 December, invasion of East Pakistan by Indian army
- 16 December, surrender of Pakistan army
- 18 December, Indian recognition of Bangladesh
- 1972–1975** 10 January, Mujibur Rahman (1920–1975), prime minister
- 1972** 4 November, Bangladesh constitution institutes cabinet government
- 1975** 7 June, constitution amended to a presidential system, Rahman president
- Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (Bangladesh Peasants, Workers, and People's Party) formed by Mujibur Rahman
- 15 August, Mujibur Rahman assassinated in “majors’ plot” Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmed president
- 3 November, military coup by Brigadier Khaled Musharraf; Chief Justice Abu Sadat Mohammad Sayem, president
- 7 November, Musharraf assassinated, Sayem chief martial law administrator
- 1976** Zia-ur Rahman military coup
- 1977** 21 April Zia-ur Rahman president
- 1978** Bangladesh Nationalist Party founded by Zia-ur Rahman

CHRONOLOGY: BANGLADESH

1981	30 May, Zia-ur Rahman assassinated	AIDS (Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome) is officially recognized by the U.S. Centers for Disease Control, 1981
	2 June, Major General Manzur Ahmed killed	
	Justice Abdus Sattar, the vice-president, becomes acting president	
	November, general election, Abdus Sattar president	
1982	24 March, military coup conducted by chief of army staff, Lieutenant General Hussain Muhammad Ershad	
1984	Land Reforms Ordinance	
1985	Jatiyo Party formed by Muhammad Ershad	
1986	November, martial law lifted	
	General elections won by Jatiyo Party	
	7–8 December, South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation inaugural meeting at Dhaka	
1988	General elections won by Jatiyo Party	
1990	6 December, resignation of Muhammad Ershad	
1991	27 February, Khaleda Zia (b. 1945) elected prime minister	
1996	15 February, Khaleda Zia reelected	South Africa adopts democratic constitution ending apartheid, 1996
	12 June, Sheik Khaleda Hasana Rahman (b. 1947) elected prime minister	
2001	10 October, Khaleda Zia reelected prime minister	



chronology: Nepal

KIRATA DYNASTY

- c. 1100 B.C.–A.D. 400** Rule of the Kirata dynasty in Kathmandu Valley Classical Greek civilization emerges, c. 800 B.C.
- 400–879** “Golden Age” of Nepali history under Licchavi dynasty

LICCHAVI DYNASTY

- 400–425** Reign of first Licchavi Vrasadeva
- 875–879** Reign of last Licchavi Mandeva IV
- 879–1200** Medieval period of historical obscurity Greenland discovered by the Norseman Gunbjorn, 900

MALLA DYNASTY

- 1200–1216** Reign of Ari Malla, founder of Malla dynasty
- 1345–1346** Raid on Kathmandu by Shams ud-din Ilyas of Bengal
- 1382–1395** Rule of greatest Malla, Jayasthiti
- 1428–1482** Reign of Yaksha Malla, last powerful Malla
- 1482–1769** Creation of three kingdoms of Kathmandu, Bhadgaun (Bhaktapur), and Patan (Lalitpur) from breakup of Malla dynasty

GURKHA RULE

- 1559** Gurhka principality established

CHRONOLOGY: NEPAL

1743–1775	Expansion of Gurkha principality by Prithvi Narayan Shah	
1769	Unification of Malla kingdoms and creation of Shah dynasty by Prithvi Narayan Shah	
SHAH DYNASTY		
1769–1846	Expansion of Shah territory	
1775–1777	Reign of Pratap Singh Shah	
1777–1799	Reign of Rana Bahadur Shah	French revolution begins, 1789
1788	First Nepal–Tibet War	
1789	Nepal–Tibet Treaty	
1791	Second Nepal–Tibet War	
1792	Signing of Nepal–East India Company commercial treaty	
1793	Kilpatrick Mission	
1799	Abdication of Rana Bahadur Shah	
1799–1816	Reign of Girvana Yuddha Bikram Shah	
1801	Treaty with East India Company	
1803	Expansion of Nepal in Garhwal under Amar Singh Thapa	
1804	Unilateral termination of 1801 treaty with East India Company by the British	
1806–1837	Prime ministership of Bhim Sen	
1814–1816	Anglo-Nepal War	
1816	Treaty of Segauli leads to loss of half of Nepal to East India Company and stationing of East India Company Resident at Kathmandu	
1816–1847	Reign of Rajendra Bikram	
1846	Massacre of 29 court nobles by Jang Bahadur Kunwar	

RANA RULE

1846	Forced abdication of Rajendra Bikram by Prince Surendra Shah	
1846–1877	Prime ministership of Jang Bahadur Rana	London is world's largest city with population of 2.37 million, 1851
1847–1881	Reign of Surendra Shah	
1854	Promulgation of Muluki Ain, modern administrative, legal, and civil codes	
1857–1858	Some 6,000 Nepali troops side with British during Indian mutiny	
1858	Anglo–Nepali entente and beginning of recruitment of Gurkhas to Indian army	
1877–1885	Prime ministership of Rannodip Singh Rana	
1881–1911	Reign of Prithvi Bir Bikram	
1885–1901	Prime ministership of Bir Shamsheer Rana	
1901	One-month rule of Prime Minister Dev Shamsheer Rana	
1901–1929	Prime ministership of Chandra Shamsheer Rana	
1911–1955	Reign of Tribhuvan Bir Bikram	
1914–1918	200,000-plus Gurkha troops join British in World War I	
1918	Tri-Chandra College founded	
1923	Anglo–Nepali treaty and independence of Nepal	
1929–1932	Prime ministership of Bhim Shamsheer Rana	
1932–1945	Prime ministership of Juddha Shamsheer Rana	
1934	Massive earthquake damages Kathmandu	
1936	Foundation of first political party, the Praja Parishad (People's Council)	
1939–1945	Some 160,000 Nepalis recruited for British during World War II	
1940	Arrest of 43 Praja Parishad leaders	

CHRONOLOGY: NEPAL

1941	Execution of four Praja Parishad leaders
1945–1948	Prime ministership of Padma Shamsheer Rana
1947	Foundation in exile in India of All-India Nepali National Congress Nepal legation in London becomes an embassy
1948–1951	Prime ministership of Mohan Shamsheer Rana
1949	Foundation of Communist Party of Nepal
1950	Foundation of Nepali Congress Party
1951	Treaty of Peace and Friendship and Treaty of Trade and Commerce signed with India

SHAH RULE

1951	Demise of Rana power and return of Shah monarchical rule	
1955–1972	Reign of Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah	
1959	New constitution institutes parliamentary government First general elections held and victory of Nepali Congress and prime ministership of B. P. Koirala	
1960	Mahendra Bir Bikram Shah assumes absolutist power, abolishes parliamentary government and bans political parties	
1962	New constitution institutes <i>panchayat</i> system	Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962
1972–1990	Reign of Birendra Bir Bikram Shah	
1980	National referendum on <i>panchayati</i> system	
1981	First elections to <i>panchayats</i>	
1983	Foundation of South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, consisting of seven South Asian nations including Nepal	
1986	Second elections to <i>panchayats</i>	
1989–1990	Trade dispute leads to closing of border with India	
1990	Creation of Movement for the Restoration of Democracy by United Left Front and Nepali Congress Party	

1990	National strikes and demonstrations against King Birendra lead to dissolution of <i>panchayati</i> system and creation of new constitution	
1991	Creation of Communist Party of Nepal (CPN), Unified Marxist-Leninist Party (UML) General elections and victory of Nepali Congress Party	
1991–1994	Prime ministership of Girija Prasad Koirala	
1994	General elections and victory of CPN-UML	
1994–1995	Prime ministership of Man Mohan Adhikari of CPN-UML	
1995–1997	Prime ministership of Sher Bahadur Deuba leading three-party coalition government	
1996	“People's War” declared by Maoist faction of CPN	
1997	March–October, prime ministership of Lokendra Bahadur Chand leading three-party coalition government	
1997 October–April 1998	Prime ministership of Surya Bahadur Thapa	
1998 April–1999	Prime ministership of Girija Koirala	
1999	Third general elections	
1999–2000	Prime ministership of Krishna Prasad Bhattarai	
2000–2001	Prime ministership of Girija Koirala	
2001	1 June, massacre of King Birendra and his immediate family by Crown Prince Dipendra Bir Bikram Shah, who later kills himself	DNA mapping of the human genome is completed, 2001
2001–	Reign of Gyanendra Bir Bikram Shah	
2001 July–October 2002	Prime ministership of Sher Bahadur Deuba	
2001	26 November, declaration of State of Emergency with 30 percent of Nepal controlled by Maoists	
2002	U.S. military advisers sent to Nepal 16–17 February, biggest attack by Maoists leads to death of 142 people	

- 2002**
- 7–14 May, Prime Minister Deuba in United States and Great Britain, asking for increased military and economic assistance
 - 22 May, Parliament dissolved by King Gyanendra
 - 27 May, state of emergency reimposed
 - 19 June, international two-day conference for assistance to Nepal begins in London
 - 4 October, Prime Minister Deuba dismissed
 - 11 October–May 2003, prime ministership of Lokendra Bahadur Chand
- 2003**
- Launch of Joint People's Movement by five political parties against the king
 - June, prime ministership of Surya Bahadur Thapa begins



chronology: Sri Lanka

483 B.C.	Migration of people from north India	
377	Establishment of city of Anuradhapura	Mayan civilization emerges, c. 4th century B.C.
240–210	Introduction of Buddhism	
210–161	Cholas rule from Anuradhapura	
161–137	Dutugemunu unifies Ceylon	
103–89	Pancha-Dravida south Indian rulers in Anuradhapura	
48	Queen Anula ascends to throne	
67 A.D.	Founding of Lambakanna dynasty	
112	Gaja Bahu becomes king	
276–301	Reign of Mahasena	
301–328	Reign of Sirimevan; Tooth Relic brought to Ceylon	
400–500	Compilation of <i>Visudhimagga</i> , <i>Dipavamsa</i> , and <i>Mahavamsa</i>	Middle Ages and rise of feudalism, 5th century
411–413	Visit of Fahsien	
429–455	Sad-Dravida rulers reign over Anuradhapura	
455–477	Reign of Dhatusena	

CHRONOLOGY: SRI LANKA

477	Reign of Kasyapa, Sigiriya palace built	
623	Silameghavanna ascends to throne	
684–718	Reign of Manvamma	
769	Aggabodhi IV moves government from Anuradhapura to Polonnaruwa	
833–853	Reign of Sena I	
993	Chola king Rajaraja I destroys Anuradhapura	
1070	Vijaya Bahu expels Cholas	
1153–1186	Reign of Parakramabahu I	
1187–1196	Reign of Nissanka Malla	
1200–1300	Independent Tamil kingdom established in Jaffna peninsula	
1232–1236	Reign of Vijayabahu III	
1287–1293	Reign of Parakramabahu III	
1341–1351	Reign of Bhuvanekabahu	Bubonic Plague (Black Death) spreads across Europe, 1347–1350
1450	Unification of Ceylon by Parakramabahu VI	
1477–1489	Reign of Vira Parakramabahu	
1479–1519	Jaffna regains independence	
1505	Portuguese Don Lourenço d'Almeida arrives in Ceylon	
1571–1582	Portuguese build fort at Galle	
1580	Ceylon bequeathed to Portuguese	
1587–1588	Great Siege of Colombo	
1595–1596	Arrival of Dutch	
1619	Portuguese capture Jaffna	
1623	Portuguese capture Trincomalee	

1656	Dutch capture Colombo	
1658	Dutch capture Jaffna	
1665	Dutch capture Trincomalee	
1722	Coffee cultivation introduced by Dutch	Industrial Revolution, c. 1750
1764	Dutch destroy Kandy	
1780	Dutch build Star Fort at Matara	
1796	British defeat Dutch and rule Ceylon from Madras	
1797	Frederick North becomes governor of Ceylon, Ceylon Civil Service established	
1801	Supreme Court established	
1802	Ceylon ceded to the British by the Treaty of Amiens, Ceylon becomes a Crown Colony	
1805	London Missionary Society established in Ceylon	
1806	British naval yard established in Trincomalee	
1815	Kandy annexed by the British	
1818	Church Missionary Society established in Ceylon	
1828	Immigrant laborers begin arriving from India	
1831	Colebrooke-Cameron Commission of Enquiry report	
1832	<i>Colombo Journal</i> newspaper published	
1834	<i>Ceylon Observer</i> newspaper published	
1846	<i>Ceylon Times</i> newspaper published	
1858	Undersea cable links Ceylon and India	
1860	<i>Lanka Lokaya</i> , Sinhalese newspaper established	
1864	<i>Udaya Tarakai</i> , Tamil newspaper established	
1866	Municipal councils established in Kandy and Galle	
1870	Tea exported for the first time	

CHRONOLOGY: SRI LANKA

1905	First Sinhalese novel, <i>Meena</i> , by A. Simon Silva published	
1921	University College, Colombo, established	Chinese Revolution, 1911–1949
1928	Donoughmore Commission report published	
1931	Elections to first State Council	
1935	Lanka Sama Samaja Party established	
1936	Elections to the State Council	
1938	Radio Ceylon starts Sinhala service	
1942	University College becomes University of Ceylon	
1943	Communist Party of Ceylon founded	
1944	All Ceylon Tamil Congress founded	
1945	Soulbury Commission Report published	
1946	United National Party founded, new constitution promulgated	
1947	First parliamentary elections held	
1947–1952	Prime ministership of D. S. Senanayake	
1948	4 February, independence of Ceylon	
1949	Ceylon army created, Central Bank of Ceylon established	
1951	Sri Lanka Freedom Party founded	
1952	National anthem adopted, second parliamentary elections	
1952–1953	Prime ministership of Dudley Senanayake	
1953	General strike	
1953–1956	Prime ministership of Sir John Kotelawala	
1954	Asian Prime Ministers Conference inaugurated at Colombo Sir Oliver Goonetilleke, first Ceylonese governor-general	

1955	Ceylon becomes member of United Nations	
1956	Sinhala-only bill passed	
1956–1959	Prime ministership of S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike	
1957	Trincomalee air and naval base and Katunayake air base handed over to Ceylon by British	
1958	Communal riots	
1959	25 September, Prime Minister S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike assassinated	
1959–1960	Prime ministership of W. Dahanayake	
1960	Fourth parliamentary elections March–July, prime ministership of Dudley Senanayake July, fifth parliamentary elections	
1960–1965	Prime ministership of Sirimavo R. D. Bandaranaike	
1961	Bank of Ceylon nationalized	
1963	Sinhala made official language of Ceylon	
1965	Sixth parliamentary elections	
1965–1970	Prime ministership of Dudley S. Senanayake	Martin Luther King Jr. assassinated, 1968
1966	Tamil Language (Special Provisions) Act	
1970	Seventh parliamentary elections	
1970–1977	Prime ministership of Sirimavo R. D. Bandaranaike	
1971	State of Emergency, Senate abolished, Court of Appeal replaces Privy Council	
1972	Sri Lanka declared a republic and republican constitution promulgated; name of country officially changes from Ceylon to Sri Lanka; Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam founded	
1974	Women jurors selected for first time	
1975	Land Reform Law	
1976	Fifth Non-Aligned Summit inaugurated at Colombo	

CHRONOLOGY: SRI LANKA

1977	Eighth parliamentary elections
1977–1978	Prime ministership of Junius R. Jayawardena
1978	Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam proscribed, second republican constitution promulgated with president elected for six-year term
1978–1988	Presidency of Junius R. Jayawardena
1978–1989	Prime ministership of Ranasinghe Premadasa
1979	Prevention of Terrorism Act, State of Emergency declared in Jaffna
1980	Open University commences operations
1982	First Test Match in cricket between Sri Lanka and England held in Colombo, Sinhala–Muslim communal clashes in Galle, referendum to extend eighth parliament for six years
1983	Anti-Tamil riots in Colombo, curfew imposed, anti-Tamil riots spread nationwide, national curfew imposed
1984	Bombs explode in Colombo
1985	Ethnic peace talks
1987	Indo–Sri Lanka Peace Accord, Indian Peace Keeping Force arrives in Sri Lanka
1989	Ninth parliamentary elections held, All-Party Conference held in Colombo, Indian Peace Keeping Force withdraws from Sri Lanka
1989–1993	Presidency of Ranasinghe Premadasa Prime ministership of Dingiri Banda Wijetunga
1993–1994	Presidency of Dingiri Banda Wijetunga
1993–1994	Prime ministership of Ranil Wickremesinghe
1994	Tenth parliamentary elections August–November, prime ministership of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga
1994–	Presidency of Chandrika Bandaranaike Kumaratunga
1994–2000	Prime ministership of Sirimavo R. D. Bandaranaike

1995	Operation Leap Forward in northern Sri Lanka, capture of Jaffna	
1996	Shirani Bandaranayake becomes first woman on Supreme Court	
2000–2001	Prime ministership of Ratnasiri Wickremanayake	
2001–2004	Prime ministership of Ranil Wickremesinghe	U.S. space shuttle “Columbia” explodes reentering atmosphere, 2003
2004–	Prime ministership of Mahinda Rajapaksa	



ABDUL KALAM, AVUL PAKIR JAINULABDEEN (A. P. J.) (1931–), president of India (2002–). Born in Tamil Nadu in 1931 to a poor working-class Muslim family, Dr. Avul Pakir Jainulabdeen Abdul Kalam became India's eleventh president in 2002, the third Muslim to serve as the head of India's republic. A distinguished prominent scientist and administrator, Abdul Kalam had no political experience prior to his election as president. His unpretentious, low-keyed manner and simple clothing and lifestyle initially raised concerns about his ability to meet the demands of his high office, but he has ably managed the heavy duties of the presidency of India and guided the transition from the Bharatiya Janata Party–led coalition government to the Congress Party–led coalition government following the 2004 general elections. His simplicity has won the respect of visiting dignitaries from around the world.

President Abdul Kalam is one of India's most distinguished and well-known scientists, though much of his work was as a science and technology administrator, laying the groundwork for the growth of India's missile and nuclear weapons programs. He studied aeronautical engineering at the Madras Institute of Technology. Known as the "rocket man of India," he made significant contributions as project director to develop India's space rocket program, beginning with the first indigenous satellite launch vehicle (SLV-III), which successfully launched the *Robini* satellite into Earth orbit in July 1980, making India a member of the international "space club." Abdul Kalam was the chief executive for the development of the indigenous guided missile program at the Defence Research and Development Organization (DRDO) of the Indian Ministry of Defence. He was briefly a professor of astronautics at Anna University in Tamil Nadu before his election as president of India.

Abdul Kalam is also credited with the development of the intermediate-range Agni and short-range Prithvi missiles, and for promoting indigenous technologies through the networking of India's main technology institutions. He was scientific adviser to the minister of defence, and secretary of DRDO of the Ministry of Defence from 1992 to 1999. During this period he supervised the transformation of peacetime space rockets into strategic missile systems and prepared the groundwork for India's nuclear tests in May 1998, in collaboration with the Indian Department of Atomic Energy, which made India a nuclear weapons state. He vigorously promoted self-reliance in several other defense fields, including the development of India's light combat aircraft.

President Abdul Kalam is the author of four inspirational books that encourage Indian youth to aspire to higher achievements and the eradication of poverty in India. These are *Wings of Fire*; *India 2020: A Vision for the New Millennium*; *My Journey*; and *Ignited Minds: Unleashing the Power within India*. These books have been translated into many Indian languages. He has also written Tamil poetry. A strict self-disciplinarian, he is a vegetarian, abstains from alcohol, and is unmarried.

Raju G. C. Thomas

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Abdul Kalam, A. P. J. *Wings of Fire: An Autobiography of A. P. J. Abdul Kalam*. New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1999.
- . *Ignited Minds: Unleashing the Power within India*. New Delhi: Penguin India, 2003.
- Abdul Kalam, A. P. J., and Y. S. Rajan. *India 2020*. New Delhi: Penguin India, 2003.
- Pruthi, R. K. *President A. P. J. Abdul Kalam*. New Delhi: Anmol Publications, 2002.

ADVANI, LAL KRISHNA (1927–), *Indian politician.* Former deputy prime minister of India and in 2004 the leader of the opposition Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in the Lok Sabha (the lower house of Parliament), Lal Krishna Advani was born on 8 November 1927 in Karachi (now in Pakistan). Advani came to the center stage of Indian politics with the Ram Rath Yatra (Chariot Procession) he led from Somnath to Ayodhya as the leader of the Hindutva movement.

Advani began his political career as secretary of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh in Karachi in 1942. After independence, he migrated to India and joined the Bharatiya Janata Sangh (BJS) Party as the joint secretary of Rajasthan province. In 1958 he was promoted to party secretary in Delhi. Since then, he has remained a central figure in the party, along with former prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee. During the “National Emergency” imposed by Indira Gandhi in 1975, Advani fought for the restoration of democratic rights, and as a result, he was jailed for eighteen months. Subsequently, when the

Janata Party came to power (1977–1979), Advani was made the cabinet minister for information and broadcasting. During his tenure, he worked to ensure freedom of the press. When the BJP was born out of the BJS, Advani was made its general secretary. As president of the organization from 1986 to 1989, he brought the debate on communalism to the center of Indian politics with his Rath Yatra. Following the Rath Yatra, BJP’s representation in Parliament jumped from two members in 1984 to 181 members by 1999. Advani was instrumental in striking strategic alliances at the state level, then in the formation of the National Democratic Alliance government, led by the BJP, in 1998. He was appointed as the minister for home affairs in 1998 and was promoted to the post of deputy prime minister in July 2002. Following BJP’s defeat in the 2004 general elections and Vajpayee’s withdrawal from active politics, Advani was made leader of the opposition in India’s Parliament.

According to Advani, all Indians are bound by a single religion—Hinduism—irrespective of their personal



Lal Krishna Advani. Advani surrounded by a throng of supporters just prior to the 2004 general elections. Following BJP’s defeat and Atal Bihari Vajpayee’s withdrawal from active politics, Advani became leader of the opposition in India’s Parliament. MUNISH SHARMA/REUTERS/CORBIS.

religious practices. Advani was always convinced about his Hindutva (“Hindu first”) stand, even though this ideological position may have deprived him of the post of prime minister, and even while it intensified the debate over secularism. As a constitutional reformist, he called for an overhaul of the electoral system. His initiatives on curbing defection and criminalization are noteworthy in this regard. Restricting the number of ministers in both union and state cabinets is one of the most evident steps in realizing his vision of Indian politics. Advani has remained a controversial figure, but his contribution to India’s polity will be remembered for his clarity of thought and his capacity to build alliances for forming coalitions, including the National Democratic Alliance, which governed India from 1999 to 2004.

Prafulla Ketkar

See also **Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP); Hindutva and Politics**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Advani, Lal Krishna. *The People Betrayed*. New Delhi: Vision Books, 1979.
- . *A Prisoner’s Scrap-Book*. New Delhi: Prabhat Prakashan, 2003.
- Bhushan, K., and G. Katyal. *Lal Krishna Advani: Deputy Prime Minister*. New Delhi: A P H Publishing, 2002.
- Gaba, Daljit Kaur, et al., eds. *Today’s “Iron Man”: Life and Times of Lal Krishna Advani*. New Delhi: Pentagon, 2002.

AESTHETICS The term “aesthetics” has no equivalent in Indian thought. One could perhaps coin a word *Saundarya Shāstra*, roughly translated as “treatise on beauty,” or use *Alamkara Shāstra*, “treatise on rhetoric.” Can a single theory be used as a criterion for judging and understanding the arts of India—written, visual, and performing? Is there any underlying unity to the arts, since no one text can be said to encompass all art forms? Although some classical arts do derive their antecedents from Bharata’s *Nāṭya Shāstra*, the earliest extant text on the arts, this text, as the name suggests, was concerned with dramaturgy and, by extension, dance and music. The problem is exacerbated in the visual arts of architecture, sculpture, and painting, since these disciplines have individual texts dedicated to their exposition. However, furrowing through this mass of textual prescriptives and descriptives, some concepts and terms seem to emerge as common. Of these, beaconlike, is *rasa*—that word which brings to mind a multitude of sensations through taste, emotion, and delight.

The term *rasa*, in its most widely employed sense, means the sap or juice of plants, an extract or fluid. In its secondary sense, *rasa* signifies the nonmaterial essence of



Rural Rajasthan Village Home. Home of an affluent family (evidenced in its two stories) in rural Rajasthan village outside the city of Udaipur. With its deeply symbolic wall paintings, construction from natural local materials, and pleasing simplicity, it becomes an intriguing metaphor for the larger Indian aesthetic: craft elevated to fine art, pure emotion (*rasa*) as distilled by art. AMAR TALWAR / FOTOMEDIA.

a thing, the best and finest part of it, like perfume. As essence, it is described as *ātman* (soul), or the giver of life to a literary work, which is the body. In its tertiary sense, it denotes taste, flavor, or relish, often yielding pleasure. As in the case of a taste like sweetness, there is no knowing of *rasa* apart from directly experiencing it. The final and subtlest sense, however, is the application of the word to art and aesthetic experience, in which it becomes synonymous with *ānanda*, the kind of bliss that can only be experienced by the spirit.

Rasa, as one of the foremost criteria of art criticism, has been theorized, developed, and commented upon by innumerable savants and rhetoricians over the centuries. Starting with Bharata, author of the supposed second-century *Nāṭya Shāstra*, and ending with that intellectual giant of the eleventh century, Abhinava Gupta of Kashmir, *rasa* runs through a gamut of meanings.

It is sufficiently clear that *rasa* for the early thinkers has only an aesthetic form. It is, on one level, the content of art, as a sentiment, mood, or emotion. This led to the development of the eightfold scheme of *rasa*. On the other level, *rasa* is the joy resulting from an indescribable aesthetic experience, variously called *alaukika* (other-worldly) and *chamatkara* (wondrous). The purpose of art creation is clearly entertainment and moral instruction. By the time of Abhinava Gupta, *rasa* takes on a metaphysical dimension. By championing a ninth *rasa* based on the mood of equanimity and tranquillity, in which the knowledge of one's soul forms the fulcrum, Abhinava's philosophical leaning is evident. Art now has the power to give a sense of liberation, or *moksha*. The experience of *rasa*, or what is called *rasānubhava*, transforms from mere joy to a state of undifferentiated bliss called *ānanda*, analogous to Brahman, the Supreme Reality in Vedānta. To these aesthetic and metaphysical aspects of *rasa*, the *bhakti* (devotion) resurgence, spearheaded by the fifteenth-century Bengal Vaishnava saints, added a new impetus. This movement, characterized by a deep passionate love for the divine, expressed itself in terms of human relationships. Lover and beloved, sacred and profane, mystical and carnal merge into a vocabulary of distilled adoration. Krishna becomes the conventional lover, heroic warrior, and religious Godhead, and Rādhā is the beloved, the cowherdess, and the divine soul. Rupa Goswamin, follower of the fifteenth–sixteenth century saint Chaitanya, borrowed the existing *rasa* phraseology to create his own version, making it into a tenfold scheme, which, however, did not survive the scrutiny of the rhetoricians.

The fountainhead of the *rasa* theory is Bharata's *sūtra* or aphorism in the *Nāṭya Shāstra*: "*Vibhāva Anubhāva Vyabbichāri Samyogāt Rasa Nishpattib*" (the coming together of *vibhāva*, *anubhāva* and *vyabbichāri bhāva* creates *rasa*). The implicit term is *bhāva*, which means "mood" or "mental state." Each of these factors makes up a whole that is greater than the sum of its parts.

Vibhāva is any condition that excites or develops a particular state of mind, which then becomes the actual cause or determinant of the creation of art. There are two kinds of *vibhāva*: *ālambana*, or stimulants, and *uddīpana*, or excitants. Examples of *ālambana vibhāva* are characters in a work of art such as heroes and heroines, messengers, villains, companions, jesters, servants, and so on. Thus the heroes and heroines poetically called *Nāyaka* and *Nāyikā*, as chief protagonists in a work of art, are decisively classified and codified in infinite detail. Based on minute observation and experience, their physical, emotional, and mental states, especially in various situations of love, are tenderly captured and conventionalized, thus becoming essential subjects for all art forms.

Poets, dancers, and painters alike favor the *Abhisārikā Nāyikā*, or "one who boldly goes out to meet her lover to keep her tryst." *Uddīpana vibhāva* are factors that enhance the underlying mood or sentiment. The actions and behavior of the characters, their ornamentations, manners, and body language are all examples. Deflections, postures, and gestures are suggestive of an inner state. Metaphors and similes from nature used to express a mood are also examples of *uddīpana vibhāva*, such as the languorous caress of a gentle breeze or dark monsoon clouds as poignant reminders of past togetherness. *Anubhāva* are the consequences, the physical reactions, and the external manifestations or indications of a feeling by appropriate gestures. Some *anubhāva* include *līlā* (when one imitates a loved one), *vibhrama* (extreme flutter), and *lalita* (gentleness in behavior). The eight *sāttvika bhāva*, or temperamental states, are also part of the *anubhāva*. These include becoming rooted to a spot, perspiration, shock, goosebumps, change of voice, trembling, change of color, weeping, and fainting. *Vyabbichāri bhāva* are mental reactions, ancillary or subordinate feelings, and moods that are transitory. These are also called *sanchāri bhāva* and are generally thirty-three in number. Some examples are *nirveda* (mental anguish), *mada* (intoxicated state), *moha* (perplexed condition), *garva* (extreme pride), and *vridā* (shyness).

An artwork, according to this theory, would have one major mood permeating it, with the other transitory moods serving only as embellishments. This dominant mood is called *sthāyī bhāva* and is both universal and latent. When the *vibhāva*, *anubhāva*, *vyabbichāri bhāva* come together in an appropriate manner in an artwork, this predominant, latent, and universal *sthāyī bhāva* is aroused and transformed into *rasa*. The principle of *auchitya*, or appropriateness, governs the rules of technique such as line, proportion, measure, color, and design. These, if correctly followed, would necessarily lead to the proper delineation of a mood, as illustrated in Table 1. *Rasa* is therefore both the aroused *sthāyī bhāva* as well as the experience of the arousal. To the eight *rasas*, a ninth was added. This was *śānta*, or tranquillity, its *sthāyī bhāva* being *śama* (to be calm) or *nirveda* (world-weariness). The tenth *rasa*, championed by the Bengali saints, is *bhakti rasa*, with its *sthāyī bhāva* as *madhurā rati*, or mystical love. Of all these, one sentiment dominates; a work of art propels a spectator forward, or becomes the occasion of a *rasa* experience.

Of all the *rasas*, the early rhetoricians and later writers on poetics give preeminence to *śringāra*, calling it *rasa rāja* (king of the sentiments) or *rasa pati* (lord of the sentiments). The depiction of the amorous sentiment in all Indian art—visual, performing, and literary—is bold, uncompromising, and celebratory of life. From the works

TABLE 1

The eight-rasa system	
<i>Sthayi bhava</i>	<i>Rasa</i>
<i>Rati</i> : Love	<i>Shringara</i> : Amorous
<i>Has</i> : Laughter	<i>Hasya</i> : Humorous
<i>Shoka</i> : Sorrow	<i>Karuna</i> : Compassion
<i>Krodha</i> : Anger	<i>Raudra</i> : Wrathful
<i>Utsaha</i> : Energy	<i>Vira</i> : Heroic
<i>Bhaya</i> : Fright	<i>Bhayanaka</i> : Fearful
<i>Jugupsa</i> : Disgust	<i>Bibhatsa</i> : Revulsion
<i>Vismaya</i> : Astonishment	<i>Adbhuta</i> : Wondrous
SOURCE: Courtesy of author.	

of Kalidasa, the renowned fourth-century Sanskrit poet, to Konarak and Khajuraho (medieval temples), one sees a plethora of this sentiment in all its subtle nuances and in the infinitely varied forms of love, both in union and separation.

The Jain rhetoricians have declared the primacy of *vīra rasa*, or the heroic sentiment. The firmness, patience, determination, and fortitude of the characters portraying this sentiment reaffirm Jain values. The *jina* (one who has conquered) images in sculpture and painting convey an air of quiet authority and energetic dignity.

The chief goal of creativity, literary or otherwise, is to produce *rasa*, which is not raw emotion but emotion depersonalized, divested of all the accidents of circumstance; it is emotion represented and distilled by art. Those artworks that are found wanting of *rasa* are considered flawed. As a result, all the techniques enunciated in the manuals of each art form are based on principles through which these *rasa* states can be evoked. These principles are evident in the rules of proportion in architecture; in the detailed formulations of the principles of *tāla* (measurement) and *bhanga* (stance) of Indian sculpture; in the relative disposition and proportion of color and perspective in painting, in the patterns of the division and combinations of the movements of the major limbs (*anga*) and the minor limbs (*upānga*) in dancing; and in the use of *shruti* and *swara* (notes) in a given mode (*rāga*) to create a particular mood in Indian music (Vatsyayan, p. 6).

The artist, through his or her *pratibhā*, or creative genius, endeavors to create a form through the language of structure, arrangement, and composition. The possible choices are often minute, the prescribed form strict. But for the greatest of them, these prescriptions lead to enormous creative energy. A point to be remembered is that *rasa* necessitates the use of symbols and the power of suggestion. Permeated with emotion, these creative works then find a resonance in the empathetic critic.

Such a sensitized spectator or reader, called *sabridaya*, must be both a *rasika* (an emotionally mature individual) and a *rasajna* (a discriminating aesthete). The act of detached contemplation of a mood is what makes the artistic experience delightful.

Rasa, according to traditional definition, is thus the aesthetic experience of an artistically engendered emotion. It cannot be experienced at the level of the mundane or empirical because it belongs to the world of art. Life provides the raw material, and actual experiences are the springboard for the artist, whose creation is unique and unlike anything in real life. Yet, like emotions in real life, aesthetic emotion too needs a cause. It too expresses itself through different shades of reactions, and it is built up through different shades of the dominant mood. There is a crucial difference, however, between actual emotion and the aesthetic one: while the cause and effects of worldly emotions are personal, the aesthetic mood suggests the universal through stylized depiction. An important point to be noted is that *rasāśvāda*, or the tasting of an aesthetic mood, is always pleasurable, regardless of the emotion portrayed. Therefore *rasa* is one, or *ekarasa*. The nine variants are based on the human responses to a situation.

The nature of aesthetic experience has been pursued within the framework of recognized schools of philosophical thought, leading to a view that the state of being which art experiences evoked was a state akin to that of spiritual realization (*Brāhmānanda sabodharā*). The experience is not a phenomenal happening or a perception induced by cognitive processes operating in the empirical context, but one in which the mind finds full repose. The beautiful is the experiencing of any mental process at its most intense point. According to Abhinava Gupta, who combined the best of aesthetics and philosophy within the Kashmir Shaivist framework, even though there is at times an objective consciousness, there is also a state of complete self-forgetfulness, since the subject is fully merged and absorbed in the objective factor. One who experiences this is infused with the throbbing pulsation of a mysterious and marvelous kind of enjoyment, which is uninterrupted, ceaseless, and replete with a feeling of satiety. This is how Abhinava describes *chamatkāra*, or wonder.

The followers of Vedānta have described *rasa* in negative terms. It is not an object of knowledge, not an effect, not permanent, not known in the present or future, and the experience is neither direct nor indirect. The validity of its existence is its experience. This is neither an ordinary worldly one, nor a false one, nor indefinable, nor resembling a worldly apprehension, nor anything superimposed upon that. In other words, it is *alaukika*, or otherworldly.

Rashmi Poddar

See also **Dance Forms; Kashmir Painting; Literature; Miniatures; Music; Nātyashāstra**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Anandavardhana. *Dhvanyaloka*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982.
- Chakravarti, S. C. *Philosophical Foundation of Bengal Vaisnavism*. Kolkata: Academic Publishers, 1969.
- Coomaraswamy, Ananda K. *The Dance of Shiva*. New Delhi: Sagar Publications, 1987.
- De, Sushil Kumar. *Early History of the Vaisnava Faith and Movement in Bengal*. 2nd ed. Kolkata: General Printers, 1942.
- Kaviraja, Visvanatha. *Sabitya Darpana*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1986.
- Masson, J. L., and M. V. Patwardhan. *Santarasa and Abhinavagupta's Philosophy of Aesthetics*. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1985.
- Miller, Barbara Stoler. *The Gita Govinda of Jaiideva*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984.
- Pandey, K. C. *Abhinavagupta: An Historical and Philosophical Study*. Varanasi: Chowkhambha Sanskrit Series Office, 1963.
- Poddar Rashmi. "Rasa and Ananda: A Visual Discovery." Ph.D. diss., University of Bombay, 1996.
- Rajan, Chandra. *Kalidasa: The Loom of Time*. New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1989.
- Siegel, Lee. *Sacred and Profane Dimensions of Love in Indian Traditions as Exemplified in the Gita Govinda of Jayadeva*. Mumbai: Oxford University Press, 1990.
- Vatsyayan, Kapila. *Classical Indian Dance in Literature and the Arts*. 2nd ed. New Delhi: Sangeet Natak Akademi, 1977.

AFGHANI, JAMAL-UD-DIN (c. 1838–1897), *journalist, political activist, one of the leaders of the Pan-Islamic movement*. Sayyid Jamal-ud-din, known outside Iran as Afghani and in Iran as Asadabadi, was born in Asadabad, in northeast Iran, in 1838 or 1839. Although he usually claimed to be from Afghanistan, primary documents establish beyond doubt that he was born and educated in Iran. In his teens he continued his education in the Shi'a shrine cities of Iraq and then went to India via the Iranian port Bushire. He was in India at the time of the 1857 "mutiny" and possibly this trip helped to cause his lifetime hostility to British imperialism. From India he went, via Iraq and Iran, to Afghanistan, where he tried to persuade the amir to fight the British. Expelled by a new amir, he went to Istanbul, where the ulama (religious scholars) attacked him for a talk comparing prophecy and philosophy, which reflected his background in the Islamic philosophers. He spent eight years (1871–1879) in Egypt, where he educated a group of young reformers, including Muhammad Abduh and others who were later prominent, teaching them elements of Islamic reform, aimed at strengthening Egypt

and other Muslim countries. In 1878 and 1879 he entered Egyptian politics with fiery speeches against the khedive and the British; the new khedive, Taufiq, expelled him from Egypt.

He returned to India for over two years, during which he gave a number of well-attended talks in Hyderabad. There he published in Persian his famous work, usually translated as "A Refutation of the Materialists." It attacked the pro-British reformer, Sayyid Ahmed Khan, implying he was an irreligious materialist. Before this work, Afghani was as known for religious heterodoxy as was Sayyid Ahmed, and the real basis for his attack was Sayyid Ahmed's cooperation with the British, whom Afghani strongly opposed.

In Hyderabad, Afghani published in Persian a series of journal articles, later published as *Maqalat-e Jamaliyeh*. During the Urabi movement in Egypt, he left Hyderabad and was apparently kept under surveillance by the British in Calcutta until Urabi's defeat, when he left for Paris. There he wrote his "Answer to Renan," which implies a view of revealed religion as untrue but useful for the masses. Abduh joined him in Paris and together they published the pan-Islamic newspaper, *al-Urwa al-Wuthqa*, distributed free throughout the Muslim world.

After a stay in Britain with Wilfrid Blunt in 1884 and 1885, Afghani returned to Iran, then went to Russia to try to promote a Russian war against Britain, then back to Iran, where he influenced Iranians to publish leaflets against the shah's concessions to Europeans. He was expelled from Iran to Iraq in 1891, where he influenced the leader of the Shi'a ulama, who supported a successful mass Iranian movement against a tobacco concession to the British by decreeing an Iranian boycott of tobacco.

Afghani then went to England, working with the Iranian-Armenian Malkom Khan in his reformist newspaper, *Qanun*. In 1892 he accepted an invitation to Istanbul from the Ottoman sultan Abdülhamid II, but there, after helping the sultan to gain supporters in Shi'a regions, he was confined to virtual house arrest. He died of cancer in 1897. Stories of the sultan's having him poisoned, like many stories about him, are untrue.

Afghani left a mixed legacy of Western-inspired reform of Muslim countries for self-strengthening, hostility to (British) imperialism and, from 1883 on, a pan-Islamic idea of uniting Muslim countries against the West. He sometimes worked with rulers and sometimes agitated against them. Different parts of his legacy have been emphasized by different groups down to today, and he remains a major symbolic figure in the Muslim world.

Nikki Keddie

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Keddie, Nikki R. *Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani": A Political Biography*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.
- . *An Islamic Response to Imperialism: Political and Religious Writings of Sayyid Jamal ad-Din "al-Afghani": With a New Introduction: From Afghani to Khomeini*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.
- Pakdaman, Homa. *Djamaled-Din Assad Abadi dit Afghani*. Paris: Maisonneuve, 1969.

AFGHANISTAN The Treaty of Rawalpindi in August 1919, ending the Third Afghan War and restoring Afghanistan's control of its foreign relations, opened a new chapter in relations between Afghanistan and India. To the government of India, Afghanistan was a pathway for a Soviet advance and subversion, or a source of instability from internal unrest or actions by Kabul or tribal or religious leaders who could exploit the cross-border sympathies of the Pathan population. To Indian nationalists, Afghanistan provided an attractive destination, whether Deobandi-educated Muslim clergy, Communists enroute to Moscow, or deserting soldiers. Indian and Afghan nationalism developed many links. Extensive ties of culture and commerce between Afghanistan and India included the Hindu and Sikh minorities in Afghanistan, while Afghan traders were long established throughout India.

The accession to the Afghan throne of the anti-British modernizing nationalist Amanullah Shah in 1919 ended Afghanistan's buffer state relationship. But after the Soviets, establishing power on the northern border, concluded their 1921 treaty with Afghanistan, Amanullah became more receptive to cooperation with Delhi. He signed the 1921 Treaty of Kabul. Under its provisions a British envoy—the first since 1879—arrived in Kabul in 1922. A trade agreement followed in 1923. However, Amanullah's modernization of Afghanistan had dissolved into civil war by 1929.

After the war, the weakened Kabul government of Nadir Shah needed support from Delhi, a policy continued by his brother and successor Hashim Khan, and by Zahir Shah (acceded 1933) throughout the 1930 and 1940s. Delhi supported the government in Kabul as a counterweight to the actions of Afghan religious figures and tribes and as a barrier against the Soviets. During the 1940s, agreements were made to equip and train Afghan troops from India.

With independence and partition, relations between India and Afghanistan became inescapably shaped by Pakistan. Afghanistan had first supported independence for a united India, and then called for extension of referendum options to the North-West Frontier and Baluchistan

provinces rather than compelling accession to Pakistan. Afghanistan claimed that any border agreements signed with British authorities did not apply to successor states. In September 1947, Afghanistan was the only country to oppose the admission of Pakistan to the United Nations, citing this issue.

The conflict in Jammu and Kashmir, starting with Maharaja Hari Singh's indecision over the issue of accession, escalated in October 1947. A traditional *lashkar* (army) of Pathans—raised on both sides of the Durand Line with Pakistani military leadership—was sent into Kashmir, only to be defeated by Indian armed forces. This established the importance, for India, of the need to separate Afghanistan from Pakistani control.

India used diplomatic and commercial relations to deflect Pakistani rhetoric, placate India's Muslim population, support Afghanistan's Hindu and Sikh minorities, and continue contact with Pathan nationalist leaders, some of whom, such as Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, the "frontier Gandhi," had been close to Jawaharlal Nehru and the leadership of the Indian National Congress before 1947. A treaty of friendship, signed in New Delhi in 1950, was followed by repeated Afghan prime ministerial visits.

India's inability to provide substantial aid to Afghanistan, as the British had done, encouraged the emergence of the Soviet role as an aid donor in Afghanistan. India joined with the Soviets in urging Afghanistan to continue to press the Pushtunistan issue and avoid security relations with the United States and the West.

Pakistan saw India-Afghanistan relations as hostile, aimed at encirclement. However, Afghanistan's neutrality in the 1965 India-Pakistan war led to an abatement of Pakistani hostility and Pushtunistan tensions. India provided aid during Afghanistan's 1970–1971 drought. Afghanistan was again neutral in the 1971 war. The 1973 seizure of power in Afghanistan by Prince Mohammed Daoud was accepted; his pro-Soviet stance was consistent with India's growing security relationship with Moscow. India was now an aid donor to Afghanistan, primarily developmental but including military training.

India's 1971 victory led Pakistan to plan on Afghanistan as a source of "strategic depth," capable of providing potential bases and also acting as a source of pan-nationalist Islamist fervor and ideology, as well as guerrillas who could be used—with plausible deniability—against India as well as against Daoud. In 1978, Daoud looked to India (along with Iran) for aid and support, distancing himself from the Soviet Union. This helped motivate the violent 1978 putsch by Communist military officers. India, following the Soviet lead, recognized the



Terraced Fields in Afghanistan. Afghanistan's terraced farming, depicted here, is largely dependent on irrigation, and irrigation works require constant maintenance. Ravaged by years of conflict, many of the country's farms are only now being restored. INDIA TODAY.

new Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. This regime's brutal policies led to widespread resistance, motivating increasing Soviet military involvement, culminating in the invasion of December 1979.

The 1980 decision of Indira Gandhi's government not to openly oppose the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan reflected the importance of the security relationship with the Soviet Union. Abstaining in the United Nations (UN) General Assembly and Non-Aligned Movement votes was unpopular domestically (especially with Indian Muslims) and internationally. It undercut Indian claims to a leadership role in the developing world and strained relations with the United States, Europe, the Middle East, and China. It was resented by most (except the pro-Soviet minority) Afghans.

From 1980 to 1986, India became increasingly concerned about the apparently permanent Soviet occupation. Acquiescence to invasion undercut policies stressing noninterference in the region and peaceful coexistence. India used its relationship with the Soviet Union to

privately push for a peaceful settlement, earning little gratitude in Moscow. India was also concerned at the acquisition of modern weapons by Pakistan—threatened by Soviets along the Durand Line—and the Pakistan-based Afghan resistance. The war caused many of Afghanistan's estimated 20,000 Hindus and 10,000 Sikhs to become refugees or to emigrate; the communities in Kabul and Jalalabad, though diminished, remained. India received over 100,000 Afghan refugees of all backgrounds.

By 1986–1987, changes under the new Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev and negotiations in Geneva led India to believe the Soviet military would withdraw. India wanted the Soviets to leave a pro-Moscow government in Kabul, strong enough to prevent the rise to power of the Pakistan-based resistance parties. India recognized the new Republic of Afghanistan (with the former secret police chief, Najibullah, as head of state) formed in 1986. It received some Indian medical and financial aid plus a small military assistance mission, but remained illegitimate in the eyes of most Afghans as well as in the international community.

In the late 1980s, responding to Indian accusations of involvement in the insurgency in the Punjab, and following the 1987 Brass Tacks exercise crisis (when Indian forces deploying to the border area were seen as a possible preparation for invasion), Pakistan used Afghanistan to internationalize the conflict in Kashmir. The goal of some in the Pakistani security services was that Afghanistan would be replicated in Kashmir, using weapons supplied for Afghans. Kashmiris, Afghans, and Islamic foreigners alike were trained in camps (run by Pakistani intelligence or foreign organizations) on Afghan territory.

India supported many abortive approaches for peace—by the United Nations and others—in 1989–1992, but Pakistan aimed to exclude Indian participation. The Republic of Afghanistan, militarily strong enough to endure beyond the Soviet withdrawal in February 1989, collapsed only with the end of the Soviet Union. Kabul fell to the resistance in April 1992.

India recognized the Islamic State of Afghanistan (ISA), which replaced the Republic of Afghanistan, in 1993. (Najibullah had tried, unsuccessfully, to flee to India.) The importance of the relationship with India to the ISA was shown by the selection, as ambassador, of Massoud Khalili, one of the most skilled political officers of the Afghan resistance and a close associate of internal resistance leader Ahmad Shah Massoud. India desired good relations with Kabul and opposed the Pakistan-backed Islamic radical and fundamentalist Afghan groups that waged a proxy war against it, the Hezb-i-Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, from 1993 to 1996 and, after 1994, the Taliban.

India sought to use Afghanistan to help build ties (aimed at energy sources and economic growth) to former Soviet Central Asia and to combat radical Islamic support for Kashmiri insurgents and destabilization in Central Asia. India's policy on Afghanistan remained consistent with that of Moscow. India also sought to work with Iran in limiting Pakistani ambitions in Afghanistan, agreeing with Iran to develop a north-south corridor, the ultimate goal being expansion of the Iranian port of Chahbahar, connecting it by rail to Afghanistan at Zaranj.

Pakistan saw this as a continuation of Indian encirclement. An Indian airlift of a limited amount of military aid (helicopter parts) in 1995, plans to reopen consulates, and provision of developmental aid were all seen as threats. Pakistan defined a friendly government in Kabul as one that excluded Indian influence, and achieved considerable success in barring India from the UN "six-plus-two" process and from most international forums dealing with Afghanistan, except for a few meetings under UN auspices and others organized by Iran and Kazakhstan.

The Indian mission in Kabul was forced to close by the civil war in 1994. Kabul fell to the Taliban in 1996. Pakistan continued to support the Taliban against the ISA, which moved its capital north. India did not recognize the Taliban regime, keeping the ISA embassy in New Delhi open and providing them with support. Unlike Iran, India did not provide identifiable military supplies. The type and volume of Indian support for the ISA from 1996 to 2001, while not publicly revealed, was obviously considerably less than Pakistan's extensive support to the Taliban.

The Taliban, influenced by al-Qaeda and terrorist organizations, allowed the use of training camps to support violence in Kashmir, Central Asia, and elsewhere. These groups also persuaded the Taliban to repress the remaining Hindu and Sikh minorities in Afghanistan. The hijacking of an Indian airliner to Britain in 1999 by



Man Manufacturing Headgear in Afghanistan. Afghani craftsman examining his wares, hats created from the hides of local livestock. Though liberated from the oppression of the Taliban regime, with a significantly damaged infrastructure, Afghanistan remains extremely poor and highly dependent on foreign aid, including that from India with whom diplomatic relations have just been recently reestablished. INDIA TODAY.

Afghans demanding the release of prisoners strengthened India's opposition to the Taliban. Al-Qaeda's assassination of Ahmad Shah Massoud on 9 September 2001 also badly wounded Ambassador Massoud Khalili, in Afghanistan for consultation. In the ensuing fighting in 2001–2002, India supported the ISA forces that, with U.S. and allied military participation, defeated the Taliban and al-Qaeda. India provided monetary rather than overt military aid, reestablishing its mission in Kabul soon after the Taliban's defeat.

The Indian special envoy to Afghanistan, S. K. Lambah, played a facilitating role in the post-conflict Bonn conference. India pledged a U.S.\$100 million developmental aid package in the January 2002 Tokyo conference. Medicine, transportation, and communications were among the areas of Indian aid. The new Afghan government responded with ministerial visits and, in February 2002, Hamid Karzai—educated in India—made his first trip as acting president. This visit elicited the announcement of a further \$10 million in aid, cooperation in antiterrorist measures, and long-term programs, including Indian training for Afghan security and governmental personnel. Massoud Khalili, recovering from his wounds, returned to India as Afghan ambassador.

High-profile terrorist attacks from groups with links to Afghanistan in 2001–2002 and the continuing Kashmir conflict kept the end of the civil war in Afghanistan from benefiting other Indian relations. Despite Pakistan's opposition to Indian participation in multilateral forums on Afghanistan—such as the 2002 Kabul Declaration on regional security—India remained committed to supporting the government in Kabul. Following 2003 bilateral and transit trade agreements with Afghanistan, India in 2004 asked for U.S. support to secure access through Pakistan. India has supported Afghanistan's membership in SAARC (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation).

India's policy goals toward Afghanistan, consistent since 1919, have focused on good relations with the government in Kabul, irrespective of its nature. Only in 1996–2001, under the radical pro-terrorist Taliban, was India willing to support the opposition, when it constituted the internationally recognized ISA government. In the future, Kabul is likely to continue to value relations with India. This is likely to align India with Moscow, as before, but now also with the United States and Europe, though tensions with Pakistan over relations with Afghanistan remain. India remains concerned that Pakistani economic and Pathan ethnic links could exert control over Kabul's policies. Indian relations with Afghanistan have value as a model for Muslims, domestic and international. Afghan resentment over Indian policies from 1979 to 1992 and unhappiness over Kashmir have not affected relations. Delhi's 1919 objectives—to

support an independent and cohesive Afghanistan and to defend it against nonstate threats—are likely to remain consistent in the future.

David C. Isby

See also **Anglo-Afghan Wars; Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier; Islam's Impact on India**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adamec, Ludwig W. *Afghanistan's Foreign Affairs to the Mid-Twentieth Century, Relations with the USSR, Germany and Britain*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1974.
- Davis, Anthony. "India Woos Afghanistan at Pakistan's Expense." *Jane's Intelligence Review* 14, no. 11 (November 2002): 34–35.
- Dixit, J. N. *An Afghan Diary: Zahir Shah to Taliban*. New Delhi: Konark Publishers, 2000.
- . *India's Foreign Policy, 1947–2003*. New Delhi: Picus Books, 2003.
- Dupree, Louis. *Afghanistan*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980.
- Ganguly, Samit. "India and Pakistan in the Shadow of Afghanistan." *Current History* 101, no. 654 (April 2002): 147–152.
- Gregorian, Vartan. *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880–1946*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969.
- Nayar, Baldev Raj, and T. V. Paul. *India in the World Order: Searching for Major Power Status*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Thomas, Raju G. C. "Afghanistan, Kashmir, China and the Territorial Question in South Asia." *Mediterranean Quarterly* 13, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 107–118.
- Wolpert, Stanley. *Roots of Confrontation in South Asia: Afghanistan, Pakistan, India and the Superpowers*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1982.

AFGHANISTAN, MILITARY RELATIONS WITH, 1994–2001

In the mid- to late 1990s, New Delhi together with Tehran joined a long line of nations, including the United States and Russia, united in their common goal of curtailing the Taliban's activities in Afghanistan, by providing material and diplomatic support to the Northern Alliance's United Front (UF). The Taliban movement, which materialized in mid-1994 under the direction of Mullah Mohammed Omar, had grown strong with Pakistan's support in reaction to widespread lawlessness in the south. By late 2000 the Taliban controlled around two-thirds of Afghanistan, although in many areas this amounted to little more than a small armed presence in the major towns. The support the UF received from India and other nations steadily grew and became increasingly desperate in the years before 2001, as regional powers sought to avert the capitulation of the UF who were operating in northern Afghanistan, and to prevent the Taliban from gaining complete control of the country.

The Tehran-New Delhi Axis

Tehran and New Delhi viewed the containment of the Taliban as essential to their national security interests. Besides India's determination to contain Taliban trained terrorist groups and factions from Afghanistan, which they believed were fueling the Kashmir conflict, New Delhi had grave concerns over the spread of Taliban fundamentalism into Pakistan and the training of personnel who could fight in Kashmir against Indian forces and interests. Should, for whatever reason, the moderate Pakistani regime collapse, India was concerned that an Islamic fundamentalist regime, backed by the Taliban, might take power. Even the remote possibility that such an extreme regime might inherit Pakistan's nuclear weapons capability and ballistic missiles was a scenario that New Delhi wanted to avoid. India also feared that an extreme Islamic government coming to power in Pakistan could destabilize South Asia, risking a full-scale war, possibly involving nuclear weapons. Fortunately, the prospect of Islamic fundamentalists taking power in Pakistan remains remote. Despite unease in Pakistan and continuing sectarian conflicts in Karachi, any attempt to develop a fundamentalist government in Islamabad would encounter little support in that country.

In an attempt to contain the spread of the Taliban, India admitted in October 2001 that for two years New Delhi had covertly assisted the UF, providing technical assistance, defense equipment, and medical aid. India's involvement began shortly after the hijacking in 1999 of one of its domestic airliners, with 155 passengers and crew, by Pakistan-backed terrorists who forced the aircraft to fly to Kandahar. In a humiliating deal with the Taliban, India secured the release of the hostages and aircraft in exchange for three Kashmiri terrorists held in an Indian jail, and an undisclosed sum of money. For over a year the Indian army had been running a field hospital near Farkhor on the Afghan border south of Dushanbe; the UF's charismatic commander, Ahmad Shah Massoud, was assassinated by a two-man suicide commando on September 9, 2001. Through Tajikistan, India also reportedly supplied the UF with high-altitude warfare equipment worth some U.S.\$8 million to 10 million. A handful of Indian defense "advisers" were reportedly based in Tajikistan to assist the UF in its operations against the Taliban. Technicians from the secretive aviation research center operated by India's Research and Intelligence Wing helped repair the UF's Soviet Mi-17 and Mi-35 attack helicopters. India also purchased Russian helicopters from Moscow to pass on to the UF. There were also unconfirmed reports of Indian Special Forces assisting UF forces and of New Delhi providing cash grants to the UF via its embassy in Tehran.

Indian-Iranian cooperation to counter the Taliban was codified in April 2001 with the signing of new strategic pact during Indian prime minister Atal Vajpayee's visit to

Tehran. Had it not been for the U.S. military involvement in Afghanistan in October 2001, India was expected to provide further assistance to anti-Taliban forces via Iran, and to fight Taliban-sponsored insurgents operating in Jammu and Kashmir. To some extent, remnants of the Taliban and al-Qaeda are understood to be still actively involved in Kashmir. The northern tip of Kashmir shares a border with Afghanistan.

India had further incentives to curtail the Taliban's activities in Afghanistan in view of their treatment of Hindus. From May 2000 until their fall, the Taliban ordered all Hindus in their controlled areas to wear a piece of yellow cloth to, as they put it, protect them against Taliban religious policemen enforcing Muslims to attend mosques daily and to ensure that they did not cut their beards. Hindus and Muslims were prohibited from sharing the same house. Observers could argue that these practices were similar to the Nazis' treatment of Jews in Germany during the 1930s and 1940s.

India found Iran to be a willing partner in its fight against the Taliban, since Tehran had viewed the Taliban as an irritant since the mid-1990s. In 1998, Iran and Afghanistan came close to full-scale war, following the murder of Iranian diplomats and journalists during the Taliban's seizure of Mazar-e Sharif that August. In September 1998, Iran mobilized around 200,000 troops along its border with Afghanistan, which led to a number of minor skirmishes. Relations did thaw in November 1999 with the reopening of the Iranian-Afghanistan border, but Iran continued to provide military assistance to anti-Taliban factions. Assistance extended to airlifting freshly trained troops from Iran to neighboring Tajikistan. Iran had been at the forefront of providing weaponry to anti-Taliban factions since 1994, when the Taliban first appeared in Afghanistan.

Iran viewed the Taliban with concern since its inception, initially fearing the Sunni force as a Western-backed operation designed to rid Afghanistan of its Shi'a minority, the same branch of Islam that is dominant in Iran. After the Taliban's success in taking control of Herat in 1995, Iran commented that the Taliban had been "conceived" by America, was funded by Saudi Arabia, and was logistically supported by Pakistan in order to crush Afghanistan's Shi'as and to contain Iran.

Moscow's Involvement

India's involvement in the anti-Taliban alliance was coordinated by Moscow, which had a vested interest in curtail-ling the spread of fundamentalism throughout Central Asia, since Russia believed that the Taliban was training and sheltering guerrillas fighting for independence in Chechnya and in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Russian deputy

foreign minister Vyacheslav Trubnikov coordinated efforts in the Central Asian states to combat the Taliban. Trubnikov held talks with Iran, India, and China on ways and means to coordinate their policies toward Afghanistan. An Indian-Russian working group was organized in October 2000, following President Vladimir Putin's visit to India.

The Threat of a Proxy War

The need to combat "Afghan terrorism" was viewed in New Delhi with great concern because of Pakistan's heavy involvement in backing Taliban forces with funds and arms. There were increasing concerns that forces trained by Taliban and al-Qaeda were becoming involved in the Kashmir dispute. There thus developed a proxy conflict in Afghanistan between India and Pakistan, each backing opposing forces, as their long conflict over Kashmir extended to Afghanistan.

Prior to 11 September 2001, the proxy war in Afghanistan appeared ready to deepen with the increasing involvement of regional powers in the attempt to prevent the fledgling UF from collapsing. Pakistan continued to play a crucial role in the Taliban's military campaign. The assassination of UF leader Ahmad Shah Massoud on 9 September 2001 threatened the survival of the fragile alliance of rival factions Massoud had achieved only months before. Massoud's efforts at providing an effective opposition to the Taliban had been compounded by the political differences among Shi'a factions, preventing the development of an effective national army and alliance. Massoud was succeeded by General Muhammad Fahim, who faced a tough battle to hold the alliance together and to avoid defeat at the hands of Taliban forces prior to the arrival of U.S. troops.

Pakistan's involvement. To understand why India seemed ready to become more deeply involved in Afghanistan, it is necessary to briefly examine the extent of Pakistan's involvement in supporting the Taliban. Pakistan's military support of the Taliban was a major reason for the Taliban's military successes during the 1990s. Islamabad maintained and operated many of the Taliban's aircraft and tanks, providing training, planning, advice, weapons, ammunition, and logistical support. In addition, military advisers attached to Islamabad's Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate assisted the Taliban with the provision of religious volunteers. It is understood, however, that no regular Pakistani army personnel were involved in backing the Taliban. Pakistan's assistance proved critical and decisive in the Taliban's July–August 1998 defeat of the opposition Jombesh-i-Milli-Islami (National Islamic Movement) headed by rivals Rashid Dostam and Abdul Malik.

Significantly, the Taliban benefited from the flow of volunteers from Pakistan's religious schools (*madrasabs*)

who were willing to fight and die for the Taliban. As long as the Taliban continued to exist, hard-line Pakistani Islamic organizations appeared likely to continue providing personnel to fight alongside the Taliban in their struggle against Indian/Iranian backed anti-Taliban forces in Afghanistan. Since the inception of the Taliban in 1994, the Pakistan based Jamiat-e-Ulema Islam organization and its *madrasab* network provided thousands of generally ill-trained Muslim youths deployed in assault roles, with Afghan Taliban moving in behind them to secure areas. By mid-2001 it was estimated that around 30 percent of the Taliban military were Pakistani and Arab units.

There appeared to be no shortage of Pakistanis willing to fight for the Taliban, nor of finances from abroad to fund the *madrasabs* supplying these fighters. Prior to the terrorist attacks on New York and Washington, Pakistan insisted they would not go along with any campaign against the Taliban. Pakistan argued that the United Nations sanctions imposed against the Taliban, following their refusal to hand over Osama bin Laden, did not cover "religious volunteers" fighting alongside the Taliban. Washington's closer ties to New Delhi, together with the lifting of many sanctions imposed following India's 1998 nuclear tests, did nothing to encourage Islamabad to abandon the Taliban. Many in Pakistan believed that the West had betrayed and abandoned them, denouncing Washington's "double standards approach." It took the shock and horror of the events of 11 September 2001 to jolt Pakistan to officially end its support for the Taliban, in return for U.S. military support and desperately needed economic aid.

The World Trade Center terrorist attacks thus significantly changed the strategic landscape of South Asia, with a sudden increase in the number of nations willing to join the cause of defeating the Taliban—although some nations, including Iran, refused to support U.S. military action against the Taliban in Afghanistan. The prospect of the Americans becoming militarily involved in Afghanistan gave General Muhammad Fahim's UF an immediate and unexpected incentive to remain united. As the United States became so heavily involved following 11 September 2001, the Taliban lost the support of its only regional ally, Pakistan.

Ben Sheppard

See also **Kashmir; Pakistan and India**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bedi, Rahul. "India's Secret War against the Taliban." *Jane's Intelligence Review* 14, no. 6 (June 2002): 19.
- Carter, Hannah, and Anoushiravan Ehteshami, eds. *The Middle East's Relations with Asia and Russia*. New York: Routledge Curzon, 2004.

Davis, Anthony. "Musharraf's Dilemma." *Jane's Intelligence Review* 13, no. 3 (March 2001): 38–41.

———. "Afghan Regional Powers Test Kabul in Run Up to Loya Jirga." *Jane's Intelligence Review* 14, no. 6 (June 2002): 8–13.

Malik, Iftikhar H. "Pakistan in 2000: Starting Anew or Stalemate." *Asian Survey* 41, no. 1 (January–February 2001): 104–115.

Stern, Jessica. "Pakistan's Jihad Culture." *Foreign Affairs* 79, no. 6 (November–December 2000).

AGNI The name of both the Vedic Hindu god of fire and sacrificial fire itself, *Agni* is an Indo-European word cognate with Latin *ignis*. The Rig Veda, the oldest text of ancient India (c. 1000 B.C. at latest), places his name as the initial word in the first of its 1,028 hymns: "Agni I praise . . ." as *purohita* (domestic priest), as god of *yajña* (sacrifice), as invoker of gods. Of all deities, only Indra is addressed more often; Agni is celebrated in some 200 hymns. The mystery of Agni is the mystery of fire that appears miraculously from churning fire sticks, but may as suddenly disappear. The hidden Agni, even his concealment in the depths of cosmic waters or plants (Rig Veda 10.51), is a constant theme, for he must be recovered to maintain both the fire for household daily offerings and the great world-maintaining sacrificial fire. As receiver of offerings, he is mediator between human and divine realms. Agni's heat and brightness frequently relate him to the fiery solar orb, Sūrya or Savitr.

The Vedic student does *agnikārya*, daily offering to Agni and, according to tradition, after completion of Vedic study, when Agni is established in the house by a married couple the god is present in one, three, or five offering fires. The single fire is *aupāsana*, but *tretāgni*, a triple form, is standard for a sacrificer. If the householders maintain ritual fires routinely for the daily morning and evening offerings of fresh milk, a ritual known as *agnihotra*, both husband and wife are eligible to project the fires onto a larger arena in order to perform solemn soma and animal sacrifices or other large-scale rituals involving as many as sixteen or seventeen priests. The initial, paradigmatic soma ritual, *agnishōma*, is "praise of Agni," following which householders are entitled to perform other soma sacrifices such as *agnicayana*, the creation of a cosmic Agni, reintegrating all of time and space into an eagle-shaped altar with five layers of a thousand or more bricks, a rite requiring a year or more in antiquity, as much as forty days in contemporary performance by some Vedic Brahmins still active in South India. The sacrificer carries a pan of embers and is thereby identified with Agni and another Vedic god, Prajāpati, as world-creator.

In post-Vedic classical Hinduism, Sanskrit epics and Purāṇas (e.g., the Agni Purāṇa) continued some of Agni's

mythic roles, often in connection with Indra, Varuṇa, Vishnu, Shiva, Skanda, Soma, and Yama. His ritual centrality, however, gradually diminished, and temples, sculptures, or paintings of Agni are rare. Domestic and temple *pūjā* (worship) prominently maintained *ārati*, the waving of burning incense or camphor before a god or goddess, although *boma* (offerings) into an actual fire still continued. Yoga and other ascetic practices became prominent, many involving *tapas*, an interior heat or fire that could replace Agni with a cosmic-human body, simultaneously sacrificer, medium, and recipient.

Although not always recognized ritually by name, Agni still is present in contemporary Hinduism in life-cycle rituals, particularly marriages and cremations, both involving circumambulation of fire. The latter is *antyeshti*, a "final offering" to Agni *kravyād*, "consumer" of the body. In addition to a long history in Hinduism, Agni and *boma* rituals are evident in Jainism and Buddhism, and in the latter have been carried in various guises across Asia.

David M. Knipe

See also **Ashvamedha; Brahmanas; Hinduism (Dharma); Indra; Soma; Varuṇa; Vedic Arya India; Yajña**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Knipe, David M. *In the Image of Fire. Vedic Experiences of Heat*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1975. Situates Agni in the history of religious symbols of fire and the dynamics of heating and cooling.
- Macdonell, A. A. *Vedic Mythology*. 1897. Reprint, Varanasi: Indological Book House, 1963. Detailed description of Agni, primarily from Rig Veda and Atharva Veda hymns.
- O'Flaherty, Wendy Doniger. *Hindu Myths*. Baltimore: Penguin, 1975. Ch. 3, selected Agni motifs from Vedic Saṃhitās to Mahābhārata.
- Staal, Frits. *Agni. The Vedic Ritual of the Fire Altar*. 2 vols. Berkeley, Calif.: Asian Humanities, 1983. Monumental work on 1975 Agnicayana sacrifice in Kerala; excellent plates.

AGRA A city in the southwestern part of Uttar Pradesh, Agra is located on the river Jumna (Yamuna) and is linked by the Grand Trunk Road to Mathura and Etawah and to the rest of India by train. An ancient site, modern Agra was founded by Raja Birbal Singh in 1475; Sikandar Lodi (r. 1489–1517) made it his capital. Along with Delhi, it was the preeminent capital of the Mughal dynasty. In 1526 the first Mughal ruler Babur (d. 1530) made Agra a co-capital, with Delhi, and built the first of the Mughal gardens, the Ram Bagh, along the river Jumna. His grandson Akbar the Great (r. 1556–1605) made Agra his capital before shifting temporarily to Fatehpur Sikri, 23 miles (37 km) from Agra, between

1571 and 1585, and he is buried at Sikandra, 6 miles (10 km) northwest of Agra. Under Akbar's son Jahangir (r. 1605–1627) and his Persian wife, Nur Jahan (Light of the World), Agra became a magnificent center of Indo-Persian culture, but it was under the third of the Great Mughals, Shah Jahan (r. 1628–1658), that Mughal style became “crystallized” and Agra became one of the most renowned cities in the world as the site of a building considered to be one of the wonders of the modern world, the Taj Mahal (Crown Palace). Shah Jahan was the most lavish spender of the Mughal rulers. He demolished almost all of the structures inside Agra Fort, built between 1565 and 1571, replacing them with white marble and stucco-covered buildings, considered by some to be more delicate and exquisite than even the Taj Mahal. The fort's walls are one and a half miles long, faced with dressed stone, and the main entrance was through the Delhi Gate. The emperor's private buildings were built in marble along the river; the public buildings such as Moti Mosque and the Public Audience Hall (Diwan-i Am), which originally housed the famous Peacock Throne, were in stucco or plaster and were located farther away. The Tomb of Itimad al-Daula (d. 1622), Jahangir's father-in-law, is another of the city's architectural wonders.

The Taj Mahal, considered the greatest of Agra's exquisite buildings, is the mausoleum of Shah Jahan's third wife, Mumtaz Mahal (Exalted of the Palace), who died in 1631. Shah Jahan's grave was also added. Designed by Ustad Ahmad and completed in 1648, it took some twenty thousand workers twenty-two years to build. Many consider it the most sublime Mughal building ever created. Built of white marble and designed using the interlocking arabesque plan, it stands on a raised, square platform, 186 by 186 feet (57 m x 57 m). The central dome is 58 feet (18 m) in diameter and is 213 feet (65 m) tall. Inside and out it is inlaid with designs of flowers and calligraphy, using precious stones such as agate and jasper. Four reflecting pools in the large garden create an ethereal effect. In the extensive grounds are a mosque, a guest house, and several other buildings. In the eighteenth century the city was occupied by Jats, Marathas, the Mughals again, and Gwalior; in 1803 the British made it their capital of Agra (North-Western) province. Though it is now an overcrowded and polluted industrial city, it remains a popular tourist destination.

Roger D. Long

See also **Akbar; Babur; Jahangir; Shah Jahan**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Asher, Catherine B. *Architecture of Mughal India*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1992.

Carroll, David, ed. *The Taj Mahal*. New York: Newsweek Book Division, 1972.

Nath, R. *Agra and Its Monumental Glory*. Mumbai: Taraporevala, 1977.

Richards, John F. *The Mughal Empire*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

AGRICULTURAL GROWTH AND DIVERSIFICATION SINCE 1991

India has recorded high rates of growth in overall gross domestic product, at about 5.5 to 6 percent per year since the 1980s. With falling rates of growth in population, this led to a significant growth in per capita incomes, at about 3.8 percent annually from 1980 to 2000. At purchasing power parity (a mechanism that allows comparison between the standards of living of different countries), although the per capita income of an average Indian is still quite low (about \$2,850 per annum), a strong middle class of at least 150 million to 200 million people enjoys an annual income of more than \$13,750.

This overall growth and prosperity sustained over a long period has led to a change in the consumption basket of Indians, more rapidly at the upper end of incomes and more gradually at the bottom. There are indications that many Indians are moving away from staples and toward high value agriculture of fruits and vegetables, dairy, fish, and meat. Since an average Indian still spends about 55 percent of his or her expenditures on food, any change in the consumption preferences has significant repercussions for India's farm economy as well as food industry, including its marketing, handling, and trade. Within this framework, one of the key questions to explore is what happens to the small farmer.

The Changing Structure of Indian Diets

The revolution in high value agriculture is driven by changing domestic consumption patterns and, to a lesser extent, increasing high value exports. Growth in Indian demand for cereals is slowing down, while demand for other foods, including fruits, vegetables, fats, and livestock products, is showing relatively high growth. On the domestic front, rising incomes, urbanization, changing relative prices, and shifting preferences are leading to dietary diversification.

How fast has the consumption basket of an average Indian changed? The per capita consumption of cereals from 1977 to 1999, for example, declined from 423 to 335 pounds (192 to 152 kilograms) per year in rural areas and from 324 to 275 pounds (147 to 125 kilograms) per year in urban areas. The consumption of fruits, on the other hand, increased by 553 percent, of vegetables by 167 percent, of milk and milk products by 105 percent,

and of meat, eggs, and fish by 85 percent in rural areas over the same period. Similar changes occurred in urban diets. These changes are dramatic, though from a small base, and indicate a structural shift in Indian diets. This shift opens a window of opportunity for farmers to raise their incomes; it is also an opportunity for agribusiness to add value and generate employment in India's economy.

Consumption of high value commodities, namely fruits, milk, meat, eggs, and fish, was substantially higher among upper income groups than among lower income groups. The pace of decline of cereal consumption in upper income groups was faster than in lower income groups. Though lower income groups consumed less quantity of high value commodities than higher income groups, their consumption of these commodities did increase. For lower income groups, the consumption of milk increased by 30 percent, of vegetables by 50 percent, of fruits by 163 percent, and of meat, eggs, and fish by 100 percent from 1983 to 2000.

Urbanization is another factor affecting consumption patterns. The consumption of pulses (edible seeds of certain crops), edible oil, vegetables, fruits, milk, meats, eggs, and fish was higher in urban areas than in rural areas in 1999–2000. Only cereal consumption was greater in rural areas than in urban areas in 1999–2000, and between 1983 and 1999–2000, it decreased in both zones. In addition to rising incomes and urbanization, other forces shaping consumption patterns include changes in relative prices of cereals and noncereal foods, and in tastes and preferences. During the 1970s and 1980s, the price of cereals relative to the general price index showed a declining trend, but in the 1990s increased at the rate of almost 1 percent per annum. Meanwhile, the price of noncereal food items declined in the 1990s relative to general prices. Dietary diversification with better nutrients may help to explain the reduction in malnutrition in India for children between the ages of one and five. The incidence of moderate malnutrition fell from 45.1 percent to 41.3 percent between 1991–1992 and 2000–2001. Severe malnutrition fell from 11.1 percent to 6.4 percent over the same period.

Changing Exports and the Production Basket of High Value Agriculture

Indian exports during the 1990s grew at an annual rate of 10.1 percent, compared to 7.4 percent during the 1980s. The exports of agricultural commodities during the 1990s, however, grew at an annual rate of 8.1 percent, compared to an annual rate of 3.3 percent during the 1980s. The share of agriculture in total exports declined from 24 percent during the 1980s to 18 percent in the 1990s.

The export basket has also diversified in favor of high value agriculture. Historically, there was virtually no

Indian export of fruits, vegetables, livestock, or fish. Exports of fish shot up from U.S.\$320 million in 1981–1982 to \$1,125 million by 1999–2000, a growth of 350 percent. Exports of processed fruits, meat, and fruits and vegetables more than doubled since 1981 (reaching values of U.S.\$145 million, U.S.\$198 million, and U.S.\$263 million, respectively, in the triennium ending 1999–2000). Exports of eggs, although erratic, increased from U.S.\$0.4 million in 1981–1982 to U.S.\$25.3 million in 1999–2000.

Changing consumption preferences and export outlets provide good incentives to farmers to risk changing their production baskets in favor of high value agriculture. During the 1990s, for example, the production of cereals grew at a rate of 2.3 percent annually, against that of fruits and vegetables, which had a growth rate of more than 6 percent. Unlike the “Green Revolution” of the late 1960s, the 1990s was a decade of “golden revolution,” with a major breakthrough in the production of fruits, and “blue revolution,” with the dramatic growth of inland fisheries. This growth has also resulted in much faster exports of fish and fruits, raising hope that India's farmers might increase their incomes by exploiting more lucrative markets in India and abroad.

Innovative institutions such as contract farming and vertical integration from “the farm to the firm to the fork” have the potential to benefit producers and consumers alike. Contract farming can reduce transactions costs and risk, and can lessen resource constraints for smallholders. A vertically integrated supply chain can respond quickly to consumers' changing tastes and preferences, and can ensure that quality and safety standards are met.

At the macroeconomic level, if India is an efficient producer of high value agricultural products, greater integration into the global marketplace will open export opportunities. But integration into the global marketplace will require that India certify the quality and safety of its high value agricultural exports. What are the implications for the smallholder? Can they be linked in such a way that a regime of grades and standards, and food safety norms, can be implemented?

Diversification to High Value Agriculture and the Smallholders

In India, 81 percent of farm holdings are of less than five acres (two hectares). Smallholders face several challenges that—unless addressed—will limit their ability to gain from the revolution in high value agriculture. High value commodities are often perishable in nature, and their markets can be fragmented, thin, and distant. Each smallholder may have only a tiny marketable surplus, for which the price is highly volatile and can fall steeply with only small

increases in supply. These factors raise the transaction costs and risk to the smallholders in the production and marketing of high value agriculture. Transactions costs are the costs incurred in the exchange of goods and services between trading partners. They include the costs of information search, negotiation, monitoring, and contract enforcement. In addition, high value agriculture may require greater capital investment than the production of cereals, a constraint for smallholders. Experiences from developed countries and developing countries in Southeast Asia reveal that innovative institutions such as cooperatives, producers' associations, and contract farming have the potential to reduce transactions costs by vertically integrating production, marketing, and processing. Vertical coordination through contract farming, beyond the cooperative model for milk and sugarcane, is a relatively recent phenomenon in Indian agriculture. In this model, farmers are contracted to produce a commodity for a company. The company may have a level of control over the production process (for example, by supplying inputs or technical assistance) without owning or operating the farm, and the practice assures procurement of output at predetermined prices that may be subject to minimum quality standards.

To understand the implications of vertical integration on the smallholder, it would be worth looking at some case studies. Three such case studies, undertaken jointly by NCAP (National Center for Agricultural Research and Policy) and IFPRI (International Food Policy Research Institute), are: Nestle India Limited for milk and milk products, Venkateshwara Hatcheries Limited for broilers (young chickens), and Mother Dairy Fruits and Vegetables Limited for vegetables. The results are based on primary field surveys of contract and noncontract producers (152 and 22 producers respectively for dairy; 25 and 25 respectively for broilers; and 150 and 50 respectively for vegetables). The studies quantify the differences in tangible transactions costs and profits for contract and noncontract producers of milk, broilers, and vegetables in India.

The results indicate that as a result of contract farming, transactions costs were reduced by over 90 percent in the case of milk, 70 to 90 percent in the case of vegetables, and 60 percent in the case of broilers. For milk and vegetables, the transactions costs were less on farms that had contract arrangements due to savings in time, cost for transportation of the product to a market, and labor in marketing the product. Collection of milk and vegetables by the firm from the village itself is the main reason for the savings in time and transportation costs. For broiler production, the lower transactions costs on contract farms were mainly due to the elimination of need for extension services, and communication and transportation costs for inputs, as the company supplied chicks, medicines, and feed to farmers under contractual arrangements.

In addition to high transactions costs, price and yield risk can also be significant for many high value agriculture products. The study also examined the implications of the risk sharing between the producer and firm in the case of broiler production. Under the contractual arrangements, the firm bears the full market risk. The producer and firm share in the production risk, including the broiler mortality risk. The study found that the coefficient of variation of profit (a proxy for risk) for noncontract farmers was very high (from 50 percent to nearly 300 percent, due to seasonal differences in mortality rates) compared to that of contract farmers, which ranged from 20 to 26 percent for the entire year.

In terms of profit, the study showed striking differences in the profit between contract and noncontract farmers. The contract farmers received substantially higher profits compared to the noncontract farmers. The milk contract farmers attained 85 percent higher profits than the noncontract farmers. For vegetables and broiler production, the profit difference was 78 percent and 31 percent, respectively. Given the opportunities for producers to increase profits by tapping into innovative institutions such as contract farming, some have expressed concerns that smallholders may be left out. Firms may reduce their transactions costs by contracting with a few large farms rather than many smallholders. For example, in a case of contract farming with two multinational firms to grow tomatoes, chilies, and potatoes in Punjab and Haryana, it was found that the average size of the contracted holding was 72 acres and ranged from 53 to 90 acres. On the other hand, the studies found that small farmers were well represented (45 percent, 32 percent, and 37 percent of the total farms involved in contract farming of dairy, broiler and vegetables, respectively). To take advantage of economies of scale, dairy and vegetable firms organize farmers into groups or cooperative associations to gain efficiency in the distribution of inputs and technical advice and the collection of output. This innovation helps the firm to reduce transactions costs associated with many geographically scattered smallholders. In the case of smallholder dairy and vegetable contact farmers, the total costs of production were 25 percent and 27 percent less, respectively, than for noncontract small farmers, due mainly to lower transactions costs. For large contract farmers, costs of production were 17 and 21 percent less than noncontract large farmers.

Linking the Supply Chain from Farm to Firm to Fork

Given the rapid changes in consumption patterns in India, it is not just the production sector that is adopting a new system, but also the retail sector. Supermarkets are

starting to serve the growing urban food demand in Asia. The rate of supermarket growth in China in 2003 was three times that of Brazil and Argentina in the 1990s. Between 1999 and 2001, supermarkets' share of urban retail food sales rose from 30 to 48 percent in China, which in 2003 had 3,000 supermarkets, with investments planned for five to ten times as many in the next five to seven years. In India, Food World was the largest supermarket chain in 2003, with 80 outlets in South India and plans for 20 more by the end of the following year.

From the farmer's perspective, the three major incentives to vertically integrate are to reduce transactions costs and risks, and to reduce resource constraints. In India, the institutional framework must safeguard the interests of smallholders without impeding the progress of vertical integration in high value agriculture and the rise of supermarkets, which can be mutually beneficial to small scale producers, wholesale and processing firms, retailers and consumers. India's small farmers can ride this new wave and exploit its potential benefits, provided that proper institutions protect them, while helping to develop vertical integration between the farm, the firm, and the fork.

Ashok Gulati

See also **Contract Farming; Rural Credit, Evolution of since 1952**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Birthal, P. S., P. K. Joshi, and A. Gulati. "Vertical Coordination in High Value Food Commodities: Assessing Implications on Smallholders." Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2004.
- Chadha, G. K., and A. Gulati. "Farm-Firm Linkages in India: Rationale, Working Experiences and Policy Choices." Paper presented at the FICCI-ICRISAT-IFPRI International Workshop on Agricultural Diversification and Vertical Integration in South Asia, 5–6 November 2003.
- Chowdhury, S., A. Gulati, S. Ramachander, and E. Gumbira-Sa'id. "High Value Agriculture, Supermarkets, and Vertical Integration in Indonesia." Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2004.
- Joshi, P. K., and A. Gulati. "From Plate to Plough: Agricultural Diversification in India." Paper presented at the JNU-IFPRI workshop, The Dragon and the Elephant: A Comparative Study of Economic and Agricultural Reform in China and India, New Delhi, India, 25–26 March 2003.
- Joshi, P. K., A. Gulati, P. S. Birthal, and L. Tewari. "Agriculture Diversification in South Asia: Patterns, Determinants, and Policy Implications." Markets, Trade and Institutions Discussion Paper no. 57. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2003.
- Kumar, P., and Mruthyunjaya. "Long Term Changes in Food Basket in India." Paper presented at workshop, Agricultural

- Diversification in South Asia, Paro, Bhutan, 21–23 November 2002.
- Landes, M., and A. Gulati. "Policy Reform and Farm Sector Adjustment in India." Paper presented at the Wye Imperial College-sponsored workshop on Policy Reform and Adjustment, London, 23–25 October 2003.
- Pingali, P., and Y. Khwaja. "Globalisation of Indian Diets and the Transformation of Food Supply Systems." ESA Working Paper no. 04–05, Agricultural and Development Economics Division, The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, February 2004.
- Reardon, T., C. P. Timmer, C. B. Barrett, and J. Berdegue. "The Rise of Supermarkets in Africa, Asia and Latin America." *American Journal of Agricultural Economics* 85, no. 5 (2003): 1140–1146.

AGRICULTURAL LABOR AND WAGES SINCE 1950

Agricultural labor households are among the poorest segments of rural society in India. The Population Census, conducted every ten years, and the quinquennial sample surveys of the National Sample Survey Organization (NSSO) on Employment and Unemployment are two sources of data on overall employment and unemployment in India. In the post-independence period, decennial census data are available from 1951. However, it is not possible to gather detailed information on employment-related aspects through this census. The quinquennial surveys of NSSO, on the other hand, provide reasonably detailed information, and the concepts used have remained similar in the various rounds of surveys on employment and unemployment it has conducted since 1972–1973.

Regarding wages for agricultural laborers, there are mainly four sources: Agricultural Wages in India, National Sample Surveys, Rural Labor Enquiries, and Cost of Cultivation Studies. In India, the share of agriculture in the gross domestic product (GDP) declined from nearly 60 percent in the 1950s to less than 25 percent in the 1990s. However, as shown in Table 1, the share of agriculture in employment declined slowly since the 1960s. The share of agriculture in employment for males declined from 75.9 percent in 1961 to 60 percent in 1999–2000. The decline is much slower for females. Still, 75 percent of females depended on agriculture for their livelihood in 1999–2000.

The agricultural workers in the table consisted of both cultivators and agricultural laborers. The growth of agricultural laborers over time was much faster than that of cultivators. In fact, some cultivators became agricultural laborers in the last few decades. The share of agricultural laborers among total agricultural workers was less than 25 percent in 1961, but it increased to 42 percent in 1993–1994 and to 45 percent in 1999–2000. The number of cultivators declined sharply, over 6.5 million

TABLE 1
Agricultural and total workers (rural and urban): 1961 to 1999–2000

Sector	Number of workers (millions)		Percentage share	
	1961	1999–2000	1961	1999–2000
Male				
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing	143.28	237.79	75.9	59.9
Total workers	188.68	397.02	100.0	100.0
Female				
Agriculture, forestry, and fishing	51.02	93.21	85.7	74.9
Total workers	59.51	121.60	100.0	100.0

SOURCE: Compiled from Sundaram, K. "Employment–Unemployment Situation in the Nineties: Some Results from NSS Fifty-fifth Round Survey." *Economic and Political Weekly* 36, no. 11 (2001): 931–940.

between 1993–1994 and 1999–2000. On the other hand, the number of agricultural laborers increased by 3 million during the same period.

Agricultural households increased significantly between 1963–1964 and 1983. The number of rural households increased by 49 percent, while that of agricultural labor households increased by more than 100 percent. The percentage of agricultural labor households among all rural households increased steadily, from around 21 percent in 1963–1964 to 31 percent in 1983. In 1993–1994, the share declined to 27 percent but rose again to 31 percent in 1999–2000. Thus, the share of agricultural laborers in total rural households hovered around 30 percent over the last two and a half decades. There were about 45 million agricultural labor households in the country in 1999–2000.

There have been changes in the composition of rural workers. Attached labor has declined, while casual labor has increased. The share of agricultural self-employed among total rural workers for males declined from 51.5 percent in 1977–1978 to 42.5 percent in 1999–2000, while the corresponding share of agricultural regular workers for males declined from 4.9 percent to 1.8 percent. On the other hand, the share of casual agricultural (temporary daily) workers among total rural workers for males increased from 16 percent to 20 percent. Similarly, the share of casual agricultural workers among the total for females increased from 25 percent to 30 percent from 1977–1978 to 1999–2000.

Trends in Wages for Agricultural Laborers

The annual earnings of agricultural laborers depend on the number of days of employment and levels of wages. Increasing wages is very important for improving the standard of living of agricultural laborers. There have

been a number of studies that have examined the trends in agricultural wages, showing that agricultural wages fell during the 1960s. The trends in wages in different parts of India were studied to explain the process of wage determination. Wages seem to have increased in all states since 1974–1975. However, only Andhra Pradesh and Assam displayed consistent rises in wages during the period. In all other states, there was considerable fluctuation in real wages.

Real wages increased in the 1980s and 1990s. However, the growth rates differ from period to period. All the sources showed that highest growth rate of real wages were achieved during the period from 1983 to 1987–1988. The lowest growth was achieved during the period from 1993–1994 to 1999–2000. In states like Punjab, Haryana, and Kerala, wage rates were more than 70 rupees per day, with Kerala showing 110 rupees in 1999–2000. On the other hand, states like Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, and Orissa recorded less than 45 rupees in 1999–2000. Many states recorded high growth rates during the period from 1983 to 1987–1988, while the period from 1993–1994 to 1999–2000 witnessed low growth rates.

Minimum wages. The major legislative instrument for fixing and enforcing minimum wages for the unorganized sectors, including agriculture, is India's Minimum Wages Act of 1948. Under this act, minimum wages for an eight-hour workday are fixed for certain types of jobs where, in the judgment of the government, market conditions leave the workers particularly vulnerable to exploitation. Many studies have shown, however, that actual wages were generally lower than statutory minimum wages, and that the minimum wage laws are generally ineffective. Only in the case of Kerala were wages high, thanks to state-guided statutory minimum wage controls. However, the implementation of minimum wages can prove counterproductive for the generation of employment, as Kerala's experience also has demonstrated.

Poverty of Agricultural Laborers

Estimates of the incidence of poverty among agricultural labor households during the period from 1963–1964 to 1983 place it around 52 percent in 1963–1964, with an increase to 56 percent in 1977–1978, then a decline to around 46 percent in 1983, a good year for agriculture.

Poverty ratios in different sectors provide a less direct but equally valuable indicator of the relative productivity of work in different sectors of the economy. Head count poverty ratios by sectors, available for rural areas, show that the three poorest segments are: agricultural laborers, construction workers, and persons in households mainly engaged in manufacturing, in that order; followed by cultivators, then households mainly engaged in transport,



Woman Hand-plowing a Field, Jhabua, Madhya Pradesh.

This drought-prone region continues to face environmental degradation (deforestation and soil erosion), which has diminished the productivity levels, and wages, of its many marginal farmers. AMAR TALWAR / FOTOMEDIA.

trade, and services other than health and education; and finally, far below all others, households engaged in rural health and education services. The numbers show that agricultural laborers who shift to any other sector seem to be better off. The poverty ratio among agricultural laborers in 1987–1988 and 1993–1994 was the highest among all the sectors. Around 55 percent of agricultural laborers were below the poverty line in 1993–1994.

Recent estimates by K. Sundaram and S. D. Tendulkar (2003) also show that agricultural labor households reported the highest incidence of poverty in 1993–1994 and 1999–2000. According to their estimates, poverty among agricultural laborers declined from about 58 percent in 1993–1994 to 45 percent in 1999–2000. However, the share of agricultural laborers in total rural poor population increased from 43 percent to 48 percent during the same period. In other words, nearly 50 percent of the rural poor belong to agricultural labor households.

Policies for reduction in poverty of agricultural laborers. Around 45 percent of agricultural laborers were still below the poverty line in 1999–2000. There is thus a need for a multipronged strategy to raise rural

employment and real wages. Agricultural growth will in itself generate more employment and higher wages, particularly in high poverty regions, but raising real wages through increase in agricultural labor productivity is an essential condition for poverty reduction. There are mainly two approaches for raising employment. One is through sectoral programs, and the other is through direct employment programs. Development of agriculture and rural nonfarm sectors will improve employment and wages. Labor-intensive public works programs, if properly designed and implemented, hold high promise as instruments for addressing both short-term relief and long-term asset creation. Agricultural labor households generally do not have assets. Provision of assets through self-employment can also reduce poverty. Priority must be given to increasing public investment in rural infrastructure and to creating environments for private investment. The infrastructure includes irrigation, electricity, agricultural research, roads, communications, and new technology. This initiative will provide incentives for the growth of the private sector. Investment in education and skill improvements is also crucial to producing rural diversification and reducing poverty among India's agricultural laborers.

S. Mahendra Dev

See also Agricultural Growth and Diversification since 1991; Economic Development, Importance of Institutions in and Social Aspects of

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ahuja, K. "Agricultural Labor and Rural Employment." In *Indian Agricultural Development since Independence: A Collection of Essays*, edited by Dantwala. 2nd rev. ed. New Delhi: Oxford & IBH Publishing, 1991.
- Bhalla, S. "Behind Poverty: The Qualitative Deterioration of Employment Prospects for Rural Indians." Working paper no. 7. Delhi: Institute for Human Development, 2000.
- Dev, S. Mahendra. "Poverty of Agricultural Labor Households in India: State Level Analysis." *Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics* 43, no. 1 (1988): 14–25.
- International Labor Organization. *India: Economic Reforms and Labor Policies*. South Asia Multidisciplinary Advisory Team. New Delhi: ILO, 1996.
- Jose, A. V. "Agricultural Wages in India." *Economic and Political Weekly* 23, no. 26 (1988): A-46–A-58.
- Parthasarathy, G. "Minimum Wages in Agriculture: A Review of Indian Experience." In *Empowering Rural Labor in India: Market, State and Mobilisation*, edited by R. Radhakrishna and Alakh N. Sharma. New Delhi: Institute of Human Development, 1998.
- Sen, Abhijit. "Rural Labor Markets and Poverty." In *Empowering Rural Labor in India: Market, State and Mobilisation in India*, edited by R. Radhakrishna and A. N. Sharma. New Delhi: Institute for Human Development, 1998.

- Sharma, H. R. "Employment and Wage Earnings of Agricultural Laborers: A State-wise Analysis." *Indian Journal of Labor Economics* 44, no. 1 (2001): 27–38.
- Sundaram, K. "Employment-Unemployment Situation in the Nineties: Some Results from NSS Fifty-fifth Round Survey." *Economic and Political Weekly* 36, no. 11 (2001): 931–940.
- Sundaram, K., and S. D. Tendulkar. "Poverty among Social and Economic Groups in India in 1990s." *Economic and Political Weekly* 38, no. 50 (13 December 2003): 5263–5276.

AGRICULTURAL PRICES AND PRODUCTION, 1757–1947 Agricultural data for late-eighteenth century India are not of adequate quality to permit us to say much about production or prices. The few British Indian agricultural products that emerged as major commodities of global trade were cotton, indigo, opium, and rice. Production of the more commercialized of these crops, indigo and opium, tended to be restricted, and in any case, their quantitative significance for peasant income remains obscure.

The second half of the nineteenth century, however, saw significant expansion of land under cultivation. In new crops that emerged as major exportables, such as cotton and wheat, there was also a steady rise in yield per acre. National income estimates confirm that agricultural production expanded in the late nineteenth century at the average rate of about 1 percent per year, thanks to an increasing area under cultivation and the availability of wasteland made cultivable by canal irrigation. Large-scale expansion in cropped area usually involved the relocation of capital and labor on a large scale as well. Important regions of agrarian expansion were the Punjab, the Narmada valley, western part of the United Provinces, and coastal Andhra.

For the period 1890 to 1947, the data are richer, based on returns from villages and district officials. These statistics can be used to construct provincial and all-India series on crop output. This data set, however, has problems. The official method of estimating crop output was to multiply cropped area by two figures: a "standard" yield, and a "condition factor" that measured the deviation of actual yield from the standard or the long-term norm. The standard yield was estimated by crop-cutting experiments in sample plots in a normal season, and did not change from year to year. In each season, the village officials gave figures for the area cultivated and the condition factor, the latter almost always reported as less than one, whereas in theory it should have exceeded one in a good season. The standard yield might have been set too high. It is also possible that some element of pessimism or underreporting was built into the system. That


being said, the data are still usable, given that the overestimation in standard yield gets partly offset by a low condition factor. Agricultural performance in the interwar period (1918–1939) was dismal. From 1891 to 1946, the annual growth rate of all crop output was 0.4 percent, and food-grain output was practically stagnant. There were significant regional and intercrop differences, however, nonfood crops doing better than food crops. Among food crops, by far the most important source of stagnation was rice. Bengal had below-average growth rates in both food and nonfood crop output, whereas Punjab and Madras were the least stagnant regions. In the interwar period, population growth accelerated while food output decelerated, leading to declining availability of food per head. The crisis was most acute in Bengal, where food output declined at an annual rate of about 0.7 percent from 1921 to 1946, when population grew at an annual rate of about 1 percent.

After 1918 land scarcity relative to population pushed cultivation into inferior lands. This "diminishing-returns" scenario explains why the growing land-shortage and deceleration in yield tended to occur together, and why the crisis was particularly acute in regions like Bengal, where population pressure was greatest. It is not easy, however, to separate the effect of diminishing returns from that of institutional differences. Property rights structure varied between the major regions; and agricultural performance tended to be poorer in Bengal's absentee landlord "permanent settlement" areas.

Investment

The question of investment in agriculture is an important one. In monsoon-dependent India, nearly 90 percent of the annual supply of moisture occurs during the three "monsoon" months, from June to September. Even those months of rain are barely adequate for cultivation in many parts of peninsular India and in the semiarid northwest. Extension of cultivation, therefore, depended on manmade systems to increase the supply of water. Some systems, such as tanks and canals, were bulky and costly, requiring either state or community effort. Others, such as wells, could be privately funded. While pre-British regimes did supply such public goods, they rarely supplied them on a satisfactory scale. Community efforts worked better in some regions of India. Private investment in irrigation seemingly accelerated when market incentives were strong.

India's irrigated acreage increased from around 5 to 6 percent of all cropped area in the early nineteenth century to 22 percent in 1938. That expansion occurred mainly in government canals and private wells. Canal construction and the restoration of older works started from the early nineteenth century in Punjab, Madras, and



Onions at a Local Market (*mandi*) Awaiting Purchase. With India's agricultural transformation from scarcity to excess, exports have risen but at a loss: Surplus is often exported at half the actual cost of procurement, warehousing, and transport. AMIT PASRICHA.

the western districts of the United Provinces. The pattern of growth in Madras and the United Provinces suggests that canals and wells were complementary investments, rather than being substitutes. Usually, government canals encouraged a change in cropping pattern and raised the value of land, which in turn stimulated private investment in wells.

Prices

Reliable price series begin from the mid-nineteenth century. Prior to that point, considerable price data exist, but only for a few commodities. Agricultural prices experienced pronounced cycles in the first half of the nineteenth century, but from the third quarter began to rise steadily and significantly until around 1920. For example, the price of wheat in 1920 was roughly three times what it had been in 1870. The expansion of the global economy and greater overseas demand for primary commodities account for the relatively greater rise in prices of exportable food grains as compared to other commodities. The steady devaluation of the rupee between 1873 and 1893 due to global depreciation in silver (the

rupee was a silver coin and could be freely minted until 1893) was another factor. From the mid-1920s world commodity prices began to fall, and they fell precipitously in India. Once again, the monetary policy of the colonial government was faulted, this time for its politically motivated persistence in maintaining an overvalued rupee.

The longer price trends and cycles were frequently interrupted by violent short-term fluctuations. The size of every harvest was the immediate cause of these fluctuations. Several contemporary analysts credibly argued that the expansion of India's railway network and consequent exports reduced the amplitude of harvest-induced price fluctuations over time. Until 1920 the commercialization of Indian agriculture did induce growth. After that, the world market diminished and land became increasing scarce, imposing hardships on peasants and landless laborers, in some areas, like Bengal, leading to famine.

Tirthankar Roy

See also **Land Tenure from 1800 to 1947**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Blyn, George. *Agricultural Trends in India, 1891–1947: Output, Availability, and Productivity*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1966.
- Guha, Sumit, ed. *Growth, Stagnation or Decline? Agricultural Productivity in British India*. Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.
- Roy, Tirthankar. *The Economic History of India, 1857–1947*. Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 2000.

AGRICULTURAL WAGES, LABOR, AND EMPLOYMENT SINCE 1757

Agricultural labor has always represented the largest occupational group in India. It has also seen the deepest concentration of poverty in the region. British colonial India introduced the beginnings of India's modern economy, with a larger role for capital, information, and the market than in earlier periods. Did these changes improve the economic conditions of India's peasants? In one view, colonial policies intensified landlessness and poverty, but the overall picture remains controversial.

Employment: Broad Trends

According to the Indian censuses, between 1881 and 1931 the share of agriculture in the workforce and the share of landless laborers in the agricultural workforce both increased. Together, these two trends suggest a “de-industrialization,” or a progressive shifting of workers in British India from declining industry back to agricultural labor.

On closer look it is revealed that these processes had a pronounced gender bias, since it was mainly women who experienced the pronounced shift from nonagricultural to agricultural labor in the early twentieth century. The labor-peasant ratio increased dramatically for women but more modestly for men. Changes in industrial organization from households to factories drove many women, formerly employed in household industries, into agricultural labor markets. At the same time, in these latter markets, long-term contracts were replaced by casual or spot transactions, offering easy entry and exit to women. Men could more easily gain access to urban-industrial labor markets. This hypothesis is indirectly validated by data on the decline of household industry and qualitative data on institutional changes in the market for agricultural labor.

Conditions of Work

Conditions of labor varied greatly by region, ecology, crops, and social history, yet, throughout rural India, “labor” conveyed some invariable features. There was, first of all, an indeterminate margin between “labor” and “peasant.” Small tenants and cultivators routinely supplied

wage-labor, as did peasants without secure titles to the lands they held. Such people often preferred to record themselves as “tenants” or “cultivators” rather than as laborers.

The census divided agricultural work into a few broad categories, such as plowing, sowing and transplanting, weeding, and reaping. Usually, the same person performed all these tasks, though sowing and reaping were seasonal tasks that required extra hands. Transplantation of paddy was generally women's work, as was carrying the crop to the threshing floor. Sowing, weeding, and harvesting were done by both men and women, whereas plowing was exclusively men's work. Cotton and groundnut picking and tea and coffee plucking were done by both men and women. Women's work had one constant characteristic in the early twentieth century, in nearly every environment in which women worked: the worksite had to be one to which they could bring their children.

Wages varied according to gender, task, area, and season. Wages tended to be higher in irrigated land, in lands near cities, in the hills, and in areas with relatively high emigration. Migration, both internal and overseas, was a powerful influence on the labor market of colonial India. The prospect of migration did not necessarily mean access to higher wage rates, but it did mean access to more employment as well as reduced risks. A great deal of overseas migration, especially for South Indian laborers, was seasonal and shortterm. In these cases, the wage incentive was probably stronger. With longer duration and long-distance migration, the elevation of economic and social status was marked. Returnees were known to make powerful impressions at their places of origin.

Rural wage “contracts” in the early twentieth century fell in two broad classes: time and piece. Within time, there were daily-wage earners in the peak season, and laborers on annual contracts available for both farm and nonfarm work. Those bound by annual contracts were called “farm servants” in British India's census, and those under daily wage or piece-rates were called “field laborers.” All these categories were internally heterogeneous. Among the so-called farm servants were some who received product-wage payments, fixed for long intervals by custom. They were not only on annual contracts but were bonded to the plot of land, or to a master or village, and were available for general labor. In the early twentieth century, such serfdom was in general decline, as were product-wages and general labor. At the same time, a new type of long-term contract began to appear, that of debt-bondage. The debtors promised to repay a loan by supplying labor services. They were not necessarily bound for life to particular employers or plots of land, nor were they always available for general labor.

Rural laborers have never been exclusively agricultural laborers. Indeed, in most parts of India, agricultural operations rarely provided more than 180 to 200 days of employment in a year, if that. A whole variety of occupations engaged those who were primarily laborers in the agricultural seasons. The 1901 census listed the following nonfarm occupations for the *chamars* of North India: “provision and care for animals, menial service, dealing in food and drink, weaving, working in metals, wood, glass, stone, canes, bamboos, leaves, etc.” In this respect, there was no significant change in the economic profile of laborers between the early and the later colonial period. There was, however, a significant change in the conditions under which farm and nonfarm works were combined. Whereas earlier there was an element of compulsion, or *corvée*, in the supply of nonfarm labor by specific castes, that element weakened over time, and the choice of occupations became more deliberate and more flexible by the end of colonial rule.

Wages

Agricultural wage data come from two main sources: the government of India's *Prices and Wages in India*, covering the period from 1873 to 1923; and the sizable *Report on the Enquiry into Rise of Prices in India* (1914). These data sets are not readily usable, however, for wages can vary according to individual capacities, contractual status, and peak or lean season. In the Indian case, wages in kind also create a problem. Rural wages typically contained both cash and a “product” (later called “perquisite”) component.

For the longer part of the nineteenth century, wage data are fragmentary and unsystematic. Collating what exists for several major regions, historians have noted the absence of a clearly discernible tendency in real wage, though in some cases a rising tendency after 1840, continuing until the mid-1870s, has been observed. But the two decades thereafter saw a steady fall in real wages, derived from monetary stagnation together with rising prices.

There was sustained upward pressure in food prices in the 1880s, because of exports as well as a depreciation of the currency. Yet the Indian nationalist argument that these circumstances intensified a subsistence crisis seems far-fetched. By all indications, real income in agriculture was increasing, as were food availability per capita, agricultural production, migration, labor demand, and employment. Except for two famines, the last quarter of the nineteenth century hardly fits a theory of rural crisis. The 1914 report suggests that, in the 1890s, money wages rose sufficiently to register a healthy increase in real wages. Prices and peasant incomes rose, while customary wages apparently did not.

All regions of India shared in a rise in wages from 1900 to 1912. In some cases a mild rising trend continued until 1920 or 1925. Not surprisingly, the fastest growth in the last phase was in Punjab, Madras, and the United Provinces—the regions that experienced the “Green Revolution” in the early twentieth century. The first half of the 1920s saw no significant change in money or in real wages. From the second half of the 1920s through the 1930s, as prices began to fall precipitously, money wages were pushed down. Real wage decline started within a few years. Real wages at the end of the period (1935–1936) were usually below those at the beginning of the trend (1929–1930). World War II brought massive inflation, further depressing real wages, though some adjustments in money wages did occur after 1941.

Studies on wage trends in the 1950s and the 1960s reported very little increase in the low averages that were established during the mid-1930s. The deadlock was broken only after the “Green Revolution” of the early 1970s. These studies generally find a positive correlation between labor productivity and real wage growth across space. Not surprisingly, the regions where acute rural poverty, landlessness, agricultural stagnation, and wage stagnation persisted—Bihar and West Bengal—exploded in violent rural unrest around 1970.

One of the striking features of real wage data are its sharp fluctuation, a feature that persisted well into the independence period, reflecting variations in the quality of monsoonal rainfall. Money wage adjustments happened less frequently, and sometimes not at all if the rainfall improved quickly. The most disastrous fall in real wages, therefore, occurred during years of famine.

Tirthankar Roy


See also **Industrial Labor and Wages, 1800–1947**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bardhan, Kalpana. “Rural Employment, Wages and Labour Markets in India: A Survey of Research.” *Economic and Political Weekly* 12 (25 June, 2 July, 9 July 1977): A34–A48, 1062–1074, 1101–1108.
- Kumar, Dharma. *Land and Caste in South India*. Delhi: Manohar, 1992.
- Prakash, Gyan, ed. *The World of the Rural Labourer in Colonial India*. Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 1992.

AHIMSA. See **Buddhism in Ancient India; Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.**

AHMEDABAD Ahmed Shah, the second ruler of the Ahmedabad sultanate, founded Ahmedabad on the banks of the Sabarmati River in the western state of Gujarat in



Tree of Life. Elaborate window from Ahmedabad's Sidi Saiyad Mosque, edifice carved from stone in the 1570s. In Sufism and other spiritual traditions, the popular tree of life motif seeks to suggest the energies of the universe. JYOTI BANERJEE / FOTOMEDIA.

1411 as his capital, but in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries the city came under the control of Jain and Vaishnava Bania merchants. The present city is believed to be on the site of a much older Hindu trading center, Asaval (Karnavati), replacing the historic capital of Hindu Gujarat at Anhilwada Patan, 70 miles (113 km) to the northeast. G. W. Forrest, the director of records for the government of India, in his *Cities of India* (1903), described Ahmedabad as “a citadel of much strength and beauty . . . and laid out . . . in broad, fair streets. Bringing marble and other rich building materials from a long distance [the sultan] raised magnificent mosques, palaces and tombs, and by encouraging merchants, weavers and skilled craftsmen he made Ahmedabad a centre of trade and manufacture.” Ahmedabad continued as Gujarat's center of trade and manufacture, its skilled workers in time raising the city to rival Manchester, U.K., in textile production. Trading and manufacturing activities created a hereditary bourgeois elite early in the history of Ahmedabad, the city developing a corporate culture and a class of indigenous bankers and financiers who helped it survive England's *laissez-faire* practices. Still, Ahmedabad

has remained socially, culturally, and politically conservative, even though it had one of the earliest municipal organizations in India. Essentially, the merchant community of Ahmedabad remained fiscally too conservative to embrace industry: it considered industry riskier than trading and banking, to which it was long accustomed. It should be added that Ahmedabad remained architecturally stagnant as well, its many old Hindu and Muslim monuments notwithstanding.

The British occupied Ahmedabad after crushing Maratha power in 1818. Until then, the city's fate had alternated between benign neglect at the hands of Mughals and economic exploitation at the hands of the Marathas. John Andrew Dunlop, the first British collector of Ahmedabad, found the city in a shambles and its economy in ruins. Nevertheless, Ahmedabad's mercantilist spirit experienced economic renaissance under the British as a result of a series of measures introduced by the East India Company: reduced tariff and taxes, infusion of capital in the hand-loom and handicraft industries, introduction of the railways (1864), the establishment of Western institutions and education, and better law and

order—arguably making Gujaratis more conscious of Indian culture in this transformation to Westernization, which would help stoke the fires of nationalism and groom Mahatma M. K. Gandhi as a nationalist leader. Ahmedabad also generated income through the opium trade (which picked up after 1819 with increasing British exports of the commodity to China), gambling, and speculation. By the end of the nineteenth century, the city's population had rebounded to 150,000 from a paltry 80,000 in 1818. With the improved business climate, the city also acquired a more cosmopolitan character, attracting Parsis, Jews, and Christians, although corresponding the size of the Muslim population declined.

The combination of improved business climate and Gujarati entrepreneurship resulted in the transformation of the merchant capital into the industrial capital, which made its debut with the establishing of the Ahmedabad Spinning and Weaving Mill in 1858. The timing proved fortuitous as the U.S. Civil War broke out in 1861, increasing demand for Indian cotton, and the Indian textile industry was well established by the end of the nineteenth century. The newly rich merchants, financiers, and mill owners invested their wealth in English-style bungalows with wide glass windows, and even adopted Western dress—the visible, if superficial, emblems of modernization that follow economic success. But the acceptance of Western higher education was slow in Ahmedabad, slower than in Bombay (Mumbai), which explains the different paths of development taken by the two cities and why Bombay became, and remained, the beacon of higher education for middle-class Gujaratis well after independence.

All these changes notwithstanding, when Gandhi elected to settle in Ahmedabad upon his return from South Africa and established his Satyagraha Ashram (later renamed the Sabarmati Ashram) there in 1915, the city looked and felt very much like a medieval Indian city—predominantly bucolic in appearance, rather than urban and industrial in shape, despite mill chimneys belching smoke into the sky. Gandhi had elected to live in Ahmedabad precisely because Ahmedabad was representative of India and its culture. Moreover, Gandhi was drawn to Ahmedabad's utilitarian and materialistic qualities; its multireligious population, particularly the presence of a large Muslim population; its large working class and legions of peasants in surrounding villages, from which he could recruit his *satyagrahi* soldiers; its wealthy Jain and Bania merchant communities, which would bankroll his *satyagraha* (nonviolent resistance) campaigns in return for the profits promised by his doctrine of *swadeshi* (indigenous goods); and the coarse homespun cloth that was popular with its residents, which Gandhi would use to generate national pride.

In the decades immediately following independence, Ahmedabad witnessed a flurry of building projects by European and Indian architects, including Le Corbusier, who built four buildings in the city: the Millowners Association Building, the Ahmedabad Museum, and the Sarabhai and Shodhan houses (the Shodhan house plan was originally drawn for Surendra Nath Dasgupta, but later sold to mill owner Shyamubhai Shodhan)—all Ahmedabad patrons of Le Corbusier eager to transform their city into a modern metropolis. In fact, Mayor Chinubhai Chimanbhai, a nephew of the respected industrialist Kasturbhai Lalabhai, had invited Le Corbusier to Ahmedabad. In the 1960s, U.S. architect Louis Kahn built the Indian Institute of Management after Harvard University's School of Management model. The respected Indian architect Charles Correa, who completed his studies at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, built the Gandhi Smarak Sanghralaya, and Balakrishna Doshi, who had worked with both Le Corbusier and Kahn, built the Centre for Environmental Planning and Technology. Gautam and Gira Sarabhai, from the distinguished industrial family of Ambalal Sarabhai, built the Calico Museum in the city.

Ahmedabad's urban renaissance in the second half of the twentieth century was fueled by industrial capital. The arrival of Le Corbusier, Kahn, and other messengers of the international modern movement to Ahmedabad held out the promise of transforming the decaying urban structure of the city into a modern metropolis, and possibly the capital of Gujarat. In the end, however, the overcrowded character of Ahmedabad would force the Gujarat government to locate the capital at Gandhinagar.


Ravi Kalia

See also **Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.; Gandhinagar**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Forrest, G. W. *Cities of India: Past and Present*. 1903. Reprint, New Delhi: Metropolitan Books, 1977.
- Gillion, Kenneth L. *Ahmedabad: A Study in Indian Urban History*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968.
- Kalia, Ravi. *Gandhinagar: Building National Identity in Post-colonial India*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press; New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004.

AIDS/HIV Ever since India's first AIDS case was reported from Mumbai in 1986, the HIV/AIDS (human immunodeficiency virus; acquired immunodeficiency syndrome) epidemic has posed a huge threat to the country. Many of India's 1.3 billion people do not as yet understand how potentially dangerous a health issue AIDS has



Poster Reads: "Learn about AIDS and Be Safe." The prevalence of HIV/AIDS in India (some health organizations have estimated the number of the infected at 10 million) is especially troubling because of its rapid spread to the general population. It is no longer an urban disease contracted only by high-risk groups. POPULATION COUNCIL.

already become, despite the fact that five million Indians have been infected by HIV/AIDS, according to official estimates. Prevalence rates of HIV/AIDS among the working age population (between the ages of 15 and 59) is 0.9 percent. Close to 90 percent of the cases reported fall within India's working age population; 25 percent are women. As reported by the United Nations (UNAIDS), India also houses around 170,000 HIV-infected children, most of whom are either already orphans or will soon become orphans.

India's National AIDS Control Organisation has arrived at these figures by using sentinel surveillance data collected from several sources: women attending antenatal clinics; STD (sexually transmitted disease) clinic attendees; injecting drug users; and men who report having sexual relations with men. However, the data do not include rural areas, private hospitals, or other groups of people, including those with cases of full-blown AIDS, sex workers, and people who do not fall into the age group of 15 to 49. This deficiency has caused widespread

criticism of the reliability of the figures supplied by the government of India. Other sources put the figures much higher. Various health workers in the country have estimated the current number of HIV/AIDS-infected Indians as close to 10 million.

Indian states have been divided into three groups according to their HIV/AIDS prevalence rates. Group I states, called high prevalent or generalized epidemic states, include Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Manipur, and Nagaland; in these states, infection rates have risen over 1 percent in antenatal women. Group II states, called moderate prevalent or concentrated epidemic states, include Gujarat, Goa, and Pondicherry; infection there is 5 percent or more among high-risk groups but is below 1 percent among antenatal women. Group III states, called low prevalent states, include all the other states of India; the HIV infection rate in this group is less than 5 percent in high-risk groups and less than 1 percent in antenatal women.

HIV/AIDS in India is transmitted through unsafe sex, from mother to child, and among injecting drug users. The prevalence of HIV/AIDS in India is especially troubling because of its rapid spread to the general population. It is no longer an urban sickness contracted only by high-risk groups. It is, on the one hand, spreading to the general population through bridge groups such as truckers (about 4 million men). Its spread is geographic as well, reaching far-flung villages of the vast country. It is thought that the disease will continue to spread at an even faster pace.

The future scenario of India's HIV/AIDS epidemic is especially grim. According to official accounts, approximately 25 percent of Indians live below the poverty line. Poverty increases the incidence of HIV/AIDS in several ways. Poor people are not able to afford medical treatment, either for HIV or for other infections. Poverty also forces some people to sell sex in order to earn a living; others sell their blood, which is often contaminated. Ignorance and lack of awareness about the AIDS epidemic has also increased India's vulnerability. The National Behavioural Surveillance Survey in 2001 found overall awareness of HIV/AIDS in India to be only 76 percent. The survey also noted that nearly 7 percent of the adults of the country reported having sex with non-regular partners in the previous twelve months. Only 33 percent of these people reported consistent condom use. The stigma attached to AIDS, and to the people infected by it, further contributes to the suffering of those infected, and discourages people from seeking testing and treatment. Many people will not even discuss the disease. Attacks against HIV/AIDS patients are widespread, and in some villages, HIV-infected people are treated as outcasts.

The AIDS control program in India receives help from the United Nations, the World Bank, major international nongovernmental organizations, and other private organizations, including the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation. However, it remains to be seen whether such initiatives, bereft of a vigorous, pro-active, and open public campaign, will be able to eradicate the disease from India; even those countries that have carried out nationwide campaigns have achieved only limited success after a very long period.

The government of India, after some initial hesitation, has realized the need to urgently address the HIV/AIDS situation in the country. The government-led initiative to bring the situation under control has focused on the following areas among others:

- Ensuring blood safety
- Implementing programs to reduce the spread of sexually transmitted diseases
- Promoting condom use
- Emphasizing the importance of information, education, communication, and social mobilization
- Giving care and support for people living with HIV/AIDS
- Training the public on HIV/AIDS/STD prevention and control (through workshops, etc.)
- Targeted interventions (among the most vulnerable and marginalized populations)
- Providing facilities for voluntary counseling and testing

Happymon Jacob

See also **Health Care**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Anand K., C. S. Pandav, and L. M. Nath. "Impact of HIV/AIDS on the National Economy of India." *Health Policy* 47, no. 3 (June 1999): 195–205.
- Bharat, Shalini. "India: HIV and AIDS-Related Discrimination, Stigmatization and Denial." UNAIDS/01.46E (English original, August 2001). Available at <<http://www.thebody.com/unais/pdfs/india.pdf>>
- Eberstadt, Nicholas. "The Future of AIDS." In *Foreign Affairs* 81, no. 6 (November/December 2002). Available at <<http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20021101faessay9990/nicholas-eberstadt/the-future-of-aids.html>>
- Ekstrand, Maria, Lisa Garbus, and Elliot Marseille. "HIV/AIDS in India." AIDS Policy Research Center, University of California at San Francisco, August 2003. Available at <<http://ari.ucsf.edu/ARI/policy/profiles/India.pdf>>.
- Gorden, David F. "The Next Wave of HIV/AIDS: Nigeria, Ethiopia, Russia, India, and China." U.S. Intelligence Community Assessment, September 2002. Available at <http://www.cia.gov/nic/PDF_GIF_otherprod/HIVAIDS/ICA_HIVAIDS20092302.pdf>
- Gupta, Indrani, Samiran Panda, and Renuka Motihar. "HIV/AIDS and Development in India." Background Study

- for the Swedish Country Strategy for India 2003–2007. New Delhi: Embassy of Sweden, February 2003.
- Mahal, Ajay. “Economic Implications of Inertia on HIV/AIDS and Benefits of Action.” In *Economic and Political Weekly* 39, no. 10 (6 March 2004): 1049–1063.
- Palanigounder, Doraisamy. “Economic Impact of HIV/AIDS on Patients and Households in South India: Costs and Burden on Households and Coping Strategies.” Available at <http://www.iaen.org/files.cgi/9838_EcoImpact-HIV-AIDS-SouthIndia.doc>
- Schaffer, Teresita C., and Pramit Mitra. “India at the Crossroads: Confronting the HIV/AIDS Challenge, A Report of the CSIS HIV/AIDS Delegation to India.” 3–10 January 2004. Available at <http://www.csis.org/saprog/0401_hivindia.pdf>
- Solomon, Suniti, and Aylur Kailasm Ganesh. “HIV in India.” International AIDS Society—U.S.A. In *Topics in HIV Medicine* 10, no. 3 (July–August 2002): 19–24. Available at <http://www.iasusa.org/pub/topics/2002/issue3/july_august2002.pdf>

AJANTA The thirty Ajanta caves are laid out in an arcing ravine cut by the Waghora River in the mountains of west central India. Although now designated a World Heritage monument by the United Nations, Ajanta had been totally forgotten until nearly two hundred years ago. It was then that some English soldiers, tiger hunting in the region, chanced upon the remote site. Their startling discovery is confirmed by a record scratched on a pillar in the spacious cave 10: “John Smith, 28th Cavalry, 28th April, 1819.”

Ajanta had two distinct periods of patronage. The first was its Hinayana Buddhist phase, dating from approximately 50 B.C. to A.D. 100. The severe *chaitya* halls 9 and 10, used for worship, and the *viharas* 12, 13, and 15A, dormitories with cells for the monks, were excavated during that period. Inscriptions recording “the gift of the facade” or “the gift of a wall” or “the gift of a cell” prove that these early caves were community efforts, as were many contemporary sites in western India, where Buddhism flourished during the period of Satavahana rule.

After about 100 B.C., Ajanta lay dormant for over three centuries. The Chinese Buddhist traveler Fahsien reported shortly after A.D. 400 that monks still lived at the site. However, he did not visit it, finding the region hostile, and that “the (local) people all have . . . erroneous views, and do not know the . . . Law of Buddha.”

However, the situation changed dramatically in the 460s, when a remarkable renaissance took place at Ajanta under the aegis of the powerful emperor Harisena of the Vakataka dynasty. Having already inherited extensive domains, including the Ajanta region, at his accession, by the time of his unexpected death in 477, Harisena controlled all of central India from the western to the eastern sea. In fact, during his all too brief reign, this “moon

among princes” was surely the most illustrious ruler in India, bringing India’s famed “Golden Age” to its apogee, which Ajanta’s Vakataka phase, completed in less than twenty years, directly reflects.

By about 465, less than five years after work had begun, twenty sizable caves were already underway, sponsored by a select group of courtiers, whose piety was happily matched by their financial resources. Thousands of excavators and artisans must have been drawn to the site by its growing fame, with skilled sculptors and painters being sent there from the major cities to work on the courtly donations. Even while learning how to excavate caves in the recalcitrant basaltic cliffs, their goal was to make monuments that would “rival the palaces of the lord of gods,” and “endure for as long as the sun and the moon continue,” as the site’s inscriptions tell us.

Among these major sponsors, besides the emperor Harisena himself, whose sumptuous cave 1 is the finest in India, we know of his prime minister Varahadeva, who chose the most central location for his influential cave 16, and King Upendragupta, the pious but spendthrift feudatory who ruled ancient Rishika (the Ajanta region) and “expended abundant wealth” on no less than five impressive excavations. At the same time, the ambitious monk Buddhahadra oversaw the creation of a dozen caves. The lavish funds at his disposal surely came from his connections with the rival province of Asmaka, with whose chief minister he had been “connected in friendship through many previous existences.”

Ajanta’s inauguration was exuberant, but in about 468 a serious “recession” occurred, caused by the threatening stance of the troublemaking Asmakas. Therefore, to conserve resources for military purposes, the feudatory ruler of the Ajanta region suddenly ordered work stopped on every cave, except for his own undertakings and the emperor’s cave 1. But by about 472, war must have flared in the region, for now work stopped on these “privileged” royal caves as well.

Significantly, when activity began again in about 475, after that local war, which probably involved Rishika and Asmaka alone, the Asmakas were the new feudatory lords of the region. At this point Ajanta’s craftsmen, who had briefly departed to more secure sites such as Bagh, returned to Ajanta, full of useful new ideas. Excavation and decoration now went on even more vigorously than before, even though the defeated local king, Upendragupta, was never heard from again. Indeed, as a signal of victory, the Asmakas forbade worship in his beautiful *chaitya* hall, cave 19, even though their own rival hall, cave 26, was still being developed.

Ajanta’s final florescence, when most of the site’s renowned murals were created, began about 475. However,

this last phase of consistent patronage was tragically short-lived. In 477, the great emperor Harisena mysteriously expired—probably due to the machinations of the perfidious Asmakas—and as a result the site rapidly went into its own deathly convulsions. All general excavation work was now abandoned as the worried patrons, expecting trouble and eager to acquire merit while they could, rushed to get their shrine Buddhas completed and dedicated.

It soon was clear that such anxiety on the part of the great patrons was justified; no sooner had Harisena's inept son ascended the throne than the warlike Asmakas boldly asserted their independence, even while plotting to take over the vast Vakataka empire for themselves. In the ensuing conflict, according to pertinent evidence from Dandin's *Tale of the Ten Princes*, the new emperor, Sarvasena III, "became mincemeat" on the field of battle, while the Vakataka house itself—like the caves it had sponsored—never recovered from the assault of its revolting feudatories.

Surprising as it may seem, while Ajanta's established patrons were in control of the site, no one else was ever allowed to make a single votive donation. It was only when the old elitist controls were gone, after 478, that the monks still living at the site, along with impatient local devotees, began eagerly donating a spate of intrusive Buddha images, to make merit for themselves. These helter-skelter donations, carved or merely painted, appear in great numbers in or on every excavation in which the shrine Buddha had been previously dedicated, and thus brought to life.

However, this frantic pious activity did not last long. It was suddenly disrupted, leaving dozens of the very latest images in various stages of completion, as if work had been abruptly cut off on a particular day—surely because the flames of the insurrection were now scorching Ajanta itself.

This was the end of votive offerings at Ajanta. After 480, not a single image was ever again made at the site. A few monks remained in residence briefly, but then they too were gone, leaving the site totally abandoned. By the last decade of the fifth century, in the aftermath of the war that had so thoroughly shattered the empire, the region had apparently been taken over by a Hindu power with no interest in such a Buddhist retreat. Ajanta, in its remote ravine, now lay forgotten, remarkably preserved by its very isolation.

Walter Spink

See also **Buddhism in Ancient India**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bakker, Hans. *The Vakataka Heritage: Indian Culture at the Crossroads*. Groningen: Egbert Forsten, 2004.

Behl, Benoy. *The Ajanta Caves*. New York: Harry N. Abrams, 1998.

Jamkhedkar, A. *Ajanta*. Mumbai: Oxford University Press, 2005.

Parimoo, Ratan, et al., eds. *The Art of Ajanta: New Perspectives*. 2 vols. New Delhi: Books and Books, 1991.

Schlingloff, Dieter. *Studies in the Ajanta Paintings*. Delhi: Ajanta Publications, 1987.

———. *Guide to the Ajanta Paintings*, vol. 1: *Narrative Wall Paintings*. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1999.

Spink, Walter. "The Archaeology of Ajanta." *Ars Orientalis* 21 (1992): 67–94.

———. *Ajanta: A Brief History and Guide*. Mumbai: Lavanya Publishers, 1994.

Yazdani, G. *Ajanta: Monochrome Reproductions of the Ajanta Frescoes Based on Photography*. 1930–1955. Reprint, Delhi: Swati, 1983.

Zin, M. *Guide to the Ajanta Paintings*, vol. 2: *Devotional and Ornamental Paintings*. Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 2003.

AKALI DAL. See **Sikh Institutions and Parties**.

AKBAR (1542–1605), "the Great" Mughal emperor (1556–1605). Born Jalal-ud-Din Muhammad in 1542, Akbar became the most powerful and the most tolerant of the Mughal emperors. For Muslims he is a controversial figure because of his unorthodox religious eclecticism. He was crowned Mughal *padishah* (emperor) at the age of fourteen in the Punjab on the sudden death of his father, Humayun. The Mughal position was so precarious, however, that all but Bairam Khan, a seasoned soldier who had also loyally served his father, advised Akbar to leave India for Kabul. India was dominated by the Afghan amir Mohammad Shah Abdali of Bengal, Sikandar Sur, and the Rajput princes. A number of states were independent. Akbar was thus initially ruler in name only. Through military conquests, marriage alliances with Hindus, and tolerant religious and social policies, however, Akbar created one of the greatest empires of the age—one that was supported by Indians, not merely a ruling foreign minority.

During the first years of young Akbar's reign, Bairam Khan, now Vakil-i-Mutlaq (prime minister), was de facto emperor. Then, Hemu, Shah Abdali's prime minister, captured Agra and marched into Delhi, proclaiming himself "King Vikramjit." At the second Battle of Panipat in November 1556, Hemu's giant force was defeated by the Mughal army, and Hemu was captured and executed. In 1557 Sikander Sur surrendered, and Muhammad Shah Abdali was killed in Bengal. Bairam Khan then conquered Gwalior and Jaunpur in 1559. In 1560, however, Bairam Khan fell from grace and was murdered; the "Petticoat Government," led by Akbar's foster mother, Maham Anga, exercised veiled authority until Akbar put himself at the head of Delhi's civil and military administration.



In 1561 Akbar assumed control of the empire and his court and began allying himself with the Hindu Rajputs, making them partners in the empire. He married Jodh Bai, the eldest daughter of the mighty Hindu Rajput

house of Jaipur. By 1570 all but a few Rajputs swore allegiance to him, and that year he also married princesses of Bikaner and Jaisalmer; in 1584 he married his son Jahangir to a Rajput princess as well. Rajputs were also

taken into his administrative service. Akbar also married a Christian and a Muslim. He endeared himself to Hindus by abolishing the pilgrim tax in 1563 and the hated *jizya* (poll tax) in 1579, ending discriminatory taxation against Hindus. He put an end to the enslaving of war prisoners and forcible conversions to Islam. He welcomed Hindus at his court, sought their advice, appointed a court poet for Hindi, and patronized Hindu artists. He employed Hindus in the revenue service and taxes were lower than in previous eras. Hindu laws were applied in disputes involving Hindus, and in times of poor harvests Akbar ordered the remittance of taxes. Raja Birbal, a Hindu courtier, became one of his confidants, and Raja Todar Mal of the writer caste (Kayasth) was responsible for all revenue settlements in North India.

As an annexationist, resolving to recapture the empire of Babur, his grandfather, Akbar proved to be an audacious general noted for his swift marches and intrepid assaults. He quashed an Uzbek rebellion and captured Gondwana. In 1561 Malwa, in the heart of India, was captured, and in 1568 he began his onslaught against the fortresses of Chittor and Ranthambor. Only Mewar defied him. In 1569 the central Indian fortress of Kalinjar fell. The rich province of Gujarat, with its port of Surat, the main outlet for trade with the West, fell in 1573. Akbar then marched east against Bengal, conquering it in 1576. A few years later he renewed his campaigns, annexing most of Afghanistan in 1585, and Kashmir in 1586. Kashmir's Srinagar became the summer home of the Mughals. Between 1592 and 1595 Sind and Baluchistan were added to Akbar's empire; in 1592 Orissa was joined to Bengal. Two years earlier, in 1590, Akbar had begun his conquests of the south, adding Berar and Khandesh and part of Ahmednagar. The Decan, however, proved to be much more difficult because of the terrain and because of determined Maratha resistance. On his death, Akbar bequeathed an empire of fifteen provinces (*subahs*), stretching from the Himalayas in the north to the River Godavari in the south.

The third distinguishing feature of Akbar's rule was his administrative reforms of 1574. He inherited a feudal system depending on personal loyalty and created a bureaucracy built upon regulations and a service of imperial officers arranged in thirty-three grades with fixed salaries that were initially paid in cash. These officers, called *mansabdars*, were ranked by the number of cavalry each was obliged to raise when the emperor called, ranging from a few hundred to thirty thousand. Revenue from lands assigned to each rank was used to support both soldiers and their horses. The *mansabdars* performed both civil and military duties. This created the opportunity for men to achieve honor, fame, and prosperity through service to the state, and it enabled the state to exercise its will in every corner of the empire. The empire was

organized in districts (*sarkars*) that were grouped into provinces (*subahs*), each ruled by a governor (*subadar*) who, with his body of troops, was responsible for law and order. A revenue collector (*diwan*) collected land taxes, remitting them to Delhi, and disbursed money from the center to pay the troops in the province. In this manner the *subadar* had no money and the *diwan* no troops, allowing the central government to maintain control. Provincial officers were rotated, and few stayed in one place more than four years. The last of Akbar's administrative reforms was his land revenue settlement, in which Todar Mal's *bandobast* (arrangement) practically remeasured and more fairly graded all of North India. Land was taxed according to productivity. The system was later adopted by the British, thus lasting for three hundred years.

Akbar was desperate for a son. When his wife gave birth to Jahangir in Sikri in 1569, Akbar was so pleased that he moved the capital there from Agra, renaming it Fatehpur (Victory) Sikri. Either for strategic reasons, or because it lacked sufficient water, he moved the capital to Lahore in 1585. Fatehpur Sikri remains a magnificent ghost town.

The most controversial aspect of Akbar's rule was his religious policy. In 1575 he built a house of worship (*ibadat-khana*) at Fatehpur Sikri in which representatives of different Muslim sects, Jesuits, Zoroastrians, Hindus, and yogis gathered to discuss religion with Akbar. In 1579 a declaration (*mazhar*) gave Akbar the authority to interpret Islamic dogma. After 1582 he created a new syncretic faith composed of ideas and observances of Sufism and Zoroastrianism, with himself as the spiritual leader of the "divine faith" (Din-i-Illahi). In art and architecture Akbar gave the Mughal empire a distinctive Persian style.

Roger D. Long

See also **Aurangzeb; Babur; Jahangir**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Fazl, Abu al-. *Ain-i Akbari*. Translated by H. Blochmann. Lahore: Qausain, 1975.
- . *Akbar Nama*. 3 vols. Translated by H. Beveridge. Delhi: Ess Ess Publications, 1977.
- Habib, Irfan. *The Agrarian System of Mughal India, 1556–1707*. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1963.
- Qureshi, I. H. *The Administration of the Mughal Empire*. Karachi: University of Karachi Press, 1966.
- Richards, John F. *The Mughal Empire*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- Rizvi, S. A. A. *Religious and Intellectual History of the Muslims in Akbar's Reign*. New Delhi: Manoharlal, 1975.

AKKAMAHĀDĒVI, *twelfth-century bhakti (devotional) saint*. Akkamahādevī, or "elder sister" Mahādevī, was born in Udutadi, Karnataka. She became enamored



You can confiscate
money in hand;
can you confiscate
the body's glory?
Or peel away every strip
you wear,
but can you peel
the Nothing, the Nakedness
that covers and veils?
To the shameless girl
wearing the White Jasmine Lord's
Light of morning,
you fool,
where's the need for cover and jewel?

(vacana 124; A. K. Ramanujan, transl.,
Speaking of Siva, 126–127)

of Shiva's icon in the village shrine when she was a young girl. Akkamahādevi composed about 350 *vacanas* (spoken free verse hymns) in Kannada, a Dravidian language. The *vacanas* of Kannada *bhakti* saints (*Shiva saranas*) are scripture for the Virasaiva sect, which does not accept Sanskrit *Vedas*. However, the *vacanas* also reflect a blend of local Dravidian and elite Aryan cultures, a hallmark of the *bhakti* movement in South India. Akkamahādevi was the first female *sarana*, and about fifty other women yogis followed her path. Akkamahādevi's *vacanas* express her radical views on women's roles, caste, and Hindu ritualism, a testimony to this female mystic's spiritual struggles in a patriarchal society. Her verses end with her *ankita* (signature) line calling Shiva by the name Chennamallikārjuna, or the "Beauteous Lord of (Goddess) Mallika." It has also been translated poetically as "Lord as White as Jasmine" by A. K. Ramanujan.

Young Akkamahādevi's beauty attracted the attention of the Jain king Kaushika, and she probably married him. However, soon realizing that she could not serve both Shiva and an earthly husband, she became an ascetic in search of Shiva, naked yet covered by her long hair. After many tribulations, including the unwanted attentions of lustful men, she reached Kalyāna where the Virasaiva saints Basavanna (1106–1167) and Allamaprabhu resided. To the sages' queries about her female methods of renunciation, she replied that it mattered little what happened to the body, that she was chaste as her soul belonged to Shiva, her true husband.

In this preoccupation with God as a divine lover, she resembles Āndāl (ninth century), and Mīrabai (sixteenth century), both of whom wrote hymns to Krishna vibrant with images drawn from nature. However, unlike these

Vaishnava *bhakti* saints, Akkamahādevi was a yogi infatuated with Shiva, the Lord of Dissolution-Creation. Some of her early *vacanas* describe Shiva's physical beauty, his shining red locks, and his even teeth (*vacana* 68). However, most poems have a searing quality. They are razor-sharp declarations of her desire for one without limitations of form and who transcended desire and illusion.

To probing male questions, this female mystic replied that worldly passions must be experienced before one discards them for spiritual goals (*vacana* 104). In other verses, she compares the triviality of rituals, caste, and worldly preoccupations with her love for Shiva.

Virasaiva Movement

Bhakti saints uniformly asserted that devotion was superior to Brahmanical ritual, and they composed hymns in their regional languages instead of Sanskrit. Belonging to many castes, they drew upon local traditions marginalized by Sanskritic Hinduism. One of the most radical challenges was posed by Basavanna, the Kannada saint. A Brahman versed in the Sanskrit scriptures, he is revered as the founder of the Virasaiva sect. Under his tutelage, Virasaivas rejected Hindu rituals and caste as well as Jainism, whose members were commercially dominant in the region. Virasaivas affirm a personal connection to Shiva by wearing an *ishta lingam* (favored icon of Lord Shiva) around their necks. Basavanna's egalitarian attitude encouraged Akkamahādevi, who found a space for women yogis in the hermitage at Kalyāna. The four major Virasaiva saints were Basavanna, the weaver Dēvara Dāsimayya, Akkamahādevi, and Allamaprabhu; their radical *vacanas* shaped the sect's ideology. Akkamahādevi is believed to have finally entered a cave near Srīshaila. Meditating alone, she is believed to have gone through six stages before attaining *Aikyās sthāla*, the final point of yogic union with Shiva.

Sita Anantha Raman

See also *Bhakti*; *Devī*; *Hinduism (Dharma)*; *Karnataka*

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Akkamahādevi. "Vacanas." Available at <<http://www.virashaivism.shaivism.org/vacs1010.htm>>
- Chekki, Danesh. *Religion and the Social System of the Virasaiva Community*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1997.
- Dehejia, Vidya. *Āntal and Her Path of Love: Poems of a Woman Saint from South India*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990.
- Embree, Ainslie, ed. *Sources of Indian Tradition*, vol. 1. New York: Columbia University Press, 1988.
- Hardy, Friedhelm. *Virāha Bhakti*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983.
- Mātaji, Vasanti. "Selections from the Discourse on Akkā Mahādevi: Yearning for Chenna Mallikārjuna." Available at <<http://www.ambahouse.org/akkamahadevi.html>>

Mullatti, Leela. *The Bhakti Movement and the Status of Women: A Case Study of Virasaivism*. New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1989.

Ramanujan, A. K., trans. *Speaking of Śiva*. New York: Penguin, 1973.

Shulman, David Dean. *Tamil Temple Myths: Sacrifice and Divine Marriage in the South Indian Śaiva Tradition*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980.

Tharu, Susie, and K. Lalitha. *Women Writing in India: 600 B.C. to the Present*, vol. 1. New York: Feminist Press, 1991.

ĀLĀP *Ālāp/Ālāpa/Ālāpana* (Sanskrit, *lāp* “speaking”; Hindustani, “dialogue,” or “talk”) in Indian classical music is an unmeasured musical form focusing on pitch; it either acts as the complement to metered music or stands alone. *Ālāp* (in North India) and *ālāpana* (in South India) is the primary medium by which a performer illuminates *rāga* (underlying melody). This illustration can follow the shape of an existing melody (with each pitch of the melody shown in its relationship to the pitches around it) or systematically elaborate each of the pitches of a *rāga*’s scale. In the latter—the *svār-vistār ālāp*—the most common approach is to start at the primary tonic (*sā*) of the *rāga* and first explore the pitches below that pitch (usually for an octave, but sometimes more) and then, ascending note by note, each of the notes in a *rāga* as high above the fundamental tonic as the performer cares to elaborate. Ultimately, an *ālāp/ālāpana* is an opportunity for the performer to show the nuances of the *rāga* without the constraints of meter. For many melodic instrumentalists and listeners, the *ālāp/ālāpana* is the most important part of the performance, the part in which the *rāga* appears most clearly.

In North Indian practice, the *ālāp* can be the entire unmeasured “first movement” of a performance as well as, more specifically, the opening unmeasured and unpulsed section. That is, the word “*ālāp*” refers both to all of the music that functions without meter (and, by implication, has no drum accompaniment) and, more precisely, to the opening music that not only lacks meter but has no pulse. Within the context of this temporal freedom, the performer is free to explore the entire range of the voice or instrument through the *rāga*. Indeed, singers will commonly use the note names (*sā*, *re*, *gā*, etc.) so that the listener can better appreciate the shapes. (Performers call these musical elaborations *sārgam tāns*.)

North Indian performers mark each section of the growing pitch *ambitus* with a form of rhythmic-melodic punctuation called a *moharā* (Hindustani, “opening” or “something formed in a matrix”), a musical phrase that—for a few seconds—gives the temporary notion of a pulse with notes that focus around the principal tonic.

Very often, a second section, which performers still broadly refer to as part of the larger *ālāp*, follows the



SVAR-VISTĀR ĀLĀP (MELODIC SOLOIST ALONE)

Section	Event
<i>ālāp</i>	meterless, pulseless develops note-by-note subdivisions are marked by <i>moharās</i> begins in <i>madhya sthān</i> descends through <i>mandra sthān</i> rises back through <i>madhya sthān</i> rises into the <i>tār sthān</i>
<i>jor</i>	pulsed, but meterless developed in all three <i>sthāns</i> (similar to <i>ālāp</i>)
<i>jhāla</i>	pulsed and intensely rhythmic meterless developed in all three <i>sthāns</i>

unmeasured-unpulsed *ālāp*. In instrumental music, the *jor* (Hindustani, “pair”) features a recurring and constant pulse with alternations between a note and a simple strummed drone. In vocal *dhruvad*, singers perform this same kind of pulsed but meterless section with nonlexical syllables and refer to this music as *nom tom*.

Sometimes in instrumental music, the rhythm of the *jor* intensifies in a frenetic concluding section called the *jhāla* (Hindustani, “web”). In this part of an instrumental performance, not only is a recurring pulse present, but the performer sets up a fast, intricate rhythmic pattern on the instrument’s drone strings (*cikārī*) and weaves the melody into that framework.

Gordon Thompson

See also **Dhruvad; Music; Rāga**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Jairazbhoy, Nazir. *The Rāgs of North Indian Music: Their Structure and Evolution*. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1971.

Vishwanathan, Tanjore. “The Analysis of *Rāga Ālāpana* in South Indian Music.” *Asian Music* 9, no. 1 (1977): 13–71.

ALBUQUERQUE, AFONSO DE (1459–1515), *viceroy of the Portuguese empire in India and Asia (1509–1515)*. Born to a family that traced its origins to an illegitimate son of King Dinis of Portugal (r. 1279–1325), Afonso de Albuquerque was indisputably the founder of the Portuguese empire in India and Asia. Before sailing to India in 1503, he had served King



Afonso de Albuquerque. Albuquerque's imperial zeal was matched by his religious fanaticism and ruthlessness that had few equals, even among his contemporary conquistadores. STAPLETON COLLECTION/CORBIS.

Manuel I (r. 1495–1521) in Morocco, where he developed a fanatical hatred for all Muslims after a Moroccan Muslim killed his younger brother there. Returning in 1504 to Lisbon, Albuquerque convinced the king of the desirability of establishing a monopoly of trade with the East by building forts at strategic ports around the Indian Ocean. Two years later the king approved his plan and dispatched him to the East. In a secret letter, he promised Albuquerque an appointment as viceroy of the Portuguese possessions at the expiration of the term of the incumbent, Francisco de Almeida. During the next nine years, Albuquerque established Portuguese maritime supremacy over the Indian Ocean, seizing crucial bases on the Asia-Europe route to Goa in 1510. A year later, he took Malacca, the principal distribution port for spices in Southeast Asia, and in 1515 he captured Ormuz in the Persian Gulf. Portugal's share in the Asia-Europe trade rose to three-quarters of the total, causing major losses for the Venetians, who had previously maintained a quasi-monopoly over the Asiatic trade through ties with Arabs and Persians. Albuquerque made Goa the headquarters of the extensive Portuguese empire in the East.

In 1509, he was made viceroy, a position he held until his death in 1515.

Albuquerque's imperial zeal was matched both by religious fanaticism and a ruthlessness that had few equals even among his contemporary conquistadores, both Portuguese and Spaniards. In a letter to the king of Portugal, Albuquerque boasted "I leave no town or building of the Mussulmans. Those who are taken alive, I order them to be roasted." One of Albuquerque's major initiatives was to encourage mixed marriages between Portuguese soldiers and sailors and the widows and abducted wives and daughters of the fallen combatants. He forcibly converted the women to Catholicism, gave them dowries of land and cash, and encouraged them to settle down and produce offspring, who he hoped would be loyal pillars of Portuguese power in the East. The policy failed in several ways. The "half-castes" it produced never lent effective strength to Portuguese imperial power. In Western India, his policy of religious intolerance produced hostility between Muslims and Hindus, who had, during the preceding centuries, lived in peaceful coexistence along the coast, promoting gainful trade.

Albuquerque's many detractors, both among his contemporaries and later historians, have condemned his excessive ambition in building an overextended empire of ports and forts while simultaneously pursuing a policy of forcible conversion. There is no doubt, however, that he was the founder of the Portuguese empire and initiator of the "Portuguese century" in Asia, making his country (along with Spain) an object of envy among contemporary European states.

D. R. SarDesai

See also **Gama, Vasco da; Goa; Portuguese in India**

BIBLIOGRAPHY


Albuquerque, Afonso de. *The Commentaries of the Great Afonso de Albuquerque, Second Viceroy of India*, translated from the Portuguese edition of 1774 by Walter de Gray Birch. 4 vols. London: Hakluyt Society, 1875–1884.

———. *Cartas de Afonso de Albuquerque para el rei D. Manuel I*. Lisbon: Royal Academy, 1884.

Earle, T. F., and John Villiers, eds. and trans. *Albuquerque, Caesar of the East: Selected Texts*. Warminster, U.K.: Aris and Phillips, 1990.

Stephens, Henry Morse. *Albuquerque*. Rulers of India Series. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892.

ALEXANDER THE GREAT (356–323 B.C.), *king of Macedon, conqueror of vast empire that included Greece, Persia, Egypt, and (briefly) parts of India.* Alexander the Great, son of King Philip II of Macedon and a student of Aristotle, was the ancient world's greatest



general. In the spring of 326 B.C. he led his Macedonian army across the Indus at Attock, conquering Punjab with only 30,000 foot soldiers and cavalry. Alexander's ambition was to conquer all of India, but he was blocked by his own soldiers, who refused to advance beyond the Beas River. Alexander's brief interlude in India proved a potent catalyst for change, probably inspiring the founder of India's first imperial dynasty, Chandragupta Maurya, and opening trade and cultural highways of intercourse between Hellenistic and Indic civilizations.

Raja Ambhi of Taxila, the first Indian prince to confront Alexander, wisely opened the gates of his capital to Alexander's army. Hellenistic coins and fragments of Gandharan art and a small Greek temple, visually reflecting the impact of Alexander's invasion, are preserved in modern Pakistan's Taxila Museum. We know from Strabo's account (XV,C.715) that just outside the gates of Taxila, Onesicritus, one of Alexander's officers, found fifteen Hindu yogis sitting stark naked on blazing rocks in the sun. He tried, through three interpreters, to learn the "secret" of their endurance, but failed. The one yogi whom Alexander took away with him died of food poisoning, as would Alexander himself, before returning home.

The most important impact of Alexander's brief conquest of Punjab, however, appears to have been the inspiration it provided to Chandragupta Maurya, a "young stripling" Alexander met after he had conquered the Punjabi kingdoms of Porus (Puru) and his neighbors.

Chandragupta returned to his Eastern Gangetic Kingdom, Magadha, soon after meeting with Alexander, inspired by Alexander's dream of universal conquest, to overthrow its raja; less than two years later Chandragupta established North India's first great empire, which lasted 140 years, as long as the British Raj would.

In addition to his martial prowess and bold vision of global conquest, Alexander was a builder of cities and bridges, his engineering corps arming him with the capability of crossing the mighty Indus. His brilliant Greek scientists brought a number of Western ideas, in medicine as well as philosophy and astronomy, to North India, some of which were adopted by precocious Indian scientists, whose own unique discoveries in those fields antedated most of those known to the Greeks. Multicultural interaction between the Hellenistic West and India would remain an important legacy of Alexander, who was so impressed by Raja Puru's elephant corps that he brought several of those earliest "tanks" back with his own army.

Stanley Wolpert

See also **Guptan Empire; Punjab**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Fildes, Alan, and Joann Fletcher. *Alexander the Great: Son of the Gods*. London: Duncan Baird, 2001.
 Hammond, N. G. L. *Alexander the Great*. 3rd ed. London: Bristol Classical Library, 1980.

ALIGARH. See Sayyid Ahmed Khan and the Aligarh Movement.

ALLAHABAD One of India's holiest cities, Allahabad was built at the confluence of the Ganges and Yamuna rivers. It is the ancestral home of Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister. The Nehrus, Kashmiri Brahman pandits, were originally the Kauls, but because the family home fronted the river, or *nehar*, they came to be called the Nehrus. The city was earlier named Prayag and Kausambi, and was a thriving Buddhist center. Its name was changed to Illahabas, or "city of Allah," in 1584 during the reign of the Great Mughal emperor Akbar. The brilliant Akbar was committed to winning the hearts of his Hindu subjects, and what better way to do so than to build a beautiful city at the confluence of India's two most sacred rivers. Thus he founded Illahabas in 1575, which quickly became Allahabad.

Allahabad is surrounded by sites dating back to ancient times: to its east lies Jhusi, ancient Pratisthanpur, the capital of the Chandras; to its west lies a medieval Kara fort, bearing testimony to the Rajput Jayachand's influence. Recognizing the commercial potential of the city and the social and religious importance of its rivers, Akbar elevated Allahabad to the status of a Mughal *suba*, or provincial capital, building a fort overlooking the Yamuna. The presence of an Ashokan pillar there also testifies to the much earlier influence of the Mauryans.

The marauding Marathas pillaged Allahabad before the British declared it their capital of the North West provinces in 1834. The British decision to place a high court there soon turned the city into a thriving center for legal studies, as well as the home of a fine university. However, the British moved their capital to Agra a year later. In 1857 mutinous Sepoys captured the city. In 1888 Allahabad hosted the fourth session of the Indian National Congress. Thereafter, it became a center of India's freedom movement, and Anand Bhavan, the Nehru ancestral home, was donated to the Congress as its headquarters. Besides the Nehrus, other Congress nationalists from the city included Mangla Prasad, Muzzaffar Hasan, Kailash Nath Katju, Lal Bahadur Shastri, and Purshottam Das Tandon. Allahabad proved to be the urban cradle of four of India's prime ministers: Jawaharlal Nehru, Indira Nehru Gandhi, her son Rajiv Nehru Gandhi, and Lal Bahadur Shastri. Allahabad remains an important city as a political and religious center. Its population in 1991 was approximately 800,000.

Ravi Kalia

See also **Akbar**; **Gandhi, Indira**; **Gandhi, Rajiv**; **Nehru**, **Jawaharlal**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bayly, C. A. *Rulers, Townsmen, and Bazaars: North Indian Society in the Age of British Expansion, 1770–1870*. Cambridge, U.K., and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Bhargava, M. L. *Hundred Years of Allahabad University*. New Delhi: Ashish, 1987.
- Low, D. A., ed. *Congress and the Raj*. London: Macmillan, 1977.
- Rothermund, Dietmar. *The Phases of Indian Nationalism and Other Essays*. Mumbai: Nachiketa Publications, 1970.
- Seal, Anil. *The Emergence of Indian Nationalism: Competition and Collaboration in the Late Nineteenth Century*. London: Cambridge University Press, 1968.

ALL-INDIA MUSLIM LEAGUE In 1885 the All-India National Congress (INC or Congress) was created as a political party. It was ostensibly noncommunal, but Muslims soon regarded it as a Hindu organization. Accordingly, Nawab Viqar ul-Mulk (1841–1917) in 1901 attempted to establish a political organization that would represent Muslim political opinion in India. In October 1906 a deputation of Muslims—the Simla Deputation, led by the Aga Khan (1877–1957)—met the viceroy of India, Lord Minto (1845–1914; viceroy 1905–1910), who encouraged British India's Muslims to create their own political party. He saw it as a moderating influence in the increasingly radical body politic of India, especially among a group of "extremists" in the Congress. Thus encouraged, Viqar ul-Mulk and the Aga Khan invited leading Muslims to meet in Dacca (now Dhaka) on 30 December 1906 to launch a new organization, the All-India Muslim League (AIML or League). The League's first meeting was held at the conclusion of the All-India Muslim Educational Conference (founded in 1886), which was cut short by one day. Its members were asked to attend the new meeting to discuss the creation of a "political association," the aims of which were:

1. To promote among the Muslims of India feelings of loyalty to the British government, and to remove any misconception that may arise as to the intention of government with regard to any of its measures.
2. To profit and advance the political rights and interests of the Muslims of India, and to respectfully represent their needs and aspirations to the government.
3. To prevent the rise, among the Muslims of India, of any feeling of hostility toward other communities, without prejudice to the aforementioned objects of the League.

The organization was to present "Muslim views" to the government on the eve of the new constitutional developments that were about to take place (the Councils of India Act, 1909). At the League's inaugural session, two joint secretaries and thirty-one members were appointed

to represent six areas of northern India from Bengal to the North West frontier province. Two years later a branch of the AIML was established in London under the presidency of Syed Ameer Ali (1849–1928) to act as a pressure lobby to influence British policy regarding India. Syed Wazir Hasan played a prominent role in the party in its early years, serving as joint secretary (1910–1912) and secretary (1912–1919), while the Aga Khan was president until 1913.

In its first five years the AIML met annually, except for 1909, in various cities of India to express Muslim views on the political issues of the day, to counter anti-League organizations, and to convince the British government of its loyalty. It established a few provincial and district Leagues and published a few brochures in various languages; its leaders toured India from time to time, giving talks on the platform and aims of the party.

League leaders presented the British Indian Muslim political community's views to the government. It maintained this pattern of limited activities for most of the first thirty years of its existence, though the League was active enough to enter into an agreement with the Congress in 1916 on a joint political postwar platform, the Lucknow Pact. This agreement established constitutional principles to be followed in future constitutions, which were reflected in the Government of India Act of 1918. Few of the League's followers paid any annual dues, and many of its members and officials were also members of other political parties. Apart from informal contacts with the government, the major event for the AIML was its annual meeting, where a number of resolutions were moved and discussed. These resolutions concerned the political and social questions of the day and, on occasion, events overseas, especially political crises that affected Muslim countries in the Mideast.

From 1906 until 1910 the central office was located at Aligarh. It then moved to Lucknow, and the raja of Mahmudabad (1879–1931) maintained the office through an annual donation of 3,000 rupees. In 1936 it was moved to Delhi, where it remained until 1947. The party membership in 1927 was only around 1,300 members, and in 1930 in Allahabad, when the philosopher Muhammad Iqbal (1877–1938) made his famous call for the creation of a state for the Muslims of South Asia in the north-western part of India, fewer than seventy-five people attended the meeting. To encourage membership, the admission fee of five rupees was abolished, and the annual subscription was reduced from six rupees to one rupee.

The League was often divided by the claims of different leaders who each wanted to assume the role of spokesman of Muslim India. These divisions at times

reflected genuine differences of opinion but were also based merely on personality clashes. In the early years, a clash developed between Fazl-i-Husain (1877–1937), who represented rural interests in the Punjab, and Muhammad Shafi (1869–1932), an urbanite from Lahore. In 1927 the conflict was between Muhammad Shafi and Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948), who had formally joined the League in 1913; Shafi opposed joint electorates, while Jinnah and his increasing number of followers supported them. A decade later the Punjab leader Sikander Hayat Khan (1892–1942) challenged Jinnah for the leadership of the League.

From 1934 until 1947 the name of Mohammad Ali Jinnah was synonymous with that of the AIML, but it was not until 1943 that Jinnah was the undisputed "great leader" (Quaid-i-Azam) of the party. Nonetheless, even after that date Muslim leaders from Bengal and the Punjab, especially Khizr Hayat Khan Tiwana (1900–1975; premier of the Punjab 1942–1947), attempted to act in an independent manner, favoring provincial interests over the national ones that the League represented. For his opposition, Khizr was expelled from the League in 1944.

The introduction of the Government of India Act of 1935 ushered in a new phase of politics in India. The election of candidates to provincial assemblies became crucial as Indians, not the British, would dominate provincial legislatures. As a result, the AIML, for the first time in its history, began to be organized as a viable national party. On 4 March 1934 the forceful and charismatic Mohammad Ali Jinnah, a wealthy self-made lawyer who had been a prominent Muslim politician since 1909, became the president of the party. Jinnah nominated the Parliamentary Board, which chose party candidates for the general elections in 1936. Even at this time only three rich supporters kept the party functioning, and it was opposed both by the Congress and regional Muslim parties, especially in Bengal and the Punjab; nonetheless, the party began its slow ascent to national importance.

The rise of the League was due to the national leadership of Jinnah and the organizational work of the independently wealthy general-secretary, Liaquat Ali Khan (1895–1951), who, like Jinnah, devoted most of his time over the next ten years to the party. The president of the AIML was elected annually, the general-secretary for three years. Under the president was the Working Committee of a dozen or so members chosen to represent all parts of India; then came the AIML Council, whose members could vote on League policy; and then came the primary party members. This organizational structure was also followed, in theory, in the provinces. However, it was only at the national level that the party had a viable organization, and that evolved only in the years after 1937. The League also had parliamentary parties in the

legislative assemblies both at the center, where Jinnah was the leader, and in the provinces.

In the General Elections of 1936 the League contested half of the seats reserved for Muslims. It obtained some 60 percent of those seats but won practically none of the seats in the Muslim majority provinces, except for Bengal where it gained 39 out of 117 seats. These electoral defeats, however, were to lead to a complete change in League fortunes, as Congress ministries governed in most of the provinces of India in a manner that was viewed as favorable to the Hindu community and detrimental to Muslim interests. As a result, there were a large number of Muslim defections from the Congress. In 1939 the League published two widely discussed reports, *The Pirpur Report* and *The Sharif Report*, that detailed "Congress misgovernment," further inflaming Muslim feeling toward the Congress and mobilizing Muslims for the League.

In October 1937 at Lucknow, Jinnah initiated a new combativeness in Indian politics by declaring that there were now three political entities in India: the Congress, the British, and the League. Later, the League chalked out a Five-Year Plan for the Muslim community and organized the All-India Muslim Students Federation. At Lahore on 23 March 1940, at its annual meeting, the League moved the "Pakistan Resolution," which called for the creation of a separate state for the Muslims of India in the northwest and northeast of India. (The term "Pakistan" was first coined in 1930.) An estimated 100,000 people attended that famous session in Lahore. Nearly 90,000 people were then members of the party, and membership would continue to rise. A weekly party newspaper, *Dawn*, was created in 1941, and the following year it became a daily, acquiring national readership. In 1943, the League created a Planning Committee that would plan economic development in the Pakistan areas, and a Committee of Action was established to enforce party discipline and its will among the provincial League parties. In 1944 a Committee of Writers was created; over the next two years it produced ten pamphlets in its Pakistan Literature Series, a considerable number of newspaper articles, and election campaign material, written primarily by students and professors of Aligarh Muslim University—most notably professor Jamil-ud-Din Ahmad (1914–1970), who also arranged for League pamphlets to be published by Shaikh Muhammad Ashraf of Lahore, who became the official publisher of the League. The League also actively recruited student workers, especially from Aligarh Muslim University and Punjab University, who would propagate the demand for Pakistan both in the cities and in the rural areas and would campaign for League candidates in election campaigns. With the rise in communal violence in the 1940s, the

League created the paramilitary Muslim National Guard to protect League meetings and to act as bodyguards for Muslim leaders, especially Mohammad Ali Jinnah.

All of the organizational work between 1937 and 1946 led to a tremendous League victory in the 1946 general elections, when it won one-third of the seats in the Punjab, 115 of 250 in Bengal, and almost all of the Muslim seats it contested in other parts of India. Membership of the party was in the millions. This victory supported Jinnah's claim that he spoke for the Muslims of India and that those Muslims demanded Pakistan. The British increasingly treated him as the spokesman of Muslim India, despite the claims of Congress—especially by Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) and Mahatma M. K. Gandhi (1869–1948)—that the Congress spoke for all of India, Muslims included. As a result of this electoral victory, an increasing number of Muslim politicians joined the League, while those who did not lost a great deal of credibility among Muslims. The League had demonstrated that it was the party of the Muslims of South Asia. In 1946 the League agreed to enter the interim government, claiming parity with the Congress. Liaquat Ali Khan gained one of the most important positions in the government, that of finance member.

By early 1947 both the Congress and the British agreed that upon independence India should be partitioned into the sovereign states of India and Pakistan. With the creation of Pakistan on 14 August 1947, Jinnah became governor-general and Ali Khan, prime minister of the new state of Pakistan. The AIML then split into two parties, the Pakistan Muslim League and the Indian Muslim League.

Roger D. Long

See also Congress Party; Jinnah, Mohammad Ali; Khan, Liaquat Ali; Muslims

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ahmad, Muhammad Salim. *The All India Muslim League: A History of the Growth and Consolidation of Political Organisation*. Bahawalpur: Ilham Publishers, 1989.
- Bahadur, Lal. *The Muslim League: Its History, Activities, and Achievements*. Lahore: Book Traders, 1979.
- Malik, Ikram Ali. *Muslim League Session 1940 and the Lahore Resolution: Documents*. Islamabad: National Institute of Historical and Cultural Research, 1990.
- Malik, Nadeem Shafiq, ed. *The All India Muslim League, 1906–47*. Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 1997.
- Mujahid, Sharif-al, ed. *Muslim League Documents, 1900–1947*, vol. 1. Karachi: Quaid-i-Azam Academy, 1990.
- Ralhan, O. P., ed. *All India Muslim League*. 2 vols. New Delhi: Anmol Publications, 1997.
- Shah, Sayyid Vaqar Ali. *Muslim League in N.W.F.P.* Karachi: Royal Book Co., 1992.

Wolpert, Stanley. *Jinnah of Pakistan*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1984.

AMBEDKAR, B. R., AND THE BUDDHIST DALITS Dr. Bhimrao Ramji Ambedkar (1891–1956), independent India’s first law minister, was a leader, scholar, and activist of the “depressed classes,” or untouchables, who are now known as Dalits (meaning the “oppressed” or “crushed”). In 1935 Ambedkar announced that he would not die a Hindu. He encouraged his followers to convert as well, yet left open the question of which religion he and his followers would ultimately choose. After two decades of religious study, negotiation, and deliberation, Ambedkar and approximately 400,000 to 600,000 of his followers converted to Buddhism in Nagpur, India, on 14 October 1956, followed by many more conversions in the ensuing years.

B. R. Ambedkar

Born into the depressed classes, Bhimrao (“Babasaheb”) Ambedkar was educated in Mumbai (Bombay) at Elphinstone College, then in New York at Columbia University, and in London at the London School of Economics and the Inns of Court before returning to India to eventually become the greatest leader of the Dalits. During the independence movement, he and Mahatma Gandhi disagreed over the best approach to gaining rights for lower castes. Gandhi preferred to keep the depressed classes within the Hindu fold, to reform Hinduism from within, and to avoid special rights for depressed classes. In contrast, Ambedkar wanted to ensure rights and representation for lower castes. After representing lower castes at London’s pre-independence Roundtable conferences on constitutional reforms, Ambedkar became law minister under Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru and was one of the major authors of India’s 1950 Constitution. Building on the nineteenth-century anticaste movement and early-twentieth-century non-Brahman movements, Ambedkar brought Dalit issues to the attention of the new Indian nation.

Mass Conversion of 1956

Ambedkar fearlessly argued against the tyrannies of Hinduism’s caste system, insisting that you “must give a new doctrinal basis to your religion—a basis that will be in consonance with Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, in short with Democracy” (Ambedkar, “The Annihilation of Caste,” 1936, p. 100). His speeches make clear that conversion for anyone born an “untouchable” meant conversion to a new life. “To get human treatment, convert yourselves,” he urged his followers. “Convert for securing equality. Convert for getting liberty.” Ambedkar ultimately



Celebrating Dr. B. R. Ambedkar’s Birth Anniversary. Buddhist Dalits carry the image of Ambedkar through the streets on the anniversary of his birth. Ambedkar fearlessly argued against the tyrannies of Hinduism’s caste system, insisting that you must give a new doctrinal basis to your religion—a basis that will be in consonance with Liberty, Equality and Fraternity, in short with Democracy. INDIA TODAY.

chose to convert to Buddhism, finding the egalitarian aspects of Buddhism appealing, as well as its moral and ethical dimensions.

Maharashtra’s outcaste community of Mahars, to which Ambedkar was born, formed the majority among the Dalit converts in Nagpur. A large, relatively well-organized community, the Mahars were particularly receptive to Ambedkar’s arguments against Brahman oppression, thanks to his own Mahar background. Other lower castes revered Ambedkar as well, but his leadership faced powerful competition from Gandhi, who called himself “untouchable by choice” and who argued against outright rebellion or rejection of Hinduism and called for reform within. Nevertheless, Ambedkar ultimately rejected Gandhi’s arguments; after Ambedkar’s own adoption of Buddhism in the last year of his life, conversions continued, resulting in 3 million new Buddhists in the next few years, some from outcaste communities in other states. Statues of Ambedkar have been erected throughout India.

Dalit Movement

After the 1956 conversion and the death of Ambedkar, the Dalit movement grew in popularity and political power. There was a Dalit renaissance in literature, renewed political activism, and a constitutional legacy in the form of affirmative action policies, including university entry positions and service appointments, for Dalits. Although the majority of Dalits are still landless or near-landless agriculturalists in rural areas, Ambedkar's two-pronged strategy—political and administrative representation via affirmative action and personal empowerment via conversion—has kept the Dalits' concerns on India's public agenda.

Reservation, or affirmative action policies for Dalits, officially called the Scheduled Castes, continue to ensure Dalit representation in all legislatures, including Parliament, in government jobs, and at universities. At the local level, some legislative seats are also reserved for Scheduled Caste women. Although Scheduled Caste converts' eligibility for such reserved places was long restricted, Scheduled Caste converts to Buddhism are now eligible for those positions.

Dalit literary contributions keep criticism of the caste system and the treatment of Dalit women in the public eye. Ambedkar stressed the importance of not only religious liberation by conversion and political liberation via agitation and organization, but of social liberation through education. A Dalit literary movement rooted in the Marathi language spread to other Indian languages, verbalizing the growing awareness and rebellion associated with the Dalit movement. A surge of writing in the decades after Ambedkar's death gave voice to Dalits reflecting on their experiences and their new aspirations. The Dalit Sahitya Movement included scathing poetry of protest and blunt condemnation of the religious underpinnings of caste.

Movements such as the Dalit Panthers, modeled in part after the Black Panthers of the United States and primarily active in the early 1970s, challenged caste through protest, agitation, and at times violent confrontation, in addition to literature. Although Ambedkar's Scheduled Castes Federation, later the Republican Party of India, did not become a major political force, lower caste parties have more recently become major players in Indian politics. In short, the Dalit movement has not solved problems of caste discrimination but has empowered many Dalits, mobilized others, and raised awareness, both in India and globally, of the problems and perspectives of modern India's Dalits.

Laura Dudley Jenkins

See also **Caste System**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ambedkar, B. R. *Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar: Writings and Speeches*, edited by Vasant Moon. Mumbai: Department of Education, Government of Maharashtra, 1989–. A multi-volume set of collected works.
- Dangle, Arjun, ed. *Poisoned Bread: Translations from Modern Marathi Dalit Literature*. Hyderabad and Mumbai: Orient Longman, 1992. Examples of the Dalit literary movement.
- Jaffrelot, Christophe. *India's Silent Revolution: The Rise of the Lower Castes in North India*. New York: Columbia University Press, 2003. Political scientist's take on Gandhi-Ambedkar tensions and contemporary rise of lower caste political parties.
- Omvedt, Gail. *Dalits and the Democratic Revolution: Dr. Ambedkar and the Dalit Movement in Colonial India*. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1994. A major biographical, sociological, historical work from a Marxist perspective.
- Shah, Ghanshyam, ed. *Dalit Identity and Politics*. New Delhi; Thousand Oaks; London: Sage Publications, 2001. Edited volume covering Ambedkar and cultural, political, and social Dalit movements.
- Viswanathan, Gauri. *Outside the Fold: Conversion, Modernity and Belief*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1998. Award-winning book by comparative literature scholar; includes chapter on Ambedkar and Buddhist converts.
- Zelliot, Eleanor. *From Untouchable to Dalit*. New Delhi: Manohar, 1996. Collection of works by leading Ambedkar historian who has followed Dalit movement since its early days in the 1960s.

AMRITSAR A city in the state of Punjab with a population of 780,000 (in 2001), Amritsar was founded in 1577 by Ram Das, the fourth guru of the Sikhs. Arjun, the fifth guru, is said to have compiled the *Adi Granth*, the sacred book of the Sikhs, in Amritsar around 1603, placing it in the central Sikh temple, Har Mandir, surrounded by a sacred tank. This temple, still the most sacred place of the Sikh faith, is called the Golden Temple, after its gold-plated cupola. The sixth guru, Hargobind, added the Akal Takht, a stronghold tower of worldly power, to the temple complex. That tower served as a bastion for the defense of the Har Mandir.

Amritsar is the site of a national calamity, the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre of 1919. This Bagh (garden) is a central square surrounded by walls. A political meeting was being held here when the British brigadier Sir Reginald Dyer ordered his troops to shoot without warning at the unarmed crowd, which could not disperse. More than 400 dead were found at the end of this massacre, some 1,200 left wounded. The general had intended to “cow down” the rebellious Punjabis in this way, in a calculated act of martial terror. Indian nationalists, however, turned Jallianwala Bagh into a national shrine, marking the decline of the British Raj. Mahatma Gandhi chaired a Congress committee appointed to investigate and report

on the massacre. He was careful to state only proven facts, but his factual report clearly showed that Jallianwala Bagh was a trap, deliberately set by a brutal British officer.

Many years later, Amritsar was marred by another national tragedy. Separatist Sikhs led by Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale captured the Golden Temple and converted its Akal Takht into a well-defended stronghold. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi initially supported Bhindranwale, hoping to weaken Sikh opposition to her Congress Party rule. But he had soon outgrown her tutelage, and she finally felt compelled to order the Indian army to storm the Golden Temple in June 1984. Bhindranwale and his followers died in the Akal Takht, which was destroyed when troops and tanks entered the temple. Indira Gandhi was subsequently assassinated by two of her own Sikh bodyguards in her New Delhi garden.

Dietmar Rothermund

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bawa, Joginder S. *The Heritage of Amritsar*. Amritsar: Faqir Singh, n.d.
- Horniman, B. G. *British Administration and the Amritsar Massacre*. Delhi: Mittal, 1984.
- Singh, Fauja. *The City of Amritsar: A Study of Historical, Cultural and Economic Aspects*. New Delhi: n.p., 1978.
- Tully, Mark, and Satish Jacob. *Amritsar: Mrs. Gandhi's Last Battle*. London: Cape, 1985.

ANAND, MULK RAJ (1905–2004), prominent Indian novelist. Mulk Raj Anand was one of India's greatest novelists, dubbed by some critics as the “father” of the Indian novel in English. His two greatest novels were *Untouchable*, first published in 1935, and *Coolie*, published a year later. He published many more works, including *Two Leaves and a Bud* (1937), *The Village* (1939), *Black Waters* (1940), and *The Sword and the Sickle* (1942). But none of his later works, including his seven-volume autobiography, *Seven Ages of Man*, had the power or impact of those two brilliant, singularly simple first fruits of Mulk Raj's prolific pen.

He was born in Peshawar, where his father served the British Raj as a soldier, and was educated at Amritsar's Khalsa College, from which he graduated with honors in 1924. He then sailed off to London, where he completed his doctorate in 1929, by which time he was a devout Marxist, volunteering to teach evening classes about India's poverty and the plight of its coolies and untouchables for London's Workers Educational Association. His passionate commitment to Mahatma Gandhi's struggle against the dreadful blight of Hinduism's untouchability was poignantly reflected in the illiterate “untouchable” hero of his first novel, who was moved by the sight of the Mahatma's naked dark torso, as “black” as his own skin,

which gave him a new sense of “national” pride. Anand himself followed Gandhi's revolutionary call to boycott the British Raj and all of its institutions until full freedom was granted to India.

His later works focused less on social issues, turning more inward, as did his last novels, *Morning Face* and *Confessions of a Lover*, published in 1968. He founded the successful Mumbai magazine of the arts, *Marg*, which he initially edited, chaired the Lalit Kala Academy of Arts in New Delhi, and wrote several film scripts and broadcasts. But his first love was the novel, and to that he devoted his best years of creative work, articulating with what he called the “fiery voice of the people,” their cries of pain and frustration, born of poverty, discrimination, and hunger. If a politician should always be judged by his worst work, a writer should be remembered by his best; and at his best Mulk Raj Anand was brilliant.

Stanley Wolpert

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Anand, Mulk Raj. *Untouchable*. New York: Penguin, 1940.
- . *The Sword and the Sickle*. London: Jonathan Cape, 1942.
- . *Coolie*. New York: Liberty Press, 1952.
- . *Private Life of an Indian Prince*. Delhi: Mayflower Press, 1954.
- . *The Old Woman and the Cow*. Mumbai: Kutub-Popular, 1960.
- . *Seven Summers*. Delhi: Hind Pocket Books, 1972.
- . *Confessions of a Lover*. London: Arnold-Heinemann, 1976.
- . *The Bubble*. New Delhi: Mayfair Press, 1984.

ANANDAMA, MA. See *Devī*.

ĀNDĀL The *bhakti* (devotional) movement began when itinerant Tamil saints composed hymns to Vishnu, Siva, and Dēvī the Goddess in the sixth century A.D. The twelve Vaishnava mystics (*āzhvārs*) and sixty-three Saiva mystics (*nāyanārs*) were of many castes, from the Brahman to the untouchable. Two women “saints,” the *nāyanār* yogi Karaikkāl Ammaiyār (sixth century) and *āzhvār* Āndāl (ninth century), left scriptural legacies in Tamil.

Āndāl was the only woman *āzhvār* and is unique in that she is venerated as an incarnation of goddess Lakshmī. Āndāl-Lakshmī's tenth-century bronze icon is housed in a shrine within Srīvilliputtūr temple. Āndāl's adoptive father Vishnu Chitta, a weaver of garlands and an *āzhvār*, visited the court of Srimara Srivallabhadeva Pandya (815–863 A.D.).

Āndāl wrote *Tiruppāvai* and *Nācchiyār Tirumozhi*, two elegant, sensuous, erotic compositions to her divine lover



“VĀRANAM ĀYIRAM”

The velvety red
of the ladybirds
whose flutter fills the air
in the dark grove of Maliruncōlai
brings to mind
the glowing red
of the kumkum powder
on my dark lord's forehead.
Once he churned the ocean
for the nectar of the gods
using Mandara mountain
as a churning rod.
I flounder in the net
of that lord
of the handsome shoulders.
Can I escape
alive?

(*Nācchiyār Tirumozhi* [9,1],
Vidya Dehejia, trans., 107)

Vishnu-Tirumāl. Āndāl's work reflects the influence of both Tamil and Sanskrit literature. Together with Perīāzhvār's cradle poems devoted to the “infant” Krishna, Āndāl's hymns constitute a sizable portion of the Vaishnava scriptures, the *Nālāyira Divya Prabandham* (Four thousand sacred verses).

Life and Legend

Āndāl's life is shrouded in a myth similar to that of Sītā in the *Rāmāyaṇa*. Lakshmī was supposedly born as Āndāl as she wished to be Vishnu's greatest devotee on Earth. Perīāzhvār discovered the infant beside a *tulasi* (basil) bush, and he called her Kōdai for her magnificent hair. As a child, Kōdai-Āndāl seems to have been enchanted with his garlands for Tirumāl, wearing them in his absence and peering at her reflection in a well near the shrine. Although the flowers were strangely fragrant, her father chided her as he could not offer desecrated flowers for the deity. That night, Tirumāl visited Perīāzhvār in a dream and told him that he wished to wear only Āndāl's used garlands; the saint realized that his daughter was Lakshmī herself. Āndāl's love for Tirumāl grew, and she urged her father to recite the names of his sacred shrines, and she refused to marry anyone else. This absorption in a divine lover, her ecstasy, and final disappearance into the icon presage myths about the women *bhakti* saints, Akkamahādevī (twelfth century), and Mīrabai (sixteenth century). Legend states that Tirumāl visited Āndāl in a dream when she was fourteen, inviting her to Srīrangam temple, where he is worshiped as Lord Ranganāthā. She

is believed to have worn her bridal finery and to have merged beatifically into the icon. A twelfth-century inscription states that a garden was created in Srīrangam in her name.

Tiruppāvai and Nācchiyār Tirumozhi

In *Tiruppāvai*, Āndāl assumes the role of a *gopi*, or milkmaid, in love with Krishna. Its thirty stanzas realistically depict human emotions and village customs. They are popularly sung by women in the month of Mārgazhi (December) prior to the Tai (January) festival of Pongal. *Tiruppāvai* is in the genre of a *pāvai pāṭal*, and it describes women bathing in the river, anointing themselves with turmeric, and fashioning clay images of Lakshmī, to whom they prayed for a fruitful life. These female folk rites are described in the sixth-century Tamil Paripatal, and in the tenth-century Sanskrit Bhagavata Purāṇa. *Tiruppāvai* has been translated into Telugu and Kannada. Āndāl is also the chief character in the sixteenth-century play *Amukta Mahyada*, by Krishna Dēva Rāya of Vijayanagar. Her more mature work, *Nācchiyār Tirumozhi*, consists of fourteen hymns in 143 stanzas, pulsating with the mystic's emotions of hope, yearning, separation, and final joy at salvation. One canto, “*Vāranam āyiram*,” describing her dream of being wedded to Tirumāl, is sung at weddings even today.

Sita Anantha Raman

See also **Bhakti**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Āndāl. *Tiruppāvai*. Mylapore: Sri Ramakrishna Math, 1996.
Bhaskaran Bhattar, G. Vijaya, *Srī Āndāl: Varalāru matrum, Tiruppāvai, Nācchiyār Tirumozhi, Gōda Stuti, Gōda Ashtakam, Gōda Ashtōtiram Sdanamavalli*. Srivilliputūr: Sri Andal Kovil Sri Nidhi Publications, 1996.
Dehejia, Vidya, trans. *Āntāl and Her Path of Love: Poems of a Woman Saint from South India*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1990.
Sundaram, P. S., trans. *The Poems of Āndāl: Tiruppāvai and Nācchiyār Tirumozhi*. Mumbai: Ananthacharya Indological Research Institute, 1997.

SECONDARY SOURCES

- Cutler, Norman. *Songs of Experience: The Poetics of Tamil Devotion*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987.
Hardy, Friedhelm. *Virāha Bhakti*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1983.
Nandakumar, Prema. *Gōda's Garland of Devotion*. Madras: Samata Books, 1989.
Ramanujan, A. K. *Hymns for the Drowning: Poems for Vishnu by Nammālvar*. New York: Penguin, 1981.
Sastri, K. A. Nilkanta. *A History of South India: From Prehistoric Times to the Fall of Vijayanagar*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1975.

Shulman, David Dean. *Tamil Temple Myths: Sacrifice and Divine Marriage in the South Indian Saiva Tradition*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1980.

Varadarajan, M. *A History of Tamil Literature*. Delhi: Sahitya Akademi, 1988.

ANDHRA PRADESH A state in Southern India, Andhra Pradesh has a population of 75.7 million (as of 2001); its area is 106,000 square miles (275,000 sq. km.); its capital, Hyderabad. The major language is Telugu, which belongs to the Dravidian family of languages. The state in its present form was established in 1956, when it merged with the territory of the former princely state of Hyderabad. The other parts of the state had earlier belonged to the Madras Presidency of British India. Madras Presidency was a multilingual province in which the Telugu speakers felt subordinate to the political dominance of the Tamil speakers. They stressed their historic linguistic identity by referring to the Andhra (Satavahana) dynasty, whose realm had expanded across the Deccan, along the Godavari River, from about the second century B.C. to the second century A.D. The Telugu linguistic movement spread in the early twentieth century and had its first visible success in the establishment of Andhra University at Waltair. Although Telugu is a Dravidian language, the movement for Dravidian solidarity, emanating as it did from Tamil Nadu, never appealed to the Andhras.

When Mahatma M. K. Gandhi reorganized the provincial committees of the All-India National Congress in 1920, the Telugu speakers demanded one of their own. Their activities remained restricted to the British Indian areas, however, because the princely state of Hyderabad was under autocratic rule until India achieved independence in 1947. Unlike other rulers who acceded to the Republic of India in 1947, the Muslim nizam of Hyderabad refused, hoping to win British support for his claim to independence based on the large size of his state and his own fortune and exalted princely status. Since this state was completely surrounded by Indian territory, however, there was no hope that either Britain or India would allow Hyderabad to live in splendid isolation. A "police action," as the government of India called it, forced the nizam to accede to India in September 1948, when the Indian army moved in.

From 1946 to 1951 the Telengana region of the state of Hyderabad was shaken by a militant mass peasant movement against their landlords. This movement, directed by Indian Communists, was finally called off in 1951. Meanwhile the Telugu speakers in the coastal areas had intensified their struggle for an independent linguistic state, which culminated in 1953 in the fast-unto-death of one of their leaders, Potti Sriramulu. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, who had until then resisted the

formation of linguistic states, feeling that they would pose a threat to national unity, relented, approving the formation of Andhra Pradesh, which thus became the first linguistic state in India in 1953, soon to be followed by many more. The amalgamation of Andhra with the erstwhile state of Hyderabad and the rise of the city of Hyderabad as the state capital shifted the political center of gravity from coastal Andhra to the western part of the state. Most people of the impoverished region of Telengana felt, nevertheless, neglected due to the preponderance of wealthier and more assertive coastal people. Recently the demand for a separate state of Telengana has been revived, particularly in view of the excision of neighboring Chhattisgarh from the state of Madhya Pradesh.

In the assembly elections of 2004 a new party, the Telengana Rashtra Samiti, led by K. Chandrasekhara Rao, scored a great success which was also reflected in the simultaneous elections to the central Parliament (Lok Sabha). Chandrasekhara Rao became a cabinet minister in the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance. The excision of Telengana from Andhra Pradesh now seemed to be a foregone conclusion. The new state would include ten districts around the present state capital Hyderabad.

The Rise and Fall of the Telugu Desam Party

Andhra Pradesh long remained a bastion of the National Congress Party. A Congress politician from Andhra Pradesh, P. V. Narasimha Rao, became the first South Indian prime minister of India. But while his career flourished in Delhi's national politics, a new, vigorous party challenged the Congress Party in Andhra Pradesh. This was the Telugu Desam Party (TDP), led by the charismatic film star N. T. Rama Rao. TDP put an end to Congress rule in Andhra in the 1980s. In the 1990s the TDP was led by Rama Rao's son-in-law, Chandrababu Naidu, who emerged as a vigorously charismatic and efficient chief minister of Andhra Pradesh. He is a pioneer of "e-governance," impressing even Bill Gates, who visited him, with the information system stored in his laptop. Naidu literally has all of Andhra's vital facts and figures at his fingertips. Fascinated with information technology, Naidu neglected the poor peasants of Andhra Pradesh who obviously voted for the Congress Party in the assembly elections of 2004. The Congress leader, Dr. Y. S. Rajashekar Reddy, replaced Naidu as Chief Minister. The TDP won only 49 seats whereas the Congress Party and its allies captured 226 of the 294 assembly seats. The sudden fall of the TDP was as dramatic as its previous rise.

Andhra Pradesh is one of the poorer agricultural states of India. Its industrial base is still very small, mostly concentrated in Hyderabad. Naidu hopes to make Hyderabad an Information Technology-center to rival Bangalore.

But this will not be achieved easily. In terms of per capita income, Andhra Pradesh is close to the national average, but its literacy rate is much below the national average. As far as urbanization is concerned, Andhra Pradesh is also far behind most other states of India. It has only three centers with more than 1 million inhabitants: Hyderabad, Vishakapatnam, and the Vijayawada-Guntur region.

Dietmar Rothermund

See also **Hyderabad**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- "Andhra Pradesh." Available at <<http://www.andhranews.net>>
 Narayana Rao, K. V. *The Emergence of Andhra Pradesh*. Mumbai: Popular Prakashan, 1973.
 Rao, R. P. *History of Modern Andhra*. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1978.
 "Telugu Desam Party." Available at <<http://www.telugudesam.org>>

ANDREWS, C. F. (1871–1940), religious leader and social reformer, one of Mahatma Gandhi's closest followers. Charles Freer ("Charlie") Andrews was born in 1871 at Newcastle upon Tweed, U.K. In 1893 he graduated from Pembroke College, Cambridge, and in 1897 was ordained into the ministry of the Church of England. Subsequently he was both lecturer and chaplain of Pembroke College and then, in 1903, was appointed by the Society for the Propagation of the Gospel (SPG) as a member of the Cambridge Brotherhood in Delhi. In March 1904, Andrews arrived in India to take up a teaching assignment at St. Stephen's College. Andrews and the Indian educator Gopal Krishna Gokhale became friends, and it was Gokhale who first acquainted Andrews with the wrongs of the system of indentured labor and the sufferings of Indians in South Africa. Andrews decided to go to South Africa at the end of 1913 to assist Mahatma M. K. Gandhi in his nonviolent resistance movement, or *satyagraha*. Upon his arrival in Durban he was met by Gandhi, whereupon Andrews bent down and touched his feet. Of the occasion, Andrews later wrote, "Our hearts met from the first moment we saw one another, and they have remained united by the strongest ties of love ever since."

Another of Andrews's friends was Rabindranath Tagore. Andrews was attracted to Tagore's deep concern for social reform, and eventually Andrews made Tagore's experimental school, Shantiniketan, the "abode of Peace," near Calcutta (Kolkata), his own headquarters. Though Andrews never departed from the Church of England, he did resign from the Brotherhood of the Cambridge Mission. In his own spiritual pilgrimage

Andrews was convinced that the cause of Christ was the cause of exploited laborers, rejected outcasts, and those who struggle for work and bread.

After leaving South Africa in July 1914, Andrews traveled to many countries, including Fiji, Japan, Kenya, and Ceylon (Sri Lanka), mostly on behalf of Indian laborers. In the 1920s, he became closely involved with the affairs of the All India Trade Union Congress, of which he became president in 1925. In the early 1930s, Andrews assisted Gandhi in preparations for the Round Table Conference in London. But it was Andrews's idea of a minister of reconciliation, first promulgated from Cambridge in 1935, that was unique. Andrews himself was widely acknowledged as a minister of reconciliation wherever he went. Many across the religious spectrum were influenced by Andrews. When he died in Calcutta, on 4 April 1940, his friend Mahatma Gandhi had traveled across India to be at his side.

C. F. Andrews was the author of numerous works, including three books on Mahatma Gandhi. His writings include *The Oppression of the Poor* (1921); *The Indian Problem* (1922); *The Rise and Growth of Congress in India* (1938); and *The True India: A Plea for Understanding* (1939).

Graham Houghton

See also **Christian Impact on India, History of; Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Andrews, C. F. *The True India: A Plea for Understanding*. London: G. Allen & Unwin, 1939.
 Eddy, Sherwood. *Pathfinders of the World Missionary Crusade*. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1945.
 Hoyland, John S. C. *F. Andrews: Minister of Reconciliation*. London: Allenson, 1940.

ANDY, S. PULNEY (1831–1909), first Indian recipient of a British medical degree. Born in Tricinopoly of Hindu parents in 1831, Pulney Andy completed studies in Madras Christian College before going to England in 1859. He was the first Indian student to register for a British medical degree. He became a fellow of the Royal College of Surgeons and returned to India in 1862. He was baptized in Calicut, 3 May 1863, but did not join a church.

On the recommendation of the secretary of state, the Madras government created a special appointment for him as superintendent of vaccination and posted him to Malabar. Among other accomplishments, he published a widely accepted pamphlet, "The Protective Influence of Vaccination." He also edited a newspaper, *Eastern Star*, and was involved with the social and political journal *Cosmopolite*.

After his retirement, Andy conceived the idea of a National Church of India (NCI), acknowledged at the time as “the first indigenous movement of Christianity.” His desire was to unite the various denominations into one church, suited to Indian culture and sensibilities, and to encourage independence, self-reliance, and self-government in the ministrations of a church that was not dependent on foreign aid. He devoted both purse and energy to this cause.

At the inauguration of the NCI, on 12 September 1886, he said; “we [Indian Christians] should look about to maintain ourselves instead of idly continuing to depend on the charitable support chiefly contributed by the people of Europe. Let us not play the part of the professional beggar any longer.” Pulney Andy was equally forthright with his missionary friends. While acknowledging the good they had done, he believed they lacked a knowledge of the intricate social and religious practices of the Hindus and failed to present Christianity in a way conducive to the development of the church in India. He was convinced that there was a need for an Indian church that did “not reflect Scotch Presbyterianism, nor English Anglicanism, nor German Lutheranism,” but that would “combine into a harmonious whole the best features of all denominations” (*NCI Third Annual Report 1888–1889*: 101).

The idea of a national church received very little encouragement from the missionaries or from Indian Christians. In 1900 the publication *Harvest Field* referred to Pulney Andy as one who had the misfortune to live ahead of his time. He did not live to see his dream fulfilled. It was not until 1947, in fact, that a union of churches took place to create the Church of South India. Pulney Andy died in September 1909 in his seventy-eighth year.

Graham Houghton

See also **Christian Impact on India, History of**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Baago, Kaj. *Pioneers of Indigenous Christianity*. Madras: Christian Literature Society, 1969.
 Houghton, Graham. *Impoverishment of Dependency*. Madras: Christian Literature Society, 1983.
NCI Third Annual Report 1888–1889. Bangalore: United Theological College. Microfilm VP37.

ANGLO-AFGHAN WARS

This entry consists of the following articles:

WAR ONE (1838–1842)

WAR TWO (1878–1880)

WAR THREE (MAY–AUGUST 1919)

WAR ONE (1838–1842)

Throughout the nineteenth century, the British government watched with concern as the Russian empire expanded across Central Asia. The British hoped to enlist the Persian government in what soon came to be known as the “Great Game,” the Anglo-Russian rivalry for control of the strategic approaches to India. However, when Britain had declined to aid Persia during its own conflict with Russia in 1826, Persia chose to entertain Russian diplomats in Tehran in 1838, launching what Britain assumed to be a Russian-inspired attempt to seize Herat, the gateway to southern Afghanistan and thence to India via the Bolan Pass.

Related events in the Afghan capital, Kabul, the northern gateway to India via the Khyber Pass, gave further cause for alarm. By 1835, the Afghan amir, Dost Mohammad Barakzai, had finally thwarted the efforts of his predecessor, Shah Shuja Sadozai, to reclaim the country Dost Mohammad had seized from him almost a decade earlier. Only Herat was still in Sodozai hands, but Ranjit Singh, Shah Shuja’s Sikh ally, had taken Peshawar for himself. In 1837 and 1838, Dost Mohammad assured a visiting British East India Company envoy, Alexander Burnes, that he would welcome an alliance with the British if the company returned Peshawar to him. Because Ranjit Singh was then a close ally of the company, Burnes could hold out little hope for such a concession, leaving a disappointed Dost Mohammad open to a “treaty” with the Persians and Russians.

A Russian diplomatic mission arrived in Kabul just as Burnes was departing. On his return to India, Burnes used news of the Russian mission to encourage the governor-general, Lord Auckland, to do whatever was necessary to secure an alliance with Dost Mohammad. However, the Russophobic Auckland and his political secretary, William Macnaghten, were convinced that this Russian presence in Kabul constituted a threat to India. In the spring of 1838, Auckland dispatched an Indian force to take the Persian island of Karrak, and that July, he laid plans to forcibly replace Dost Mohammad. This was to be accomplished by a tripartite alliance between the East India Company, Ranjit Singh, and Shah Shuja. The latter, a now pliant and penniless exile in India, pledged to supply Auckland’s government with troops to help re-install him as amir in Kabul, where he promised he would be warmly welcomed. Auckland regarded the idea of installing a willing client like Shah Shuja in Kabul as too good an opportunity to miss, and on 10 December 1838, he ordered his British and Afghan “Army of the Indus” into Afghanistan. Ranjit Singh refused to let that army pass through his state, so it entered Afghanistan by crossing Sind and entering the country through the Bolan Pass.

By August 1839, the Army of the Indus had fought its way to Kabul, installed a less-than-welcome Shah Shuja as amir, and accepted the surrender of Dost Mohammad, who was sent into exile in India. Auckland, lauded as a hero in Britain, was given an earldom. Macnaghten, then serving as the British political agent in Kabul, was rewarded with the governorship of Bombay; however, before he could leave to assume his new post, conditions in Afghanistan deteriorated.

In the fall of 1841, an insurgent war led by Dost Mohammad's son, Akbar Khan, made Macnaghten desperately call for reinforcements. Auckland, pressed for money elsewhere, not only denied this request, but also cut the British subsidies to the Afghan leaders Macnaghten was employing to keep Akbar Khan at bay. These decisions triggered an uprising in Kabul that led to the murder of Macnaghten and Alexander Burnes, then serving as his assistant. It also paralyzed the Army of the Indus. In January 1842, its Kabul garrison was forced to withdraw to its similarly hard-pressed garrison in Jalalabad. The retreating British-Indian units, some 16,000 soldiers and camp followers, were ambushed by Afghans in the Khurd-Kabul Pass; only one wounded doctor survived to reach Jalalabad. One hundred other hostages had been taken by Akbar Khan.

Auckland had by then been replaced by Lord Ellenborough, who dispatched a British column to retake Kandahar and another to retake Kabul. They completed their missions and linked up in the Afghan capital. There they secured the release of the survivors of the Army of the Indus, blew up the commercial and administrative heart of the city, called the Bala Hisar, and then returned to India. Shah Shuja, who had remained in Kabul, was assassinated in April 1842. Dost Mohammad Khan returned to Afghanistan the following year. He ruled as amir until his death twenty years later.

Marc Jason Gilbert

See also **Afghanistan; Auckland, Lord**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Iqbal, Afzal. *Circumstances Leading to the First Afghan War*. Lahore: Research Society of Pakistan, 1975.
 Kaye, John W. *History of the War in Afghanistan*. 3 vols. London: W. H. Allen, 1851.
 McCrory, Patrick. *The Retreat from Kabul*. Guilford, Conn.: Lyons Press, 2002.
 Norris, John Alfred. *The First Afghan War*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1967.

WAR TWO (1878–1880)

The Afghan amir, Shir Ali, had barely survived a prolonged war of succession that followed the death of his

father, Dost Mohammad, in 1863. In the 1870s, he sought to avoid repetition of that struggle by allying himself with the British East India Company which, in return for his following its guidance in foreign affairs, would guarantee his country's independence, providing British arms and money in the event of a Russian invasion, and recognizing his lineage's claim to the throne of Kabul. These terms, however, were twice rejected by Britain's Liberal governments in London as an unwarranted and costly expansion of imperial commitments. Thus rebuffed, Shir Ali sought similar terms from Russia, sparking another Anglo-Afghan confrontation.

Benjamin Disraeli's British Conservative Party ousted William Gladstone's Liberals in the elections of 1877, just prior to the Russo-Turkish War of 1877 to 1879. The new Conservative government was committed to a more active imperial policy and was in no mood to permit Afghanistan to slip under Russian influence. It directed the Indian viceroy, Lord Lytton, to send a mission to Kabul that would offer Shir Ali the alliance he had long desired, though it would also provide for a British Resident in Herat. Lytton's demand that Shir Ali receive a British mission and Resident was matched by a Russian demand that he receive a mission led by General Count Stolietoff.

Caught between two such powerful suitors, Shir Ali sought to keep both at bay, declining to receive either mission. He turned back the British mission at the Khyber Pass, but was not able to prevent an unbidden Russian delegation from forcing its way into Kabul. Rightly fearing that its arrival would alienate the British, Shir Ali sought from the visiting Russians a pledge to defend his country from British attack. Soon after, Stolietoff withdrew from Kabul, but too late for Shir Ali to meet an ultimatum from Lytton that he receive a British mission by 20 November 1878. Shir Ali's reply was dated 19 November, but reached Lytton only at the month's end.

On 21 November, Lytton launched a multipronged invasion of Afghanistan, quickly occupying the country; facing exile, Shir Ali died in Mazar-i-Sharif in February 1879. By the Treaty of Gandamak in May of that year, Shir Ali's sole surviving son, Yaqub Khan, was placed on his throne under the watchful eye of Lytton's agent, Louis Cavanagri, who was expected to dominate Afghan affairs after the fashion of a Resident in an Indian state. Four months later, Cavanagri was killed in an Afghan insurgency that for a second time made a shambles of what initially seemed a great British military and political success in that country. On this occasion, however, the British military response was rapid and decisive. General Frederick Roberts brutally suppressed the Afghan resistance around Kabul. With logistical help from Shir Ali's

nephew, Abdor Rahman, Roberts rushed to Kandahar, where, on 29 July 1880, Ayub Khan, the brother of the now discredited Yaqub Khan, had crushed a British force at Maiwand, just outside that city. Roberts defeated Ayub's forces there in September, after which Abdor Rahman drove Ayub out of Herat and into exile in India. But in April 1881, under orders of the newly returned Liberal government, Roberts handed Kandahar, and effectively the rest of the country, over to Abdor Rahman, who was then confirmed as amir. The new amir pledged to have no relations with Russia, and received an annual subsidy, which he used to start transforming his tribal state into a nation.

Marc Jason Gilbert

See also **Afghanistan**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Hanna, Henry B. *The Second Afghan War: Its Causes, Its Conduct and Its Consequences*. Westminster, U.K.: Constable, 1899.
- O'Balance, Edgar. *Afghan Wars: 1839 to the Present Day*. London: Brassey's, 2002.
- Roberts, Lord Frederick. *Forty-one Years in India*. 2 vols. London: Bentley, 1897.
- Robson, Brian. *Road to Kabul: The Second Afghan War, 1878–1881*. Staplehurst, U.K.: Spellmount Publishers, 2003.

WAR THREE (MAY–AUGUST 1919)

From the end of the Second Afghan War until his death in 1901, Afghan amir Abdor Rahman preserved his slowly modernizing buffer state against Russian and British machinations along his frontiers. He chafed, however, at the British interpretation of his receipt of a subsidy as a mark of dependency, and he sought to gain British recognition of Afghan national sovereignty. Though he failed in these efforts, he remained a loyal British ally on the most practical of grounds: whereas Russia entertained notions of conquering Afghanistan en route to India, the British were not bent on conquering Afghanistan to facilitate the building of an empire in Central Asia. Abdor Rahman's son, Habibollah, continued to pursue his father's policies.

During and after World War I, Habibollah sought to aid the Ottoman Empire and those Muslims resisting the Russian revolution, but he was careful to avoid any step that might provoke a break with British India. His failure to offer greater support to these doomed Muslim enterprises further raised the ire of fundamentalist forces within Afghanistan already opposed to the modest steps he and his father had taken toward modernization and led to his assassination on 20 February 1919. That May,

Habibollah's third son and ultimate successor, Amanollah, diverted the energies of his father's political opposition into what proved to be a quixotic invasion of British India. Though much depleted by the demands of World War I, the Indian army responded with its entire arsenal of modern arms, including aerial bombardment. Amanollah sued for peace after a month of unequal combat. The war had, however, achieved his most cherished objectives. It discredited the Muslim conservatives in Kabul and, through the 21 November amendments to the Treaty of Rawalpindi of 8 August 1919, it secured Britain's acknowledgment of Afghanistan's status as an independent sovereign state in full control of its own foreign affairs.

Marc Jason Gilbert

See also **Afghanistan**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ali, Mohammed. *Afghanistan: The War of Independence, 1919*. Kabul: n.p., 1960.
- Molesworth, George N. *Afghanistan, 1919: An Account of Operations in the Third Afghan War*. Mumbai: Asia Publishing House, 1962.
- O'Ballance, Edgar. *The Afghan Wars: 1939 to the Present*. Rev. ed., London: Brassey's, 2002.
- Robson, Brian. *Crisis on the Frontier: The Third Afghan War and the Campaign in Waziristan 1919–1920*. Staplehurst, U.K.: Spellmount Publishers, 2004.

ARJUNA. See **Mahābhārata**.

ARMED FORCES The Indian armed forces have long enjoyed the respect and confidence of the country for the professionalism of its officers and men and women. The Indian army, navy, and air force still retain the basic organizational and rank structure prevalent in the British armed forces. India's armed forces are all-volunteer services, and recruitment is on a countrywide basis. The supreme command of the armed forces is vested in the president of India. The Ministry of Defence, run mostly by civil servants, is responsible for both formulating policy and for the administration of the armed forces. In 2002 the ministry was renamed the Integrated Headquarters of Defence. As in most democracies, the minister of defense is a senior political figure and not a serving military officer. All three service headquarters, commanded by four-star officers, are located in New Delhi.

Following India's nuclear tests (1998), the Kargil conflict (1999), and major mobilization (2001–2002), India's defense and intelligence establishments have undergone extensive reorganization, with an emphasis on integrated staff structures involving civil servants. The Indian



Indian Army on Duty in Kashmir. Soldier walks the calm waters in Kashmir, a scene of periodic bloodletting between Pakistani and Indian troops. INDIA TODAY.

defense budget (\$16.73 billion for 2004–2005) is comparatively transparent and amounts to approximately 2.5 percent of gross domestic product. This percentage is similar to Indian defense spending from 1947 to 1962. Though all three services list reserves, little operational planning is based on the call-up of reservists. Hence, the value and significance of reserves is doubtful. This budget does not include expenses of the greatly enlarged paramilitary forces and some costs of the country's missile and nuclear weapons programs.


The Army

The army is the largest and the most senior of the defense services. Approximately 54 percent of the defense budget is allocated to it. At independence in 1947, India received 66 percent of the British Indian Army, amounting to 310,000 officers and men. Over the next five years, the army made up for the loss of Muslim units and British technical staff, stabilizing at around 400,000 and remaining at that level until the setback of the Sino-Indian War (1962). The army was thereafter enlarged to 825,000. Its strength increased further as a result of the Kargil War and the mobilization of 2001–2002 to an estimated 1.3 million, the second-largest army in the world. Despite growth in armor,

mechanization, and firepower, it is basically oriented toward the infantry, both in numbers and in tactical doctrine.

At the behest of General K. N. Cariappa, the first Indian to head the army, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru furnished the mandate for the army as: “primarily to defend India against external aggression; secondly to assist the government, when asked to give such assistance,” commonly referred to as “aid to civil authority.” The army was also expected to cooperate fully with the navy and the air force both in war and peace. The army is headed by its chief of army staff (COAS). He is assisted by the vice-chief and principal staff officers (PSOs), consisting of two deputy chiefs of army staff, adjutant general, master general of ordnance, quartermaster general, military secretary, and the engineer-in-chief. The general staff is headed by a three-star general, the vice-chief, and includes the directorates of military operations and intelligence.

Five field armies, called commands, led by army commanders (lieutenant generals), carry geographical names. Northern Command is at Udhampur, Western Command at Chandi Mandir, Central Command at Lucknow, Eastern Command at Kolkata, and Southern Command



Republic Day Parade, New Delhi. A Sikh army regiment in perfect formation at the Republic Day Parade, New Delhi. AMIT PASRICHA.

in Pune. A Training Command (ARTRAC) is located at Shimla. The country is also divided into administrative formations called areas (under a major general) and sub-areas (commanded by brigadiers).

Each command consists of one or more corps. Of the twelve corps, three are designated as strike corps, the other nine as holding corps. Each corps consists of two or more divisions, along with additional engineers, medical services, aviation assets, artillery, and logistics. Each strike corps has an air defense group. Divisions are classified as armored (3), infantry (18), mountain (10), RAPID (semimechanized infantry divisions, 4), and artillery (2). About a third of the infantry divisions have more brigades than the standard three, and the brigades may have more than the traditional three battalions. Each infantry division includes an artillery brigade and an armored regiment. The mountain divisions have reduced motor transport.

Combat forces. The army is divided into “arms” (combat) and “services” (support units). Arms are cavalry (armor), mechanized infantry, infantry, artillery, signal,

combat engineers, army aviation and air defense units. The primary unit is the battalion, though it is designated as a regiment in armored, artillery, engineer, and signal units. Each armored regiment has 45 tanks. The upgraded T-72 and the newly inducted T-90 form the bulk of Indian armor. Slow induction of the indigenous Arjun Mk I is proceeding as well.

The Indian army’s air defense forces are considerable, with at least 50 units divided into 35 gun and 15 missile regiments. Virtually every type of operational Russian surface to air missiles (SAMs) are in India’s inventory. More than 4,000 pieces of towed artillery, with calibers ranging from 155 millimeter to 105 millimeter, are in service. Lighter artillery (105 millimeter, 122 millimeter, and 130 millimeter) is being replaced by the 155 millimeter gun. The latter, manufactured by Bofors, proved to be exceptionally effective especially in the mountains. However, the weapon is tainted by the high cost of spares and ammunition, and a scandal associated with its purchase. Reportedly, six Artillery Groups of the surface to surface missiles, the Prithvi and the Agni, were to be inducted into the army by 2005.

Most of India's infantry still moves into battle on foot, though about 2,300 infantry combat vehicles, consisting of the tracked BMP-1 (700) and BMP-2 (900) and the wheeled BRDM-2s, are in service. Infantry's basic weapon, the 7.62 millimeter FN-FAL rifle is being replaced by the lighter, equally effective 5.56 millimeter INSAS assault rifle. The belated modernization of the infantry includes induction of handheld thermal imagers, long range observation systems, night vision goggles, antimatieral rifles, battle surveillance radar, and body armor for the troops.

The army's engineers perform the traditional functions of bridging and breaching, land survey, the laying and clearing of mines, and civil engineering works.

Cyberspace is the crucial new element in war. Accordingly, the Information Technology Road Map 2000 envisaged all officers to be computer literate by 2002. The Army Radio Engineering Network and Army Static Communications Network were upgraded using UHF, fiber-optics, and communications satellites. The Low Intensity Conflict Operations Very Small Aperture Terminal system for direct voice and data communications is in limited service. Field trials of Akash, a secure tactical battlefield communications network, are in progress. Two other systems are under development: the Army Strategic Operational Information Dissemination System and the Defence Communications Network.

The army has about 2,000 men trained and equipped in NBC (nuclear, biological, and chemical) warfare. The army's attack helicopters are piloted by the air force. In 2003 the army undertook a five-year modernization plan. Acquisition of more precision guided munitions, unmanned aerial vehicles, weapon locating radars, self-propelled artillery, ground sensors, and a reduction of the different types of artillery guns and mortars is planned.

History. During the seventeenth century, three ports were the nuclei for the creation of both the British Indian Empire and the Indian army. Watchmen and doorkeepers in Madras, two companies of Rajputs in Bombay, and an ensign and thirty men in Bengal were the first armed men raised by the British to protect the factories of the British East India Company. The three areas became eponymous presidencies, each with its own army. In 1748 Major Stringer Lawrence founded the Indian army when he organized the watchmen and others into permanent companies under European officers. In 1757 Robert Clive further systemized the force by providing it with scarlet uniforms, standardized weapons, and equipment at company expense. Clive was also among the first to recognize that the collection of land revenue was far

more lucrative than mere trade. However, to receive land revenue, the right had to be acquired by conquest, perfidy, or purchase. As conquest was often the favored option, the East India Company, a commercial venture, concluded that the cost of bringing European or American mercenaries for fighting in India would greatly reduce profits. Hence, Indians, paid substantially less than their European or American counterparts, but drilled, trained, and equipped to their standards, and led by ambitious and avaricious British officers, routed much larger forces of the decaying Mughal empire in two lopsided victories at Plassey (1757) and Buxar (1764). During the hundred years of piecemeal conquest of India, the army also fought in other imperial wars ranging from the Philippines (1762) to China (1840–1854). Not all wars were victorious. The First Afghan War (1838–1842) was an unmitigated disaster.

In 1857 the total strength of the army was 234,500. The largest was the Bengal army (137,500). Regiments of this army were at the forefront of the Struggle of 1857 (called the First War of Independence by Indians and the Great Mutiny by most British). This event changed the nature of Indo-British relations, the administration of the country, and the composition of the army. India had a long established warrior caste (Kshatriyas). Others, especially Brahmans and the Muslim tribes of Central India, were well-known for their military prowess. The British had largely recruited from these groups, especially among those from the lower Indo-Gangetic Plain. After 1857 enlistment from this area was drastically reduced, and the concept of the "martial races" was advanced. Classes that had cooperated with the British during the uprising of 1857 were declared martial. Future enlistment was largely limited to these groups: Sikhs, Punjabi Mussalmams, Rajputs, Jats, Ranghars, Pathans, and the hill-men from Kumaon, Garhwal, and Nepal (Gorkhas). Field artillery was placed exclusively with British forces. Generally, for every two Indian units a British unit was stationed in the same cantonment or field formation.

In England, uproar followed the dispatch of Indian army units to Malta and Cyprus in 1878; was perceived as inappropriate for colonial troops of color to kill or defeat Europeans in battle. Consequently, the Indian army was not sent to South Africa during the intermittent Boer Wars (1881–1901).

In 1895 the three presidency armies were amalgamated to form the modern Indian army. By then, ambitious British officers competed to join the Indian army because of its higher pay, quicker promotion, and more chances of active service than in the British army or other colonial military units. Accordingly, the Indian army was well managed and the troops well motivated through a

system of rewards. There were cash awards, decorations, land grants, and special privileges for soldiers and their families. However, despite dazzling uniforms and landscaped cantonments, the army was neither trained nor equipped to fight a major war outside India.

At the onset of World War I (1914–1918), the army's strength was only 155,000 men. To stop the Germans in France, the policy of not pitting Indians against Europeans was hastily suspended. Two ill-equipped infantry divisions and a cavalry brigade were rushed to France, and the Germans were stopped. Nevertheless, the performance of the army was not outstanding. This, too, was the case in Mesopotamia and East Africa. Altogether, 1.3 million Indians served. The dead, wounded, or missing totaled 113,743. For the first time, large numbers of Indians saw for themselves incompetence and cowardice among British and other Europeans. The soldiers also found Britain to be cold and shabby, not quite the glamorous country of their imagination. In addition, they found the French warm and hospitable to both their own colonial forces and to Indians. Not unexpectedly, increased political awareness and national consciousness entered the minds of the soldiers (especially Sikhs and Pathans). Religion was no longer an understated factor, as many Muslim Pathans deserted to their coreligionists, the Turks and their allies, the Germans. Great changes were inevitable. Slow and reluctant induction of Indians into the officer corps was undertaken as a result of a pledge given by the British government in 1917. The army was reorganized: a number of new supporting organizations ("Services") were added; infantry battalions were amalgamated into larger regiments of four or five units each, and cavalry regiments were standardized (1921–1922).

During World War II (1939–1945), the Indian army ballooned from 205,000 to 2,181,960 men, the largest volunteer army in history. It fought with distinction in Abyssinia, Eritrea, Italy, the Middle East, North Africa, and the Sudan. Unfortunately, it was defeated in Malaya and Singapore (60,000 were taken prisoner). Then it fought back in the steamy jungles of Burma to become the only army to defeat the Japanese by ground fighting alone. However, only the operations of the PAI (Persia, Arabia, Iraq) Force, consisting of about three divisions, were conducted by the General Headquarters of the Indian army. Elsewhere, Indian army divisions and units constituted parts of British or Allied armies. Indians held no significant staff appointments, and only one commanded a brigade in battle. Clearly, the Indian army, the most complete of all colonial forces, functioned only as an adjunct to other imperial forces, and Indians had little experience in higher staff or command. The army lost 36,092 dead, 64,350 wounded, and 79,489 prisoners.

Increased political consciousness manifested itself in the latter. Prisoners in Germany formed the 2,000-man Indian Legion to fight for the country's independence. Under the charismatic leadership of Subhas Chandra Bose, a former president of the Indian National Congress, an astonishing 40,000 prisoners of war (POWs) in Japanese hands initially volunteered to join the Indian National Army. Ultimately 16,300 POWs served in this poorly led, poorly equipped, but well-meaning renegade army.

The end of World War II did not bring peace to the Indian army. There was an internal upheaval on how to deal with men who had carried out the treasonable though patriotic act of joining the German- and Japanese-sponsored forces. Eventually some nominal punishments were meted out, but the men were not allowed to return to the army. The final bizarre act in the age of colonialism was the dispatch of more than four divisions of this colonial army to Indonesia and Indochina to restore colonial Dutch and French rule and sustained considerable casualties. Indian independence and partition followed in 1947.

In August 1947 the army, disorganized by its own vivisection and the withdrawal of British technical and other ranks, was tasked to manage the movement of 14 million refugees between India and the newly created Pakistan and to prevent communal bloodletting in what quickly became a humanitarian disaster. An additional responsibility fell in September on the western edge of the country. The army had to pacify the Junagadh region, where a popular revolt against the *nawāb* had broken out. In October, troops were hurriedly airlifted to the northern edge of the country, where Pakistan-assisted tribals had invaded the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir. Fourteen months of desultory, sometimes desperate fighting followed. The state was left divided between India and Pakistan. In September 1948, the army accelerated the integration into India of the recalcitrant princely state of Hyderabad. During the 1950s the army restored the coherence of units, administrative, training and command structures weakened by partition. Some civil works, disaster relief, peacekeeping with the United Nations, and counterinsurgency operations in the Northeast region and in Andhra Pradesh were also carried out.

The momentous decade of the 1960s began with the liberation of the Portuguese colonies of Goa, Daman, and Diu after protracted negotiations for the peaceful return of these territories to India had failed (1961). Indian troops formed the largest contingent in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping forces in the Congo (1960–1963). Hubris followed. The famous 4th Division was defeated in the Northeast region during the Sino-Indian border

war of October–November 1962. Despite incomplete expansion and modernization in the wake of the 1962 debacle, national confidence was restored by creditable military performance in the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War. The army sent troops from three infantry battalions to Sri Lanka in April 1971 to quell a sudden Marxist uprising. Further triumph followed later in the year. In a lightning multipronged campaign in December 1971, Bangladesh (erstwhile East Pakistan) was liberated. Still more challenges emerged: Sikh recruits mutinied after the army's intervention in Sikhism's holiest shrine, the Golden Temple in Amritsar (June 1984), and the Indian Peace Keeping Force in Sri Lanka (1987–1990) failed.

There were successes as well: in 1989 a combined arms intervention prevented a coup in the Maldives; in 1999 the Indian army achieved a remarkable victory against entrenched Pakistani forces in the desolate frozen heights in Kargil. Periodic bloodletting between the two armies still continues in another similar region of Kashmir, the Siachen glacier (since 1984). The army is active in UN operations and in quelling a rebellion in Kashmir and the varied, long-standing insurgencies in the small northeastern states of the country. The protracted deployment in remote border areas and in insurgency-ridden regions has made the profession less attractive for the officer corps than in earlier years.

Enlistment, especially in pre-independence combat regiments with “fixed class” (only one caste or ethnic group forms the unit) and “mixed class” (two or three castes or ethnic groups in a unit) battalions is by selective recruitment. Hence, troops in about 60 percent of arms are still selectively recruited. There are no such restrictions for officers, though in general no more than a third of officers in a unit are from the same ethnic group or caste as the troops. The tradition of the son following in the father's footsteps by joining the army is still alive, but with a difference: sons of junior commissioned officers and noncommissioned officers form an increasing portion of the officer corps. Since 1991, female officers (50 to 100 per year) have joined the army. They, too, are often from military families. Marriages are also common within military families.

Training. Recruits are trained at the applicable regimental training centers. Advanced training in all arms and services is imparted by pertinent institutions, including the Armed Forces Medical College, the Armored Corps School and Center, the Army Air Transport School, the Army Educational Center and School, the Army Ordnance Corps Schools, the Army Signals School, the Army School for Physical Training, the Army War College, the Artillery Center and School, the College of Military Engineers, the Counter Insurgency and

Jungle Warfare School, the Electrical and Mechanical Engineers Center and School, the High Altitude Warfare School, the Infantry School, and the Military Intelligence Training School.

Officer training is at three levels: pre-cadet, cadet, and staff. The government established feeder schools like the Rashtriya Indian Military College and “Sainik Schools” for preparing young men for entry into the army as cadets. However, the majority of officers are not from these institutions as any boy after twelve years of schooling (aged 16–19) can apply for admission to the academies. Cadets are selected after a competitive written examination, interviews, and physical tests before entering the tri-service National Defence Academy (NDA) at Khadakvasla, near Pune. An eighteen-month course for slightly older cadets (19–24 years) is at the Indian Military Academy (IMA), Dehra Dun. NDA cadets and others like engineering graduates, attend one year at Dehra Dun. Soldiers serving in the ranks who qualify for the officer cadre train at the Army Cadet College Wing of the IMA and short service commission officers (5–10 years service liability) receive instruction at the Officers Training Academy, Chennai.

Reserves and paramilitary forces. There are 300,000 first-line reserves (men and women with five years of full-time service) and 500,000 second-line reserves (up to age 50). The 40,000 person Territorial Army, founded in 1920, consists of full-time workers, doing part-time military service.

Of the nine main police and paramilitary forces, seven interact with the army. The oldest, the Assam Rifles (founded 1835), and the youngest, the Rashtriya Rifles (founded 1990), are entirely officered by the army. The former draws most of its recruits from the sub-Himalayan population and is permanently stationed in the Northeast region; the latter is a counterinsurgency force, entirely manned by the army, deployed in Jammu and Kashmir. The National Security Guard and the Special Frontier Force have substantial numbers from the army. The Border Security Force and the Indo-Tibetan Border Police, as the first line of defense, work closely with the army. During war, both come under the army's operational control. So does the Central Reserve Police Force.

Indian Air Force

Military aviation in India began with a military flying school at Sitapur, in Uttar Pradesh, in December 1913. Thirty years later, on 1 April 1932, the formation of the “A Flight” marked the beginning of the Indian air force (IAF). Four Westland Wapiti Mk II biplanes, six officers, and twenty-two airmen was its total strength. Seventy years later, the IAF was the fourth-largest air force in the world,

with 120,000 men and 1,700 aircraft and an allocation of 24 percent of the defense budget. The air force was initially created for supporting the army against tribes in the North-West Frontier province. From punitive attacks against tribals (1936) to the ouster of entrenched Pakistani troops at the forbidding heights in Kargil (1999), the IAF has provided close ground support to the army.

Like Britain's Royal Air Force, the IAF's commands were based on function (Bomber Command, Fighter Command, etc.). After the 1962 Sino-Indian War, it was apparent that the vast country faced threats from different directions. Accordingly, the commands were reorganized, with geography as the main consideration. The five operational air commands, each under an air marshal, have geographical names: Western Air Command, headquartered in New Delhi; Eastern Air Command at Shillong; Central Air Command at Allahabad; South Western Air Command at Gandhinagar; and Southern Air Command at Trivandrum. Maintenance Command at Nagpur and Training Command at Bangalore are non-operational commands. The latter controls the more than thirty major training institutions. Most are located in three south Indian states.

Forces and equipment. The IAF operates 774 combat planes, 34 armed helicopters, 203 transport aircraft, and 133 helicopters organized as the following squadrons.

- 18 squadrons of fighter ground attack (FGA) aircraft (30 Su-30k, 53 MiG-23 BN/UM, 88 Jaguar, 147 MiG-27, and 69 MiG-21 MF/PFMA)
- 20 fighter squadrons (66 MiG-21 FL/U, 169 with MiG 21 bis/U, 26 MiG-23 MF/UM, 64 MiG-29, 35 Mirage 2000H/TH, and 16 SU-30Mk aircraft)
- 3 attack helicopter squadrons (Mi-25)
- 12 transport squadrons (105 AN-32 Sulej, 45 Do-228, 28 BAe-748, and 25 IL-76 Gajraj) and 5 IL-78 tankers
- 11 helicopter squadrons (73 Mi-8, 50 Mi-17, and 10 Mi-26)
- 38 missile squadrons and 4 missile flights

The Prithvi Surface-to-Surface Missile (SSM) and the Agni Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, the Electronic Counter Measure, Electronic Intelligence, Airborne Early Warning, and various reconnaissance, survey, tankers, training, and miscellaneous aircraft complete the inventory. Three Airborne Warning and Control Systems IL-76 aircraft, with the Israeli Phalcon system, and 66 BAe Hawk Advanced Jet Trainers are on order. Inventory includes air-to-air missiles, air-to-surface missiles, mostly of Russian and French origin, laser-guided and free-fall bombs. The Su-30, the upgraded MiG-23/27, Jaguars, and Mirage 2000 are the most nuclear capable planes.

History. Five years after its inception, the first full squadron (No. 1) was finally formed. World War II led to its expansion to nine combat squadrons and one transport squadron. Virtually the entire small air force saw intense action in Burma during the war. For instance, No. 1 Squadron went in with twenty pilots. Within a year, only four of the original twenty survived, and the squadron had received ten decorations for valor. With partition, the IAF was reduced to six fighter squadrons (five Tempest Mk II, one Spitfire), one transport (C-47) squadron, and one Air Observation (Auster) Flight. Most permanent bases and other establishments ended up in Pakistan. The IAF rose to its first challenge in October 1947, when it managed to assemble 100 civilian and military transport aircraft to airlift the army to the airstrip in Srinagar (Kashmir) to repel the tribal invasion. Within a month, Tempest Fighters (No. 7 Squadron) in support of the army won the critical battle of Shelatang, thereby saving the Srinagar Valley for India. The pilots of transport planes continued to play a decisive role. In May 1948, a C-47 Dakota, flying along an uncharted route through peaks averaging 25,000 feet (7,625 m) landed on a small airstrip in Leh (Ladakh). Indian army troops were thereafter airlifted to secure Ladakh. In similar fashion, an air-bridge for seven months assured the survival of the garrison and citizens of the besieged town of Poonch (1947–1948).

The IAF carried out some air strikes during the Goa operation. However, combat aircraft were not committed against the Chinese in 1962. Air strikes may have made a difference. In the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, both air forces were used extensively, with mixed results. India lost about 55 planes to Pakistan's 25. However, 18 to 20 of the Indian planes were destroyed on the ground by surprise attacks early in the war on airbases at Pathankot and Kalaikunda. In April 1971, six helicopters were committed in a low-key but intensive operation against Marxist insurgents in Sri Lanka. During the 1971 Bangladesh war, the IAF quickly gained total air superiority over East Pakistan and provided considerable close support for the army. The first heliborne operation was carried out in the same sector. The coup de grace was delivered by precision bombing by a MiG-21 on the governor's residence during a high-powered meeting. The roof collapsed on the high-ranking civil and military officers, and with it fell the will to fight. On the western front the IAF was not caught on the ground, despite Pakistani preemptive air-strikes leading to the formal outbreak of hostilities on 3 December 1971. The next day, both the navy and the IAF carried out spectacular attacks in and around Karachi harbor. In another dramatic performance, four aging Hawker Hunter fighter-bombers caught Pakistan's 22 cavalry without air cover near Longewala (Rajasthan). The regiment was decimated, losing nineteen T-59 tanks.

The IAF's airlift capabilities were in evidence in the evacuation of 200,000 Indians from the Gulf before the 1991 war and the transportation of 50,000 men and material after a devastating earthquake in Gujarat in 1998. The IAF has also successfully lifted tanks in and out of Leh (11,600 feet [3,538 m] above sea level). Air strikes using precision guided munitions during the Kargil conflict (1999) played a critical role in the Indian victory.

Indian Navy

For a large peninsular country like India, with a coastline of more than 4,660 miles (7,500 km) and ownership of some 1,280 islands, a substantial navy is to be expected. Instead, the Indian navy is the smallest of the three defense services. Its current strength is 53,000. It includes 5,000 in naval aviation, 2,000 marines, and 2,000 women. It accounts for 15 percent of the country's defense budget.

India's semiofficial nuclear doctrine envisaged a triad of land-based missiles, aircraft, and seaborne or submarine-launched missiles for retaliatory strikes. Arguably, submarine-based ballistic missiles are the most flexible and secure means of delivery. A more limited option is cruise missiles.

The navy's major vessels are 26 principal surface combatants and 16 submarines. The carrier *Viraat*, the 7 destroyers (5 Rajput-Kashin, 2 Delhi), and the 4 larger frigates (1 Brahmaputra, 3 Godavari) are not grouped into squadrons.

The Indian navy has 79 aircraft (30 Sea Harrier attack planes, maritime reconnaissance planes including 8 IL-38, 11 Tu-142), 83 helicopters (antisubmarine warfare: 26 Chetak, 7 Ka-25, 18 Ka-28, 31 Sea King), and air-to-air, air-to-surface missiles (R-550 *Magic* I and II, *Sea Eagle*, *Sea Skua*). The indigenous short range ballistic missile (SRBM) Dhanush and the supersonic Indo-Russian short range cruise missile Brahmos are in developmental trials. The antimissile Barak and the antiship KH-35 were in service in 2003. The status of three other indigenous missiles, Koral, Lakshya, and Sagarika, is unclear. The Marine Commando Force (MCF) was created in 1987. The 2,000 man unit has participated in special operations in Sri Lanka, Maldives, and Kashmir.

History. In 1830 ships of the British East India Company were designated as the Indian navy. However, in 1863, it was disbanded when Britain's Royal Navy took control of the Indian Ocean. About thirty years later, the few small Indian naval units were called the Royal Indian Marine (RIM). In the wake of World War I, Britain, exhausted in manpower and resources, opted for expansion of the RIM. Consequently, on 2 October 1934, the RIM was reincarnated as the Royal Indian Navy (RIN).

During World War II, the navy grew twentyfold to 27,650 sailors and 2,700 officers. This rapid expansion was marred by nine minor mutinies in 1942–1945. The stage was set for the “Great Mutiny” of 1946. Ratings onboard 74 of 84 ships and at 20 of 22 shore establishments across the country mutinied. The magnitude shook London and probably hastened Britain's departure from India. The mutiny was defused by masterly intervention by the senior Congress Party leader Sardar V. Patel. Thereafter, the navy was swiftly halved to 49 ships. Doubts about the reliability of the navy were to persist into the 1960s. In 1947, India's share was 33 ships, and Pakistan's 16. Of 538 officers, captain was the senior-most rank held by Indians. Consequently, plans drawn up by the still-serving British officers were largely ignored in New Delhi. All the same, the navy was used in national integration by ferrying troops and securing the coast during the Junagadh state operations (October 1947). The 1950s were marked by annual Joint Exercises Trincomalee with other Commonwealth navies and by Britain's begrudging sale of warships: London refused to sell modern submarines to India, and the aircraft carrier *Vikrant* was sold without the long-stroke catapult, thereby greatly reducing its capabilities. Nevertheless, during the liberation of Goa, the Indian navy, among other actions, sank the Portuguese frigate *Afonso de Albuquerque*.

The Indian loss in the Sino-Indian War (1962) was a further reverse for the navy, since in its wake funds were directed toward the army and the air force. The 1965 war, Indonesia's threat to seize the Nicobar Islands, and the smaller Pakistan navy's attack on the holy city of Dwarka all triggered naval expansion. Indigenous warship design and production and the acquisition of Soviet warships followed. The navy's fortunes were greatly restored in 1971. After East Pakistan (Bangladesh) seceded, leading to civil war between Pakistan's two wings, the Indian navy trained four task forces of riverine guerrillas. Those frogmen sank or damaged over 100,000 tons of shipping in four months and disrupted ports and inland waterways, the lifeline of the country. In December, after the war formally started, an imaginative, daring raid by Osa missile boats on Karachi harbor sank two warships, damaged others, and ignited oil storage facilities. The Indian armed forces conducted amphibious landings for the first time toward the end of the war. The threat of U.S. naval intervention on behalf of Pakistan led to the Advanced Technology Vessel project to produce nuclear submarines in India. Further emphasis on aviation, technology, missiles, and submarines followed.

In the late 1980s, India's regional assertion of power included the use of the navy in Sri Lanka (1987–1990) and in the Maldives (1988). In anticipation of adding a fleet of nuclear submarines, India leased a Charlie-I class

nuclear submarine, the *Chakra*, from the Soviet Union. Plans changed. The submarine was returned to the Soviet Union. Indigenous warship design and production (destroyers, frigates, corvettes, and submarines) was also accelerated, partly due to the difficulty of obtaining spare parts from the successor states to the Soviet Union. In the 1990s, the navy was active under the United Nations in Somalia, escorting Indian ships in the Gulf, and repatriating Indian nationals from Kuwait. Exercises with other navies, especially the U.S. Navy, were initiated. During the Kargil War (1999), the aggressive posture adopted by the navy played a role in convincing Islamabad and Washington that a larger conflict loomed unless Pakistan withdrew from the heights. A year earlier, nuclear tests added another strategic dimension to the navy. Warming ties with Israel and the United States led to the acquisition of cutting-edge missiles and to joint patrolling of the Straits of Malacca.

The navy has about ten major training establishments. Most are located in Maharashtra, Cochin, Goa and Vishakhapatnam.

The Coast Guard

On 19 August 1978, India's Coast Guard Act was passed. This new paramilitary force was to police and superintend the seas, the coastline, and fishing craft. Control of pollution was another major peacetime responsibility. Two frigates and five patrol boats from the navy formed its nucleus. One of its critical functions, the protection of offshore oil facilities, was transferred back to the navy in 1986. Nevertheless, the service has grown to 5,500 men, with about 50 vessels, more than a dozen Dornier aircraft, and an equal number of Chetak helicopters. Its effectiveness has steadily improved, as evidenced by its performance during operations in Sri Lanka and antiterrorist duties since the 1990s.

Rajesh Kadian

See also **Civil-Military Relations; Nuclear Weapons Testing and Development; Paramilitary Forces and Internal Security; Strategic Thought; Wars**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Information on the Indian armed forces has been drawn from diverse sources. The following are particularly useful: the web site <barat-rakshak.com>, the periodicals *Asian Defence Journal*, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, *Sainik Samachar*, and *USI Journal*, and the annual *Military Balance and Strategic Survey* published by the International Institute of Strategic Studies, London. The following books are important for providing historical and holistic perspectives: Mohammed Ayooob and K. Subrahmanyam, *The Liberation War* (New Delhi: Chand, 1972), B. C. Chakravorty and S. N. Prasad, eds., *History of the Indo-Pak War, 1965* (New Delhi: History Division, Ministry of Defence, Government of India, 1992), M. S. Chaturvedi,

History of the Indian Air Force (New Delhi: Vikas, 1978), Stephen P. Cohen, *The Indian Army: Its Contribution to the Development of a Nation*, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), Rajesh Kadian, *India and Its Army* (New Delhi: Vision, 1990), R. D. Katari, *A Sailor Remembers* (New Delhi: Vikas, 1982), Verghese Koithara, *Society, State, and Security: The Indian Experience* (New Delhi: Sage, 2000), N. Kunju, *Indian Army: A Grassroots Review* (New Delhi: Reliance, 1991), P. C. Lal, *My Years with the IAF* (New Delhi: Lancer, 1986), Philip Mason, *A Matter of Honour: An Account of the Indian Army, Its Officers and Men* (London: Jonathan Cape, 1974), S. L. Menezes, *Fidelity and Honour: The Indian Army from the Seventeenth to the Twenty-first Century* (New Delhi: Viking, 1993), S. N. Prasad and Dharam Pal, *Operations in Jammu and Kashmir* (New Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, 1987), K. C. Praval, *Indian Army after Independence* (New Delhi: Lancer, 1987), Stephen Peter Rosen, *Societies and Military Power: India and Its Armies* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1996), Mihir K. Roy, *War in the Indian Ocean* (New Delhi: Lancer, 1995), Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, *India's Maritime Security* (New Delhi: Knowledge World, 2000), Rahul Roy-Chaudhury, *Sea Power and Indian Security* (London: Brassey's, 1995), K. Subrahmanyam et al., *Report of the Kargil Review Committee* (New Delhi: Controller of Publications, Government of India, 2000), George K. Tanham and Marcy Agmon, *The Indian Air Force: Trends and Prospects* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1995).

ARTHA SHĀSTRA A work on statecraft, the *Artha Shāstra* of Kauṭilya advises the king on the running of the state, foreign policy, and war. In ancient India, the three ends of man were *kāma* (love), *artha* (wealth and political success), and *dharma* (religion), and for each of them there was a *śāstra*, or “science,” made up of a body of written works. *Artha Shāstra*, then, is the science of economics and politics, though in practice works of this science are largely about kingship. The *Artha Shāstra* of Kauṭilya is one of the books of this science, and it makes reference to a great many previous works of *artha śāstra* that have not survived; it appears that it eclipsed its predecessors.

The *Artha Shāstra* was composed by someone named Kauṭilya, who is usually identified with Chāṇakya, the able Brahman minister of Chandragupta Maurya. However, there are many features of the text that show it belongs to a later period, about 150 A.D. But it is the culmination of a long tradition of theorizing about statecraft, by Brahmans who worked for the king as ministers rather than as priests or religious teachers, codifying their wisdom about statecraft and putting it in writing to pass on to succeeding generations. Thus the *Artha Shāstra* of Kauṭilya is put in the form of advice to a king, as if given by a Brahman minister. The roots of this science certainly go back to the period of the Mauryas, and probably long before.

The *artha śāstra* tradition is notable for the cool, rational pursuit of interest, and this realpolitik is especially

characteristic of the *Artha Shāstra* composed by Kauṭilya. For example, according to the doctrine of the “four means,” the king should consider conciliation, gifts, sowing dissension, and force, in that order of preference, as ways of dealing with an adversary. Force or warfare is the least desirable, not because of moral considerations but because it entails loss of men and treasure, so that even the winner is poorer at the end; and conciliation is the most desirable for the opposite reason, that it costs nothing. Another concept, that of the “circle of states,” has the same effect. A king desirous of conquest should take into account that the neighboring king in whose direction he hopes to expand is a natural enemy; that the enemy of one’s enemy is one’s natural ally; that the next two states are the enemy’s ally and the ally’s ally; and so forth. To the rear is a neighboring king who is also a natural enemy, the “heel-catcher” who trips one up from behind; his neighbor, one’s natural ally, a “rescuer” to whom one calls for help; the heel-catcher’s ally; and the rescuer’s ally. A king whose territory touches both one’s own and the enemy’s, the middle king, is in a position to tip the balance one way or the other by a very small expenditure of force. Finally, a large, powerful kingdom in the region, at a distance from the conqueror and his enemy, called the neutral king, is also able to affect the outcome of a contest by a small interjection of force. The doctrine of the circle of states identifies the fields of force that an expansionist king must take into account when taking action. This atmosphere of cool rationality, in pursuit of greater power and territory by the king, pervades the *Artha Shāstra* of Kauṭilya. It presupposes continuous conflict of interest among neighboring kings seeking empire, and advises the king how to act under such circumstances, including the use of spies and secret practices as well as the threat of military force.

Kingship is the political norm for the *Artha Shāstra*, but it devotes one of its fifteen books to the “republics” (*gaṇas* or *saṅghas*), in which political power was not centralized in the hands of a king but was broadly diffused across a warrior class, which formed policy in deliberative assemblies. Kauṭilya recognizes that the strength of these republics lies in their strong sense of unity and collective responsibility, making them the hardest of adversaries and the strongest of allies. He advises the king to use secret agents to stir up trouble among them by sowing false rumors, as a way of undermining the republic at the source of its strength. Republics of this archaic kind had a long history in India, and continued at least until the Gupta period. In the *Artha Shāstra* they are seen not from within, but from the viewpoint of a king trying to get the better of them or to recruit them as allies.

About half of the fifteen books of the *Artha Shāstra* are concerned with running the kingdom, and half with

foreign affairs and war. The treatment of internal affairs begins with Book 1 on the training of the prince. It shows the life of the king to have been very strenuous (at least in this ideal portrait), continuously considering matters of state or hearing petitioners adjudicating disputes, and it allows only four and a half hours for sleep. A great deal of attention is paid to the appointment of government servants, and the testing of their integrity by the use of secret agents, as well as the use of spies to report on the temper of various factions within the kingdom and in that of the enemy. There are large numbers of spies and secret agents, disguised as students, monks, nuns, ascetics, householders, and traders. The king must be continuously on guard against disgruntled princes and queens whose affections have strayed elsewhere. The *Artha Shāstra* makes cautionary mention of kings killed by a brother, a son, or a queen, the latter using such means as a poison-smeared anklet or belt-jewel or mirror, or a weapon concealed in a braid of hair. Great care is taken to check the king’s food for poison, and birds whose behavior indicates the presence of poison should be kept on the palace grounds. The overall impression is that the king has a strenuous life, living under carefully guarded conditions and relying, therefore, very heavily on spies to take the pulse of popular feeling. The strength of kinship is its centralization of power in the hands of one man, but that makes it vulnerable to being overturned by killing that one man, the inverse of the condition of republics, in which power was diffused and shared by many; coup d’état was a common fate of ancient kingdoms. This vulnerability made for an intense concern with security arrangements, and the heavy use of spies to overcome the king’s isolation.

Book Two

The most valuable part of the *Artha Shāstra* is Book 2, the longest of the fifteen books, which lays out the duties of the heads of government departments in great detail. There are several overall tendencies of this section. One of them is that the king is to be an economic manager, not only taxing every kind of produce, but acting to promote the growth of production. Thus at the outset of Book 2 we read about means of settling the countryside with taxpaying farmers, by shifting people from the city to the country or by attracting peasants from neighboring kingdoms, providing them with land, seed, and cattle for plowing, and a tax holiday for bringing new land under cultivation. Agriculture was the largest sector of the economy, and the king’s share of the crop made up the largest part of his revenue, so that a policy of extending agriculture was a matter of enlightened self-interest for states. In terms of manufacturing, the royal household was itself a large producer of goods, such as textiles, for its own use but with a surplus sold in the market. As the protector of widows and orphans in the absence of

kin, the king had a body of people that constituted a workforce of his own and that produced for the palace, making it largely self-sufficient, and for sale.

Another tendency in Book 2 is to oversee the market and regulate it in detail. The overall goal we can infer from the passages on the superintendent of the market is not so much to maximize the king's take in taxes—although that is a constant consideration—as to prevent what are seen as “evils” of a free, price-making market, namely the evil to consumers of high prices in the case of a shortage of goods and the evil to merchants of low prices in the case of a glut. In both cases, the superintendent of the market is to sequester all supplies of the commodity and establish a single market at a fixed price deemed to be fair to buyers and sellers, for the general good. When foreign merchants bring goods to the city gate, they are to declare them for sale at a certain price, three times, and the superintendent of trade is to confiscate the excess if a competition of buyers raises the prices. A sense that everything has a fair price, which the king should endeavor to enforce, governs the sale of land as well. Such attempts to restrain the ability of supply and demand to set prices inevitably provoked various kinds of evasion, and measures against them are addressed at length.

A third tendency we can identify in this book is the royal oversight of forests, and the care taken to assure the supply of forest products of all kinds, especially elephants, which were a critical element of military might. A census of wild elephants was kept, and mature elephants were trapped and trained for labor and for war. The four canonical elements of the army (foot, horse, chariot, and elephant) plus the logistical section (oxcarts) each had their superintendents. The importance of the forest to the king was both economic and military, and it was necessary to husband it rationally, taking a long view.

A final tendency in Book 2 is a frank recognition of the problem of misappropriation of funds by government officers, who were in charge of large amounts of money. Just as it is not possible not to taste a drop of honey or a drop of poison placed on the tongue, it is not possible for government officials not to taste of the money that passes through their hands, if only a little bit, the *Artha Shāstra* says; just as one cannot tell when a fish in water is drinking, it is impossible to tell when government officials are embezzling. A considerable amount of attention is given to the problem of detecting those who are peculating and identifying those who are promoting the growth of the royal wealth and who deserve, therefore, to be rewarded.

Books Three and Four

Books 3 and 4 are devoted to law. The first of these gives the eighteen topics of disputes at law that may come before the king or his judges for adjudication, which

consist of what may be thought of as a law of contracts, concerning marriage contracts and those between buyers and sellers or employers and employees. The second, called “Removal of thorns,” is a kind of rudimentary criminal law, in which the state acts on its own initiative to redress an act deemed to affect the general good. Book 5 (“Secret conduct”) continues this theme, but in respect to the king's officials and the detection of treason.

The remainder of the *Artha Shāstra* has to do with foreign policy and war. Book 6 is on the circle of states doctrine; Book 7 on the six measures of foreign policy, namely peace, war, staying quiet, marching, seeking refuge, and the dual policy of making peace with one and war with another; Book 8 on calamities of state. Books 9 and 10 concern the preparation and execution of battle, with a list of battle arrays for the army with descriptive names like “staff,” “snake,” and “circle,” and subtypes such as the undulating line called “moving like a serpent” or “cow's urination.” Book 11 is about republics; Book 12 on the policies a weaker king should adopt; Book 13 on besieging a fort; Book 14 on “secret practices” used in warfare, including various potions to increase endurance or cause the enemy harm. The final Book 15 is a brief analysis of the “method of the science,” that is, the logical or rhetorical devices of *artha shāstra*.

Thomas R. Trautmann

See also **Guptan Empire; Mauryan Empire**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The best translation of the *Artha Shāstra* of Kauṭilya is that of R. P. Kangle: *The Kauṭīliya Arthśāstra*, Part II (Bombay: University of Bombay, 1963). Part I of Kangle's work is a critical edition of the Sanskrit text, and Part III is a study. On the date and structure of the text, see Thomas R. Trautmann, *Kauṭilya and the Arthashastra: A Statistical Investigation of the Authorship and Evolution of the Text* (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1971).

ARUNACHAL PRADESH Arunachal Pradesh, “Dawn's Province,” is the most northeasterly and most sparsely populated state in India, containing just over 1 million people. Carved out of Assam, it is nearly 84,000 square miles (about 217,500 sq. km); it borders Assam and has an international border with Bhutan, China, and Myanmar. The state is mountainous, with the Himalayas along its northern border, and mountain ranges running north-south, creating five river valleys: the Kameng, Subansiri, Lohit, Tirap, and the Siang, containing the mightiest river. With the heaviest rainfall in India, the state is hot and humid, with temperatures as high as 107 degrees Fahrenheit (42°C) in the summer in the valleys but considerably cooler in the higher altitudes.

Arunachal Pradesh is populated by some twenty main tribes, divided into numerous subtribes mainly of Mongoloid and Tibeto-Burmese stock. The principal tribes are the Adi, Nishi, Apatani, Tagin, Misaim, Monpa, Aka, Nocte, Wancho, Singpho, Tangsha, Khampti, Padma, Miris, and Sherdukpen, speaking over twenty dialects, fourteen of which are used as the medium of instruction at the elementary school level. The tribes are patriarchal and the inheritance is based on primogeniture. The tribes follow endogamy and the clans are exogamous. Polygamy is also practiced. Many of the tribes are Buddhist, although animism is widely practiced; some practice Vaishnavism, and Christianity is spreading. The tribes practice shifting slash-and-burn cultivation, known as *jhuming*. Rice is the main crop. With few roads and little arable land, about 95 percent of the people live on subsistence farming in rural areas, although the state is a food deficit area. The literacy rate is just over 50 percent.

References to the state are found in the Mahābhārata and Kalika Purāṇa, although little is known of its early history. In 1826 the British took control of the Brahmaputra Valley as a consequence of the Treaty of Yanabo with Burma (present-day Myanmar), and in 1838 absorbed the area, appointing an agent to exercise a semblance of control. Recognizing the special character of tribal culture and the backwardness of the area, the British in 1874 enacted the Scheduled District Act and in 1880 the Assam Frontier Tract Regulation. They created the North-East Frontier Agency in 1913, but its control remained very limited. The following year, the 550-mile (885 km) border with Tibet was created as the McMahon Line, an international border that was never recognized by China. Until the eve of World War II, the area was declared off-limits to visitors.

Under India's Constitution, adopted 26 January 1950, the area remained autonomous under district councils. In 1954 the area became the North-East Frontier Area under the governor of Assam. In 1962 China invaded India through the state, and New Delhi realized how vulnerable it was to attack from the north. Accordingly, India absorbed Arunachal as a union territory on 20 January 1972, and it was renamed Arunachal Pradesh. An elected legislative assembly was constituted, and the first general election was held on 3 January 1980. On 20 February 1987 it became the twenty-fourth state of the Indian union. Divided into sixteen districts, the capital is Itanagar.

Roger D. Long

See also **China, Relations with**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Dutta, S., ed. *Studies in the History, Economy, and Culture of Arunachal Pradesh*. Delhi: Himalayan Publishers, 1997.

Grewal, Dalvinder Singh. *Tribes of Arunachal Pradesh: Identity, Culture, and Languages*. 2 vols. New Delhi: South Asia Publications, 1997.

Singh, Chandrika. *Emergence of Arunachal Pradesh as a State*. Delhi: Mittal Publications, 1989.

ĀRYABHATA (476–c. 550), the first of the great astronomers of the classical age of India. Āryabhata was born in A.D. 476 in Ashmaka but later lived in Kusumapura, which his commentator Bhāskara I (A.D. 629) identifies with Pāṭaliputra (modern Patna). It appears that he was the *kulapati* (head) of the University at Nalanda in Magadha.

There is no agreement about the location of Ashmaka, but since the Āryabhatian school has remained most strong in Kerala in South India, many believe that he may have belonged to that region. In addition, Āryabhata employed the Kali era (3102 B.C.), which was most popular in South India.

He wrote at least two books: the *Āryabhatīya* and the *Āryabhata-siddhānta*, of which the latter is known only through references in other works. Bhāskara I (seventh century), who wrote a commentary on Āryabhata's work, tells us that Āryabhata's disciples included the astronomers Pānduranga-svāmi, Lātadeva, and Nishanku.

Āryabhata's main contributions to mathematics included the good approximation of 3.1416 for π , a table of sine-differences, and a method to solve indeterminate equations of a certain type that are important in astronomy. He used a novel representation of numbers as words. His figure for the sidereal rotation of the earth was extremely accurate. Āryabhata made important innovations in planetary computations by using simplifying hypotheses, and he presented a method of finding the celestial latitudes of the planets. The *Āryabhatīya* presented Āryabhata's astronomical and mathematical theories, in which the earth was taken to be spinning on its axis and the periods of the planets were given with respect to the sun. In this book, the day was reckoned from one sunrise to the next, whereas in his *Āryabhata-siddhānta*, he took the day from one midnight to another. There was also difference in some astronomical parameters.

It appears that the *Āryabhatīya* used the earlier *Paitāmaha Siddhānta* as a model, whereas the *Āryabhata-siddhānta* used the conventions of the *Sūrya-siddhānta*. The *Āryabhata-siddhānta* was incorporated with some emendations into the *Khanda-khādyaka* by the celebrated seventh-century astronomer Brahmagupta (born 598).

The later Kerala school of astronomy and mathematics followed Āryabhata. Nīlakantha Somayāji (1444–1545) made significant contributions to the Āryabhata system of astronomy.

The *Āryabhatīya* was translated into Arabic as *Araj-babara*, and in turn it influenced Western astronomers. The *Khanda-khādyaka* was translated into Arabic under the title *Zij-al-Arkand* and *Az-Zij Kandakatik al-Arabi*. From the Arab world, this book reached Europe.

Subhash Kak

See also **Āryabhatīya; Astronomy**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Sharma, S. D. "Post-Vedic Astronomy." *Indian Journal of History of Science* 20 (1985): 131–145.
Shukla, K. S., and K. V. Sarma. *Āryabhatīya of Āryabhata*. New Delhi: Indian National Science Academy, 1976.

ĀRYABHATĪYA The *Āryabhatīya*, the astronomical text written by Āryabhata (born 476), is one of the landmarks of the history of astronomy. The *Āryabhatīya* is divided into four parts. The first part provides basic definitions and important astronomical parameters. It mentions the number of rotations of Earth and the revolutions of the sun, moon, and the planets in a period of 4,320,000 years. This is a partially heliocentric system because it presents the rotation information of the planets with respect to the sun. The second part deals with mathematics. The third part deals with the determination of the true position of the sun, the moon, and the planets by means of eccentric circles and epicycles. The fourth part deals with planetary motions on the celestial sphere and gives rules relating to various problems of spherical astronomy.

The notable features of the *Āryabhatīya* are Āryabhata's theory of Earth's rotation and his excellent planetary parameters based on his own observations made around A.D. 512, which are superior to those of others. He made fundamental improvements over the prevailing *Sūrya-siddhānta* techniques for determining the position of planets. Unlike the epicycles of Greek astronomers, which remain the same in size at all places, Āryabhata's epicycles vary in size from place to place. Āryabhata expressed relativity of motion very effectively thus: "Just as a man in a boat moving forward sees the stationary objects (on the shore) as moving backward, just so are the stationary stars seen by the people on earth as moving exactly towards the west."

Āryabhata took the sun, the moon, and the planets to be in conjunction in zero longitude at sunrise at Lanka on Friday, 18 February 3102 B.C. In a period of 4.32 million years, the moon's apogee and ascending node too are taken to be in conjunction with the planets. This allowed him to solve various problems using whole numbers.

The theory of planetary motion in the *Āryabhatīya* is based on the following ideas: the mean planets revolve in

geocentric orbits; the true planets move in eccentric circles or in epicycles; planets have equal linear motion in their respective orbits. The epicycle technique of Āryabhata is different from that of the Greek astronomer Ptolemy and it appears to be derived from an old Indian tradition.

Āryabhata made important innovations on the traditional *Sūrya-siddhānta* methods for the computation of the planetary positions. The earlier methods used four corrections for the superior planets and five for the inferior planets; Āryabhata reduced the number of corrections for the inferior planets to three and improved the accuracy of the results for the superior planets.

Āryabhata considers the sky to be 4.32 million times the distance to the sun. He and his followers believed that beyond the visible universe illuminated by the sun and limited by the sky is the infinite invisible universe. Rather than taking the universe to be destroyed at the end of the "Brahmā's day" of 4.32 billion years, he took Earth to go through expansion and contraction equal to one *yojana* (approximately 7.5 miles [12 km] according to Āryabhata; 9 miles [14.5 km] by the mainstream Indian tradition).

Āryabhatīya's mathematics includes the decimal place-value system, various problems of arithmetic and geometry, sums of arithmetic series, and the solution of the linear indeterminate equation using the pulverizer method.

Many passages in the *Brāhma-sphuṭa-siddhānta* of Brahmagupta (born 598) are strikingly similar to that of the *Āryabhatīya*, showing the influence of Āryabhata. His commentator Bhāskara I (seventh century) declared that Āryabhata's theories were the best, and they were widely thought to be so all over India, especially in Kerala.

Subhash Kak

See also **Āryabhata; Astronomy**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Billard, R. *L'Astronomie Indienne*. Paris: École Française d'Extrême Orient, 1971.
Shukla, K. S., and K. V. Sarma. *Āryabhatīya of Āryabhata*. New Delhi: Indian National Science Academy, 1976.
Thurston, H. *Early Astronomy*. New York: Springer-Verlag, 1994.

ĀRYA SAMĀJ The Ārya Samāj (literally, "society of the nobles") was perhaps the most influential of the many reform movements that sprang up in nineteenth-century India in reaction to the double challenge Hinduism had to face: Christian missionary zeal and European modernity in the shape of British colonialism. The impact of the movement can be measured not only in terms of the number of its adherents—by 1947 the Samāj counted almost 2 million members—but also by the fact that many of its leaders

became prominent in Indian politics, academia, journalism, and other spheres of public life throughout the twentieth century. Clearly, the religious association provided an ideology that was attractive to certain strata of (North) Indian society in a particular historical situation.

Origins, Doctrinal Basis, and Early Development

The first branch of the Ārya Samāj was founded in Bombay in 1875 by Swāmi Dayānanda Sarasvatī (1824–1883). Dayānanda, a Gujarati Brahman with a Shaivaite background, had grown dissatisfied with the polytheism and shallow ritualism that characterized the varieties of Hinduism he had experienced in his youth. During his wandering years as a *sanyāsin* (ascetic world renouncer) in the 1850s and 1860s he built his own vision of a reformed and “purified” *ārya dharma*. In his view, arbitrary and selfish Brahmins were the root cause for what he saw as a degenerate state of Hinduism: the prevalence of idolatry, “blind faith” and “social evils” like child marriage, the abuses of the caste system, and the suppression of women in Hindu society. The *pandits*, he maintained, had neglected the study of the Veda, which contained the guidelines for a perfect society, and had instead imposed morally corrupting texts like the Purāṇas. Only a return to the sober and rational monotheism he believed to find in Vedic scripture would provide the solution to India’s spiritual, social, and political problems, ensuring that the Hindus could carry on where their proud Aryan ancestors left off.

Making use of the new technologies of mass communication, the swāmi expounded his textual revisionism in various pamphlets and in his book *Satyārth Prakāśh* (The light of truth), published in Hindi in 1875. The book also contained a polemical critique of Christianity, Islam, Sikhism, and Hindu “orthodoxy,” a fact that made the Ārya Samāj a rather controversial body from its inception. Nonetheless, in a period where many educated Hindus found it hard to reconcile their religious tradition with the new Western knowledge they had acquired, Dayānanda’s reformatory message became particularly popular with the emerging Anglicized middle class in the urban centers of the Hindi-speaking regions, particularly in the Punjab.

The death of the founder in 1883 did not stop the movement from expanding further and becoming conspicuous in various fields of public activity. In 1886 the Dayananda Anglo-Vedic High School (DAV) was founded in Lahore, and it became the nucleus of a tremendously successful network of educational institutions, which continues to blossom today. Already at this early stage it was obvious that one of the strengths of the Āryas was their efficient organization, energetic fund raising, and propaganda. Their techniques were partly inspired by Christian missionaries and partly by recycled elements of Hindu tradition.



Ārya Samāj. Portrait of Dayānanda Sarasvatī, founder of the Ārya Samāj in the nineteenth century, graces a contemporary Indian postage stamp. With the teachings of the Vedas as his inspiration, he called for Indians to embrace the ideals of equality and education, especially for women. Dayānanda championed these reforms at a time when barely 2 percent of women in India could read or write, and most in North India still wore the *purdah* (veil). KAMAT’S POTPOURRI.

A Religious Movement in the Age of Nationalism

In 1893 the movement split over the question of doctrinal purity. Swāmi Shraddhānanda (1857–1926), the second charismatic figure to emerge from the movement, accused the faction running the DAV School of being too Westernized and thereby betraying the founder’s ideological legacy. From 1900 onward, he established his own network of schools, the Gurukulas, which were outwardly modeled after ancient Hindu seats of learning and which placed more emphasis on the study of the Vedas. Yet at the same time, they also borrowed heavily both from the curricula and the pedagogical practices used in British public schools.

Both factions became politically active from the 1890s onward, albeit in completely different ways. Whereas some of the prominent leaders of the DAV wing joined the Indian National Congress and became part of the mainstream national movement (e.g., Lālā Lājpat Rāi), Shraddhānanda and his followers for decades advocated an “evolutionary nationalism” based on a Spencerian perception of society as a “social organism.” Political self-rule, far from being a birthright, had to be earned through an arduous learning process. Only the gradual perfection of the individual through education, it was believed, could pave the way for

independence. It was only after the nationalist agitation had reached new heights in the wake of the massacre at Jallianwala Bagh in 1919 that the Gurukul Āryas joined the mass campaigns organized by Mahatma M. K. Gandhi.

Education for both men and, crucially, for women, thus certainly was the cornerstone of Ārya activity, but their reformatory zeal expressed itself also in other fields. From the 1880s they undertook various experiments in “untouchable uplift” with the final goal of breaking all caste barriers. Orthodox distrust of the Āryas and their general reluctance to accept “purified” untouchables in their midst, however, soon produced a backlash. *Shuddhi*, the purification ritual used to “reclaim” outcastes, was also employed to reconvert (neo-)Muslims who had left the fold of Hinduism during Islamic rule. Such endeavors soon brought the Samāj into conflict with Islam. Communal tensions were further acerbated by the Ārya fight for the ban of cow slaughter and the propagation of Hindi (instead of Urdu, spoken by most Muslims) as the administrative language in large parts of North India. In the context of steadily worsening relations between Hindus and Muslims during the 1920s, the Āryas seem to have deliberately cultivated their image as pugnacious, avant-garde defenders of Hinduism in the hope of gaining greater acceptance among their conservative Hindu brethren. Some of today’s scholars, therefore, see the organization in the first place as a forerunner of contemporary Hindu chauvinist parties and organizations. However, the picture seems to be more complex, as the movement was quite heterogeneous, and militant Hindu chauvinism was but one of the many strands accommodated within the regionally diverse Ārya movement.

Reaching its peak from the 1920s to the 1940s, the popularity of the organization waned steadily after independence. Nowadays, it is no longer the vital movement it used to be for almost a century, even in its former strongholds in the Hindi belt of North India. However, in some of the homelands of the Hindu diaspora (like Guyana, Fiji, and Mauritius), where the Samāj had spread with the immigration of indentured laborers from India in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, the Ārya Samāj brand of “purified” Hinduism is still very much alive.

Harald Fischer-Tiné

See also **Hinduism (Dharma); Hindutva and Politics**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Fischer-Tiné, Harald. “Kindly Elders of the Hindu Biradri: The Ārya Samāj’s Struggle for Influence and Its Effect on Hindu-Muslim Relations.” In *Gurus and Their Followers: Studies in New Religious Movements in Late Colonial India*, edited by A. Copley. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000.

- . “The Only Hope for Fallen India: The Gurukul Kangri as an Experiment in National Education.” In *Explorations in the History of South Asia: A Volume in Honour of Dietmar Rothermund*, edited by G. Berkemer, et al. New Delhi: Manohar, 2001. In-depth discussion of the Gurukul wing.
- Jones, K. W. *Ārya Dharm: Hindu Consciousness in Nineteenth-Century Punjab*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976. The locus classicus for a historical analysis of the Ārya movement.
- . “The Ārya Samāj in British India, 1875–1947.” In *Religion in Modern India*, edited by R. D. Baird. New Delhi: Manohar, 1994. The best informed general overview.
- Jordens, J. T. F. *Swami Dayananda Saraswati: His Life and Ideas*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978.
- . *Swami Sbraddhananda: His Life and Causes*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981. Detailed and reliable biographies of the founder (above) and his most charismatic successor.
- Llewellyn, J. E. *The Ārya Samāj as a Fundamentalist Movement: A Study in Comparative Fundamentalism*. New Delhi: Manohar, 1993. Particularly strong on the textual basis of the movement.
- Sarasvatī, Dayānanda. *The Light of Truth: Or, an English Translation of the Satyarth Prakash*. Translated by Chiranjiva Bharadwaja. Reprint, New Delhi: Sarvadeshik Ārya Pratinidhi Sabhā, 1975. English translation of the Ārya Samāj’s “bible.”

ASHOKA. See **Mauryan Empire.**

ASHRAMAS. See **Hinduism (Dharma).**

ASHTĀDHYĀYĪ Pāṇini’s *Ashtādhyāyī* (The eight chapters; fifth century B.C.), provides four thousand rules that describe completely the Sanskrit of his day. The great variety of linguistic ideas used in the text mirrors the complexity of cognitive relationships, and this is the secret of its power and success. It is remarkable that Pāṇini set out to describe the entire grammar in terms of a finite number of rules. Scholars have shown that the grammar of Pāṇini represents a universal grammatical and computing system.

The *Ashtādhyāyī* deals ostensibly with the Sanskrit language. However, it presents the framework for a universal grammar that can apply to any language. Two important early commentaries on this grammar are by Kātyāyana and Patanjali. Its philosophical basis was examined in an important work by Bhartrihari in the fifth century A.D.

Pāṇini’s grammar begins with “metarules,” or rules about rules, using a special technical language, or “metalanguage.” This is followed by several sections on how to generate words and sentences starting from roots, as well as rules on transformation of structure. The last part of the grammar is a one-directional string of rules, where a given

rule in the sequence ignores all rules that follow. Pāṇini also uses recursion by allowing elements of earlier rules to recur in later rules. He thus anticipates by more than 2,500 years the idea of a computer program, both in form and spirit.

In Pāṇini's system, a finite set of rules is enough to generate infinity of sentences. The algebraic structure of Pāṇini's rules was not appreciated in the West until the mid-twentieth century, when a similar generative structure was proposed by Noam Chomsky. Well before this, in the nineteenth century, Pāṇini's analysis of roots and suffixes and his recognition of ablaut led to the founding of the subjects of comparative and historical linguistics.

Pāṇini took the idea of action as defined by the verb and developed a comprehensive theory by providing a context for action in terms of its relations to agents and situations. This theory is called the *kāraka* theory and stipulates these categories: that which is fixed when departure takes place; the recipient of the object; the instrument, or the main cause of the effect; the basis, or location; what the agent seeks to attain, deed, object; and the agent.

These definitions do not always correspond to the nature of action; therefore, the *kāraka* theory is only a via media between grammar and reality. It is general enough to subsume a large number of cases; where not directly applicable, the essence of the action/transaction can still be cast in the *kāraka* mold. To do this, Pāṇini requires that the intent of the speaker be considered. Rather than being based on conventions concerning ways to string words together, Pāṇini's system is based on meaning. The *kārakas* do not have a one-to-one correspondence with grammatical cases. Grammars based on Pāṇini's ideas also have been devised for languages other than Sanskrit.

Subhash Kak

See also **Pāṇini**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Cardona, G. *Panini: His Work and Its Traditions: Background and Introduction*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1997.
Sharma, R. N. *Astādhyāyī of Pāṇini*. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 2001.

ASHVAMEDHA The Ashvamedha, or the “horse sacrifice,” is one of the most significant rituals of ancient India. The horse in Indian mythology represents the sun, and the sea is taken to be its stable and its birthplace, since it emerges every day from the primal “waters” surrounding Earth. The Ashvamedha is the sacrifice of the annual renewal of the sun at the New Year and that of the accompanying renewal of the king's rule. At the spiritual level, the celebration evokes a reconnection to the “inner sun.” This rite is a great state function in which ritual

elements are woven together with secular ceremonies to create an assertion of monarchical authority.

The use of the word “sacrifice,” with its common meaning of “killing to offer to God or gods,” is cause of much misunderstanding of the Vedic ritual. Vedic *yajña* (sacrifice) need not involve any killing of animals. It is a highly symbolic performance, and the animals of the sacrifice may be clay images or grains, specific utterances, or a sacred song. When an animal is sacrificed in the ritual, the sacrifice is a mock killing within sacred theater. The word “killing” is described in the texts to apply equally to the pressing of the soma stalks and the grinding of the grain. This is not to say that “animal” sacrifice has never been taken literally in India, but that the normative meaning of the term is symbolic.

The Vedic rites were meant to help the participant transform himself. This was accomplished through sacrifice. The *rishis* (Hindu sages) saw the universe as going through unceasing change in a cycle of birth and death, potentially free yet, paradoxically, governed by order. This order was reflected in the *bandhu* (connections) between the planets, the elements of the body, and the mind. At the deepest level, the whole universe was bound to, and reflected in, the individual consciousness.

The place of sacrifice represents the cosmos, and its three fires stand for the three divisions of space. The course of the sacrifice represents the year, and all such ritual becomes a part of continuing annual performances. The rite culminates in the ritual rebirth of the *yajamāna* (sacrificer), signifying the regeneration of his universe. It is sacred theater, built upon paradoxes of reality, in which the symbolic deaths of animals and humans, including the *yajamāna* himself, may be enacted.

The early texts indicate that in sacrifice some people substituted a clay or gold image of the victim. The Atharva Veda says that the inner *yajña* is superior to the outer one. For some, sacrifice only meant singing a Sāman, which is a song, with its various movements, from the Sāmaveda. The upward and downward movements of the Sāman may be interpreted as having five or seven parts. When divided into five parts, they are called *hinkāra*, *prastāva*, *udgītha*, *pratibhāra*, and *nidhana*. But these five movements are also the five animals of sacrifice: the *hinkāra* is a goat, the *prastāva* a sheep, the *udgītha* a cow, the *pratibhāra* a horse, and the *nidhana* a man. The specific identification may be owed to etymological considerations as well as animal traits. *Aja*, goat, means the unborn; sheep climb up the mountainside; the cow represents prosperity; the horse, speed, appropriate for fast movement; and (the cosmic) man is the objective of the song.

The Ashvamedha is performed by a consecrated king. The horse chosen for the sacrifice is worth a thousand

cows. It is black in the forepart, white in the rear, with a mark on its forehead. It is set free to roam, protected by attendants from the four different classes of society. Together with these people, it creates a linkage with the three kinds of beasts: those who live in the air, in the forests, and in villages. The horse has a unique position: it is the sky-bird; it lives in the forest and in the village.

In the beginning, a “four-eyed dog” (a dog with markings above its eyes) is made to float under the sacrificial horse. The “four-eyed dog” is Sirius, the Dog Star, the brightest light of Canis Major, whose orbit is below (to the south) that of the sun. The ascent of the sun puts an end to the light of Sirius, the brightest star in the sky. The reference to the thousand cows recalls that the sun’s splendor is a thousand times that of Earth, since *gaub* (cow) also means the planet. The first step of the initiation thus mirrors sunrise.

But how long is the horse supposed to be free? In later enactments of the ritual, the horse roamed for one year. But the Rigvedic and the Shatapatha accounts suggest that the rite took place just over a few days. It appears that the original meaning was to consider the day of the sun as symbolic of its annual circuit.

The texts prescribe that the queen must lie down with the “dead horse” (*ashvaka*). This was the time spent with a fire called *ashvaka*, which represented the sun dead in the sky during the night, preserved in a small fire in a lamp.

There is a threefold drama of change and renewal suggested here. First is the cosmic layer, related to the preservation of order in spite of precession and the stars losing their bearings. Second is the strengthening of the sun in the spring after its weakening in the winter. Third is the mirroring of these processes in the spirit of the sacrificer. The king, by virtue of his authority and responsibility, sees the dangers to his position magnified many times over those faced by the commoner.

It appears that the prototype of this rite required just a few days and was relatively simple. The later pageantry of 101 horses, and hundreds of soldiers and attendants, arose in an embellished version prescribed for kings. Even now, the householder ritual, that consists of a simple fire sacrifice or breath-control, is declared to be thousands of times superior to the Ashvamedha—a comparison that preserves, no doubt, a memory of the times when it was performed more widely.

Subhash Kak

See also **Brahmanas; Vedic Aryan India**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Heesterman, Jan C. *The Broken World of Sacrifice*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1993.

Kak, Subhash. *The Āśvamedha: The Rite and Its Logic*. New Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 2002.

Tripathi, Visvambharanatha. *Agnicayana*. Varanasi: Sampurnananda Sanskrit University, 1990.

ASIAN DEVELOPMENT BANK (ADB), RELATIONS WITH

Established in 1966, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) was created as a multilateral development bank for the Asia-Pacific region, with India as one of the thirty-one founding members. However, India has sought assistance from ADB since only 1986. The bank’s development assistance consists of loans to support investment and policy adjustments, technical assistance grants, political and credit risk guarantees, and a limited volume of investment in the private sector. Loan operations in India are funded exclusively from the ADB’s Ordinary Capital Resources. These loans are linked to LIBOR (London Interbank Offer rate), with a five-year grace period and a twenty-year repayment period. In 2004 the rate of interest amounted to around 2.2 percent. India does not have access to ADB’s concessional window, the Asian Development Fund. However, India does have access to a large volume of bilateral grant assistance as well as concessional International Development Agency (IDA) financing from the World Bank. The cost of ADB funds relative to loans and grants from other multilateral and bilateral development agencies active in India impacts on the profile of ADB’s operations in India.

ADB’s Operational Strategy and Quantum of Assistance

ADB’s first “Country Operational Strategy” for India, prepared in 1986, and the second strategy, launched in 1996, both focused on combining infrastructure investments with assistance for reforms to strengthen growth. A major innovation of the 1996 strategy was the introduction of state-level operations in addition to loans and technical assistance at the federal level. The current operational strategy was introduced in April 2003, the first such strategy for India after adoption of ADB’s own Poverty Reduction Strategy in 1999. The current India strategy recognizes that achievement of the global Millennium Development Goals by 2015 will depend significantly on outcomes in India, given its enormous size. Hence, the central organizing theme of the strategy is mainstreaming poverty reduction. The three pillars of the current strategy are “pro-poor” growth, social development, and good governance.

High growth is the main instrument for reducing income poverty. This is being addressed primarily through infrastructure-led growth. A large body of evidence in India and elsewhere, including studies by the ADB, the Department for International Development of the United

Kingdom, the International Food Policy Research Institute, the Overseas Development Institute, and the World Bank, shows the strong poverty-reducing impact of infrastructure development. Accordingly, infrastructure—primarily energy, transport, and urban infrastructure—accounts for more than 80 percent of ADB's assistance pipeline. The pro-poor aspect of growth is being strengthened by extending assistance, including infrastructure investment loans, for agriculture and rural development. Since most of the poor depend on this employment-intensive sector, extending ADB assistance to this sector greatly strengthens the poverty-reducing impact of ADB operations in India. Support for pro-poor growth is being further strengthened by extending ADB's state-level operations to some of India's poorer states.

Social development is the main instrument for reducing human poverty. India prefers to use its own resources and external grants, or concessional funds such as IDA, for social development projects in education and health, and for environmental protection. Hence, ADB does not directly provide assistance for these sectors. However, the ADB program attempts to address these social and environmental goals mainly through specific components of its infrastructure projects, its projects in the rural sector, and public resource management projects in selected focal states.

ADB's financial assistance is quite small compared to India's total investment needs. However, the current assistance program of approximately U.S.\$2 billion per year is being significantly leveraged through strong governance components, such as policy reform and capacity building, to maximize the development impact of every dollar of assistance. The government has often indicated that it looks to ADB to play a leading catalytic role in introducing international best practices in development projects, programs, and policies.

Programmed annual ADB assistance to India of around U.S.\$2 billion per annum in loans, plus about \$14 million in technical assistance grants, is the largest among all countries borrowing from ADB. As of 31 December 2003, ADB had cumulatively provided 72 public sector loans amounting to \$12.9 billion. Investments in the private sector included 13 projects totaling \$222 million. ADB also provided grants for 192 technical assistance projects for a total of \$102 million.

Sectoral Interventions

Transportation sector. Transportation sector operations are primarily directed at strengthening rural-urban connections, linking poor rural producers to their markets in towns, cities, and ports. Accordingly, the ADB program includes investment for networks of rural roads, state

roads, and national highways. ADB also leads the external assistance program for reforms being undertaken by the Indian railways. Projects are also being prepared to improve inland water transport systems as an energy-efficient and cost-efficient mode of transportation to link producers in poor, remote regions with their markets.

Energy sector. The main thrust of ADB's energy sector operations is to protect the environment by promoting the use of clean fuels across major Indian cities, and by supporting the government's efforts to increase hydropower generation. The program supports only those hydropower projects in which the potential for adverse social and environmental impacts, such as loss of biodiversity or displacement of people, is minimal. Several energy sector interventions are designed to help the state governments undertake reforms in the power sector, a critical issue in most states.

Urban sector. In its urban sector operations, ADB undertakes projects to improve water supply, sanitation, and solid waste management. Projects are also undertaken to build the capacity of municipal bodies for better service delivery. Urban projects also include components to create livelihood opportunities for the urban poor, for example, microcredit projects for women living in slums.

Agriculture and natural resources development. An important challenge in Indian agriculture is the distorted structure of incentives, which encourages overproduction of food grains. Marketing opportunities for fruits, vegetables, floriculture, and other agricultural products are very underdeveloped. Accordingly, ADB assistance is being directed to agribusiness development in several states in India. Another major constraint for agriculture, highlighted in India's tenth Five Year Plan, is inadequate development of irrigation and continuing dependence on rain-fed agriculture. Irrigation development is essential to support multiple cropping as the only means of increasing cropped acreage, given the virtual exhaustion of available cultivable land. It is also essential to protect farmers from the production instability associated with rain-fed agriculture. Hence, ADB is also providing assistance for environmentally friendly irrigation and water resource management projects in the poorer states.

Financial sector operations. In its financial sector operations, ADB is focusing on development and reform of the capital market, and improved access to financial services for the poor. The latter involves strengthening rural finance institutions, reforming cooperatives and regional rural banks, and restructuring the credit system for small and medium enterprises.

Fiscal consolidation. A large fiscal deficit, around 10 percent of gross domestic product, is one of the most serious risks that need to be addressed in India's macroeconomic

management. About half of this is accounted for by the budgets of state governments, many of which are saddled with large stocks of debt and contingent liabilities. ADB's public resource management programs help states implement fiscal reforms by financing a part of the adjustment costs, which typically include costs of debt restructuring, government voluntary retirement schemes, social safety net payments, and initial revenue loss due to tax reforms. Public enterprise reforms under ADB's program loans encompass restructuring, privatization, or closure, with emphasis on social safety net mechanisms. These programs also include state-level tax reforms and expenditure rationalization, such as the reallocation of expenditure toward improved delivery of pro-poor social services.

Strengthening governance. ADB's efforts to support improved governance has four elements: fiscal consolidation at the central government level; sector-level policy reforms combined with capacity building for better service delivery in the sectors where ADB is active; state-level fiscal policy reforms combined with interventions to strengthen state and local governments to ensure greater accountability, transparency, and efficiency in service delivery, especially for pro-poor services; and core governance interventions such as support for enhancing efficiency in the justice administration system, which will play a key role in the next generation of reforms in India.

Private sector development. ADB's support for private sector development addresses three critical impediments: poor infrastructure, policy distortions that deter entry as well as exit in different sectors, and weaknesses of the financial system. The program also includes interventions to support public-private partnerships and direct investment in the private sector by the Private Sector Operations Department of ADB.

Social development and environmental protection. It was noted above that India does not directly borrow for social and environmental projects from ADB. Hence these concerns are being addressed through urban social infrastructure projects, such as supply of potable water, sanitation, sewerage, and solid waste management, which will directly improve public health, especially women's health. Similarly, in promoting the use of clean fuels, ADB is assisting in reducing pollution and also contributing to health protection. ADB's assistance for physical infrastructure projects also includes components that address relevant social issues, such as the spread of the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), transportation safety, trafficking of women and children, and livelihood programs for poor communities in project areas. The objective is to go beyond ADB's policies on resettlement and indigenous peoples to ensure that in addition to promoting growth, all ADB interventions, including growth

projects, are socially inclusive and proactively address the issue of gender equity and other social obligations of the development community.

Sudipto Mundle

See also **Gender and Human Rights; Industrial Growth and Diversification; Infrastructure and Transportation, 1857–1947; World Bank (WB), Relations with**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ali, I., and E. M. Pernia. *Infrastructure and Poverty Reduction: What Is the Connection?* ERD Policy Brief Series, no. 13. Manila: ADB, 2003.
- Asian Development Bank. *RETA 5947: Interim Report on Assessing the Impact of Transport and Energy on Poverty Reduction*. Manila: ADB, 2001.
- . *Country Strategy and Program, 2003–2006*. CSP: IND 2003-10. Manila: ADB, 2003.
- . "India." In *Asian Development Outlook, 2004*. Manila: ADB, 2004.
- Crisil Infrastructure Advisory. *Private Sector Assessment: India*. Report prepared for ADB. Manila: ADB, 2002.
- Fan, S., P. Hazel, and S. Thorat. *Linkages between Government Spending, Growth, and Poverty in Rural India*. Research Report 110, Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 1999.
- Ghosh, Jayati. *India: Gender Briefing Paper*. Report prepared for ADB. Manila: ADB, 2002.
- Government of India (GOI). *The India Infrastructure Report*. Expert Group on the Commercialization of Infrastructure Projects. New Delhi: GOI, 1996.
- Government of United Kingdom. *Making Connections: Infrastructure for Poverty Reduction*. London: Department for International Development, 2002.
- Mathur, Kuldeep. *Governance for Improved Public and Judicial Management in India*. Report prepared for ADB. Manila: ADB, 2002.
- Mundle, S., and H. Mukhopadhyay. *State Government Finances, Fiscal Reforms, and the Role of ADB*. Report prepared for ADB. Manila: ADB, 2002.
- Sharma, Savita. *Poverty Estimates in India*. ERD Working Paper Series, no. 51. Manila: ADB, 2004.
- Sundaram, K., and S. D. Tendulkar. *Poverty in India: An Assessment and Analysis*. Report prepared for ADB. Manila: ADB, 2002.
- World Bank. *Public Private Partnerships in Infrastructure and the Poor: Transport and Poverty Reduction Strategy, Attacking Poverty Course*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2002.

ASIATIC SOCIETIES OF BENGAL AND BOMBAY Despite frequent disclaimers in their archives, the Asiatic Society of Bengal and the Asiatic Society of Bombay had close and valuable links with the government, particularly at their inception and in the early decades of their growth. High officials of the East India Company (EIC), including successive governors-general in Calcutta (Kolkata) and governors of Bombay



Town Hall, Bombay. Built by the British in 1804 in the grand neoclassical style, Town Hall, home to the Asiatic Society of Bombay. In the twenty-first century, with the wide availability of scholarly information on the Internet, membership in the still prestigious society has markedly declined. CHRISTINE PEMBERTON / FOTOMEDIA.

(Mumbai), were associated with those two societies as president or patrons, and the government, directly or indirectly, helped them with funds and space to house their books and antiquities.

The question of such association is important to the debate over whether the objectives of these societies was to understand India with a view to better administer an alien people with a rich past or whether the societies were purely learned bodies in pursuit of knowledge for its own sake.

The Asiatic Society of Bengal

The intellectually oriented among the early elites of the EIC in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were motivated both by a genuine academic interest in India's past as well as the practical value of such knowledge in their administration. The Asiatic Society of Bengal's famous founder, Sir William Jones (1746–1794), who had arrived in India to take over as judge only a few months earlier, admitted that he wanted to study ancient Hindu law to help him in his work. At the same time, he told the gathering of thirty at the society's inaugural event on 15 January 1784 that the society's object of

inquiry would be “Man and Nature . . . whatever is performed by one or produced by the other.” The society's focus would be Asia, not Europe. The company's governor-general, Warren Hastings, was elected patron, while Jones became its first president, a position he held until his death a decade later.

Among the fine scholars who presented research papers at the society's first meetings were the leading lights of Indology: William Jones, Henry Thomas Colebrooke, H. H. Wilson, William Carey, and James Prinsep. They translated the most important texts from Sanskrit and several from Persian, commenting on them and devising systems of transliteration, as well as deciphering scripts. Their combined labors would not only introduce India's rich heritage to the West but to subsequent generations of English-educated Indians who lacked proficiency in Sanskrit. Such knowledge of India's past has had an impact on the Indian Renaissance and on the growth of a new spirit of nationalism.

The society's extensive early research was published from 1788 to 1839 in twenty volumes of *Asiatick Researches*. In 1832 the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of*

Bengal began publication; it was integrated in 1904 with *Proceedings of the Asiatic Society*, begun in 1869. Renamed the *Journal of the Asiatic Society* in 1953, the journal continues to be published. Additionally, the society published between 1905 and 1933 a serial called *Memoirs*, which included archaeological and geological surveys, census reports, and treatises on law and revenue systems.

In 1808 the society moved into its own building, constructed on a plot gifted by the government. In the same year, the government also gave the society the invaluable Tipu Sultan Library collection, seized after the fall of Seringapatnam. That famous collection includes an illuminated manuscript of the Qur'an and of the *Padshanamah*, bearing the autograph of Shah Jahan. The society also received Surveyor-General Colonel Colin Mackenzie's large personal library, a collection principally on South India, as well as N. Wallich's botanical library and the entire library of the government's Fort William College. Over the years, gifts to the society from all over the world have included about five thousand various journals (only about one hundred are subscribed), comprising over 110,000 volumes. Donations of personal libraries such as of Nirmal Chandra Chunder, Prafulla Chandra Sarkar, Nirmal Kumar Bose, C. R. Cama, and Jnananjan Niyogi form but a part of what is probably the best collection in Asia on premodern India as well as India in the British era.

In 1833, 1843, 1856, 1884, 1910, and 1934, the society published catalogs of its collections. Since independence, several catalogs have been added: Arabic-Persian materials by Muliar Rahman in 1958; Hindi books by G. N. Bhattacharji in 1967; and Bengali books by S. Chaudhuri in 1968. Plans have been underway for a comprehensive catalog of all books, manuscripts, inscriptions, coins, drawings and antique objects in the library and museum.

The tradition of governmental assistance to the society continued after India's independence. In 1961 the governments of India and of West Bengal financed the construction of a new building for the society, which, on its completion in February 1965, was inaugurated by President Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan. In 1984, at the time of the society's bicentennial, the Indian Parliament designated it as an Institution of National Importance, making the central government responsible for the full funding of its operations. One of the last acts of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi was to participate in the celebration and to announce a special grant of fifty million rupees. Both central and state governments nominate representatives to the society's executive body.

The Asiatic Society of Bombay

The Asiatic Society of Bombay was first established in 1804 as the Literary Society of Bombay by Sir James Mackintosh, the recorder of Bombay, at the official

residence of Governor Jonathan Duncan. Among those present at the event were historian William Erskine, Sir Charles Forbes, the much-acclaimed artist Henry Salt, and Viscount Valentia, whose journals of travels in the East with sixty engravings by Salt, would be published in 1809. The inspiration for founding the Bombay society may have been provided by the older Asiatic Society of Bengal, since two attendees at the Bombay conclave, Duncan and Erskine, were among the founders and active participants of the Asiatic Society of Bengal. Mackintosh defined the Bombay society's objective as "promoting useful knowledge particularly such as is more immediately connected with India."

In 1829 the Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain (established in London in 1823) invited the Asiatic Society of Bengal, the Literary Society of Bombay, and the Literary Society of Madras (established in 1812) to join it, assuring them that their administrative and fiscal independence would be respected; the societies in Bombay and Madras agreed. Known thereafter as the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society, the organization moved into the northern wing of the magnificent new town hall between 1830 and 1833.

The first phase of the society's history ended in 1840, when the membership, thus far restricted to Europeans, was opened to Indians. In that year, Sir Maneckji Cursetji, a Parsi philanthropist from Bombay, joined the Royal Asiatic Society during a visit to London, which entitled him to use the facilities of its branches anywhere in the world. Having admitted Cursetji, the Bombay Branch was obliged, reluctantly, to open its doors to other Indians. Scores of educated, affluent Indians, fluent in English, applied for membership. Several prominent citizens, among them Jagannath Shankarshet, Premchand Roychand, and Sir Jamsetji Jeejibhoy, joined the society. Scholarly works by Englishmen were complemented by the research of brilliant Indian scholars like Pandit Bhagwanlal Indraji and Bhau Daji Lad. The third phase of the society's development, from about 1885 until India's independence in 1947, was dominated by Indian scholars like Kashinath Trimbak Telang, the first Indian to serve as president of the Bombay Branch, a judge of the High Court and vice-chancellor of Bombay University. Equally important was the research of society members Sir Ramakrishna Bhandarkar, Jivanji Mody, and K. R. Cama.

Although scholarly papers read at the society's meetings were published periodically as *Transactions*, the society started a journal in 1841, which with changes of name continues to be published annually as the *Journal of the Asiatic Society of Bombay*. The society's valuable collection includes a 1350 A.D. manuscript of Dante Alighieri's *Divine Comedy* (Benito Mussolini offered one million pounds sterling for it and was refused), an illustrated

Shabnama, *Kalpasutra*, *Aranyaka Parvan* and many other valuable rare volumes; fifteen thousand coins, including gold coins of Samudra Gupta and Akbar; fifteen hundred maps and charts; and several thousand manuscripts in Sanskrit, Arabic, and Persian.

In 1947, with the advent of independence, the Bombay Branch dropped its royal links, becoming simply the Asiatic Society of Bombay. In 1954 the society agreed to the government's proposal to designate it one of the four "central" libraries under the Delivery of Books Act with responsibility to receive, catalog, and preserve books published in all Indian languages anywhere in India. The society regained its independence after four decades of fiscal dependence on government through a court-ordered separation of the Central Library effective 1 July 1994. Arguably the greatest achievement of the society during the fourth phase of its history was the publication of Mahamahopadhyaya P. V. Kane's multivolume *History of Dharmashastra*, which brought him the highest honor in India, the *Bharata Ratna* (jewel of India).

In the decade beginning 1989, when the undersigned was president of the society, it launched a massive fund-raising campaign to implement initiatives to prepare the society for its bicentennial. Nearly 60 million rupees were collected, including 20 million from the central government—the bulk of the balance coming from Bombay's philanthropists: foundations and trusts, corporations, and individuals. The reserve fund was reconstituted and a corpus fund created, enabling the society to fund a number of fellowships, endowed lectures, and research projects. Among the new facilities created were microfilming and conservation laboratories and renovation of the society's famed Durbar Hall, adorning it with oil portraits of some of the greatest scholar-members of the society. Bharat Ratna Mahamahopadhyaya, in whose name the society had already established a center for research in 1972, was singled out for a bronze bust in the vestibule.

D. R. SarDesai

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Arberry, A. J. *British Orientalists*. London: W. Collins, 1943.
- . *Asiatic Jones*. London: Longman Green, 1946.
- Asiatic Society of Bengal. *150th Jubilee of the Royal Asiatic Society of Bengal (1784–1934) and the Bicentenary of Sir William Jones (1746–1946)*. Kolkata: Asiatic Society of Bengal, 1946.
- Conant, M. P. *The Oriental Tale in England in the Eighteenth Century*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1908.
- Datta, Bhagavat. *Western Indologists: A Study in Motives*. Delhi: Itihas Prakashan Mandal, 1954.
- Kejariwal, O. P. *The Asiatic Society of Bengal and the Discovery of India's Past*. Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Kopf, David. *Nineteenth Century Bengal*. Kolkata: Indian Committee for Cultural Freedom, 1963.
- . *British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance: The Dynamics of Indian Modernization, 1773–1835*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969.
- Mukherjee, S. N. *Sir William Jones: A Study in Eighteenth Century British Attitudes to India*. London: Cambridge University Press, 1968.
- Singh, J. P. *William Jones, His Mind and Art*. Delhi: S. Chand, 1982.

ASSAM The state of Assam in northeast India had a population of nearly 27 million in 2001. An overwhelmingly agricultural state, producing over 50 percent of India's tea, Assam has one of India's lowest literacy rates and highest poverty rates. The capital is Dispur, and the state is divided into twenty-three districts.

Assam was known in ancient times as Pragjyotisha or Pragjyotishpura ("the City of Eastern Lights"), and as Kamarupa. Asom (Axom), or its Anglicized version, Assam, is a modern name. It derives from the Bodo word *Ha-Cham* (low or level country) or *Asama* ("unequalled" or "peerless") and was used to describe the Ahoms, a Shan tribe of Mongoloid abstraction, who ruled the state from 1228 for six centuries, recording their activities in the *Buranjis* (the "store-house of unknown things"). Perhaps the first people to populate the state were Austroloids, none of whom remain, followed by Mongoloids and Caucasoids. The people of the state are broadly classified as nontribals, or plains people, and the tribals, who mostly live in the hills. A variety of ethnic groups make up the "Assamese" because the British brought in people from Orissa, Bihar, Tamil Nadu, and Kerala to work on the tea plantations in the nineteenth century, as indigenous labor was scarce. About 70 percent of the nontribal population, concentrated in the Brahmaputra and the Barak Valleys, are Hindus who are divided into castes and subcastes (though caste barriers are not as pronounced as elsewhere in India), and they speak Assamese. Renowned Hindu temples are the Kamakhya at Guwahati and the Kechaikhati at Sadiya. They are both *shakti* temples in the tantric tradition. Muslims are the second-largest group (about 29%), followed by Christians (about 3%), Sikhs, Buddhists, and Jains.

There are twenty-three different tribes, most of whom practice animism with elements of Hinduism, although a number are Christian and a few Muslim. The Bodo Kacharis, Karbis, and Lalungs are patriarchal; the Khasis, Jaintias, and Garos are matriarchal, while the Dimasas have a patriarchal family structure but also have male and female clans who accord exclusive rights to women. Like other tribes in northeastern India, the Hmars, Rengma Nagas, and Garos have youth dormitories where young males are educated in tribal customs. The Zeme Nagas have dormitories for both males and females. In the Official Language Act of 1960, English and Assamese became official languages in the Brahmaputra



River Brahmaputra in Assam. Assam is dominated by the mighty Brahmaputra, river of legend that has its origins in Tibet. Commonly referred to as the “sorrow of Amman,” this river has brought raging floods and agricultural devastation to the region in recent years. IPSHITA BARUA.

Valley, while Bengali and English, along with Assamese, were official languages in the Barak Valley and the hill districts. The tribal people speak Tibeto-Burman, Austro-Asiatic, and Tibeto-Chinese languages, while the immigrant tea garden laborers speak Oriya, Mundari, Santhal, Tamil, and Tèlegu.

Some 800,000 looms are at work in Assam, and handloom weaving is a way of life. Assamese weavers produce such textiles as clothing, shawls, and quilts. Over 30,000 looms produce silk, and they are concentrated in the township of Sualkuchi, the “Manchester of Assam.” Each ethnic group has its own distinctive design, depicting everything from animals and human figures to the galaxy. Jewelry, especially of gold, has also been a tradition in Assam. One tribe, the Sonowal Kacharis, specialize in panning for gold in the rivers that flow down from the Himalayas. The abundant cane of Assam is made into the renowned furniture of the state, and bamboo is used for a variety of products, including the *japi*, the colorfully decorated hat worn by Assamese peasants as they toil in the fields. Hajo, in Kamrup district, is the center of the important cottage brass industry, and nearby Sarhebari produces

distinctive bell-metal objects. The Hira and the Kumar are two communities of pottery artisans, and the Khanikar are practitioners of the ancient art of woodcarving; the painted woodwork of Golaghat is prized by tourists. Fiber weaving, *kubila koth*, is a renowned handicraft in Nagaon and Dhubri districts, and cork toys of gods, animals, and birds have been made for centuries in Goalpara.

The Varman dynasty ruled Assam from A.D. 400 to 1228; the Chinese pilgrim Hsieun Tsang visited around A.D. 630. The Ahoms ruled after 1228, repelling seventeen military expeditions by the Mughals until, in a weakened state at the end of the eighteenth century, the Burmese invaded. They were in turn beaten back by the British in 1824 who, with the Treaty of Yandibo of 1826, absorbed Assam into the Raj. The British passed the Assam Clearance Act in 1854, which allowed any European planter up to 3,000 acres of prime land to create tea plantations. Within twenty years, there were nearly three hundred plantations in India, many of them in Assam. After Indian independence, a number of states were carved out of Assam. They included Nagaland in 1963, Meghalaya and Mizoram in 1971, and Arunachal Pradesh in 1972.

In 1979 and 1980 separatism raised its head in Assam and the six other neighboring tribal states (Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, and Tripura). In Assam the movement began with sporadic nonviolent protests against the influx of some 5 million Bengali immigrants, who had been migrating into the state in increasing numbers since 1947, especially after the creation of Bangladesh in 1971. The Assamese Liberation Army increased the insurgency, and violence intensified, adversely affecting the tea and jute industry and bringing the Assam oil industry practically to a halt. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi sent troops to the area and flew there to try, unsuccessfully, to negotiate a settlement. Unrest increased, and the Seven United Liberation Army, led by Naga, Mizo, and Assamese tribals, called for independence from India. Ethnic resentment of the Bengalis continued as the Assam Movement (1979–1985), led by the All-Assam Student Union and the All-Assam Gana Sangram Parishad, a coordinating committee representing several political parties and associations, attempted to preserve the cultural identity of Assam and of the Assamese, represented by the term *Asamiya*. This led to the Assam Accord of 1985 with the government and the cessation of violence, though resentment of Bengalis and fear of Bengali domination continues.

Roger D. Long

See also **Arunachal Pradesh; Ethnic Conflict; Ethnic Peace Accords; Meghalaya; Mizoram; Nagas and Nagaland; Tripura**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Baruah, Sanjib. *India against Itself: Assam and the Politics of Nationality*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999.
- Bhuyan, Arun, ed. *Nationalist Upsurge in Assam*. Dispur: Government of Assam, 2000.
- Chatopadhyay, Dilipkumar. *History of the Assamese Movement since 1947*. Kolkata: Minerva Publications, 1990.
- Choudhury, P. C. *The History of Civilisation of the People of Assam to the Twelfth Century A.D.* Gauhati: Department of Historical and Antiquarian Studies in Assam, Government of India, 1959.
- Gogoi, Lila. *The Buranjis Historical Literature of Assam: A Critical Survey*. New Delhi: Omsons Publications, 1986.
- Guha, Amalendu. *Medieval and Early Colonial Assam: Society, Polity, Economy*. Kolkata: K. P. Bagchi, 1991.
- Hussain, Monirul. *The Assam Movement: Class, Ideology and Identity*. Delhi: Manak Publications, 1993.
- Saikia, Rajen. *Social and Economic History of Assam (1853–1921)*. New Delhi: Manohar, 2000.

ASTRONOMY There are astronomical references of chronological significance in the Vedas. Due to precession of Earth, the seasons shift at a rate of about a month every

two thousand years. Some Vedic notices mark the beginning of the year and that of the vernal equinox in Orion; this was the case around 4500 B.C. There are other astronomical references from the subsequent millennia, which indicates the memory of a long period over which astronomy developed into a science. Fire altars, with astronomical basis, have been found in the third millennium cities of India. The texts that describe their designs are conservatively dated to the first millennium B.C., but their contents appear to be much older.

Vedic ritual was based on the times for the full and the new moons, the solstices and the equinoxes. There were two years: the ritual year started with the winter solstice (*mahāvratā*), and the civil one started with the spring equinox (*vishuva*). The passage of the rising of the sun in its northward course from the winter solstice to the summer solstice (*vishuvant*) was called *gavām ayana*, or the sun's walk. The solar year was divided into two *ayanas*: in the *uttarāyana*, the sun travels north; in the *dakshināyana*, it travels south.


The movement of the moon was marked by its nightly conjunction with one of the 27 or 28 *nakshatras* (stars or star clusters). The Rig Veda 1.164 also speaks of another tradition of dividing the zodiac into twelve equal parts. It appears that these divisions were called the *Ādityas*.

The incommensurability between the lunar and the solar reckonings led to the search for ever-increasing cycles to synchronize the motions of the sun and the moon. This is how the *yuga* (world cycle) astronomical model was born. In the lunar month, there were separate traditions of counting the beginning of the month by the full-moon day and the new-moon day.

During the earliest times in India, there existed a centennial calendar with a cycle of 2,700 years. Called the Saptarshi calendar, it is still in use in several parts of India. Its current beginning is taken to be 3076 B.C. Notices by the Greek historians Pliny and Arrian suggest that, during the Mauryan times, the calendar used in India began in 6676 B.C. It is very likely that this calendar was the Old Saptarshi calendar with a beginning at 6676 B.C. Other major Indian eras are that have wide currency are Kaliyuga (3102 B.C.), Vikrama (58 B.C.), and Shaka (A.D. 78).

The shifting of seasons through the year and the shifting of the North Pole allow us to date several other statements in the Vedic books. Thus the Shatapatha Brāhmaṇa statement that the Krittikās never swerve from the east corresponds to 2950 B.C.

The Maitrāyaṇīya Brāhmaṇa Upanishad refers to the winter solstice being at the midpoint of the Shraviṣṭhā (Delphini) segment and the summer solstice at the beginning of Māgha. This indicates 1660 B.C. The Vedāṅga



Observatory in Jaipur. In Jaipur, one of five Jantar Mantar (literally “instrument for calculation of the heavens”) constructed at the behest of Maharajah Sawai Jai Singh II between 1727 and 1734. These national observatories incorporate multiple buildings of unique form (each with a specialized function for astronomical measurement), monumental scale, and lavish materials. ADITYA PATANKAR / FOTOMEDIA.

Jyotisha, the text that describes some of the astronomical knowledge of the times of altar ritual, has an internal date of circa 1350 B.C.

Astronomical Ritual

The year was known to be somewhat more than 365 days and a bit less than 366 days. In one tradition, an extra eleven days were added to the lunar year of 354 days. According to one text, five more days are required over the nominal year of 360 days to complete the seasons.

The central idea behind the Vedic system is the notion of *bandhu* (connections) between the astronomical, the terrestrial, and the physiological. The connections were represented in sacred ritual and sacred books. This knowledge was also coded in the organization of the Rig Veda, which was taken to be a symbolic altar of hymns. The examination of the Rig Veda is of unique significance since this ancient book has been preserved with incredible accuracy.

Vedic ritual was generally performed at an altar. The altar design was based on astronomical numbers related

to the reconciliation of the lunar and solar years. The fire altars symbolized the universe, and there were three types of altars representing the earth, the space, and the sky. The altar for the earth was drawn as circular, whereas the sky (or heaven) altar was drawn as square. The geometric problems of circulature of a square and that of squaring a circle are a result of equating the earth and the sky altars. These problems are among the earliest considered in ancient geometry.

The fire altars were surrounded by 360 enclosing stones; of these, 21 were around the earth altar, 78 around the space altar, and 261 around the sky altar. Thus the earth, the space, and the sky are symbolically assigned the numbers 21, 78, and 261.

The main altar was built in five layers. The basic square shape was modified to several forms, such as that of a falcon and a turtle. These altars were built in five layers, of a thousand bricks of specified shapes. The construction of these altars required the solution to geometric and algebraic problems. The main altar was an area that was taken to be equivalent to the nominal year of 360 days.

The altar ritual dealt with the difference between the two years: lunar, which is a fraction more than 354 days (360 *tithis*); and solar, which is in excess of 365 days (between 371 and 372 *tithis*). A well-known altar ritual says that altars should be constructed in a sequence of 95, with progressively increasing areas. The residual excess in 95 years adds up to 89 *tithis*; it appears that this was distributed in some manner over the 95-year period. The 95-year cycle corresponds to the tropical year being equal to 365.24675 days.

The Vedic astronomical system as given in the Vedānga Jyotisha is a luni-solar system. It considers a five-year *yuga*, employing two intercalary lunar months, with the condition that at the beginning of each *yuga* both the sun and the moon would be at the Shravishthā *nakshatra*, and it will be the winter solstice. For these conditions to be met, several corrections had to be made at the end of the *yuga*. For example, an additional day was needed to make sure that the new *yuga* would start with the new-moon day.

Nature of the Planetary System

The *Āryabhatīya* of Āryabhata (b. A.D. 476) is a milestone of astronomy for two reasons. In it Earth is taken to spin on its axis, and the orbits of the planets are considered with respect to the sun. This idea of a spinning Earth causing night and day was a major advance in astronomy. Since the inner planets were already seen close to the sun, it made it easy to refer their orbital motions with respect to the sun. In contrast to this, in the Greek view the planets and stars were on concentric crystalline spheres centered on Earth. Each planet, the sun, and the moon were on their own sphere; the stars were placed on the largest sphere surrounding all of the rest.

A pure heliocentrism is to be found in the following statement in the Vishnu Purāṇa: “The sun is stationed for all time, in the middle of the day. The rising and the setting of the sun being perpetually opposite to each other, people speak of the rising of the sun where they see it; and, where the sun disappears, there, to them, is his setting. Of the sun, which is always in one and the same place, there is neither setting nor rising.”

By examining early Vedic sources, the stages of the development of the earliest astronomy become apparent. After the Rīg Vedic stage comes the period of the Brāhmaṇas, in which we place the Vedānga Jyotisha astronomy. The third stage is early Siddhāntic and early Purāṇic astronomy.

The concepts of the *shighbrocca* and *mandocca* cycles are peculiar to Indian astronomy. They indicate that the motion of the planets was taken to be fundamentally around the sun, which, in turn, was taken to go around Earth. The *mandocca*, in the case of the sun and the moon,

is the apogee where the angular motion is the slowest; in the case of the other planets, it is the aphelion point of the orbit. For the superior planets, the *shighbrocca* coincides with the mean place of the sun, and in the case of an inferior planet, it is an imaginary point moving around Earth with the same angular velocity as the angular velocity of the planet around the sun; its direction from Earth is always parallel to the line joining the sun and the inferior planet.

The *mandocca* point serves to slow down the motion from the apogee to the perigee and speed up the motion from the perigee to the apogee. It is a representation of the nonuniform motion of the body, and so it can be seen as a direct development of the idea of the non-uniform motion of the sun and the moon. The *shighbrocca* maps the motion of the planet around the sun to the corresponding set of points around Earth. The sun, with its winds that hold the solar system together, is, in turn, taken to go around Earth. The antecedents of this system can be seen in the earlier texts.

Astronomical Siddhāntas

In these standard texts of Indian astronomy, which became popular about two thousand years ago, the calculations are not done with respect to the *nakshatras* but rather with respect to the twelve signs of the zodiac. There is speculation that this change arose out of the interaction with the Greeks, but the twelve-division zodiac was a part of the early Indian astronomical tradition.

The mean longitudes were computed from the number of days elapsed from the beginning of long periods called the *kalpa* and the *yuga*, with the current *yuga* (Kaliyuga) having commenced on 17/18 February 3102 B.C. Planetary motions were computed using epicyclic and eccentric circles. Eclipses were computed more accurately by applying corrections due to parallax. Computations were based on arithmetic, geometric and algebraic techniques; plane and spherical trigonometry was also used.

The problems dealt with in the *siddhāntas* include: the determination of the longitudes of the planets and also of the ascending and descending nodes of the moon; corrections of these computations with the passage of time; lunar and solar eclipses; problems relating to the shadow; the phases of the moon; helical rising and setting of the planets; occultation of stars and planets; and astronomical instruments.

The astronomical texts may be divided into three types: *siddhāntas*, *karanas*, and *koshthakas*. While the *siddhāntas* are comprehensive and commence the calculations from the *kalpa* or a *yuga*, the *karanas* are practical manuals to facilitate calculations from a specific epoch with zero corrections at that point. The *koshthakas* or *saranis* are astronomical tables for the casting of horoscopes by astrologers. There are also texts that focus only on instruments.

The prominent astronomers after Āryabhata include his later rival Brahmagupta (seventh century), Bhāskara II (b. 1114), and the many mathematician-astronomers of the Kerala school that flourished during the years of the Karnataka (Vijayanagara) empire. The two most prominent names of this school are Mādhava (c. 1340–1425) and Nīlakantha (c. 1444–1545). Their contributions include power series for trigonometric functions, demonstration that π is irrational, and contributions to calculus. Nīlakantha presented an improved version of the Āryabhata's scheme in which the five planets orbit the sun and in turn they all orbit Earth.

Size of the Universe

The Brāhmaṇas consider noncircular motion of the sun and, by implication, of the moon, and the sun is taken to be about 500 Earth diameters away from Earth. Much later, Āryabhata considers the orbit of the sky as 4.32 million times greater than the orbit of the sun. Clearly, this was inspired by cosmological ideas. The Purāṇas consider the size of the universe to be 500 million *yojanas* (or over 4.5 billion miles). They also speak of other universes beyond ours. The conception of such a large size, and the noncentrality of Earth for the universe sets this tradition apart from Western astronomy.

Subhash Kak

See also Āryabhata; Āryabhaṭīya; Brāhmaṇas; Upanishadic Philosophy; Vedāṅga Jyotiṣha

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Billard, Roger. *L'Astronomie Indienne*. Paris: École Française d'Extrême Orient, 1971.
- Kak, Subhash. "Astronomy of the Vedic Altars." *Vistas in Astronomy* 36 (1993): 117–140.
- . "The Astronomy of the Age of Geometric Altars." *Quarterly Journal of the Royal Astronomical Society* 36 (1995): 385–396.
- . *The Astronomical Code of the Rgveda*. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 2000.
- . "Birth and Early Development of Indian Astronomy." In *Astronomy across Cultures: The History of Non-Western Astronomy*, edited by H. Selin. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2000.
- Rao, S. Balachandra. *Indian Astronomy: An Introduction*. Hyderabad: Universities Press, 2000.

ATMAN. *See* Upanishadic Philosophy.

ATOMIC POWER. *See* Nuclear Programs and Policies.

AUCKLAND, LORD (1784–1849), governor-general of India (1836–1842). George Eden, second baron and first earl of Auckland, arrived in India after

long, if undistinguished, service to the Whig Party, previously rewarded by appointment to the Board of Trade (1830), and as First Lord of the Admiralty (1834). As governor-general, he established the universal applicability of general rules for appointments, pensions, and legislation, thus obviating continual recourse for guidance by provincial administrators. He also supported the spread of education, particularly Western medical knowledge, if to little effect. Such minor service was, however, entirely overshadowed by the First Afghan War of 1838 to 1842.

There has been much speculation as to why Auckland waged a disastrous war to remove the Afghan amir Dost Mohammad Barakzai, against the advice of British envoy Alexander Burnes, who had held amicable negotiations with the amir in 1837. It has been argued that the easily led Auckland was persuaded to override Burnes's sound advice by his political secretary, William Macnaghten, who was fatally overconfident in India's military prowess. Auckland had previously acted precipitously in suppressing unrest in Oudh, deposed the rebellious rajas of Satara and Karnul, and annexed the lands of the latter. In a prelude to the Afghan war itself, he had forced the amirs of Sind to accept violations of their sovereignty precluded by previous agreements. He also seized Persian territory in the Gulf, insisting that such aggression was justified by the need to provide for the "safety and integrity of the Anglo-Indian empire."

The sources of Auckland's bellicosity may well have been more political than personal, if also more illusory than real. These included not only fears of Russian intrigues in Herat and Tehran as well as Kabul, but also the presence in India of Shah Shuja Sodozai, a weak refugee-claimant to the throne of Afghanistan, who was expected to be more pliant than Dost Mohammad. Auckland, like most British officials, also harbored an almost pathological fear of a Russian invasion of India.

In December 1838, Auckland's "Army of the Indus" marched off with much ceremony for Afghanistan. Its operations began well enough to earn Auckland an earldom, but by late 1841 Macnaghten, in Kabul, was pleading for reinforcements. Auckland delayed the dispatch of a more British forces until Macnaghten had been killed and the Army of the Indus, forced to withdraw from the country, had been virtually annihilated in the Khurd-Kabul Pass. This event is generally considered one of the most ignominious defeats of British arms in India and darkened Auckland's departure for home. Nonetheless, he was reappointed in 1846 as First Lord of the Admiralty, a post he occupied until his death.

Marc Jason Gilbert

See also Anglo-Afghan Wars: War One (1838–1842)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Mukharya, P. S. "Centralized Administration under Lord Auckland." *Journal of Indian History* 54 (December 1976), part III: 761–767.
- Trotter, Lionel J. *Earl of Auckland*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1893.

AURANGZEB (1618–1707), sixth and last of the Great Mughal emperors of India. Born Muhi-ud-Din Muhammad, Aurangzeb was renowned for his long war in the south (the Deccan) and for his religious orthodoxy. He expanded the Mughal empire to its greatest extent but bankrupted the empire, impoverishing the land and most of its people, by trying to conquer and control the vast Deccan, which rebelled against his rule. After his father, Shah Jahan, fell ill, Aurangzeb captured and imprisoned him in Agra Fort in June 1658, securing vast treasures and armaments in the process. He was crowned emperor in Delhi the following month, and gave himself the title "Alamgir" (World Seizer). He then defeated and killed his three brothers in a murderous civil war. His victory was assured by his skilled generalship, acquired while serving in his father's army in Gujarat and in the south for over ten years.

For the first twenty-five years of his rule, Aurangzeb maintained his capital at Shahjahanabad (Delhi). Later, his encampment became a movable capital as he waged war in Rajasthan. In the final years of his life he moved with his army across the Deccan. The setbacks in the north in the 1660s and 1670s convinced him of the need to expand and enrich his empire in the south and to end the defiance of southern rulers.

Aurangzeb's initial attempts to expand his empire in the 1660s and 1670s met with mixed success. In 1660, in the northeast, he began to reclaim territory lost in the war of succession. The capital of Bengal was moved east from Rajmahal to Dacca, and Assam was subdued by 1663. In 1664 Chatgaon, the fortified pirate and slave-raider port on the Bay of Bengal, was captured and renamed Islamabad. In south Bihar he defeated the raja of Palamau in 1661 and annexed his kingdom. He incorporated Chittagong in 1666. In 1679 he went to Ajmer to annex Marwar, a campaign that lasted two and a half years.

In 1667, in the Swat Valley in the northwest, the Yusufzai tribe rose in rebellion, and that revolt was harshly put down, but in 1672 an Afridi chief declared himself king and closed the Khyber Pass. He then surprised and massacred a Mughal army, and destroyed another one the following year. Finally, in 1674, Aurangzeb himself led the imperial army north and, using both a show of force and numerous bribes, restored Mughal authority along the northwest frontier, though at a very high cost. Only lavish and frequent subsidies over the next twenty years kept the Khyber Pass open.



Aurangzeb's Coin. Coin minted during the reign of Aurangzeb in the seventh century. A devoutly conservative Muslim, Aurangzeb was harshly intolerant of Hinduism (he banned many of its religious practices), and this intolerance sparked rebellion among Hindus and other similarly oppressed groups, soon leading to the dissolution of the Mughal empire. NATIONAL MUSEUM / FOTOMEDIA.

Aurangzeb had a strong sense of duty and he was self-restrained, never having more than four wives. He sired ten children, five boys and five girls, half of them with his first wife. He was filled with puritanical Islam zeal. A follower of the Hanafi school of Islamic jurisprudence, he devoted seven years while emperor to memorizing the entire Qur'an. His cold reserve, his simplicity, and his cruel and suspicious nature made him very unpopular, even hated. He ended just over a century of tolerant Mughal policy when in 1679 he reestablished the poll tax (*jizya*) on non-Muslims, which Akbar had abolished in 1564. He forbade the building of Hindu temples, and allowed old ones to be destroyed. This exclusionist and hated policy alienated Hindus and Sikhs and led directly to rebellion by a number of groups. Aurangzeb's ultra-orthodox policies shattered the harmony of India's multicultural polity that had allowed non-Muslims to serve the Mughal dynasty faithfully and honorably. The ultimate decline of the Mughal empire began with Aurangzeb, whose harsh intolerance helped create a strong Hindu nationalism and led to revolts by Marathas, Rajputs, and Sikhs, as well as others farther south. Many conservative Muslims, however, considered him the greatest of the Mughal emperors because of his extreme piety, especially toward the end of his life.

Aurangzeb's imperial army was huge and cumbersome, with thousands of elephants, large numbers of

guns and cavalry, and an enormous number of followers, and could stretch some thirty miles (48 km) from end to end. In order to wage war in the south, Aurangzeb moved his capital to Aurangabad in the Deccan in 1682 and for the most part remained there for the rest of his life. This huge, moving army was highly vulnerable to attack. The great Maratha Hindu leader Shivaji Bhonsla (1627–1680) developed highly successful guerrilla tactics. Shivaji had sacked the Mughal port of Surat in 1664, and it was only after his death that Aurangzeb was able to capture Bijapur (1686) in the west and Golconda (1687) in the east. Yet many of the territories Aurangzeb conquered would soon be lost. The longer the Deccan war went on, the weaker the Mughals became, as the Marathas got stronger. It was said that Aurangzeb “chased his own shadow,” and morale in the Mughal army plummeted.

In the very last phase of his campaign in the south, Aurangzeb personally led his army after every rainy season, and between 1698 and 1707 he captured over a dozen strongholds. He also created two highly mobile field armies, which actively sought out the enemy. Nonetheless, the Marathas continued to attack, capture, and plunder Mughal allies, as in Hyderabad in 1702. This war in the south devastated the economy, and long-distance trade with the north was completely shut down between 1702 and 1704. Aurangzeb’s obsession with the war and his absence from Delhi also enabled the English, Dutch, and French to greatly strengthen their positions at the expense of the Mughals. In many areas of the empire, governors, landlords, and peasants successfully defied imperial laws. The increasing number of revolts by such groups as the Jats around Agra, the Sikhs in the Punjab, and especially the Marathas of the Deccan, were made possible, in part, by the illegal but widespread production of light firearms.

Aurangzeb died, nearly ninety years old, in 1707 and was buried in a modest tomb by the side of a road in Aurangabad. The empire did not long survive his death.

Roger D. Long

See also **Akbar; Babur; Shah Jahan**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Athar Ali, M. *The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997.
 Eraly, Abraham. *The Last Spring: The Lives and Times of the Great Mughals*. New Delhi: Viking, 1997.
 Hintze, Andrea. *The Mughal Empire and Its Decline*. Brookfield, Vt.: Ashgate, 1997.
 Richards, John F. *The Mughal Empire*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1993.

AUROBINDO, SRI (1872–1950), Indian poet and philosopher. Sri Aurobindo was born Aurobindo Ghose. The change in name reflected a profound transformation



Sri Aurobindo. Sri Aurobindo’s belief in higher consciousness as the path to individual perfection, social transformation, and human unity continues to hold sway. TIME LIFE PICTURES/GETTY IMAGES.

in the person: from a poet of patriotism, committed to India’s freedom, to a philosopher-visionary of the New Age, heralding the ultimate stage of human evolution.

Ghose was born on 15 August 1872 in Kolkata to K. D. Ghose, a physician, and Swarnalata Bose, the eldest daughter of Rajnaryan Bose, a nationalist pioneer. Dr. Ghose was an Anglophile: he loved everything Western. When Aurobindo was seven years old, Dr. Ghose took his wife and three sons to England. Aurobindo was educated at St. Paul’s School in London, and graduated from Cambridge University with a first in Classics Tripos, winning all the top prizes the university offered in his field. While attending high school, he developed a passionate interest in the Classical world and its languages, Greek and Latin. Later, he not only mastered these two classical languages, but also learned French, German, Italian, and Spanish in order to read Johann Goethe, Dante Alighieri, and Pedro Calderón in the original texts.

He sat for and passed the Indian Civil Service examination. But he decided not to work for the British government in India. Instead, he accepted an appointment in the Baroda (a princely state, semiautonomous under the Raj) state service in 1893. He spent thirteen years in Baroda and rose to the post of principal of the Baroda State

College (later University). These were years of preparation for the work to be done in the near future. He learned Sanskrit and read the Vedas, the Upanishads, and the epics; he learned Marathi, Gujarati, and brushed up on his native language, Bengali. He married Mrinalini Basu in 1901 according to strict Hindu rites.

The partition of Bengal in 1905 brought Ghose into the public limelight. He went to Kolkata and accepted the post of principal of the newly established National College, later Jadavpur University. He started the Bengali daily *Yugantar* and joined the English daily *Bande Mataram*, edited by Bipin Chandra Pal. He published in the pages of *Bande Mataram* his doctrine of passive resistance and the methods of *swadeshi* (the first major phase of a militant nationalist movement protesting against the British authorities' decision in 1905 to divide the province of Bengal in two parts—one with a Muslim majority, the other Hindu) and boycott. In the 1906 Indian National Congress session held in Kolkata, he declared "complete autonomy free from British control" to be the nationalist agenda, with Bal Gangadhar Tilak as the leader. Ghose was arrested in 1907 for publishing inflammatory articles in *Bande Mataram*. His bold and dignified self-defense prompted Rabindranath Tagore to pen one of his most famous congratulatory poems, which begins, "Aurobindo! Accept the salutations of Rabindra."

Ghose was arrested again in 1908 and he spent a year as an under-trial prisoner. The experience totally transformed him. Nationalism seemed to acquire a deeper, more integral meaning to him. In the English weekly *Karmayogin* and the Bengali weekly *Dharma*, he wrote articles on the transcendental significance of Indian nationalism. In 1910 at the office of the *Karmayogin*, he received word that he would be arrested for sedition. He made a quick decision, took a boat to Chandernagore, a French concession outside Kolkata, and from there to Pondicherry, the French concession in South India, on a French boat under an assumed name. The British attempted to get him out of Pondicherry but failed.

In Pondicherry, Ghose withdrew from political activity altogether. Instead, he devoted himself to yoga, meditation, and intensive study of the sacred texts. His patrons were a French couple, Paul Richard and his wife Mirra Alfassa Richard (later the Mother of the Pondicherry Ashram). With assistance from his French friends, Ghose started to publish the monthly journal *Anyā*, in which he articulated his basic philosophical positions: the divine destiny of humankind, unification of the human race, and the spirit and significance of Indian civilization and culture. Later, these articles appeared in Ghose's magnum opus *The Life Divine*. Soon after, Aurobindo wrote his supreme epic poem *Savitri* in

23,813 lines of blank verse, the longest poem in the English language. It prompted Sir Herbert Read to call the epic poem "great by any standard."

In 1926 Aurobindo retired to complete seclusion. He broke his isolation a few times. In 1928 he met the poet Rabindranath Tagore, who saw Aurobindo's face radiant with inner light. Many others followed Tagore to seek his counsel or urge his intervention in nationalist politics. Aurobindo turned down all requests, pleading that few in the popular platform would understand his ideals and ideas.

Aurobindo in his complex and extensive body of writings privileged consciousness from within over material, economic, and political spheres. His system of yoga empowers the individual to transform life, mind, and body. It is a dynamic of integral cultural consciousness that helps bring about the transformation, and the only power that can transform is the supreme one, above the mind, which he calls "supermind." It will manifest itself in a class of "supermen," the truth-conscious beings. Following Charles Darwin's trajectory to its deterministic future, Aurobindo predicts this to be evolution's ultimate destination for humankind.

Aurobindo had a five-part vision. He wished to see a free and independent India, which he witnessed on his birthday on 15 August 1947. His second vision was the resurgence of Asia, the third a "world union," the fourth the spiritual gift of India to the world, the fifth "a step in evolution which would raise man to a higher and larger consciousness."

On 5 December 1950, Aurobindo left this world. His work was continued by the Mother, and after her death by her successors at the Pondicherry Ashram. Auroville, an international community established on the outskirts of Pondicherry, to this day celebrates Aurobindo's revolutionary utopian vision. His collected works, written in an elegant inimitable prose and verse, have inspired authors and scholars to probe their metaphysical and philosophical wealth. One such scholar, the late Haridas Chaudhuri, founded the Institute of Integral Studies in San Francisco in 1971. It is now a full-scale accredited graduate school with a curriculum modeled on Sri Aurobindo's cultural and East/West integral philosophy.

Dilip K. Basu

See also Tagore, Rabindranath; Tilak, Bal Gangadhar

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Haridas, Chaudhuri. *The Philosophy of Integration*. Pondicherry: Sri Aurobindo Ashram, 1967.
Iyengar, K. R. Srivastava. *Sri Aurobindo: A Biography and a History*. Pondicherry: International Centre, 1985.

Mitra, Sisir Kumar. *Sri Aurobindo*. New Delhi: Orient Paperback, 1976.

AVATĀRAS. See *Vishnu and Avatāras*.

AVATĀRAS OF VISHNU, IMAGES OF In Hinduism, the trinity of gods—Brahmā, Vishnu, and Shiva—are believed to be responsible for creation, preservation, and annihilation of the Universe, respectively. Although Vishnu appears second in the triad, he is very popular because of his identity as the supreme being. In the Vedic period, he was not placed in the foremost rank, but in the post-Vedic period, Vishnu was identified as the supreme God who from time to time descends from heaven, assuming many *avatāras* (incarnations), to put an end to evil and to establish Dharma (religious law).

Incarnations of Vishnu are of three categories: *avatāra*, *āveśa*, and *amśa*. In the *avatāra*, Vishnu incarnates in complete form, whereas in the *āveśa*, he incarnates partially; this can be more or less temporary in nature. The *avatāras* of Rāma and Krishna are “complete,” whereas the incarnation of Parashurama is only partial. In *Amsa*, by order of Vishnu, his attributes and aspects are occasionally born on Earth in the form of saintly beings to improve the lives of ordinary human beings.

The Purāṇas (ancient texts) enumerate ten to twenty *avatāras*, of which ten are major: Matsya (fish), Kūrma (tortoise), Varāha (boar), Narasimha (man-lion), Vāmana (dwarf), Parashurāma, Rāma, Balarāma, Krishna, and Kalki. There are three different versions concerning the eighth and ninth incarnations. According to the first tradition (Mahābhārata, Sāntiparvan, and the Bhāgavata Purāṇa), Balarāma and Krishna are accepted as the eighth and ninth incarnations. The second tradition (Bhāgavata Purāṇa and the Matsya Purāṇa) treats the eighth and ninth as Krishna and the Buddha. The third tradition (Agni Purāṇa) regards Balarāma and the Buddha as the eighth and ninth incarnations. Chronologically, this belief is of later origin. The second tradition, which regards Krishna and the Buddha as the eighth and ninth incarnations, came into vogue only after the Buddha was adopted as an *avatāra* of Vishnu, dropping Balarāma, who then was recognized as an *avatāra* of Sesha rather than Vishnu.

Matsya Avatāra

Matsya, the first of the ten *avatāras* of Vishnu, originated from the ancient flood legends. The earliest account of this myth is found in the Shatapatha Brāhmaṇa, which does not, however, mention Matsya, the fish, as an *avatāra* of any god. All that the fish did was to save Manu,



Narasimha. Massive stone sculpture from Hampi depicting the fourth avatar of Vishnu, the all-powerful Narasimha (half-man, half-lion) sent to slay the errant ruler Hiranyakashipu. Regardless of what form his manifestation takes, Vishnu's pervasiveness in Indian culture is never far from mind. K. L. KAMAT / KAMAT'S POTPOURRI.

the first man of Hindu mythology, from the flood, thereby helping him to become the progenitor of the human race. The epic Mahābhārata notes that Prajāpati assumed the form of a fish, whereas later Purāṇas speak of the fish as an *avatāra* of Vishnu, who saved Manu from floods.

As Manu was performing his rites in the river, a small fish fell into his folded hands. Manu first put it into a jar, then into a lake, and later into the sea because the fish grew so rapidly. Then the fish (Matsya) warned Manu of the coming deluge, which was to take place on the seventh day because the demon Hayagrīva had stolen the Vedas. Matsya instructed Manu to gather various seeds of creation and to enter a boat that would be waiting for him on the appointed day, along with the seven Rishis (Sages). On that day Manu entered the boat and tied it to a large fish that had one stupendous horn. This fish revealed himself to Manu as Vishnu, who later killed Hayagrīva and recovered the Vedas.

Iconography and images. The Matsya Purāṇa and Agni Purāṇa, Abhilashitārthachinthāmani, Rūpamandana, Shilparatna and Shilparatnākara prescribe the iconographic features of Matsya Avatāra in natural fish form. The Vishnudharmottara is the only text that describes it as horned fish. In the Meru Tantra, Śrītattvanidhi, and Chaturvargachintāmani (compendium), the image is described as only partly zoomorphic. The upper part of the body is represented as that of Vishnu with his usual attributes, and the lower part is that of a fish.

No independent shrine of this *avatāra* has yet been found in India. But images of a fish with one or two attributes of Vishnu are rarely represented in the Dasavatāra (ten avatars) panels in the temples and in the *prabhavalis* (arches) of sculptural images of Vishnu. The zooanthropomorphic images of Matsya Avatāra are found on the pillars of all Vishnu temples.

Kūrmavatāra

The earliest reference to this *avatāra* is found in the Satapatha Brāhmaṇa, which indicates that Kūrma, the tortoise, was an incarnation of Prajāpati. But several Purāṇas, including Vishnu, Bhāgavata, and Agni, proclaim Kūrma as an *avatāra* of Vishnu. According to them, Vishnu assumed the form of a tortoise to support the sinking Mandara Mountain at the time of the churning of the milky ocean to obtain ambrosia for the gods, so that they could retrieve their glory and power, which had been taken away by demons.

Iconography and images. The Purāṇas (Matsya, Agni, and Vishnudharmottara) and the Shilpa Shāstras (Rūpamandana Abhilashitārthachinthāmani and Shilparatna) describe Kūrma in zoomorphic form. The Śrītattvanidhi describes it as half tortoise and half man, with two hands, the right hand holding a *gada* (throne), the left hand with a *chakra* (wheel).

There are very few shrines for Kūrmavatāra. However, the images of Kūrma, in both forms, are found in the Dashavatāra panels and in the *prabhavalis* of Vishnu dating to the medieval period.

Varāha Avatāra

The Varāha (wild boar) myth, which originated in the Vedic period, gradually developed in different phases over time and took final shape in the Puranic period. The myth of Varāha as the uplifter of the earth developed in two stages. The first stage, a long period from the Vedas to the Purāṇas, accepted the boar as the creator of Earth. According to Vedic tradition, the creator Prajāpati assumed the form of a boar to bring the earth from the waters; the cosmogonical section of the Purāṇas states

that Lord Nārāyaṇa, in his role of Brahmā, assumed the form of a boar to raise the earth.

The earliest reference to the boar called Emusha Varāha is found in the Rig Veda. The earliest reference to Varāha's association with goddess Earth is found in Bhūmi Sūkta of the Atharva Veda. The Samhitās and Brāhmaṇas identify Emusha Varāha with the creator Prajāpati, who brought up soil exactly the size of his snout. This soil became the earth.

In the second stage, the myth of Varāha was transformed into the *avatāra* cycle of Vishnu. According to Puranic legend, while Brahmā was engaged in the process of creation, the earth had merged in the Garbhodaka Ocean. Brahmā wondered how he could lift the earth out of the waters. In the meantime, a small boar, no larger than the upper portion of a thumb, emerged from his nostril. It quickly became gigantic, making a roaring sound as it ascended into the sky. The denizens of different *lokas* (the worlds above and below earth), realizing that the boar was not only a form of Vishnu but also a form of divine speech (Vāk), started chanting auspicious verses from the Vedas. The boar, smelling the earth, which had been hidden by the demon Hiranyāksha, entered the ocean, killed Hiranyāksha, then lifted the earth on his tusk and brought it to the surface.

Iconography and images. The Vaikhānasāgama prescribes the iconography of Varāha in three forms: Adivarāha, Nrvarāha, or Bhūvarāha; Yajnavarāha; and Pralayavarāha. In the forms of Bhūvarāha, Yajnavarāha, and Pralayavarāha, the image is depicted with a boar's head and a human body. While the image of Bhūvarāha is shown standing in the *ālīdhāsana* pose, resting his right leg on the hoods of the cosmic snake Sesha, the other two forms of Varāha are shown seated in *lalitāsana* (sitting posture in which one leg is folded and the other is hanging and resting on the ground) on a *simbasana* (lion throne). An Earth Goddess figure is shown in the right hand of Bhūvarāha. In the Yajnavaraha form, both Lakshmi (Goddess of Wealth) and Bhūdevī (Earth Goddess) are represented. In the case of Pralaya Varāha, Bhūdevī alone is shown.

The Purāṇas, Vayu, Matsya, Vishnu, Bhāgavata, Brahmānda and Brahmā compare each and every limb of Adivarāha with various components of Yajña in the light of Vedic cosmogony. They, therefore, call it Yajnavarāha and this is purely in animal form. The Purāṇas describe the images of Nrvarāha and Bhūvarāha. They do not describe the iconography of Pralayavarāha and Yajnavaraha mentioned in the Vaikhānasāgama.

The images of Bhūvarāha are found in different parts of India. The earliest image of a colossal and majestic Bhūvarāha, datable to the fifth century A.D., of the Gupta

period, can still be seen in cave number five, popularly known as the Varāha court, on the hill of Udayagiri, nearly 3 miles (5 km) southwest of Besnagar in the district of Vidisha in Madhya Pradesh. The whole panel on the wall depicts the legend of the Varāha *avatāra* in great detail. Depicted with a human body but the head of a boar, and standing in *ālīdhāsana* pose, his left foot rests on the thirteen-hooded cosmic serpent, and his right foot is on the body of Kūrma. His right hand rests on his hip and his left hand is on his knee. Bhūdevī is shown seated on his left shoulder, holding his right tusk with her right hand.

The earliest image of Yajñavarāha in zoomorphic form, belonging to the Gupta period, is still standing majestically in Eran in the Vidisha district of Madhya Pradesh. The colossal image, measuring nearly 14 feet (4.2 m) long, 6 feet (1.8 m) wide, and 12 feet (3.6 m) high, is depicted with Bhūdevī, who is shown hanging from the right tusk. The huge body, with a long and wide vertebral column, is meticulously carved with 1,185 figures of sages in twelve rows. On the snout, a striking figure of the two-armed Vāk is shown, standing in *samabhanga* position, keeping her hands at her sides. This is the only form of Varāha that includes the figure of Vāk. In later years, when Vāk was merged with Sarasvatī, she came to be depicted in the form of seated Sarasvatī, with Vina in her hands, on the snout of Varāha. The depiction of Vāk on the snout of Varāha, which began in the fifth century A.D. in the Gupta period, continued into the periods of the Pratiharas, Chandellas, and Paramaras, until the fourteenth century in Madhya Pradesh. A few images of Yajñavarāha have been found in Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Rajasthan, but none earlier than the twelfth century. A rare depiction of Yajñavarāha, measuring nearly 6 feet (1.8 m) long, 2 feet (.6 m) wide, and about 4 feet (1.2 m) high, datable to the eighth century and the Pratihara dynasty, from Badoh-Pathari in Vidisha, is preserved in the Gurjaramahal Museum of Gwalior in Madhya Pradesh. Starting from the vertebral column of Varāha, the entire body is carved with figures of various creations in nine rows, indicating four aspects of the Supreme God. A fine Chandella specimen of Yajñavarāha, datable to the tenth century, still stands majestically in the Varāha shrine at Khajuraho, in Madhya Pradesh. It is nearly 9 feet (2.8 m) long and 6 feet (1.8 m) high, carved with 689 figures in eleven rows. In this image the symbolic representations of various components of Yajña (sacrifice) in the form of gods and goddesses proclaim Yajñavarāha as the supreme creator and the depiction on the vertebral column reveals three important factors: pure creation; emanations of Vyūha (concept of Vaishnavism); and synchronization of the emanations with the trinity of Gods of the Purāṇas. Among the *avatāras*, Varāha *avatāra* is the only one assumed by Vishnu for the purpose of creation.

Narasimha *Avatāra*

The incarnation of Narasimha (lion's face with human body) constitutes the transition from the stage of beast to the human form. The earliest reference to this *avatāra* is found in the epic Mahābhārata, which informs us that in order to protect the Devas (gods) and the people, Lord Madhusudana took the *avatāra* of Narasimha. The myth of this *avatāra* is described in the Harivamsa. The demon Hiranyakasipu obtained a boon from Brahmā, according to which he could be killed by no gods, no Asuras (demons), no Rishis (sages), no *astras* (weapons), no dry or wet object. He could be killed neither in heaven nor on earth and neither by night nor by day. He could be killed with only one stroke of the hand. Once he was granted the boon, he became a terror to gods. Hence, answering the prayer of Brahmā to rescue them, Vishnu assumed the form of Narasimha and killed the demon by tearing off his chest with his long, sharp nails. However, the Purāṇas, including the Kūrma, the Padma, the Vishnu, and the Bhāgavata, narrate the myth differently. The most popular form of the myth relates that, in answer to the prayer of Prahlada, son of Hiranyakasipu, Vishnu emerged out of a pillar in the form of a man-lion (lion's face with human body) and killed the demon with his nails.

Iconography and images. The image of Narasimha is described in two forms: Girija Narasimha, or Kevala Narasimha, or Yoga Narasimha; and Sthauna Narasimha. In the first form, the deity is shown in the form of a lion coming out of a mountain cave. In the second, the deity is shown emerging from a pillar. Images of Narasimha are found in both standing and seated postures. A sixth-century image of Narasimha, with mane hanging to the shoulders and a fierce face with a lolling tongue, is found in the Varāha temple in Kadvar in Gujarat. He is seated, resting his right bent leg on the back of Prahlada, and his two human hands are shown tearing off the belly of the demon. There are innumerable images of Narasimha found throughout India, and several temples are dedicated to him.

Vāmana *Avatāra*

Vāmana-Trivikrama, the fifth incarnation of Vishnu, occupies a very significant place in the evolution of Vaishnavism. In this *avatāra*, Vishnu reveals himself in human form in two sizes, dwarf and gigantic. The Vāmana myth had its origin in the Rig Veda, which refers not only to the three steps of the solar deity Vishnu, but also to the two forms, that of a young dwarf and that of a giant. The earliest legend of this *avatāra* is found in the Shatapatha Brāhmaṇa. The Purāṇas narrate that Bali, the grandson of Prahlada, through his penances acquired enough strength to vanquish the gods, including Indra.

So Vishnu, who was born to Indra's mother, Aditi, went to Bali at the time of sacrifice and asked him to give the gift of as much space as could be measured by his three footsteps. Bali confirmed it by the ceremonial pouring of water, in spite of warnings by his guru, Sukracharya. At once Vishnu, as Vāmana, assumed a gigantic form and encompassed Prithvi (Mother Earth) with one step and *svarga* (heaven) with the second step; he lifted his foot as high as Satva loka (upper region), where Brahmā worshiped the foot. The third step he kept on the head of Bali and sent him to Patala loka (Nether region).

Iconography and images. The iconography of Vāmana and Trivikrama is given in the various Shilpa Shāstras. The Vaikhānasāgama classifies the images of Trivikrama into three categories, based on the level to which the foot is raised. The Naishadhīyacharita, in its description of the Trivikrama image, says that the raised foot of Trivikrama is shown as touching the image of Rāhu, who is holding the foot of the deity like a shoe. The black Rāhu, with a severed head, is compared to the shoe. A fine specimen of this description is found in a niche in the Sūrya Kunda, opposite the Sun Temple at Modhera, in Mehsana district, Gujarat. A similar representation exists in the Ghanadvara Harihara Temple at Osia in Rajasthan. There are a few temples dedicated to Vāmana and Trivikrama.

Parashurāma Avatāra

In this *avatāra*, Vishnu incarnates as the son of Jamadagni and Renuka to suppress the haughtiness of the Kshatriyas. Parashurāma (Rāma with an ax) possessed divine power for only a short time. Hence his *avatāra* is considered to be *avesa*. Parashurāma is also called Bhargava and Jamadagneya. The legend of this *avatāra* is found in the Mahābhārata, Agni Purāṇa, Vishnu Purāṇa and Bhāgavata Purāṇa.

Iconography and images. The image of Parashurāma is described in every Shilpa Shāstra as holding a bow, an arrow, a sword, and a battle-ax. Kerala is known as Parashurāma *kshetra* (country). His images are represented in the Dasāvatāra panels.

Rāma Avatāra

Among the *avatāras*, Rāma and Krishna are considered to be *sampoorna* (complete). Rāma, the son of King Dasharatha of Ayodhya, was first regarded as an ideal person, a hero. It was only later that he was deified. The legend of Rāma is given in seven *kandas* (sections) in the epic poem Rāmāyaṇa, written by Valmiki. The main purpose of this *avatāra* was to establish Dharma in the universe. Valmiki relates the legend, in which Rāma forsakes the throne and goes to the forest to fulfill the promise

given by his father to his stepmother Kaikeyi. His wife Sītā is abducted by the demon Ravana, and eventually Rāma battles Ravana, defeating and killing the demon. Thus the legend emphasizes the triumph of right over wrong, and of virtue over vice.

Iconography and images. The iconography of Rāma is given in the various Purāṇas and Shilpa Shāstras. He is always represented holding a bow and arrow. The story of Rāma has universal appeal and has been told in almost every language. There are innumerable temples dedicated to Rāma. In these temples, the image of the standing Rāma is accompanied by his wife Sītā to his left and his brother Lakshmaṇa to his right.

Balarāma Avatāra

Balarāma is known as Baladeva, Balabhadra, and Samkarshana in the Shilpa texts. He is the elder brother of Krishna. In the Harivamsha, Balarāma is described as the manifestation of Ananta, the cosmic Sesha. The Bhāgavata Purāṇa narrates that in the womb of Devaki a part of the luster of Lord Vishnu, known as Ananta, entered as the seventh child. Then, under the command of Vishnu, Yogamaya transferred Ananta from the womb of Devaki to that of Rohini, the second wife of Vasudeva at Gokul. Because of such transfer, the child came to be known as Samkarshana. He was called Bala as he would be the mightiest of men, and Rāma as he would give delight to the world. In the Mahābhārata he is called the plowman, Langalin, or Halayudhadeva.

Iconography and images. The various Purāṇas and Shilpa Shāstras describe Balarāma as holding a *bala* (plow) and a *musala* (pestle). The images of Balarāma are very rare. They are generally shown in the Dasāvatāra panels in the *prabhavali* of Vishnu.

Krishna Avatāra

Krishna *avatāra* is also considered to be the *sampoorna avatāra* of Vishnu. However, in Gujarat, Krishna is regarded as the incarnator, rather than as an incarnation. The legend of Krishna is enumerated in the Vishnu Purāṇa, the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, and the Brahmavaivarta Purāṇa. The Vishnu Purāṇa narrates that in order to relieve the earth of the burden of demonic *asuras*, Vishnu incarnated himself in the eighth conception of Devaki, and at his command Yogamaya was born to Yasoda, the wife of Nanda at Gokul. Devaki was the cousin of King Kamsa, who had imprisoned her and her husband Vasudeva, fearing the prophecy that he would be killed by their eighth child. He killed all six children of Devaki as soon as she gave birth to them. The seventh child, however, was Balarāma, and the eighth was Krishna, who was taken away to Gokul, where he was exchanged with the female child of

Yasoda, to whom Yogamāya was born as a baby girl, as ordained by Vishnu. When the baby girl was thrown upon the floor by Kamsa, it sprang up high and, after warning Kamsa that his destroyer was already born, disappeared. Krishna was so called because of his dark complexion. His many childhood pranks are described in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa. Krishna plays a major role in the Mahābhārata war, helping the Pandavas to win over their Kaurava cousins, who had denied them justice. The Bhagavad Gītā, which is the dialogue between Arjuna and Krishna at the battleground of Kurukshetra, speaks of the relationship between Jeevatma (man's soul) and Paramatma (god).

Iconography and images. The Vaikhanasagama, Agni Purāṇa, Visnudharmottara, and Chaturvargachintamani all describe Krishna. The most popular image of Krishna is that in which he holds a flute in his two hands. He is also depicted in the form of a child. He is then called Balakrishna. There are innumerable temples dedicated to Krishna throughout India.

Kalki Avatāra

Kalki is treated as the last *avatāra* of Vishnu. He is predicted to appear on a white horse toward the end of the Kaliyuga (the current "Black Age"). The Purāṇas (the Vishnu, Agni, and Bhāgavata) narrate that a portion of the divine being will be born as Kalki in the family of one Vishnu Yasas, an eminent Brahman of Sambala village, and will be endowed with eight superhuman powers. He will put an end to wrong and will establish Dharma. According to the Vaikhanasagama, Kalki should be depicted with the face of a horse and the body of a man, with four hands holding *shankha* (mace), *chakra* (wheel), *khadga* (sword), and *khetaka* (shield).

Images of Vishnu

In addition to the images of the *avatāras* of Vishnu, the Shilpa Shāstras provide detailed descriptions of the image of Vishnu himself, shown in standing, sitting, and reclining positions. In the first two postures, Vishnu's images are described as having from two to twenty hands, with a single face or four faces. The four-armed images of Vishnu with a single face are prescribed with twenty-four specific names chosen from the Vishnusahasranama. Though the images are alike, the order in which the attributes of *shankha* (mace), *chakra* (wheel), *gada* (throne), and *padma* (lotus) are placed differs according to the nomenclature. The four-faced Vishnu with eight and ten hands is called Vaikuntha Chaturmurti (four-faced), twelve- and fourteen-armed is Ananta, sixteen-armed is Trailokyamohana, and twenty-armed is called Vishvarupa. The Shilpa Shāstras do not describe an eighteen-armed Vishnu. In the reclining position, Vishnu is represented lying on the coil bed of Seshanaga.

Avatāra (earthly incarnation) is the instrument through which Vishnu fulfills his function of protecting the universe and Dharma.

Haripriya Rangarajan

See also **Krishna in Indian Art**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Agni Purāṇa*. Anandashrama Sanskrit Series. 1900. Edited and translated by Shastri Manmatha Nath Dutt. Varanasi: Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1967.
- Bhāgavata Purāṇa*. Edited and translated by G. P. Bhatt and J. L. Shastri. New Delhi: Ancient Indian Tradition and Mythology Series, 1976–1978.
- Brāhmaṇḍa Purāṇa*. Edited and translated by J. L. Shastri. 1936. Reprint, New Delhi: Ancient Indian Tradition and Mythology, 1983.
- Brāhma Purāṇa*. Edited and translated by G. P. Bhatt. New Delhi: Ancient Indian Tradition and Mythology, 1985.
- Brāhmavaivarttha Purāṇa*. Mumbai: Venkateshvara Press, 1910.
- Harivamsa*. Edited by Vaidya Parasurama Bhandarkar. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1969.
- Kūrma Purāṇa*. Mumbai: Venkateshvara Press, 1927.
- Mahābhārata*. Book XII: *Shantiparvan*. Edited by S. K. Belvalkar. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1949–1951.
- Matsya Purāṇa*. Mumbai: Venkateshvara Press, 1913.
- Padma Purāṇa*. Mumbai: Venkateshvara Press, 1867.
- Vāyu Purāṇa*. Edited by G. P. Bhatt. New Delhi: Ancient Indian Tradition and Mythology Series, 1987.
- Visnudharmottara*. Edited by Stella Kramrisch. Kolkata: Calcutta University Press, 1928.
- Vishnu Purāṇa*. Translated by H. H. Wilson. Kolkata: Punthi Pustak, 1961.

SECONDARY SOURCES

- Rangarajan, Haripriya. *Spread of Vaishnavism in Gujarat up to 1600 A.D.: A Study with Special Reference to the Iconic Forms of Vishnu*. Mumbai: Somaiya, 1990.
- . *Varaha Images in Madhya Pradesh: An Iconographic Study*. Mumbai: Somaiya, 1997.

AYODHYA Called the city of temples, Ayodhya is considered in Hindu tradition to be one of the seven most important cities of Hindu India. In its long and contentious history, however, the city has been home not only to Shaivism and Vaishnavism sects of Hinduism but also to Buddhism, Jainism, and Islam. Ayodhya covers a little over 4 square miles (about 10 sq. km) in area; at the 1991 census, it had a population of 40,642 (more recent population estimates put the number at a little over 50,000). Ayodhya is well connected by bus and rail, but the nearest airports are in Amausi, Bumrauli, and Babatpur, at a distance of about 93 miles (150 km). Situated on the banks of the Ghagra or Saryu River in the Faizabad district of Uttar Pradesh, the heartland of Hinduism, Ayodhya's importance in Hindu tradition is the belief

that the city is the birthplace of Lord Rāma, the seventh incarnation of Lord Vishnu, one of the Hindu trinity.

According to Hindu legend, the mythic man Manu founded Ayodhya, as recorded in the Hindu epic Rāmāyaṇa. Later, it became the capital of the Suryavanshi (Sun) dynasty, of which Lord Rāma is the most celebrated king. References to Ayodhya are also contained in the Atharva Veda. Jain traditions claim that five Tirthankaras (Jain equivalents of Hindu gods) were born at Ayodhya. The city is also believed to have served as the capital of the ancient Kosala kingdom, a sixth-century tribal oligarchy and rival to the mighty Magadha kingdom based in modern Bihar in the east (mentioned in the Buddhist sources), as well as of medieval Awadh, or Oudh.

Ramkot, in the western corner of the city, is the most sacred site of worship, attracting Hindu pilgrims throughout the year, but particularly on Rām Navami, the birth anniversary of Lord Rāma, which falls in the Hindu month of Chaitra (March–April), when as many as 500,000 pilgrims descend on the city. Other important religious sites include Hanuman Garhi in the center of the city, Nageswararnath Temple, a Shaivite temple, and Rām Janmabhumi, the site of Lord Rāma's birth, where a small Rām temple stood alongside the now demolished Babri Masjid, built in the sixteenth century by Mir Baqi, commander of the Mughal emperor Babur. Hindu extremists destroyed the mosque in 1992, maintaining that it was built on the ruins of an earlier temple of Rāma, the most revered deity in the Hindu pantheon. After the demolition of the temple, which was politically manipulated by the right-wing Bharatiya Janata Party, there ensued a series of Hindu-Muslim riots throughout India, belying Ayodhya's very essence as a place of peace.

In 1993 the Indian History Congress voted overwhelmingly against destruction of monuments on the grounds that a religious structure of another community once stood in its place. Such postfacto rationalization, the historical body concluded, would set a dangerous precedent for religious structures throughout the subcontinent and would fan the fires of communal violence in cities like Mathura, the birthplace of Lord Krishna, and Varanasi, where hundreds of temples and mosques stand side by side.

Ravi Kalia

See also **Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP); Hindutva and Politics**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Elst, Koenraad. *Ayodhya: The Case against the Temple*. New Delhi: Voice of India, 2002.
 Sharma, Arvind, ed. *Hinduism and Secularism: After Ayodhya*. New York: Palgrave, 2001.

ĀYURVEDA Āyurveda, the Vedic system of medicine, views health as harmony between body, mind, and spirit. Its two most famous texts belong to the schools of Charaka and Sushruta. According to Charaka, health and disease are not predetermined, and life may be prolonged by human effort. Sushruta defines the purpose of medicine as curing the diseases of the sick, protecting the healthy, and prolonging life. The beginnings of medicine may be traced to the Rig Veda, since it speaks of the *bhishaj*, or physician, in connection with setting a broken bone. From other references the *bhishaj* or *vaidya* emerges as a healer of disease and an expert in herbs. The twin gods Āshvins are particularly associated with the healing of blindness, lameness, and leprosy. Soma is another healing deity.

According to the Charaka tradition, there existed six schools of medicine, founded by the disciples of the sage Punarvasu Ātreya. Each of these disciples—Agnivesha, Bhela, Jatūkarna, Parāshara, Hārīta, and Kshārāpāni—composed a *Sambitā*. Of these, the one composed by Agnivesha was supposed to be the best. The *Agnivesha Sambitā* was later revised by Charaka, and it came to be known as *Charaka Sambitā*. Āyurveda is traditionally divided into eight branches which, in Charaka's scheme, are: *sūtra-sthāna*, general principles; *nidāna-sthāna*, pathology; *vimāna-sthāna*, diagnostics; *śharīra-sthāna*, physiology and anatomy; *indriya-sthāna*, prognosis; *chikitsā-sthāna*, therapeutics; *kalpa-sthāna*, pharmaceuticals; and *siddhi-sthāna*, successful treatment.

In the Charaka school, the first teacher was Bhāradvāja. In the Sushruta school, the first person to expound Āyurvedic knowledge was Dhanvantari, who then taught it to Divodāsa. The *Charaka* and *Sushruta Sambitās* are compendiums of two traditions, rather than texts authored by single authors. A third tradition is that of the Kāshyapas. The beginnings of these traditions must go back to the second millennium B.C., if not earlier, because of the parallel information obtained in the Vedic *Sambitās* and the description in the *Mahābhārata*. There is much that is common in the texts, except that the *Sushruta Sambitā* is richer in the field of surgery. Part of the original *Charaka Sambitā* is lost, and the current version has several chapters by the Kashmiri scholar Dridhabala.

An attempt to reconcile the texts of Charaka and Sushruta was made by Vāgbhata the Elder in the second century B.C. in his *Ashtāṅga Sangraha*. The works of Charaka, Sushruta, and the Elder Vāgbhata are considered canonical and are reverentially called the Vriddha Trayi, "the triad of ancients." Later, Vāgbhata the Younger wrote the *Ashtāṅga Hridaya Sambitā*, which is a lucid presentation of the Āyurveda giving due place to the surgical techniques of Sushruta. In the eighth century, Mādhav wrote his *Nidāna*.

The Principal Ideas

The idea that breath (*prāna*) is central to health occurs very early in the Vedic literature. In Āyurveda, which is one of the secondary sciences associated with the Atharva Veda, health is seen as balance of the three *doshas*, or primary forces of *prāna* or *vāta* (air), *agni* or *pitta* (fire), and soma or *kapha* (water). *Vāta* was taken to represent the principle of motion, development in general, and the functions of the nervous system in particular. *Pitta* signifies the function of metabolism, including digestion and the formation of blood, and various secretions and excretions that are either the means or the end product of body processes. *Kapha* represents functions of cooling, preservation, and heat regulation. The imbalance of these elements leads to illness. The predominance of one or the other *dosha* leads not only to different physiological but also to different psychological types. Just as the body mirrors the entire universe in a recursive fashion, the three *doshas* are defined recursively within the body.

Each of the *doshas* is recognized to be of five kinds. *Vāta* appears as *prāna* (governing respiration), *udāna* (for uttering sounds and speaking), *samāna* (for separating the digested juice), *vyāna* (carrying fluids including blood to all parts of the body), and *apāna* (expelling waste products). *Pitta* appears as *pāchaka* (digest and impart heat), *ranjaka* (impart redness to the chyle and blood), *sādhaka* (increase the power of the brain), *ālochaka* (strengthen vision), and *bhrājaka* (improve complexion). *Kapha* appears as *kledaka* (moisten food), *avalambaka* (impart energy and strength), *bodhaka* (enable tasting), *tarpaka* (govern the eye and other sensory organs), and *shleshma* (act as lubricant).

Every substance (animal, vegetable, or mineral) is a *dravya* with the following properties in different proportions: *rasa*, *guna*, *vīrya*, *vipāka*, and *prabhāva*. The *gunas* are qualities such as heat, cold, heaviness, and lightness, in a total of twenty types. Of the twenty *gunas*, heat (*ushna*) and cold (*shīta*) are the most prominent. *Vīrya* is generative energy that may also be hot or cold.

Vipāka may be understood as the biochemical transformation of food, whereas *prabhāva* is the subtle effect of the substance on the body. Food is converted into *rasa* by the digestive action of *jātharāgni*, or the fire in the stomach. *Rasas* are six in number: *madhura*, *āmla*, *lavana*, *tikta*, *katu*, and *kashāya*. Each *rasa*—which is recognized by taste—is a result of the predominance of two elements. Knowledge of the *rasas* is important in therapeutics.

The five elements in various proportions are said to form seven kinds of tissue (*dhātu*). These are: *rasa* (plasma), *rakta* (blood), *māmsa* (flesh), *medas* (fat), *asthi* (bone), *majjā* (marrow), and *shukra* (semen). The activity of the *dhātu* is represented by *ojas* (vitality) or *bala*

(strength). *Ojas* is mediated through an oily, white fluid that permeates the whole body. The functions of the vital organs like the heart, brain, spleen, and liver are explained on the basis of the flow and exchange of tissues. The heart is considered the chief receptacle of the three chief fluids of the body: *rasa*, *rakta*, and *ojas*.

The body has 107 vital points or *marmas*, which are points of vulnerability where important vessels, nerves, muscles, and organs are situated.

Physiological References in the Vedic Texts

The Garbha Upanishad describes the body as consisting of five elements (with further groups of five as in the *Sāṅkhya* system of philosophy), supported on six (the sweet, sour, salt, bitter, acid, and harsh juices of food), endowed with six qualities, made up of seven tissues, three *doshas*, and twice-begotten (through father and mother). It further adds that the head has four skull bones, with sixteen sockets on each side. It says that the body has 107 joints, 180 sutures, 900 sinews, 700 veins, 500 muscles, 360 bones, and 45 million hairs.

In Chhandogya Upanishad, organisms are divided into three classes based on their origin: born alive (from a womb), born from an egg, and born from a germ.

Training a Vaidya

The Āyurvedic physician was trained in eight branches of medicine: *kāyāchikitsā* (internal medicine), *shalyachikitsā* (surgery, including anatomy), *shālākya-chikitsā* (eye, ear, nose, and throat diseases), *kaumārabbritya* (pediatrics), *bhūtavidyā* (psychiatry, or demonology), *agada tantra* (toxicology), *rasāyana* (science of rejuvenation), and *vājīkarana* (the science of fertility).

Apart from learning these, the student of Āyurveda was expected to know ten arts that were indispensable in the preparation and application of medicines: distillation, operative skills, cooking, horticulture, metallurgy, sugar manufacture, pharmacy, analysis and separation of minerals, compounding of metals, and preparation of alkalis. The teaching of various subjects was done during the instruction of relevant clinical subjects. For example, teaching of anatomy was a part of the teaching of surgery, embryology was a part of training in pediatrics and obstetrics, and the knowledge of physiology and pathology was interwoven in the teaching of all the clinical disciplines.

The initiation ceremony of the Charaka physician was called *upanayana*, and it involved the teacher leading the student three times around the sacred fire. This ceremony made the student thrice-born (*trija*), distinguished from the twice-born (*dvija*) nonphysicians.



Ayurvedic Massage. In the late twentieth century, Ayurvedic practices became increasingly popular in the West. Ayurvedic massage, shown here, is believed to enhance circulation and help the body naturally expel toxins. AMIT PASRICHA.

At the closing of the initiation, the guru gave a solemn address to the students in which the guru directed the students to a life of chastity, honesty, and vegetarianism. The student was to strive with all his being for the health of the sick. He was not to betray patients for his own advantage. He was to dress modestly and avoid strong drink. He was to be collected and self-controlled, measured in speech at all times. He was to constantly improve his knowledge and technical skill. In the home of the patient he was to be courteous and modest, directing all attention to the patient's welfare. He was not to divulge any knowledge about the patient and his family. If the patient was incurable, he was to keep this to himself if it was likely to harm the patient or others.

The normal length of the student's training appears to have been seven years. Before graduation, the student was to pass a test. But the physician was to continue to learn through texts, direct observation (*pratyaksha*), and through inference (*anumāna*). In addition, the *vaidyas* attended meetings where knowledge was exchanged. The doctors were also enjoined to gain knowledge of unusual remedies from herdsmen and forest-dwellers. The *vaidya* was assisted by nurses (*parichāraka*). Sushruta describes

the ideal nurse as devoted, friendly, watchful, not inclined to disgust, and knowledgeable.

There is reference to free hospitals in ancient India. They were called Bhaishajya Griha, Ārogya Shālā, or Chikitsā Shālā. The best account of the workings of such a free hospital has come down to us from the Indianized Khmer kingdom of Cambodia.

Dissection and Surgery

Sushruta laid great emphasis on direct observation and learning through dissection (*avagharshana*). Sushruta classified surgical operations into eight categories: incision (*chhedana*), excision (*bhedana*), scarification (*lekhana*), puncturing (*vedhana*), probing (*eshana*), extraction (*āharana*), evacuation and drainage (*visbrāvana*), and suturing (*sīvana*). Sushruta lists 101 blunt and 20 sharp instruments that were used in surgery—instructing that these should be made of steel and kept in a portable case with a separate compartment for each instrument—and describes fourteen types of bandages. Surgical operations on all parts of the body were described, including laparotomy, craniotomy, cesarian section, plastic repair of the torn ear lobe,

cheiloplasty, rhinoplasty, excision of cataract, tonsillectomy, excision of laryngeal polyps, excision of anal fistule, repair of hernias and prolapse of rectum, lithotomy, amputation of bones, and many neurosurgical procedures.

Medications were used for preoperative preparation, and medicated oils were used for the dressing of wounds. Ice, caustics, and cautery were used for hemostasis. Medicated wines were used before and after surgery to assuage pain. A drug called *sammobini* was used to make the patient unconscious before a major operation; another drug, *sanjivani*, was employed to resuscitate the patient after operation or shock.

Diagnosis

It was enjoined that diagnosis be made using all five senses together with interrogation. The diagnosis was based on: cause (*nidāna*); premonitory indications (*pūrvārūpa*); symptoms (*rūpa*); therapeutic tests (*upashaya*); and the natural course of development of the disease (*samprāpti*). Sushruta declares that the physician (*bhishaj*), the drug (*dravya*), the nurse (*parichāraka*), and the patient (*rogī*) are the four pillars on which rest the success of the treatment.

Different methods of treatment, based on the diagnosis of the patient, were outlined. The drugs were classified into 75 types according to their therapeutic effect. For successful treatment, the following ten factors were to be kept in mind: the organism (*śarīra*); its maintenance (*vritti*); the cause of disease (*hetu*); the nature of disease (*vyādhī*); action or treatment (*karma*); effects or results (*kārya*); time (*kāla*); the agent or the physician (*kartā*); the means and instruments (*karana*); and the decision on the line of treatment (*vidhi vinishchaya*).

Sushruta considers the head as the center of the senses and describes cranial nerves associated with specific sensory function. Based on the derangement of the *doshas*, he classifies a total of 1,120 diseases. Charaka, on the other hand, considers the diseases to be innumerable. The *dosha*-type diseases are called *nija*, whereas those with an external basis are called *āgantuka*. The microbial origin of disease and the infective nature of diseases such as fevers, leprosy, and tuberculosis was known. According to Sushruta, all forms of leprosy, some other skin conditions, tuberculosis, ophthalmic and epidemic diseases are borne by air and water and may be transmitted from one person to another. These diseases are not only due to the derangement of *vāta*, *pitta*, and *kapha*, but are also of parasitic origin. He adds: "There are fine organisms that circulate in the blood and are invisible to the naked eye which give rise to many diseases."

One of the most impressive innovations arising out of later Āyurveda is that of inoculation against smallpox. It

is believed that this treatment arose before 1000 A.D. From there it spread to China, western Asia, and Africa, and finally, in the early eighteenth century, to Europe and North America. The Indian treatment was described by John Z. Holwell in 1767 to the College of Physicians in London in a report titled "An account of the manner of inoculating for the smallpox in the East Indies." It not only described the system in great detail, it also provided the rationale behind it.

It appears that the idea of inoculation derived from *agada-tantra*, one of the eight branches of traditional Āyurveda that deals with poisons and toxins in small dosages, and application of specific concoctions to punctures in the skin for treatment of certain skin diseases (Sushruta *Sambitā in Chikitsāsthāna* 9.10). The Charaka *Sambhita* speaks of how deadly poisons can be converted into excellent medicine and how two toxins can be antagonistic to each other.

An Āyurvedic classification, based on etiological factors, divided disease into seven categories: hereditary conditions based on the diseased germ cells (*ādibala*); congenital disease (*jāmmabala*); diseases due to the disturbance of the humors (*doshabala*); injuries and traumas (*sanghātābala*); seasonal diseases (*kālabala*); random diseases (*daivabala*); and natural conditions such as aging (*svabhāvabala*).

Menstrual disturbances, diseases of the female genital tract, and their treatments were classified. The clinical course and the various stages of labor, the management of puerperium, miscarriage and abortion, and difficult labor were discussed in detail. The different malpositions of the fetus were well understood. Many diseases of children were described.

The diseases of the head and the nervous system were given in detail. Among the nervous disorders described are convulsions, apoplectic fits, hysteric fits, tetanus, dorsal bending, hemiplegia, total paralysis, facial paralysis, lockjaw, stiff neck, paralysis of the tongue, sciatica, St. Vitus's dance, paralysis agitans, and fainting. Four kinds of epilepsy were described; it included an instruction that, once the attack was over, the patient should not be rebuked but should be cheered with friendly talk. Sushruta devoted one complete chapter to interpretation of dreams, believing that the dreams of the patient, together with other omens, can be an indication to the outcome of the treatment.

Āyurveda was also applied to animal welfare. Texts on veterinary science describe the application of the science to different animals. Refuges and homes for sick and aged animals and birds were endowed.

Indian medical texts had currency in lands far beyond India. A fourth-century medical manuscript from

Chinese Turkistan, known as the Bower Manuscript, is based on Indian texts. Burzuya, the court physician to the Persian emperor Khusrau Anushirvan (sixth century), visited India, bringing back Indian texts and physicians. The Weber Manuscript is a translation into Kuchean of a collection of Sanskrit medical recipes. The ninth-century Arabic medical compendium by Tabari mentions the texts of Charaka, Sushruta, Vāgbhata, and Mādhava. In the eighth century, *Amritabridaya*, a large text in four parts, was translated into Tibetan. It embodies the teachings of Buddha Bhaishajyaguru. From Tibetan this text was translated into Mongolian and later into Russian, achieving great popularity. Other Āyurvedic texts were also translated into Tibetan; these included the *Ashva-āyurveda* (the horse ayurveda) of Shālīhotra. In the late twentieth century, Āyurveda became increasingly popular in India and the West.


Subhash Kak

See also **Ashvamedha; Upanishadic Philosophy; Yoga**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Das, Bhagwan. *Fundamentals of Ayurvedic Medicine*. Delhi: Konark Publishers, 1992.
- Filliozat, Jean. *The Classical Doctrine of Indian Medicine*. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1964.
- Keswani, N. H., ed. *The Science of Medicine and Physiological Concepts in Ancient and Medieval India*. New Delhi: All India Institute of Medical Sciences, 1974.
- Ray, P., and H. R. Gupta. *Caraka Sambita*. New Delhi: Indian National Science Academy, 1980.
- Sharma, Priyavrat. *Caraka-Sambitā*. Varanasi: Chaukhambha Orientalia, 1981.
- . *Suśruta Sambitā*. Varanasi: Chaukhambha Visva-bharati, 2001.

AZAD, MAULANA ABUL KALAM (1888–1958), *president of Indian National Congress (1923, 1940–1946), India's first minister of education (1947–1958)*. Mohiuddin Ahmad, known as Abul Kalam “Azad” (the free) was born in Makkah in 1888. His mother was an Arab who died in Calcutta (Kolkata) when his father, Khairuddin Dehlavi, returned to India after several years in Makkah. Azad was educated by his father, a Sufi, learning religious sciences as well as classical Arabic, Persian, and Urdu at home. Azad wrote mostly in Urdu, the language of his passion and to which he made a lasting contribution through his commentary of the Qur’an. Azad was also interested in learning other systems of knowledge beyond his training in the traditional Islamic learning. He was open to Western knowledge and values that seemed to be in accord with Islamic ethical teachings. Intellectually, Azad saw himself following in the footsteps of such Indian scholars as Shaykh



Maulana Abul Kalam Azad. The scholarly Azad was a key link between Mahatma Gandhi and the Muslim community, as both men sought greater support for *sarvodaya* (“the uplift of all”) among India’s Muslims. BETTMANN/CORBIS.

Ahmad Sirhindi (d. 1624), a reformer of Indian Islam who is mostly remembered for his opposition to a kind of Sufism that appeared to be closer to Hindu monistic philosophy than to Islamic orthodoxy. Another intellectual and reformer whom Azad lauds in his writings is Sayyid Ahmed Khan (d. 1898).

In 1912 Azad started his weekly journal, *al-Hilal*, and in 1915 he began publishing *al-Balagh*. The purpose of these journals, as well as his other activities, was to inculcate among Muslims a sense of religious calling that could be placed in the service of nationalism and to draw them to the political movement for independence from the British. In 1916 his presses were shut down by British authorities. Azad was imprisoned for his activities, and during this period he produced an autobiographical work, *Tazkira*.

Azad’s political activism and his membership in the Indian National Congress brought him in contact with Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. Azad first worked with Gandhi during the noncooperation and the Khilafat movements, which began after Gandhi’s return from South Africa in 1919. Azad became a key link between Gandhi and the Muslim community, as they both sought greater support among Muslims for Gandhi’s brand of nonviolent activism. Azad was the youngest person to be elected president of the Indian

National Congress in 1923. He was later reelected and served from 1940 to 1946.

Azad is most remembered for his scholarship, his intellectual ingenuity, and his originality. During his second imprisonment, between 1921 and 1923, he wrote a commentary on the Qur'an, which was later published as *Tarjuman al-Qur'an* (Lahore, 1931). The commentary is incomplete but is best known for its first volume, which is entirely devoted to the first chapter of the Qur'an, "al-Fatiha." He also wrote several other works, including a longer autobiographical work, *India Wins Freedom*, the full manuscript of which was deposited in the National Archives, to be revealed thirty years after his death. Thus a much anticipated revised edition of *India Wins Freedom: The Complete Version* was published in 1988.

Azad died in New Delhi in 1958, while he was still in office as India's first minister of education. His tomb lies within the confines of the Jama Masjid, facing the Red Fort, in the old city of Delhi.

Irfan A. Omar

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Anjum, Khaliq, ed. *Maulana Abul Kalam Azad: Shakhshiyat aur karnamey*. Delhi: Urdu Akademi, 1986.
- Azad, Abul Kalam. *The Tarjuman al-Qur'an*. Edited and translated by Syed Abdul Latif. Mumbai: Asia Publishing House, 1962.
- Douglas, Ian Henderson. *Abul Kalam Azad: An Intellectual and Religious Biography*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- Kabir, Humayun, ed. *Maulana Abul Kalam Azad: A Memorial Volume*. Mumbai: Asia Publishing House, 1959.

AZARIAH, VEDANAYAKAM SAMUEL (1874–1945), *Indian prelate, first Indian bishop of the Anglican Church*. V. S. Azariah was born in Tinnevely, 17 August 1874, the son of an Anglican pastor. He studied in the local Church Missionary Society College and at Madras Christian College. In 1902, he visited Jaffna (Ceylon) and was so impressed with the vigor of the Christian community there that on his return he organized, with K. T. Paul, the Indian Missionary Society (IMS), convinced that an indigenous mission would revitalize the local church. They met in Calcutta, 25 December 1905, and founded the National Missionary Society

(NMS)—their objectives to unite all Protestant Christians and to evangelize all of India. Azariah was the first general secretary.

In 1904 the IMS had sent missionaries to work in Dornakal, a very impoverished location, east of Hyderabad. Azariah himself became so concerned with this work that in 1909 he resigned his post as general secretary of the NMS and took charge.

In 1910 Azariah was invited to the Edinburgh Missionary Conference. He addressed the gathering, appealing for a much deeper level of cooperation between foreign missionaries and Indian Christians. Azariah reminded the audience that the Indian church would always be grateful for the heroism and self-denying labor of the missionaries. "You have given us your goods to feed the poor. . . . We also ask for your love. Give us friends!" Azariah believed that to make a significant impact, a genuinely Indian church must emerge and the role of foreign missionaries must diminish.

On 29 December 1912, Vedanayakam Samuel Azariah was consecrated the first Indian bishop of the Anglican Church. Over the next thirty years, he was instrumental in what came to be known as a mass movement to Christianity among the poor and the exploited in the districts around Dornakal. In 1904 there were almost no Christians. By the time Azariah died, their number exceeded 250,000.

Azariah was not active in the nationalist freedom struggle. Rather than political independence, he was most concerned with the self-determination and self-expression of the Indian church. Azariah did take a stand against communal based electoral reforms; in this he agreed with Mahatma M. K. Gandhi.

Bishop Azariah of Dornakal died after a brief illness on 1 January 1945.

Graham Houghton

See also **Christian Impact on India, History of**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Eddy, Sherwood. *Pathfinders of the World Missionary Crusade*. New York: Abingdon-Cokesbury, 1945.
- Harper, Susan Billington. *In the Shadow of the Mahatma*. Cambridge, U.K.: Eerdmans, 2000.
- Stock, Eugene. *The History of the Church Missionary Society*, vol. 4. London: CMS, 1916.



BABRI MASJID. *See* Ayodhya.

BABUR (1483–1530), founding emperor of the Mughal dynasty in India. A Chaghtai Turk, Zahir-ud-Din Muhammad, known as Babur (“the Tiger”), was a fearless soldier, adventurer, poet, and diarist. His *Tuzu-i-Babri* (Memoirs of Babur), written in Turki, the diary he kept throughout his life, is one of the great works of historical literature. Babur’s father was a petty chief of Farghana, one of five principalities of Central Asia; he was descended from Genghis Khan and Timur. In 1494, when his father died, Babur, aged eleven, became king of Farghana. He immediately came under attack, but survived the assault, and in November 1487 captured Samarkand, the heart of Central Asia. Driven out of Samarkand the next year, Babur recaptured it in 1499, lost it again in 1501, held it briefly in 1511, and for the rest of his life dreamed of reconquering it and ruling Central Asia.

After losing Samarkand in 1501, he found refuge with his uncle and wandered around Central Asia seeking his fortune before capturing Kabul in 1504. He held Kandahar briefly in 1507. In Kabul, Babur adopted Ottoman firearms and became a powerful ruler, although the struggle for power in the region between the Ottomans, the Persians, and the Uzbeks prevented his recapture of Samarkand. Thus, he turned to India. In 1519 he marched over the Khyber Pass, down across the Indus to the Punjab, as far as the River Chenab, before returning, richly laden, to Kabul a few months later.

In 1520 he captured Badakhshan and in 1522, Kandahar. In 1524 he briefly controlled Lahore. Then, on 20 April 1526, Babur won his first great battle of Panipat against the mighty army of Sultan Ibrahim Lodi, achieved through superior cavalry tactics and Central

Asian artillery, establishing Mughal rule over North India. Delhi and Agra were captured, and on 27 April, in Delhi, the Khutba prayer was read in Babur’s name as ruler. He crippled the Hindu Rajput confederacy after breaking his wine cups and vowing that he would never drink again, rallying his outnumbered troops. His days of wandering were over; he was now the dominant power in northern India. In January 1528 he finally crushed the Rajputs. His last great battle was on 6 May 1529, when he won the Battle of Ghagra.

As the first Mughal ruler, Babur substituted the Afghan confederacy with divine right absolutism, acting through a prime minister and introducing Persian language and manners into his court. He was renowned for his alcohol- and opium-laced parties and for his cruelty to his victims. Though not a good administrator or organizer, Babur built a large number of palaces, baths, gardens, and *daks* (postal stations), through which he maintained contact with distant regions, and he was recklessly generous to his soldiers and officers, bankrupting the state. He practiced religious tolerance, marrying his sons to Hindu Rajput princesses, and brought the Rajputs into his government.

In 1530 Babur died, after walking around his sick son Humayun’s bed praying that the seemingly fatal illness would be transferred to him. Humayan recovered, and Babur fell ill and died. A king for thirty-six years, he was just forty-eight years old. At Ayodha, the Babri Masjid (Babur Mosque) was erected to commemorate the founder of India’s mightiest pre-British empire.

Roger D. Long

See also Akbar; Aurangzeb; Jahangir; Shah Jahan

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Awan, Muhammad Tariq. *History of India and Pakistan*, vol. 2, part 1: *Great Mughals*. Lahore: Ferozsons, 1994.
- Eraly, Ibrahim. *The Mughal Throne: The Saga of India's Great Emperors*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2003.
- Richards, John. *The Mughal Empire*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- Thackston, Wheeler M., ed. and trans. *The Baburnama: Memoirs of Babur, Prince and Emperor*. Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution, 1996.

BACTRIA The region between the Hindu Kush Mountains and the river Amu Darya (Oxus) is called Bactria. Its old capital, Bactra, was located near the present city of Mazar-e-Sharif in northern Afghanistan. Another important center of this area is Balkh, a town 15.5 miles (25 km) to the west of Mazar-e-Sharif. The Mughal prince Aurangzeb ended his attempt to reconquer the homelands of his dynasty in Fergana and Samarkand at Balkh.

Bactria had been coveted by conquerors throughout history, since it served as an important link between East and West. The Persian kings had tried to control this region, and Alexander the Great captured it on his march toward India. In subsequent years it was ruled by the Greeks, and later by the Scythians. The Silk Road passed through this area, connecting China with Europe. Traveling traders needed transport animals, the sturdy two-humped camels (*Camelus bactrianus*) of the region that were so well suited for this purpose.

While the area around the ancient town of Bactra was the heart of Bactria, its territorial dimensions varied a great deal over the course of time. In the best of times it would include the northern part of Afghanistan and all of present Tajikistan. Under Darius it was the eastern bulwark of the Achaemenid empire. For some time it was the heartland of the Kushan empire, which then expanded so as to include a large part of northern India. It remained of strategic importance for many centuries, until the Mongols swept through it in the early thirteenth century. It then lost much of its pivotal position. In modern times it became once more of importance in the "Great Game" when Tsarist Russia penetrated Central Asia. With the capture of Merv in 1884, the Russians came very close to the region of Bactria, and the British tried their best to keep Afghanistan firmly under their control. Being far from Kabul, the capital of Afghanistan, this region has in recent times emerged as the stronghold of warlords who cannot be easily controlled by Afghanistan's government.

Dietmar Rothmund

See also **Afghanistan; Alexander the Great; Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Barthold, Wilhelm. *Turkestan Down to the Mongol Invasion*. 2nd ed. London: Luzac, 1958.
- Ligabue, Giancarlo, and Carl C. Lamberg-Karlovsky. *Bactria: An Ancient Oasis Civilization from the Sands of Afghanistan*. Venice: Enrizzo, 1989.
- Rawlinson, Hugh G. *Bactria: The History of a Forgotten Empire*. New Delhi: Asian Educational Services, 2002.
- Tarn, William W. *The Greeks in Bactria and India*. 2nd ed. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1966.

BAHADUR SHAH I (1643–1712), Mughal emperor (1707–1712). The eldest son of the Great Mughal emperor Aurangzeb, Bahadur Shah's original name was Mu'azzam. He was sixty-three years old when he succeeded his father in 1707, ruling for less than five years. Since there was no designated crown prince according to Mughal tradition, most successions had led to bloody struggles for power. This kind of dynastic Darwinism had guaranteed that only strong contenders could prevail. Aurangzeb's most ambitious son, Akbar, had rebelled against his father and had died in exile long before Aurangzeb's death. Mu'azzam, who was governor of Kabul when Aurangzeb died, had to fight and kill his brother, Azam Shah, before he could ascend the throne as Bahadur Shah I. He was a mild ruler confronted by determined enemies, among them the Rajput rulers of Jaipur and Udaipur. The Sikhs of the Punjab had also long resisted Mughal rule. Their tenth and last guru, Gobind Singh, had established the Khalsa in 1699 as a kind of martial order, with rites of initiation and visible marks of distinction. Bahadur Shah I had to fight against these indomitable warriors. Gobind Singh was killed in 1708, and there was no further guru, but Banda Bahadur emerged as a powerful Sikh military leader, whom the Great Mughal could not subdue.

Bahadur Shah I tried to make peace with the Marathas, the greatest threat to Mughal rule under Aurangzeb, who had kept Shahu, the grandson of Shivaji, as a hostage at his court. By installing Shahu as raja of Satara in the heart of Maratha country, Bahadur Shah I hoped to pacify the Marathas. Shahu was a mild courtier and seemed to serve the Great Mughal well, but he appointed as *peshwa* of Pune the wily Chitpavan Brahman Balaji Vishvanath, whose son Baji Rao then emerged as the greatest challenger to Mughal rule. Thus Bahadur Shah's policy ended in failure, and he precipitated the decline of the Mughal empire. He was succeeded by his son Jahandar Shah, whose reign was even less fortunate than his father's. Nevertheless, Mughal rule lingered on. Baji Rao commented, regarding Mughal rule, that once the trunk was cut, the branches would also fall. Rather, the Mughal empire simply became hollow, with many parties using it for their own purposes, and the successors

of Bahadur Shah I became mere pawns in the power game of eighteenth-century India.

Dietmar Rothermund

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Irvine, William. *Later Mughals*. Edited by Jadunnath Sarkar. Kolkata: South Asia Books, 1996.
Sarkar, Jadunnath. *The Fall of the Mughal Empire*. 4 vols. 2nd ed. Kolkata: South Asia Books, 1991–1993.

BALANCE OF PAYMENTS

This entry consists of the following articles:

EXCHANGE RATE POLICY

FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE EXCHANGE RATE

EXCHANGE RATE POLICY

Foreign exchange scarcity was a chronic feature of most of India's post-independence history. This was both cause and consequence of India's inward looking (and quasi-socialistic) choice of development model, with concomitant negative implications for its economic performance, especially in comparison to emerging economies in East and Southeast Asia.

At independence in 1947, India was left with strong sterling balances arising from its wartime contributions. The prewar exchange rate arrangements continued, with the rupee being pegged (or fixed) to the British pound sterling at the prewar parity. In 1949, when the pound was devalued, the rupee-sterling parity was left unchanged, creating an effective devaluation. During the 1950s low inflation kept the exchange rate competitive. The first major foreign exchange crisis in India came as a consequence of the second Five Year Plan in 1957, which, with its ambitious heavy industry import substitution industrialization strategy, led to a sharp increase in imports. Growing external imbalances resulted in the imposition of severe foreign exchange and import controls, which would persist over the next three and a half decades. A deep distrust of the price mechanism extended to the principal levers of macroeconomic policy, exchange rates and interest rates.

India's Five Year Plans were based on the premise that prices would be constant and that the exchange rate, as one of myriad prices, must remain fixed. Adherence to a fixed exchange rate was necessary (from the narrow perspective of the plan's model) because any change in its level would have upset the careful balance that was part of the plan's design. Indeed, when it did just that (in 1966), the Five Year Plans had to be temporarily suspended. This was the rationale behind the government's

aversion to changing the fixed exchange rate, even though conditions had vastly changed. Throughout its history there has been a close link between the health of India's foreign exchange reserves and the stringency of foreign trade and payments controls. The periods of severe tightening (1957–1962, 1968–1974) and moderate relaxation (1966–1968, 1975–1979, 1982–1989) followed this pattern.

Exchange Rate Regime

Table 1 gives the currency regimes prevailing in India during the twentieth century. From being pegged to the pound sterling, the rupee moved to a peg to a basket of currencies in the mid-1970s and a de facto crawling band around the U.S. dollar by the end of the decade. It switched to a floating exchange rate regime in 1993 after a transitional phase of dual exchange rates for two years. The postfloat period is distinguished by remarkable exchange rate stability, which is contrary to commonly observed experience, as countries that switch from fixed to floating exchange rate regimes typically experience a rise in exchange rate volatility. The floating of the rupee has also been accompanied by a rise in the frequency and scale of intervention by the central bank in the foreign exchange market.

The post-independence exchange rate regime, while formally an adjustable peg Bretton Woods-style regime, operated in practice as a fixed nominal exchange rate. (Between 1946 and 1971, under the Bretton Woods system, each country's exchange rates were fixed to the U.S. dollar and could be changed only if the International Monetary Fund (IMF) agreed that the country's balance of payments was in a state of "fundamental disequilibrium." Countries settled their international balances in U.S. dollars, and the U.S. government promised to redeem other central banks' holdings of dollars at a fixed rate of U.S.\$35 per ounce.) By the end of the 1950s and in the first half of the 1960s, a fixed nominal rate and mounting inflation led to an appreciation of the real effective exchange rate (REER), and despite severe trade and capital controls and foreign aid, India's balance of payments problems mounted. REER is a measure (index) of the degree of competitiveness of a country relative to its trading partners, where weights are chosen to correspond to the relative importance of each trading partner. In June 1966, under pressure from the United States and the Bretton Woods institutions, India undertook a large nominal devaluation (36.5%), but due to a complex tax regime and high inflation, the REER depreciation was only about 7 percent. The devaluation of 1966 is widely regarded as having been a political disaster that severely shaped India's macroeconomic policies and political economy over the next two decades.

TABLE 1

India's currency regimes		
Time period	Classification	Comments
August 1914–March 1927	Peg to pound sterling	Convertibility into sterling was suspended
March 1927–September 1931	Peg	Gold standard
September 1931–September 1939	Peg to pound sterling	Suspension of gold standard adherence to sterling area
September 1939–October 1941	Peg to pound sterling	Introduction of capital controls
November 1941–October 1943	Peg to pound sterling; “freely falling”	
November 1943–October 1965	Peg to pound sterling	
October 1965–June 1966	De facto band around pound sterling; parallel market	There were multiple exchange rates; band width was $\pm 5\%$
June 1966–August 1971	Peg to pound sterling	
August 1971–December 1971	Peg to U.S. dollar	
December 1971–September 1975	Peg to pound sterling	
September 1975–February 1979	De facto crawling band around pound	Band width was $\pm 2\%$; officially sterling pegged to a basket of currencies
March 1979–July 1979	Managed float	
August 1979–July 1989	De facto crawling band around U.S. dollar	Band width was $\pm 2\%$; officially pegged to a basket of currencies
August 1989–July 1991	De facto crawling peg to U.S. dollar	
August 1991–June 1995	De facto peg to U.S. dollar	One devaluation in March 1993; black market premia rose to 27% in February
July 1995–December 2001	De facto crawling peg to U.S. dollar	During this period black market premium consistently in single digits

SOURCE: Compiled from Reinhart, C. M., and Ken Rogoff, “The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Re-interpretation,” NBER Working Paper 8963, Cambridge, Mass.: June 2002.


With the breakdown of the Bretton Woods regime in August 1971, the rupee was briefly pegged to the dollar, but after December 1971 it was pegged to the pound sterling until 1975. This proved to be an astute move, as it led to an automatic depreciation of the rupee (due to the weakness of the sterling) without drawing political attention. In the early 1970s India weathered the first oil shock because the sterling peg led not only to a nominal effective devaluation but to a real devaluation as well (see Figure 1 for India's nominal effective exchange rate [NEER] and REER series, 1970–2003). NEER is an index of the value of a country's currency with respect to a group of countries, usually trading partners (as opposed to only one country). Thus the effective exchange rate depreciated by 20 percent by 1975, although there was no explicit devaluation. In September 1975 the peg was altered from the pound sterling to a basket of currencies. Tight monetary and fiscal policies reduced inflation sharply, resulting in a steady depreciation of the rupee and an export boom.

For reasons that are not entirely clear, India's exchange rate policies faltered in the immediate aftermath of the second oil shock in 1979. There was no nominal depreciation, and mounting inflation led to an appreciation in the REER. However, in 1983 the exchange rate management changed direction (a crawling basket peg). The REER became the explicit indicator for exchange rate policy

with a nominal effective exchange rate managed so as to keep the REER at about the 1982 level. By the mid-1980s, the exchange rate policy became much more active, leading to a depreciation in the nominal rate of 47 percent and the REER of 35 percent.

Over the 1980s, while India's economy grew more rapidly, its fiscal performance worsened significantly. The growing fiscal deficit spilled over into the current account, and when India was hit by a succession of external and domestic shocks at the turn of the decade, a full blow balance of payments crisis erupted. The wide-ranging reforms ushered in at the wake of the crisis attacked the plethora of economic controls that had characterized India, both on external sector and domestic policies.

The rupee was devalued by 9 and 11 percent in two stages between 1 and 3 July 1991. A new system of exchange rate management in 1992–1993, the Liberalised Exchange Rate Management System (LERMS) made the rupee partially convertible on the current account. Initially a “dual exchange rate” system was introduced to ease the transition from an onerous trade regime to a market-friendly system encompassing both trade and payments. Under this system, 40 percent of exporter receipts and remittances had to be sold to authorized dealers at the official exchange rate, while the balance were converted at the market rate, which

FIGURE 1

effectively meant that export proceeds were taxed at 0.4 times the difference between the market and the official exchange rate. All capital account transactions (except IMF and multilateral flows against rupee expenditure) were also at the market rate. The success of LERMS in restoring India's external health brought enough confidence to move to a market-based exchange rate system, and the two rates were unified in March 1993.

During the 1980s, India had been losing substantial remittance receipts because of links between gold smuggling and remittances. To address this, tariffs on gold imports were lowered and gold imports gradually liberalized, which led to a shift of a substantial foreign exchange market from the underground (Hawala) to the open market.

The liberalization of the trade and payments system culminated in August 1994, with India finally accepting the IMF Article VIII; thus the rupee officially became convertible on the current account. By the end of the decade (in 2000), India replaced its draconian Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (passed in 1973) with the Foreign Exchange Management Act, moving from a system of administrative controls to a regulatory framework.

Balance of Payments

For the better part of four decades, economic policy making in India was hemmed in by the specter of balance of payments vulnerability. The second Five Year Plan, with its focus on heavy-industry import-substitution industrialization, soon ran into balance of payments problems. The formation of the India Consortium in 1958 and the International Development Association gave India access to considerable concessional foreign aid and foreign exchange. Nonetheless, a series of shocks in the mid-1960s increased India's dependence on foreign

donors. As the rupee weakened, India had little choice but to accede to the pressures exercised by the consortium, devaluing the rupee in 1966.

With India's outward orientation from the early 1990s underpinned by continuing trade and payments liberalization, prudent debt management and market-determined exchange rate policies driven by the goal of maintaining competitiveness, the scope for external vulnerability has since declined. By virtually any relevant indicator—foreign debt service ratio, external debt–gross domestic product ratio, and months of current payments—India's situation has improved markedly. When storm clouds threatened, as in the aftermath of the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and India's nuclear tests in 1998, India raised funds from its diaspora: U.S.\$4.2 billion from the India Resurgent Bonds issued in 1998 and another U.S.\$5.5 billion from the India Millennium Deposit program in 2000.

The reversal of decades of inward-looking policy to one of gradually (but decisively) opening up the economy to external competition and acceptance of a more flexible exchange rate regime helped India to increase its share in world trade of goods from about 0.5 percent at the beginning of the reforms to 0.8 percent a decade later, and of services from 0.6 percent to 1.2 percent in the same period. India's current account receipts were especially boosted by the country's emergence as a proven powerhouse of service exports. The export of relatively unskilled services to the Middle East, coupled with outflows of skilled labor to industrialized countries, has brought growing remittances. Information technology (IT) and IT-enabled services, particularly business process outsourcing, continue to post exceptionally high year-on-year growth, and the prognosis continues to be bright. The years 2001–2002 to 2003–2004 were

watershed years: the only time since independence that India has had three successive years of surplus in the current account of its balance of payments.

Capital Account Liberalization

A singular change that epitomized India's post-1991 integration with the global economy, compared to its dirigiste past, was the two-way opening of the capital account that unfolded over a decade. Growing confidence in India's balance of payments situation, as well as a different intellectual and political climate, led the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) in 1997 to constitute a committee for drawing up a road map for full capital account convertibility (CAC). It specified elaborate preconditions—indicators of vulnerability—including, among others, fiscal consolidation, permissible current account imbalances, foreign reserves cover, and a mandated inflation target. The committee recognized that the health of the financial system was particularly important, emphasizing that strengthening the financial system was an important precondition to the move to CAC. Since the release of the CAC report in 1997, all “pure” balance of payments conditions have been attained, indeed exceeded. However, two key conditions remained unmet. The fiscal deficit worsened between 1997 and 2003; and the health of the financial system improved only modestly in the absence of any serious steps toward changing incentives that were blunted by public sector ownership and the concomitant regulatory forbearance that this inevitably entailed. Nonetheless, the RBI gradually went ahead fairly single-mindedly toward CAC, driven by a realization that not moving to a more liberal CAC stance would increase reserves even more and make monetary and exchange rate management more difficult. By 2004 hardly any onerous controls on the capital account remained, other than those pertaining to short-term debt creating flows and borrowing by financial intermediaries. Most recently, Indian residents have been allowed to open bank accounts abroad.

Foreign Exchange Reserves and Its Management: From Drought to Flood

By the late 1990s, India's foreign exchange reserves began climbing rapidly, crossing an unprecedented \$130 billion by December 2004, driven mainly by a respectable surplus on the current account, portfolio capital inflows, revaluation of reserves on account of depreciation in the value of the U.S. dollar against other major currencies, and continuing net inflow of nonresident Indian deposits. For decades Indian policy makers had devoted their energies to coping with an endemic droughtlike situation on foreign exchange reserves. In the new millennium they faced a completely new challenge: how to cope with a flood.

The accumulation of reserves was in part a conscious decision. With the RBI committed to liberalizing the capital account on the one hand, and the country's continued inability to address long-standing macroeconomic (especially fiscal) problems on the other, a high level of reserves had become a necessary insurance cover to counter the resulting enhanced risk perceptions of the Indian economy.

Policy circles usually adopt a normative consumption, smoothing-type approach for assessing the “appropriate” level of foreign currency reserves. Consumption smoothing occurs when the temporal profiles of income and desirable consumption do not coincide; then, by using saving and borrowing, purchasing power available in one period is transferred to an earlier (borrow) or later (save) period. Often the demand for reserves is investigated in terms of a buffer stock model, whereby the macroeconomic adjustment costs without reserves are balanced with the cost of holding reserves. Another way of looking at a reserve buildup is analogous to the precautionary motive for savings traditionally put forward. In India's case, the high level of reserves appear to have been affected by three factors: strategic considerations arising from prevailing and likely geopolitical realities; domestic political realities in India that increase its risk and susceptibility to economic shocks; and the high prospective political price that the government of the day will have to pay if the country faces an external payments crisis, that is, if the country runs out of foreign exchange reserves. Thus, India's high accumulation of reserves appears to be driven by its internal economic and political weaknesses and global uncertainties. In other words, its high reserves have been a signal that the country is compensating for its weaknesses in some areas.

Increasing foreign exchange inflows led to new pressures on the RBI. In order to maintain competitiveness, the central bank aggressively bought foreign exchange to stem upward pressure on the rupee. Unlike the past, keeping the exchange rate from appreciating to maintain India's export competitiveness emerged as a key goal of exchange rate management. The real effective exchange rate showed no depreciation on average during the post-crisis period, after depreciating by an average of 2 percent per annum during the 1980s. To check the resulting liquidity growth (and contain inflationary pressures) on account of its intervention in the foreign exchange market, the RBI sought to sterilize using its stock of government bonds. However, the increased supply of perceived risk-free assets in turn contributed to crowding out bank lending to the private sector, contributing a much higher (sometimes around 40 percent) share of commercial banks' assets in government securities than was warranted by the mandated Statutory Liquidity

Ratio (25 percent). By 2003, mounting foreign exchange inflows meant that even this strategy had run out of course as the RBI exhausted its holding of government bonds. This led it to establish a Market Stabilisation Scheme, comprising a “war chest” of 600 billion rupees of intervention bonds. India’s failure to contain large fiscal deficits meant that the burden of coping with the impact of large foreign currency inflows from spilling over into prices and inflation has had to be largely borne on the monetary side.

Political Economy and Analytical Issues

The economic debates on India’s exchange rate policies have focused on three questions.

The first concerns the relationship between trade and exchange rates. Indian economic thinking had long been characterized by “export pessimism”; however, it later became apparent that India’s exports have been quite responsive to exchange rates, with short-run elasticity of about 0.7 and long-run slightly greater than 1. However, these estimates were valid for goods exports; as India’s export basket becomes more services-weighted, this is likely to change. A second debate has centered around the inflationary consequences of devaluation stemming from a belief that India’s import basket was relatively inelastic, especially because of India’s dependence on oil imports for its energy needs. It was long argued (and not just in India) that since devaluation was inflationary, real devaluation would have little effect. However, by and large the REER has been responsive to nominal exchange rate depreciation in India, although the REER has usually been less than the nominal rate depreciation. The inflationary effects of devaluation have been muted in India by the simple reality that until very recently, India’s trade sector was small, relative to the size of the economy.

Exchange rate policies affect different parts of the economy in very different ways. Consequently, they can become a major target of political conflict. Pre-independence Indian industrialists consistently argued for monetary and exchange rate policies that would afford them some degree of protection. The demand for fiscal and monetary policies that would promote their interests was seen not as mere capitalistic interest, but as a general national interest. Indian industrialists joined nationalists, insisting that the rupee was overvalued. As this lifted exports and curbed imports, it was natural for the industrialists to identify with this “nationalist” demand for a devaluation of the currency. Industrialists and nationalists pressed for a gold standard in preference to the gold exchange standard, arguing that the latter facilitated the drain from India through the mechanism of council bills and reverse council bills.

Following the breakdown of Bretton Woods, monetary policy, and especially exchange rate policy, became gradually depoliticized even as fiscal policies became more politicized. In the 1970s India’s devaluation was done by stealth (under the cover of the sterling peg); by 1983 the exchange rate policies moved in the direction of a crawling basket peg. Exchange-rate management policies became increasingly overt and active by the end of the decade, when India began operating a discretionary crawling peg regime. An observer trying to understand the political economy of exchange rate management in India is faced with two puzzles: 1) why did India not adopt an undervalued exchange rate as an explicit instrument to promote its hallowed goal of import substitution industrialization? and 2) why, despite the lack of strong interest groups as well as external pressure, India’s exchange rate policies in the 1970s and 1980s were reasonably sound (at least as compared to many other developing countries)? The first question is somewhat puzzling in that pre-war, India’s industrialists and politicians had opposed a strong exchange rate. It is possible that the anomaly of high foreign exchange reserves at the time of independence (arising from India’s contributions to the Allied war effort) led to the par value of the rupee being set too high; but once it was fixed, it was hard to change. Not only would it upset the planning process but new interest groups had formed that had a vested stake in promoting foreign exchange shortages. As regards the second question, it should be emphasized that during this period the small size of the export sector also meant that there were no strong lobbies in favor of maintaining competitive exchange rate regime. However, by the end of the 1990s, the growing importance of trade in the Indian economy and the particular economic and political importance of the IT sector meant that pressures grew from the private sector to maintain a “competitive” exchange rate.

In the new millennium, India’s overflowing foreign exchange coffers have mitigated pressures to rectify India’s fiscal mismanagement. In the past, when reserves were much more modest, India’s policy makers were quite aware that large deficits sustained over a long period would either inevitably spill over into higher levels of inflation (if the deficit was monetized) or a balance of payments crisis (if the country drew increasingly on external savings). Since both outcomes had harsh political repercussions, it forced policy makers to act with due caution (most of the time). Now, with high levels of reserves, policy makers are much less worried about either concern. Liberalization has eased supply-side weaknesses, and monetization has not yet been seriously resorted to, thereby attenuating inflationary pressures. Indeed, the increasing disjuncture between large internal fiscal imbalances on the one hand and improving external

balances on the other is analytically relatively unexplored territory in India.

Devesh Kapur
Urjit R. Patel

See also **Economy since the 1991 Economic Reforms**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Buiter, W. H., and Urjit R. Patel. "Debt, Deficits, and Inflation: An Application to the Public Finances of India." *Journal of Public Economics* 47, no. 2 (1992): 171–205.
- . "Budgetary Aspects of Stabilisation and Structural Adjustment in India." In *Macroeconomic Dimensions of Public Finance, Essays in Honour of Vito Tanzi*, edited by M. Blejer and T. Ter-Minassian. London: Routledge, 1997.
- Joshi, Vijay, and I. M. D. Little. *India Macroeconomics and Political Economy, 1964–1991*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1994.
- Kapur, Devesh, and Urjit R. Patel. "Large Foreign Currency Reserves: Insurance for Domestic Weaknesses and External Uncertainties?" *Economic and Political Weekly* 38, no. 11 (15–21 March 2003): 1047–1053.
- Khatkhate, Deena. "Reserve Bank of India: A Study in the Separation and Attrition of Powers." In *India's Public Institutions: Performance and Design*, edited by Devesh Kapur and Pratap B. Mehta. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- Kohli, R. "Real Exchange Rate Stabilization and Managed Floating: Exchange Rate Policy in India, 1993–1999." ICRIER Working Paper no. 59. New Delhi: 2000.
- Mukherjee, Aditya. *Imperialism, Nationalism and the Making of the Indian Capitalist Class: 1920–1947*. New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2002.
- Reinhart, C. M., and Ken Rogoff. "The Modern History of Exchange Rate Arrangements: A Re-interpretation." NBER Working Paper 8963. Cambridge, Mass.: 2002.

FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND THE EXCHANGE RATE

The balance of payments of colonial India was characterized by certain distinctive features that disappeared or weakened after the end of colonial rule in 1947. For example, the economy of India was more open in the nineteenth century than it became later. There was close integration between the world economy and the domestic economy. There was also a close relationship between balance of payments and the currency and exchange system. Further, government remittances abroad made public finance and external transactions mutually dependent, and this was an area of potential conflict between Indian and British economic interests. For this reason, the balance of payments became a politically charged issue, one that figured prominently in nationalist critiques of colonial rule in India. Finally, there was a large transaction in gold and silver in the external

accounts. Much of this gold and silver was normally imported for private consumption.


Balance of Payments and Foreign Investment

In the 1920s there were two major types of net inflow: net export of goods and net inflow of foreign investment. These two together were as large as about 4.4 percent of national income. These were balanced by three types of net outflow: private remittances (2.7 percent of national income), government remittance (0.4 percent), and net purchase of gold and silver (1.3 percent).

Estimates available for the middle of the nineteenth century suggest that the pattern was not fundamentally different from the beginning of Crown rule in India in 1858. The five items above were even then the principal items in India's external account, and in most years carried the same signs as these did later. Balance of trade was usually positive, whereas remittances and precious metal transactions were usually negative. The relative magnitudes, however, were different. The total size of external transactions relative to national income was smaller in 1858 than in 1914. And within total payments, the shares of private remittance and gold purchase were smaller as well, while the share of government remittance was larger.

The five principal items—trade, capital flows, factor income flows, government remittance, and gold—need fuller description. Foreign trade (export plus import) increased significantly in value, from 123 million rupees in 1834 to 3.8 billion rupees in 1939, and as a ratio of national income, from possibly 3–4 percent around 1800 to 20 percent in 1914. It did not rise any further in the next thirty years until the end of colonialism in the region. The ratio declined subsequently to 7–8 percent in the early 1970s, rising again to 18–20 percent in the mid-1990s. India's presence in the world economy was small, however. India accounted for no more than 2–3 percent of world trade in 1914. Yet, India played a significant role in the international settlements system. Colonial India usually maintained a trade deficit with Britain, but a trade surplus with the rest of the world. This pattern facilitated Britain to meet its international settlements on the current account. In turn, that enabled Britain to use the income from its investments abroad to make further investments.

The composition of India's exports changed in the long run. In the nineteenth century, semiprocessed natural resources accounted for more than 70 percent of exports, the principal items being raw fibers, seeds, food grains, indigo, opium, and hides and skins. The percentage declined to 30 in the mid-1930s, whereas textiles and tea accounted for another 30 percent. Imports, likewise, underwent a change. Cotton textiles constituted almost



Kamal Nath, Cabinet Minister for Commerce and Industry. Since Kamal Nath became Minister of Commerce and Industry in May 2004, the Indian government has announced a host of major economic initiatives. Included is the comprehensive Foreign Trade Policy for 2004–2009 (a bound copy of which Nath proudly displays for the camera), with its focus on increased exports. INDIA TODAY.

half of India's imports in the mid-nineteenth century. Late in the interwar period, the major items were machinery and intermediate goods. The change in composition, in other words, partly reflected the advancement of a textile-based industrialization. This process accelerated in the interwar period, when import tariffs on a range of manufactured goods were raised.

Direction of trade in this period steadily moved away from the dominance of Britain as a market and as a source of imports into India, even though there was a slight reversal in the trend in the 1930s as a result of Britain's attempts to establish preferential trade arrangements within the empire. The two countries that emerged as major trading partners were the United States and Japan. The increasing importance of Japan was a reflection of a relatively new intra-Asian commodity exchange pattern involving Japan, China, Southeast Asia, and India, driven to a large extent by Japan's own rapid industrialization.

India received several types of capital flow, short term and long term. The usual type of short-term flows, which are not adequately captured in the annual accounts, went to meet the seasonal demands of trade. The India Office sold bills in London (called council bills) redeemable in India, which went to meet export transactions that peaked in the harvest seasons. Interest rates in India varied greatly by season, and these capital flows were evidently influenced by the high interest rates that prevailed in the busy season. The business of council bills was mainly conducted by the exchange banks, which were a group of banks licensed to conduct the foreign exchange business. All of them had headquarters outside India. In the 1920s, there was another kind of inflow of short-term foreign capital for investment in the government of India's rupee debt, but as the Great Depression began, the flow reversed.

Long-term capital came in two forms: net private foreign investment, and net increase in public debt. Private

foreign investment remains the weakest link in India's balance of payments database. Based on what data are available, net foreign investment was usually positive, but a rather small item (well below 1 percent of national income). Private investment was dominated by railways in the third quarter of the nineteenth century, and toward the century's end, by the formation of tea, jute, and mining companies. Such investment was initially in the form of shares sold in London by companies based in India. In the interwar period, the pattern changed into direct investment in subsidiaries of foreign firms. At least some of these multinational firms were attracted by the substantially higher import tariffs introduced from the 1920s. At independence, foreign capital accounted for between a quarter and a third of capital stock in the private corporate sector, according to different estimates. Plantations, jute textiles, and engineering had 70 percent of the capital stock. Seventy-seven percent of foreign capital was owned by British companies, the bulk of which had come in as portfolio investment. Of the remaining amount, the major part came from the United States, all of it as direct investment.

The government of India sold two types of securities, one denominated in sterling, and the other denominated in rupees. In the nineteenth century, the former exceeded the latter in value. By 1910 the two were of roughly equal magnitude. In the 1930s sterling securities were being retired rapidly, and for new issues, the government relied entirely on the Indian money market. The events of the Great Depression weakened confidence in London in India's sterling bonds. But there was also a long-term factor behind the decline of sterling bonds. Between 1880 and 1930, the average buyers of government securities had changed as well, from "old India hands" in Britain to Indian banks and the Indian public, who accepted rupee debts more easily. Public debt went to finance the railways, irrigation, roads, and buildings in the nineteenth century. In the twentieth century, these productive expenditures declined in importance. On the other hand, World War I led to a significant accumulation of debt.

Net factor income flows were consistently negative. Both private flows and government remittances were individually negative items. The ratio between these was roughly 3:2 in the 1860s, and probably increased marginally toward the end of colonial rule. The largest item in private flows (about half in the 1920s, and increasing) was repatriated income earned on foreign investment. Other items included insurance and freight charges, and dividends of railway companies, which progressively declined as the railways became increasingly state-owned.

In any normal harvest year, a large quantity of gold and silver was imported into India. This bullion was converted into jewelry and ended up as the private hoarded

assets of the peasant households. The quantity of non-monetary gold absorption by Indians was so large that the world financial circles, and especially the City of London, were often fearful that a good year in India might interfere with monetary expansion elsewhere in the world. The demand for precious metals can be seen as a response to exceedingly high risks of livelihood in Indian agriculture. Financial assets fluctuated in value given the rather extreme movements in prices and interest rates. Gold and silver were traded the world over, and therefore were more stable assets. This preference for precious metals took a toll on the savings available for productive private investment. By a rough calculation, had the acquisition of precious metals been zero, private investment in interwar India could have risen by as much as 2 to 3 percent as a proportion to national income.

A politically controversial element in the balance of payments was government remittance. Every year, the government in India paid to Britain a sum of money in sterling, which were called the "home charges" in the nineteenth century. About half of the home charges in the prewar years consisted of interest payment on loans raised to finance construction of railways and irrigation works. The second most important item was payment for the maintenance of army and marines. A third major component was pension payments for officials who had served India and retired to Britain. India Office expenses and stores purchased were the other considerably less important items of expenditure.

These payments, it was argued by Indian nationalists, compromised the capacity of the domestic economy to generate savings and investments. In principle, if such payments were financed from taxes, domestic consumption or savings could fall. If such payments were financed out of government's own investment funds, public investment could fall. If such payments were financed out of foreign borrowings, the volume of payments would increase by interest obligations. All three methods were used to meet these charges. For example, the regressive salt tax was used to finance increased government obligations in sterling in the 1890s. However, none of these adverse effects might result if these charges corresponded to factor services that in turn increased national income, or that supplied public goods that the government ought to provide anyhow. The potential adverse effects, in other words, depended on the "quality" of these charges. Whether or not government remittance enhanced national income, and to what extent it did, remains difficult to determine. To take one example, Indian nationalists alleged that the charge on account of the British Indian marines, who normally guarded trade routes, was unproductive because the marines were sometimes deployed for purposes other than the defense of Indian

waters. On the other side, it was suggested that the British public, which paid ten times more than their Indian counterpart on average toward the maintenance of the marines, in fact subsidized Indian defense.

A second problem with these payments was that they compromised the government's capacity to follow a stabilization policy independent of British economic interests. This effect was in evidence whenever the Indian currency was under pressure, for example, during the Great Depression. This issue leads to an examination of the currency and exchange system.

The Exchange System

The primary objective of monetary policy in colonial India was to stabilize the exchange rate. The government wished to ensure that the exchange rate remained stable, and did not fluctuate with balance of trade. An appreciation hurt commercial interests exporting from India, and depreciation made it difficult for the budget to meet its sterling obligations.

Between 1835 and 1893, the Indian rupee was a silver coin. The British East India Company in 1806 chose silver as the standard of value, and pushed silver coins into circulation in Madras, where the gold "pagoda" was still in circulation. In 1835 the government declared the silver rupee as the legal tender, and announced an exchange rate (15:1) between the rupee and the pound sterling. There were two ways that money could be transferred between India and the rest of the world. As mentioned before, the India Office sold council bills in London at an announced exchange rate, which the exchange banks purchased, sent to India, redeemed at the Treasury, and financed trade demands for money. The receipts in London were used to meet the home charges. Alternatively, traders could buy silver in London, ship to India, and have these minted into silver coins for a fee. In the last quarter of the nineteenth century, excess supply of silver in the world led to a fall in silver prices, which made the second mode of payment the more profitable. The council bill system came under threat unless the government devalued the rupee. Depreciation did occur, but at considerable cost to the budget. On the recommendations of a committee of inquiry headed by Lord Herschell, the Lord Chancellor, free coinage of silver was abolished in 1893. The next few years saw shipping of silver bullion for payment, and yet, the rupee did appreciate somewhat. In 1898, on the recommendation of another committee under the direction of Sir Henry Fowler, a gold exchange standard was introduced in India.

The gold exchange standard was in force between 1898 and 1916. The rupee was convertible against sterling and not against gold, at a ratio of 16 pence per rupee,

or 15 rupees for a pound sterling. These years witnessed an animated discussion on the merits of a full gold standard for India, within India and in London. The desire for a gold standard was strong in India, and the view that the gold exchange standard was adequate for India was strong in London. In effect, the autonomy of Indian monetary policy was at stake here. For many contemporaries, the gold standard represented the freedom for India to settle her obligations directly by means of flows of metals. In any case, World War I suspended these debates on the gold standard.

To support the exchange, the India Office now sold council bills in weekly auctions at the Bank of England. Until 1905 the volume of these sales was limited to the home charges. The limit was removed thereafter, and the sale of these bills effectively became a strategy to stabilize the exchange by preventing the free movement of metals for settlement of balance of trade. An official gold standard reserve was created. It was transferred to the India Office in 1902. The reserve thereafter consisted of mainly British government securities, Treasury bills, Exchequer bonds, and consols, in turn contributing in no small measure to keeping interest rates low in Britain. The India office also used the gold standard reserve of India in the call money market, leading to a closer alliance between the office and the financial world of the City of London. The only occasion in the prewar period when the government needed to draw on the currency reserve occurred in 1907, when a trade deficit threatened a depreciation of the rupee. On this occasion, the government also used the reverse council bills, a counterpart instrument that facilitated supply of sterling.

The gold exchange standard faced its first serious crisis toward the end of World War I. The first years of the war saw a loss of confidence in the rupee, due to inflation in silver prices. From 1916 to 1917, the inflation threatened a disappearance of silver rupee coins from circulation. An appreciation of the rupee seemed inevitable. Between 1917 and 1919, the rupee was allowed to float. By December 1919, the rupee had appreciated by 75 percent. A committee of inquiry was established to study the situation, which recommended an exchange rate at 2 shillings, provoking a strong minority report from the Indian member, who advocated a return to the prewar ratio. Silver prices, however, eventually stabilized, and confidence in paper currency returned in the next two years, with the result that early in the 1920s, the rupee depreciated somewhat. In 1925 another committee of inquiry endorsed the then prevailing ratio, 18 pence, to be the basis for a return to a modified gold exchange standard. From 1926 on, the rupee was again closely controlled to remain near 18 pence, the rate that was to prevail for the next several decades.

The next twelve years, until the outbreak of World War II, saw what has been described in historical scholarship as the “ratio controversy.” In the emerging political environment of 1930–1931, Indian commercial and political opinion had united in the belief that the rupee was overvalued at 18 pence. The demand for a full gold standard and autonomy with regard to the exchange rate grew strong again.

The conduct of Indian monetary policy during the Great Depression, which seemed to serve British interests at the expense of Indian ones, worsened the controversy. The beginning of a fall in world commodity prices in the second half of the 1920s turned the terms of trade adverse for India, and weakened the balance of payments. Further, the fear that the rupee might devalue eroded confidence in the rupee. Official and nonofficial opinion in India strongly favored depreciation of the rupee against sterling. But depreciation was neither easy nor acceptable to London, for that step would have changed the volume of home charges measured in rupees, and might lead the government of India to default on its external obligations. None of the options usually available to the India Office for dealing with a financial crisis—fresh borrowings in London, or drawing on the reserves—seemed practicable in the prevailing economic and political climate. The options available to the monetary authorities in India were even more limited and inflexible. A postponement of India’s sterling obligations was discussed, but did not materialize.

Eventually, on London’s insistence, the government of India carried out monetary contraction, in the hope that this would reduce prices and raise demand for Indian goods. The goal was not easily attainable, for the demand depression was not specific to India but was a global phenomenon. The contraction, therefore, had to be a deep and sustained one. Furthermore, as the contraction continued, and the less it seemed to work, the harder it became to return to devaluation; the expected devaluation would have had to be larger than before, causing larger-than-before adjustments in budget. The government of India feared that the resultant decline in prices would raise real interest rates and rents, causing hardship. These fears were borne out. The financial situation did cause widespread transfer of assets from debtors to creditors in rural India, and led to rural unrest in some cases.

One principal mechanism used for such transfer was the sale of gold jewelry. As mentioned before, a significant part of rural assets was held in the form of gold and silver jewelry. These now began to be liquidated. At the same time, the British government’s decision to leave the gold standard in 1931 depreciated the pound, and with it the rupee, against gold. These circumstances led to a rise

in the price of gold in terms of rupees. On the basis of an 18 pence rupee, the price of gold was lower in India than in the international market, causing a great quantity of this gold to be sold abroad. In the next five years, these gold exports reflatated the Indian economy, restored balance of payments, and provided the government of India with enough remittance to meet its sterling obligations. Nevertheless, these exports were widely seen as a sign of distress and a lost opportunity to build a currency reserve for India, and thus left Britain-India relations seriously strained.

The establishment of the Reserve Bank of India in 1935 was the first step in the dissociation of monetary policy from balance of payments in India. Balance of trade in World War II was in surplus. At the same time, a massive monetary expansion was allowed to take place to meet the needs of war financing, even as severe shortages of essential commodities developed. The result was massive inflation. On the more positive side, India’s contribution to the war effort accumulated in a “sterling balance” account, which became available for liquidation in the late 1940s. For the newly independent nation, the balance came in handy in its efforts to consolidate the balance of payments.

By contrast with the colonial pattern, the general pattern of balance of payments after colonial rule was very different. Restrictions on gold import brought the share of gold transactions close to zero almost immediately after 1947. Government account showed a net receipt due to foreign aid. The relative shares of trade, foreign investment, and private remittance all declined as India withdrew from an open to an autarkic regime from the 1950s onward. Also, balance of trade turned consistently negative, due to the need to import capital goods, oil, and sometimes food. Over the next fifty-odd years, several major changes took place. Two of these are noteworthy. As the number of expatriate workers increased, remittances of the private account turned into a net receipt item. And as India ended its autarkic policies in the 1990s, the shares of trade and investment in national income increased again.

Tirthankar Roy

See also **Fiscal System and Policy from 1858 to 1947**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Banerji, A. *India’s Balance of Payments: Estimates of Current and Capital Accounts from 1921–22 to 1938–39*. Mumbai and New York: Asia Publishing House, 1963.
- . *Aspects of Indo-British Economic Relations, 1858–1898*. Mumbai: Oxford University Press, 1982.
- Chandavarkar, A. G. “Money and Credit.” In *The Cambridge Economic History of India*, edited by Dharna Kumar. Vol. 1:

- c. 1757–c.1970. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- De Cecco, M. "Indian Monetary Vicissitudes: An Interlude." In *India and the World Economy*, edited by G. Balachandran. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Pandit, Y. *India's Balance of Indebtedness, 1898–1913*. London: Allen and Unwin, 1937.
- Roy, T. *The Economic History of India, 1857–1947*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Tomlinson, B. R. "Britain and India's Currency Crisis, 1930–2." *Economic History Review* 32, no. 1 (1979): 88–99.

BĀLASARASVATI, T. (1918–1984), classical dancer and musician. T. Bālasarasvati, or Bāla, as she is affectionately called by her admirers, is widely regarded as the greatest exponent of the dance form now referred to as Bharata Natyam. Like her ancestors, most notably her grandmother Vīnā Dhannammal and her mother Jayammal, she was also an accomplished musician, whose "singing exhaled serenity, tranquility and poise" (Mahadevan).

Kandappa Nattuvanar, a descendant of Ponnayya, was her guru. Ponnayya (one of the four brothers known as the Tanjore Quartet) is credited with systematizing the Bharata Natyam repertoire in the nineteenth century. On similar lines, Kandappa Nattuvanar did not hesitate to introduce major changes to Bālasarasvati's presentation, as he "felt the need for imminent reform if dance were to regain social esteem. He dispensed with the *ottu* or pipe-like drone in favour of a pair of tanpuras. He bade his men in the orchestra give up their old-fashioned attire and take their seats on the right edge of the concert platform instead of moving forwards and backwards with the dancer . . . abolishing anything crude" (Sankaran, p. 56). The foundation of major institutions, most notably the Music Academy Madras (where Bālasarasvati taught) and Kalākshētra (founded by dancer and educationist Rukmini Dēvī), enabled women from any social background to study and perform dance.

Bālasarasvati embodied the ideal of a refined personality for whom dancing was an art that consecrates the body. She postulated that by controlling his breath and by modifying his body, a yogi may acquire sanctity, as does the dancer who dissolves her identity in rhythm and music, making her body an instrument for the expression of her spirit. Bala's international fame notwithstanding, she remained rooted in Tamil Nadu, where her ancestors had shaped the art of dance and music as part of temple and court culture in Tanjāvūr. In her talks, she often referred to the environment in which the fine arts, dance, music, and poetry had enhanced one another and flourished as "a Great Temple: we enter the outer tower of *alārippu*, cross the half-way hall of *jatisvaram*, then the great hall of *sabdam*, and enter the holy precinct of the

deity in the *varnam*. This is the place, the space, which gives the most expansive scope to revel in the rhythm and moods and music of the dance. The *varnam* is the continuum which gives ever-expanding room to the dancer to delight in her self-fulfilment, by providing the fullest scope to her own creativity as well as to the tradition of the art" (Bālasarasvati in Vatsyayan, 1997, p. 81).

Her daughter Lakshmi Knight (1943–2001) was her foremost disciple.

Ludwig Pesch

See also **Music: South India**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Guhan, S., trans. *Bala on Bharata Natyam*. Madras: Sruti Foundation, 1991.
- Kothari, Sunil. *Bharata Natyam*. Mumbai: Marg Publications, 2001.
- Mahadevan, K. S. "The Peerless Balasaraswathi." *Shanmukha Quarterly* 10, no. 2 (1984): 28A–28C.
- Sankaran, T. "Sangeet Natak." *Journal of the Sangeet Natak Akademi* 72–73 (1984): 5–7, 55–65.
- Sruti Magazine for Indian Music and Dance*, nos. 4–5. Chennai: Sruti Foundation, 1984.
- Vatsyayan, Kapila. *Classical Indian Dance in Literature and the Arts*. 2nd ed. New Delhi: Sangeet Natak Akademi, 1977.
- . *Indian Classical Dance*. New Delhi: Publications Division, 1992.
- . *The Square and the Circle of the Indian Arts*. New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1997.

BALLISTIC AND CRUISE MISSILE DEVELOPMENT

India possesses one of the most advanced missile programs outside the original five declared nuclear states (China, Britain, France, Russia, and the United States). With its sophisticated missile and space programs, New Delhi is technically capable of indigenously developing long-range nuclear-tipped missiles. India's research into ballistic missiles began in the 1960s. In July 1983 India created the Integrated Guided Missile Development Program (IGMDP), with the aim of developing an indigenous missile infrastructure. The IGMDP's first indigenously developed missile was the Prithvi (Earth). India's second ballistic missile system is the Agni (Fire) missile series, which is longer in range than the Prithvi.

Ballistic Missiles

The short-range Prithvi was developed in Hyderabad, starting in 1983, and was first tested in February 1988. There are two versions of the Prithvi ballistic missile, an SS-150, designated P-1, with a range of 93 miles (150 km), and an SS-250, designated P-2, with a range of 155 miles (250 km). The SS-150 missiles are used by

the Indian army, and the SS-250 by the Indian air force to attack enemy airfields and by the Indian army for battlefield support. A third version was reported to be in development in 1994, an SS-350, designated P-3, with a range of 217 miles (350 km), but it is not known if this development has continued. A nuclear warhead was originally planned for the Prithvi missile, probably for the SS-250 and SS-350 versions. With the successful introduction of the Agni I missile, it is no longer expected that nuclear warheads will be fitted to Prithvi missiles.

In the early years of the 21st century, there were reports that a solid-propellant motor was being developed. Solid-fueled Prithvi missiles would have the advantage over liquid-fuel variants of being able to be readied for launch in a shorter time. Liquid-fuel missiles have to receive their fuel prior to firing, while solid-fueled missiles are manufactured with their fuel in place, enabling a shorter preparation time to launch. A ship-launched version, named Dhanush, believed to be similar to the SS-250, was tested from a naval vessel INS *Subhadra*, in April 2000 and 2004. It is believed that this program is a technology demonstrator, and that this missile might be fitted to future destroyers and frigates, or to India's new nuclear-powered submarine. The Dhanush may be converted into a submarine-launched ballistic missile.

The SS-150 was first test flown in February 1988 and entered service in 1994. User trials were completed in June 1994, carried out by the 333rd Indian Army Missile Group at Secunderabad. The 444 Missile Group was reported to have been formed in May 2002, with a mixture of Prithvi and Agni I missiles. The SS-150 missiles are kept in storage and can become fully operational at short notice. Production of the SS-150 version began in 1993 and continued until 1999, with around sixty missiles built and some thirty-five transport erector launcher (TEL) vehicles constructed to launch the missile. The TEL vehicles can also fire the SS-250 missile.

A first reported trial of the SS-250 was carried out in January 1996, with further tests in June 2000, March 2001, and December 2001. The SS-250 entered service with the Indian air force in 1999, and it is believed that around seventy missiles will be built. In 2002 the control of the SS-250 was transferred from the air force to the army, but with the air force retaining responsibility for providing target data.

There are unconfirmed reports that the SS-350 was first tested in November 1993, and then in April 2001. It is not clear if this program has been discontinued, although it is possible that some design work continues as a later upgrade option, probably entering

service around 2010. The ship-launched Dhanush was first tested from INS *Subhadra*, a Sukanya class offshore patrol vessel, in April 2000. The test failed after about 30 seconds of flight. A second test was made in December 2000, and a third in September 2001. The last test is reported to have been over a range of 93 miles (150 km).

Agni I, II, III, and IV, and Surya

By late 2003 three Agni versions were in production or development: Agni I (435-mi. or 700-km range), Agni II (1,243-mi. or 2,000-km range), and Agni III (2,175-mi. or 3,500-km range). The Agni intermediate-range ballistic missile program began around 1979 and first test launched in 1989. No further tests were carried out on the Agni I in the early and mid-1990s by successive governments, in light of international pressure. Partly to placate international concerns, the early Agni I was referred to as a technology demonstrator. This changed with the electoral victory of Prime Minister Atal Vajpayee and his Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) in 1998. In April 1999 the BJP authorized the launch of Agni II. The Agni I was flight tested in January 2002.

Development on a shorter-range Agni (currently called Agni I) began in 1999. The system uses the first stage of the original Agni, developed in the early 1990s, and its warhead assembly. A reduced payload would enable the missile to strike targets 746 mi. (1,200 km) away, sufficient to target all of Pakistan. Agni I has been designed to provide a short reaction time nuclear capability.

The 1,243 miles (2,000 km) range Agni II, first tested in April 1999, is a two-stage solid propellant design, developed from the original Agni demonstrator program from 1997. Agni III is believed to be a two- or three-stage missile, with an official maximum range of 1,864 miles (3,000 km). Agni III could, however have an increased range capability of 3,107 to 3,728 miles (5,000–6,000 km) with improved motors and reduced payloads. A range of around 2,796 miles (4,500 km) would enable India to target Beijing.

It was reported that an Agni IV was on the drawing boards, with a possible range of 3,418 miles (5,500 km), making this an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). It was unclear whether this missile was also the Surya (Sun) that India was working on to create a series of ICBMs, building on the experience of the Agni family. Like the Agni missiles, the Suryas would incorporate propulsion systems developed for India's satellite launch vehicle programs. There were reported to be three variants under consideration: Surya I (or 3,107–3,728 mi. or 5,000–6,000 km) and Surya II (between 4,971–7,456 mi.

or 8,000–12,000 km), and possibly a Surya III (12,427 mi. or 20,000 km). Although there was ambiguity surrounding the designation and range of the ICBMs, India was technologically capable and intent on developing ICBMs.

The first Agni successful test launch was made in May 1989, when a trial missile flew about 621 miles (1,000 km). A second test flight was made in May 1992, which failed. A third test flight was made in February 1994, with a range reported to be 901 miles (1,450 km). In 1995 it was reported that a further five flight tests were planned and that a nuclear warhead design had been prepared.

The Agni II's development began in 1997. The maiden launch occurred in April 1999 from a railcar launcher with a payload of 2,205 pounds (1,000 kg) over a range of 1,429 miles (2,300 km). A second test flight was made in January 2001. Low-rate initial production of the Agni II version began in May 2001. Around five were operational from late 2001. Ten to twelve missiles are produced a year and are operated by the Indian Army Strategic Rocket Regiment, 555 Missile Group. The nuclear warheads are stored at separate locations from the missiles.

The 435-miles (700 km) range Agni I was first flight tested in January 2002. U.S. intelligence reports suggest that the reentry did not separate as planned. A second test was made in January 2003 from a transport erector launcher vehicle, and was reported to have been successful. The Agni I missiles are planned to be delivered to the Indian Army Strategic Rocket Regiment, 444 Missile Group, which also operates the short-range SS-150. Agni III is in full development, and has been ready for its first test flight since 2003. Information on the ICBMs (Agni IV and Surya) is limited.

Cruise Missile

India is placing extensive resources into the development of air- or ship-launched cruise missiles that could be armed with nuclear warheads. The development of nuclear-armed cruise missiles is a natural progression for India, which is seeking to develop various platforms for its nuclear deterrence. Although it is likely to be the latter half of the first decade of the twenty-first century before nuclear-tipped cruise missiles enter service, the technologies are in place to develop this capability in the form of existing programs, notably the antiship PJ-10 BrahMos missile, jointly developed by Russia and India. This appears set to be developed into a nuclear-armed land attack cruise missile launched from air, submarine, and surface ships. BrahMos comes from the Indian and Russian companies Brahmaputra-Moscow Pvt. The

airframe and engine will be manufactured by Machinostroyeniye of Russia.

The antiship version (carrying a high-explosive warhead) incorporates an Indian-developed guidance system and a Russian ram-jet propulsion system. Official Indian sources state that the missile can be launched from a container that can be fitted onto a ship, a submarine, and after modification, to an aircraft. The air-launched version of BrahMos is likely to be carried by Indian air force Su-30MKI fighters. The submarine-launched variant is referred to as the Sagarika, and is likely to be deployed on the new nuclear-powered submarine advanced technology vessel (ATV) that is under development. Some reports refer to Sagarika as the sea-launched ballistic missile (Dhanush). Five ATV vessels are under development and are due to be operational in 2008. Originally the name Sagarika was applied to a project started in 1994 that was canceled in 1996. With the advent of the PJ-10 BrahMos program on the antiship missile front, India now has the option of applying proven Russian technology to the Sagarika project. With the capability to carry a warhead weighing 441 pounds (200 kg), a nuclear-armed version would require what is called "miniaturizing" the nuclear device to fit atop the cruise missile. Nuclear warheads have been developed for the Prithvi and Agni missiles, weighing in the region of 2,205 pounds (1,000 kg).

In November 2004 the antiship BrahMos missile was successfully tested for the sixth time. The first test took place in June 2001 and the missile was scheduled to enter production in 2005. Initial production will focus on the antiship variants carrying a high-explosive warhead, before the land-attack version equipped with a nuclear warhead is developed. In 2005 a nuclear land-attack version, capable of being delivered by sea or air, based on the PJ-10, could be operational, if India can develop a miniaturized nuclear warhead without conducting further nuclear tests. India clearly is capable of and intent on developing a nuclear-tipped air- and sea-launched cruise missile. The delivery mechanism should be in place for India to add this weapon to its nuclear arsenal once it has developed a suitable warhead.

National Security Concerns

Ballistic missiles offer India, as with any other country possessing this capability, certain advantages on the battlefield. Compared to manned aircraft, ballistic missiles cannot be brought down by antiaircraft artillery or surface-to-air-missiles. Once a missile is launched, it is almost certain to reach its target, as long as it does not suffer a technical malfunction. To India, the development of missiles provides an assured means of attacking fixed targets in Pakistan or China. The only real constraints are the range of the missile, the accuracy of the missile,

and the size of the warhead (payload). Consequently, the possession of ballistic missiles by India remains a highly effective means of deterring its opponents. India has ordered from Russia the Antey-2500 SAM ballistic missile defense system for itself, and this system could be complemented by the Israeli Arrow missile defense system, for possible use against missiles with a range of around 932 miles (1,500 km).

Ballistic missiles are most vulnerable during transportation to and preparation at their launch sites. For instance, if the Pakistani military, through their ground and aerial reconnaissance and intelligence gathering, know the location of India's possible Prithvi launch sites near along their border, they could attack these locations before any missiles are launched. The short range of the Prithvi missiles means they would have to be deployed fairly close to the border with Pakistan—around 62 miles (100 km), depending on the variant used. Such close proximity to Pakistan thus raises the spectre of their movements being detected and easily attacked. The Agni, however, could be deployed much deeper inside Indian territory.

There are, however, a few drawbacks to India's ballistic missile capability. Because missiles are not that accurate, they are therefore suited to strike large targets, like cities or known troop concentrations. This is particularly the case for missiles armed with a high-explosive (conventional) warhead. The Prithvi missiles, for instance, have an accuracy of only around 164 feet (50 m). In addition, unlike an aircraft, a ballistic missile cannot search for its target or alter course during its flight. Missiles are thus suitable only for static targets whose location is known prior to launch. Second, ballistic missiles are not reusable, unlike aircraft that can be used for multiple missions (although used armaments must be replaced). Third, aircraft can be recalled during their mission. A ballistic missile, once launched, has only one option: to reach its predetermined target.

Despite these drawbacks, New Delhi considers its missiles of great value as a nuclear deterrent. Since the early 1990s, India and Pakistan have made considerable progress in developing ballistic missiles that are capable of carrying nuclear warheads. As was the case with the United States and the Soviet Union during the cold war, India and Pakistan both view their nuclear-capable ballistic missiles as essential nuclear deterrents and thus as a source of maintaining stability in South Asia.

Were they ever to launch a nuclear strike, India and Pakistan would likely target each other's cities. Pakistan is also capable of launching a significant nuclear strike, having developed two main ballistic missile programs. First, there is the Shaheen family based on Chinese designs: 466-miles (750 km) range Shaheen

I/Hatf IV (operational); 1,553-miles (2,500 km) range Shaheen II (ready to flight test); and possibly a 1,864-miles (3,000 km) range Shaheen III (in development). Second are the North Korean-based Ghauri missiles: 932-miles (1,500 km) range Ghauri I/Hatf V (operational); 1,429-miles (2,300 km) range Ghauri II/ Hatf VI (flight tested); and the 1,864-miles (3,000 km) range Ghauri III (in development). In addition, Pakistan received from China in 1992 around 30 M-11 (CSS-7/DF-11) missiles with a range of 174 miles (280 km). It is believed that Pakistan is indigenously developing this missile as the Hatf III/Ghaznavi. All these missiles systems can carry nuclear warheads.

Neither New Delhi nor Islamabad seeks an arms race in the cold war sense: their ongoing ballistic missile programs are more of an arms "crawl." The key goal has been and remains the ability to convince each other that one could launch a nuclear attack against the other's city, if required, even if one had already been attacked by a nuclear weapon(s). The ability to strike back after first succumbing to a nuclear strike is known as "second strike capability" and requires effective nuclear command and control mechanisms that could survive a nuclear strike. This is an important issue, since Islamabad has stated that it reserves the right to launch a nuclear attack first (most likely by a ballistic missile to ensure a successful strike) should it believe the attack necessary for its survival. Should, for instance, Indian troops cross into Pakistan, New Delhi would be justified in fearing that Pakistan might be tempted to launch a preemptive nuclear strike, should Islamabad perceive its national survival under threat. Pakistan views its nuclear weapons as essential to compensate for its weakness in nonnuclear forces, where India holds a numerical and technological advantage. Islamabad's refusal to follow India's decision to adopt a policy of "no first use" in 1998 was due to Pakistan's concerns that such a stance could create a destabilising military imbalance between the two nations.

An intriguing dimension to India's missile developments is the strong influence of the nation's missile scientists in continuing to develop longer range and more sophisticated ballistic missiles because they can and desire to build them. The process in which technology drives developments is known as technological determinism. The pursuit of technological achievements may have worked well in India's initial pursuit of ballistic missiles, but now that a minimum nuclear deterrent has been accomplished, maintaining and augmenting the existing capabilities is arguably all that is required. But India's scientists do not want to stop there, thinking rather of developing longer-range nuclear-tipped missiles, including ICBMs.

Indian officials are already speaking openly about work on the Agni IV, which could have a range in excess of 3,418 miles (5,500 km), providing India with an ICBM capability and a nuclear warhead of at least 160,000 tons (160 kilotons). India's development of such long-range missiles runs the risk of initiating a dangerous new round of nuclear tests by India and Pakistan.

Ben Sheppard

See also Ballistic Missile Defenses; Nuclear Programs and Policies; Nuclear Weapons Testing and Development; Weapons Production and Procurement

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Chengappa, Raj. *Weapons of Peace: The Secret Story of India's Quest to Be a Nuclear Power*. New Delhi: HarperCollins India, 2000. A detailed insight into the emergence of India's missile programs.
- Karp, Aaron. *Ballistic Missile Proliferation*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1996. A good general introduction to ballistic missile proliferation.
- Lennox, Duncan. *Jane's Strategic Weapons Systems*. Coulsdon, U.K.: Jane's Information Group, 2003. Details the specifications and hardware of ballistic missiles.
- Mistry, Dinshaw. *Containing Missile Proliferation*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2003. Looks at India's program in the general issue of missile proliferation and international attempts to curtail their developments.
- Sheppard, Ben, ed. *Special Report: Ballistic Missile Proliferation*. Coulsdon, U.K.: Jane's Information Group, 2000. An overview of missile proliferation; based on the 1999 Jane's Ballistic Missile Proliferation Conference.
- Thomas, Raju G. C., and D. R. SarDesai, eds. *Nuclear India in the Twenty-first Century*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. Contains an in-depth chapter by Ben Sheppard into the ramifications of missile proliferation in South Asia.

BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSES Ballistic missile defenses constitute the strategic paradigm that introduces new possibilities of evolving strategic defenses against ballistic missiles carrying nuclear, chemical, or biological payloads, known as weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The post-cold war strategic environment is a transformed landscape of new nuclear powers who have acquired the requisite technical capabilities, with varying sophistication and diverse strategic intents and interests. The new strategic environment has replaced the previous deterrence logic of mutual assured destruction with a focus on war-fighting capabilities and intents. Ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons have become the new means to accentuate military escalation and brinkmanship, available to the new nuclear missile powers, which include India and Pakistan.

The Strategic and Technological Imperatives of Ballistic Missile Defenses

Ballistic missile defense systems in their evolving technological architecture constitute a layered defense that can be divided into four distinct areas. First, the lower-tier systems are designed to defend against short-range threats, such as short-range ballistic missiles (SRBMs), cruise missiles, and aircraft deployed in the land-based Patriot Advanced Capability-3 the Israeli Arrow system, the Russian S-300V and S-300VM systems, and S-300 PMU and the sea-based systems of the SM-3 class and its derivatives of the Navy Area Wide Missile Defenses. The second, upper-tier systems are designed to defend against medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) intercepting at the edge of or outside Earth's atmosphere, or the Theater High Altitude Air Defense and the Navy Theater Wide Missile systems. Third, the U.S. National Missile Defense system features deployment of interceptors of longer range and speed to intercept intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) attacks and defend the homeland. These systems would intercept offensive missiles at the apex of their ballistic curve above the atmosphere.

Finally, the Boost-Phase Intercept (BPI) systems are designed to attack a missile shortly after it is launched, before it exits into the atmosphere. The range of BPI systems includes an airborne laser, with a converted Boeing 747 and an oxygen-iodine chemical laser to shoot down missiles in their ascent phase. The second BPI system would be an unmanned aerial vehicle to launch high-speed airborne interceptors now being developed by the United States and Israel. The third system is a space-based laser that could be deployed in a constellation of twenty satellites, each equipped with a hydrogen-fluoride chemical laser and onboard sensing and surveillance equipment, employed to shoot down targeted missiles in their boost phase. The fourth option would be the forward-deployed Aegis ships deploying the Navy Theater Wide system, which would be deployed in conjunction with Navy Area Wide Missile Defenses.

The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972 had envisaged a limited antimissile capability for the United States and the Soviet Union. It was abrogated unilaterally by the United States, citing the emergence of foreign missile threats. U.S. missile defense efforts have been designed to neutralize the missile arsenals of the states of concern, which may attempt to redress their comparative declining national power and their containment by U.S. strategic power through missiles and weapons of mass destruction.



Missiles aloft an Indian Naval Vessel. In India, the debate on missile defenses continues, with the present government hoping to strike a balance between adequate conventional weaponry and a robust nuclear force in the face of any threat from nearby Pakistan or China. INDIA TODAY.

South Asian Nuclear and Ballistic Missile Balance

South Asia features a triangulation of nuclear and missile deployments by China, India, and Pakistan that are enmeshed in a high-intensity strategic arms buildup, premised on stubborn national policies that defy attempts at stabilization. China and Pakistan would be the revisionist powers opposed to missile defenses that neutralize their nuclear status quo. India is more subtle, and would welcome stabilization measures emanating from an optimal missile defense system that would be technologically proficient, inducing a psychological deterrent against Pakistan's potential missile rattling. India is, however, concerned about the ramifications of a U.S. Theater Missile Defenses (TMD) in Northeast Asia, as that could spur Chinese missile modernization and quantitative buildup of its intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and ICBMs, having targeting consequences against India.

The regional cascade dynamics in the Middle East and Northeast Asia and its spillage into South Asia has resulted in second-tier nuclear missile proliferation, and it

could trigger quantum revisions of the prevalent nuclear missile asymmetries to India's disadvantage, spurring India to further nuclear and missile tests and activating serial deployment options of its IRBM and ICBM missiles of the Agni class. Missile defense deployments by India at the lower tier would lead to its saturation by large numbers of SRBMs in the Pakistani inventories, transferred by China. Cruise missiles constitute the next template in ballistic missile defenses. Cruise missiles are faster air-breathing vehicles that are capable of carrying WMD payloads. The BrahMos, C-801 and C-802 are the emerging types that would equip the Indian and Pakistani arsenals that are sea- and air-launched variants with antiship attack roles. The possibilities of their technological adaptation into land-attack modes with nuclear/WMD payloads are not ruled out. The Novator 3M-54E1 Klub-S (SS-N-27) to be inducted into the Indian navy in 2008 would be a dedicated land-attack cruise missile.

The nuclear missile forces of India, Pakistan, and China that constitutes the South Asian Triangulation are small and medium arsenals, with the Chinese nuclear missile arsenal being a medium-sized force with triad charac-

teristics. The impact of a limited Theater Missile Defense in the region would have a triangulation of consequences: India's acquisition of a limited missile defense capability would likely erode the Pakistani nuclear deterrent and would prompt Pakistan to increase its number of missiles and nuclear warheads. Pakistan resolutely opposes the missile defense technology, and given its limited resources would prefer more offensive missiles than any missile defense system. Indian preference for an Arrow-2 and the S-300 V, S-300 VM, and S-300 PMU, along with its Akash missile, could provide a layered defense that might erode Pakistani air-deliverable nuclear warheads by F-16 fighter-attack aircraft, and could force Pakistan to deploy more transferred Chinese and North Korean missiles of deeper range and faster reentry speed in quantities to overwhelm any Indian advantages.

China could react to an India-U.S. convergence on missile defenses by: preference of a joint missile defense network with Russia, employing the proven S-300 V and S-300 VM systems; simultaneously increasing the number of its deployable nuclear warheads and delivery vehicles by adopting multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle technology. The cumulative impact of these would erode any limited Indian missile defense and could prompt India to resume testing and to increase its deployment options of the Agni IIB IRBM, with ranges targeting China.

India and China would prefer to safeguard their respective second-strike capabilities and assets with a limited missile defense system, and would respectively prefer the Russian missile defense network with other options. India and China would prefer to engage with the United States on its missile defenses plans in terms of diplomatic and strategic postures.

India's Nuclear Doctrine and Its Force Posture

India's nuclear posture is premised as a force-in-being and rests on a quartet of deterrence that would be credible and minimalist; disarmament that seeks eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons; diplomacy premised on multilateralism and de-alerting of nuclear forces with a "no-first-use" (NFU) treaty. India's NFU policy is entwined with its assured retaliatory capability premised on a triad structure for its nuclear forces. Its premise of employment would arise out of nuclear coercion or use by its adversaries. India's assured retaliatory capability would emerge from a high degree of mobility and dispersal of its nuclear warheads. India prefers to employ nuclear weapons in a mode of deterrence or punishment, using procedures that are reliable and suitable to Indian conditions, ensuring high levels of civilian custody, with a secure role for the Indian armed forces. India prefers an effective nuclear targeting strategy to determine the nature and quantum of any retaliatory strike.

India's nuclear doctrine emphasizes delayed but assured retaliation. India's nuclear deterrent hinges on its credibility and certainty of retaliation. It is also defined by the quantum of retaliation. This certainty factor would be assured by the extent of dispersal of India's nuclear forces, and their ability to recover from a first strike and to deliver unacceptable damage to the aggressor.

India's nuclear missile force posture has been reinforced into operational effectiveness by the constitution of the Strategic Forces Command and the National Command Authority in January 2003. However, India's NFU policy would be notional, given the dynamics of its operational milieu. In the context of a limited missile defense shield, India's nuclear missile posture could graduate into a first-strike force with assured retaliatory capabilities.

Options for Ballistic Missile Defenses: A Net Assessment for India

India's options for ballistic missile defenses widen with the growing nuclear missile proliferation in its region. An arc of multiple missile threats confronts India. The arc ranges from China in the north, to the U.S. missile-armed fleets in the Indian Ocean, to Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and Iran in the west, all equipped with MRBMs and IRBMs that could target India. India's quest for missile defenses emanates from prevalent instability introduced by Pakistan's missiles, and the missile rattling of its coercive diplomacy against India. Pakistani readiness for a first strike undermines the Indian force-in-being posture that has its emphasis on the de-alert status of its nuclear missile forces. The rapid escalation spiral and the persistent Pakistani initiative to escalate induce considerable irrationality, undermining the deterrence logic.

Geographical contiguity, brief missile flight times, the lack of omnidirectional surveillance, and the lack of institutionalized nuclear risk reduction measures with verification and monitoring systems in place necessitate the imperative for a limited ballistic missile defense system that has inbuilt components of tracking and surveillance to act as a rapid response system in the event of any surprise or inadvertent launches by Pakistan.

The challenge of strategic offense versus strategic defense has been a universal dilemma that has plagued the deterrence debate. India's dilemma increases with the increase of hostile multiple missile threats with nuclear payloads. India's inevitable resort to ballistic missile defenses remains a crucial necessity; its challenge lies in potential priorities for India between a robust minimal nuclear deterrence built around its manned aircraft and its land-based missile force with sea-based deterrence to be in place in the long run. India's priorities would therefore have to be with the certitude of assured retaliation,

along with a credible conventional force posture that could dissuade Pakistan of any escalatory potential and effectively deter China. The Indian debate in missile defenses and its nuclear force posture would concern maintaining an optimal balance between conventional weapons and a robust nuclear force with limited missile defense capability and technological affordability.

W. Lawrence S. Prabhakar

See also **Ballistic and Cruise Missile Development; Nuclear Programs and Policies; Nuclear Weapons Testing and Development; Weapons Production and Procurement**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Chellaney, Brahma. "New Delhi's Dilemma." *Washington Quarterly* 23, no. 3 (2000): 135–144.
- Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States. Executive Summary Report to Congress. Washington, D.C.: GPO, 15 July 1998.
- Cordesman, Anthony H. *Strategic Threats and National Missile Defenses: Defending the U.S. Homeland*. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies; Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2002.
- Eisendrath, Craig, et al. *The Phantom Defense: America's Pursuit of the Star Wars Illusion*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 2001.
- Feickert, Andrew, and Alan K. Kronstadt. *Missile Proliferation and the Strategic Balance in South Asia*. CRS Report for Congress, RL 32115. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 17 October 2003.
- Kampani, Gaurav. "How a U.S. National Missile Defense Will Affect South Asia." CNS Reports, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies, May 2002. Available at <<http://cns.mii.edu/pubs/reports/usmsia.htm>>
- Kan, Shirley. *China and Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction and Missiles: Policy Issues*. CRS Report for Congress, RL 31555. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 23 January 2003.
- Koblentz, Gregory. "Theater Missile Defense and South Asia: A Volatile Mix." *Nonproliferation Review* 4, no. 3 (Spring–Summer 1997): 54–62.
- Krepon, Michael. "Missile Defense and the Asian Cascade." In *The Impact of U.S. Ballistic Missile Defenses on Southern Asia*, edited by Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne. Report no. 46. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2002.
- Prabhakar, W. Lawrence S. "The Challenge of Minimal Nuclear Deterrence." In *The Impact of U.S. Ballistic Missile Defenses on Southern Asia*, edited by Michael Krepon and Chris Gagne. Report no. 46. Washington, D.C.: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2002.
- Russell, Richard L. "Swords and Shields: Ballistic Missiles and Defenses in the Middle East and South Asia." *Orbis* (Summer 2002): 483–498.
- "Russian and Israeli Means of Non-strategic Anti-missile Defence for India." *Vayu Aerospace Review* (Society of Aerospace Studies) 3 (2003): 69–70.
- Sidhu, Waheguru Pal Singh. "The Implications for Postures and Capabilities in South Asia." In *Missile Proliferation and Defences: Problems and Prospects*. Occasional Paper no. 7. Special Joint Series on Missile Issues. Monterey, Calif.: Center for Nonproliferation Studies; Southampton, U.K.: Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, University of Southampton, 2001.
- Slocombe Walter. *Missile Defense in Asia*. Policy Paper. Washington, D.C.: Atlantic Council, 2003.
- Tanks, David R. *National Missile Defense: Policy Issues and Technological Capabilities*. Cambridge, Mass.: Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, 2000.
- Tellis, Ashley J. *India's Emerging Nuclear Posture: Between Recessed Deterrent and Ready Arsenal*. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 2001.

BALUCHAR SARI The Baluchar sari derives its name from the village of its origin, which is situated on the banks of the river Bhagirathi in the Murshidabad district of Bengal. Patronized by the aristocratic Jain traders and merchants who settled and flourished there in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Baluchar style acquired a special place among the traditional saris of India.

The uniqueness of this sari is as much in its design concept as in its weaving technique. Multicolored motifs emerge on the ground through the introduction of extra wefts of floss silk with the help of small shuttles. The weavers could create the desired pattern on the draw loom (*naqsh* loom) with the help of several draw boys, who would lift the thread with harness cords, to pass the extra weft. Later, these looms were replaced by the jacquard. What distinguishes the Baluchar from other brocades is the complexity of its design, executed in silk on silk without gold or metal thread, setting it apart even among the various rich brocades of India.

The most distinguishing feature of the Baluchar sari is the intricate design of its large *pallu* (end of the sari). Most saris produced and worn in Bengal have a comparatively simple *pallu*, which is arranged vertically from the shoulder when draped. The Baluchar, on the other hand, has an elaborate *pallu*, more like the heavy *pallu* of the saris from Gujarat, where women preferred to exhibit the richly decorated *pallu* in the front, and where the Jain patrons of Murshidabad had originally lived. These saris were also exported to Gujarat. The plain or *butidar* (with a small floral motif) ground is bounded by a floral border along the entire length of both sides. The *pallu*, at the end, is decorated with an elaborate design, arranged in rectangles around a row of large *kalga*, or paisley motifs. The decorations on these rectangles consist of human figures, such as noblemen smoking a *buqqa*, a king or a nobleman riding an elephant, or a lady holding a flower; some even depict couples, wearing European dress, seated in a railway carriage, or European soldiers carrying cannons, revealing the influence of European trade contacts. In

some cases, the row of figures is repeated on all four sides of the rectangle; the figures change direction so that they will be in the correct position when the sari is worn, involving a great deal of work on the part of the weaver, who had to retie the leashes of the pattern harness. One of the central paisleys is sometimes a different color from the rest, functioning as a *nazarbattu* to ward off the evil eye. Generally, these saris are purple, maroon, red, blue, or yellow, but occasionally they are made of two tones, using different colors of warp and weft.

Later, other important centers of Baluchar saris also developed at Kasimbazar, Ajimganj, Jiaganj, and Baharampur in West Bengal. The tradition of the Baluchar sari almost disappeared in the early twentieth century after the death of the famous master weaver Dubraj Das and his contemporaries. However, it was revived in the late twentieth century with incentives offered by the government. A much simplified version of the Baluchar sari is now in vogue.

Kalpana Desai

See also **Brocade**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Dhamija, Jasleen, ed. *The Woven Silks of India*. Mumbai: Marg, 1995.
- Lynton, Linda. *The Sari: Styles, Patterns, History, Techniques*. Singapore: Thames and Hudson, 1995.
- Riboud, Krishna, ed. *In Quest of Themes and Skills: Asian Textiles*. Mumbai: Marg, 1989.
- Singh, Martand. *Saris of India: Bihar and West Bengal*. New Delhi: Wiley Eastern, 1995.

BALUCHISTAN AND THE NORTH-WEST FRONTIER When Abdul “Badshah” Ghaffar Khan’s son Wali Khan, one of the best-known leaders of the North-West Frontier province, was asked to define his identity, he replied: “I am first a Pukhtun tribesman, then a Muslim, and finally a Pakistani.” He explained that the Pukhtun tribe was several thousand years old, while Islam was just fourteen hundred years old, and Pakistan a mere half century in age. The tensions between ethnicity, religion, and state create tensions in the tribal groups of this area and have never really been resolved.

Historical Background

The tribal groups who inhabit the Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier provinces are largely Baluch and Pukhtun, or Pushtun (the southern tribes pronounce “kh” as “sh”). They have rightly gained a reputation for being fiercely independent people. At the height of the British Empire, Rudyard Kipling wrote his famous poem

“The Ballad of East and West” in which he pointed out “the twain shall never meet.” Yet Kipling made an exception to his own imperial rule in the people of this area:

But there is neither East nor West, Border, nor
Breed, nor Birth,

When two strong men stand face to face,
though they come from the ends of the earth.

Baluch and Pukhtun tribes have resisted the authority of central governments from the time history was first written. Delhi, before the creation of Pakistan, and Islamabad afterward have had to face the reality of turbulent tribes along a largely undefined international border. Some of the world’s most renowned historical figures have therefore played their part on this stage—Alexander the Great, Timur, Babur, Aurangzeb, Lord George Curzon, Sir Winston Churchill, Mahatma M.K. Gandhi, and Mohammad Ali Jinnah.

Pukhtun tribes in the Khyber Pass shattered the imperial army of Aurangzeb, the great Mughal emperor, in 1672. Ten thousand Mughals were killed and twenty thousand captured. Across the border in Afghanistan, Pukhtun tribesmen decimated an entire British army called the Grand Army of the Indus. One sole survivor, half-demented and half-dead, appeared on a cold January morning at the Jalalabad garrison.

Treaties and Agreements

By the end of the nineteenth century, the British had enough experience of the tribes of this area to introduce significant administrative changes. Treaties and agreements, which guaranteed a large degree of autonomy, were signed with Baluch and Pukhtun tribes in order to pacify them. The Durand Boundary Commission was formed in 1894 to demarcate the borders between Afghanistan and British India. It came to be called the Durand Line after the British officer who was responsible for its demarcation. As the boundary passed through tribes, often cutting them in half, Afghanistan has disputed the Durand Line. The North-West Frontier province was created in 1901. Within the province there would be a special administrative category called the Tribal Areas. The civil and criminal procedure codes of British India would not apply to the Tribal Areas. The government’s writ extended to a hundred yards on either side of the main road. Tribesmen could live their lives according to their own custom and tradition, or *riwaj*.

The Tribal Areas helped to contain but could not eliminate the problem of recalcitrant tribesmen for the British. A policy of “carrot and stick” was administered by some of the finest political officers drawn from the elite Indian Civil Service. Nonetheless, the tribes were

inclined to launch a tribal or religious war at the slightest provocation. During the 1930s there were twenty-eight British battalions in Waziristan—more troops than on the rest of the subcontinent.

In contrast to the Tribal Areas in the new province, there were also settled districts with regular laws and administration. New districts were created such as Hazara. The people of Hazara were a mixture of Pukhtun and Punjabis. In time the district of Hazara created a distinct ethnicity called after the district itself—Hazarawal. The creation of a wholly new ethnicity is a phenomenon, suggesting the need for study by social scientists.

A certain romance developed in British literature regarding these tribesmen. They were seen as independent, courageous, and even honorable. While the British treated other Indians as little more than subjugated natives, the tribesmen along the Durand border were cast in a different light; indeed, they were considered the nearest thing to the “noble savage.”

British officers grew to respect these tribes. John Masters, who served in Waziristan and later became a well-known novelist—his *Bhowani Junction* was made into a film with Stewart Granger and Ava Gardner—described these tribes as “physically the hardest people on earth” (Masters, p. 161). The following note, written as a confidential memorandum by a senior political officer, illustrates this respect:

I spoke above of political officers as the custodians of civilization dealing with barbarians. Against this definition, if he were to hear it, I am sure that Mehr Dar, or any other intelligent Mahsud Malik, would emphatically protest. Their argument, which is not altogether in a subconscious plane, may be stated thus—“A civilization has no other end than to produce a fine type of man. Judged by this standard the social system in which the Mahsud has been evolved must be allowed immeasurably to surpass all others. Therefore let us keep our independence and have none of your *qanun* [law] and your other institutions which have wrought such havoc in British India, but stick to our own *riwaj* [custom] and be men like our fathers before us.” After prolonged and intimate dealings with the Mahsuds I am not at all sure that, with reservations, I do not subscribe to their plea. (Howell, p. xii)

The jostling for power between imperial Britain, Russia, and China naturally involved the tribes of this area because of the undefined nature of the international border, the toughness of the terrain, and the fierceness of the tribes. Besides, Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier province contained the two important passes into India:

the Bolan Pass in the former province and the Khyber Pass in the latter. The government in Delhi based its military and political policy on the assumption that Russia would be tempted to drive through these passes in its search for the warm water ports of the Indian Ocean.

Great Game

The British called the political contest between the imperial powers the Great Game. The Game became an analogy and even extension of the public school ethos that dominated the elite ruling class of Victorian England. Every government in the region in one way or the other was involved in playing the Game. Even the boy Kim in one of Kipling’s most famous novels becomes a player. The tribesmen too maneuvered within the Great Game. It was not difficult for them to play off Delhi, later Islamabad, against Kabul. A tribal leader summed it up thus: “We are like men with two jealous wives—both pulling us in their direction. Sometime we prefer one, sometimes the other.”

Their participation in the Great Game allowed the tribesmen to continue political maneuvering after the creation of Pakistan in 1947. The Baluch have never quite given up the dream of an independent Greater Baluchistan, nor have the Pukhtun abandoned that of Pukhtunistan. Baluch leaders like the Khan of Kalat claim that Baluchis live in an area of over 3 million square miles (7.8 sq. km), the core of which is the province of Baluchistan itself, and total about 30 million people in number. Although the idea of creating a new state based on ethnicity remains a powerful one, the states from which it would be carved—Pakistan Afghanistan, Iraq, and Iran—have vigorously opposed it.

The British, on the basis of trial and error, had several policies toward these two provinces and what lay beyond. At first, the British more or less left the tribesmen to their own devices. They called this policy one of “masterly inactivity.” This was followed by greater involvement, and the policy was named “conciliatory intervention.” A more aggressive “close border policy” followed. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the British were implementing what came to be called the “forward policy.” Some of these policies created a straightforward clash between two different civilizations. Villages, water tanks, and grain stores were destroyed in what came to be known as “butcher and bolt” raids. The tribesmen therefore rejected modernization—schools, electricity, and roads—as they associated it with the imperial British.

The reluctance to accept modern development schemes did not change once the political dynamic was revamped after the creation of Pakistan in 1947. But the fact that Pakistan was a self-consciously Muslim country

helped to ease the tension in the relationship between the state and the tribes. Thousands drifted to the cities. In time, Karachi would become the largest Pukhtun city in the world in terms of population. Pakistan's policy toward Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier province has alternated between benign neglect and crude aggressiveness. In the 1970s the Tribal Areas of Baluchistan saw a particularly brutal military adventure. This has not prevented Baluch and Pukhtuns from emerging as prominent figures in Pakistan itself. Indeed, at least two heads of state have come from the North-West Frontier province. Mir Zafarullah Khan Jamali, from Baluchistan, was elected prime minister in 2002.

Economy and Society

Both Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier province are sparsely populated. Temperatures can go beyond 120 degrees Fahrenheit (49°C) in the summer and below freezing in the winter. It is a land of high mountains and deep ravines. Although there are valleys with limited agricultural land, the terrain is usually harsh and rainfall is limited to a few inches. Settlements are few and far between. The geography of these areas cannot sustain standing armies or feudal social structures headed by affluent leaders. Taxes are neither demanded nor given. An egalitarian ethos is therefore prevalent among the tribes.

A developed code of behavior, sometimes called the code of honor, pervades Baluch and Pukhtun society. Among the Baluch this code is called the *Baluchiat* and among the Pukhtun it is called *Pukhtunwali*, or "the way of the Baluch" and "the way of the Pukhtun," respectively. The idea and practice of hospitality, revenge, and upholding the honor of the tribe are important elements in these codes. Folk literature is replete with references to these codes. There is a Baluch war ballad going back to the sixteenth century that sums up the sense of tribal independence backed by formidable terrain: "The lofty heights are our comrades and the pathless gorges our friends."

Baluchistan harbors a sense of grievance against Islamabad. In size Baluchistan is about 44 percent of the total area of Pakistan. Its population, however, is only 5 percent of the entire population of Pakistan. Islamabad bureaucrats, quick to seize an advantage, have tended to ignore the first fact and concentrate on the second when allocating funds to the province. In addition, the dominating province of Punjab, which has about 60 percent of Pakistan's population but only 26 percent of the area, has tended to send people to settle in and administer Baluchistan, causing further resentment.

There are, however, differences between Baluch and Pukhtun social structure. The chief, called the *sirdar*,

dominates the Baluch tribes. Although he has little economic power to back him, tribal tradition ensures his status and authority. He provides a rudimentary form of justice in disputes. He provides leadership against the enemy and protection in challenging times. In time the *sirdar* became identified with the tribe itself. Some, like the *khan* of Kalat, were able to convert a tribal base into a full-fledged state recognized by the British. Some *sirdars* are called after the tribe itself, like the Marri and the Bugti in the Tribal Areas of Baluchistan.

Among the Pukhtun, leadership is quite different. There is a stronger tradition of individual independence. While certain elders may emerge through their wisdom or bravery, their authority still remains restricted. Decisions are made on the basis of the *Jirga*, or the council of elders. This makes for independent tribesmen who fiercely guard their independence but also for a perpetual state of anarchy. Anthropologists have referred to this kind of society as "ordered anarchy."

There are non-Muslim groups living in both Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier province. Hindu groups have lived in Baluchistan for a long time, even in the Tribal Areas. The tribe protects these groups, and their honor is identified with the honor of the tribe. The Bugti tribe has a prominent Hindu group attached to it, which has adopted the dress and code of the tribe. At one stage, the tribe successfully fielded a Hindu for the provincial assembly seat. He was known by his Hindu name, with his tribal affiliation as an honorary Bugti attached to it.

In the North-West Frontier province, the Kalash, usually called the *Kafirs* or unbelievers, have not been so fortunate. A small group who according to legend are descended from Alexander's troops, they are constantly subject to attempts at conversion to Islam. Earlier Amir Abdur Rahman, the "Iron Amir" of Afghanistan, converted the *Kafir* living on the Afghan side of the border by the sword. He renamed their land from *Kafiristan*, the land of the *Kafirs*, to *Nooristan*, the land of light. Kipling's *The Man Who Would Be King*, which was made into a film starring Sean Connery and Michael Caine, is set among the Kalash. The group faces an uncertain future in a region which itself is on the threshold of major change.

The Future of Tribal Society

In the early part of the twenty-first century, the tribal societies of Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier provinces are facing serious challenges to their identity. These challenges are both external and internal. Modern technological developments have succeeded in penetrating even the most inaccessible areas. Many of the bigger

settlements now have generators for electricity and therefore access to television, computers, and the Internet. Thus modern images, alien and often disturbing, are now available locally. These images clash with traditional ideas of behavior and attitudes toward social life.

The war in Afghanistan in the 1980s against the Soviets and the ongoing war of the United States against the Taliban, which began in 2001, have affected these areas. The Baluch generally and the Pukhtun in particular are sympathetic to the local tribesmen and are opposed to any foreign intervention. There are strong rumors of American incursions in the Tribal Areas, which has caused deep unrest. The Pakistan army, aiding the Americans, has set up posts in large numbers for the first time in history along the international border in the Tribal Areas. This intrusion has caused deep resentment and heated discussion in the areas.

One result of the unhappiness with Pakistan's alliance with America was the vote given to the religious parties in the two provinces in the elections held in 2002. Religious parties have never made significant inroads traditionally because of the nature of the social structure of the tribes. This time, however, religious parties swept the polls, particularly in the North-West Frontier province. Religious leaders have once again gained ascendancy over the traditional tribal elders by talking of a holy war against the infidel. This has encouraged the mood of defiance against America—and by extension, anything associated with Westernization, such as films and videos.

Internally, members of the young generation want more change and more authority. Many would like to benefit from the educational system of the rest of the country. Some would like to be involved in the mainstream politics of the nation. In particular, the role of women will act as a catalyst in the future. Most women would like to preserve their traditions but want to assert their right to be educated and participate in social and even political life.

Tribalism in these areas appears to be a blessing and an affliction. While it has provided stability through unstable times, it has also created dilemmas and sometimes impossible challenges. Now that the twenty-first century is poised to penetrate one of the most closed societies of the world, it is to be seen whether the tribesmen can remain “men like our fathers before us.”

Akbar Ahmed

See also **Islam's Impact on India; Pakistan**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ahmed, Akbar S. *Resistance and Control in Pakistan*. London: Routledge, 1991. Rev. ed., 2004.

———. *Pakistan Society: Islam, Ethnicity and Leadership in South Asia*. Karachi and New York: Oxford University Press, 1986.

Caroe, Olaf. *The Pathans: 550 B.C.—A.D. 1957*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1983.

Howell, Evelyn. *Mizb: A Monograph on Government's Relations with the Mahsud Tribe*. 1931. Reprint, Karachi and New York: Oxford University Press, 1979.

Kipling, Rudyard. *Kim*. 1901. Reprint, New York: Heritage Press, 1962.

Masters, John. *Bugles and a Tiger*. London: M. Joseph, 1956.

“BANDE MATARAM” Written between 1872 and 1875 by the Bengali author Bankim Chandra Chatterji (1838–1894), “Bande Mataram” (Hail to thee, mother) was a poem consisting of twelve lines in two stanzas. It was expanded when it appeared in his Bengali-language novel *Anandamath* (Abbey of bliss) in 1882. The novel was first serialized in the literary journal *Bangadarshan*, which Chatterji founded in 1872, between 1880 and 1882. Chatterji was from an orthodox Brahman family and was educated at Hooghli College, Presidency College, and the University of Calcutta, where he studied law and was one of the first graduating class. From 1858 until his retirement in 1891, he was a member of the Indian Civil Service, retiring as a deputy magistrate.

Chatterji, the author of over a dozen novels, wrote first in English, then in his native Bengali. *Anandamath* was a patriotic tale of Hindu rebellion against the British by the Sannyasis (Shudras who usually worshiped Shiva) in Bengal and Bihar between 1762 and 1774. Their slogan was “*Om Vande Mataram*.” *Anandamath* was made into a play in 1883 and translated into Hindi in 1905, and then into English in 1906 by Sri Aurobindo (1872–1950) before being translated into other Indian languages. Music was composed for the poem by Jadu Bhatta, who was the music teacher of future Nobel laureate Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941). Tagore himself is usually credited with composing the music in 1882. He sang it on a phonograph record that was first produced in 1905.

For Chatterji, Hinduism and nationalism were synonymous, and his novels and essays became an inspiration to nationalists at the turn of the century, especially at the time of the partition of Bengal in 1905. The song was banned in Bengal by Sir Bampfylde Fuller (1854–1935), the lieutenant-governor of East Bengal and Assam (1905–1906), on 7 November 1905, as it was considered an incitement to violence. The ban was imposed until 1911 and it was reimposed between 1930 and 1937. It was first sung by the Indian National Congress at their twenty-first annual meeting held in 1905 at Benares (Varanasi). It became exceedingly popular among Hindus and was described in 1907 by Sri Aurobindo in the journal *Vande Mataram* as a “mantra”: “The *mantra* had been given and

in a single day a whole people had been converted to the religion of patriotism.” It was sung outside the court-house by supporters at the sedition trial of Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856–1920) in 1909 and became the national anthem of the Indian National Congress during the nationalist struggle for independence and was sung at its meetings. As its author, Chatterji is considered one of India’s nationalist heroes.

The controversial nature of the song lay in the fact that the identification of the “mother” with India, which was redolent of Hinduism, was found objectionable by Muslims. The criticism was taken to heart by the Indian National Congress at a time when there was a great deal of discussion about what should be the national anthem. At Calcutta on 28 October 1937, the Congress Working Committee recommended that only the first two stanzas of “Bande Mataram” should be sung at national gatherings and that the organizers of the conference could substitute or add any other song that was “of an unobjectionable character.” Nonetheless, “Bande Mataram” continued to offend Muslims and constituted one more piece of evidence that Congress rule would mean “Hindu rule” in an independent India. It therefore played a role in the Pakistan movement.

When it came time for India to decide on a national anthem, “Bande Mataram,” in spite of its popularity and its role in the freedom movement, was not chosen. Instead, “Janaganamana Adhinayaka” (The morning song of India), written by Tagore in 1911 and sung at the second day’s sitting of the Indian National Congress Annual Session at Calcutta the same year and published in 1912, became India’s national anthem in 1950. It had been adopted by Subhash Chandra Bose’s (1897–1945) Indian National Army, founded in 1943. It was, ironically, claimed that “Janaganamana” was composed to commemorate the visit of King George V to India in 1911 and was sung at his *durbār*. This claim was denied by Tagore, and the song is not mentioned in the *durbār* program. “Bande Mataram” was, however, according to Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) in a speech in 1950, honored equally and accorded equal status. This decision met with considerable opposition at the time by people who favored “Bande Mataram” as the national anthem. In the 1990s the Hindu Bharatiya Janata Party called for its adoption as India’s national anthem.

Roger D. Long

See also **Bose, Netaji Subhash Chandra; Chatterji, Bankim Chandra; Tagore, Rabindranath**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bhattacharya, Sabyasachi. *Vande Mataram: The Biography of a Song*. New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2003.

Gadgil, Amarendra Laxman. *Vande Mataram (The Song Perennial)*. Pune: Gokul Masik Prakashan, 1977.

Sen, Prabodhchandra. *India’s National Anthem*. 1949. Reprint, Kolkata: Visva-Bharati, 1972.


BANDHANI The earliest form of surface decoration using dyes on textiles was based on the technique of tying the cloth with threads before dyeing. Though the tie-dye technique, called *bandhani*, may have originated accidentally, it evolved into an art, perfected by dyers who created intricate patterns. The antiquity of this tradition (c. 1000 B.C.) was established by the location of a textile fragment showing evidence of the technique found by Aurel Stein during his expedition to Central Asia in the early twentieth century.

The art of *bandhani* is currently concentrated in desert areas from Kutch in Gujarat, through Saurashtra, Rajasthan, and Haryana, to the environs of Delhi. The finest tie-dye is produced by the Khatri community in Kutch, Gujarat. Madhya Pradesh also produces tie-dyed fabrics, used by peasants and tribal communities, in its areas bordering Rajasthan. Another minor center is Madurai in Tamil Nadu.

Technique

The traditional technique followed for making *bandhani* is by first bleaching the cloth, then folding it across its length and then across its width, thus making four folds. The dyer next demarcates an 18-inch-long (45 cm) area on one side of the width so as to cover both ends of the cloth, which for a sari forms both the *pallu*, the cross border, and a narrower border at one end. The wider area is subdivided into panels, with a wider central panel and two narrower panels on each side. Using charcoal, the dyer creates the basic design that will be followed for tying the knots. In the same way, the border of the sari is outlined at the two edges of the cloth, folded lengthwise. The cloth is then passed on for the tying of knots on the outline in the border, as well as on the pattern for the body of the sari. The tying is generally done by women. In the Khatri community, the very fine tying is done by men. The left hand is used for pinching the cloth and the right hand holds a long thread, which is wound around the cloth and knotted. This is repeated with the same thread with rapid dexterous movement. The knots must be handled carefully when dyeing, as they can unravel easily by tugging at the open end.

Initially, the sections that are to remain white are tied. The fabrics are then collected by the dyer and are dyed in a light yellow color, after which the fabrics are again returned for tying; the next set of knots is tied to retain the yellow color. The process continues from lighter



Man Wearing Turban, Rajasthan. His tie-dyed turban has a pattern and deep red hue common to the region. AMAR TALWAR/FOTOMEDIA.

colors to the final dark color, which is either a brilliant red, purple, black, dark green, or deep blue. This procedure is the traditional technique for tie-dyeing and is followed in all the major centers of Saurashtra, Kutch, and parts of Rajasthan.

Rajasthan has, however, developed another technique, called *lipai*, in which the fabric is given a light background color. The fabric is folded and designs marked as described above. The border designs, which will be in a dark color, are marked. The dyer proceeds to color sections of the inner cloth with different colored dyes according to the design, with the help of a felt. The tied border is then dyed and covered fully and the body of the sari is bleached, removing the surplus dye. The fabric is then immersed in dye for the background color. After drying, the sari is opened and the fabric emerges with dark tied designs on a light background and a contrasting dark border and cross border.

Kutch creates the finest tie-dyed fabrics; Mandevi and Bhuj are the main centers. The famous *gharcholas*, an

important ritual cloth of Saurashtra, are actually prepared by the Khatri community of Kutch but are dyed in Jamnagar in a brilliant red. It is the Khatri community that creates *bandhanis* for different communities living in the area. The *bandhanis* prepared for the rich Mahajan community are of a finer design; among the finest are *gharchola*, a grid pattern, and *bavanbagh* (fifty-two gardens). Almost all Hindus use *bandhani* for weddings. The bride's sari is pale yellow, signifying her status as a virgin, and only the border and the cross border are red. *Gharcholas*, auspicious patterns worked into a grid, are given to the bride by her husband after marriage or after the first child is born. Tie-dyed turbans are worn by the bridegroom and by the men participating in the celebrations.

Special types of *bandhani* are made for the Muslim Bora community, as well as for the Khatri's own families. The Bora women wear an *abho* (a loose shirt) and *salwar* (pantaloon), as well as *ordhani* (veils). These are mostly in silk with black backgrounds and motifs worked in red. Thick cotton cloth with bold tie-dyed patterns were made for the seminomadic Rabaris, as well as for the skirts of the Meghvals, the craftsmen's community. Woven woolen shawls were also tie-dyed and embellished with embroidery.

In Rajasthan's Jodhpur and Jaipur, in addition to the traditional fine *chundris*, tie-dyed veils, and saris, special turbans were made for the men. Each season required a change in the color of the turban and the veil. *Vasant*, the season of spring, required *basanti* (lemon yellow) colored turbans; *Haryali Amavasia*, the rainy season, was the time for sage green and pink turbans. Pink and saffron were auspicious colors for marriages. The red bridal veil was never dyed with permanent colors, as that was considered inauspicious.

Jodhpur specialized in distinctive techniques of tie-dye, called *lebria*, a pattern of diagonal lines in multiple colors, and *mothra*, a checkered pattern. The cloth is stretched from opposite corners, then tied with strings and dyed in stages from light to dark shades. When opened, it reveals its diagonal pattern. For the *mothra*, the other side is stretched, thus creating a checkered diagonal pattern.

Sikar of Shekhawati Rajasthan produces the finest quality cotton *bandhani* fabrics for urban clients. They also create bold patterns for the agriculturists of Bikaner, Jhunjhunu, Rewari, and Rohtak in Haryana. The background of deep maroon has large sections in lemon yellow with bold tie-dyed patterns in red and green.

Madhya Pradesh also has a tradition of *bandhani*, which is quite distinct from that of Rajasthan. The patterns are simple dotted patterns interspersed with bird and animal motifs. These were made for the local peasantry as well as

the tribal community. Each community had its own distinctive patterns.

Another center, which is isolated from the main tie-dye center, is at Madurai's temple complex in Tamil Nadu, where a community of Khattris had migrated from Saurashtra. They produced tie-dyed saris, known as *sugardi* saris, using locally woven gold-bordered saris dyed a deep red with patterns in off-white. The motifs used—conch shell, lamp, lotus, and stars—were influenced by the *kolam*, ritual floor designs. Plain unbleached cotton with a gold border was bleached and folded double on the length. The patterns were then blocked and the fabric was passed on for tying. The sari was then dyed a maroon color; the border was dyed in black by covering the main body. This tradition survived because the *sugardi* sari was considered essential bridal attire. By the early part of the twentieth century, the demand had diminished, but the tradition was later revived as part of a national program supporting the development of handicrafts.

Jasleen Dhamija

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Askari, Nasreen, and Rosemary Crill. *Colours of the Indus: Costumes and Textiles of Pakistan*. London: M. Holberton, 1997.
- Bühler, Alfred. "Indian Resist-Dye Fabrics." In *Treasures of Indian Textiles, Calico Museum*. Mumbai: Marg Publications, 1980.
- Bühler, Alfred, Eberhard Fischer, and Marie-Louise Nabholz. *Indian Tie-Dyed Fabrics*. Ahmedabad: Calico Museum of Textiles, 1980.
- Chattopadhyay, Kamaladevi. *The Glory of Indian Handicrafts*. Delhi: New Indian Book Company, 1976.
- Dhamija, Jasleen. *Indian Folk Arts and Crafts*. Delhi: National Book Trust, 1970.
- . *Crafts of Gujarat*. Ahmedabad: Mapin, 1985.
- Jayakar, Pupal. "Tie Dyed Fabrics of India." *Marg* 2, no. 1 (1948).
- Murphy, Veronica, and Rosemary Crill. *Tie Dyed Textiles of India: Tradition and Trade*. New York: Rizzoli, 1991.

BANERJEA, SURENDRANATH N. (1848–1925), Indian politician and nationalist leader. A pioneer of moderation in nationalist politics, Surendranath Banerjea infused the English-educated middle class with ideals of communal harmony, faith in British rule, and belief in progress. Widely admired for his eloquence and oratory as well as his unshakable political and personal convictions, he was nicknamed "Surrender Not."

Banerjea was born in 1848 in a Kulin, high-ranked Brahman family in Kolkata. His father, Durga Charan Banerjea, was a medical practitioner. Surendranath was introduced to Western ideas by his liberal-minded father,

and at the Presidency College where he received his education. Upon graduation, he went to England to sit for the Indian Civil Service examination. He passed and qualified for an administrative appointment in the British Indian government. He was posted at Sylhet in Bangladesh as an assistant magistrate. He was, however, soon dismissed from the post on the grounds of a technical impropriety in a report on his age, prepared by a subordinate, that Surendranath had failed to correct. It was a severe punishment for a minor oversight. Banerjea traveled to London to appeal his case in vain. He decided to try the next best course open to young educated Indians—to sit for the Bar examinations. He was denied admission. Convinced that the personal wrong done to him was evidence of the "impotency of a people" under British rule, he decided to dedicate his life to political awakening in Bengal and in India, in accordance with his faith in the Western ideals of fairness and justice.

Upon his return from the failed mission in England, he chose teaching as his profession. He became a professor of English at the Metropolitan Institution, then at the Free Church College. Seeking an educational forum where he could articulate his reform ideas, he helped establish a college of his own. He named it Ripon College after the marquis of Ripon, the viceroy of India from 1880 to 1884. (The college is now called Surendranath College.) With his stirring eloquence, he inspired students, intellectuals, and the educated public in Kolkata and other major metropolitan cities of India. He became the editor of the *Bengalee*, an English-language newspaper that became the mouthpiece of his measured, moderate political views. He founded the Indian Association, the political platform that battled the landholders' British India Association. He traveled the length and breadth of India promoting his brand of nationalism. In the process, he became a leading figure in the Indian National Congress, and the champion of Indian demands in England, which he visited from time to time. In the 1900s, he was without doubt the most important leader in the Calcutta Corporation and the Bengal Legislative Council. When Lord George Curzon announced the partition of Bengal, Banerjea's commanding figure, with striking white beard and baritone voice, took up the cry of protest at public meetings and rallies. This was his finest moment.

The slide began in 1907. Banerjea could not control the passions he had roused in India's youth. The political movement he led, based on newspaper articles, public meetings of protest, petitions, and deputations, was now of no avail. Extremist violence had gripped the *swadeshi* movement. In a remarkable about-face, Banerjea found himself joining hands with landlords and Muslim leaders to meet with the viceroy to seek his intervention. "It was

simply marvelous to see . . . the ‘King of Bengal’ sitting on my sofa with his Mohammedan opponents,” quipped Lord Minto, the viceroy (Broomfield 1968, p. 67).

From 1912 until his death in 1925, Banerjea participated in all the major political developments: the Lucknow Pact of 1916, the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, the *satyagraha* (noncooperation) movement of 1921. But his influence was on the wane. The extremists dismissed Banerjea and his ilk of upper-middle-class moderates as irreligious, luxury-loving blind followers of British institutions and recipients of titles and honors given as rewards for loyalty. He also had formidable opponents in men like C. R. Das, Ashutosh Mookherjee, and young leaders of the day like Subhash Chandra Bose and Dr. B. C. Roy. Dr. Roy defeated Banerjea with a large margin in the 24-Parganas Municipal constituency during the elections to the Bengal Legislative Council in 1923.

Banerjea’s career in the last fifteen years of his life comprised tireless efforts to deflect the British from their course of action, and to stem the rising tide of militancy in the neonationalists. His efforts met with an equal lack of success on both fronts.

Dilip K. Basu

See also **Bengal; Congress Party; Curzon, Lord George; Minto, Lord; Satyagraha**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Broomfield, J. H. *Elite Conflict in a Plural Society: Twentieth Century Bengal*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968.
- Majumdar, R. C. *History of Modern Bengal*. 2 vols. Kolkata: G. Bharadwaj & Co., 1978–1981.

BANGALORE The capital of Karnataka, Bangalore, once the capital of the princely state of Mysore, had a population of 4.2 million in 2001. The city was founded in the early sixteenth century by Kempe Gowda, a military officer (*amaranayaka*) of the kingdom of Vijayanagar. It thus owed its origin to the pattern of urbanization under military feudalism as it combined the functions of a cavalry garrison, an administrative headquarters, and a marketplace. After the demise of the Vijayanagar kingdom, Bangalore became the capital of the Wadiyar dynasty of Mysore, and then of the military commanders Hyder Ali and his son Tipu Sultan, who usurped the Wadiyar throne. After Tipu Sultan’s defeat and death in the Third Mysore War in 1799, the victorious British reinstated the maharajas of Mysore as puppets. In the twentieth century, these maharajas devoted much attention to the growth of industry in their state and to the development of Bangalore. The great Indian industrialist

Jamseti N. Tata (1839–1904) endowed the Indian Institute of Science, which started its work in Bangalore in 1907. (Tata did not live to see its inauguration.) Initially, Tata had thought of the institute as a center of research and development for Indian industry, but since that industry could not progress much under British colonial rule, the Institute of Science concentrated on fundamental research. The Nobel laureate C. V. Raman (1888–1970) worked there.

Located about 2,300 feet (700 m) above sea level in a rather dry region, Bangalore became known for its “rustproof” climate, which was attractive to many industries. Hindustan Aircraft Limited was established there just before World War II and contributed a great deal to the British war effort. After India achieved independence, the government of India selected Bangalore as the site for Hindustan Machine Tools. In the private sector, a joint venture (MICO) of the German company Bosch and the nizam of Hyderabad started manufacturing automobile parts, particularly spark plugs. In addition to supporting these various engineering industries, Bangalore also retained its reputation as a center of production of excellent silk. With the rise of information technology, Bangalore became the metropolis of software production in India, home to firms such as Wipro and Infosys. Foreign companies established their own data processing centers there for such activities as bookkeeping, reservation of airline tickets, and “outsourcing” of every kind. Some firms also built centers of research and development in Bangalore, which houses a growing community of highly trained specialists.

Bangalore is the Indian city with the highest population growth rate; its population may well reach 7 million by 2011. Thus far it has retained its spacious urban structure and wonderful parks, such as the Lalbagh Botanical Garden.

Dietmar Rothermund

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Fromhold-Eisebith, Martina. “Bangalore: A Network Model for Innovation-Oriented Regional Development in NICs?” In *Making Connections: Technological Learning and Regional Economic Change*, edited by E. J. Malecki and P. Oinas. Aldershot, U.K.: Ashgate, 1999.

BANGLADESH When India was partitioned in 1947 into the sovereign states of India and Pakistan, Pakistan comprised two wings: East Bengal, with its capital at Dacca (Dhaka); and West Pakistan, with its capital at Karachi (later Islamabad). Though Pakistan was created on the basis of a common religion, Islam, the Bengali

language and ethnic identity proved to be much stronger than religious affiliation. Resentment by Bengalis toward West Pakistanis surfaced almost immediately over the question of the use of Urdu as the national language of Pakistan. Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948), the Quaid-i-Azam (Great Leader), was heckled in March 1948 in Dacca when he insisted Urdu should remain the only national language of Pakistan. Resentment over what Bengalis regarded as economic, financial, and political domination of the East by West Pakistan's minority, Bengalis also led to increasing antagonism. Bengalis resented what they viewed as arrogance, rooted in racism, on the part of West Pakistanis, especially Punjabis. Demonstrations in support of Bengali as a national language became violent on 21 February 1952 and led to the shooting death of Bengali students. The day came to be celebrated as "Martyrs' Day." In 1954 Bengali finally became an official language. East Bengal was renamed East Pakistan the following year, but continuing indignation over perceived economic injustice—mostly concerning the proceeds from the export of jute and tea being used disproportionately to benefit West Pakistan—continued to inflame discontent among Bengalis.

Bengali nationalist Huseyn Suhrawardy (1892–1963), who had attempted to establish a united Bengal as an independent sovereign state in 1947, founded the Awami League (People's League) Party in 1949. Sworn in as prime minister of Pakistan in 1956, he attempted to give East Pakistan greater autonomy and more financial resources, but was forced out after only thirteen months, dying in Lebanon in 1963. Bangabandhu ("Nation Unifier") Mujibur Rahman (known as Sheikh Mujib; 1920–1975) succeeded Suhrawardy as leader of the Awami League. Mujib had been imprisoned without charges for eighteen months in 1958. In 1962, when he refused to abstain from politics for five years, he was imprisoned for another six months. The Pakistani Constitution, adopted that year, gave greater power to West Pakistan at the expense of East Pakistan. In 1966, Mujib proclaimed his party's Six-Point Program, the Mukti Sanad (Charter of Freedom), which demanded a federal government that would control only foreign affairs and defense. There would be a separate currency or separate fiscal accounts, and taxation would be exacted only by the provincial governments, which would control all provincial foreign exchange earnings. A militia would be established for each province. Mujib was imprisoned in 1967 and again in 1968 in the Argatala conspiracy case when he was named as the leading figure in a conspiracy to bring about the secession of East Pakistan through the assistance of the Indian government. He was one of thirty-five accused, which included high-ranking East Pakistan civil servants. It was called Argatala because Mujib held discussion with Indian army officers there.

The trial, held in open court, was a public relations disaster for the government and the case was dropped.

With the fall of the Ayub Khan (1907–1970) government (1958–1969), Mujib returned to East Pakistan a hero. In December 1970 he led the Awami League to victory in the general elections in East Pakistan, winning 167 of 169 seats. On 26 March 1971, the independence of East Pakistan as Bangladesh was announced by radio from Chittagong. Mujib was imprisoned, convicted of treason by a military court, and sentenced to death. Civil war against the Pakistani army followed, led by the Indian-trained Mukti Bahini (Liberation Force), the East Bengal Regiment, the East Pakistani police, and civilians, especially students. Atrocities against Bengali civilians were committed by the Pakistani army, and some 10 million refugees fled to India. War between India and Pakistan followed, with India's invasion of East Pakistan on 4 December 1971. India recognized the new state of Bangladesh two days later. The Pakistani army, isolated and overwhelmed, surrendered on 16 December. Bangladesh became a sovereign state with its own parliament, the Jatiyo Sangsad, the following day and adopted the taka as its currency. It was nevertheless a country near economic breakdown.

Mujibur Rahman was released from prison and received a rapturous welcome as the founder of his nation on his return. On 10 January 1972 he became Bangladesh's first prime minister. A constitution was adopted on 4 November 1972, and on 16 December he created a cabinet form of government. It was based on the four principles of Mujibbad (Mujibism): nationalism, secularism, democracy, and socialism. He amended it on 25 February 1975 to create a presidential system, with himself as president. On 7 June 1975 he made Bangladesh a one-party state and banned all existing parties. A new party, the Bangladesh Krishak Sramik Awami League (Bangladesh Peasants, Workers, and People's Party), was formed on the basis of his Awami League, but Mujib lost the support of the urban and military elite when he established an autocratic state, curtailed freedom of speech, installed his relatives in high government positions, and even created his own private army, the Jatiyo Rakkhi Bahini (National Defence Force). He was assassinated on 15 August 1975 in a military coup, the "Majors' Plot," along with over twenty members of his family and political allies. Khondakar Mushtaque Ahmed, a former colleague, was installed as president.

On 3 November 1975, Mujib loyalist Brigadier Khaled Musharraf staged a military coup, and the elderly Chief Justice Abu Sadat Mohammad Sayem was appointed president. Four days later, Musharraf was killed, and Sayem became chief martial law administrator. A year later, in November 1976, the charismatic

Zia-ur Rahman, whom Musharraf had displaced as chief of staff, staged his own military coup. On 21 April 1977, Zia became president, suffered an unsuccessful army mutiny in October 1977, and in 1978 founded the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). In the election of that year he became president of the new Islamic republic. He finally reestablished law and order, and conditions in Bangladesh improved markedly. On 30 May 1981, Zia was assassinated in Chittagong by Major General Manzur Ahmed, who was killed two days later. Justice Abdus Sattar, the vice president, became the acting president. A general election was held in November 1981 and Sattar became president, but he was ousted in the military coup conducted by the chief of army staff, Lieutenant General Hussain Muhammad Ershad, on 24 March 1982. Martial law remained in place until November 1986, during which time Ershad consciously Islamized the culture and politics of Bangladesh. The Land Reforms Ordinance of 1984 gave new and significant rights to tenants for the first time.

General Ershad created his own Jatiyo Party in 1985, and it won control of Parliament in the elections of 1986 and 1988. During his presidency, the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation, an organization of seven South Asian nations, was founded at a meeting of foreign ministers in New Delhi in August 1983, and the inaugural meeting of heads of state and government was held in Dhaka in December 1986.

Khaleda Zia (b. 1945), the wife of Zia-ur Rahman, entered politics after his murder. She was appointed vice chairman of the BNP in March 1983 and was elected chairperson in September 1983. Over the next nine years, she led the seven-party opposition to Ershad and was detained seven times. Ershad resigned on 6 December 1990 in the face of massive movement against his administration. A caretaker government presided until the elections of 27 February 1991, when Zia was elected as the first female prime minister of Bangladesh. She won a landslide reelection on 15 February 1996, but that election was boycotted by all other parties. She then lost the election of 12 June 1996 to Sheikh Hasana Wajed's Awami League. She remained in Parliament with the largest opposition party.

Sheikh Hasana Wajed (b. 1947) is the daughter of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman. She and her sister were in Germany in 1975 and had thus escaped being murdered along with their father, mother, and three brothers. She remained in exile for six years before returning in 1981 to a hero's welcome to head her father's Awami League. She was one of the leaders of the opposition until the Awami League victory in the general elections of 1996 made her prime minister. Following this victory, she became prime minister. Her government was noted for its introduction

of liberal measures, including free primary education, free education for girls up to the tenth grade, and a stipend for female students, but she was faced with the determined opposition of Khaleda Zia, whose BNP formed a four-party alliance with the Jatiya Party, the Jamaat-e-Islami, and the Islam Oikya Jote. In the election of 10 October 2001 Khaleda Zia was returned to office as prime minister and Sheikh Hasana entered into the opposition.

Conditions of life for Bangladeshis remain extremely difficult. The country, one of the poorest in the world, is characterized by being located mostly on the Bay of Bengal's delta. The Ganges joins the Jamuna, the main channel of the Brahmaputra, and then joins the Meghna to empty into the Bay of Bengal. About one-third of the country is flooded every year during the summer monsoon. With a population of some 145 million in 2005 and a high population growth rate, many people are landless and live on and cultivate land prone to flooding. Rice is the main crop. Two-thirds of the people are agriculturists. Water-borne diseases are prevalent, and the country suffers from a variety of serious environmental problems. Overseas Bangladeshis working in the Middle East and Malaysia remit around \$2 billion annually. The cheerfulness and strength and energy of the Bangladeshis in the face of these harsh conditions is a testament to their remarkable human spirit.

Roger D. Long

See also **Pakistan; Pakistan and India; Wars**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Baxter, Craig. *Bangladesh: A New Nation in an Old Setting*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984.
- Chakravarty, S. R. *Bangladesh under Mujib, Zia and Ershad: Dilemma of a New Nation*. New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 1995.
- Maniruzzaman, Talukder. *The Bangladesh Revolution and Its Aftermath*. Dhaka: Bangladesh Books International, 1980.
- O'Donnell, Charles Peter. *Bangladesh: Biography of a Muslim Nation*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1984.
- Rahman, Sheikh Mujibur. *Bangladesh, My Bangladesh*. New Delhi: Orient Longman, 1972.
- Wilcox, Wayne A. *The Emergence of Bangladesh*. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1973.
- Ziring, Lawrence. *Bangladesh: From Mujib to Ershad, an Interpretive Study*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1992.

BANK AND NON-BANK SUPERVISION The Reserve Bank of India (RBI), the country's central bank, carries out the supervision and regulation of banks and non-bank finance companies under the provisions of the Banking Regulation Act of 1949 and the Reserve Bank of India Act of 1934. The High Level Coordination

TABLE 1

Main supervisory agencies in the Indian financial sector	
Agency	Jurisdiction
Reserve Bank of India (RBI)	Commercial banks, urban cooperative banks, local area banks, non-bank finance companies, financial institutions, primary dealers
Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI)	Stock exchanges, merchant bankers, market intermediaries, rating agencies, mutual funds
Insurance Regulatory and Development Authority (IRDA)	Insurance companies
National Bank for Agriculture Development (NABARD)	State and central cooperative banks, regional rural banks, agricultural and rural development banks
National Housing Bank (NHB)	Housing finance companies
SOURCE: Courtesy of author.	

Committee of the government of India provides a forum in which banking, securities, and insurance supervisors can address policy differences. The main supervisory agencies in the financial system and the institutions in their jurisdiction are given in Table 1.

Banks

India's banking system dominates its financial sector, with over 60 percent of the combined assets, and is the focus of prudential supervision, the framework for which has evolved since the establishment of the RBI in 1935. Earlier, both banking and non-banking companies were governed under the provisions of the Indian Companies Act of 1913, which was amended in 1936 to include a chapter on banks. This evolved into the Banking Companies Act of 1949 was renamed the Banking Regulation Act of 1949 from 1 March 1966, at which date certain provisions were extended to cooperative banks.

The Banking Regulation Act is a comprehensive piece of legislation which provides the RBI with the authority and the instruments to make supervisory interventions through the life cycle of banking companies. The RBI can issue directions, obtain information, inspect the books and accounts, appoint nominees to boards, effect change in management, impose monetary and other penalties, cancel the license, and cause merger, amalgamation, or closure of banks. The act also incorporates a powerful enabling clause to issue directions to banks on matters of policy and administration.

Traditionally, on-site inspection has been the main instrument of supervision, with a comprehensive off-site surveillance system introduced only in 1995. Under this system, banks submit quarterly data, which are processed and stored electronically and used for supervisory analysis and intervention. The RBI had, however, begun limited inspection of banks with their consent as far back as 1940 to arrive at their "free and exchangeable value of assets" for the purpose of determining their eligibility for scheduling under the RBI act. In 1946 the objective was widened to include a determination of "whether the

affairs of the bank were being conducted in a manner detrimental to the depositors," thus adding a qualitative appraisal of management and operations to a quantitative assessment of solvency.

Since 1958, banks have been inspected annually to ensure their compliance with directions and regulations. These inspections now also aim at assessing the risk management capabilities of the banks. With the implementation of Risk Based Supervision, which is currently being tested, supervisory resources (including inspection frequency and focus) will be based on the risk profile of individual banks.

The approach followed has been one of gradual strengthening of the prudential framework, with creeping targets normally announced well in advance to prevent sudden shocks. For example, the capital adequacy ratio was increased from 4 percent to 9 percent over a five-year period while the contraction of the delinquency period for nonperforming loans to ninety days was announced three years before scheduled implementation in 2004.

The position of compliance with standards and practices dispensed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (committee of the Bank of International Settlement, or BIS, which is based in Basel, Switzerland) has been evaluated by three groups since 1998: internally; through a group of outside experts set up by the Committee on Standards and Codes; and by the International Monetary Fund. The assessments have found the supervisory system for banks largely compliant with the Twenty-five Basel Core Principles of Effective Banking Supervision and identified gaps mainly in the areas of consolidated supervision, country risk management, and interagency cooperation.

There have been no systemic crises in the commercial banking system since India's economic liberalization of 1991, despite instances of individual institutional stress. The challenges now arise from the difficulty that the supervisors may face in taking appropriate action in a system dominated by state-owned banks.

Non-banks

Traditionally, non-bank trading and manufacturing companies accepted public deposits to finance their working capital requirements and were subject to the provisions of the Companies Act. In the 1950s, there was an expansion in the deposit-taking activities of financial non-banks, notably hire-purchase companies. Bankers protested the “diversion” of potential bank deposits by unregulated entities. This led to the Banking Laws (Miscellaneous) Provisions Act of 1963, which authorized the RBI to specify the terms and conditions applicable to public deposits, to call for information about these deposits, and to issue directions, conduct inspections, and impose penalties. In 1966, by which time non-bank deposits had reached 8 percent of bank deposits, the RBI issued comprehensive directions.

The prudential framework for supervision is more focused on the deposit-taking non-bank finance companies, and by an amendment to the RBI act in 1997, the RBI now has legislative authority to give such companies directions on prudential norms and take corrective action including prohibiting them from accepting further deposits or alienating assets; imposing penalties and filing for their winding up. The instruments of supervision are similar to those of banks and include periodic on-site inspection, off-site reporting, and surveillance. A market intelligence function and forums for coordination with other regulators and enforcement agencies are integrated into the supervisory response. The introduction of the strengthened framework that incorporates strict minimum requirements for registration has led to a melt-down in the industry, with a large number of companies having been denied permission to commence or continue business.

Aditya Narain

See also **Banking Sector Reform since 1991**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Balachandran, G. *The Reserve Bank of India, 1951–1967*. New Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- International Monetary Fund. “Implementation of the Basel Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision, Experiences, Influences, and Perspectives.” Available at <<http://www.imf.org/external/np/mae/bcore/2002/092302.pdf>>
- Reserve Bank of India. *History of the Reserve Bank of India, 1935–1951*. Mumbai: Reserve Bank of India, 1970.
- . *Core Principles of Effective Banking Supervision: The Indian Position*. Mumbai: Reserve Bank of India, 1999.
- . *Report of the Standing Committee on International Financial Standards and Codes*. Mumbai: Reserve Bank of India, 2002.
- . *Annual Reports on the Trend and Progress in Banking in India*. Mumbai: Reserve Bank of India, 1949–2002.

BANKING SECTOR REFORM SINCE 1991

Banking sector reforms were an important part of the broader agenda of structural economic reforms introduced in India in 1991. The first stage of reforms was shaped by the recommendations of the Committee on the Financial System (Narasimham Committee), which submitted its report in December 1991, suggesting reforms in banking, the government debt market, the stock markets, and in insurance, all aimed at producing a more efficient financial sector. Subsequently, the East Asian crisis in 1997 led to a heightened appreciation of the importance of a strong banking system, not just for efficient financial intermediation but also as an essential condition for macroeconomic stability. Recognizing this, the government appointed a Committee on Banking Sector Reforms to review the progress of reforms in banking and to consider further steps to strengthen the banking system in light of changes taking place in international financial markets and the experience of other developing



Branch of ICICI Bank, India's Leading Private Sector Bank. By the end of March 2003, private sector banks boasted an almost 20 percent market share, up from approximately 4 percent a decade before. AKHIL BAKSHI / FOTOMEDIA.



Customer Withdrawing Money at a Kotak Mahindra ATM in Mumbai. With the reforms of the 1990s, many Indian private sector banks, including Kotak, fully modernized their operations and today flourish, with electronic capabilities comparable to those of foreign banks. INDIA TODAY.

countries. The two reports provided a road map that has guided the broad direction of reforms in this sector.

Pre-reform Situation

India's commercial banking system in 1991 had many of the problems typical of unreformed banking systems in many developing countries. There was extensive financial repression, reflected in detailed controls on interest rates, and large preemption of bank resources to finance the government deficit through the imposition of high statutory liquidity ratio (SLR), which prescribed investment in government securities at low interest rates. The system was also dominated by public sector banks, which accounted for 90 percent of total banking sector assets, reflecting the impact of two rounds of nationalization of private sector banks above a certain size, first in 1969 and again in 1983. These banks were nationalized because of the perception that it was necessary to impose social control over banking to give it a developmental thrust, with a special emphasis on extending banking in rural areas. The system suffered from inadequate prudential regulations, and nontransparent accounting

practices. Supervision by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) was also weak.

Broad Approach to Reform

The strategy for banking reforms was broadly similar to that followed in other countries, but with some important differences. It was similar to the extent that it focused on imposing prudential norms and improving regulatory supervision to meet Basel I standards (standards that were formulated by the committee of the Bank of International Settlement, or BIS, based in Basel, Switzerland), and it aimed at increasing competition to promote greater efficiency. However, there were two important differences compared with reforms in other countries. First, the reforms in banking were much more gradualist than in most countries, a course of action that was in line with the general strategy of reforms in India, made possible by the fact that the reforms were not introduced in the midst of a banking sector crisis, which might have entailed greater urgency. Second, unlike the case in many other countries, there was never any intention to privatize public sector banks. It was clearly recognized

that competition was desirable, and this implied that both private sector banks and foreign banks should be allowed to expand their market share if they could. However, the government also declared its intention to strengthen public sector banks and enable them to meet competition.

There was also a great deal of progress in introducing prudential norms for income recognition, asset classification, and capital adequacy in a phased manner. As a consequence of this gradualist process, income recognition norms and capital adequacy norms have been fully aligned with Basel I standards, while asset recognition norms, though still falling short of international best practice, are now close to existing international standards.

Decontrol of Interest Rates and Credit

There has been a significant liberalization of interest rate and credit controls on commercial banks. Earlier, there were detailed restrictions on interest rates that could be paid on different types of deposits and rates that were charged to various categories of customers. These have been extensively liberalized. On the deposit side, interest rates paid on term deposits have been decontrolled, except that the RBI prescribes a maximum interest rate on short-term (15-day) deposits and also prescribes the interest rate on savings deposits. On the lending side, the detailed structure of interest rates prescribed for different types of borrowers and for different sizes of loans has been abolished; the RBI prescribes only the interest rate to be paid under the differential rate of interest scheme a very small window for loans to individuals below the poverty line. For the rest, individual banks fix lending rates with reference to the prime lending rate fixed by the bank. The reforms also abolished the requirement that banks needed to obtain RBI approval for individual credit limits fixed for large customers. With these changes, decisions on the cost of credit and the volume of credit to be extended have been left to bank management, subject to internal guidelines and procedures for credit approval and general prudential limits on single borrower and single project exposure.

Directed Credit

Reducing directed credit requirements is a common feature of banking reforms, and this was the case in India as well. A major directed credit requirement was constituted by the high levels of the SLR, which preempted bank resources to finance the government deficit at low interest rates. Preemption of credit by the government also occurred indirectly because the RBI followed a practice of automatically issuing ad hoc Treasury bills to meet any shortfalls in the government's balances with

the RBI. Since this implied a mechanical transmission of fiscal expansion to the monetary side, it was offset by imposing a high cash reserve ratio (CRR) in the commercial banks, thus effectively crowding out private sector credit.

At one stage, prior to the reforms, the combined effect of the high CRR and the SLR was such that only 35 percent of the increment in bank deposits was actually available for commercial advances, the rest being either impounded by the RBI in the form of cash reserve deposits or absorbed by the government. The practice of automatic monetization was abandoned in 1994, and both the CRR and the SLR were reduced over time from 15 percent and 38.5 percent, respectively, before the reforms to 5 percent and 25 percent by 2005. The fiscal deficit is now financed through the auction of government securities conducted by the RBI, and in that sense, the interest rate on government borrowing is market-determined. However, it is interesting to note that, despite the reduction in the SLR from 38.5 percent to 25 percent, the proportion of government securities held by the banks to their total assets has actually increased from 30.4 percent at the end of March 1994 to 34.5 percent at the end of March 2004. This has occurred because of the combined effect of the inability to reduce the fiscal deficit—a key weakness of the reforms to date—and the fact that the prudential norms give sovereign debt a very low risk weight. In other words, while statutory preemption of bank resources was steadily reduced in the 1990s, the banks' appetite for government debt has remained high because the prudential norms contain a built-in regulatory bias in favor of government debt in preference to commercial credit.

The other major form of directed credit was the requirement that 40 percent of commercial credit has to be extended to the priority sector, which includes agriculture, small-scale industry, small transport operators, artisans, and so on. It applies to Indian commercial banks but not to foreign banks because the latter do not operate in rural areas and therefore cannot engage in agricultural lending. In their case, the requirement is that 15 percent of advances must be for exports and for the small-scale sector. These provisions have not been altered by the reforms. However, although the priority sector target for Indian banks has not been changed, the provision has been liberalized indirectly to some extent by definitional changes that expand the range of borrowers that are eligible. It is also worth noting that while banks are subject to sectoral direction of credit, they are not required to lend to particular borrowers; the credit decision of lending to a particular borrower is left to the bank on the basis of normal creditworthiness analysis.

Banking Supervision

Improved prudential regulation must be supported by strong supervision, and several steps have been taken in this area since 1991. A Board of Financial Supervision, with an advisory council and an independent department of supervision, was established in the RBI. Traditional on-site supervision was supplemented by a system of off-site supervision, which allows a closer and more continuous monitoring of asset quality. A new supervisory reporting system was introduced in 1995, using the CAMELS approach (capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, liquidity, and system for risk assessment) to assess the financial position of banks. More recently, the RBI has moved from the Basel I risk-based approach to a system of risk-based assessment for selected public sector banks.

In 2003 the RBI introduced a framework of prompt corrective action under which banks falling short of predetermined critical levels of capital adequacy, percentage of nonperforming assets (NPAs), and return on assets would automatically trigger some mandatory corrective action and possibly also further nonmandatory actions. Properly implemented, this should ensure that banks falling below a certain standard would be forced to correct their market share. An effective framework for corrective action is particularly important in the Indian context, where there are a number of weak public sector banks, and in which corrective action is the best way of preventing regulatory forbearance.

Increasing Competition

Increasing competition within the banking sector was an integral part of the reforms as a means of promoting efficiency in the sector, and important steps were taken in this direction. New banking licenses for Indian private sector banks, which had not been granted for many years before the reforms, were granted, and several new Indian private sector banks were established in the 1990s. While some have fared poorly, others have prospered. Some of the best Indian private sector banks have modernized their banking operations commendably and have developed electronic banking capability fully comparable with foreign banks. They have also expanded their market share. Foreign banks, which were earlier subjected to a very restrictive policy, were allowed more liberal expansion opportunities. New foreign banks were licensed to enter the market, and existing banks were allowed to expand branches more liberally.

These changes had an impact on the banking system. At the end of March 1991, 90 percent of the assets of the banking system were accounted for by public sector banks, with the private Indian banks accounting for 3.7 percent and foreign banks 6.3 percent. By the end of

March 2003, this had changed to 75 percent, 18.5 percent, and 6.9 percent, respectively. The major expansion in market share has been on the part of Indian private sector banks, though the extent of the increase is exaggerated because they include the effect of the merger of a major nongovernment development financing institution (ICICI) with its banking subsidiary to create a new bank, leading to the inclusion of its assets in the total for private bank assets.

The share of foreign banks has increased only marginally, despite a more liberal policy of branch expansion of this sector. This reflects the fact that these banks are focused primarily on high-end corporate clients, who are in any case moving away from bank financing, relying increasingly upon the capital markets to raise finance. The income-earning strategy of foreign banks is correspondingly oriented toward greater reliance upon fee-based income.

Public Sector Banks

Unlike banking reforms in most developing countries, India's banking sector reforms abjured privatization; the strategy from the very outset was that public sector banks would remain publicly owned but would be made to improve their performance by a combination of better supervision and greater managerial autonomy.

While ruling out privatization, public sector banks were encouraged to raise capital from the market, which diluted government equity, a dilution that was allowed as long as the government share remained 51 percent. The induction of private shareholders was expected to help the banks meet capital adequacy requirements without putting a strain on the budget. It was also expected to create a more commercial environment and thereby also to condition the attitude of government, even though the government remained a majority shareholder. Twenty of the public sector banks were able to raise capital from the market, and by 2005 the private shareholding in these banks varied from 20 percent to 46 percent.

A number of steps were taken to improve the efficiency of public sector banks, including rationalizing the branch network and reducing the labor force through voluntary retirement plans. Productivity enhancement through information technology application was also pursued, though public sector banks were slower than others in introducing electronic banking. However, some of the better public sector banks now offer online banking facilities at a large number of their branches. The fact that public sector banks have to observe the public sector salary structure remains an important limitation, and this is likely to become more of a constraint as the size of the private banking sector expands. However, within this

constraint, public sector banks have made efforts to improve recruitment and develop better human resource development policies.

Skeptics remain unconvinced that public sector banks can ever be managed in a way that distances government from individual banking decisions. The problem in India is not so much political intervention in individual credit decisions as the imposition of procedures that make it difficult for bank managers to take initiative in making commercial decisions without being accused of having extended undue favors. This is primarily because the law equates the employees of any entity in which the government has a 51 percent stake with civil servants, making them subject to the same standards of accountability for their actions. This places a great deal of emphasis on compliance with procedures, which forces bank management to be cautious and rule-bound rather than innovative.

Despite these constraints, the evidence suggests that public sector banks have improved their performance in the postreform period. Gross nonperforming loans of public sector banks declined from 17.8 percent at the end of March 1997 to 9.4 percent at the end of March 2003. Net nonperforming loans as a percentage of total assets declined from 3.6 percent to 1.9 percent over the same period. Net profit in public sector banks as a percentage of total assets increased from 0.6 percent in 1996–1997 to 1.0 percent in 2002–2003, and operating expenses as a percentage of total assets declined from 2.9 percent to 2.3 percent in the same period.

Banking System Performance

The impact of the reforms on the efficiency of the banking system in performing its twin roles of financial intermediation and resource allocation is not easy to evaluate. As far as the scale of bank intermediation is concerned, the ratio of total credit extended by the banking system to India's gross domestic product has increased, but it is still relatively low compared to countries such as China or some of the other East Asian countries. The ratio in India increased from 51.5 percent in 1990 to 53.4 percent in 2000, whereas in China it increased from 90 percent to 132.7 percent in the same period. The figures over the same period are also much higher for Malaysia (75.7% and 143.4%) and Thailand (91.1% and 121.7%), though many Latin American countries have figures closer to those of India.

There is evidence of significant improvement in several dimensions in recent years. Gross nonperforming assets (NPAs) as a percentage of total advances have fallen from 15.7 percent in 1996–1997 to 7.3 percent in 2003–2004. Gross NPAs as a percent of total assets are much lower because Indian banks typically have a large proportion of their assets in sovereign debt; this ratio has

also declined from 7 percent in 1996–1997 to 4 percent in 2002–2003. More importantly, the financial strength of the banks is actually better than it appears from these ratios because Indian banks do not write off assets, even though large provisions have been made. Net nonperforming assets, calculated after taking account of provisioning, are 3 percent of total advances and only around 2 percent of total assets. There has been a general improvement in other financial indicators, such as net profit as a percentage of total assets, interest spread as a percentage of assets, and operating expenses as a percentage of total assets, for public sector banks, old private sector banks, new private sector banks, and foreign banks. The financial strength of the banks, as measured by the capital to risk adjusted assets ratio (CRAR), shows distinct improvement in the postreform period. The required CRAR was increased in phases, to 8 percent at first (which is the Basel I minimum) and then to 9 percent in 1999–2000. Initially, banks with insufficient capital had to be capitalized by the injection of government equity from the budget, but subsequently several banks were able to raise capital from the market, and this, combined with plowing back of profits, led to a substantial improvement in capital adequacy. At the end of March 2003, out of the 93 commercial banks operating in India, 91 were above 9 percent and as many as 87 were above 10 percent, compared with only 54 out of 92 banks above 9 percent and 42 above 10 percent at the end of March 1996.

It is noteworthy that the Indian banking system did not suffer from any contagion effect in the aftermath of the East Asian crisis. However, this is not so much due to the improvements brought about after 1991, as the fact that the capital account was not fully open. Banks were not allowed to undertake excessive foreign currency exposure, and external borrowing (especially short-term borrowing) was strictly controlled. This cautious policy helped insulate India from the severe reversals of external flows witnessed in many emerging market countries in the 1990s.

The Future Agenda

The agenda for banking reforms in the future involves the continuation of the process of aligning prudential norms and supervision systems to the best international practices. This is bound to be a moving target since the banking system internationally is shifting from Basel I to Basel II (standards formulated by the committee of the Bank of International Settlement, or BIS, based in Basel, Switzerland), which involves use of much more sophisticated and bank-specific methods of risk assessment. An immediate challenge facing the public sector banks relates to the case for merging some of the banks to create stronger banks with a larger capital base and therefore

correspondingly larger capacity to finance large projects. Given the size of the economy and its projected growth, there is a case for having at least two banks at a scale comparable to the larger Asian banks.

A general problem affecting the banking system (both public sector and private sector banks) is the efficacy of the legal system in enforcing creditor rights. At present the legal procedure is dilatory, and there are difficulties associated with enforcing recovery through seizure and sale of collateral or through forced liquidation. Recent changes in the law enable banks to seize collateral, but the process of the sale of collateral remains difficult. Legislation was introduced in 2003, though not yet enacted, to make it easier to force liquidation in cases where bank debts are overdue and no agreement is reached between the creditor and the borrower on restructuring the debt. There is also a need for a credit information bureau that would enable banks to access information on the credit standing of prospective borrowers based on their status with other banks. The Credit Information Bureau of India was set up for this purpose in 2000, and the government has announced that it will introduce legislation to enable the bureau to obtain information from participatory banks with suitable safeguards protecting privacy. Improvements in the legal environment for recovery of bank dues and institutionalization of information sharing among banks will make a major contribution to increasing the efficiency of bank intermediation.

Montek S. Ahluwalia

See also Capital Market; Commodity Markets; Debt Markets; Economic Reforms of 1991; Money and Foreign Exchange Markets

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ahluwalia, Montek Singh. *Annual Reports on Currency and Finance*. Mumbai: Reserve Bank of India, 1992–2004.
- . *Lessons from India's Economic Reforms in Development Challenges in the 1990s—Leading Policy-Makers Speak from Experience*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank and Oxford University Press, 2005.
- Report of the Committee on Banking Sector Reforms. New Delhi: Government of India, 1998.
- Report of the Committee on Financial Systems. New Delhi: Government of India, 1991.

BARAHMASA The Indian seasons have been the subject of beautiful descriptions in poetry, prose, and drama since ancient times, and the relationship between man and nature has been fundamental to India's worldview. The paintings of *barahmasa* (the depiction of twelve months in painting) appear to be modest attempts to cor-

relate the artistic and literary endeavors of Indian poets and painters, portraying the cycle of seasons. At the same time, music, which also forms an important part of India's way of life, is closely associated with *rāgas* and *rāginis* (representations of musical modes in color) painted by Rajasthani artists, which ring in consonance with the above theory.

Indian literary references to *ritus* (seasons) are as ancient as the great Indian epic *Rāmāyaṇa*, in which experiences of the changing seasons were mentioned for the first time. In the forest, Rāma laments the loss of his abducted wife, Sītā. He observes the changes in nature, which aggravate his passionate longing for his beloved wife. Throughout classical Indian literature, we find men pining for their loved ones, taking cues from nature, as the seasons manifest their effects on the heros and heroines in *samyoga* (union) and *viyoga* (separation).

The Vishnudharmottara Purāṇa, (c. 3rd–4th centuries A.D.) indicates the features of different seasons, as they should be painted. For example, the severity of summer is indicated by the heat of the sun and its tormenting effect on human beings. Spring is suggested by trees in bloom, humming with bees and resounding with the sweet call of the cuckoo. The rainy season is represented by dark, heavy-laden clouds, bent by their aquatic burden, beautified by rainbows and frequent flashes of silver lightning in the sky.

In the Gupta period (c. 3rd–4th centuries A.D.), Kalidasa, India's foremost playwright and poet, wrote his *Ritusamhara*, a poetic work of both seasons and love. He describes each *ritu*, observing as well the passionate responses of the lovers. Although there is a total absence of visual representation of this emotional drama during the early period, Kalidasa composed some of world's best classical works. In yet another notable work titled *Kumarsambhava*, he elaborates on the seasons, and his description of spring is particularly noteworthy.

Shrada ritu, or spring, was the favorite season of the poets and painters of the medieval period in Jain and secular literature, as well as Sufi romances, including the *Laur-Chanda* of Mullah Daud, the *Mirgavat* of Qutuban, and *Padmavat* of Malik Muhammed Jaysi, which proved most popular. They excelled both in poetic content and in the simple and attractive pictorial language of the Delhi Sultanate school of painting. The scroll of *Vasanta Vilasa (pbagu)*, painted at Ahmedabad, in Gujarat, in A.D. 1451, reached a peak of excellence in both verbal and visual imagination. It primarily describes Vasanta (spring), and though painted in the Jainesque, hieratic manner, opens up a panorama of love, romance, and erotic splendor, highlighted by an appropriate landscape.

In the wake of the Vaisnava renaissance in Rajasthan, in the seventeenth century, Vallabhacharya propagated the *Pushti-marg* (path of grace), and his followers, the *Asta-chhap* (eight poets) wrote in the Vrajabhasha language, spreading the gospel of *bhakti-marg* ("path of devotion" to Krishna). Poets and painters at this juncture offered their hearts and souls to Krishna (worshiped as Sri-Nathji at Nathadwara, near Udaipur in Rajasthan), producing painting, poetry, *sangeet* (music), and literature. Prominent among the poets was Keshavadasa, the court poet of Maharaja Madhukarshah of Orchha (central India), who composed the *Rasikapriya* (Connoisseur's delight), an account of the twelve months as *barabmasa*. The tenth chapter of the *Kavipriya* (Poet's delight) and depicts the life of people in different seasons, their ceremonies and rituals, and describes how a *nayika* (heroine) should prevail upon the *nayaka* (hero) to stay with her instead of beginning a journey. He gives an account of the months mentioning the delightful spring (*Chaitra* and *Baisakh*), the heat of summer (*Jyestha* and *Ashadha*), the showers of *Shravan* and *Bhadon*, the clear sky and brightness of *Aswin* and *Kartik*, the pleasant *Agahana*, chilly *Pausha*, and the pleasant *Megha*.

The earliest pictorial representation of *Rasikapriya* is in the popular Mughal style, from about A.D. 1600 (now in the Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York). Though most of the Rajasthani schools favored this theme in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the sets produced by the Amber-Jaipur, Jodhpur, Bikaner, Malwa and Bundelkhand, and Bundi and Kotah are noteworthy. They give prominence to the changing of nature, showing its connection to social customs, festivals, and traditions, as well as to the behavior of animals in the forest. Among the complete sets, the one of the Bundi Kotah school, in the Prince of Wales Museum, Mumbai, is fairly representative of the theme.

In the nineteenth century, the popularity of the subject reached the Hill States of Himachal Pradesh. Patronized by the Hindu rajas, painters from different schools such as Garhwal, Kangra, and Guler took up this theme, and a good number of *barabmasa* sets came to light. Unlike the stylized Rajasthani idiom, the Pahari artists excelled in the realistic rendering of nature in the hill states. They depicted as well delicate and slender figures, the ardent lovers of the Kangra style, looking into each other's eyes with passion and love, announcing their desire to unite and remain indoors. A depiction of a couple, standing on an open terrace against a backdrop of looming rain clouds and white cranes in flight, or witnessing the first rain from the balcony, is a common theme among the Pahari painters. Thus, the changing of the seasons and the natural atmosphere affect the minds of the hero and the heroine, prevailing upon them to experience the pangs of separation and the ecstasy of

union, in the company of the chain of seasons known as *barabmasa*.

Shridhar Andhare

See also **Miniatures**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Dwevedi, V. P. *Barabmasa*. Delhi: Agama Prakashan, 1980.
Randhawa, M. S. *Kangra Paintings on Love*. New Delhi: National Museum, 1962.

BARODA The name "Baroda" derives from the older "Vatapadraka," literally, "a dwelling by the banyan." Situated today at the division of the Bombay-Delhi and Bombay-Ahmedabad railway lines (244 mi., or 392 km, north of Mumbai and 62 mi., or 100 km, southeast of Ahmedabad), Baroda (present-day Vadodara) first gained its prominence in the region in the eighteenth century. It was not until the reign of its fourteenth ruler, Sayajirao Gaekwad III (r. 1881–1939), however, that the city witnessed a large-scale building effort, growing to its full urban character in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It was during those six decades that several large-scale building complexes were erected in Baroda: palaces, including the sprawling Laxmi Villas Palace, Baroda College and Kalabhavan (an art school), the Nyaya and other temples, the Mandavi tower, parks and gates, and bridges across the Vishwamitri River.

The Gaekwads trace their origin to Poona (Pune) to a Maratha Kshatriya clan by the name of Matre, which was corrupted to Mantri, meaning "minister." Legend has it that in the seventeenth century a prosperous farmer, Nadaji, became a militant protector of cows, gaining the nickname *gae-kaiwar* (one who protects cows). The label stuck to the family and was simplified into Gaekwad. It was Pilaji Gaekwad who "rescued" Baroda from the clutches of an oppressive Mughal governor in 1725 and restored order. Pilaji is believed to have lost his life fighting both the Mughals and the *pesbwa* (the Maratha prime minister, who had his power base in Poona) to defend Gujarat against exploitation by these outsiders.

It was not uncommon for Indian rulers and princes to undertake public works projects, and even to develop an abiding interest in city beautification, at least in their capitals. The Mughal passion for parks, gardens, and lakes had survived into the British period, and it received a fresh impetus from Ebenezer Howard's "Garden City" movement, which in late-nineteenth-century England aimed at intermarrying town and country. Such urban plans and new architectural designs were not lost on the Anglophile Indian rulers, and they did not hesitate to imitate them in their own territories.

Sayajirao Gaekwad (also spelled Gaikwad or Gaekwar) was born into a modest peasant branch of the Gaekwad family in Kavlane village, some 300 miles (483 km) from Baroda in 1853. In May 1875, at the age of thirteen, Matushri Jamnabai Saheb, widow of the late Khanderao Gaekwad, adopted Sayajirao, changing his life from that of a farmhand into that of a crown prince.

One of the duties of the British Resident of an Indian princely state was to protect British interests; what better way to ensure them than to provide an English education to the local rulers? Sayajirao's English biographers, Stanley Rice and Edward St. Clair Weeden, confirm the young prince's insatiable appetite for books and new ideas. His Indian teachers (including Diwan Sir T. Madhav Rao and the Parsi Dadabhai Naoroji, who later became the first Indian elected to the British Parliament and served three times as president of the Indian National Congress, earning the sobriquet "Grand Old Man" of Indian nationalism) and his English teachers (including F. A. H. Elliot) instilled a love for literature and an appreciation for the arts in the young prince. Another influence on Sayajirao was Maharaja Chamarajendra Wodeyar (r. 1863–1894) of Mysore. In early 1876, the princes met in Bombay (present-day Mumbai) on the occasion of the visit of Edward, the Prince of Wales, Queen Victoria's eldest son, who would succeed her as Edward VII. The Wodeyars, with the assistance of able *diwans* (ministers) who recruited European architects and planners, contributed richly to the urbanization of Mysore and, by example, to that of Baroda.

Sayajirao's travels to Europe and the United States in 1906 and 1910 deepened his interest in education and architecture. On his first visit to the United States in 1906 he met Booker T. Washington, the African American social reformer who had risen from slavery to complete his education at the Hampton Institute, Virginia, later founding the Tuskegee Institute in Alabama. On both his visits to the United States, Sayajirao traveled extensively throughout the country, visiting Washington, D.C., Philadelphia, Chicago, Denver, and San Francisco, frequenting museums, art galleries, and libraries. On a visit to Europe in 1923, Sayajirao met King Victor Emmanuel and Benito Mussolini. Sayajirao was impressed by Italy's recovery after World War I and by Rome's postwar buildings, stadiums, parks, and wide roads.

These exposures to America and Europe left Sayajirao with the conviction that education was the basis of all reform; his belief prompted him to introduce free compulsory primary education and a state-supported free public library system in Baroda. He even committed state support for the promotion of industry, albeit with limited success. Sayajirao recruited British engineers R. F. Chisolm and Major R. N. Mant as state architects to



Facade of the Laxmi Villas Palace in Baroda (also known as Vadodara). Constructed in 1890, the palace, like so many others in the city, is a sterling example of the elaborate Indo-Saracenic style, with a distinctly Islamic influence. AMIT PASRICHA.

implement his architectural vision, and appointed a custodian for the upkeep of his capital's public buildings. Drawing on Saracenic sources (domes; *chhatris*, or umbrellas; towers; and courtyards) and on classical schemes, they produced unusually diverse architectural forms, spaces, scales, and imagery. Their work included the Laxmi Villas Palace, Kamati (Committee) Bagh, and the Residency (home of the British Resident). Chisolm and Mant may have influenced the Indo-Saracenic vocabulary that Edward Lutyens later employed in his architecture in New Delhi. In the belief that India could not make progress without industrial development, Sayajirao approved the use, wherever possible, of new industrial materials such as steel and glass, in place of the old brick and mortar.

The modernization and urbanization of Baroda was put on firmer ground with the founding of Baroda

College and the art school Kalabhavan, which heavily emphasized engineering and architecture while teaching art, representing a synthesis of ideas borrowed from America's Tuskegee Institute and Europe's Staatliches Bauhaus. Western ideas continued to influence Baroda even after Sayajirao. In 1941, Herman Goetz, a German émigré, took over the directorship of the Baroda Museum. Goetz supported contemporary Indian art and used the museum to promote visual arts education in Baroda. The Maharaja Fatesinghrao Museum was founded in 1961, the year that Gujarat state was created, in the Laxmi Villas Palace complex. By any measure, Baroda's credentials for becoming the capital of Gujarat in the 1960s were impressive, given its museums, parks, playgrounds, colleges, temples, hospitals, industry (albeit nascent), progressive policies, and cosmopolitan population. However, Baroda's princely heritage and the Gaekwads' Maratha origins prevented the city from being chosen as a state capital in democratic India.

Ravi Kalia

See also **Gandhinagar; Gujarat**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Erdman, Howard L. *Political Attitudes of Indian Industry: A Case Study of the Baroda Business Elite*. London: Athlone Press, 1971.
- Gaekwad, Fatesinghrao P. *Sayajirao of Baroda: The Prince and the Man*. Mumbai: Popular Prakashan, 1989.
- Kalia, Ravi. *Gandhinagar: Building National Identity in Post-colonial India*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press; New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- Rice, Stanley. *Life of Sayajirao III, Maharaja of Baroda*. 2 vols. London: Oxford University Press, 1913.
- Weeden, Edward St. Clair. *A Year with the Gaekwar of Baroda*. Boston: Dana Estes, 1913.

BENARES. See **Varanasi**.

BENE ISRAEL The largest and, perhaps, the oldest of the India's Jewish communities is known as the Bene Israel (children of Israel). Though in numbers they rank among the smallest of Indian minority groups, their long history on Indian soil, their dispersion throughout the subcontinent, their steadfastness in preserving their identity for centuries—much of that time beyond the perimeters of Jewish learning and law—and the peace in which they lived amidst their neighbors make the Bene Israel unique among the Jewish diasporas. The use of the term “Israel,” rather than “Jew,” to self-designate may be an indication of the antiquity of their presence in India. Israel was the name of the northern kingdom, which broke away from Solomon's kingdom in the tenth

century B.C. It was subsequently conquered and absorbed by the Assyrians in 723 B.C., leaving the smaller Kingdom of Judah to survive until it was conquered by the Babylonians in the early sixth century B.C. The term “Jew” came into use only after the Babylonian exile. There are biblical and Talmudic references to India (*Hodu*) and evidence of loanwords in Hebrew from Sanskrit and Tamil, indicating familiarity with the region as early as the first millennium B.C., when the Hebrew texts were canonized. The lack of Hanukkah celebrations in the traditional Bene Israel annual holiday cycle suggests that the founders of their earliest community might have left ancient Israel prior to the Maccabean Revolt of 165 B.C.

Disaster, Deliverance, and Discovery

According to their oral traditions in Marathi tales—which were later recorded, translated, and studied by visitors, missionaries, and scholars—the ancestors of the Bene Israel reached the shores of the Konkan coast after having been blown off course by a storm. The seven couples who survived the shipwreck struggled ashore near the village of Navgaon, having lost all their belongings in the sea. These fourteen founding fathers and mothers were able to survive by adopting a trade that they had, perhaps, plied before arriving in the Konkan: oil pressing. Since oil was a commodity very much in demand, and since the necessary ingredients were not difficult to obtain, providing a needed service and maintaining a low profile proved a successful method of adapting to the Indian environment. Jewish oil pressers alongside Hindu, Muslim, and even Christian craftspeople were not unusual in the Konkan. Over time the Bene Israel tradesmen came to be known as the Shanwar Teli (Saturday oilpressers), indicating that they refrained from work on that day. Certain striking similarities to Hindu tales and practices are evident in elements of the traditional Bene Israel origin story. There are resonances with the origin tale of the Chitpavan Brahmans of the Konkan and Shani (the deity of the planet Saturn whose day of observance is Saturday) holds special significance for people in the region.

Despite their accommodation to life in the Konkan villages, another tale relates that the Bene Israel were different enough from their neighbors so that a visiting Jew from abroad, known as David Rahabi, could recognize them as such. The local Bene Israel women took him to the market to assure him that the meal they were preparing in his honor would conform with the laws of kashrut (Jewish dietary requirements). Rahabi was so impressed with their fastidiousness and by their repetition of the Hebrew phrase *Shemah Israel, Adonai Eloheinu, Adonai Ehad* (the Hebrew credo “Hear, oh Israel, the Lord our God is One”) that he took these Konkan oil pressers to

be preservers of cultural ties to a Jewish past. So, the tradition relates, Rahabi selected three heads of families from among the *teli* folk and taught them the Torah Laws from which, he concluded, they had been estranged for a long time. Although his identity, place of origin, and date of arrival remain subjects of controversy, it is acknowledged that Rahabi initiated the first religious revival among the Bene Israel.

Life in Konkani Towns and Villages

Gradually the Bene Israel population extended throughout the northern Konkani, settling in villages and towns, earning their livelihood, along with oil pressing, in country trade and military service with the Hindu forces of the Marathas and the Muslim forces of the Siddis (the rulers of Janjira). The tax files of the local Konkani administrators (the Peshwah Daftar) contain names such as Eloji (Elijah) *teli*, Samsen and Abhram *teli*, along with Aron and Sileman Israil in the record for the mid-eighteenth century. Toward the end of the century, surnames are linked to villages with a suffix *-kar* such as Naogaonkar, Waskar, and Chordekar. By the late twentieth century, there were over 140 village-linked surnames. Subdivisions within the Bene Israel village communities, perhaps reflecting accommodation to Indian patterns of endogamy, recognized two groups: the Gora (fair) and Kala (dark) Israel, the distinction based on descent from either two Bene Israel parents, in the former case, or only one in the latter. These patterns were brought to the cities when, in the eighteenth century, the Bene Israel began migrating first to the Maratha capital, Pune, in the plain beyond the Western Ghats and then to Bombay, which had been acquired by the British East India Company and was being developed as a factory and port for goods procured by company agents.

The British: Military, Missionaries, and Renewal

After the defeat of the Marathas in 1818, the British were in control of much of the Konkani, Gujarat, and Maharashtra, and the ensuing policy changes brought new opportunities to the Bene Israel. Even prior to British hegemony, some Bene Israel had begun enlisting in the British East India Company's Native Regiments, continuing the tradition of military service they had maintained in the Konkani. This brought Bene Israel families to the cities. (Samuel) Hassaji (Ezekiel) Divekar, a captain in the company army who had been taken prisoner in the Mysore wars, came in contact with the Jews of Cochin. Upon his release, he built the first Bene Israel (Gate of Mercy) Synagogue in Bombay in 1796. Subsequently synagogues were constructed in a dozen towns and villages throughout the Konkani.

By the early nineteenth century, the company lifted its ban on missionaries, which led to the arrival of American missionaries in Bombay and the Konkani. The education now made available to the Bene Israel launched the second religious revival in the community. The Old Testament was translated into Marathi, and the Hebrew taught to them at Mission schools enabled the brothers Haeem Samuel Kehimkar and Joseph Samuel Kehimkar to open the first Bene Israel school in 1875. Jewish instructors there taught Hebrew and Bible classes to Bene Israel children. By mid-century, Iraqi Jewish merchants and entrepreneurs began arriving in Bombay, providing a further boost to the Bene Israel community there and in Pune. The Bene Israel were eager to send their boys and girls to school. Dr. Rebecca Reuben (1889–1957) studied at the High School for Native Girls at Pune, while teaching herself Hebrew. She went on to study at Bombay University, graduating first in her class, the first Indian female to do so, and continued her studies in England. After her return to India, she contributed greatly to the fields of education and community service. Dr. Jerusha Jhirard (1890–1984) obtained her medical degree in England, returning to serve as superintendent of Bombay's Cama hospital. She also founded the Bene Israel Women's Association and, in 1925, brought Liberal Judaism to Bombay—introducing modern Western ideas into traditional Bene Israel identity. Dr. Jhirard was honored with the prestigious Padma Shri Award (the fourth-highest civil award for national distinction) in 1966.

By 1948 both India and Israel had won independence from Britain, emerging as new nations in the world community. In the aftermath, some Bene Israel found themselves in Pakistan, where the surroundings were hostile both to Israel and to India. Many Bene Israel began to emigrate from their ancient homeland: some found their way to Great Britain, Canada, Australia, and the United States. Others went to Israel. The Bene Israel community, which had reached its peak in the decade between 1941 and 1951 at approximately 20,000, has declined dramatically. As of 2004 approximately 4,000 Bene Israel remained in India.

Brenda Ness

See also **Jews of India**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Goodman, Hananya, ed. *Between Jerusalem and Benares: Comparative Studies in Judaism and Hinduism*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994.
- Isenberg, Shirley Berry. *India's Bene Israel: A Comprehensive Inquiry and Sourcebook*. Mumbai: Popular Prakashan, 1988. Includes voluminous bibliography with complete texts of rare sources.

- Israel, Benjamin D. *The Bene Israel of India: Some Studies*. London: Sangam Books, 1984. Most scholarly work by a Bene Israel author.
- Kehimkar, Haem Samuel. *The History of the Bene Israel of India*. Tel Aviv: Dayag Press, 1937. First history of the Bene Israel written by a member of the community (in 1897, published in 1937).
- Ness, Brenda Joseph. "The Saturday Oilpressers: The Bene Israel of Maharashtra." In *Charisma and Commitment in South Asian History: Essays Presented to Stanley Wolpert*, edited by Roger Long. New Delhi: Orient Longman, 2003.
- Samuel, Shellim. *Treatise on the Origin and Early History of the Beni-Israel of Maharashtra State*. Mumbai: Iyer and Iyer, 1963. Important as a Bene Israel view of the community's history.

BENGAL The name "Bengal" (or Bangla) comes from Vanga or Banga, the name of the ancient deltaic kingdom. The state of over 100 million people is fructified by the Ganges-Brahmaputra river system, has a humid climate; an intense and vibrant cultural, literary, and educational life; and a dynamic financial hub, all centered around one of the world's largest and most vital cities, Kolkata. Bengali had developed a distinct body of literature by the eleventh century.

Early History

Bengal is mentioned in the Purāṇas and other ancient Sanskrit literature and was known to the Romans, mentioned in *The Periplus of the Erythraean Sea* (first century A.D.) and in Ptolemy's *Geography* the following century. According to the Buddhist text *Anguttara Nikaya*, Magadha was one of sixteen major states (*mahajanapadas*, "great tribal regions") in North India between about 770 and 450 B.C.; Anga, in the northwest of Bengal, was the easternmost of these. With its capital at Rajagriha (later Pataliputra), Magadha became prosperous due to its fertile land, the timber and elephants from its forests, and control of the eastern Gangetic trade through its command of the River Ganges. Attacking the force to its east, Magadha incorporated Anga, thereby controlling the ports of Bengal and trade from the east coast.

References to Bengal, however, became more numerous after it became part of the first great empire of India, the Mauryan empire (c. 322–180 B.C.). The Mauryas supplanted the Nandas and built an empire that controlled much of India. Its founder was Chandragupta Maurya (reigned c. 321–297 B.C.), and the Mauryas built their capital at Pataliputra. Chandragupta controlled his empire with the assistance of his Brahman minister Kautilya, whose *Artha Shāstra* tells us a great deal about the period. Chandragupta Maurya also appears in Jain and Buddhist traditions and in the Greek account of

Megasthenes. He brought Bengal firmly into the imperial orbit, as the province served as the main port for coastal and overseas trade. Chandragupta abdicated in favor of his son Bindusara (r. 298–273), but it was his grandson, Ashoka (r. 273–232), who was the most famous ruler of the dynasty. One of Ashoka's minor rock edicts was located north of Bengal's delta at Mahasthan.

Between the collapse of the Mauryas and the rise of the Guptan empire created by Chandragupta I (r. 320–c. A.D. 335), the history of Bengal remains hazy. Bengal was brought within the imperial Guptan order by its second emperor, Samudragupta (reigned c. 335–375), as the Guptas re-created much of the empire of the Mauryas in the North India. The Guptan period is considered the classical age of India, when a flourishing trade developed and Sanskrit literature reached its peak. Buddhism and Jainism coexisted with Hinduism, and all thrived. The dynasty came to an end in the middle of the sixth century, perhaps as a result of internal weaknesses and the Huna invasions, but the Guptan agrarian economy, religious tolerance, and a number of political units, of which Bengal was one, and Brahmanical social institutions continued much longer.

After the collapse of the Guptas, an independent kingdom arose in the south of Bengal in 507–508 called Vanga-Samatata, with the first king being Vainyagupta. In northern Bengal another kingdom was based at Gaur. The first king was Shashanka (c. 600) and he fought against Harsha Vardhana, who came to power in 606. After Shashanka's death sometime before 637, the kingdom's history becomes obscure once again until the first Pala became king of Gaur. The eighteen kings of the Pala dynasty controlled much of the eastern Gangetic plain as one of three major kingdoms controlling India. The Rashtrakutas were in the Deccan and the Pratiharas were in western India. The area was rich, as land was cleared for rice cultivation and settlement. As settlement expanded, priests were recruited into the Brahman caste and the grants of land to them were recorded on copper plates. The origin of the dynasty was unusual because the first king, Gopala (r. 750–770), was elected as the monarch. Legend states that he was given a club by the goddess Chanda, a consort of Shiva, and he used this to kill a female demon that had killed off previous kings. The capital of the early Palas was at Pataliputra. Gopala's son Dharmapala (r. 770–810) claimed legitimacy, stating that his father's election had ended a period of anarchy, and he made the Pala kingdom a powerful one in North India, dominating eastern India. The third Pala king, Devapala (r. 810–850), extended the Pala domain; gold was panned in the eastern rivers, and the Palas benefited from the trade with Assam, Burma, and Southeast Asia, receiving an embassy from Sumatra. He moved the



Gateway to Kolkata. The imposing Howrah Bridge over the Hooghly River (a tributary of the Ganges, where all life is said to begin). It is one of the finest examples of a cantilever bridge. AMIT PASRICHA.


capital to Monghyr. After Devapala, the kingdom came under increasing attack. The Buddhist universities of Nalanda in south Bihar and Vikramasila at Patharghata, Bihar, where the famous Buddhist monk Atisha (c. 981–1054) taught, were patronized by the Palas.

Later, the exploits of the powerful king Ramapala (1077–1120) led to a revival of Pala power. His relations with his tributary rajas were detailed in Sandhyakaranandin's Sanskrit *kavya* (lyric) *Ramacharita*, although the central event of his reign was a revolt by the Kaivartas. Pala authority was maintained by the assertion that the king was an incarnation of Shiva or Vishnu or received instructions directly from the god. The Palas made alliances with the kings to the north and also ensured a modicum of peace through sponsorship of Buddhist as well as Hindu temples. This was a policy that the more orthodox Hindu Senas maintained after they defeated the Palas around 1155.

The first king of the Sena dynasty was Viyayasena (1095–1158), and the Senas extended their power before all of North India was swept up by the invading Turks, Afghans, and an assortment of mercenary soldiers from the whole region, including India, who had superior

central Asian horses and Asian military tactics emphasizing speed, after Muhammad Ghuri captured Kanauj in 1192. The Khiljis defeated the Senas, and Bengal was captured in 1199. The Senas fled east and continued to rule in eastern Bengal until 1245, when they too fell to the forces of Islam.

Islam spread into Bengal and developed its own syncretist pattern. Bengali Muslims were cut off from direct access to Islamic tradition as it developed in Arabic and Persian literature because of their lack of knowledge of Arabic or Persian; therefore, they remained steeped in local traditions, and Islam in Bengal was a fusion of the two. During the five dynsties of the Delhi Sultanate, established by Qutuddin Aibak (d. 1210) in 1206 and overthrown three centuries later by Babur (1483–1530) in 1526, control of Bengal was only sporadically maintained. It was in the Mughal period that Bengal became a part of an empire for the third time in history. Sher Shah Suri (1472–1545) of Bihar captured Bengal, and he and his successors ruled Bengal until Akbar (r. 1556–1605) invaded Bengal in 1575 and brought it into the orbit of the Mughal empire. Bengal became ruled by Mughal governors when Murshidkuli Khan became the *nawāb* of



Murshidabad (r. 1717–1727), instituting a period of autonomy. He was followed by Sujauddin Mohammed Khan (r. 1727–1739), Sarfraz Khan (r. 1739–1740), Alivardi Khan (r. 1740–1756), and Siraj-ud-Dawla (r. 1756–1757), the last independent ruler of Bengal.

British Rule

The agent of the British East India Company, Job Charnock (1631–1693), was assigned to Kasimbazar, the site of the company's factory (trading post). The Portuguese had posts at Chittagong and Saptagram since 1517 (the post on the Hughli established in 1580 was destroyed by the Mughal emperor Shah Jahan in 1632), the Dutch at Chinsura since 1653 (until 1825 when it was exchanged with the British for Bencoleen in Sumatra), and the French at Chandanagore in 1673 (it changed hands a number of times between the French and the British before it was returned to the French in 1815, who maintained possession until 1952), the Danish at Serampore since 1699 (it remained in Danish hands until 1845). In 1686 Charnock was posted to Hughli but came into conflict with the *nawāb* of Bengal. The Mughal emperor Aurangzeb (r. 1658–1707) awarded the company a tract of land to the south, about 100 miles (161 km) upriver from the coast, and there Charnock founded the city of Calcutta, perhaps named after Kālī-ghat (the steps of the

goddess Kālī). It was located at the highest point at which the river was navigable to oceangoing ships. Fort William was built on the spot, and by the end of the sixteenth century Calcutta had just over a thousand English residents. In 1707 the East India Company declared Bengal a separate presidency, accountable to the company directors in London. Calcutta, however, was subject to the predations of the Mughal governors of Bengal, and so in 1717 the Calcutta Council sent a successful embassy to the Mughal emperor in Delhi to establish their rights and for permission to buy property. The result was that the growth of British trade in Bengal and the growth of Calcutta was spectacular, with the British and rich Indians living in the north of the town and poorer elements in the south. By 1756 some fifty ships visited Calcutta and trade was worth 1 million pounds annually. The city was, however, in a precarious military position. Fort William was by no means impregnable. In 1741 the Marathas launched an expedition into Orissa (a sub-province of Bengal), and they were threatening Calcutta the following year. The British responded by digging the "Maratha ditch" around the city as a defensive measure.

On 20 June 1756, Siraj-ud-Dawla (1733–1757), *nawāb* of Bengal, attacked Calcutta from Murshidabad with an army of some 50,000 troops and captured it. His biggest grievance against the company was their misuse of trading

privileges, which deprived him of much-needed revenue, but he also resented the fortifying of Fort William without his permission or even knowledge, for giving sanctuary to a trader who owed the *nawāb* tax money, and for expelling one of his officials. The British also did not acknowledge his accession to the throne of Bengal, and ignored his notes to the company, or answered them in an offensive manner. After the capture of the fort, it was reported by one of the survivors, John Zephaniah Holwell, in his *A Genuine Narrative of the Deplorable Deaths of the English Gentlemen and others who were suffocated in the Black Hole*, published in London in 1758, that 145 men and women had been imprisoned in the airless fort dungeon. The following morning they were released, but only twenty-three staggered out. The rest had suffocated or died of wounds or shock. The incident of the Black Hole of Calcutta, however much it was exaggerated, inflamed the British, entered their vocabulary, and started a series of events that led to a fundamental change in Bengal and the rest of India as the British sought their revenge. Geopolitics also played a part, as the Seven Years' War had broken out between the British and the French, and Siraj formed an alliance with the French.

Robert Clive (1725–1774), who had first arrived in Madras in 1743, had been lieutenant-governor of Fort St. George at Madras since 1753. With 900 Europeans and 1,500 sepoys, he arrived in Calcutta in December 1756 and the next month recaptured Fort William. He attacked the French first before moving north against the *nawāb*, as removal of the French was one of the aims of the attack in Bengal. French posts at Chandanagore and Hughli were captured. Clive had allied with the Hindu banker Jagat Seth, a supporter of Mir Jaffir, who was jealous of his great-nephew Siraj and wished to replace him as *nawāb*, and Clive moved on Murshidabad with their support. On 23 June 1757, Clive's vastly outmanned 800 European troops and 2,000 sepoys defeated Siraj's rump army as Mir Jaffir and many others were paid off by Seth and Clive; three-quarters of Siraj's army refused or had been paid not to fight. After the victory, Clive escorted Mir Jaffir to the throne at Murshidabad, and Siraj was murdered on 2 July on orders from Miran, one of Mir Jaffir's sons. In 1760 Mir Jaffir was succeeded by his son-in-law Mir Kasim, who handed over to the British the districts of Chittagong, Midnapore, and Burdwan. He attempted, however, to recover Bengal from the British by enlisting the military assistance of the Mughal emperor Shah Alam II and *nawāb* Shuja ud-Dawla of Oudh. The allies were defeated by East India Company forces under Hector Munro (1726–1805) at the Battle of Buxar in 1764.

Clive became known as “Clive of India,” one of the founders of the British Empire in India. He reaped a

personal fortune of £234,000, was made a *mānsabdār*, and the recipient of £30,000 of the rent of the Twenty-four Parganas of Bengal. The British were also allowed to establish a mint in Bengal. The British Company had now become the most powerful force in Bengal, and the state was denuded of its wealth by Company merchants who spread out from Calcutta, which, henceforth, enjoyed great wealth and prosperity, especially after 1765 when, on 12 August, the Mughal shah Alam granted to the East India Company the *divāni*, the right to collect and administer the revenue of the state (which incorporated Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa) in exchange for an annual payment of 2,600,000 rupees. The wealth of the province fell into the clutches of the British and their Indian business partners. Clive in 1765 reported that Bengal had become the “scene of anarchy, confusion, bribery, corruption, and extortion” and that fortunes were being acquired in a rapacious manner, with little money actually ending up in the company coffers. In 1769 the monsoon rains failed, and famine struck the following year, killing a quarter of the peasant population.

What prompted the British government to interfere in this state of affairs was the East India Company's failure to pay its annual tax of £400,000, while many of the company's officials were returning to England with fortunes. In 1772 Warren Hastings (1732–1818) was appointed governor of Fort William. He redesigned the revenue system in Bengal so that revenue flowed directly to Calcutta, and an attempt was made to cut out the middlemen. The *nawāb* lost half his stipend and all his power, and payment to the Mughal emperor ceased. Hastings made the company profitable again, and the British government lent the company one and a half million pounds but passed the Regulating Act of 1773 and Pitt's India Act of 1784 which, among other things, brought the presidencies of Madras and Bombay under the control of Calcutta. Bengal was now the capital of British India and under the control of a governor-general. Charles Cornwallis (1738–1805, governor-general 1786–1793), introduced the Permanent *Zamindari* Settlement in his Cornwallis Code of Forty-Eight Regulations, or the Cornwallis Code, of 1793. It fundamentally changed the relationship between the peasant tiller and the *zamindar* by introducing the concept of private property in landowner relationships and creating a class of landowners that would be the backbone of the British Raj and a middle-class Hindu professional class. These were the *bhadralok* (respectable people). The *zamindars* often became bankrupt, and a great deal of land was transferred from Muslim to Hindu hands. Cornwallis also introduced British circuit courts to replace *faujdari* courts, introducing the principles of British law into Bengal.

The economy of Bengal was also transformed, most notably with the creation of the jute industry, the destruction of its homespun cotton industry because of imports from England, and as the center of the opium trade with China. The tea industry of Assam also contributed to the prosperity of Calcutta. Bengal's incorporation into the global economy was also accelerated with the Charter Act of 1833, which abolished the East India Company's monopoly of trade. During this period the Marwaris, from the Bania or Vaisya caste, prospered in Calcutta and began their eventual rise to wealth and prominence in twentieth-century India.

From its center in Bengal, the company expanded its influence up the Ganges as the activities of the "man on the spot" and the pressures of the "turbulent frontier" induced the British to continually expand its empire in India. Its wars in the Carnatic and Mysore and against the Marathas and later in the Punjab against the Sikhs, and in Afghanistan, were all directed from Calcutta. Assam was incorporated into Bengal in 1826, and three wars were fought against the Burmese until that area was incorporated in 1886; the British also expanded their influence and territories in Southeast Asia, directing their activities from Bengal. Until 1935 Burma was governed from Calcutta. Bengal became the axis of a rampant British Empire in Asia.

Bengali Intellectualism

Bengal also became the leading intellectual center of British India and the heart of its educational activities until the capital was moved to Delhi in 1911. The British established a number of educational institutions that transformed the intellectual climate of India. At the request of a number of Muslims, Warren Hastings arranged for the creation of the Muhammadan Madrasa in 1782 and encouraged the creation of the Bengal Asiatic Society founded by the jurist Sir William Jones (1746–1794), the first of the great Orientalist scholars who translated the laws of Manu and other Sanskrit works into English and helped to spread Indian learning in Europe. The missionary William Carey (1761–1834) preached Christianity in Bengali and other indigenous languages, and his Serampur printing press helped to lay the foundations of Bengali literature. Fort William College was founded in 1800 and it encouraged science, literature, and Oriental languages. This began the start of a number of schools and colleges in Bengal. Hindu College, founded in 1817, was the citadel of English education in Bengal. Its most famous lecturer was the Anglo-Indian Louis Henry Vivian Derozio (1809–1831) whose patriotic poem, "My Native Land," was an inspiration to a generation of young Bengalis. Calcutta University was founded in 1857. The result of this

introduction of Western learning and science, along with the encouragement of Indian learning in Sanskrit, Persian, and contemporary indigenous languages, led to the worldwide dissemination of Buddhist and Hindu scriptures. It also created a remarkable multilingual intellectual class that was versed in both Indian and Western learning. The launch of such newspapers as *Sambad Kaumudi* (1821), *Partbenon* (1830), and *Reformer* (1833) began Bengal's vigorous journalistic tradition.

Ram Mohan Roy (1772–1833) is known as the father of the Hindu renaissance, or the father of modern India. He was born to a prosperous Brahman family at Radhanagar in west Bengal. Educated at home, he learned Persian, Arabic, and Sanskrit, and then English, Latin, and Greek. His studies of Muslim, Christian, and Hindu religious books led him to become a renowned critic of superstitious and idolatrous religious practices. From 1804 until 1814 he served the East India Company, retiring to Calcutta in 1815, after which he increasingly established himself as the leading Bengali intellectual, meeting weekly at his home with other members of the Bengali *bhadralok* in their Amitya Sabha (Friendly Society). He attained a new appreciation of Hinduism through his studies of the Upanishads, and he achieved fame through his efforts to revitalize Hinduism by being the first upper caste Hindu to advocate social reform. He wrote extensively and founded the Brahmo Samaj (Society of Brahma) in 1828; the organization was to have a significant effect in Bengal and throughout India. Roy died in England and he was buried in Bristol. He died as a Hindu but he insisted that no religious ceremony be conducted at his funeral. As a person who was educated in Western thought and who remained a Hindu while critical of many Hindu caste and social and religious practices, he was the model for many future Indian modernists.

There were many other great figures of the Bengali intellectual tradition who flourished in this maelstrom of ideas from East and West. They included Aksayakumar Datta (1820–1883), who was a student of science and had pictures of Charles Darwin and Isaac Newton in his rooms. A social scientist, he was also renowned for his Bengali prose. He was a proponent of education and industrialization and a harsh critic of the treatment by British indigo planters of their indigenous workers. Iswarchandra Vidyasagar (1820–1891), the son of a rural Brahman Sanskritist, was a "people's hero" who was educated and later taught at Sanskrit College, becoming principal. He also taught at Fort William College. He advocated the reform of the educational system, for without reform there could be no social progress. He supported the propagation of Bengali literature in the Bengali language and traditional subjects such as history,

mathematics, and natural philosophy. The riches of Bengali culture would be informed with Western learning. Among his many books were a history of Bengal and books for children. He devoted a great deal of his energies toward the establishment of vernacular schools and social reform, including the advancement of women. Bhudeb Mukhopadhyay (1827–1894) was the son of a Brahman Sanskritist but he was educated at Hindu College, became a teacher, and was the first Indian to rise through the ranks to become inspector of schools in the Department of Education. He was a sociologist who decried the loss of tradition in India, especially among the Western-educated, and sought to rationally defend the virtues of traditional Hindu culture and Hindu social organization. He was also a journalist, a novelist, and a writer of children's textbooks. Romesh Chander Dutt (1848–1909) assessed the impact of British rule on India, and his studies showed how British capitalism disrupted the Indian economy. Michael Madhu Sudan Dutt (1824–1873) was a poet and dramatist who introduced the Bengali sonnet (*amitraksar*). He is considered the first great poet of modern Bengali literature.

Bankinchandra Chatterjee (1838–1894), a Brahman and one of the first graduates of Calcutta University, was a government official from 1858 until his retirement in 1891, but he was also a journalist and novelist whose novel *Durgeshnandini* established the Bengali novel. His Hindu heroes roused the nationalist spirit in India, and Hinduism and nationalism became linked in the eyes of many Hindus. His patriotism was expressed in the song *Bande Mataram*, with the words “Hail to thee, Mother,” which appeared in the novel *Anandamath* (1882); the song became the hymn of the Indian nationalist movement after the poet Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) composed a musical accompaniment.

Tagore, hailed as a poet, is one of Bengal's and India's greatest cultural and intellectual figures. He was mostly educated at home in Calcutta by his wealthy father in Sanskrit, English, the sciences, and ancient Hindu religious texts. He also spent a year in 1878–1879 at University College in England. A precocious talent, he published his first poem in 1874. He also developed a talent in music, and his songs became very popular. He managed the family estate in Jessore for ten years, and this was his most creative period. In 1901 he opened a school at Santiniketan and moved there. In 1903 his collected poems were published in thirteen volumes. He also wrote short stories and novels. He translated *Gitanjali* (song offerings) of lyrical and devotional poems into English and in 1912 took them to England, where he became lionized by the English literati class. The following year he received the Nobel Prize for literature. In 1915 he was awarded a knighthood. By the end of his life he had written over

1,000 poems, 2,000 songs, and a host of short stories, plays, dance dramas, essays, literary criticism, novels, pieces of translation, and a book of early reminiscences (1917). His musical compositions became known as “Rabindra Sangeet.” He was also a humanist, believing in the importance of education, and a nationalist whose writings on economics stated that economic and social progress could only come through rural rehabilitation.

Sri Aurobindo (Aurobindo Ghosh; 1872–1950) was first an activist on behalf of India's independence and an early advocate of noncooperation before he became renowned as a Hindu spiritual leader. In 1902 he started an organization along with Margaret Elizabeth Noble, known as Sister Nivedita (1867–1911), to generate anti-British literature. For a time he served as principal of Bengal National College (Javadpur University). He advocated the boycott of British trade, and the substitution of British courts and institutions by indigenous ones. His slogan became “no control, no cooperation.” The Bengali newspaper *Jugantar*, with which he became closely associated, was dubbed seditious by the government, and by 1910 the British were describing him as the most dangerous man they knew. He was, along with Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856–1920), one of the “extremists” of the Indian national movement. He not only demanded independence for India, he also advocated a spiritual and moral regeneration of the individual. He was imprisoned for a year as he was found guilty of conspiracy. In March 1910 he left Bengal for the French enclave of Pondicherry, where he set up an ashram and devoted himself to yoga, writing, and his devotees, and to the conception of a world society and the unity of humankind. In 1926 he went into seclusion, but his ashram became a large center, attracting devotees from around the world.

The Rise of Nationalism

In 1885 the Indian National Congress was founded in Bombay, and Womesh Chandra Bonnerji (1844–1906) of Calcutta became its first president, a role he performed again in 1892. A member of the wealthy *bhadralok* class, like so many of the modern intellectual and political leaders of modern Bengal, he was educated at one of the Inns of Court in London (Middle Temple) and established himself as a successful and exceedingly prosperous lawyer who maintained a lavish lifestyle. He was the first Indian to be appointed standing counsel to the government. In 1886 he became president of the Law Faculty at Calcutta University in 1886. He was a “moderate” who believed that personal relationships could overcome barriers of race, class, and caste. He moved to England in 1902 and practiced before the Privy Council. He also advised the Standing Committee on India in the British Parliament.

In 1905 Bengal was partitioned, as it was felt by the governor-general, Lord George Curzon (1859–1925, viceroy 1899–1905), that the province had become too large to administer under a single administration, especially due to poor communication facilities in east Bengal. Accordingly, Bengal was split into two provinces: Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa in the west, with the capital remaining at Calcutta; and eastern Bengal and Assam, mostly a Muslim province, in the east, with the capital at Dacca. This was a turning point in India's history, as the Hindu commercial classes who dominated Bengal regarded this as an attempt to destroy the growing nationalist movement in Bengal and in India. It smacked of British *divide et impera* policies, an attempt to make Hindus a minority in the province, and an attack on the unity of Bengali language and culture. Opposition to the partition was manifested in mass demonstrations in Calcutta, agitation in the rural areas to rouse the peasants, and a *swadeshi* (self-rule) movement whereby imported goods from Britain were boycotted in favor of indigenous products. The effect was to mobilize Indians in opposition to the British and to transform the incipient nationalist movement from a middle-class debating society into a national movement against the British. Along with the Amritsar Massacre of 13 April 1919, when General Reginald Dyer marched fifty troops into Jallianwala Bagh (Park) and ordered them to open fire on unarmed civilians, killing 379 and wounding 1,200 (according to official figures), it included the development of a terrorist movement that led to assassinations and bomb attacks on British officials. Kudiram Bose (1889–1908) attempted to assassinate a magistrate, but he murdered two British women instead. He was hanged by the British but he is not forgotten in Bengal.

Bengal became the leading center of opposition to British rule in India. Rashbehari Ghosh (1845–1901) and Surendranath Banerjea (1848–1925) led the early nationalist movement. Banerjea founded the Indian Association in 1876 and became the first political prisoner of British India. Tagore and Swami Vivekananda (1863–1902) were also critical of British rule and respected nationalists. Tagore returned his knighthood in protest of the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre of 1919 (also known as the Amritsar Massacre). Visva Bharati, Tagore's school at Santiniketan, became a nationalist symbol. Vivekananda's speech about Hinduism at the World Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893 helped bring public attention in the West to the Indian situation; his Ramakrishna Mission, which he established in 1898, became an important educational center. Bipin Chandra Pal (1858–1932) believed in armed struggle against the British.

Bengal saw the organization of the first all-India Muslim political party with the foundation of the All-India

Muslim League on 30 December 1906 at Dacca. This came about as a response to the creation of the All-India National Congress in 1885, and as a result of the efforts of *nawāb* Viqar ul-Mulk (1841–1917), who had been attempting for the previous five years to create a political organization for Muslims to press the views of the Muslims with the British administration, especially as plans for constitutional development were in place. The move was encouraged by the viceroy, Lord Minto (1845–1914, viceroy 1905–1910), who envisaged a moderate Muslim party led by Muslim grandees as a counterbalance to the increasingly radical Congress.

In 1911 the partition of Bengal was reversed, and at the same time, the capital of British India was moved from Calcutta to Delhi. This shifted the center of national politics from Bengal to Delhi, and Bengal began to lose some of its political importance. In the Government of India Act of 1919, Bengal received a legislative council, and the leading Congress figure in the province became *Deshbandhu* (Friend of the Country) Chittaranjan Das (1870–1925), a lawyer who had served as the mayor of Calcutta in 1924 and 1925. He resigned as Congress president to establish the Swaraj Party in December 1922 with Motilal Nehru (1861–1931). The Swaraj Party was opposed to Mahatma M. K. Gandhi's noncooperation tactics and was designed to acquire the legislative power given by the Government of India Act of 1919 and at the same time to fight for Dominion status for India within the Legislative Councils of India.

In the Government of India Act of 1935, Bengal was designated an autonomous province. After the general elections of 1937, an elected ministry assumed office on 1 April 1937, although the governor retained a considerable amount of authority, both formal and informal. Due to the preponderance of Muslims in eastern Bengal, Muslims could dominate the elected government. Between 1937 and 1943, A. K. Fazlul Haq (1873–1962), the Sher-i-Bangla (Lion of Bengal), the leader of the Krishak Praja Party, headed a coalition government. Four of the six Muslims in his ministry were from the Muslim League. They included Khwaja Nazimuddin (1894–1964), Nawab Habibullah (1895–1958), and H. S. Suhrawardy (1892–1963) who were powerful politicians in their own right and who helped to bring Muslim politics in Bengal under the sway of the League. After the Simla Conference of July 1945, the League acquired increasing support in Bengal as it became increasingly difficult for Fazlul Haq, or any other political leader, to maintain viable cross-communal political alliances.

During World War II, Calcutta had become the headquarters of Southeast Asia Command, and the Japanese bombed the city several times. The renowned Howrah

Bridge was built in 1943, the same year that a terrible famine hit Bengal, when over 2 million people died of starvation. Haq was dismissed by the governor in 1943 and a Muslim League ministry under Nazimuddin was in office until March 1945, when Suhrawardy headed the government. During his ministry the All-India Muslim League called for a Direct Action Day on 16 August 1946. This was aimed at demonstrating the League's authority and to remind the British government that it could only be ignored at the risk of civil war; it unleashed a carnage of communal rioting in Calcutta that left several thousand people dead. The 1946 elections proved to be a great victory for the Muslim League, which won 95 percent of the urban Muslim vote and 84 percent of the rural Muslim vote and was calling for partition of India and of Bengal as well. Many Muslims in east Bengal supported the partition of Bengal, but Suhrawardy, whose support came from Calcutta, opposed it. He worked with the most important Bengali Congress leader Sarat Chandra Bose (1889–1950), who formed his own Socialist Republican Party in 1946, for an independent Bengal separate from both India and Pakistan, but this was opposed by Congress leaders. Accordingly, Bengal was partitioned when India became independent on 15 August 1947. The history of Bengal since the coming of the British had seen increasing communal feeling and increasing communal antagonism. Most importantly, class antagonism between Muslim cultivators and Hindu landlords became seen not as class conflict but as communal conflict. Bengal was split into East Bengal and West Bengal in 1947 as a result of Muslim identity gaining more prominence than class identity.

One of Bengal's most popular leaders, revered in Bengal as a national leader, was Sarat Chandra Bose's charismatic younger brother, Subhash Chandra Bose (1897–1945). He was born in Cuttack and studied at Calcutta and at Cambridge in England. He joined the Indian Civil Service but resigned and returned to India in 1921. He was imprisoned for several years for his opposition to the British. A leading member of the Indian National Congress, he was elected president of the Congress in 1938 and again in 1939, but he was hounded out of office because he came into conflict with Mahatma Gandhi (1869–1948), as for Bose *ahimsa* (nonviolence), the leitmotiv of Gandhi's political philosophy, was merely a tactic. He organized his own Forward Bloc in 1939. In 1940 he was placed under house arrest in Calcutta. He escaped in 1941 and made his way to Germany, met Adolf Hitler, and then was sent to Japan in 1943. In Singapore he became leader of the Azad Hind Fauj, Indian National Army, made up of freed Indian prisoners-of-war, and on 21 October 1943 the head of a provisional government, at which time he declared war against the British. His army marched on India through Burma to the cry of "*Chalo Delhi*." (Let's Go to Delhi!), but they were defeated

in 1944. On 18 August 1945, he disappeared as result, it is believed, of a plane crash. His body has never been found. For many Bengalis he is more beloved than Gandhi.

After Independence

After India became independent on 15 August 1947, the first chief minister of West Bengal was Dr. Prafulla Chandra Ghosh (1891–1983), but he resigned in January 1948. The greatest problem for the province was the communal violence that broke out between Hindus and Muslims as the state was broken into two, with the eastern part of the province becoming East Pakistan with its capital at Dacca. There was large-scale migration, riots, and lawlessness. Though it was quickly brought under control, the human tragedy has never been forgotten. With the Constitution of India taking effect on 26 January 1950, West Bengal received a governor, appointed by the central government, who is advised by the chief minister and his Cabinet, who are members of the Vidhan Sabha, the unicameral state legislature. Calcutta maintains its municipal corporation.

In the post-independence period, Bengal continues to be the center of enormous artistic and intellectual creativity. Among a long list of artists and thinkers, Satyajit Ray (1921–1992), the filmmaker, is one of the most renowned. His first film *Pather Panchali* (1955), the first in his "Apu Trilogy," established him as one of the world's great directors. The music for the film was composed by Ravi Shankar (b. 1920), the most renowned sitar player in the world and an ambassador of intercultural understanding. In 1998, Amartya Sen (b. 1933) received the Nobel Peace Prize for his work on welfare economics, and he was the first Indian Master of Trinity College at Cambridge University (1998–2004). Mother Teresa, born Agnes Gonxha Bojaxhiu in Albania in 1910, arrived in India in January 1929. Between 1931 and 1948 she taught at St. Mary's High School in Calcutta; she then left the convent to work among the poor of Calcutta. In 1950 she established the Missionaries of Charity, which became a worldwide organization. She received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1979, by which time she had become an Indian citizen. After her death in 1997 she was given a state funeral by the government of India.

Dr. Prafulla Chandra Ghosh was replaced by Dr. Bidhan Chandra Ray (1882–1962) in 1948; Ray remained the chief minister until his death. In 1956 Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964) reorganized the states along linguistic lines, and the princely state of Cooch Behar was incorporated into the state of Bengal, and just over 3,000 square miles (7,770 sq. km) was added from Bihar. Prafulla Chandra Sen (1897–1990) governed Bengal from 1962 until 1967. These administrations were all Congress ministries.

During this period, leftist parties took advantage of the disaffection with Delhi and the poverty of the state and formed the Communist Party of India (Marxist) splitting off from the Communist Party of India that had been formed in 1920. In a United Front with other parties, it came to power in 1967 under Ajoy Kumar Mukherjee (1901–1986) of the Bangla Congress. This short-lived government was replaced by Prafulla Chandra Ghosh, the first chief minister, in a Progressive Democratic Front. In 1969 the United Front returned, and the government survived until 1971.

That same year, the war in East Pakistan and the creation of Bangladesh led to the flight of massive numbers of refugees to Bengal, causing enormous problems for the state in housing and feeding the homeless. Fort William became the headquarters for the Indian army during its war with Pakistan in East Pakistan. A Congress coalition ruled in Bengal in 1971, before Siddhartha Shankar Ray took over in 1972 and governed in a Congress ministry until 1977. During that time the Naxalite movement (named after Naxalbari) arose in opposition to the government. Naxalbari is in Darjeeling district in the northern part of Bengal and on 25 May 1967 the Naxalbari movement began when an *adivasi* (tribal) had been given land by the courts under the tenancy laws. He was attacked by local *goondas* (thugs) but the tribals responded by attacking landlords and seizing land. Great publicity was given to this “Naxalbari Uprising.” The Communist Party of India (Marxist Leninist) was created in 1969 to continue the fight for the oppressed in a people’s war and the movement spread to a number of other states as well. The Naxalites started a number of journals including the Bengali weekly, *Deshabrati*. The movement lost momentum but not before most of the leaders of the party and the movement were killed in clashes with the police. In the meantime, however, it gained large numbers of adherents from disaffected urban youth and led to demonstrations, instability, and lawlessness, which impelled a number of major companies and businesses to close down and move to other states. In 1977 Jyoti Basu (b. 1914) became Bengal’s longest-serving chief minister in a Communist Party (Marxist) and Left Front coalition ministry. In 1999 the name of Calcutta was changed to Kolkata, and the name was accepted by the central government the following year. In November 2000 Jyoti Basu was replaced by Buddhadeb Bhattacharya, who maintained the coalition government.

Roger D. Long

See also **Asiatic Societies of Bengal and Bombay; Aurobindo, Sri; Bose, Subhash Chandra; Brahmo Samaj; Clive, Robert; Cornwallis, Lord; Gupta Empire; Hastings, Warren; Mauryan Empire; Roy, Ram Mohan; Tagore, Rabindranath; Tilak, Bal Gangadhar**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Banerjee, Surabhi. *Jyoti Basu: The Authorized Biography*. New Delhi: Viking, 1997.
- Bose, Sugata. *Peasant Labor and Colonial Capital: Rural Bengal since 1770*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1993.
- Brass, Paul R. *The Politics of India since Independence*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Chakrabarti, Amita. *History of Bengal (c. A.D. 550 to c. A.D. 750)*. Burdwan: University of Burdwan, 1991.
- Chatterjee, Srilata. *Congress Politics in Bengal, 1919–1939*. London: Anthem Press, 2002.
- Crawford, S. Cromwell. *Ram Mohan Roy: Social, Political, and Religious Reform in Nineteenth Century India*. New York: Paragon House Publishers, 1987.
- Karim, Abdul. *History of Bengal: Mughal Period*, vols. 1–2. Rajshahi: Rajshahi University, Institute of Bangladesh Studies, 1992–1995.
- Malik, Nadeem Shafiq, ed. *The All India Muslim League, 1906–47*. Islamabad: National Book Foundation, 1997.
- Marshall, P. J. *Bengal: The British Bridgehead, Eastern India, 1740–1828*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1987.
- Mukhopadhyay, Amal Kumar, ed. *The Bengali Intellectual Tradition: From Rammohan Roy to Dharendraanath Sen*. Kolkata: K. P. Bagchi, 1979.
- Ray, Niharranjan. *History of the Bengali People: Ancient Period*, translated by John Wood. Kolkata: Orient Longman, 1994.
- Roy, Asim. *The Islamic Syncretist Tradition in Bengal*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983.
- Thapar, Romila. *Early India: From the Origins to A.D. 1300*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002.

BENTINCK, LORD WILLIAM (1774–1839), governor of Madras (1803–1808) and governor-general of India (1828–1835). William Bentinck was born on 14 September 1774, the second son of the duke of Portland. In 1803 he was appointed governor of Madras Presidency; he was recalled in 1808 after what London authorities deemed a mishandling of a rebellion by Indian soldiers in the company’s army. In 1828, however, he was appointed as governor-general. During his administration, financial retrenchment in the military and civil service moved India toward a modern government, as did judicial reforms that made it possible for more Indians to serve as magistrates and judges. He regarded it as a “monstrous absurdity” that only Europeans could hold high office in British India.

The two most celebrated acts of his administration were also the most controversial: the abolition of the practice of widows burning themselves to death on their husbands’ funeral pyres (known to Europeans as *sati*, and regarded by them as a mark of Indian barbarity); and the introduction of English as the medium of higher education. In the case of the abolition of *sati*, he was under significant pressure from Great Britain, with Christian activists insisting it was the duty of a Christian government

to reflect Christian and British values in the Indian administration. Though *sati* was common only in North India, and only among upper castes, Bentinck was initially reluctant to take any action; although he personally favored abolition, he was told that the practice was sanctioned by Hinduism and would provoke fierce resistance from the Hindu population. Convinced, however, by Indian intellectuals that the custom was not enjoined by the Hindu scriptures, he issued a regulation in 1829 proscribing it throughout British India. That there was no adverse reaction suggests, as Bentinck said, he was “following, not preceding public opinion” (Philips, vol. 1, p. xxviii).

The other great innovation of Bentinck’s administration, and one with enormous implications for modern India, was the decision in 1835 that the government would give support only to institutions of higher education that used English as the medium of instruction. Bentinck had decided that the use of English would make possible the

“improvement” he so desired. In this he was supported by the most prominent Indian intellectual of the time, Ram Mohan Roy, as well as by Calcutta businessmen.

He retired in 1835 and died in 1839. While his administration did not, as he had hoped, greatly “improve” Indian society, it probably began its modernization.

Ainslie T. Embree

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bentinck’s years as governor-general are covered in C. H. Philips, *The Correspondence of Lord William Bentinck: Governor-General of India, 1828–1835* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1977). John Rosselli, *The Making of a Liberal Imperialist, 1774–1839* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974), provides material on his career in India and elsewhere. Isaiah Azariah, *Lord Bentinck and Indian Education, Crime, and Status of Women* (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1978) argues for Bentinck’s importance as a social reformer.



Homi Bhabha. A formidable advocate for the peaceful use of nuclear energy (in this instance, an atomic reactor), Bhabha here signs a 1956 contract authorizing the U.S. sale of 21 tons of heavy water to India. Admiral Lewis L. Strauss, chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission (right), and Gaganvihari L. Mehta, Indian ambassador to the United States (rear), look on. BETTMANN/CORBIS.

BHABHA, HOMI (1909–1966), physicist, first chairman of the Atomic Energy Commission of India. Born in Mumbai (Bombay) as the son of a distinguished Parsi family, Homi Jehangir Bhabha proved to be exceptionally talented, reading Albert Einstein's theory of relativity at the age of fifteen. At Cambridge University, he first completed studies in the mechanical sciences in 1930, then switched to physics. He did research on cosmic rays and became known for the Bhabha-Heitler cascade theory of electron showers (1937) and for his classical theory of spinning particles. In 1939 he returned to India for a holiday but was prevented from returning to England by the outbreak of World War II. He was appointed to a professorship of cosmic rays research at the Indian Institute of Science in Bangalore, where he worked with Nobel laureate C. V. Raman. In 1940 he was elected fellow of the Royal Society. In 1944 he approached the Sir Dorabji Tata Trust and asked for support for an institute of fundamental research, which was established in Mumbai as the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research in 1945. In his letter to the Tata Trust, he had already referred to the importance of nuclear energy. His talent and vision attracted the attention of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru; Bhabha became the first chairman of the newly created Atomic Energy Commission and started building reactors at Trombay near Mumbai. The first one, called Apsara, was started in 1955, soon to be joined by Cirus, a Canadian-Indian joint venture. The Trombay Atomic Energy Establishment was thus already in operation before it was formally inaugurated in 1957. It was renamed the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre in 1967.

Bhabha was not an advocate of the atom bomb, influenced perhaps by Mahatma M. K. Gandhi's strong aversion to the bomb. He suggested to Nehru in 1955 that India should unilaterally renounce the production of atom bombs. Nehru replied that India should first have the ability to make a bomb—otherwise the renunciation would not be very convincing. Ten years later, Nehru's successor Lal Bahadur Shastri asked Bhabha, in view of the Chinese tests of 1964, whether Indian scientists could manage an underground test. Bhabha did not live to see any further development in this field; he was killed in an air crash in 1966 in Mont Blanc, Switzerland.

Dietmar Rothermund

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Cockroft, John, and M. G. K. Menon. *Homi Jehangir Bhabha, 1909–1966*. London: Royal Institution of Great Britain, 1967.
- Deshmukh, Cintamani. *Homi Bhabha*. Mumbai: Granthali, 1994.
- "Homi Jehangir Bhabha." Available at <<http://www.dae.gov.in/bhabha.htm>>
- Kulkarni, R. P., and V. Sarma. *Homi Bhabha: Father of Nuclear Science in India*. Mumbai: Popular Prakashan, 1969.

BHAGAVAD GĪTĀ The title of the Bhagavad Gītā is now generally rendered as the "Song of the Blessed One," but it originally meant the "Upanishads sung by the Blessed One"—a philosophical, rather than a lyrical poem. Together with the old Upanishads and the philosophical "aphorisms of Vedānta," it forms the "triple canon" (*prasthāna-traya*) of Vedānta (End of the Vedas) philosophy and has thus been a mainstay not only of Vedānta, but of Hinduism in general for more than two millennia. Part of the gigantic epic Mahābhārata, the Gītā was composed sometime around the third or second century B.C. Whether it was an early or later episode in that epic as it evolved in the oral tradition, it is now a central element of that entire work. Attempts by some scholars to show it as an interpolation are now generally regarded as oversimplifications, attributed to a lack of appreciation for the character of oral literature.

The Bhagavad Gītā comprises eighteen chapters in the sixth book of the Mahābhārata, which described the beginning of the great battle between the armies of the rival cousins: the five Pāṇḍava brothers against the one hundred Kauravas. Krishna, a prince of a local tribe—known only to a few insiders as the god Vishnu descended in a human form—had taken the side of the Pāṇḍavas, but only as an adviser, not as a combatant. In this battle of the righteous Pāṇḍavas against the devious Kauravas, a struggle of good against evil that was really part of a larger divine scheme in which all men played their assigned roles, Krishna assumed the role of the trusted charioteer to his friend Arjuna, one of the five Pāṇḍavas and the commander of their army. As the battle was about to commence, Arjuna realized that he would fight and kill his relatives and his former teachers for the sake of the kingdom. He sat down in his chariot and refused to start the battle. After first appealing without success to Arjuna's pride and sense of honor as a soldier, Krishna turned to philosophy, the vanity of bodily existence, and finally to the ethics of action and the love of God. As Arjuna still hesitated, Krishna overwhelmed him with a display of his divine glory and authority. It is this code of ethics that gave the Gītā, as the text is commonly known, its prominent role, spawning innumerable commentaries and becoming the guiding light for many prominent people, among them Bal Gangadhar Tilak, Mahatma M. K. Gandhi, Henry David Thoreau, and Ralph Waldo Emerson.

In the Gītā, Krishna went beyond earlier philosophic concepts that sought bliss and liberation through ritual acts, metaphysical insight, or total renunciation and inactivity, proposing the new paths of "disinterested selfless action" (*karma yoga*) and fervent "devotion" (*bhakti*). Activity out of a sense of duty (*dharma*, which includes

the notions of law, righteousness, and functional identity) leaves no residue of karma to create painful rebirths, since it is not the act itself, but the emotions and thoughts behind it that create karma. Arjuna must fight because it is his princely duty, not for the sake of the prize of victory. Better still is the path of total devotion (*bhakti*, “sharing, taking part”) to God. There are few antecedents to this new theism before the Gītā, but it flourished later, especially among the millions of devotees of Krishna/Vishnu.

Hartmut E. Scharfe

See also **Hinduism (Dharma); Mahābhārata; Vishnu and Avatāras**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brockington, John. *The Sanskrit Epics*. Leiden: Brill, 1998.
van Buitenen, J. A. B. *The Bhagavadgītā in the Mahābhārata*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981.

BHĀGAVATA PURĀṆA The Bhāgavata Purāṇa, or “The Ancient Tales of the Blessed One,” stands in a long tradition of such “ancient tales” (Purāṇas) that dealt with the genealogy of gods, seers, and kings, the repeated creation of the world, and the aeons of human existence, along with a multitude of myths. Much of Hinduism’s sectarian movements have found their expression and ideology in these texts, dating from the last centuries B.C. down to premodern times. The Bhāgavata Purāṇa summarizes the world view of Vishnu/Krishna devotees as it developed in the Bhagavad Gītā and the late Vedic Vaikhāṇasa school, and may, as a result, be regarded as the most prominent of all the Purāṇas. It incorporates material from the Vishnu Purāṇa regarding the creation of the world and shows in its philosophy a strong affinity with Vedānta, blended with Sāṃkhya concepts and perhaps a hint of Buddhist compassion. Its form is metric, with the exception of a few prose chapters, mostly *ślokas* (poetic stanzas), and its language occasionally imitates archaic Vedic usage, giving it the patina of venerable age. Its presentation of myths is more restrained than that of other Purāṇas, putting more emphasis on the miraculous rather than the gruesome features. It was most likely composed in the ninth or tenth century A.D. in South India’s Tāmil Nadu.

Ten “descents” (*avatāras*) of Vishnu into this world are mentioned or described in this work in detail, including his appearance as a fish, a turtle, a boar, the Man-Lion (Narasimha), Rāma, Krishna, Buddha, and Kalkin, who is yet to come. Especially popular has been the tenth book, in which the amorous plays of the young



Scene from the Bhāgavata Purāṇa, Painted c. 1550. The most popular and widely circulated of all the Purāṇas, its strong emotional and erotic imagery has been a continual source of inspiration for Indian artists. BURSTEIN COLLECTION/CORBIS.

Krishna with the wives of the cowherds (*gopis*) are described—an inspiration to countless Indian painters. Its most pervasive feature is its emphasis on the intense devotion (*bhakti*) to Vishnu as Krishna, which seems to reflect the powerful influence of the Tāmil poets known as the Ālvārs (diving deep), whose devotion to Vishnu is expressed in strong emotional and erotic images. The Bhāgavata Purāṇa has frequently been commented on by authors from all regions of India, and numerous translations and adaptations in various regional languages were produced. The appeal of this text was not limited to one school. On the contrary, authors of various schools have tried to prove themselves as the true heirs to the Hindu doctrines propounded there. These include the clear formulation of Vishnu’s presence in everything (as when he emerged out of a pillar to kill the blasphemous counter-god Hiranyakashipu) and a “theology” of devotion (*bhakti*) that is based on worship of Krishna, selfless deeds, praise, and devout thoughts, rewarded by Vishnu with his divine grace.

Hartmut E. Scharfe

See also **Bhagavad Gītā; Vishnu and Avatāras**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Rocher, Ludo. *The Purāṇas*. Wiesbaden, Germany: Otto Harrassowitz, 1986.
- The Srimad-Bhagvatam of Krisna-Dwaipayana Vyasa*. Translated by J. M. Sanyal. 2nd ed. Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1973.

BHAJAN *Bhajan* (Sanskrit, from *bhaj*, meaning “to serve, to love, to share”) is a Hindu devotional and ritual song performed either privately or communally by a soloist or (more commonly) by a soloist (or soloists) with responding chorus since probably the first millennium A.D. *Bhajan*, both in terms of practice and etymology, is associated with the *bhakti mārg* (*bhaj* is also the root of the word *bhakti*). The genre’s vernacular texts and regional musical idioms help to make it one of the most popular modes of worship, serving as a vehicle for the expression of devotion to a personal deity. Consequently, the repertoire is vast and diverse, with some examples hundreds of years old and others composed freshly for Bollywood.

Bhajan texts are often didactic and autobiographical. The former suggest idealized behaviors for *bhaktas* (devotees) to imitate, while the latter cite examples from the lives of famous *bhaktas* such as Mirabai. Sometimes, deities such as Krishna or Rāma are the subject of *bhajan* texts, with stories from their lives as examples for devotees.

Bhajans generally consist of two musico-poetic parts: *dhruva-pada* and *pada*. The *dhruva-pada* is the identifying couplet refrain sung at the beginning of the *bhajan* and after each succeeding *pada* or verse (also a rhymed couplet). Commonly, performers repeat each *pada* and *dhruva-pada*. As in many other South Asian musical forms, pitch register generally defines structural sections (*pada* and *dhruva-pada*).

In many traditions, singers use the same tunes for several *bhajans* so that a single tune can serve as a vehicle for a number of different texts. Sometimes, this melody is simple and standardized; however, in some traditions (Gujarati *dhāl*, for example) and in concert performances, the melodic materials and the concept itself can be more complex. Devotees often refer to these melodies by the title of a particularly popular *bhajan*.

The musical and textual transmission of *bhajan* materials is usually oral and communal, with singers learning from each other in performance contexts. Devotees can also purchase *bhajan* texts in small booklets (sometimes called *bhajanāvalis*) in the bazaar or at bus and railway stations, or they can hand copy texts compiled by devotees. Increasingly, *bhajans* composed for the popular film industry are also making their way into local repertoires through cassettes.

Praxis

Performances can be as simple as a single devotee singing to him- or herself during a quiet moment, or as formal as a classical musician closing a program in a concert hall. A stereotypical performance involves a gathering of devotees (a *bhajan mandal*) led by a singer (a *bhajanik*) who knows and can perform many *bhajans*. In different traditions, Hindu women and/or men (sexually segregated groups are more common in the north) get together on a weekly basis. Mixed groups also perform in special contexts (such as family performances).

Bhajan performance reflects other South Asian models in which a principal singer and group of responsorial singers (*jbelā*) participate in communal song (*samāj gāyan*). In *bhajan*, anyone can lead; he or she needs only have the devotion and conviction to begin and others will follow and support. *Bhajan* performances are common at temples, but neighbors and relatives engage in communal performances of *bhajan* in the home and, since neighborhoods have historically tended to be caste-defined, domestic *bhajan mandals* tend to be caste-defined. However, an individual (a *bhajanik*) may become so proficient, or may come to know such a specialized *bhajan* repertoire, that others will invite him or her to their community to lead the singing. Increasingly, in modern urban and suburban settings—and especially in the Indian diaspora—*bhajan mandals* are ethnically diverse and class consistent, thus reflecting social developments in modern India.

Reflecting the widespread popularity of *bhajan*, performers will employ whatever instruments they have available, especially those that are small and portable. Historically, performers prefer an unpitched drum such as the *dholak* or *dhul* for the purpose of providing the basic rhythmic accompaniment, with singers striking metal cymbals such as the *jhāñjh*, *kartāl*, or *mañjira*, if not clapping. As music education has grown, classical drums such as the *tablā* (in the north) and *mrdangam* (in the south) have become more common. Performances might also include the harmonium, a portable keyed bellows organ introduced into India by Europeans in the eighteenth century but widely adopted and adapted by Indians. In the late twentieth century, small electronic keyboards also appeared in homes to accompany singing.

Many communal *bhajan* performances begin with an *ārathī* (an invocation) asking to make the ritual auspicious and successful. An image of the god is placed before the singers, and a plate with a flame (usually from an oil lamp) is passed around the room. Commonly, devotees pass their outstretched hands over the flame and then touch their closed eyes in a symbolic gesture. After the completion of the *ārathī* the singers begin their first *bhajan*.

Gordon Thompson

See also **Bhakti; Music; Rāga; Tāla**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Henry, Edward. *Chant the Names of God: Music and Culture in Bhojpurī- Speaking India*. San Diego: San Diego State University Press, 1988.
- Singer, Milton, ed. *When a Great Tradition Modernizes: An Anthropological Approach to Indian Civilization*. New York: Praeger, 1972.

BHAKTI *Bhakti* (“sharing” or “devotion”) denotes an intensely personal devotion to one’s deity. Religious devotion in a general sense can be found in the earliest Indian literature, the poems of the Rig Veda. But the devotion known as *bhakti*—and the word itself—first appears in the last two or three centuries B.C. The Shvetāshvatara Upanishad preaches devotion to Shiva, the Bhagavad Gītā to Vishnu/Krishna. Other, later texts are dedicated to the worship of the Great Mother Goddess or to a more abstract deity, as in the scripture of the Sikhs. Much of the *bhakti* movement was distinguished by its links to the rich Purāṇic mythology, questions of righteousness and spiritual liberation, and to India’s Hindu social structure, either defending or criticizing the system of castes (*jati*) and classes (*varna*).

A common feature of *bhakti* worship is the acceptance that spiritual liberation is open to members of all social orders, including women, even by those who maintain the traditional divisions of castes and classes. The devotion manifests itself in various ways: through ritual offerings, by listening to stories of Krishna’s deeds, by consorting with pious people, and by chanting the deity’s name or merely thinking about it. Even hatred or fear of Vishnu/Krishna may lead to liberation, because one’s mind is fixed on him. *Bhakti* is the preferred path to liberation (*moksha*) in this degenerate age, rather than meditation, Vedic sacrifice, or temple worship, which dominated in ages past; *bhakti* is a special blessing and opportunity for our otherwise miserable age. In the sixth through the tenth centuries the level of emotional involvement was raised dramatically in the poetry of the Ālvārs, who were devoted to Vishnu, and that of the Nāyanārs, who were devoted to Shiva, all written in Tamil. There were also hymns centered on yoga composed by the Siddhas (perfect masters). An idea that developed among the later Vishnu devotees was that *bhakti* is difficult and really plays only a secondary role, since salvation depends ultimately on Vishnu’s grace.

During the following centuries, what appears to have been a wave of popular *bhakti* movements spread north, expressed often in regional languages and carried by ordinary people. Late highpoints included the songs of

Kabīr, many of which entered the Guru Granth Sahib, the holy scripture of the Sikhs, with their focus on an abstract nondenominational deity; and the popular Rāmāyaṇa epic of Tulsīdās and the Gītagovinda, both works of intense devotion to forms of Vishnu, (Rāma and Krishna). The modern International Society of Krishna Consciousness traces its roots to Chaitanya, a fifteenth-century devotee of Krishna in Bengal.

Hartmut E. Scharfe

See also **Bhāgavata Purāṇa; Bhagavad Gītā; Vishnu and Avatāras**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Lorenzen, David N. “Bhakti.” In *The Hindu World*, edited by Sushil Mittal and Gene Thursby. New York: Routledge, 2004.

BHARAT The Constitution of India begins with this sentence: “India, that is Bharat, shall be a Union of States.” Written in English and adopted in 1950, the Constitution uses the name “India” throughout, but nevertheless provides the Sanskrit alternative to a name that is essentially foreign. Persian kings had named the eastern province of their large empire *Hindu* after the river Indus (Sanskrit *Sindhu*, Iranian *Hindu*); then, in the mouth of Greek-dialect speakers, the initial consonant was lost, and the people were called *Indoi* and their land *India*. These foreign forms were introduced as *Hindostan* (Land of the Indians) by the Muslims and *India* by the Europeans. In the oldest Indian texts, the country was simply called “the Earth,” later also *Jambū-dvīpa* (continent of the rose-apple tree). After the emergence of a powerful tribe, the Bharatas, in the Punjab toward the end of the second millennium B.C., the name *Bhārata Varsha* (the continent belonging to the Bharatas), or simply *Bhārata*, appears first in the great epic Mahābhārata, where it denotes more or less the Indian subcontinent, that is, the world region south of the mythical Mount Meru, which was ideally (but never in reality) ruled by an Indian “world ruler” (*cakravartin*). Later the name appears also as a compound, *Bhārata-varsha*.

India’s great epic, the Mahābhārata (The Great Tale of the Bharatas), deals with the dynastic conflict within the ruling family, which resulted in a gigantic battle and ultimate unification under the model king Yudhishtira. Though many of the events in this epic may be fictional, Indians have always regarded them as part of their early history, a time of great conflict but also of glory and the triumph of good over evil. It is often claimed that karma “matures” only in Bhārata-varsha, meaning that a man’s soul can only be cleansed and achieve spiritual liberation

there. The people living in this land were supposed to observe the four social orders or classes (*varna*) and the four stages of life (*ashramas*), following thus the code of inherited customs and ethics. Outsiders were considered *mlecchas* (barbarians), and contact with them was to be avoided. Historical events, however, resulted in many compromises, such as the acceptance of foreign rulers and extensive political and commercial interactions. But the ideal of Bhārata-varsha ruled by a righteous king like Rāma was never forgotten, and the mythology held out the hope that at the end of this decadent aeon Vishnu, in the form of Kalki, born in a Brahman family, will arrive on a white horse and restore the world to its proper order.

Hartmut E. Scharfe

See also **Hinduism (Dharma); Mahābhārata**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Basham, A. L. *The Wonder That Was India*. 3rd rev. ed. New York: Taplinger, 1968.
 Rocher, Ludo. *The Purāṇas*. Wiesbaden, Germany: Otto Harrassowitz, 1986.

BHARATA NATYAM. See **Dance Forms**.

BHARATIYA JANATA PARTY (BJP) Generally regarded as the party of Hindu nationalism, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) was the largest, dominant partner in the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) coalition government that rose to power in India after the general elections of 1990 and that governed in 1998 and again from 1999 to 2004. Although the BJP still has a significant political presence in the populous north and west of the country, it is weaker in the south and the east.

The BJP was formed in 1980, the successor to the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS), which was founded in 1951 by Shyama Prasad Mookherji. The BJS had been established with the reluctant acquiescence of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS), which had rapidly become the preeminent “Hindu-first” national organization after its creation in 1925. The BJS remained on the margins of Indian national politics until the RSS launched a renewed campaign against cow slaughter in 1966, under the aegis of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad. That campaign proved rewarding for the BJS in the parliamentary elections of 1967. A decade later, the BJS merged with a disparate umbrella group of political parties that united to form the Janata Party. They defeated Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and her Congress Party, following her “National Emergency” of 1975. The Janata coalition itself, however,

swiftly succumbed to internal divisions soon after coming to power in 1977.

The Hindu nationalists of the newly formed BJP reentered the fray of Indian politics in the 1980s with new strategies, led by party president Atal Bihari Vajpayee, who later became prime minister. The Congress Party, which had led the struggle for Indian independence and had dominated national politics for three decades, resumed its decline despite a brief revival in fortunes, creating an opportunity for the BJP, which invoked “Gandhian socialism” and adopted the symbolically significant green, identified with Islam, as well as the saffron of the old Jana Sangh in its flag.

L. K. Advani, who later served as deputy premier and home minister in the BJP-led coalition government, was identified with a more traditional conservative, Hindu-first outlook. He took over the leadership of the BJP from Vajpayee in 1984. His invocation of cultural nationalism appealed to the growing Hindu middle class. The BJP called for a uniform civil code, which would end both Islamic personal law and the special status for the Muslim-majority state of Jammu and Kashmir embodied in India’s Constitution. In addition, the implementation in 1990 of sweeping affirmative action quotas proposed by the Mandal Commission for deprived communities angered upper caste Hindu voters, whose support for the BJP grew. Advani, as the new president of the BJP, combined his critique of the anomalies of secularism in Hindu-Indian society and politics with an espousal of religious symbolism that captured the public mood. He began his symbolic *rath yatra* (chariot pilgrimage) across northern India to rally support for the party. It culminated in the BJP’s campaign for the construction of a Ram temple at Ayodhya over the site of the Babri Masjid, which appealed to zealous Hindus.

The fortunes of the BJP advanced rapidly, its paltry two members in Parliament in 1984 rising to over 119 by 1991. It thus became the largest single party in Parliament. In 1991 the BJP captured of 21 percent of the vote in the India’s most populous state, Uttar Pradesh, and had more than a third in Gujarat state, as well as over 28 percent in its southern stronghold, the state of Karnataka. By 1998, when it joined a coalition government, it had over a quarter of the vote, but it fell by a single vote thirteen days later in a vote of no-confidence in Parliament. But the BJP-led government managed to carry out nuclear tests during its tenure, dramatically turning India into a nuclear weapons state and winning public acclaim. The BJP alliance regained power in 1999 after expelling Pakistani invaders from Indian bunkers in Kargil in a highly televised summer war. Prime Minister



BJP Rally at Ramleela Grounds in New Delhi. The rally, 1 December 2004, intended to protest escalating prices, coincided with the first day of Parliament's most recent winter session, disrupting morning traffic in several parts of the capital. INDIA TODAY.

Atal Bihari Vajpayee was then returned to power, with two additional seats, commanding a total of 182 in India's 540-member Lok Sabha.

During the following years, when the BJP led the NDA government, Indian politics experienced dramatic changes. The liberalization of the Indian economy continued in fits and starts, but with ever greater resolve, as it seemed to spur economic growth, structural transformation, and exports. The major change was India's abandonment of familiar foreign policy postures and its espousal of a new pragmatism that involved a much closer relationship with the United States and Israel. Relations with Pakistan remained tense, and the armed conflict over Kashmir continued unabated, worsening after India formally became a nuclear weapons state in 1998. Pakistan followed suit, and used its nuclear status to intensify covert warfare. But the BJP's reputation suffered a setback when its members and others from associated Hindu-first organizations were implicated in widespread attacks on Muslims in Gujarat.

Despite its ideological Hindu nationalist moorings, the BJP as a political party was compelled to make pragmatic electoral calculations. As a result, tensions arose with zealous Hindutva organizations, which had provided manpower for its election campaigns and had inspired Hindu voters. Historically, the RSS had preferred to engage with civil society to reform Hinduism, and generally disparaged political activity despite, inconsistently, arguing in favor of a robust modern Indian state.

Three interrelated factors complicated this tension between electoral imperatives and ideological issues. The first was the need to raise money, requiring distractions for government policy that constrained populist measures and disappointed voters. Another problem was corruption, fueled by the need to fund elections and finance the party apparatus, which compromised its members and the organization itself, and proved impossible to conceal from voters. The third was the growing criminalization of Indian politics, especially in regions experiencing economic stagnation, or indeed regression, making politics the most attractive vehicle for personal enrichment. The

BJP has been unable to escape these hard realities, which threaten its identity more than does its narrow ideological vision. In the elections of 2004, the BJP was defeated by the Congress Party, led by Sonia Gandhi.

Gautam Sen

See also **Ayodhya; Hindu Nationalism; Hindu Nationalist Parties; Hindutva and Politics; Vajpayee, Atal Bihari; Vishwa Hindu Parishad (VHP)**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Banerjee, Partha. *In the Belly of the Beast: The Hindu Supremacist RSS and BJP of India: An Insider's Story*. New Delhi: Ajanta Books International, 1998.
- Malik, Yogendra K., and V. B. Singh. *Hindu Nationalists in India: The Rise of the Bharatiya Janata Party*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1994.

BHAVE, VINOBA (1895–1982), Indian reformer, disciple of Mahatma Gandhi. A Chitpavan Brahman from Maharashtra, Vinoba Bhave showed remarkable aptitude in mathematics as a young boy, but he also mastered several languages and could have done well in any field. Instead he left home for Varanasi at the age of twenty, studied Sanskrit and meditated, but also took an interest in national affairs. When he heard of Mahatma Gandhi, he made up his mind to join his Sabarmati Ashram, where he was readily accepted. Soon after, Gandhi asked him to assume a significant responsibility. Jamnalal Bajaj, a rich Marwari businessmen from Wardha in central India, had joined Gandhi's movement and had requested him to set up a branch of the Sabarmati Ashram at Wardha. Gandhi sent Bhave to Wardha in 1921, where he organized an ashram in a very disciplined manner. In 1923 he joined Bajaj in the Nagpur



Vinoba Bhave. Bhave, Gandhi's spiritual heir, 1960. His Bhoodan (land gift), Jivadan (life gift), and Gramdan (village gift) movements were the natural extension of Gandhi's program of national reconstruction. BETTMANN/CORBIS.

National Flag Satyagraha, and they were both jailed. Their offense was that they had participated in a procession waving the Congress flag in Nagpur. They were released after a few months, and Bhave took up his work in the new ashram, which he called Sevagram (service village). Gandhi was impressed with the ashram when visiting there in 1928. In 1930, when Gandhi left the Sabarmati Ashram to begin his Salt March, he vowed not to return to his ashram until independence was achieved. He therefore settled in Bhave's ashram outside Wardha after he was released from prison. Bhave was again arrested in 1932, together with Bajaj, and they spent time together in Dhulia jail. Bajaj, who did not know Sanskrit, urged Bhave to translate the Bhagavad Gītā into Marathi, which he did; Bajaj later got it published, and it proved to be a great success. In 1940, when Gandhi launched a campaign of individual *satyagraha* (nonviolent resistance) against the British war effort, he selected Vinoba Bhave as his first disciple to break the law by public protest to be followed by Jawaharlal Nehru. Gandhi commented that Bhave was breaking the law as a representative of the pacifists who object to all wars, whereas Nehru represented those who objected to India's participation in this particular war.

The Bhoodan (Land Gift) Movement

Bhave was a self-effacing man who never gained prominence as a politician, but after Gandhi's assassination he embarked on a campaign that revealed him as the spiritual heir of the Mahatma. Bhave launched the Bhoodan (Land Gift) Movement in 1951, walking barefoot about 28,000 miles (45,000 km) throughout India, imploring landowners to give him one-fifth of their village land, "adopting" him as their son, so that he in turn could gift that acreage to the landless poor. He touched the hearts of the people and many promises were made, but when he left the scene few of them were kept, even though some land was eventually turned over to the poor. The Bhoodan Movement reached its zenith in 1956, then declined. Bhave then shifted the emphasis from Bhoodan to Gramdan and Jivandan. Gramdan (village gift) implied that a whole village would pledge to give all its land to Bhave for equal redistribution among its tillers of the soil. The first village of this kind took the pledge in 1952, and many others followed, but there was more lip service than practical consequence. Jivandan (gift of life) called for volunteers to devote their lives to the movement. Jaya Prakash Narayan, one of India's leading socialists, was the first to become a Jivandani. Bhave's decision of 1956 to stress Gramdan and to get along without paid organizers must be seen in the context of the political atmosphere of this time. In 1955 the Congress Party had passed a resolution recommending

joint collective farming at its annual meeting at Avadi. This radical resolution frightened the peasants, who subsequently supported the Swatantra Party founded by Chakravarti Rajagopalachari. Vinoba Bhave did not favor the socialist idea of collective farming. His Gramdan emphasized voluntary cooperation based on individual autonomy. But most of the land surrendered to Bhave, entrusted to the government for distribution among the landless, was of poor quality, and government officials often did not know what to do with it. Bhave's faith in individual conviction, self-help, and prayer, and his disregard for institutional support for his movement led to its decline. His charismatic appeal could not suffice to give land to all of India's landless, but he had tried his best, hoping to see his dream, and that of his Mahatma, come true.

Dietmar Rothermund

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Nanda, B. R. *In Gandhi's Footsteps: The Life and Times of Jannalal Bajaj*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990.
Nanekar, K. R., and S. V. Khandewale. *Bhoodan and the Landless*. Mumbai: Popular Prakashan, 1973.

BHOPAL The capital of Madhya Pradesh, Bhopal (population 1.4 million in 2001) was founded by the Afghan Dost Mohammad in 1709, and was attacked by the Marathas in the late eighteenth century. The local Muslim ruler, the *nawāb* of Bhopal, entered into an alliance with the British in 1817, shortly before they defeated the Marathas in 1818. The small state, which had only about 730,000 inhabitants in 1931, survived under British rule. For several decades it was ruled by a succession of remarkable ladies. In 1926 Sultan Jahan Begum abdicated in favor of her son, Hamidullah, who then played a very active role in Indian politics prior to independence. In 1931, before Mahatma Gandhi left for London to attend the Second Round Table Conference, Hamidullah tried his best to promote a Hindu-Muslim compromise, with Gandhi's blessing. He could not achieve much at that time; he was later eclipsed by Mohammad Ali Jinnah, who after 1938 emerged as the sole spokesman of the Indian Muslims. In 1947 the princely state of Bhopal acceded to the Indian Union, and in 1956 it was integrated into the new central Indian state of Madhya Pradesh.

The area around Bhopal is known for its rich historical heritage. The famous Buddhist stupa of Sanchi, built in the third century B.C. and embellished in subsequent centuries, is situated at a distance of about 12 miles (20 km) from Bhopal. The old capital of this region,

Vidisha, where the Mauryan emperor Ashoka served as viceroy in his youth, is located about 30 miles (50 km) to the northeast of Bhopal.

In independent India, Bhopal became an industrial city. The U.S. company Union Carbide built a major factory for chemical pesticides there. The plant attracted worldwide attention in 1984, when thousands of people died due to a leak of its poisonous isocyanate gas, and thousands more became ill. Union Carbide was sued for damages, and it was requested that Warren Anderson, the chairman of the company, be extradited to India to be tried for homicide. (The Bhopal city court based the request for the extradition on Section 304, Indian Penal Code, which refers to “causing death by rash or negligent act.” The U.S. government rejected the request on technical grounds.) Union Carbide argued that the leak was caused by the negligence or even “sabotage” of its Indian workers, but those accusations could not be proven. The case dragged on for years and was finally settled out of court, but the meager compensation paid by the company hardly reached those who were actually affected by the disaster. Thus Bhopal became a symbol for the carelessness with which multinational companies handle their operations in Third World countries. The Bhopal disaster has tended to make people forget that this city is currently a thriving industrial center that manufactures a great variety of products, including cotton textiles, electrical goods, and jewelry. It is also known for its cultural activities.

Dietmar Rothermund

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Begam, Sultan Jahan. *History of My Life*. 3 vols. London: John Murray, 1910–1927.
 Morehouse, Ward, and Arun Subramaniam. *The Bhopal Tragedy*. New York: Council on International and Public Affairs, 1986.

BHUBANESWAR Before becoming the capital of Orissa in 1948, Bhubaneswar had been a temple town. As such it prospered and thrived, becoming an important Hindu cultural center. It has remained an important Hindu center, notwithstanding the influx of Buddhism, Jainism, Shaivism, and Vaishnavism—religions that found a home in Bhubaneswar at one time or another, with the changing dynasties of Kalinga (the ancient name of present-day Orissa). It is generally believed that the town probably developed around the Lingaraja temple, erected to Lord Shiva. Thus the name Bhubaneswar derives from the Lord of the Three Worlds, Tribhunesvara.

The religious character of Bhubaneswar ultimately became responsible for its selection as the new capital of Orissa, although the city had never been the political capital of the region. But the Oriyas, in their search for a city that exemplified Oriya spirit and unity, strongly felt that Bhubaneswar was best suited to be the capital of their new province, the eleventh province of British India, in 1936. Before Orissa was created as a separate province, it had been administered from Calcutta and Bihar, in complete disregard of its ethnic and linguistic imperatives. Overshadowed first by the Bengalis and later by the Biharis, the Oriyas under the banner of the Utkal Union Conference launched a successful struggle to unify the scattered Oriya territories into a single province, Orissa.

Bhubaneswar was selected over the neighboring Cuttack by the Maharastrian Brahman B. K. Gokhale, special adviser to Governor Hawthorne Lewis, who, visiting it on 13 April 1945, strongly felt that the site was best suited for the capital of the new province. He was supported in his choice by the rising young Oriya Congressman Harekrushna Mahtab. Gokhale and Mahtab were attracted to Bhubaneswar because of the presence of the airport, which had been carved out of scrub jungle west of the temple town by the Allies during World War II. Certainly if the Allies could succeed in taming the jungle, they felt, the Orissa government could take the rest of the land which belonged to itself and build a new city. Moreover, Bhubaneswar had a mild climate throughout the year, and the main railway line connecting Calcutta and Madras ran past the site. The urban vision that formed in the mind of Gokhale looked to Bhubaneswar becoming an educational and cultural center of the region, with Cuttack retaining the commercial functions, and Chowdwar (a Cuttack suburb) growing into an industrial center.

To implement their urban architectural mission, the Oriyas hired the German-Jewish planner Otto Koenigsberger. From the beginning, Koenigsberger and the Oriyas disagreed on their visions of the capital city. Reared in a tradition of German secularism, Koenigsberger viewed the development of new Bhubaneswar along secular lines, having political autonomy, organized commercial relationships, and brave new architecture that would accommodate the requirements of modern life. The Oriyas, given their tendency to idealize antiquity, harkened back to their glorious religious past.

Also, from the beginning, the temple town and the capital city (which are located adjacent to each other) each sought to establish dominance over the other. The final shape and style of Bhubaneswar bears as much the imprint of religion as that of rational scientific knowledge imported from the West. Governor Asaf Ali clearly

instructed the Public Works Department (PWD) that “the architecture of the new capital should conform to the . . . ancient art of Orissa.” Koenigsberger, on the other hand, maintained that since the new India was intended to be a secular state, there was no place for temple architecture in the capital city—although he was prepared to include important religious monuments of the old town in his master plan to “form interesting viewpoints at the end of the main road.”

Although such divergence of interests created mixed results in Bhubaneswar, the Indians were able to work out their ideas far more freely in Bhubaneswar than in Chandigarh, where Swiss-born French architect Le Corbusier retained close control of all architectural developments. Other than the master plan that was provided by Koenigsberger, the architectural developments in Bhubaneswar were carried out by Julius Vaz, a graduate of the J. J. School of Art, Bombay, and his PWD staff.

Ravi Kalia

See also **Chandigarh**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Kalia, Ravi. *Bhubaneswar: From a Temple Town to a Capital City*. Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press; New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- Panigrahi, Krishna Chandra. *Archaeological Remains at Bhubaneswar*. Mumbai: Orient Longman, 1961.
- Seymour, Susan, ed. *The Transformation of a Sacred Town: Bhubaneswar, India*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1980.

BHŪTA In Sanskrit, *Bhūta* (*bbūt* in modern Indic languages) means a “supernatural being,” a ghost or spirit, sometimes beneficent but more often malevolent and a source of anxiety for individuals and communities. In the late Vedic period, two original meanings—a living being or a cosmic element—shifted to include “disembodied spirit.” *Bhūtas* became a broad category of beings worthy of daily sacrifices, usually a scattering of grains, but sometimes a more deliberate offering known as *balī*. The untimely dead, including suicides, victims of murder, drowning, fire, snakebite, and falls from trees are likely troublesome ghosts haunting the sites of death. Persons with improper funeral rites may vex living relatives by lingering as *bbūtas*. From the Vedic period to the present, a Hindu funeral and succeeding rites (*sbrāddha*) serve to transform a *preta*, the continuing spirit released from the body after death, into a *pitṛ* (“father” or “ancestor”) abiding in an otherworldly realm, avoiding *bbūta*-hood. *Bhūta* is often conflated with *preta*; in modern Hindi, *bbūtpret* is a common term for “ghost.” Every region of South Asia has vernacular equivalents to *bbūta* or *preta*. In Tamil, *pey* is a derivative of *preta*. A Telugu colloquialism, *gāli-dbūli*

(wind and dust), signifies omnipresent, dangerous, invisible spirits. Muslims in South Asia speak of jinn with the authority of the Qurʾān (surah 55.15) to describe similar phenomena: a jinn, acting for good or evil, may represent the haunting presence of the deceased as well as other supernatural powers.

Classical Sanskrit medical treatises on Āyurveda understood *bbūtas* broadly to include malevolent *grabas* (seizers), possessors of humans with ill effects to mind and body. Chapter 60 of the Uttaratāntra appendix to Sushruta Saṃhitā covers *bbūtavidyā*, “the science of *bbūtas*,” including prescriptions for a patient seized by ancestors, demons, ghouls, or other ghosts. Recitation of mantras, offerings of meat, blood, milk, fermented beverages, and even clothes, incense fumigations, and applications of unguents to the patient are recommended by the physician in this text, still considered authoritative.

Folklore holds that a *bbūt* or *pēy* is likely to jump on a person at night, or high noon in the hot season, particularly someone passing a cremation site or burial ground or a well (a venue for suicides), under certain trees, or obeying calls of nature. Following a death, a house may be closed for a time, or sold, because of dangerous ghosts. Those who do not fear *bbūts* are said to be immune from attack. Most every village or town has specialists in exorcisms laboring with the aid of favored goddesses, gods, and saints to identify and dispatch *bbūts* or jinn from the bodies of their clients. Brahmins and Brahman-imitating high castes profess little credence in *bbūt* phenomena, yet at times they too become victims, forced to consult generally low caste exorcists. In some locales, both Hindus and Muslims have recourse to the same healer, shrine, or tomb of a saint.

There are many categories. In North India, a *brahm* is a powerful Brahman male ghost, liable to exact vengeance on enemies with diseases such as leprosy. A *bbavāmi* is the spirit of an unmarried girl. The *curail*, the ghost of a vengeful barren woman, causes miscarriages. Aborted fetuses may terrorize their kin. *Bbūts* are supposed to be invisible, yet many describe them as hideous humans dressed in white, feet turned backward, palms of hands reversed, noses clipped, fingernails grossly long.

On the other hand, not all “ghosts” are malevolent or undesired. Male or female children who die before marriage may be installed as household guardian-deity images, credited with the well-being of the family, worshiped and fed daily, paraded in processions, where they possess and speak through mothers or other relatives. In the Vīrabhadra cult of coastal Andhra, possessions are deliberately sought to maintain contact, ease the pain of loss, and satisfy an infant or child deprived of a full life span. The *bīr* (from Sanskrit *vīra*, “hero”) cults of North

India honor heroes, particularly those who died an early, violent death. *Bhūta* cults of coastal Karnataka also welcome heroic and other spirits, who ritually possess and speak through dancers and priests, receive offerings, and provide blessings to the community.

David M. Knipe

See also **Āyurveda; Hindu Ancestor Rituals; Hinduism (Dharma); Saṃskāra**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Hiltebeitel, Alf, ed. *Criminal Gods and Demon Devotees: Essays on the Guardians of Popular Hinduism*. Albany: State University of New York, 1989. Fieldwork essays by Diane Coccari (Banaras [Varanasi]), David Knipe (coastal Andhra), Günther Sontheimer (the Deccan), and others.
- Parry, Jonathan P. *Death in Banaras*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University, 1994. Fieldwork basis for discussions of ghosts, spirit possession, exorcism.
- Wilson, Liz, ed. *The Living and the Dead: Social Dimensions of Death in South Asian Religions*. Albany: State University of New York, 2003. Fieldwork essays by Peter Gottschalk (Bihar), David Knipe (coastal Andhra), Isabelle Nabokov (Tamil Nadu), Jonathan Walters (Sri Lanka), and David White (North India).

BHUTTO, ZULFIKAR ALI (1928–1979), president (1971–1977) and prime minister (1973–1977) of Pakistan. Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto was Pakistan's most popular political leader and its only prime minister to be hanged. Born in Sind's Larkhana, Zulfi was the youngest son of wealthy Sindi "landowner" (*wadero*) and princely state premier Sir Shah Nawaz Bhutto and his second wife, young Hindu Lakhi Bai, who converted to Islam, changing her name to Khurshid. Zulfi's formal education started in Bombay's Cathedral High. In September 1947, a few weeks after partition tore India apart with the birth of Pakistan, he flew from Bombay to New York and Los Angeles, enrolling at the University of Southern California (USC).

Impact of Study Abroad

Zulfi was less interested in USC course work than in fraternity pranks and parties. After two years at USC, he transferred to Berkeley, majoring in political science, fascinated by Napoleon Bonaparte, his role model. Though he had been married as a boy to one of his Larkhana child cousins, Zulfi met his true wife, Nusrat Ispahani, at his sister's wedding on his first trip to Pakistan from Berkeley. Two years later they married in Karachi, flew to London and then to Oxford, where Zulfi enrolled at Christ Church College. A year later, their first of four children, Benazir, was born. Zulfi taught his daughter everything

he loved about realpolitik; eventually, Benazir would follow in his footsteps to the pinnacle of Pakistani power.

Lincoln's Inn Barrister Bhutto returned to Pakistan in 1953, briefly practicing law in Karachi before abandoning it for politics. Soon after General Ayub Khan's coup in 1958, Bhutto became his foreign minister, urging his older martial "president" in 1965 to ignore the "cease-fire line" in Kashmir and quickly "liberate" that state's Muslim majority from India's army "of occupation." Bhutto assured Ayub that Kashmir's people would "rise up" as soon as Pakistan's tanks moved east. No popular welcome awaited them, however, only Indian bombs, floodwaters unleashed by India's engineers, trapping Pakistan's heavy armor in deep mud. India's tanks then rolled west to the outskirts of Lahore, and Ayub was forced to accept a cease-fire, flying with Bhutto to Tashkent for a peace conference with Indian prime minister Lal Bahadur Shastri, hosted by Russian premier Aleksey Kosygin. The frail Shastri died the day after the armistice agreement was signed in January 1966, succeeded by Indira Gandhi. Ayub, depressed by the war he had lost, soon succumbed to heart failure, turning over his martial rule to General Yahya Khan.

Bhutto alone emerged after Tashkent stronger than ever. He started a new Pakistan People's Party (PPP), winning popular acclaim wherever he spoke in West Pakistan. But East Pakistanis showed little interest in anything Bhutto said. Most Bengalis understood none of his Urdu or English rhetoric. Bengal's Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, head of his Awami (People's) League, was the only politician supported by most Bengalis. They voted overwhelmingly for him in Pakistan's first nationwide election of 1970. Bhutto's PPP won a majority in West Pakistan, but East Pakistan had 10 million more people, so Mujib's Awami League won a majority of National Assembly seats. Mujib should have become Pakistan's first democratically elected prime minister, but Bhutto refused to accept him and persuaded Pakistan's weak-minded martial "president" Yahya Khan to launch a bloody war against "Bangla-Desh" (Land of Bengalis) in March 1971 instead. Pakistan's army suffered a humiliating defeat as Indian troops, supported by heavy Russian artillery and tanks, rolled across Bangladesh in early December. Bhutto blustered to the United Nations Security Council that Pakistan would "never surrender." But two days later it did.

Bhutto flew home in the aftermath of that debacle to take Yayha's job as "martial law president," vowing to "pick up the pieces" of battered Pakistan. He soon nationalized Pakistan's banks, took control of Pakistan's shipping, and began funding the development of a secret nuclear arms program. In midsummer of 1972, Bhutto flew with his daughter to Simla for a summit with Indira Gandhi. They agreed to turn Jammu and Kashmir's cease-fire line into a redrawn "line of control" and formally ended the



Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. Bhutto at the height of his power and popularity, 1973. Just six years later, he was found guilty of murder and hanged. The Pakistani population remains divided in its assessment of his legacy. HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS.

Bangladesh War. Pakistan soon recognized the totally independent “nation of Bengal,” losing more than half its population and most of its foreign-currency earnings from jute. India promised to return its more than 90,000 Pakistani prisoners. Bhutto flew home to cheering crowds and a hero’s welcome in Lahore, Karachi, and Larkhana, where he kept his huge arsenal of guns and ammunition for festive annual shooting parties.

Pinnacle of Power

In 1973 Bhutto persuaded his National Assembly to adopt a new Constitution for the “Islamic Republic of Pakistan,” over which he would preside as its first prime minister. He then flew to Washington, welcomed warmly by his patrons, President Richard M. Nixon and Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, as Pakistan’s “savior.” February 1974 marked the peak of Bhutto’s power. He regally hosted an Islamic summit of thirty-eight Muslim heads of state in Lahore, including Bangladesh’s prime

minister, and every “king, royal highness and excellency” of the Islamic world.

But that May 1974, Indira Gandhi triggered India’s first underground nuclear explosions in Rajasthan, close enough to Pakistan’s Sind to be felt by Bhutto himself. Zulfi inveighed against such “nuclear blackmail,” vowing that his people would sooner “eat grass” than allow India to use its bombs against a less powerfully armed Pakistan. South Asia’s most lethal arms race thus moved into high gear. The Peace of Tashkent and the harmony of the 1972 summit at Simla were buried under nuclear bomb blasts and angry rhetoric.

Decline and Fall

Before year’s end, the father of one of Bhutto’s outspoken critics and political opponents, Ahmad Raza Kasuri, was gunned down inside a car driven by his son. The son accused Bhutto of murdering his father by “mistake,” aiming to kill him instead. Bhutto denied it, but on the

night of 4 July 1977, Bhutto's handpicked choice for Pakistan's chief of army staff job, General Zia ul-Haq, ordered Prime Minister Bhutto arrested. Zia's midnight coup was followed a few months later by Bhutto's trial for the "murder" with which he had previously been charged. In March 1978 Bhutto was found guilty as charged, sentenced to death, and after a series of appeals, all of which failed, was hanged before dawn on 4 April 1979.

Bhutto was hailed by millions of Pakistanis as Shaheed (martyr)—"Zulfi Bhutto lives on!" they cried. His daughter, Benazir, began her first term as Pakistan's prime minister a decade later, shortly after Zia ul-Haq and most of his loyal staff went down in flames in 1988 in a mysterious crash of their C-130 plane almost immediately after it took off.

Stanley Wolpert

See also **Pakistan**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Batra, J. C. *The Trial and Execution of Bhutto*. Delhi: Kunj, 1979.
- Bhutto, Benazir. *Daughter of the East: An Autobiography*. London: Hamish Hamilton, 1988.
- Burki, Shahid Javed. *Pakistan under Bhutto, 1971–1977*. London: Macmillan, 1988.
- Chishti, Faiz Ali. *Betrays of Another Kind*. London: Asia, 1989.
- Jalal, Ayesha. *The State of Martial Rule*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1990.
- Kak, B. L. Z. A. *Bhutto's Notes from the Death Cell*. New Delhi: Rada Krishna Prakashan, 1979.
- Kaushik, S. N. *Pakistan under Bhutto's Leadership*. New Delhi: Uppal, 1985.
- Mody, Piloo. *Zulfi, My Friend*. Delhi: Thomson Press, 1973.
- Mukherjee, Dilip. *Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto: Quest for Power*. New Delhi: Vikar, 1972.
- Schofield, Victoria. *Bhutto: Trial and Execution*. London: Cassell, 1979.
- Taseer, Salmaan. *Bhutto: A Political Biography*. London: Ithaca Press, 1979.
- Wolpert, Stanley. *Zulfi Bhutto of Pakistan: His Life and Times*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

BIHAR Bihar (*vibar*; Sanskrit, meaning "monastery") is one of the most populous states in India, bordered by Nepal on the north, and by the states of West Bengal in the east, Jharkhand in the south, and Uttar Pradesh in the west.

Bihar has an area of 36,357 sq. miles (94,163 sq. km), after losing approximately 45 percent of its territory and the rich mineral resources of its southern part when the new state of Jharkhand was created in November 2000. Bihar is on latitude 24°20'10" to 27°31'15" north and longitude 83°19'50" to 88°17'40" east. The state is

dominated by the middle Ganga Plains, divided into the north and the south plains. The north Bihar Plain is flat alluvial country, less than 250 feet (76 m) above sea level and prone to flood; the south Bihar Plain is more diversified, with many hills rising from the level alluvium. The rivers Kosi and Gandak from the north and Son and Punpun from the south join the Ganga. In Bihar's fertile plains, rice, wheat, oilseeds, maize, gram, barley, and various fruits and vegetables are cultivated. Among the important cash crops are chilies, tobacco, jute, potatoes, and sugarcane.

May is Bihar's hottest month, when temperatures average 81° to 102° Fahrenheit (27° to 39°C). The normal annual rainfall varies from 40 inches (1,016 mm) in the west central part to more than 60 inches (1,524 mm) in the far north and in the northwest.

Bihar enjoyed a prominent position in Indian history, as several kingdoms flourished there. The first Indian state was formed at Vaishali by about 700 B.C. From the sixth century B.C. to the fifth century A.D., this region was the seat of major empires and the cradle of Indian civilization. Magadha, in the sixth century B.C., was the main center of the Buddha's activities, and also of his contemporary Mahavira, the founder of Jainism. The fourth century B.C. saw the rise of the Mauryan dynasty, of which Ashoka was the third monarch. Magadha reemerged to glory during the Guptan dynasty in the fourth and fifth centuries A.D. After the onslaught of the Hunas in the mid- and late fifth century, Bihar lost its former glory, regaining it during the era of the Palas of Bengal (A.D. 775–1200). Under Muslim rule (12th–18th century), Bihar had little independence. It was conquered by the British in 1765 and remained part of the Bengal presidency until 1912, when the province of Bihar and Orissa was formed. The two provinces were separated in 1936.

Bihar played a significant role in different phases of India's struggle for independence. It was an important center of the "mutiny" of 1857–1859, during which Kuer Singh emerged as a hero in Bihar. Mahatma Gandhi, the father of the nation, launched his first *satyagraha* (devotion to truth), or passive resistance movement, against European indigo planters in the Champaran district of northern Bihar. Rajendra Prasad, the first president of independent India, came from Bihar.

The population of Bihar in 2001 was almost 83 million. It is one of India's most rural states, with only about 13 percent of its people being urban. Patna, Gaya, Bhagalpur, Muzaffarpur, Darbhanga, and Munger (Monghyr) are the major cities. Hindus constitute about 83 percent and Muslims about 14 percent of Bihar's population. The literacy rate is very low, only about 47 percent for males and 33 percent for females.



Cooking Outside a Village Hut, Bihar. In the densely populated and largely rural state of Bihar, a typical scene unfolds: outside a thatched home, woman preparing her family's meal atop a *chullah* (mud stove). AMAR TALWAR/FOTOMEDIA.

Bihar's cultural and linguistic regions are closely integrated. Maithili, in the area of Mithila in north Bihar, and Bhojpuri and Magahi in the central plains, are of the Bihari group of languages. Hindi is spoken by over 90 percent of Biharis and is Bihar's official language, with Urdu being its second language. Madhubani line paintings, done originally by the women of Mithila to decorate the facades of their village homes, are perhaps the most famous works of folk art in Bihar.

Hindu, Buddhist, Jain, Muslim, and Sikh shrines abound in this ancient land. Patna (Pataliputra), the capital of Bihar, is one of the most ancient cities of the world. Gaya, about 62 miles (100 km) south of Patna, is a great center of pilgrimage for Hindus. Nine miles (15 km) from there is Bodh Gayā, the world's greatest pilgrimage site for Buddhists, where over 2,500 years ago, Gautam, the prince of Kapilavastu, attained enlightenment and became the Buddha, the "enlightened one." The ruins of the world's earliest university, the celebrated Nalanda Buddhist monastic university (founded in the fifth century A.D., flourished until the twelfth century), lies 56 miles (90 km) south of Patna. Rajgir, a pre-Pataliputra town of Magadha, and a very important

center for both Hindus and Jains, lies 9 miles (15 km) west of Nalanda. Pawapuri, 24 miles (38 km) from Rajgir, is the place where the founder of Jainism, Mahavira, died.

Biharis of different sects and faiths celebrate their festivals with much gaiety and devotion throughout the state. Holi, the spring festival of colors, is the most buoyant of all Hindu festivals. At the festival of Dussehra, prayers are offered to the Mother goddess Durga, symbolizing the victory of good over evil. Diwali (Deepawali) is celebrated by illuminating houses to commemorate the return of Lord Rāma after fourteen years of exile. However, the most revered festival in Bihar is Chhat, in which the Sun God is the object of veneration. Muslims observe Eid (Eid-al-Fitr) and Bakrid (Eid-al-Zuha) with great devotion and zest. Jayanti (birthdays) of Buddha and Mahavira are celebrated by Buddhists and Jains, and Guru Gobind Singh's birthday is celebrated by Sikhs on a grand scale.

The governor of Bihar, appointed by the president of India, is the head of the state, who functions on the advice of the chief minister, who heads the council of ministers of the state government. The legislature in

Bihar is bicameral. The upper house, or Legislative Council, and the lower house, or Legislative Assembly, are called Vidhan Parishad and Vidhan Sabha, respectively. The state judiciary is headed by a high court at Patna, with a chief justice and several other judges. The state is divided into 9 administrative divisions, 38 districts, 101 subdivisions, and 533 blocks. Its bureaucracy is headed by the chief secretary, below whom are the secretaries of various departments.

Yuvaraj Prasad

See also **Bengal; Guptan Empire; Patna**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Comprehensive History of Bihar*. Vol. 1, parts I and II, edited by B. P. Sinha (1974); vol. 2, parts I and II, edited by H. S. Askari and Q. Ahmad (1983, 1987); vol. 3, parts I and II, edited by K. K. Dutta and J. S. Jha (1976). Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute.
- Diwakar, R. R. *Bihar through the Ages*. 1959. Reprint, Patna: K. P. Jayaswal Research Institute, 2003.
- Dutta, K. K. *History of Freedom Movement in Bihar*. 3 vols. Patna: Government of Bihar, 1952–1958.

BIMBISARA (c. 555–493 B.C.), *king of Magadha*. Bimbisara, the king of Magadha (southern Bihar), made his capital, Rajagriha, the splendid center of the first empire in eastern India. Having added to his realm both Koshala, to the west of Magadha, by matrimonial alliance, and Anga, to the east, by conquest, he ruled over a large territory with fertile rice fields and access to iron ore and other natural resources in the adjacent forests. By controlling the River Ganges (Ganga) from about the present-day western border of Bihar to its mouth, he could profit from the river trade of eastern India. Bimbisara introduced a land-revenue system and an efficient administration and could thus support a strong army. It is said that in his administrative policy he may have been influenced by that of the Persian emperors Cyrus II and Darius I. Cyrus had founded an empire that extended from the Mediterranean to Afghanistan when he died in 530 B.C. The brilliant usurper Darius, who ruled from 522 to 486 B.C., then held sway from the Nile to the Indus. Bimbisara must certainly have been aware of their grandeur.

Bimbisara is a prominent figure in the Buddhist legends (Jataka tales), which portray him as a contemporary of the Buddha, whom he is said to have admired and protected. He may also have extended his support to Mahavira, the founder of Jainism. His ambitious son, Ajatashatru, forced Bimbisara to abdicate, and then imprisoned him and starved him to death. According to the Jataka tales, the motive for this crime was that Bimbisara was a staunch follower of the Buddha, which was resented by his son's

evil advisers. Bimbisara had founded the first great royal dynasty of India, and the territory that he ruled also served as the base of the empires of the subsequent dynasties, the Nandas and the Mauryas.

Dietmar Rothermund

See also **Guptan Empire; Magadha; Mauryan Empire**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Thapar, Romila. *Early India: From the Origins to A.D. 1300*. London: Penguin, 2002.

BINDUSARA. See **Mauryan Empire**.

BIOTECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION Modern biotechnology originated in the mid-1970s with new advances in genetics, immunology, and biochemistry. Biotechnology includes all techniques that use living organisms or substances from organisms to produce or alter a product, cause changes in plants or animals, or develop microorganisms for specific purposes. Biotechnology encompasses several techniques and methods, including genome mapping, gene splicing (or the transfer of one or more genes with certain prospectively useful qualities to plants, domestic animals, fish, and other organisms), and molecular breeding. Although genetic modification of crops and domesticated animals has been occurring for over a thousand years, using tools such as selective breeding and hybridization, modern biotechnology speeds up the process enormously, incorporating new traits from virtually any species at will. Indeed, biotechnology's unprecedented ability to move genes within and across species, including the ability to move genes across distantly related species, and potentially even between animals and plants, makes it a powerful tool for modifying nature.

Although the first biotechnology-based foods entered the marketplace in 1994, by 2001 over 50 modifications involving 13 crops had been approved and produced on more than 128 million acres (52 million hectares) in at least 14 countries. The bulk of commercial applications of biotechnology are concentrated in agriculture and food processing, particularly in the development of new varieties of food plants, diagnostics for plant and animal diseases, and vaccines against animal diseases, including reduced herbicide and pesticide use through the utilization of biological control agents. One of biotechnology's first applications included staple crops such as corn and cotton that were bioengineered to make toxins capable of killing insect pests. For example, "Bt maize" has been genetically modified to make it produce a protein from



Kiran Mazumdar-Shaw of Biocon India. Mazumdar-Shaw, managing director and founder of Biocon India, a pioneer in the manufacture of specialty industrial enzymes and active pharmaceutical ingredients. Biocon, like other Indian biotechnology companies, is increasingly serving as a research arm to major multinational corporations. INDIA TODAY.

the bacterium *Bacillus thuringiensis* that kills the corn borer insect, a major threat to maize crops. Similarly, crops such as squash, potatoes, wheat, papaya, and raspberries have been successfully engineered to resist common plant diseases, and to be kept much longer in storage and transport. Transgenic tomatoes and bananas have been developed with slow ripening properties. Genetically modified soybeans, corn, canola, and cotton have been developed with resistance to the herbicide glyphosate and are now widely used in the United States.

Biotechnology has successfully enhanced the quality of food by increasing the levels of essential amino acids and vitamins to foods traditionally lacking in those nutrients. For example, the incorporation of two daffodil genes that produce vitamin A to a rice variety (called golden rice) is a major breakthrough. If used widely, it has the potential to substantially increase the nutritional

quality of diets and to reduce blindness and other threats to health in millions of adults and especially children in the developing world. Similarly, enhancing fruits and vegetables to contain vaccines against deadly and debilitating diseases, such as hepatitis, cholera and malaria, may help developing countries where such infectious diseases are rampant, especially among children. Of course, the key will be the ability to grow and distribute foods containing these edible vaccines locally and at relatively low cost.

Modifications to tissue culture, marker-assisted selection, and DNA fingerprinting now allow a faster and more targeted development of improved genotypes for crop varieties. This has enabled crops to grow in difficult environments such as those that have irregular water supplies or poor soils, to greatly reduce postharvest losses, and to strengthen a crop's own ability to defend itself against destructive insects, thereby reducing the need for chemical pesticides. Biotechnology and genetic engineering therefore have the potential to help increase productivity in agriculture, forestry, and fisheries. It could lead to higher yields on marginal lands in countries that today cannot grow enough food to feed their people. These developments have been hailed as the coming of a second Green Revolution, giving farmers a powerful tool in their struggle against the vagaries of nature and the age-old scourge of pestilence and disease.

Despite the potential gains, opposition to biotechnology ranges from concerns regarding the dangers of gene splicing and objections to the patenting of living organisms on religious and ethical grounds to fears of unanticipated health and environmental consequences. The harshest opposition is reserved for the "unregulated" production of genetically engineered or modified foods—dubbed Frankenfoods by some. Critics argue that there has been insufficient testing on genetically modified (GM) foods and that the benefits of such foods have not been adequately demonstrated. They point out that the potential risks of adulterated GM foods may include toxic reactions, food allergies, increased cancer risks, antibiotic resistance, and even death, as the recent outbreak of bovine spongiform encephalopathy (mad cow disease) in Britain tragically illustrated. Moreover, many also see a clear potential for ecological disaster as a result of wholesale genetic pollution resulting from cross-breeding and gene transfer to nontarget plant and animal species, the creation of new viruses and bacteria, and the mutation of weeds and pests into "superweeds" and "superpests," either by accidental transfer of the herbicide-resistant genes from the crops to weeds, or as weeds and pests eventually develop resistance to pesticides and vaccines in the genetically engineered crops. Critics claim that over the long run, biotechnology will

serve to greatly reduce biodiversity by deliberately promoting certain species over others, thereby reducing the genetic pool of plant and animal life, making the planet even more dependent on a handful of food varieties. Some environmental activists and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), including Greenpeace, have called for a complete moratorium on further development of biotechnology, while others have urged developing countries to refrain from producing GM foods because they may lose export markets in industrialized countries where consumer anxiety over genetically engineered foods remains palpable. Indeed, despite reassurances by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration, the U.S. Department of Agriculture, and other national and international agencies that biotech foods currently on the market are safe for human consumption, the European Union in April 1998 banned the use and import of GM crops. Consumers in the European Union, Japan, the United States, and India remain deeply wary of GM foods.

Most agricultural biotechnology research has concentrated primarily on commercial agriculture and on industrialized nations' staple crops, rather than on the food needs of developing countries. Investments in crops consumed by the vast majority of people in developing countries, such as cassava, millets, sorghum, sweet potatoes, yams, legumes, lentils, pigeon peas, chickpeas, traditional rice varieties, and groundnuts, remain insignificant. Critics maintain that such a bias is deliberate, as private investment in biotechnological research is oriented toward agriculture in higher-income countries, where there is purchasing power for its products. Of equal concern, the development of substitutes for major developing country export crops such as cocoa and sugarcane could have a devastating impact on these economies. Unlike earlier Green Revolution technologies, which were developed mainly by publicly funded institutions in both developed and developing countries, and philanthropic organizations such as the Ford and Rockefeller foundations, modern agricultural biotechnology remains the monopoly of multinational corporations, in particular, those in the pharmaceutical and food-processing industries. At present, biotechnology applications remain concentrated among a few large corporations, including Aventis, Monsanto, AgrEvo, Syngenta, DuPont, Zeneca, and Dow. Unlike the philanthropic organizations, which literally gave away high-yielding seed varieties to developing countries, corporations have agreed only to transfer proprietary technologies at a cost—some even demanding royalties up front. Such actions inevitably raise concerns that property rights protection on the processes and products of biotechnology may prevent cultivators in developing countries from benefiting from the new technologies.

The Development of Biotechnology in India

In 1986 the Indian government established a Department of Biotechnology (DBT) under the Ministry of Science and Technology to give impetus to the development of modern biotechnology in India. The DBT has a mandate to promote biotechnology throughout the country by collecting and disseminating relevant information, developing safety guidelines, and promoting education, research, and development by establishing research institutes. India's national budget provides significant increases for research and development spending on biotechnology; since 2001, biotech firms enjoy a 150 percent tax deduction for research and development. This has resulted in the proliferation of biotech parks (high-tech industrial complexes), like the Marine Biotech Park in Chennai. States like Punjab, Haryana, and Andhra Pradesh are collaborating with private promoters to build or expand biotech parks in their respective states. Currently, both the Indian private sector and government are investing heavily in the agricultural and medicinal applications of biotechnology.

India now has a fairly advanced infrastructure in both fields, and has made important scientific contributions in several areas: biological control of plant pests, diseases, and weeds; development of new vaccines and veterinary products from medicinal and aromatic plants; and enhancement of the nutritional value of staples such as Basmati rice, mustard, mustard oil, wheat, mangoes, cardamom, chickpeas, potatoes, vegetables, bananas, oil palm, and coconut. Moreover, India has a great deal of expertise in critical areas such as microbiology, chemical synthesis, immunology, and biotech equipment manufacturing. Also, patenting of innovations, technology transfer to industries, development of transgenic plants, recombinant vaccines, and drugs are now quite advanced. Several universities and colleges now have biotechnology programs, and the prestigious Indian Institutes of Technology have launched advanced degree programs in biosciences, biomedical engineering, bio-informatics, and applied biotechnology. As a result, the country not only has developed a strong base of indigenous capabilities, it is well prepared to benefit from foreign collaboration. Indeed, India's biotechnology industry is increasingly serving as a research arm to major multinational corporations, with growing potential for further strategic alliances.

However, there are some major challenges. India's regulatory system for biotechnology products is bureaucratic and secretive. Currently, biotechnology products must be reviewed by both district and state monitoring committees. Then the products are reviewed by committees at the national level, including those from the DBT, the Department of Health, the Ministry of Agriculture,

and the Ministry of Environment. The industry has called for expediting revisions, proposing a single national regulatory agency for all biotechnology products under direct authority of the prime minister, independent of various government departments and ministries. Similarly, inconsistent policies regarding intellectual property rights in India limit the growth potential of the biotechnology industry.

Clearly, both India and the international community need to formulate a consistent policy on intellectual property rights. Consider the case of *haldi*, or tumeric. *Haldi*, an essential ingredient in curry powder, has been used in India for centuries as an antiseptic on wounds. In 1993, when two American scientists registered a patent for *haldi*'s wound-healing properties, the Indian government mounted a successful challenge and had the patent revoked after proving (using ancient Sanskrit texts) that this was no discovery. However, such "success" has been rare. For example, despite protests by the Indian government and NGOs that basmati rice was the product of informal breeding by Indian farmers, the U.S. company Ricetec was granted patent rights for developing "Basmati 867." Ricetec successfully argued that it had developed a new higher-yielding strain. Similarly, *sarson* (mustard seeds), used for centuries in Ayurvedic medicine, was patented by a number of Western laboratories who had successfully extracted the mustard oil used for certain medicines. An extract from the leaves of the neem plant, used as toothpaste and as an antiseptic for centuries in India, was patented by several American and European laboratories, despite challenges by the Indian government. A broad global agreement on intellectual property rights related to biotechnology is clearly critical.

In the last quarter of the twentieth century, India achieved dramatic increases in food production by developing high-yielding rice and wheat varieties, increased irrigated areas, and enhanced fertilizer and pesticide use. However, intensification of agriculture and reliance on irrigation and chemical inputs has led to severe environmental degradation with problems of salinity and pesticide abuse. To meet its food demand, India must attend to these challenges immediately. With the potential to increase India's agricultural productivity, biotechnological applications in agriculture could help address India's food availability challenges while preserving fragile land areas. Biotechnology may substantially increase productivity in major food crops, without reliance on chemicals, fertilizers, or pesticides. It also offers possible opportunities for better soil, water, and nutritional management as well as productivity of livestock, fisheries, and aquaculture. Biotechnology offers both promise and perils. Appropriately monitored and integrated with other technologies for the production of food, agricultural products, and

services, biotechnology could be of significant assistance in meeting the needs of India's expanding and increasingly urbanized population.

Shalendra D. Sharma

See also **Agricultural Growth and Diversification since 1991; Indian Institutes of Technology (IITs)**


BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Paarlberg, Robert. *The Politics of Precaution: Genetically Modified Crops in Developing Countries*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000.
- Phillips, Peter W. B. "Policy, National Regulation and International Standards for GM Foods." Policy Brief no. 1. Washington, D.C.: International Food Policy Research Institute, 2003.
- Pinstrup-Andersen, Per, and Ebbe Schioler. *Seeds of Contention*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2000.
- Pringle, Peter. *Food Inc., Mendel to Monsanto: The Promises and Perils of the Biotech Harvest*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2003.

BOLLYWOOD. *See* **Cinema.**

BOMBAY India's modern metropolis of Bombay, known for its fashions, films, financial industries, cotton mills, skyscrapers, and squalor, was once an archipelago of seven sleepy islands, inhabited only by Buddhist monks and the tribal deep-sea fishermen called Kolis, whose stone goddess, Mumbadevi, gave the principal island its present name, Mumbai. For the British, Bombay was their main harbor and the nucleus of the British East India Company's fort on Mumba Island, from which the modern city grew. Present-day Bombay, or Mumbai, stretches from Dongri (the congested inner city, one of the oldest parts of Bombay) on the east to Malabar Hill on the west. The other islands include Colaba—the most expensive real estate in the world in 2005; Old Man's Island, also called Old Woman's Island; Mazagaon, famous for its mango groves; Worli, known for the Haji Ali Dargah, a mosque-tomb named after a Sufi saint; Parel, which is possibly named after the Shaivite Parali Vajjanath Mahadev temple of the thirteenth-century kingdom of Raja Bhimdev (the island is also called Matunga, Sion, and Dharavi); and Mahim, the capital of Raja Bhimdev to the west of Parel, north of Worli, named after the Mahim River.

Bombay changed hands many times, from the Buddhist Mauryan emperor Ashoka to the Muslim rulers of Gujarat to the imperial Mughals, remaining marginal to Indian history because neither the Hindu rajas nor the Muslim rulers placed much importance on maritime



Bombay's Diverse Environs. A world apart: In the island city of Bombay a narrow stretch of water separates a slum from towering luxury high-rises. VIVIANE MOOS/CORBIS.

trade—and whatever maritime trade flourished between the ninth and thirteenth centuries in the Indian Ocean was limited to Aden (Yemen), west coast cities of Africa, and Calicut, south of Bombay on the Malabar coast. However, under both the Ahmedabad sultans and the Mughals, Bombay experienced Islamization. The oldest surviving Hindu structures in the archipelago are the Elephanta Caves containing fresco paintings and, possibly, a portion of the Walkeshwar Temple Complex, both dating back to the late thirteenth century. The mosque in Mahim dates back to the Ahmedabad sultanate period.

With the advent of the Europeans in the sixteenth century in the Indian Ocean, Bombay was soon pushed from the margins of Indian history to center stage. Soon after Francis Almeida in 1534 sailed into the deep-water natural harbor of the island that the Portuguese called Bom Bahia (the “good bay”), the Portuguese realized Bombay’s potential importance. The Portuguese, who already controlled Goa, Daman, and Diu off the west coast of India, forcibly occupied Bombay until 1662, when it was given to England’s King Charles II in dowry on his marriage to the Portuguese princess Catherine of Braganza. Under the Portuguese Jesuits, Christianity

came to Bombay, with the building of churches and vigorous attempts to proselytize the indigenous Kolis. The Portuguese built a fort in Bassein. Still, the Portuguese never realized Bombay’s full potential as a strategic natural harbor or a vital commercial center of imperial power.

The British first reached Gujarat on 24 August 1608, when Captain William Hawkins of the East India Company dropped anchor off Surat, at the mouth of the Tapi River. Hawkins found the port city crowded with Indians, Arabs, Jews, Armenians, Portuguese, Dutch, and other merchants engaged in a trade of goods encompassing luxuries as well as necessities: indigo, cotton, carpets, and satin, ready for export. Hawkins feared that Portuguese Jesuits “had helped convert Indian apathy and neutrality toward Englishmen into a positive aversion.” But the Anglo-Portuguese rivalry culminated in Hawkins’s victory over the Portuguese fleet off Surat in November 1612. However, the growing demand for indigo and saltpeter, combined with the famine of 1630 in Surat, persuaded the British to look for a new location. The archipelago of Bombay, considered worthless by the British, was turned over by Charles II to the East India Company for an annual rent of only £10 in 1668.

George Oxenden became the first British governor of Bombay, but it was Gerald Aungier, the second governor, who had the vision to turn the archipelago into a trading port that would rival other ports in the Indian Ocean. He first secured the island by building a fort (a small portion of the wall has survived), and through a variety of inducements he attracted skilled workers and traders from Gujarat: Parsis, Bohras, Jews, and Hindu Banias. Bombay's population soared from 10,000 in 1661 to 60,000 in 1675. Bombay soon displaced Surat as the western gateway to India.

After finally defeating the Hindu Marathas in 1818, the British embarked upon reclamations of land and large-scale public works projects in Bombay. From 1784 to 1845 the British successfully fused Bombay's seven islands into a single landmass. In 1850, Thana (a suburb) was linked with Bombay by a 21-mile (35 km) railway line, and in 1854, the first cotton mill was built. With the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, cotton exports from Bombay became an important part of the colonial economy. The Bombay Municipal Corporation was founded in 1872 and its Stock Exchange opened in 1875. The city witnessed the erection of several imperial monuments well into the twentieth century, including the Flora Fountain, Victoria Terminus, Hanging Gardens, Gateway of India, General Post Office, and the Prince of Wales Museum. The British employed High Victorian and Edwardian architectural language, fused with features derived from twelfth- to fifteenth-century English, French, and Venetian Gothic, augmented by elements of the Indo-Saracenic style.

As a result of the efforts of Governor Mountstuart Elphinstone in the 1820s, Bombay became India's center of English education and social reform. The establishment of the Bombay University in 1857 provided a new impetus to English-language education: Indians gained proficiency in English in the hope of economic success and social mobility. With the spread of English education came printing presses, newspapers, periodicals, libraries, and cultural and political associations that would initiate reform movements whose impact would be felt throughout India. Inevitably, Bombay became an important center of Indian nationalism; the first meeting of the Indian National Congress was held there in 1885.

In postcolonial India, Bombay witnessed a surge in its population as its economic growth attracted Indians from all parts of the country. In 1960, Bombay state was bifurcated into Maharashtra and Gujarat, based on linguistic differences, with Maharashtra retaining Bombay city as its capital. With the completion of the back-bay reclamation project in the early 1970s, Nariman Point (named after the former mayor K. F. Nariman) became the hub of commercial activity. Bombay itself was renamed Mumbai

in the late-1990s, which also witnessed the computerization of its stock exchange. The Bombay Stock Exchange itself was shifted to the twenty-eight-story Phiroze Jamshejee Jeejeebhoy Towers, named after its former Parsi chairman. Bombay was also the home of the famous Parsi industrialist Sir Jamsetji N. Tata and several nationalist leaders, including Dadabhai Naoroji.

How this city of over 18 million people will cope with overcrowding, health problems, pollution, and sanitary issues is difficult to predict. But the Mumbaikars are completing Navi Mumbai (New Bombay) across the bay as a possible solution to overcrowded old Bombay, much as the British built New Delhi as an alternative to overcrowded Old Delhi.

Ravi Kalia


See also **Urbanism**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- David, M. D. *Bombay, the City of Dreams: The History of the First City in India*. Bombay: Himalaya Publishing House, 1995.
- Furtado, Joseph Vernon. *Bombay the Beautiful*. Bombay: Thacker, 1957.
- Kalia, Ravi. *Gandhinagar: Building National Identity in Postcolonial India*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press; New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004.
- Mehta, Suketa. *Maximum City: Bombay Lost and Found*. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004.
- Tindall, Gillian. *City of Gold: The Biography of Bombay*. London: Temple Smith, 1982.

BONNERJI, WOMESH C. (1844–1906), first president of the Indian National Congress. Barrister Womesh C. Bonnerji of Calcutta presided over the first meeting of the Indian National Congress on 28 December 1885 in Bombay. Seventy-three professional men, representing British India's major cities and far-flung districts, gathered during that Christmas week in Gokuldas Tejpal Sanskrit College, a self-selected inchoate "Parliament" of New India's elite. Bonnerji, born in Sonai to a Bengali Christian family, was educated at the Oriental Seminary in Calcutta, and in 1864 sailed to England, where he studied law and was called to the Bar of London's Middle Temple. He returned home to join Calcutta's High Court in 1868. Inspired by his visits to London's Parliament and Temple of Justice, he became one of young India's most eloquent advocates of representative government.

Surely never before had "so important and comprehensive an assemblage" gathered on Indian soil, President Bonnerji told his compatriots at that first session of the Congress. Though not popularly "elected," they



Portrait of Womesh C. Bonnerji. Relocating to London in 1902, he eloquently argued the case for self-rule before the Privy Council, convinced to the very end that the British Empire might be swayed by higher ideals. K. L. KAMAT/KAMAT'S POTPOURRI.

were uniquely qualified to speak for India's voiceless masses, since all Congress delegates shared their "sentiments," "feelings," and "community of wants." In 1892 Bonnerji was again invited to preside, over a larger seventh session of India's National Congress in Allahabad. He was also elected that year to represent the University of Calcutta's Senate on Bengal's Legislative Council.

In 1901 Barrister Bonnerji moved to London and established his practice there, pleading before the Privy Council, until he lost his vision in 1904. He died in July 1906, half a year after his brilliant young friend, Gopal Krishna Gokhale, presided over the Benares Congress. In his eulogy to Bonnerji, Gokhale hailed him as a man whose wisdom and political integrity should have elevated him to the position of prime minister of India, had India been an independent nation-state. Bonnerji, like Gokhale, Mahatma Gandhi's "political guru," was one of New India's bravest and best political leaders.

Stanley Wolpert


See also Congress Party; Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.; Gokhale, Gopal Krishna

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Martin, Briton, Jr. *New India, 1885*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969.
- Sisson, Richard, and Stanley Wolpert, eds. *Congress and Indian Nationalism*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988.
- "W. C. Bonnerji's Presidential Addresses to the Indian National Congress, 1885 and 1892." In *The Indian National Congress*. 2nd ed. Madras: G. A. Natesan, 1917.

BOSE, SUBHASH CHANDRA (1897–1945), Bengali political leader. Hailed as *Netaji* (Leader) of the Indian National Army he founded, with Japanese support, during World War II, Bose is considered by many to be India's greatest Bengali leader. Born in Cuttack, Orissa, brilliant Bose entered Calcutta's Presidency College at the age of sixteen, launching his revolutionary career by leading a student protest against a racist English teacher. Bose was suspended as a result, but he was able to complete his education a year later in Bengal's Scottish Churches College. In 1919 his successful father sent young Bose off to London, where he learned enough Latin to pass the Indian Civil Service examinations, shortly before Mahatma Gandhi launched his first *satyagraha* (nonviolent resistance) movement against the British Raj. Bose decided then to abandon his ambition of joining the British Service, sailing home instead to join Gandhi's revolutionary opposition to British rule. He met with Gandhi in Bombay, but found him too nebulous about the goals of his movement, and too worried about avoiding all violence in the national protest he led in 1921.

Bose returned to Calcutta, where he organized a student boycott against the Prince of Wales in 1921, and worked under Bengal's great "nation-unifier," Deshabandhu Chitta Ranjan Das, who became his political guru. When Das was elected as Calcutta's mayor, he appointed Bose to serve as his chief executive officer, and together they began work to clean up the slum districts of that "City of Dreadful Night," as Rudyard Kipling called it. Bose, however, was accused of "aiding terrorists" by the British and was shipped off to Mandalay prison for three years. After 1927, he returned to Calcutta a popular hero, elected to preside over Bengal's Provincial Congress Committee. A decade later, Bose was elected president of the Indian National Congress, which met in 1938 in the village of Haripura. Mahatma Gandhi, along with a majority of more conservative members of the Congress Working Committee, had expected Bose to step down after his presidential year ended, but fiery Bose wanted another year in office, urged by many of his devoted Bengali supporters to contest the National Congress elections held in Tripura in 1939. It was the first contested election since the Congress was created in



Handwritten Message from Subhash Chandra Bose. A message written in his official capacity as president of the Indian National Congress in 1938–1939. Bose subsequently flirted with fascism as an answer to India's woes. Before long in collaboration with the Nazis (in exchange for their promised support of Indian autonomy), he broadcast daily appeals, from Berlin via Radio Free India, in Bengali and Hindi, urging his countrymen to rebel against "British tyranny" and support the Axis powers. KAMAT'S POTPOURRI.

1885, and Bose won, despite Gandhi's silent disfavor and the open opposition of his Working Committee, which immediately resigned. Bose was then obliged to step down, his health failing him in the aftermath of that exhausting struggle.

Bose had lived for several years in western Europe during the early 1930s, and was attracted to the ideals of socialism and communism. He later preferred fascism and Nazism, which he thought he could humanize with an admixture of Indian philosophy, then introduce to India as a potent form of national Indian socialism, first forcing the British out, then eliminating poverty and the inequities of caste and class. His Forward Bloc Party, which he started with his brother Sarat Bose after leaving the Congress, was very popular in Bengal, but when World War II started, the Bose brothers were placed under house arrest in Calcutta. Subhash escaped, however,

moving by night across North India to Afghanistan. He managed to fly to Berlin, met Adolf Hitler, and adopted as his title Netaji, "Leader," hoping someday to become India's "Führer." He broadcast daily appeals to India in Bengali and Hindi, urging those who heard him to rebel against "British tyranny," insisting that the Axis powers were winning the war and that the Allies would soon be routed.

After Singapore fell to the Japanese, the British Indian army of some 60,000 troops surrendering without a fight early in 1942, the Nazis decided that Bose would be much more useful to them there than he was in Germany. He was sent by submarine in the spring of 1943 from Hamburg, around the Cape of Good Hope, to Singapore, and when he arrived was given command by the Japanese of all Indian troops willing to join his Indian National Army (INA). In October 1943, Netaji inaugurated his Provisional Government of Azad (Free) India, leading his army on its epic march up the Malay peninsula and Burma to Rangoon, where they began their advance toward eastern India, his battle cry taken from the 1857 Sepoy Mutineers: "*Chalo Delhi!*" (Let's Go to Delhi!). Bose and his INA reached the outskirts of Manipur's capital, Imphal, in May 1944. Had heavy monsoon rains not bogged them down long enough for British and American planes to fly in troops and arms, forcing them back, Bose might have reached Bengal, where Netaji would have been welcomed as his nation's savior. Instead he marched back to Saigon, flying off to Taiwan (Formosa) on the last, overloaded plane to escape the Allied army that recaptured Burma and Malaya and routed the INA in May 1945. His plane crash-landed and burned, and Bose died in a Taiwan hospital. His ashes were taken to Japan.

So many Bengalis and ardent Indian patriots believed, however, in the myth of Subhash Chandra Bose's "immortality," refusing to think of him as dead, that as late as 1957 the government of India sent a special deputation of members of Parliament to Japan to examine his ashes, reporting that they were in fact those of Netaji Bose.

Stanley Wolpert

See also Congress Party; Das, Chitta Ranjan; Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bose, Subhas Chandra. *The Indian Struggle, 1920–1942*. Bombay and New York: Asia Publishing House, 1964.
 ———. *An Indian Pilgrim: An Unfinished Autobiography*, translated and edited by Sisir Kumar Bose and Sugata Bose. Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 1977.
 Bright, Jagat S. *Subhas Bose and His Ideas*. Lahore: Indian Printing Works, 1946.

Getz, Marshall J. *Subhas Chandra Bose*. Jefferson, N.C.: McFarland, 2002.

Gordon, Leonard A. *Bengal: The Nationalist Movement, 1876–1940*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974.

———. *Brothers against the Raj: A Biography of Indian Nationalists Sarat and Subhas Chandra Bose*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.

Roy, Dilip Kumar. *The Subhas I Knew*. Bombay: Nalanda, 1946.

BRAHMA. *See* **Hinduism (Dharma).**

BRAHMACARYA The *Brāhmacārīn* student “doing (religious) formulation” in the older Vedic literature denoted men who devoted their lives exclusively to religious duties. Later, this Sanskrit term came to refer to young Indians of the three higher social orders during their time of study, which typically began at the age of eight and ended at age sixteen. The young men stayed with their teacher’s family, trained to follow a strict discipline that included sleeping on the ground, simple food and dress, and obedience. Another disciplinary feature was absolute celibacy. Graduation from this period of study was immediately followed by marriage and the setting up of a household, with ensuing economic and sexual obligations. Much later, as an old man, the higher caste Hindu would, according to standard doctrine, retire with his wife to a celibate life in the forest, eventually renouncing the world as an ascetic. Celibacy was seen as such a prominent feature of a man’s life in his student years that *brahmacarya* (life of a Veda student) acquired the secondary meaning of “celibacy.”

Indian society, on the one hand, placed a high priority on the production of offspring, especially sons, both for religious and economic reasons: only sons could make the offerings to ancestors, and sons were required to work the fields and to defend and support the family as well as the community. At the same time, there was admiration for those who resisted the temptations of worldly life and lived a life of religious devotion in poverty and celibacy. In some instances, the inability to get married and function sexually due to physical defects may have been a factor, but mostly the decision was based on religious fervor, a belief that restrictions and mortifications helped to destroy bad karma, and a conviction that the retention of semen increased a man’s potency. The ascetic is often called *ūrdhva-retas* (whose semen is up), which in tantric texts is explained as retaining it in the head; tantric rituals included intercourse without orgasm. Male orgasm was often seen as the effluence of power, weakening the man. The celibate ascetic was credited with great powers that he could unleash in terrible curses or could use to bestow blessings. God Shiva is typically seen in a yoga pose as an

ascetic or as a virile dancer. He is described alternatively as the ultimate celibate ascetic and as the passionate lover of his wife Pārvatī. In modern times there are reports how, in his old age, Mahatma Gandhi extolled the virtues of celibacy and imposed on himself exercises to test and strengthen his powers of restraint.

Hartmut E. Scharfe

See also **Hinduism (Dharma); Shiva and Shaivism; Yoga**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Kane, Pandurang Vaman. *History of Dharmasāstra*. 2nd ed., vol. II. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1974.

Olivelle, Patrick. *The Āśrama System: The History and Hermeneutics of a Religious Institution*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

BRAHMAN. *See* **Caste System.**

BRĀHMAṆAS Brāhmaṇa is derived from the Vedic Sanskrit word *brahman* (formulated speech, mantra) and signifies the genre of texts that deal with mantras, their use in solemn Vedic ritual, and, extensively, with the explanation of the secret meaning of the ritual itself as well as its component parts. The Brāhmaṇas are composed in stark, archaic prose and include the incidental discussion of a large variety of additional topics: etymology, customs, beliefs, proverbs, semihistorical legends, mythological tales, many asides, and much incidental speculation about the Vedic ritual. The oldest preserved Brāhmaṇa texts are part and parcel of the Yajur Veda Saṃhitā of the Black (Krishna) Yajur Veda. The Brāhmaṇas proper are linguistically younger, independent texts that are attached to the four Veda Saṃhitās. The Āraṇyakas and the older Upanishads also belong here, as they continue the discussion in the same style and language. The Āraṇyakas are “wilderness (texts),” not “forest texts,” which discuss, outside of the settlement, the secret and dangerous rituals; the older Upanishads contain the secret teaching, presented in dialogue fashion, on the nature of the soul and its ultimate identity with *brahman*, the force underlying the cosmos. They frequently continue to rely on Brahmanic ritual data and their discussion.

The Brāhmaṇa-style text constantly emphasizes correct knowledge of the hidden meanings of the ritual (“he who knows thus,” *ya evaṃ veda*). The Vedic Brahmins strove to discover that meaning by correlations (homologies, or identifications). The underlying technique correlates certain items in the three spheres: microcosm (humans, society), mesocosm (*yajna*, i.e., ritual), and



Contemporary Brahman Blesses a Devotee at the Hanuman Ghat in Varanasi. Located in Uttar Pradesh, this temple and others in Varanasi remain an important destination for religious pilgrims, drawn to the centuries-old city situated on the banks of the sacred Ganges. AMIT PASRICHA.

macrocosm (gods, universe). By performing certain actions in ritual, both the human and divine spheres can be affected, but only “if one knows thus.” This correlation was possible as the ritual ground, its layout, its objects, and the very participants have corresponding counterparts in both the human and the divine or cosmic realm. Actions in ritual space therefore give the priests control over society and the cosmos outside it. Such ritual actions must be accompanied by ritual speech (mantras in verse and prose), used by the three major priests, and occasional silence, represented by the Brahman priest. Action, speech, and thought (*shrāddhā*, “trust [in the efficacy of ritual]”) are integral parts of any ritual, which, by its correlations, works like sorcery and magic, as seen in the Atharva Veda and outside the Vedic sphere. The same system of correlations, allowing the control of macro- and microcosm, is also at work, with straightforward magic, in solemn Shrauta rituals.

This “ritual science” works with strictly logical applications of cause and effect, even where we would see co-variation, that is, several “causes.” We can also not accept the initial propositions (e.g., “fire is semen,” “the sun is gold”). In order to establish such correlations, it is enough that two entities have just one thing in common, be it an attribute, phonetic similarity in designations and names, or even just a number. Preferably, multiple links are established. Use is made of facts drawn from everyday observations of nature and society (“cattle are thin in spring”; “nobility and Brahmins depend on the ‘people’”), of mundane and sacred speech (“the gods love the recon-dite,” and other proverbs), etymologies, details of ritual (a piece of gold = wealth, the sun), traditional legends (a certain king did not offer to Indra, disaster followed), myths (Indra opened the Vala cave, slew the dragon), and specially fabricated ritual myths that often restate older (Rig Vedic) ones (the gods feared the glowing Pravargya vessel and asked Prajāpati for help). Wherever possible, such data are correlated to establish multiple relationships that “explain” the ritual and empower the performers. A typical, involved argument, playing with etymologies, runs like this: “Prajāpati did not know to whom to give the offering fee (*dakṣhiṇā*). He put it in his right hand (*dakṣhiṇā*). He took it (pronouncing the mantra) For fitness (*dakṣha*) I take you, the offering fee (*dakṣhiṇā*). Therefore, he became fit (*adakṣhata*). The one knowing this who receives the offering fee (*dakṣhiṇā*) becomes fit (*dakṣhate*).”

The constant employment of such procedures in the Brāhmaṇa-style texts has created a complex, amorphous, still not completely described web of “hidden” interrelations, known only to the contemporary ritual specialists. Over time, many new sets of parallel and interlinking correlations were discovered, stated in sets of three or five, and increasingly brought to higher levels of abstraction, so that in the Upanishads, certain truths could be stated in abbreviated form, such as “*tat tvam asi*.” Traditional esoteric Brāhmaṇa investigation thus resulted in Upanishadic speculation, a fact not always recognized, and it also is a predecessor of early Buddhist thought.

All of this is based on the important role of “classical” Vedic ritual, first seen in Brāhmaṇa-style texts, that is after the so-called Kuru reforms of Rig Vedic ritual. These transformations were due to a combination of political, social, and religious changes. The relationship between the development of Vedic ritual and changing social and political structures is a promising field for further inquiry. Ritual had been part of the Rig Vedic cycle of exchange of “food” (*annā*) between men and gods; after the Kuru reforms, in Brāhmaṇa-style texts, ritual became the center of religious life in the more elevated echelons of society. Its proper and increasingly complex

performance allowed the nobility (and other wealthy persons) to be prosperous in this world: having many sons, cattle, long life, achieving dominance in clan and society, or reign over the tribe in case of chieftains, and to “reach heaven” after death. The priests performing the rituals strove after the same goals, and after expected, ritually correlated donations from their noble sponsors.

Always nervous about their purity, which cemented their (theoretical) highest position in society, an all-important point of discussion was how to avoid evil (*agha*, *enas*, *pāpa*) and pollution. This—and not the avoidance of violence as such, which has always remained involved in the classical ritual, until today—is one of the important aspects of the Kuru Shrāuta reform. The myth of Indra cutting off the head of Dadhyanc is the “charter myth” of the main priests acting in classical ritual, the Adhvaryus, who want to avoid direct involvement in the evil and pollution, caused by killing, that is necessary in ritual. They fear pollution by *pāpa*, the “evil” of being stained with blood and being “touched” by death (working through *meni*, “revenge” that “sticks” to perpetrators) but cannot object to the killing and force that is necessary in many rituals. Rather, they delegate such actions to helpers, working outside the sacrificial ground, to avoid direct contact. Killing is not even referred to overtly: the animal is “pacified” (*śam*) and “agrees.” This attitude has been copied by other religions, such as Buddhism and Jainism. The Dadhyanc tale thus is the main myth of justification of the priestly class. The Ashvin, doctors and latecomers to the ritual of the gods, become their Adhvaryu priests, after having gained the secret of the “(cut-off) head of the sacrifice.” This they received from Dadhyanc, whose head they had replaced with a horse’s head to save him from Indra’s wrath. In ritual, likewise, the killing of sacrificial victims is done by helpers, outside the sacrificial ground. Because of its foundational character, the entire line of thought is in need of detailed treatment.

The Brāhmaṇa texts also offer considerable insight into the society and history of the period before 500 B.C. While the earlier texts, the Yajur Veda Samhitās, were confined to western North India (mainly eastern Punjab, Haryana, and Uttar Pradesh), the Brāhmaṇas cover most of North India, from the eastern Punjab to the western border of Bengal, and from the Himalayas to the Vindhya, and they even provide a few glimpses of areas beyond it. The cultural center, among the Kuru-Pāncāla, began to shift eastward, to Kosala (Oudh) and North Bihar (Videha), with emerging kingdoms that claim Ikshvāku lineage (like the Buddha). The late Brāhmaṇa texts provide legends about links with Rig Vedic poets (Vishvāmitra, in Aitareya Brāhmaṇa) and Kurukshetra origins (Videgha, who founded Videha, in Shatapatha Brāhmaṇa). Some of the more complex royal rituals, necessary for social stratification and legitimization

in these emerging large kingdoms, have been added to the core of the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa (1–5). While the earlier Yajur Veda texts overlap with the Painted Grey Ware archaeological culture (though the peripatetic pastoral Indo-Aryans cannot have been the actual bearers of this settled, agriculture-oriented culture), the later Brāhmaṇas overlap with the widespread Northern Black Polished Ware culture and the beginnings of the first Indian empire in Magadha.

The oldest Brāhmaṇas are contained in the Samhitās of the Black (Krishna) Yajur Veda (Maitrāyaṇī, Kaṭha, Kapishthala-Katha, Taittirīya S.), while the Brāhmaṇas proper include the following: the Taittirīya Brāhmaṇa is merely an addition to the Taittirīya Samhitā; a further, very interesting addition, with much cultural information and otherwise unknown myths, is the late Vādhūla Brāhmaṇa (or Vādhūla Anvākhyāna. There is no Maitrāyaṇī Brāhmaṇa, and only fragments of the original Kaṭha Shatādhyāya Brāhmaṇa, mostly referring to domestic rituals, have been preserved in Kashmiri Ṛcaka ritual handbooks. The extensive “Brāhmaṇa of the Hundred Paths” of the White (Shukla) Yajur Veda is available in two closely related versions, the Mādhyandina and Kāṇva Shatapatha Brāhmaṇa, with a complicated mutual relationship. The Shatapatha Brāhmaṇa is one of the Vedic texts first edited and translated; though it is a late Vedic text, which sums up much of the earlier discussions, it occupies a central position in Indian studies, in spite of the existence of similarly important texts such as the Jaiminīya and Vādhūla Brāhmaṇas. Most of these Brāhmaṇas belong to the schools of the Yajur Vedins and therefore explain the work of the Adhvaryu priests, the main priests acting in Vedic ritual, at great length, offering deep insights into the structure, sequence, and meaning of contemporary ritual actions.

The two Rig Vedic Brāhmaṇas, the Aitareya and the Kaushītaki (or Shāṅkhāyana) Brāhmaṇa, mostly deal with the recitation of Rig Vedic mantras by the Hotṛ priests, but the Aitareya Brāhmaṇa also contains important additions that offer a glimpse of the rituals and society of the emerging larger kingdoms of the Vedic East, in Kosala and Bihar.

The Sāma Veda Brāhmaṇas deal with the proper recitation of Sāman melodies but also offer a large amount of legends connected with the “authors” of such melodies. These are the Jaiminīya, Pancaviṃsha (or Tāṇḍya Mahābrāhmaṇa), and Shaḍviṃsha Brāhmaṇa. The Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa is an extremely important text with many otherwise unknown myths, legends, and a wealth of cultural data. It has only partially been edited, translated, and studied. The Pancaviṃsha Brāhmaṇa is available only in uncritical editions. The Minor Sāma Veda Brāhmaṇas, often called the Sāma Veda Sūtras, have

been edited by B. R. Sharma: *Shaḍviṃsha Brāhmaṇa*, *Sāmavidhāna*, *Ārsheya*, *Devatādhāya*, *Upanishad Brāhmaṇa* (or *Mantra Brāhmaṇa*), *Samhitopanishad Brāhmaṇa*, *Vaṃsha Brāhmaṇa*, *Kshudra Sūtra*, and *Mashaka Kalpa Sūtra*.

The Atharva Veda has a very late Brāhmaṇa, the *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa*, which is in fact an additional Brāhmaṇa (*anubrāhmaṇa*) of the Paippalāda school of the Atharva Veda. Fragments of lost Brāhmaṇas have been compiled by B. Ghosh.

Michael Witzel

See also **Hinduism (Dharma); Upanishadic Philosophy; Vedic Aryan India**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Adhikari, T. N. *Gopatha Brāhmaṇa, a Critical Study: An Analysis of the Topics and a Comprehensive Critique of the Brāhmaṇa Text of the Atharva-veda*. Kolkata: Sanskrit Pustak Bhandar, 1994.
- Bodewitz, H. W. *Jaiminīya Brūhmaṇa I, 1–65. Translation and Commentary with a Study of the Agnibotra and Prānāgnibotra*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973.
- . *The Jyotishbṛtoma Ritual. Jaiminīya Brūhmaṇa I, 66–364. Introduction, Translation and Commentary*. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1990.
- Eggeling, J. *The Shatapatha Brāhmaṇa: According to the Text of the Mādhyandina School*. 5 vols. 1882–1900. Reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1963.
- Farmer, S., J. B. Henderson, and M. Witzel. “Neurobiology, Layered Texts, and Correlative Cosmologies: A Cross-Cultural Framework for Premodern History.” *Bulletin of the Museum of Far Eastern Antiquities* 72 (2002): 48–90. Also available at <<http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~witzel/BMFEAfinal.pdf>>
- Ghosh, B. *Collection of the Fragments of Lost Brāhmaṇas*. Calcutta: 1935. Reprint, New Delhi: Panini, 1982.
- Keith, A. B. *Rigveda Brāhmaṇas: The Aitareya and Kaushītaki Brāhmaṇas of the Rigveda*. 1920. Reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1971.
- Raghu, Vira, and Lokesh Chandra. *Jaiminīya-Brāhmaṇa of the Sāmaveda*. Nagpur: Sarasvati-Vihara series 31, 1954.
- Sen, C. *A Dictionary of the Vedic Rituals Based on the Shrauta and Grhya Sūtras*. Delhi: Concept, 1978.
- Surya, Kanta. *Kāṭhaka-Saṃkalana: Extracts from the Lost Kāṭhaka-Brāhmaṇa, Kāṭhaka-Shrautasūtra and Kāṭhaka-Grhyasūtras*. Lahore: Mehar Chand Lachhman Das, 1943.
- Witzel, M. *On Magical Thought in the Veda*. Inaugural lecture. Leiden: Universitaire Pers, 1979.
- . “Early Sanskritization. Origins and Development of the Kuru State.” In *Recht, Staat und Verwaltung im klassischen Indien: The State, the Law, and Administration in Classical India*, edited by B. Kolver. Munich: R. Oldenbourg, 1997. Also published as “Early Sanskritization.” *Electronic Journal of Vedic Studies* 1, 1995. Available at <<http://www.shore.net/~india/ejvs>>
- . “The Development of the Vedic Canon and Its Schools: The Social and Political Milieu.” In *Inside the Texts, beyond the Texts: New Approaches to the Study of the*

Vedas. Harvard Oriental Series. Opera Minora, vol. 2. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 1997. Available at <<http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/%7Ewitzel/canon.pdf>>

BRAHMO SAMAJ The “Society of Brahma,” or the Brahmo Samaj, was founded by Ram Mohan Roy (1772–1833) in Calcutta in 1828. Roy, revered as the father of India’s nineteenth-century Hindu Renaissance, a Bengali Brahman by birth, studied English, Latin, and Greek as well as Sanskrit, Persian and Bengali, while employed as a young man in the British East India Company’s Revenue Department. He read Vedic Sanskrit, and Western classics in Greek and Latin. A brilliant student of religion, Roy focused first on Hindu texts, several of which he translated into English, and then on mastering Christianity. He considered the monistic equation of every individual’s “soul” (*atman*) with the universe’s transcendental “soul” (*Brahman*), as articulated in Upanishadic Vedānta texts, the apogee of Hindu philosophy, only millennia later “adopted” by Deists and Unitarian Christians. He easily confounded and, in the profundity of his philosophic arguments, defeated every Christian missionary who tried to convert him.

In 1815 Roy started to meet regularly with an elite group of brilliant Bengali friends, who at first simply called their discussion group a “Friendly Association” (*Amitya Sabha*). Roy had published his first Upanishadic translation that year, an *Abridgement of the Vedānt*, and he discussed with his friends the enlightened wisdom of India’s ancient Upanishadic philosophy, rejecting as an “aberration” all later “idol worship” that so “debased” Hinduism as to leave India at the mercy of every Western conqueror, first Muslims who abhorred all images, then European Christians, the wisest among whom adhered to Vedāntic monism, focusing as did enlightened Jews and Muslims on the transcendental power of the One God, whose spirit pervaded the universe, and was reflected in every person’s soul.

Meetings of the Brahmo Samaj were rarely attended by more than fifty members of that elite Bengali brotherhood, which included the wealthy and singularly creative Tagores as well as the brilliant Sens and remarkable Roys. Their passionate reborn pride in Hindu philosophy and faith, and in the great civilization that had nurtured and sustained it from the dawn of human history, inspired millions of others, including countless Western as well as Indian leaders and thinkers, who long before century’s end came to recognize India’s unique cultural genius and the wisdom of its greatest ancient seers and yogic sadhus. That Bengali Hindu Renaissance thus launched the intellectual revolution, small in its numbers

at first, but most profound in its ultimate impact, inspiring India's nationalist demands for independence as well as several social reform movements by the last decade of the nineteenth century, long after Roy and his *bhadralok* (intelligentsia) contemporaries had passed on.

Stanley Wolpert

See also **Roy, Ram Mohan**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Kopf, David. *British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969.
- . *The Brahmo Samaj and the Shaping of the Modern Indian Mind*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1979.
- Roy, Ram Mohan. *A Defense of Hindoo Theism in Reply to the Attack of an Advocate for Idolatry*. Calcutta: n.p., 1818.
- . *Precepts of Jesus*. London: Unitarian Society, 1824.
- Sastri, S. *The Brahmo Samaj*. 2 vols. Calcutta: R. Chatterjee, 1911–1912.
- Sen, K. *The Brahmo Samaj God-Vision in the Nineteenth Century*. Calcutta: Indian Mirror, 1880.

BRAZIL–INDIA RELATIONS The relations between Brazil and India as sovereign countries began in 1948, just a few months after India gained independence in 1947. The historical platform on which the new political dialogue was to be staged was by no means devoid of earlier inscriptions. From the fifteenth century onward, European overseas expansion was instrumental in generating symbolic and real connections between the regions. From the “discovery” of the Americas as “Indias” to the direct exchanges that took place from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries between Brazil and the present-day Indian state of Goa, the colonial period was responsible for bringing into the formative melting pot of Brazilian people (Europeans, Africans, and Amerindians) a South Asian component. The independence of Brazil in 1822, and the neocolonial compulsions that followed, led to a decrease in communication with Asia. Indirect exchanges, however, continued to take place through studies of Indian philosophy and politics, and through the influence of leading Indian figures, especially Rabindranath Tagore and Mahatma Gandhi.

The dialogue between Brazil and India as sovereign countries was initiated after World War II, when Brazil and India emerged as giant nation-states, both in terms of territory and population—respectively, the world's fifth and seventh largest territories and the world's fifth and second most populous countries. The new nations shared commonalities: similar processes of postcolonial nation building, a multicultural society, and a predominantly tropical geography with vast natural resources;

both had also adopted a federal system to accommodate their democratic ideals. The 1940s signaled the beginning in both countries of aggressive state-led processes of industrialization, which sought to reverse colonial and neocolonial poverty and dependency. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in India and President Getúlio Vargas in Brazil played decisive roles in nation building, both projecting a vision of a society committed to eliminating the causes of underdevelopment and seeking to ensure social inclusion. Thus, despite gaps in cultural genealogy and political independence—Brazil, a young civilization, born politically in 1822, and India, an ancient civilization, born politically in 1947—the concomitance of their industrialization laid the ground for a dialogue on the challenges posed by their similar models of economic development.

The First Stage: Multilateral Dialogue, Cold War Predicaments

One could roughly divide the history of sovereign relations between Brazil and India into two periods: from 1947 until the 1980s, and from the 1990s onward. The first period was dominated by a set of ambivalent forces. On the one hand, the need to effectively challenge an international system hostile to peripheral or “southern” industrialization brought emphasis to the so-called south-south dialogue. On the other hand, dependency on the “north” for transference of technology and financial assets, and the inward character of the developmental model, based on import-substitution, did not, at least in the initial stages, augur significant commercial and technological exchanges among southern nations. Perhaps more important, the dominant geopolitical scenario of the cold war threw Brazil and India into opposite camps: Brazil in the U.S. bloc, and India in the Soviet bloc. Nevertheless, a look at India's major role in the nonaligned movement and at Brazil's independent foreign policy adopted from 1961 onward clearly suggests that convenience and compulsion, rather than ideological affiliation, informed their respective interlocutions with the superpowers.

Thus, the first period of India–Brazil relations was essentially characterized by efforts at joining multilateral organizations, such as the G-77 (The Group of 77 at the United Nations), UNCTAD (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development), and GATT (General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade), whereby the two giant nations provided leadership to developing and underdeveloped countries in their common struggle to bring fairness to trade and economic relations with the rich “north.” From the 1970s onward, when environmental and nuclear issues became prominent in international affairs, Brazil and India worked closely to prevent international interference in their forest and biodiversity

assets and to defend their right to pursue their own nuclear and space programs. Their timid steps in bilateral relations included the signing of general framework agreements on commerce (1968), culture (1968), nuclear energy (1968), science and technology (1985), and the prevention of double taxation (1988), with minimal impact on trade. There was one visit by Indian prime minister Indira Gandhi to Brazil in 1968.

The India-Brazil cultural dialogue did not expand much beyond the previous parameters, with “mysticism” and “poverty” continuing to dominate Brazilian perceptions of India, while “carnival” and “football” dominated Indian ideas of Brazil. Some intellectual exchanges on contemporary matters began, however, in the 1960s and 1970s. They included: the impact on India of Brazilian studies on “dependent development” by Celso Furtado, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, and Theotônio dos Santos; the influence of Jawaharlal Nehru’s principles of international relations on Brazil’s conceptualization of an independent foreign policy in the 1960s; and the creation of the first department of Sanskrit in Latin America at the University of São Paulo in 1968.

The Second Stage: Strategic Partnership and Globalization

The transformations that engulfed the world and, particularly, South America and South Asia, after 1990 functioned as a wake-up call to both political leaders and civil society. A new phase of sovereign relations between Brazil and India had begun, within an international arena freed from the dichotomies of the cold war and marked by the intensification of the process of globalization, which compelled developing countries to adopt more liberal economic postures. The vast state bureaucratic machinery earlier put in place in both countries had not only generated mismanagement and corruption but had also achieved very limited results in terms of poverty alleviation and the reduction of inequality. The processes of economic liberalization in India and Brazil, which started practically at the same time in 1991, combine policies suited to an increasingly integrated global economy with the mobilization of civil society, calling for good governance and decentralization. In Brazil, the political changes led to the re-democratization of the country after over twenty years of military dictatorship. After over half a century of industrialization and the development of human, scientific, and technological resources in space, nuclear, chemical, and genetic fields, by 2003 the gross domestic products of India and Brazil ranked fourth and ninth in the world, respectively.

India-Brazil relations since 1990 have been marked by the exponential growth of bilateral relations, which augurs well for the formation of what Brazilian president

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva described as a “strategic partnership.” Figures of bilateral trade show that in a span of just six years (1997–2003) the total trade between the two countries increased by over 300 percent. In 2003 that total reached U.S.\$1.04 billion and, according to Brazil’s minister of industry and trade, Luiz Fernando Furlan, had the potential to grow fivefold in the next five years. India exports diesel oil, pharmaceuticals, chemicals, engineering goods, and textiles to Brazil, which sends crude oil, soya, and iron ore to India. Aircraft, footwear, furniture, and food items are potential future markets for export by Brazil. The establishment of an Indo-Brazilian Commercial Council in 1998 has enabled both governments as well as private investors to coordinate efforts to develop bilateral trade.

Favored by agreements on nuclear energy (1996), phyto-sanitary measures (1997), health and medicine (1998), information and technology (2000), blending of ethanol (2002), biotechnology (2002), and space research (2003), capital investment and transfer of technology in Brazil have made immense progress. Several Indian private corporations in the pharmaceutical, software, and engineering sectors have established joint ventures with local counterparts in Brazil. Similarly, Brazilian companies are operating in partnership with electronic and alcohol distillery sectors in India. A government program to blend ethanol with gasoline in Brazil has proved successful. Technological collaboration is also being explored in the areas of satellite construction, climate, marine sciences, biotechnology, e-banking, and e-governance.

The current phase of India-Brazil friendship and cooperation began in 1992 with the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding for Consultations of Mutual Interest by both governments. That was followed by the first official visit of Brazil’s head of state in 1996, when President Fernando Henrique Cardoso met with Indian leaders, and both parties vowed to give high priority to their bilateral relations. In 1998 Indian president K. R. Narayanan made an official visit to Brazil. In 2004, Brazil’s newly elected president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, traveled to India to sign a number of important trade agreements. Reflecting the new bilateral dynamics, those agreements helped to consolidate concerted action at multilateral World Trade Organization meetings, where India and Brazil supported joint initiatives to promote the interests of developing countries and to resist indirect forms of protectionism in the spheres of trade, intellectual property, and public health. An aggressive campaign to democratize the Security Council of the United Nations and persuade world leaders of their legitimate claims to permanent seats prompted Brazil and India in 2004 to constitute, along with two other candidates (Germany and Japan), a core group aiming at

reform of the Security Council. Equally significant were two other initiatives of “south-south” cooperation. The first was the creation in 2003 of G-3 (The Group of 3) or IBSA (The India, Brazil, South Africa Dialogue Forum), a forum to promote dialogue between three of the major developing economies (Brazil, India, and South Africa) to enhance trilateral cooperation across three continents. The second was the signing in 2004 of a framework agreement on trade between India and all partners of the Mercosur (Common Market of the South; Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay, and Uruguay), which sets the principles for the adoption of preferential tariffs among the parties.

The World Summit on Environment met in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, and the World Social Forum met in Mumbai in 2004, with nongovernmental organizations from both India and Brazil developing fruitful exchanges at both conferences, confronting common problems of environmental degradation, the rights of indigenous peoples, land conflicts, and urban issues. Similarly, their academic and intellectual dialogues have grown with the creation and consolidation of several institutional mechanisms of cooperation. In India, the Latin American Department and the Center for Spanish and Portuguese Studies were established at Jawaharlal Nehru University in New Delhi, and endowed chairs of Brazilian Studies were created by the Ministry of External Affairs of Brazil at Jawaharlal Nehru University and at Goa University. In Brazil, their academic counterparts are the Center for Afro-Asian Studies at Cândido Mendes University in Rio de Janeiro, the Center for Asian Studies at Brasília University, and the Center for Afro-Asian Studies at Londrina State University. In 2001 the first bilateral interuniversity agreement was signed between Goa University and the Federal University of Rio de Janeiro.

The enlargement of mutual perceptions beyond inherited stereotypes has also been boosted by major cultural initiatives, including film festivals, book publications, and exhibitions of dance, music, and photography. Finally, the recently signed India-Brazil Cultural Exchange Program (2004) and the Agreement on Tourism (2004) both have the potential to accelerate bilateral cultural exchanges and to further consolidate the immense gains made since 1990 in what is destined to be a vibrant and geopolitically crucial partnership.

Dilip Loundo

See also **Economic Reforms of 1991**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Guimarães, Samuel, ed. *Estratégias: Índia e Brasil*. Brasília: Instituto de Pesquisa de Relações Internacionais/Fundação Alexandre Gusmão, 1997.

Loundo, Dilip, and Michel Misse, eds. *Diálogos Tropicais: Brasil e Índia*. Rio de Janeiro: Editora da Universidade Federal do Rio de Janeiro, 2003.

Meireles, Cecília. *Travelling and Meditating: Poems Written in India*. New Delhi: Embassy of Brazil, 2003.

Osava, Mario. “India-Brazil: Cementing the South-South Alliance.” Inter Press Service, 31 January 2004. Available at <<http://www.globalpolicy.org/globaliz/econ/2004/0131indiabrazil.htm>>

Sachs, Ignacy, and C. Comelieu. *Histoire, Culture et Styles de Développement: Brésil et Inde, Esquisse de Comparaison*. Paris: Harmattan, 1988.

BRITISH CROWN RAJ During the period from 1858 to 1947, called the British Crown Raj, all of the territory that is now India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh was directly ruled from Great Britain by Parliament in the name of the British Crown. This article is mainly concerned with the organization of political power and its direct relations with Indian society; other articles will examine the British and Western impact in more cultural terms.

The Organization of Power

In 1858 Parliamentary control replaced the East India Company, which had gradually gained control of this territory, and had ruled it as the proxy of the British government. While the company's rule had long been regarded as an inefficient anachronism, the uprising in 1857–1858 against the company by Indian soldiers in its armies and by many groups in North India was the immediate cause of the takeover. There is no way of assessing Indian public opinion at that time, but the general impression given by Indian commentators is that the transfer of power was welcomed by Indian elites, especially in the great urban port areas of Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras. They seemed to have taken seriously the proclamation issued in 1858 by Queen Victoria stating that Indians would be placed on equality with all the subjects of the British Crown, with everyone freely admitted, on the basis of merit, to all offices in India. The realities during the next ninety years of British rule were very different, marked by the exclusion of Indians from most positions of political power, although many achieved high economic and cultural status. The ideals of the proclamation, however, later were adopted into the manifestos of Indian nationalists as the legitimate rights and demands of the Indian people.

The “Home” government. In Great Britain, control of Indian affairs was vested by Parliament in the secretary of state for India, whose position as a cabinet member made clear that the final control and direction of the affairs of India rested with the Home government, and



Curzon Ganges Bridge, Allahabad. Under Lord Curzon's rule as viceroy, the Raj initiated the development of an extensive rail and bridge network throughout India, partly to stimulate trade, partly to facilitate troop movements. The result was that by 1910 India had the fourth-largest railway system in the world. SURVEY OF INDIA / AKHIL BAKSHI.

not with its appointees in India. This legal position was strengthened by the ease of communications made possible by the telegraph, the opening of the Suez Canal, and by steamships, all of which brought the government of India in Calcutta and Simla under close scrutiny.

The government of India. The actual administrative structure in India, however, was not basically changed from what it had been under the East India Company, with the governor-general remaining the head of the government of India, but with the additional title of viceroy, indicating he was the personal representative of Great Britain's monarch. He was assisted by an Executive Council of five members, each of whom had specific portfolios. A Legislative Council, established in 1853, was made up of officials and nonofficials nominated by the governor-general. This was expanded to include Indian appointees in 1862, and their numbers were increased in 1892, when a small measure of representation, based on a very narrow franchise, was introduced. A momentous change took place in 1909 with the passage of the Indian Councils Act,

which gave a wider, but still very limited, franchise for elections to the councils. The great innovation, however, was the decision to reserve seats for Muslims in the legislatures. The argument for reservations and separate electorates was that otherwise the Muslim minority would have no chance of election in the face of the Hindu majority, but Indian nationalists, then and now, saw this as a move to drive a wedge between Hindus and Muslims, thus weakening the nationalist movement.

Below the central government of India were the various provincial governments, each of which had versions of executive councils and legislative councils modeled on that of the central government. The provinces were in turn divided into districts, which were grouped under a commissioner. The district officer, often referred to as the "collector," reminiscent of his former function as the chief revenue officer, was also in some periods the chief magistrate and in charge of police. This structure echoed in many ways the administrative system that dated from the Mughal empire.

These formal administrative structures of British power were dependent for their control of the vast Indian population on three institutions: the army; the civil bureaucracy; and the legal system.

The army. The continuance of British power ultimately depended upon the Indian army, and there was general agreement among the British authorities that the mutinies in the army in 1857 reflected basic weaknesses, making reform essential. Under the East India Company, each of the three presidencies—Bengal, Madras, and Bombay—had separate armies under the general control of a commander-in-chief, and this cumbersome system was revised by unifying all the armies under the civilian governor-general, but with a commander-in-chief of the army as the second most important person in the government. This recognition of civilian, not military control of the government was a basic element of British power in India and remained a fundamental characteristic of the government of independent India. The most significant clash between the rights of the civilian and military chiefs took place during the administration of Lord Curzon (1899–1905).

Another issue of special concern, after the uprisings of 1857–1858, was the proportion of Indians to British soldiers in the Indian army. In 1856 there had been a total of about 238,000 Indians in the three armies and about 45,000 British. By 1863 this ratio had been changed to 205,000 Indians and 65,000 British. This remained fairly constant until the beginning of World War II, when it shifted to 177,000 Indian soldiers to 43,000 British. Another important issue was the regional and caste composition of the Indian soldiers. Since it was high caste soldiers from the Bengal army who had taken part in the mutinies, enlistment from Bengal was drastically curtailed. In this context, British officers insisted that certain Indian regional and religious groups belonged to “martial races,” identified as Rajputs, Muslims (especially from the Northwest), Sikhs, and Gurkhas from Nepal, and that Indian soldiers should therefore come only from these groups. While there is no historic evidence for the theory of martial races, it was widely accepted by Englishmen and is still influential in India. All the officers of the Indian army were British, but by the end of the nineteenth century, the British officers and the Indian soldiers seemed to have developed mutual respect for each other.

After 1858 the army was mainly used to guard the frontiers, both on the northwest and northeast, against militant groups, and only occasionally did it have to be used within India proper. It was also used, however, to support British foreign policy in China, East Africa, and the Middle East, where there was little direct Indian concern. During World War I, over a million Indian soldiers



served overseas, mainly in France and the Middle East. In World War II, the Indian army was used in the Middle East and in Southeast Asia. Both wars saw an increase in the number of Indian officers in the army, but its traumatic moment came with the defeat of the British at Singapore in 1942, when the Japanese persuaded a number of Indian officers and men to join the Indian National Army to fight with them against the British under the leadership of Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose, who had been a leading figure in India's nationalist movement.

The army was an important element in the transfer of power from the British to Indians in 1947, despite mass outbreaks of violence among the civilian population. It continues to be a vital element in the preservation of the new nation against insurrections and movements for self-determination in its borderlands, notably in Kashmir, Nagaland, and in Punjab, as well as in wars with Pakistan and China.

The Indian Civil Service. While the Indian army was the ultimate guarantor of British power in India, its maintenance as an authoritarian regime based upon laws

depended upon another institution, the Indian Civil Service (ICS). Originally known as the “covenanted service” of the East India Company, most of the young men who signed contracts to serve in its commercial and political branches were relatives or dependents of East India Company directors or shareholders. In 1853 the great innovation was made of appointment to the service through competitive examinations. Indians could have competed, but the examinations, based entirely on English subjects, were held in England, and it was not until 1864 that an Indian succeeded in passing. After 1923 the examinations were held in India as well as England, making it easier for Indians to compete; by 1947 the majority of ICS members were Indians, and it was this group that moved into the successor service of independent India, the Indian Administrative Service. Never numbering more than four thousand, the members of the Indian Civil Service held all the important executive posts in the bureaucracy and were the real rulers of India’s vast population, which by 1900 numbered about 285 million people. Its members were generalists, expected to fulfill any position assigned to them, whether in agricultural, financial, or legal administration. They were revenue officials, magistrates, police superintendents, and district commissioners. They have been much lauded for their fairness and efficiency, but some have judged them wanting in imagination and sympathy for the people they governed.

The legal system. When the East India Company took control of Bengal in the 1770s, its officials intended to make use of the existing legal systems of the Mughal empire, following what was often described as the “ancient institutions and usages,” but when they discovered that there were no codes of law or courts of the kind they expected, they began to improvise. The result was ad hoc construction of a complex mixture of courts and laws, often different in the various provinces. The new system included laws and regulations made by the central and provincial governments and by municipal authorities, laws devised in England that applied only to India, and English common law. European residents, never a large body, were subject to some courts but not to others. Gradually, a body of criminal law was created that applied to all residents, and commercial codes were also constructed that had applicability throughout the country. What was most difficult to codify was personal law, that is, matters relating to marriage, divorce, inheritance, and adoption. All of these were perceived to be sanctioned by religious beliefs, and British officials were wary of any actions that seemed to come in conflict with matters of religion. The fateful decision was therefore made that personal law would be decided on the basis of the religion of the persons concerned. This added new complications, for there were no universally applicable Hindu or Muslim laws, and the British in effect codified laws for court usage that were more rigid than the

usages that had been in existence. This system, subject to much acrimonious criticism, was the material with which officials of the Crown had to deal, much of which forms the basis for contemporary India’s legal system.

At the same time, British India’s courts were increasingly modeled on British patterns, and lawyers came to occupy a very important place in Indian life, making India an extremely litigious society. This new class of lawyers played a very important role as India’s national movements developed. Though at first all the judges were British, by the end of the century many Indian judges had been appointed. The judiciary was remarkably independent of governmental control, and the new legal system, along with the modernized army and the ICS and its ancillary bureaucracies, proved of fundamental importance to the development of modern India.

Major Government Policies

The major policy concerns of the British Indian government after 1858 can be summarized under four main headings: foreign policy, taxation and economic policy, education and social welfare, and internal security.

Foreign policy. The immense archives of the government of India indicate that foreign policy excited more interest than any of the other policy concerns, since India’s security was central to Great Britain’s role as a world power in the nineteenth century. The foreign relations of the government of India were focused, therefore, on its contiguous neighbors. Two general principles guided these relations: first, the government of India was unwilling to permit any genuinely independent country to exist on its borders; second, the imperial designs of Russia in Central Asia were considered a major threat to British power in India. The corollary of acting on these principles was that throughout the nineteenth century, British India was, in a very real sense, an expansionist state. The rulers of unstable Afghanistan, with its ethnic links to the whole northwest area of Punjab, were a constant threat to the British attempt to control the mountainous region. Then there was a fear, undoubtedly overblown, that Russia in its conquest of Central Asia would move into Afghanistan, either through conquest or alliance with its chieftains, thus posing a threat to India. As a result of these fears, the British government of India invaded Afghanistan in 1838–1842 and again in 1878–1880, but both times its troops were forced to withdraw in the face of popular resistance. To the east, the government of India fought wars with Burma in 1824 and 1852, finally annexing the whole country in 1885. In the Himalayan region, a border known as the McMahon Line was defined in 1913–1914 between India and China, claiming vast areas for India, though it was never acknowledged by China. Indian claims for this as the



British India Postage Stamp. Letter posted to one Alexander Wyatt in February 1856 (two years prior to the official proclamation of the British Crown Raj). The Indian stamp bears image of the then reigning British monarch, Queen Victoria. SURVEY OF INDIA / AKHIL BAKSHI.

legitimate border in 1962 became the occasion of war between India and China, another instance of the legacy of the imperial era in foreign policy, as in other areas of contemporary Indian life.

Taxation and economic policy. The right to collect the revenues of Bengal, taken by the East India Company from the decrepit Mughal empire in 1765, marked the beginning of British imperial power in India, and the collection of taxes remained at the heart of the policies of the British Government of India. A third of the government's revenue, which came mainly from land taxes, was used to pay for the army, in contrast to three percent of the revenues in the other colonies. Indian revenues paid for military expenses even when the army was used for British wars elsewhere, including in China and Africa. The very high salaries paid to members of the ICS were mainly remitted to Great Britain, as were the profits of British companies in India. All expenses incurred in London that were connected in any way with India were charged to the Indian account.

After 1858, as Indians became more publicly vocal in criticizing British rule in India, the burden of taxation was

a constant theme. The most famous of the critics was R. C. Dutt, one of the first Indians to be accepted into the ICS, who wrote the first economic history of India. His major argument was that the poverty of the Indian people was due to the economic policies of the British. The British, he argued, suppressed the Indian textile industry in order to facilitate their own, and used Indian raw materials to produce manufactured goods in Great Britain, which were then sent to India. His conclusion was that although Britain gave India internal peace and political unity, at the same time its economic policies destroyed the Indian economy. Although modern economic historians are more nuanced in their analysis of British economic policies, his arguments were widely accepted by generations of Indians and by many critics of British imperialism in the West. While not denying that foreign rule almost inevitably meant the implementation of policies that favored Great Britain, not India, current economic analysis tends to emphasize the disadvantages of having Britain's free trade policies imposed on India, which gave no protection to India's own industries. Furthermore, capitalists, both Indian and British, could get better returns from trade than from investing in new industries.

While the Indian government did not actively promote economic development, preferring to leave it to private enterprise, it took the lead in the development of railways, partly to stimulate trade, partly to facilitate troop movements. The result was that by 1910 India had the fourth-largest railway system in the world. The government built some lines itself, but it encouraged private investors by assuring them subsidies if the railways did not yield a minimum rate of 5 percent return on investment. This new system of transportation served to unify the country both economically and socially.

Education and social welfare. One policy of deliberate social intervention by the British in India that had enduring results was the decision made by the East India Company in 1835 to grant support only to those institutions of higher education that used English as the medium of instruction. The motivation for this decision was not, as was often said, to supply the British with clerks for their government offices, but was the result of joint pressure from British and Indian groups. For Indian leaders like Ram Mohan Roy (1772–1833), the English language was key to the useful knowledge of the West that could transform Indian society. From the British side, the famous *Minute* by T. B. Macaulay, who was in Calcutta working on the legal system, summarized another case for the English language. It would, he wrote, create among the Indian higher classes, “persons, Indian in blood and colour, but English in taste, in opinion, in morals, and in intellect,” who would be the interpreters between the British and the millions whom they

governed (*Sources*, p. 601). This attitude tied in with the decision in 1854 to set up provincial universities in Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay, based on the model of the new University of London. These new universities were not teaching bodies, but they were responsible for curricula, examinations, and awarding of degrees. Teaching colleges were affiliated to the universities. This set the pattern for the other provincial universities established after 1858 in Allahabad, Lahore, Pune, Patna, and Agra, each with many affiliated colleges with the same standards. The system had many faults, but out of it came India's educated classes for all the new professions, such as law, journalism, and medicine; it also provided the leaders of the nationalist movement that eventually ended British rule in 1947. The students came mainly from the old elite classes, so the dominance of India's traditional ruling classes was perpetuated.

Because of the belief that a primary cause of the uprisings of 1857–1858 had been interference in Indian religious customs, the British government of India became very hesitant to legislate social change of any kind. Coupled with this was the widespread belief in British official circles that Indian society, although possessing a great culture, was by its very nature resistant to the progress so highly valued in Great Britain in the nineteenth century. The obvious path for a foreign government, uncertain of its support among the people, therefore, was not to innovate but to move with extreme caution, an approach that served the British Raj very well. Its police, army, bureaucracy, and law courts could preserve society without disturbing it.

Internal security. While the army was the ultimate guarantor of British power, it was only called upon for internal security in times of major disturbances, which, after 1858, were remarkably few. In Amritsar, in 1919, Brigadier Reginald Dyer opened fire on an unarmed crowd that had gathered in an enclosed garden (Jallianwala Bagh) to listen to nationalist speeches; 400 people were killed, 1,200 wounded. The army was also used in 1942, during the “Quit India” movement, opening fire in Bihar and along the North-West Frontier, where British control of large areas appeared to be threatened. Otherwise, internal security was left in the hands of the police, who were under the control of provincial authorities. At the dawn of the Crown Raj in 1858, however, the police had a reputation for oppression and corruption, which led to a series of attempted reforms. Police were organized in each district under a British superintendent, with Indian constables. By 1902 a police commission reported, however, that the police were still feared almost as much as criminals.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, internal security took on a new urgency as the government became more concerned about the increasing spread of

nationalism sentiment, which the British usually referred to as “sedition” or even “terrorism.” As a result, in 1904 Criminal Intelligence Departments were set up to maintain stricter watch over the nationalists. Censorship of the press also increased after 1857, the government monitoring all Indian-language papers as well as those printed in English. The Indian press, nevertheless, was usually left free to criticize the government, though publishers might be treated with suspicion as “seditious agents” and might face the loss of their deposits or their presses.

Challenging British Rule: The Rise of Nationalism

The Indian National Congress. The founding of the Indian National Congress in 1885 must be understood in the context of this century of change. Many local associations had been formed in different parts of the country seeking government action for social change, but the Bombay meeting of representatives from all parts of India in 1885 was the first of its kind. The Congress delegates in the early years thereafter met annually; they were almost all drawn from the new English-speaking professional classes. Their speeches and resolutions were hardly hostile to British rule, primarily expressing that they wanted to share in India's administration and direction in collaboration with the British. They asked for a modest portion of representative government, entrance into the Indian Civil Service through examinations to be held in India as well as in England, and the right for Indians to serve as officers in the army. They argued that the poverty of the masses was due to exorbitant taxes and Britain's free-trade policy, which deprived Indian industries of protection from foreign competition.

Opposition to the moderate and conciliatory proposals of the Indian National Congress leadership soon developed from at least three directions. The British viewed them as a threat to their power; British officials insisted at the time (and many of them continued to do so right up to 1947) that democracy was an impossible dream for India, because of its deeply rooted divisions of caste, language, and religion. Democratic institutions, they argued, could not be transferred to India, which had known only autocracy throughout its history. From Muslim leaders, like Sayyid Ahmed Khan, came somewhat similar conclusions, fortified by their convictions that representative institutions, based on the Western model of “one person, one vote,” would keep Muslims permanently subjected to India's Hindu majority. In subsequent years, a growing estrangement between Muslims and Hindus became a characteristic of Indian political life, especially as Hindu leaders identified Hindu culture as Indian culture.

A third source of tension surfaced within the Congress itself when the moderate stance of its early leaders was questioned. This was done most effectively at the end of the nineteenth century by Bal Gangadhar Tilak (1856–1920), a Poona (Pune) journalist, who denounced the Congress policy of moderation as humbly “begging” the British for favors. In a slogan that soon became famous, he declared that “*Swaraj* (freedom) is my birthright and I will have it.” More fateful for the subsequent history of India, however, was his linking of nationalism with a revival of Hindu military glories, harking back to Shivaji’s struggle against the Mughal Muslims centuries earlier. Charged with “sedition” and inciting violence, Tilak was sentenced to jail and deported to Mandalay.

The All-India Muslim League. While the Indian National Congress always insisted that it stood for the freedom of all Indians, Muslim leaders saw Hindu leaders like Tilak as spokesmen for a Hindu nationalism that threatened the Muslim minority. In 1906 this sense of unease led a group of prominent Muslims to form the All-India Muslim League to protect Muslim social and political interests. The League had little influence before the late 1930s, however, when Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876–1948) began his campaign for a separate homeland for Muslims.

The rise of nationalism. In the aftermath of World War I, Indian political life gained a new momentum, following the Jallianwala Bagh massacre in Amritsar and Mahatma Gandhi’s return from South Africa to lead the first nationwide *satyagraha* (“hold fast to the truth”) movement. British Liberal Secretary of State Edwin Montagu also inaugurated new reforms with the passage of his 1919 Government of India Act, admitting more Indians to councils and offering much wider franchises for elections to all legislatures, central as well as provincial, the latter including Indian ministers. That act fell far short, however, of what the Congress nationalist leaders wanted, and the retention of separate Muslim electorates expanded the growing divide between the Muslim League and the National Congress.

In 1920 Mahatma Gandhi persuaded the Indian National Congress to adopt his method of nonviolent noncooperation (*satyagraha*) to win freedom from British rule. This was a rejection of both the constitutional gradualism of the moderates and the violent militancy that was being increasingly advocated by young revolutionaries demanding an immediate end to British rule. Gandhi’s devout belief was that confrontational politics based only on nonviolence could win true freedom for India.

Gandhi was an idealist and visionary, but he was also a superb political organizer, and under his leadership

the Indian National Congress became a carefully articulated body, with grassroots committees in most of India’s towns and villages, as well as provincial committees, and, at the top, an All-India Congress Committee, with its supreme Working Committee “cabinet.” Mahatma Gandhi urged people to refuse to obey unjust laws and to be willing to go to jail for having done so. He called for multiple boycotts of British goods and institutions, asked students not to attend government schools, lawyers not to practice in courts, and Congress not to participate in government elections. He stopped short, however, of asking Indians not to serve in the army, recognizing that the soldiers were not free agents.

Gandhi’s success in revising the agenda of the India National Congress depended upon many factors, including his unique personality, his profound spirituality, his teachings, and his organizational abilities. A basic one, relating to all these, was the loyalty he evoked in the numerous very able men and women, both Indians and foreigners, who made his work possible. He was especially proud of having mobilized Indian women to take an active part in the dangerous work of confrontational politics.

The most famous of Gandhi’s followers was wealthy Jawaharlal Nehru (1889–1964), who was the son of a wealthy family, educated in England, strongly influenced by Marxist thought, and sharing little of Gandhi’s religiosity. Frequently elected president of the Congress, Nehru remained Gandhi’s chief supporter through the long and tortuous developments of the 1930s, which led to the next great constitutional landmark, the Government of India Act of 1935. This act gave a larger measure of autonomy to Indian political leaders at the provincial level, and when elections were held in 1937, Congress won enough legislative seats to form the government in seven provinces, leaving the Muslim League out in the cold. This opportunity to serve as ministers and elected officials before independence was an important asset to the success of the Indian democratic system after 1947.

In 1939, when Great Britain declared war, India’s viceroy also proclaimed that India was at war, without consulting any Indian leaders. Congress’s Working Committee ordered all its provincial ministries to resign. The gulf between Muslims and Hindus was dramatized in 1940, when the League made its momentous announcement in Lahore that its goal was the formation of a separate nation, to be called Pakistan, as a homeland for South Asia’s Muslims. In 1942 Gandhi launched his last great campaign against British rule, known as the “Quit India” movement. The government acted decisively,

arresting all Congress leaders, including Gandhi. As World War II ended, the Congressmen were all released, but now Nehru, not Gandhi, was at the center of the complex negotiations on behalf of the Congress that led to independence and to the partition of the British Raj into the two states of India and Pakistan. Jinnah alone spoke for the Muslim League.

Independence and partition. By 1946 the issue was no longer whether Britain would give India her freedom, but when. Though Great Britain had won the war, her resources were depleted, and there was no will to fight to hold India by force. Nehru and Jinnah had very different visions of South Asia's future. Nehru's vision, shared by Gandhi and all the leaders of Congress, was that the British should transfer their power to a single Indian nation-state with a strong central government and relatively weak provincial governments, with all decisions to be made by democratic process. Jinnah's vision appeared initially to be that he might accept an undivided India, but with a weak central government and strong state governments, a number of which—including the key states of Punjab, Bengal, North-West Frontier, and Sind—would all have Muslim majorities. This solution was completely unacceptable to Nehru. In the end, the last British viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, opted for India's partition along religious lines, to which Nehru agreed, despite Gandhi's adamant rejection of any "vivisection" of Mother India. As for Jinnah, he initially opposed the partition of Punjab and Bengal, knowing how disastrous that would be, hoping as well for a corridor across the thousand miles of North India that were to separate West from East Pakistan. But Lord Mountbatten made the decision that the partition should take place on 15 August 1947, and he directed his staff to accelerate the final plans to place full responsibility for dividing India conspicuously on the Indians themselves. As the news spread of the imminent partition, violence on an unprecedented scale broke out; Muslims were murdered as they fled from India, Hindus and Sikhs murdered as they tried to escape from Pakistan. No one is sure of the numbers, but it is estimated that half a million to 1 million people died, as 13 million fled, the rest becoming refugees. India's struggle for freedom is often represented, because of Gandhi, as a nonviolent struggle, but in truth few nations have been born with greater loss of human life. The horror reached a dramatic climax when Gandhi himself was assassinated in Delhi on 30 January 1948 as he led a prayer meeting for the end of the violence. The assassin was a militant Hindu who wrongly blamed Gandhi for the partition and for favoring Muslims.

Ainslie T. Embree


See also **British East India Company Raj; British Impact; Curzon, Lord George; Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.; Nehru, Jawaharlal; Tilak, Bal Gangadhar**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The bibliography for the period of direct British rule in India is immense, and only a representative sampling can be given. The most comprehensive bibliographical work is Maureen Patterson, editor, *South Asian Civilization: A Bibliographic Synthesis* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), chapter six. C. H. Philips, editor, *The Evolution of India and Pakistan, 1858–1947* (London: Oxford University Press, 1962) is a very useful selection of political documents. Stephen Hay, editor, vol. 2, *Sources of Indian Tradition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988), provides writings from many leading Indian leaders. There are three multivolume series on India history that have volumes devoted to the period: Volume six of *The Cambridge History of India* (Delhi: S. Chand, 1958); *The History and Culture of the Indian People* (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1963, 1965, 1969), with volumes nine, ten, eleven, dealing with the period 1858–1947; *The New Cambridge History of India* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987) has a few volumes dealing with some aspects of the period. Judith M. Brown, *Modern India The Origins of an Asian Democracy* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985) is an authoritative guide, as are Sugata Bose and Ayesha Jalal in *Modern South Asia: History, Culture, Political Economy* (New York: Routledge, 1998). Some of the most interesting work on the period has appeared under the editorship of Ranajit Guha, in collections of essays under the general title *Subaltern Studies*, published by Oxford University Press beginning in 1982. Its general theme is the contribution to the struggle against British domination by the people on their own, independent of the elites in the Indian National Congress.

B. B. Misra, *The Bureaucracy in India* (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997) is a sober analysis of the functioning of the administration, while Philip Woodruff, *The Men Who Ruled India*, vol. 2, *The Guardians* (New York: Schocken Books, 1964), is a readable tribute to British officials with much useful information. Byron Farwell, *Armies of the Raj from the Great Indian Mutiny to Independence 1858–1947* (New York: Norton, 1989), is a valuable summary. An outline of the legal system is found in the *Cambridge History of India*, vol. 5, pp. 379–394. B. R. Tomlinson, *The Economy of Modern India, 1860–1970* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), is a volume of *The New Cambridge History of India. The Cambridge Economic History of India*, vol. 2, edited by Dharma Kumar (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983), has excellent articles on many aspects of the economic life of the period. Percival Spear, *India, Pakistan, and the West* (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), has excellent brief analyses of educational and legal changes. Bose and Jalal, *Modern South Asia*, and Judith Brown, *Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope*, provide important insights into the process of decolonization and the partition of South Asia into India and Pakistan in 1947.

BRITISH EAST INDIA COMPANY RAJ In the late eighteenth century the British East India Company gained control of much of the territory that is now India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and other territories in Southeast Asia for Great Britain. The company carried on an extensive trade throughout a vast area, including China, but in this article attention will be given almost wholly to India, where its activities had a decisive role in India's economic and political life and in its relationships with Great Britain and the rest of the world. Its activities in India will be noted in three main periods: from 1600 to 1750; from 1750 to 1798; and from 1798 to 1858, when, as proxy for Great Britain, it became the major political power throughout India, finally losing its position in 1858. In examining these time spans, major consideration will be given to the establishment of British control, the fate of indigenous political powers, and the creation of new military, administrative, and revenue systems.



British East India Company's Coat of Arms. The coat of arms reads, "Under the Auspices of the King and Senate of England." Long before the company evolved into a territorial power in the late eighteenth century, it was an actor within the Indian financial institutions that made political conquest possible. SURVEY OF INDIA / AKHIL BAKSHI.

1600–1750: The British East India Company in the Mughal Empire

Trade and monopoly. The British East India Company became a legal entity when a charter was granted on 31 December 1600 by Queen Elizabeth I to a group to trade to the East India Indies, by which was meant countries on the Indian Ocean. They also were granted a monopoly of the trade between England and all the countries defined as part of the East Indies. This restriction of the home market for Asian products to the British East India Company was to remain a subject of fierce controversy for the next two hundred years, but the monopoly was defended by the company as absolutely essential for its financial success. Such monopolies were common features of contemporary European economic life, but the company had three great problems to overcome before it could make a profit. One was that two European rivals—the Dutch East India Company, or the Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, which was already established, and the French Compagnie des Indes Orientales, which would soon be set up—were hostile to the British attempt to enter their trading areas. Another difficulty was getting the Mughal government, both at the center and in the provinces, to grant permission and to provide protection to the company's traders. This permission was not easily obtained, because the Mughals were not interested in European trade, but in 1615 Sir Thomas Roe, as an ambassador from the English king to the emperor's court, was given permission to set up trading posts not only at the port of Surat in Gujarat but inland at a number of towns, including Agra and Patna. A third, and fundamental, problem was finding items to trade. The English soon discovered that their great staple of trade—woolens—would find no market in India, and that the only product for which there was a demand was bullion, gold and silver. Throughout the company's long association with India, imports into Europe, not exports to India from Europe, would be the key to its successes and failures. The traditional European demand associated with the Indian trade had been spices, particularly pepper, but by the middle of the seventeenth century demand was peaking. Indigo, valued as a dye, brought a good profit in Europe, as did raw silk for the French and Italian weaving industries. Saltpeter was used in the flourishing munitions industry. By far the most important Indian exports for the company, however, were Indian textiles, especially Indian cotton cloth, which was cheaper than the linens and woolens of England. Expensive Indian patterned fabrics, such as chintz and calico—words of Indian origin, as are the names of most specialized cotton fabrics—became fashionable among the wealthy.

The British East India Company's ventures were an important link in bringing Mughal India and the entire

Indian Ocean littoral into the world trading market while making England a dynamic force in the emerging capitalist economy. Various aspects of the British East India Company's activities in India contributed to its influence. The bilateral trade between England and India based on its monopoly of imported Indian goods was basic, but their reexport to the rest of Europe gave the company a solid, and expandable, base for its profits. The goods imported from India had to be paid for in bullion, with more than 75 percent of the value of the company's exports to India being in bullion, not in goods; one source of this money was the reexport trade. The bullion was made into coinage by the Mughal authorities and was then used by the European traders in their dealings with the Indian merchants. Another source of profit for the company was what was known as the "country trade," port-to-port trade in Indian goods within India itself and with other Asian regions. Java and Sumatra, for example, willingly accepted Indian textiles instead of bullion.

The rise of the port cities. The British East India Company's trade is closely linked with the emergence of new urban centers in India. At first, it sought a foothold in existing trading centers on the coast for its "factories," as its trade depots were called after the official in charge: the factor, or agent. He and his assistants bought goods from Indian merchants, storing them until the company's ship's arrived, or if the factory was inland, arranging for transport to the port. The first factory was set up in 1611 at Macchilipatnam, on the southeast coast, a center for the manufacture of chintz, where the Dutch already had a factory. Then in 1613 the company established a factory at Surat in Gujarat, which for centuries had been a trading center for Indian goods to the Middle East and Southeast Asia.

Surat exemplified the close connection between political power, long-distance trade, and a high level of commercial activities. Its wealthy bankers financed trade throughout India and the Persian Gulf, and they lent money to the foreign multinationals, including the British and the Dutch East India companies. At all times, but especially in the seventeenth century, the company's trade depended on Indian merchants as well as Indian government officials. This may serve as a reminder of how different India was from North America, where the English were penetrating at approximately the same time. As the Portuguese had reported when they arrived in 1497, India was a land of "large cities, large edifices and rivers, and great populations, among whom is carried on all the trade in spices and precious stones" (Lach, p. 96). Surat was an entrepôt that had all these items and more to trade. The factory in Surat set a basic pattern that was to be followed elsewhere. The factor, or senior

merchant, was in charge of the depot, with English assistants, some of them in their teens; the depot was in a compound with living quarters, store houses, and offices for doing business with Indian traders and merchants. They were protected by both European and Indian guards, the embryo of the later armies of the company.

Long before the British East India Company became a territorial power, it was embedding itself into the Indian financial and economic institutions that made political conquest possible. Three of these early settlements—Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta—became great modern cities, centers of economic and political power, which were retained in independent India but under names that reflect their pre-British origins: Chennai, Mumbai, and Kolkata. Their origin and growth, so intimately connected with modern India, demonstrates, as a foremost authority on trade and politics in the region insists, that "the historical connection between long distance trade and the process of urbanization was a simultaneous phenomenon, a source of both strength and weakness to the towns and cities of the Indian Ocean" (Chaudhuri, *Asia before Europe*, p. 367).

The British East India Company established the settlement that later became Madras, one of the three great port cities of India, in 1639 on the southeast coast. That the center of the settlement was known as Fort Saint George is a reminder of how trade and military security were linked. It became the capital of Madras presidency, as all of the British East India Company's factories that were established in the region were brought under the control of its chief official. Until late in the eighteenth century, the presidency was linked directly with the company's officials in London, giving it an autonomy that was jealously prized.

The establishment of a settlement at Bombay was in part a result of the growing instability in Surat, occasioned by attacks from Shivaji, the great Maratha warrior, in his rebellion against the Mughals. Consisting of a group of islands, Bombay had come under Portuguese control in 1534. It was given to the English king as part of his dowry when he married a Portuguese princess in 1661, and was ceded to the British East India Company in 1668. Bombay was not of much importance at first, as it was remote from market sources, but it began to flourish in the eighteenth century when the company built a wall to protect its own traders and Indian merchants from Surat and elsewhere. An important shipbuilding industry was started by a Parsi, a member of the small Zoroastrian minority from Gujarat that soon became a dominant factor in Bombay's industrial, commercial, and cultural life. It was, like Madras, the capital of the company's presidency, consisting of the areas that are now the states of Maharashtra and Gujarat. In the nineteenth century it

THE ADVANCE OF BRITISH POWER, 1766–1857

BOUNDARIES

———— International
 ——— Internal (selected in India only) as of
 late 1819 on map (a) and 1857 on map (b).


Dates of acquisition of selected areas of British India and of establishment of control over selected princely states are noted.

SINDHIA
BHUTAN
GOA } Independent dynasties and states,
vassal states outside India,
major colonial possessions


BENGAL } Major political entities
MYSORE } within India

	Bihar	Other regions
Number of respondents	100	100
Mean age (years)	36.5	36.5
Gender		
Male	50	50
Female	50	50
Marital status		
Married	70	70
Unmarried	30	30
Education		
Illiterate	10	10
Below primary	10	10
Primary	20	20
Below secondary	20	20
Secondary	20	20
Below tertiary	20	20
Tertiary	10	10
Occupation		
Unemployed	10	10
Below primary	10	10
Primary	20	20
Below secondary	20	20
Secondary	20	20
Below tertiary	20	20
Tertiary	10	10


- Presidency and provincial capitals



(b) ADVANCES UP TO 1857



(a) ADVANCES PRIOR TO 1819

ACQUISITIONS IN BRITISH
INDIA AND CEYLON

■ Prior to 1767

11/10/10 to 11/01/11

1767 – 1805

INDIAN STATES UNDER BRITISH PROTECTION

 From before 1806

1999-2000

Quasi-protectorates existed also with respect to Sindhia, Nepal, Sikkim and several other minor states.

ABBREVIATIONS

A.	Ajmer
A.M.	Ajmer-Merwera
B.	Baroda (Gaikwar on map ^a)
Bah.	Bahawalpur
Bas.	Bastar
B.B.S.	Bundelkhand and Baghelkhand States
Bh.	Bhopal
Bik.	Bikaner
C.	Chamba
C.B.	Cooch Behar
C.S.H.	Cis-Sutlej Hill States
C.S.S.	Cis-Sutlej Sikhs
G.	Gaikwar
Ga.	Garhwal
H.	Holkar
H.T.	Hill Tippera
I.	Indore (Holkar on map ^a)
I.T.	Independent tribes
Jaip.	Jaipur
Jais.	Jaisalmer
Jey.	Jeyapore
K.	Kotah
Kh.	Khairpur
Kol.	Kolhapur
Kur.	Kurnool
Mar.	Marwar/Jodhpur
Me.	Mewar/Udaipur
P.	Pudukottai
Pat.	Patiala
P.C.	Petty chiefdoms
R.	Rampur
S.	Sirohi
Sat.	Satara
Si.	Singbhum

became a center of trade, manufacturing, and educational enterprises, as well as political power. In all these enterprises, except for political power, Indians were prominent.

Calcutta, the third of the great urban centers, was founded by the company in 1690 in an area that was chosen because it had direct access to the sea by the Hugli River. The site had little importance to the Mughal rulers, so the company was given proprietary rights to three villages. The fortification the company built was called Fort William, and in 1700, when it became the third of the presidencies, it was known as the presidency of Fort William in Bengal. Calcutta was to play an even larger role in modern India's history—as the second city of the British empire after London—than would the other two port cities. It was the political capital of the vast British Indian empire until 1912, when the capital was moved to Delhi. It was also the dominant center of trade and culture, as well as original home of the national political movement that later gained independence for India.

One feature of the new urban areas that had great significance for the future was that they were all magnets for migration from areas hundreds of miles from the cities themselves. Another was that the cities became centers of European influence, as well as for new professions such as journalism and medicine. The thousands of Indians employed by the new government and by the traders and merchants were also concentrated in the port cities.

Decline of the Mughal empire. Historians have long speculated on the reasons for the decline of the power of the Mughal rulers in the first half of the eighteenth century; the general conclusion must be that there was no one cause, but rather a multitude of factors working together. These included the expenses of wars that had depleted the treasury; a crushing burden of taxation that some authorities believe led peasants to flee the land in despair; rebellions and uprisings by the Marathas and the Sikhs; and invasions by the Persians in 1739 and by the Afghans in 1748. The empire might have survived these shocks, but many of the governors of the Mughal provinces, while never formally denying allegiance to the emperor, in fact became virtually independent. It was this situation of weakened central authority and competing regional leaders that made possible the realignment of powers throughout the region that saw the British East India Company emerge as a dominant actor.

1750–1798: The British East India Company Seizes Power

The armies of the British East India Company. While the search for trade took the British East India Company to India, it was its armies that kept it there,

both as a trader and later as a ruling power. The story of those armies is complex, but each of the presidencies had its own army raised in India. It was the French *Compagnie des Indes Orientales*, not the British, that made two crucial discoveries. One was that Indians could be hired as soldiers for far less than Europeans and that they made excellent soldiers if given modern European military discipline and weapons. The other discovery was that it was possible to gain influence and even control at the courts of Indian princes through the use of the armies to support activities of the princes or their rivals. In addition to its own armies, the British East India Company had regiments and officers from the English army sent to assist them. All these armies were paid for by the company from its Indian profits. The superiority of its military forces was demonstrated in a number of conflicts in South India with the Indian princes, especially the *nawāb* of Arcot, but also by its defeat of the French forces in various engagements from 1740 to 1748, and then, more decisively during the Seven Years' War (1756–1763), when the English effectively excluded France from India. While the seizure of power by the company in Bengal was partly due to financial and political intrigue, its armies were always the potent force that established and maintained its power.

Regime change in Bengal. The appointment of Siraj-ud-Dawla as *nawāb*, the Mughal governor of Bengal, in 1756 marked a new direction in the history of modern India. His predecessor had given the British East India Company trading privileges that exempted its traders from certain taxes, but the company had grossly abused them, hindering Indian merchants and depriving the government of revenue. The company had also increased the fortifications around Calcutta. When Siraj-ud-Dawla was appointed in 1756, he understood, perhaps better than any other Indian ruler, the danger the British East India Company posed. The capture of Calcutta in 1756 by his army created one of the most famous episodes in the Indo-British relationship, when British captives were imprisoned in a small room overnight and many of them died because of the heat and overcrowding. This event passed into British historical myth as “the Black Hole of Calcutta,” becoming a symbol of the barbarity of Indians, with Siraj being pictured as a monster of cruelty, a threat to his own people as well as to the English traders. The decision was made, therefore, to replace him with a ruler who would be an ally of the company. At the battle of Plassey in 1757 the company's army, under Colonel Robert Clive, defeated and killed Siraj, replacing him with their candidate. One of the greatest Indian merchants of the time, Jagat Seth, had also helped in the overthrow, hoping to profit from a British victory, though he was in turn cheated by Clive. The company had hoped to rule through the new *nawāb*, but they soon

found, in their terminology, that he was “disloyal” and had to be replaced.

The next important move in the transfer of political power came in 1764, when the company’s army defeated the combined armies of the *nawāb* of Bengal and the Mughal emperor at the battle of Buxar. Then, in 1765, the company’s agents forced the emperor to give them control of the revenue systems of the heavily populated areas of Bengal, Orissa, and Bihar. This meant that the British East India Company had become the largest territorial power in India, and that it would be able to use the tax revenues of a vast area of India to buy the goods for its export trade. These events fundamentally altered the position of the British in India.

For the people of Bengal, the next decade was a bitter time, when the Mughal system of administration collapsed. The English were ignorant of the complexities of the system, but eager to extort as much money as possible from the peasants and Indian merchants. They were guided by the remnants of the old system, which were equally corrupt and rapacious. The effect of these years on the land and its people was summed up by one of the company’s servants in a report to London in 1769. “It must give pain to an Englishman,” he wrote, “to have reason to think that since the accession of the Company to the Diwani the condition of the people has been worse than it was before. . . . This fine Country, which flourished under the most despotic and arbitrary government, is verging towards its Ruin” (Muir, pp. 92–93). Such reports, of which there were many, of what the British were doing in India to its people led to great criticism of the British East India Company. There was also a fear that the company’s servants, like Clive and others, returning to England with their great ill-gotten fortunes, would buy their way into Parliament. The result was the passing of regulations to control the company, culminating in a series of acts, including what is known as Pitt’s India Act of 1784, which gave Parliament control over the company’s affairs in London but left the administration of the India territories in the hands of the company. Indians had no role in this first constitutional act, but its linkage to the constitution of independent India in 1950 is direct. The three Residencies were linked under a governor-general, appointed with the approval of British government. The first appointee was Warren Hastings (1774–1783), one of the most famous names in Indo-British history, who carried on wars against the Indian powers that substantially increased British power.

The major changes in the administrative structure that tightened British control while moving India toward a Western state model—albeit an authoritarian one—began during the governor-generalship of Lord Cornwallis

(1786–1793), the British general who had been defeated by the American rebels at Yorktown in 1781. The central issue for the Bengal government was the establishment of a revenue system for the collection of taxes on agricultural land, the major source of revenue. There were three main problems to be solved. The first was to decide who actually owned the land: the rulers; the *zamindars*, or tax officials; or the peasants. There was an enormous discussion as the officials studied the Mughal records, and in the end it was decided, largely because it was the simplest thing to do, that the *zamindars* would be recognized as the “owners” of the land. The second problem was the amount that the *zamindars* had to pay in taxes, and it was agreed that the current assessments would be accepted, with some adjustments. The third issue was the duration of the assessment: would it be fixed for a ten-year period, or would it be annually variable. Again, it seemed simplest to decide that the amount they were paying in 1793 would be fixed as the permanent tax. Probably, in the short run, this was good for the government, assuring a fixed income, and it was certainly good for the *zamindars*, as they became a wealthy class as land increased in value. The peasants were left, however, without protection as *zamindars* increased their rents at will. The Bengal system was not introduced elsewhere; various systems, such as direct taxation of the peasants or of the village, were used as British collectors realized that there were many different systems of land taxation in the different regions of India.

Another great change of the last decade of the eighteenth century was the establishment of a new kind of bureaucracy that would eventually be uniform throughout India. By this time, there was widespread belief among Englishmen that Indians could not be trusted with positions of influence and control. This belief was based partly on experiences with Indian tax officials after 1765 but also on the growing prejudice that both Hindu and Muslim societies were so corrupt that Indians could not be employed at the highest levels of government. As a result, after 1793, only British were employed in higher posts. This new Indian civil service, extremely well-paid, with security of tenure and the ability to retire to England in late middle age, was very attractive to sons of the English middle classes. The army, strengthened by new technology and new discipline, followed the same pattern, with only Europeans being commissioned as officers. Eurasians, people of mixed parentage were also excluded. It became, however, one of the best and one of the largest standing armies in the world in the nineteenth century. This new ruling class was remarkably small, with about two thousand in the civil service and fifty thousand British officers and men in the army, for a population that in 1850 probably numbered about 200 million. Its rule was only made possible by the hundreds of thousands of

Indians who served in the lower ranks of both the civil and military services.


Important changes were also introduced in the legal system. At first, the British tried to work through existing Indian laws and systems of courts, but they soon discovered that the legal system was particularistic to regions and that what they thought were Hindu law codes were abstract principles and ideal religious practices that had never been uniformly followed. By the end of the eighteenth century, English law began to be applied and an English system of courts was created, with the judges of the higher courts all being British. Here, as elsewhere, Indians were divested of real authority, and specifically Indian laws disappeared, with one very important exception. Personal law, that is, matters relating to marriage, inheritance, and adoption, were defined by religious usage: Hindu practices for Hindus, Muslim usages for Muslims, and Christian ones for Christians. This remains one of the most controversial aspects of the British legal inheritance.

1798–1858: Territorial Conquest

The great period of territorial conquest that began in 1798 depended on the powerful armies that the British East India Company had built up at the three presidencies, using

its control of the Indian land revenues and the profits generated by the English and Indian traders. The chief architect of this expansion was Lord Wellesley, governor-general from 1798 to 1803, along with his even abler and more famous brother, Arthur Wellesley, later the duke of Wellington. Wellesley defended his conquests on various grounds. One was that the Indian rulers were tyrants who had overthrown legitimate rulers; conquest was therefore justified to restore to “an ancient and highly cultivated people their religious and civil rights” (Bayly, p. 81). He also stressed, however, that conquest was necessary to bring more tax revenues to support the large army. Finally, conquest would guard the company’s territories against what he referred to, without irony, as the restless ambition of Asiatic rulers that led them to seize other ruler’s lands.

These conquests were made either quickly or easily. Although by 1798 the British East India Company controlled large areas in the hinterlands of Bombay and Madras and almost all of the huge Mughal *subas* of Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa, three formidable organized military powers challenged British hegemony in the period from 1798 to 1858. In the south, Mysore was the site of an ancient Hindu kingdom that had been taken over by a Muslim commander, Hyder Ali, and he and his son, Tipu



Last battle of Tipu Sultan. Print depicts Tipu Sultan’s final stand against the British in the South of India. After his death in this skirmish in 1799, he was replaced by a compliant descendant of the earlier Hindu leaders. Such regime change became a familiar pattern in the British East India Company’s dealings with Indian rulers. SURVEY OF INDIA / AKHIL BAKSHI.

Sultan, endeavored to counteract the British East India Company's influence by building a strong army and adding new territories to secure more revenue. Tipu also threatened the company by seeking an alliance with the French. Wellesley decided that he must be removed, and after a bitter fight, he was defeated and killed, and a compliant descendant of the former Hindu rulers was made the ruler under British control. This became a familiar pattern in dealing with Indian rulers. In western and central India, the Marathas, with a number of powerful chieftains, rebelled against the Mughals and now became the chief threat to British power. Many of them were defeated and forced to sign treaties, known as "subsidiary alliances," making them, in effect, vassal states. Wellesley's wars were very expensive, and the British East India Company recalled him in 1805. Wars with the Marathas continued, however, until 1818, when their organized resistance to the sweep of British power ended.

With the Marathas defeated as a military threat, British power turned its attention in the 1830s to the area, now western Pakistan and Afghanistan, that remains in the twenty-first century a contested region of national and international ambitions. With a range of motivations—including hope for increased trade, fear of Russian advance into the region, and desire to overthrow an unfriendly ruler to be replaced with a more pliable one—the company's officials promoted the invasion of Afghanistan in 1839. At first the British were successful, but three years later they were driven out by an uprising of irate Afghans. Of the nearly 20,000 company troops, mainly Indian soldiers and camp followers, who fled in the dead of winter under fire by Afghan tribesmen, only one, a British army doctor, reached India. This event was the greatest disaster in British military history, and it must have encouraged Britain's enemies in India.

The officials of the British East India Company had begun to believe that great trading opportunities could be found by using the Indus River as a channel of communication into the Punjab and beyond that to Central Asia. The result of this ill-founded idea was the conquest in 1843 of Sind, of the vast region controlled by a number of Muslim chieftains stretching from the Arabian Sea northward along the Indus.

The next great challenge came from the Sikh kingdom in Punjab, the last independent power of any size in the subcontinent, that had been conquered by the Sikh warrior Ranjit Singh at the end of the eighteenth century. Conquest of the Gangetic Plains during the Wellesley era brought the British into conflict with the Sikh kingdom, which was decisively defeated in 1849. Punjab was annexed by the British, becoming a major center of British power. Many of the Sikh soldiers were quickly recruited into the company's army.

In addition to these wars of resistance fought by major Indian rulers, there were many local groups, often called "tribal people," living in the hilly and marginal areas of the country, who resisted the intrusion of the British—as they had all previous rulers—into their territories. While many of these groups fought valiantly, they were not able to match the military superiority of the British, nor could they form alliances with each other. Often after defeat they were co-opted by the new rulers into military service. In Central India, for example, the Bhils, tribal people living in impoverished hilly areas, were recruited into a military unit, the Bhil Corps, which was used against other recalcitrant groups.

By 1848 the entire subcontinent had come effectively under British control, either directly as "British India" or indirectly as "Princely India" through subsidiary treaties. While there had been great political upheaval in the previous eighty years, the period under the new governor-general, Lord Dalhousie (1848–1856), saw many modernizing or Westernizing innovations. These included the building of railway and telegraph systems, as well as new roads and improvements in the postal service. Three universities modeled on the new University of London were established, determining the pattern of Indian higher education up to the present time, based on the use of the English language and an English curriculum. The first cotton mills were established, the beginning of an immense industry. In 1853 it was decided that all entrance to the Indian civil service would be through an examination system, ending the patronage system of the British East India Company. While technically Indians could compete in the new civil service system, the examinations were held in England and were based on an English curriculum, and thus very few Indians managed to pass them before the end of the nineteenth century. Another important change, and a cause of much dissatisfaction, was the policy of getting rid of some of the quasi-independent Indian states that had resulted from the subsidiary alliances of earlier wars. To Dalhousie and his officials they seemed medieval backwaters that served no purpose in a progressive age.

Many of these changes were applauded by Indians in the great port cities and other urban areas, but elsewhere, particularly in North India, there was smoldering resentment by influential segments of the population. These included descendants of Maratha rulers who had been defeated and members of the Mughal elites who watched the Mughal emperor become a virtual prisoner in his Delhi palace-fort. It also included both Muslim and Hindu religious leaders who saw the British encouraging the spread of Christianity by allowing missionary activity. The incident that ignited an explosion came, however, from Indian soldiers in the company's army, the group on which British power had depended for a hundred years.

What became known to the British as the “Sepoy Mutiny” started when the rumor spread that new guns issued to the Indian troops used bullets that were greased with cow and pig fat, a mixture contaminating to both Hindu and Muslim soldiers. The soldiers believed this to be an attempt to pollute them so they would abandon their religions and accept Christianity. Whatever the causes, on 10 May 1857, soldiers at Meerut murdered their officers, marched to Delhi 30 miles (48 km) away, and proclaimed the aged Mughal emperor their leader. Indian nationalist historians later called these events the beginning of the “First War of Independence.” Whatever its name, the war was fought with tenacity and great brutality on both sides; in the end the British won because of superior military equipment and discipline, as well as unified leadership.

There were a number of results from the uprising that had long-range consequences. One was that most English rulers now believed that Indians were “disloyal” and could not be trusted. For many Indians, the success of the English in putting down the uprisings showed that the English were too powerful to be defeated by recourse to revolutionary violence. These points are debatable, but what is not debatable is the fate of the British East India Company as the ruler of India. In debates in the House of Commons in 1858 there was almost unanimity in blaming the uprisings on the mismanagement of the company, and its role as the government of India was abolished. Henceforth, government would be vested in the British Crown. Queen Victoria issued a proclamation declaring that she desired no extension of territory, promising freedom for all religions without any interference by government, and ensuring Indians the right to serve the government in all capacities. None of these promises were carried out completely, but the proclamation was received by educated Indians as a sign of hope for the future. After more than a century of involvement in ruling India, change and progress had made the company irrelevant.

Ainslie T. Embree

See also Bentinck, Lord William; British Crown Raj; British Impact; Clive, Robert; Cornwallis, Lord; Dalhousie, Marquis of; Hastings, Warren; Shore, Sir John; Wellesley, Richard Colley

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Indian Office Collections are in the British Library in London, in the National Archives in New Delhi, and in the state archives of Calcutta, Madras, and Bombay. In the United States, the most extensive collection of printed materials is to be found in the Library of Congress. Three books by K. N. Chaudhuri fit the British East India Company into the dynamic world of Asian commerce: *The English East*

India Company: The Study of an Early Joint-Stock Company, 1600–1640 (London: Frank Cass, 1965) fits the company into the economic life of early capitalist enterprise; *Asia before Europe: Economy and Civilisation of the Indian Ocean from the Rise of Islam to 1750* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990) gives the large picture of Asian trade; and *The Trading World of Asia and the East India Company, 1660–1760* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978) is a detailed study of its commercial activities in India and surroundings countries. For the complex social and political changes taking place in India in the period from 1750 to 1858, four volumes in *The New Cambridge History of India*, published by Cambridge University Press, present interpretations based on contemporary scholarship: John H. Richards, *The Mughal Empire*; Om Prakash, *European Commercial Enterprise in Pre-Colonial India* (1998); P. J. Marshall, *Bengal: The British Bridgehead, Eastern India, 1740–1828* (1987); and C. A. Bayly, *Indian Society and the Making of the British Empire* (1988). Philip Woodruff, *The Men Who Ruled India: The Founders* (New York Schocken Books, 1964), is a laudatory, but interesting, celebration of the achievements of many of the individuals involved in the establishment of British rule.

BRITISH IMPACT The British impact on Indian civilization began when Great Britain became an intrusive colonial force in India in the middle of the eighteenth century. To arrive at some reasonable indication of the British influence, it must be recognized that this was not a one-way process, but rather a complex interaction of adaptation and appropriation by both civilizations that can never be completely unpacked. There were many areas in which British political power and culture intersected with Indian society in formative ways that became part of the legacy of modern India. These included: the demarcation of the territorial borders of British India; the impact on the economy; the use of English as the medium of instruction in higher education; new urbanization; religious movements; the position of women in civil society; and constitutionalism.

Defining Borders: Territorial Sovereignty

One of the most decisive changes that Great Britain introduced into the Indian subcontinent was its insistence that the British Raj's bureaucracy must exercise its sovereignty up to a clearly defined linear boundary. The external frontiers of India's pre-British Mughal empire were areas of shifting control, buffer zones rather than borders, without the precise definition or demarcation that became the mark of national sovereignty in the nineteenth century. The British always spoke of their “unification” of India from an aggregation of states into a single political unit as their greatest achievement, but this was only made possible by the boundaries that they created for their centralized Raj. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, disputes between India and her neighbors



Victoria Terminus, Mumbai. In Mumbai, the Victoria Terminus—recently renamed Chhatrapati Shivaji Terminus after a Maratha warrior—is an important symbol of India’s past (as a subject of British imperialism) and its present (as a leader among developing nations). Atop the Gothic edifice’s central dome stands the triumphant figure of Progress. BHARATH RAMAMRUTHAM / FOTOMEDIA.

over the boundaries that were created as a result of British rule remain one of the most difficult legacies of British imperialism.

The Economic Impact of Foreign Rule and Free Trade

Although there is no scholarly consensus on the nature of the impact of British rule on India’s economy, there is general agreement that the economy, and the population upon which it depended, had been stable for some centuries before the period of British rule, “fluctuating within narrow limits in response to non-economic factors like the level of peace and security and adjusting with ease to limited expansion in demand” (Kumar, p. 35). Few modern historians would dispute that, especially in its early years, British control worked to India’s economic disadvantage, as the industrial revolution was transforming England itself from an agricultural economy to the world’s leading industrial and military power. With an enormous demand for raw materials and its ability to supply manufactured goods more cheaply and in greater quantity than any other country, Great Britain adopted

free trade, without import or export tariffs, and without subsidies, in nineteenth-century India as well as in Great Britain. India’s existing industries thus had no protection from British competition, and new ones did not receive the kind of tariff protection that was given new industries elsewhere in the world throughout the nineteenth century. India’s already large population, which doubled in the nineteenth century, provided cheap labor for an essentially subsistence economy that gave no encouragement to industrial development, since everything could be imported so cheaply from England without duty. For the advocates of the new British theory of “comparative advantage”—that is, that a country should produce what it can more cheaply than another—this combination of the Indian and English economies seemed a vindication of their ideas. For Indian nationalists, however, it only proved that India was being exploited by the combined political and economic power of British imperialism. In a famous judgment on the British economic impact on India, Karl Marx argued in 1853 that the traditional forms of economic life in India were being destroyed, not by the soldier and the tax collector, but by the steam engine and free trade, thus producing “the only social revolution ever

heard of in Asia.” Although the British were motivated, he said, by “vile self-interest,” they were “the unconscious tool of history in bringing about that revolution” (Marx, pp. 19–20).

English as the Medium of Instruction in Higher Education

One of the most distinctive features of modern India is that English is the language used by most leaders in every field—from journalism to medicine, in the legal system, in higher education, in the higher ranks of the immense bureaucracy, among officers in the armed services, business leaders beyond the local level, and politicians, at least those who aspire to national leadership. The vast majority of India’s people, however, can neither read nor speak English. This dominance of English as a medium of communication had its origin in a number of conflicting pressures on the British East India Company’s government in India. The precipitating pressure for the government’s involvement came in a clause in the Parliamentary act of 1813, renewing the East India Company’s charter, that £10,000 a year should be spent by the Company for “the encouragement of the learned natives of India” for “the improvement of literature” and for “the promotion of the knowledge of the sciences.” The sum was piddling, but it became central to a great controversy that is still of vital concern in modern India, namely, what should be the primary language of higher education, English or Sanskrit? A number of the company’s officials, known as “Orientalists,” argued in favor of promoting the traditional cultures of Hinduism and Islam through their respective classical languages, Sanskrit and Arabic. In the other camp were the “Anglicists,” who argued that what India needed most was the teaching of English and modern scientific subjects. They were a varied lot; they included some officials who viewed the Indians who had learned English as a cheap source of tax collectors and other minor bureaucrats needed to run the expanding government. The most potent argument for English came, however, from members of India’s own upper classes, who saw the English language as the key that would put the learning of the West at their disposal. In 1835 the decision was made that all government expenditures on higher education would go to institutions that taught through the medium of English.

The impact of English as the medium of instruction has been enormous. It undoubtedly delayed the development of Indian languages, but those Indians who mastered English were in a position to claim the leadership of India. Eventually, those fluent and educated in English could gain positions of influence throughout the English-speaking world and, more widely, in a world in which English was rapidly becoming the language of diplomacy, business, and science.

New Urbanization

India was a land of cities and towns long before the advent of British rule, with great religious centers, like Madurai, and administrative and military capitals, like Vijayanagara in the south, Delhi and Agra in the north, and great trading ports like Surat in western India. For a variety of reasons, however, the urban centers had almost all entered a period of stagnation or decline when the British arrived in India as sea-borne traders, establishing their mercantile toeholds on the fringes of the Mughal empire. In the eighteenth century, three great port-cities—Calcutta in Bengal, Madras on the southeast coast, and Bombay on west coast—became dominant in their regions, first as centers of trade, then as the seats of British political power. Their populations were overwhelmingly Indian, who, while taking goods from the West, maintained their own cultural traditions. The new presidency capitals became the centers of India’s cultural life, with flourishing colleges, universities, newspapers, and Indian-owned businesses, and inevitably emerged as the heartlands of the new politics of nationalism.

Religion and the State in British India

One of the most important aspects of British rule was its relationship to the institutionalized religions of India, which first emerged as a public problem in 1793, when the East India Company’s charter was up for renewal by Parliament. Evangelical Christian spokesmen among the company’s directors and members of Parliament demanded that the company drop its long-standing prohibition against Christian missionaries working in its territories in India, arguing that the only justification for British rule in India was the improvement of the lives of its “heathen” people. This could be done only if the company was required to send teachers and missionaries to India to teach the people and advance their religious and moral improvement through the spread of the Gospel. This move was defeated, but the pressure continued in two other ways. One was an attack on the company’s support of Hindu institutions of any kind, and the other was a demand for the company to forbid certain Hindu practices—such as *sati*, the immolation of widows on their husbands’ funeral pyres—which many British Christians condemned as immoral.

The demand for Christian religious activity in India was based on a reading of Indian religion and society that began late in the eighteenth century, which has colored the perception of India in the Western world almost to the present time. An extreme, but unfortunately not uncommon, belief in England was that Indian society was degraded and degenerate, and that Hindu caste restrictions prevented social mobility and progress. This dark condition of society was due, it was argued, to Hinduism,

the religious beliefs that the Brahmans, the priestly caste, through “fraud and imposture,” had imposed upon society. The mark of Hinduism was the worship of idols, fiercely condemned in the Hebrew Bible, so central to the faith of Christians in nineteenth-century Great Britain and America. British missionaries therefore sought to replace “blasphemous” Hinduism with the “pure truth” of Christianity, creating a torrent of criticism of Indian religion and society in Great Britain and North America that affected not only the way Westerners thought about India, but also the way Indians thought about their own society.

The most telling argument against government interference was the fear, expressed by many British officials, that any attack on Hindu customs would lead to such resistance from Indians that British rule would be threatened. The company’s government therefore tried to exclude itself from any appearance of official support for Christianity or hostility to Indian religions by initially adopting a policy of neutrality, the “colonial compromise.” Soon after 1818, however, when the British achieved paramount power over India, they became bolder, and were more openly committed to reforms like the abolition of *sati* (1829); the Caste Disabilities Act (1850), allowing Hindu converts to Christianity to inherit property; and the Hindu Widow Remarriage Act (1852). Sepoys of the company’s Bengal army believed that it was the British intention to convert them to Christianity that inspired the order to bite the new Enfield rifle cartridges, greased with “cow” or “pig” fat, issued to them by the British in 1857. That issue triggered the “Mutiny War,” after which Queen Victoria, in her proclamation in 1858, declared that the British Crown Raj would replace the old company, and that while she relied on the truth of Christianity, she would now forbid any interference with the religious beliefs or worship of any of her Indian subjects. It was this compromise that held, more or less, until the end of British rule.

The impact of British rule in religious matters nonetheless proved powerful, not in official policy but in the building and growth of Christian churches and other institutions, funded by congregations from the United States and Britain, which in a variety of ways served mainly a Hindu and, to a lesser extent, a Muslim constituency. These included schools of all kinds, hospitals, orphanages, and above all, the Christian colleges that still occupy a preeminent place in Indian education. They produced very few Christians, but their influence was reflected not just in their own activities but in the establishment of similar institutions by Indian religious organizations. Powerful religious movements were also begun within both Hindu and Muslim communities to counteract what their leaders saw as the threat to their own faiths from the onslaught of Christian propaganda.

The Arts and Literature

The impact of British rule, so great on many aspects of Indian life, was surprisingly small in the arts. Western classical music was not introduced to any significant extent, and its popular modern varieties, especially American forms, attracted a following only in post-independence India. The explanation for this probably lies in the very rich tradition of Indian music, both classical and folk. The fact that music did not play a large part in British life may also have been a factor, along with the fact that the number of British residents in India was always small. Influence on painting was more direct, since the government did encourage the establishment of art schools in Calcutta, Bombay, and Madras, which inspired painting that showed influence of Western styles and techniques. Western influence was also revealed in the growth of cheap lithographed illustrations of religious myths, following the success of painter Ravi Verma (1848–1906). One of the most intriguing British impacts on Indian art and culture came, however, late in the nineteenth century in the form of interest and encouragement given to the traditional arts of India, especially folk art. This interest was revealed in the extraordinary exhibition of Indian art of all kinds in Delhi in 1903, in which no work with any European influence was allowed to be shown (Watt, p. xv).

The Position of Women

The improvement of the condition of Indian women has been a favorite topic in discussions of the impact of British rule on India, contrasting it with the treatment of women without the ameliorating influence of British rule. It is impossible to render any kind of fair reckoning, on the one hand, of just how oppressed women were by Hindu and Muslim social customs, including child marriage, female infanticide, discrimination against widows, the difficulty of divorce for women, and polygamy, or, on the other hand, how their condition improved during the period of British rule. All that can be done is to note some of the many attempts made by interested groups and individuals, including missionaries and liberal British officials, to bring about change in civil society or, through pressure and publicity, to get the government to legislate social change that affected women. Such activities are among the clearest markers of modernity. A historian of modern women in India summarizes the numerous influences that were at work as Christian criticism of Indian religion, humanitarianism, utilitarianism, social Darwinism, and nationalism, with all basically insisting on the need for “a new gender ideology and modification of the actual treatment of women” (Forbes, p. 14).

The earliest and the most famous act of social legislation was the criminalizing of *sati*, the practice, fairly

common among higher Hindu castes in Bengal, of widows immolating themselves on their husbands' funeral pyres. In the West, this had become symbolic of Indian treatment of women, leading to demands for its abolition by the government. The British government of India had hesitated to take such action, believing that the custom was prescribed by religion, and that forbidding it would lead to great resentment. In 1829, however, when it was declared illegal, there was no apparent popular outcry. Another symbolic piece of legislation came in 1856, under the leadership of the Hindu reformer Iswar Chandra Vidyasagar (1820–1891), with the passage of an act permitting Hindu widows to remarry. One of the most famous Indian reformers of the century, Ram Mohan Roy (1772–1833), had always argued that such customs were not integral to true Hinduism but were “corruptions” that had evolved through the centuries and that should be abolished. An issue that aroused far more support as well as opposition was child marriage, that is, the marriage of girls before puberty. In 1860 an act made ten years the age at which marriage could be consummated, but it was rarely enforced. In 1891 the age of consent was raised to twelve, but it was hardly enforced either. The landmark legislation did not come until 1929, when the Hindu Marriage Restraint Act raised the age of consent for girls to fourteen.

The activism of Indian women behind such social legislation was as important as the acts themselves. Numerous local groups of women organized throughout the country by the beginning of the twentieth century, and after World War I, three major organizations were formed: the Women's Indian Association, the National Council of Women in India, and the All-India Women's Conference. This last of these had the widest influence, probably because of the high social status of its leaders as well as their willingness to engage in serious political work and to organize lower-class women. It was especially influential in organizing support for the Hindu Marriage Act and for the education of girls.

The emergence of women as an important force in the nationalist movement came with the ascendancy of Mahatma Gandhi as the leader of the Indian National Congress in 1920. He insisted on the equality of men and women, and urged women to join in the difficult and dangerous work of opposition to British rule. Women could play a special part, he argued, in the fight for freedom because by nature they were accustomed to self-sacrifice. Women have had an extraordinary place in modern India, matched by no other country in the world, serving as prime minister of the country, leaders of the opposition, chief ministers of the states, ambassadors, and doctors and lawyers in very large numbers, as well as in the traditional role of teachers.

Constitutionalism

In terms of the interaction of the indigenous traditions of India with the political, economic, and cultural power of Great Britain, perhaps the most conspicuous and enduring was the development of the constitutional framework of modern India and the emergence of various forms of nationalism in competing political parties. In the 1890s, at the high noon of British imperial power in the subcontinent, most knowledgeable British officials, if they had been asked to speculate on the major impact of Great Britain on India, would almost certainly have answered, “law and order.” Although electoral politics had barely begun, most of the leaders of the Indian National Congress, founded in 1885, would, curiously enough, have given somewhat the same answer. So would many prominent Indians who were not identified with the Congress. In the next thirty years, Indian nationalists and historians would argue that ancient India had not only possessed republican forms of constitutional government, it had also had the military power to protect itself. Indians were thus able to accept the constitutional and legal framework that had been created by British rule in India as consonant with their own history. Armed revolution was not necessary in order to drive out the British, but rather a melding of the formal structures of British power with the force of India's own traditions. In 1922, when Mahatma Gandhi was sentenced for sedition against the British government, he told the judge, “I believe that I have rendered a service to India and England by showing in non-cooperation a way out of the unnatural state in which we are now living” (Brown, p. 118). In 1947, as he moved the bill in the House of Commons that would end British rule in India, Prime Minister Clement Attlee in effect assented to this, from the British perspective, when he claimed that while there had been mistakes and failures, British rule in India could “stand comparison with that of any other nation which has been charged with the ruling of a nation so different from themselves” (*Parliamentary Debates*).

Ainslie T. Embree

See also British Crown Raj; Christian Impact on India, History of; Women and Political Power; Women's Education

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Brown, Judith M. *Gandhi: Prisoner of Hope*. New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989.
- Embree, Ainslie T. *Charles Grant and British Rule in India*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1962.
- Forbes, Geraldine. *Women in Modern India*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1996.
- Griffiths, Percival. *The British Impact on India*. London: Cass, 1962.

- Jones, Kenneth W. *Socio-Religious Reform Movements in British India*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Kumar, Dharma, ed. *The Cambridge Economic History of India*, vol. 2. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1983.
- Majumdar, R. C. "Nationalist Historians." In *Historians of India, Pakistan, and Ceylon*, edited by C. H. Philips. London: Oxford University Press, 1961.
- Marx, Karl, and F. Engels. *The First Indian War of Independence, 1857–1859*. Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1959.
- Mitter, Partha. *Art and Nationalism in Colonial India: Occidental Orientations*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- Parliamentary Debates*, House of Commons, series 5, vol. 439 (1947), col. 2441.
- Watt, George. *Indian Art at Delhi*. 1903. Reprint, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1987.

BRITISH INDIA OFFICE, THE From 1858 to 1947 the India Office, in London, was the home government for Britain's largest and most complex overseas possession. Its diverse responsibilities were carried out collaboratively by a secretary of state for India, permanent officials, a mélange of departments and petty officials, and the Council of India—that unique imperial institution designed to provide "currency" and represent the Indian ethos in the policy-making process in London. Established formally by the Government of India Act of 1858, the India Office, in its first decade, was not markedly distinguishable from the "dual government" that had evolved under the Court of Directors and Board of Control of the East India Company. In its first years, the personnel and internal committee system were carryovers from the company, and for all intents and purposes, the new India Office was a change in form but not substance.

The act of 1858, however, did mark out new objectives that would, over time, change completely the functioning of the Office. The most significant overarching change articulated in 1858 was a new alignment of India Office responsibility to Parliament, and thus both implied and real control of Indian affairs from London. The secretary of state for India, now a member of the Cabinet, could, in fact, overrule the Council of India on "urgent" and "secret" matters, something his predecessor, the president of the Board of Control, could not do. However, secretaries of state for India rarely used this power, and de facto, the home government of India operated as a corporate entity, with the secretary of state "in council"—especially important since all matters involving expenditures of funds required council approval.

Although Parliament possessed the technical wherewithal to involve itself routinely in Indian affairs, it by and large remained apathetic to India and the India Office

until well into the nineteenth century. As the currents of both British domestic and foreign policy debates brought Indian management (both at home and in India) to the fore, the India Office staff worked meticulously to minimize what they construed as parliamentary "interference." The office had, over time, developed a collective administrative psyche among its permanent officials that often encouraged them to circumvent what seemed an obvious fact: they were, after all, a British department of state. While it was true that secretaries of state rotated the seals with each shift of British administration, and that the India Office was always obligated to liaise with U.K. departments, the unique funding circumstances of the India Office mitigated Parliament's control of the office. From 1858 to 1919 (although a few minor exceptions were left unaffected until 1937), the salary of the secretary of state for India, the permanent undersecretaries, and office operating expenditures were paid for with Indian, not British revenues. The India Office was not subject to the usual Treasury pressures until well into the twentieth century.

The first secretary of state for India, Sir Charles Wood (1859–1866), effected the first structural reorganization of the India Office in 1859. Increasingly concerned that the old system of handling office business was too cumbersome, he designed reforms to streamline the processing of paperwork among the permanent and parliamentary undersecretaries, the departments, and the committees of the Council of India. In particular, he designated specific subjects to be handled by each of the undersecretaries, and he refined the process of dispatch writing to reside primarily with department heads. Gradually, the departments of the India Office and the committees of the Council of India were brought into alignment. As the office ended its first decade, the correspondence departments of the office had become the linchpins for coordinating the flow of paper among the departments, the Council of India, the permanent undersecretary, and the secretary of state for India. The six correspondence departments of the India Office were: financial; judicial and public; military; political and secret; public works; and revenue, statistics, and commerce. This division of labor was further codified and institutionalized by Arthur Godley when he became permanent undersecretary in 1883.

In mid-nineteenth century—a pre-photocopy, pre-carbon paper age—the India Office processed nearly 100,000 documents annually. This paperwork increased significantly as the telegraph reached India in 1870, and in the 1890s, when the typewriter was introduced in the office. Increasingly, the office was consumed not only with spiraling amounts of official paperwork related to Indian affairs, but it also became the focal point of much lobbying by emergent Indian political parties and their allies in Britain. As the India Office tended to shy away

from public comments and posturing—especially during the long permanent undersecretaryship of Godley (1883–1909)—it was castigated in the Indian press as the “great manufactory of lies.”

The Indian Council Act of 1909 added a new presence in the India Office. For the first time, two Indians joined the Council of India. Perhaps sensing a harbinger of things to come, Lord Crewe introduced a new Council of India Bill to Parliament in 1914 designed to strengthen the power of the secretary of state vis-à-vis his council. Oddly, it was defeated when Lord Curzon, former viceroy of India, championed the Council of India as a bulwark against India Office browbeating of the Government of India in New Delhi. Curzon was reacting to the “Simla versus Whitehall” tensions (such as the differences in perspective between Calcutta and London) that had been writ large in his tenure in India, but was hardly ever absent from Indian governance since 1858. In that contest, however, the India Office almost always held the upper hand.

World War I accelerated the intensity of Indian affairs on many fronts, and no less so in the internal organization of the India Office. Paramount among these was the change effected in the Government of India Act of 1919. Insofar as the home government of India was concerned, it was shifting the expenses of the office from Indian revenues to the British estimates, thus opening the door for active involvement of the Treasury and Parliament in the day-to-day operation of the India Office, which was seminal. The ineptitude of the Mesopotamia campaign in World War I also subjected the India Office to the kind of public scrutiny it had largely avoided in its first half century, and a significant reordering of the office structure was put into place. In the interwar period, the number of Indians on the Council of India was increased from two to three. Further, the six traditional correspondence departments were submerged into three larger units: services and general; public and judicial; and economic and overseas. In response to the new, more direct Treasury link, an establishment officer assumed personnel matters from the accountant general's operations. The Council of India historically met weekly, a practice now cut to once a month, and new requirements were effected to update “currency” in Indian affairs to the council—now, more than ever, moved to periphery of the policy-making process as a purely “consultative” body. The coup de grâce for the Council of India came with the Government of India Act of 1935, implemented in 1937, which transformed the Council of India into a group of “Advisers” to be consulted only at the secretary of state's discretion. Finally, in 1937, Burmese affairs were slivered off from the India Office, although Burmese Office officials tended to simply wear two hats in serving both India and Burma.

During World War II, the India Office coordinated its activities with an assortment of British, Indian, and Allied bureaucracies. Such cooperation was necessary in order to prosecute the war effectively and carefully monitor the increasingly intense and complicated Indian nationalism of the 1940s. In pursuit of these goals, the India Office perspective was not always the same as that of other agencies, and considerable bureaucratic rivalry was evident. When Britain withdrew from India in 1947, the India Office ceased to exist; it was merged with the newly formed Commonwealth Relations Office.

Arnold P. Kaminsky

See also **British Crown Raj**


BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Kaminsky, Arnold P. *The India Office, 1880–1910*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1986.
Williams, Donovan. *The India Office, 1858–1869*. Hoshiarpur: Vishveshvaranand Vedic Research Institute, 1983.

BROCADE Brocade is fabric with a woven pattern that is purely decorative and independent of the structure of the cloth. The brocade weaving technique is also defined as loom embroidery. Brocade patterned fabrics can be made using any fiber, such as cotton (*jamdani*) or wool (for shawls), but the term generally refers to the richly patterned fabrics woven in silk, together with decorative gold or silver threads.

History

Sanskrit terms like *hiranya drapi* (golden drape), *hiranya chandataka* (golden skirt), or *hiranya pesas* (gold embroidered) are first mentioned in sacred ancient Indian sources as ancient as the Rig Veda and the Atharva Veda. Those are the earliest references to Indian gold brocade garments, either woven or embroidered with gold. Other terms are mentioned in ancient Indian literature referring to silk fabrics: *kausheya*, *kitsutram*, *pattasutra*, or *patron*. Gold and silver brocades, referred to as *kinkhab* or *kamkhwab* in later periods, may be related to the ancient fabrics like *debag* or *stavaraka*, described as rich material of Persian origin, woven with gold and silver, to be used by gods and kings. Traditional Indian dress, such as the sari, *dupatta* (veil), sash, *dboti* (men's lower garment), and turban, had exquisite brocade borders and end pieces (*pallu*). These were usually woven with silk and gold and silver threads (*zari*) while the remaining ground (which usually remained in folds when worn) was woven with fine cotton or silk. The style was perfect for India's climate. Heavier material with brocade work throughout was used mostly for home furnishings and stitched garments like coats, jackets, and trousers.



Nawāb of Bahawalpur, 1868–1900, Wearing Brocade Coat. Garments of heavy brocade were often reserved for royalty or conquerors. This late-eighteenth-century photo was possibly taken in the princely state of Bahawalpur, now part of modern-day Pakistan. HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS.

Brocade weaving centers developed in the capitals of ancient kingdoms, holy cities, and the trade centers. The raw material used in weaving silk brocades were costly, and the weavers had to depend on royal patrons to either provide the raw material or finance its purchase. Some of the best silk weaving centers were in Gujarat (Ahmedabad, Surat, and Patan), central India (Chanderi and Burhanpur), Maharashtra (Paithan, Aurangabad, and Yeola), South India (Kanchi, Tanjore, Arcot, and Trichinapally), North India (Agra, Jalalpur, Mau, Mubarakpur, Azamgarh, and Varanasi), Bengal (Murshidabad), and Assam. Banaras (Varanasi), which today is India's leading brocade weaving center, has been known for its fine cotton weaving since ancient times. Silk brocade weaving in Varanasi probably began in the mid- or late seventeenth century. Fabrics made here were used only for royal dress, palace furnishings, as gifts to political envoys, or as robes of honor for meritorious courtiers. Most ancient Indian dynasties supported weavers who created fabrics of the highest quality. The royal workshops established by the Mughals at Agra, Lahore, Delhi, and Ahmedabad had the greatest influence on the craft. Fabrics made here were used only for royal dress, palace furnishings, as gifts to political envoys, or as

robes of honor for meritorious courtiers. In addition to Indian weavers, these workshops employed the best weavers from Persia, Central Asia, and Turkey. Persian brocades, renowned for their quality and beauty, clearly influenced Mughal brocades. The international fusion of design and technique resulted in some of the finest examples of Indian brocades, and its effect can be seen in later Indian brocades, including those of the present day.

Materials and Techniques

Indian varieties of silk, known as *tassar*, *eri*, and *muga*, are grown in the jungles of Assam, Upper Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand, Orissa, Chattisgarh, and Madhya Pradesh. Compared to Chinese silk, Indian silk is rougher, less lustrous, and has shorter fibers; it was referred to as wild silk. *Muga*, the costliest and the best, is usually used in its original color, cream or golden. The most commonly used Indian silk is *tassar*. Fine mulberry silk is made as well, but the quality is inferior to that of Chinese silk. For this reason, a large percent of silk used in India is imported from China (in Varanasi, 80 percent of the silk is imported).

The gold and silver (*zari*) threads used for brocade weaving are of two different types. The flattened gold or silver wire (*badla*) is more difficult to weave. The more common type (*kalabattu*) is made by winding the metal wire around a core thread of silk, cotton, or even rayon. The metal wire is made of silver or gold-plated silver. The metal thread used is called artificial *zari*, which is silver-coated copper wire. Lacquer is used to give the golden hue.

Silk has a remarkable affinity for dyes. India was long famed for using a variety of natural dyes, including indigo, turmeric, saffron, pomegranate skin, catechu, lacquer, iron rust, and a number of flowers. In modern times, only chemical dyes are used.

The traditional simple pit loom is still used for handloom brocades. Jacquard was introduced in India in the late nineteenth century. The power loom is also used for mass production. The three main techniques used for creating the pattern are tapestry, *lampas*, and brocade. If more than one technique is applied to form a pattern, it is called a compound weave (e.g., the decorative panels of Mughal sashes).

Tapestry and *lampas* are more ancient than the brocade technique. Paithan, Aurangabad, and Chanderi were known for making saris, sashes, or *dupattas* with intricately woven borders in tapestry weave. Colored threads were used with gold or silver *zari*, creating a jewel-like look. In this weave, the warp is stretched on the loom and weft threads of different colors are woven into it—not across the entire width of the warp, but each one only in the specific areas where it is needed to form the pattern.

The different sets of weft threads are interlocked together, giving a geometrical outline to the pattern.

In *lampas*, two or more warps are used, one to make the background and another to make the pattern. The weft is used as a binding yarn. Assam is known for making figured *lampas* (e.g., Vrindavani Vastra, depicting scenes from Hindu mythology). Remarkable home-furnishing fabrics and curtains woven with large floral patterns are beautiful examples of Mughal *lampas*. Agra, Mau, Azamgarh, and Varanasi were known for making *lampas* using mixed yarns (cotton and silk warp and weft), usually with a striped pattern. Well-known varieties included *sangi*, *galta*, and *illaycha* or *alacha*.

Brocade, the most popular pattern-making technique, is used in most of the centers. The most intricate and beautiful pattern is called *kadwa* (embroidered). This pattern requires as many shuttles of differently colored silk as will appear in a pattern, and each pattern has its own set of shuttles. The use of different colors of silk and *zari* gives the pattern an enameled look called *minakari*. Brocades made in Gujarat usually had a ground of gold or silver threads on which patterns were created using colored silks. Some of the finest examples are the end panels and borders of Ashavali saris and the Mughal *patkas* (sashes). In Varanasi, the background is usually of silk or organza, with *zari* and colored threads forming the pattern.

An easier and cheaper way of weaving the pattern, commonly used in modern times, is called *fekwa* (to throw). Here the pattern weft is not broken, as in the *kadwa*, but runs fully across the warp, appearing on the surface as required by the pattern. The loose weft threads running between the patterns on the reverse are cut away to make the patterns clearer on the front. The work is known as *katraua*, or cutwork.

Motifs

The study of ancient Indian decorative motifs reveals an amazing persistence of certain motifs for thousands of years. These motifs appear in architecture, pottery, jewelry, metalware, and textiles. Most brocade weaving centers use traditional patterns, though each center has unique characteristics. The saris made at southern centers are known for their long and rich gold brocaded *pallu* (end piece), showing a predominance of animal or bird motifs, including the bull, deer, horse, tiger, elephant, peacock, parrot, swan, twin-headed eagle, and a mythical animal called *yali* (having a lion's head and a bird's body) or a combination of peacock and swan. Similar architectural decorations are found on the walls of southern Hindu temples.

Gujarati brocades, also famed for their animal and bird representation, also incorporated human figures

with elephants, tigers, peacock, and parrots. Intricate floral borders and trellis patterns were also used. *Carrie*, the mango-shaped pattern (better known as paisley), became a widely used motif from the eighteenth century onward. It became the standard corner motif (*Konia*) in saris and *dupattas* (veils) in most of India's centers. A number of Persian floral patterns were copied in Gujarati brocades and can be seen on the exquisite end panels of Mughal sashes and Ashavali saris.

Mughal brocades were known for their elegance and symmetry; their patterns, which were mostly floral, included iris, poppy, tulip, and narcissi. A number of geometrical patterns, including zigzag, diagonal, or straight lines, squares, chevrons, circles, trellis, and lozenges, were also used. Early brocade is known for its bold and realistic compositions. Later patterns are more complex, the space between the main patterns filled by additional motifs. Specialty Banaras brocades included *Shikargah* (a hunting scene, a combination of vegetal, floral, animal, birds, and human figures), *latifa buti* (an inverted or swaying floral pattern), and *zal* (a trellis, incorporating floral and geometrical patterns). Western patterns also influenced the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Varanasi brocades. Designs like meandering creepers, abstract motifs, ribbons, and open borders were incorporated into traditional patterns.

Special brocades were made for different religious uses, like the backdrops or rosary covers with figures of Lord Krishna surrounded by cows, made in Ahmedabad for the devotees of the Vallabh cult. *Gyasar*, used in Buddhist monasteries, include dragon motifs and floral patterns and are made in Banaras.

Types of Fabric

Fabrics are classified as either loom-finished or as yardage. Yardage is used as dress material and for home furnishings. Loom-finished fabrics are saris, *dupattas*, sashes, caps, or borders. Varanasi was also known for weaving garments such as *lehnga* (a woman's skirt) and *choga* (the long and loose man's coat).

Besides *kinkhab* the other best-known brocade fabrics are *kinkhab*, the splendor and elegance of which, combined with its cost, gave it that name, which means "little" (*kim*) "dream" (*khab*). *Alfi* is another exclusive and expensive brocade, used mostly in ceremonial outfits. Gold or silver patterns are outlined with single or double colored silk threads; the pattern is called *minakari* (enameling). *Tasbi* is a fabric in which flat golden or silver metal wire (*badla*) is used as pattern weft along with colored threads, creating ashiny, luxurious appearance. The *himru* variety of brocade pattern is woven with only silks, without the use of gold or silver threads. *Baluchari* saris and

dress materials woven at Murshidabad are the finest examples of this technique.

Masbru is mixed fabric, in which cotton and silk are used as warp and weft, usually creating a striped or floral pattern. *Masbrus* were used mostly for trousers, jackets, or the lining of garments.

Varanasi remains the premier center of brocade weaving. Both hand and power looms are used. The number of weaver families was, according to the 1995–1996 census, approximately 125,000. Of these, 60 percent were Muslim, residing mostly in and around urban areas, and 40 percent were Hindu, working mostly in villages near Varanasi. The metal threads used are mostly artificial, made either in Varanasi or Surat. Other well-known weaving centers are Kanchipuram, Tanjore, Bangalore, and Mysore in the South; Aurangabad, Yeola, Chanderi, and Maheshwar in mid-peninsular India; and Murshidabad and Guwahati in eastern India.

Yashodhara Agrawal

See also **Textiles**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Agrawal, Yashodhara. *Silk Brocades*. New Delhi: Roli and Jansen, 2003.
- Birdwood, George C. M. *The Art of India*. 1880. Reprint, Jersey, U.K.: British Book Company, 1986.
- Dhamija, Jasleen, ed. *The Woven Silks of India*. Mumbai: Marg Publications, 1995.
- Mookerjee, Ajit, ed. *Banaras Brocades*. New Delhi: Crafts Museum, 1966.
- Yusuf Ali, Allahabad. *A Monograph on Silk Fabrics Produced in the North-Western Provinces and Oudh*. 1900. Reprint, Ahmedabad: Calico Museum of Textiles, 1974.

BRONZES

This entry consists of the following articles:

EARLY IMAGES

SOUTH INDIAN

EARLY IMAGES

A figure made from an alloy of metals is generally described as “bronze.” In the Indian context, the common term for such items is *ashtadhatu*, meaning eight metals. As gathered from ancient canonical texts (Shilpa Shāstras), the mixture of metals included gold, silver, copper, bronze, brass, tin, lead, and iron, though an alloy of even two metals was called bronze. In the southern part of the country, five metals (*panchalauba*) made a bronze; the ingredients were gold, silver, copper, brass, and white lead. Iron, being considered impure, was

avoided for shaping divine figures, and costly metal like gold was sparingly used. With the passage of time, an icon made of even a single metal was called bronze.

Bronzes, or metal figures, have been used for worship, meditation, cult purposes, aesthetic admiration, and as prized possessions. These also served as substitutes for large consecrated images (*dbruvaberas*); they were called *chalaberas*, mobile images that were used on festive occasions and in processions. These became popular in India among Hindus, Buddhists, Jains, and in folk cults.

As works of art, Indian bronzes are highly esteemed, equal to the best stone sculpture, displaying a high degree of workmanship, exquisite beauty and charm, rhythm, posture, and expressions. Chronologically, these works first emerged in the Indus Valley dating back to the middle of the third millennium B.C.; their production has continued to the present, with a fascinating journey of development through the ages and in different regions.

Indus Figures

The lumps revealed from sites like Mehargarh, Baluchistan (in Pakistan) prove the prevalence of metal, particularly copper, by about the sixth millennium B.C., although the earliest use of bronze or metal hails from Mohenjo-Daro and belongs to the third millennium B.C. Small in dimension (4.3 in. [10.8 cm] high), the figure of a dancing girl is of great aesthetic merit. Looking like a young indigenous maiden with horizontally enlarged eyes, she stands in rhythmic pose, with her left leg flexed forward, balancing the weight of her body on the right leg, with her right arm resting on her hip and her left arm on her thigh. While no trace of drapery is marked, she wears a triple-beaded, single-stranded necklace around her neck, double bangles on her right wrist and arm, and a row of thick bangles covering her entire left arm. The hairdo terminates into an elongated tuft (*juda*) resting on the nape. The use of drapery and sometimes decorated textiles is attested by terra-cotta figurines (particularly a stone bust of a so-called priest with trefoil motif scarf), but this female bronze is bare bodied except for these ornaments, which do not conceal her nudity. It may perhaps be presumed that the young girl (*sbodashi*) served some cult or ritual purpose. Alternatively, it may simply be a demonstration of ornaments on the body for decorative purposes. At the same time, the naturalistic treatment of the human figure suggests an advanced stage of production of metal sculpture in the early phase of Indus culture.

Another female figure in metal was revealed from the same site (Mohenjo-Daro). With her right arm on her waist, she bears some similarity to the dancing girl, wearing some ornaments on her unclothed body, but the workmanship lacks grace and elegance, and the figure is

weather worn. The buffalo from Mohenjo-Daro (2.8 in. [7.1 cm] long) is another excellent product of the Indus bronze atelier. It is notable for its anatomical rendering as well as its projection of vitality and strength. The bull from Kalibangan (2.76 in. [7 cm] long) is also a fine specimen. The little dog from Mohenjo-Daro (.7 in. [1.78 cm] long), probably made as a toy, must have come from the hands of a skilled smith. Its raised ears and tail bespeak realism, and a collar-type projection around the neck is an interesting feature. Whether it indicates a domestic breed of pet or something else is unknown. All the above objects are housed in the National Museum of New Delhi. From Mehri were recovered several bronze specimens, but the mirror (4.9 in. [12.5 cm] diameter) is outstanding. The handle is shaped like a standing female figure, with suspended arms alongside an unusually elongated body. The object also suggests the application of shining polish for reflection.

Daimabad. Bronze casting not only continued to be practiced in the late or post-Indus culture, but it was considerably improved. This is evidenced by a hoard unearthed at Daimabad, on the left bank of the Pravara River in the Ahmednagar district of Maharashtra in western India. Four large bronzes are of immense significance, particularly for the fact that they have been dated between 2000 and 1800 B.C. Of these, three represent animals (an elephant, buffalo, and rhinoceros) and the fourth is a chariot driven by a standing male figure. All the statues are made in solid bronze (*ghana dhātu*), but each is a different size. The animals stand on three separate pedestals, which have wheels for movement.

The elephant (14.4 x 10.4 in. long [36.5 cm high, 26.5 cm]) is the highest of all four, though the wheels of its pedestal are missing. The large holes on the four pegs conspicuously explain its use for a procession. The anatomy is robust and the twist of the tip of its trunk and a curved cavity between the hind legs and stomach befit the representation. The buffalo (10.8 x 9.7 in. long [27.5 cm high, 24.8 cm]), resembling a bison with large horns, bears the natural projection of front knees and stands on a four-wheeled chariot. The front two wheels are smaller than the rear ones. The rhinoceros (11.2 in. [28.5 cm] high) lacks naturalism, as the pleats of thick skin, legs, mouth, and horn are stylistically treated, similar to the depiction of a rhinoceros on some Indus seals. All four wheels of the base are of equal dimension.

The most fascinating object of the hoard is certainly a chariot driven by a standing young man. There are several remarkable features of this unique piece. With a length of 19.7 inches (50 cm) and a height of 9.2 inches (23.3 cm), this is the largest item from Daimabad hoard. The chariot has two components; the front part is dominated by a driver in commanding attitude. The two parts are joined

by a thick string, terminating in a yoke on the necks of a pair of bullocks, whose front and hind legs are supported on two separate pedestals. The animals have a composite appearance: while the horns, hoofs, and midsections are suggestive of bulls, the mouths, tails, and hind portions give the impression of horses. The fabrication of the back unit is rather complicated but exciting. Its basic structure is composed of a flat base with two vertical rods terminating in loops on top. A triangle of rods gives it strength and, along with a curved rod, rests on the back of an animal (probably a tiny horse). The young charioteer holds a whip. This may also be conjectured as a section of a broken rein, which controlled the running or galloping animals. This part of the carriage has two wheels for movement. The exact purpose of this extraordinary object is unknown. The posture of the charioteer and the shape of the cart, allowing no room for cargo or a passenger, encourage us to think that it was meant to depict a racing cart. Thus, the object on one hand is a rare example of advanced metallurgy and on the other suggests the prevalence of sports like cart racing in the early second millennium B.C.

Technology. The finds from the Indus and late or post-Indus sites attest to the popularity of the lost wax (*cire perdue*) method of bronze casting in India. This process continues to the present with slight variations in different parts of India. Medieval period textbooks refer to it as *madbucchbhishta-vidhana*, which could be applied either for solid (*ghana*) or for hollowed (*sushira*) figure. The different stages of bronze casting for a solid (*ghana*) figure are as follows:

- Preparation of model image in wax;
- Application of several coats of clay;
- Perforation, especially on top and bottom;
- Drying of casket-type mold in shade and sun;
- Heating of mold for melting the wax, which is then "lost";
- Top holes are closed;
- Preparation of an alloy of metals in molten form;
- Pouring of liquid metal through top hole;
- Allowing liquid to spread thoroughly in space created by lost wax figure;
- Cooking of the lump;
- Outer clay cover to be broken;
- Cast figure is ready;
- Finishing and filing.

The different stages of bronze casting for a hollow (*sushira*) figure are:

- Preparation of mold image in clay;
- Coating of wax;
- Coating of clay;
- Remaining stages the same as for solid (*ghana*);

Lightweight hollow figure ready;
Finishing and filing.

The details of the process of metal casting are recorded in the canonical texts, like *Manasara* (68.20–23), *Manasollasa* or *Abhilasitarthachintamani* (1.77–97), and *Vishnu-sambita*, *Aparajitaprichchha* (199.13–14). We are yet to come across a hollow metal figure from the Indus or late Indus culture, and it may be presumed that it was a later innovation. The last process of bronze casting, the finishing and filing, became so elaborate with the passage of time that the finished figure looked quite different from the cast model.

Vedic Period

It cannot be said with certainty whether the Vedic people preceded or followed the Indus culture, although historians generally subscribe to the view that the Vedic age is later. While material remains of the period are wanting, the Vedas furnish ample testimony regarding the artistic renderings and use of metals. Tvashta remains busy in creating different forms (Rig Veda 3.60.4) and Vishvakarma produces beautiful figures (ibid., 10.81.7). He is compared with a smith who uses furnace for smelting metals (ibid., 10.72.2). When a person (a smith artist) asks for ten cows in exchange for Indra (ibid., 4.24.10), he must be in possession of a costly figure of the deity, probably made in gold. The process of metal smelting was known as *sandhamana*.

Copper Implements

Archaeology is silent for about eight centuries, and no metal figure is found up to the eleventh or tenth century B.C., when some copper implements resembling a human figure (anthropomorphic) emerge from several parts of India, like Orissa and Uttar Pradesh. Their purpose and the lifestyle of their users remain a mystery. Some do bear the incised marks of fish, but these do not seem to be art objects. There is again a big gap of time when bronzes or metal figures disappear. It is only in the Shunga age (2nd–1st century B.C.) that we find a unique gold *repoussé* sculpture from Patna, now in the Bharat Kala Bhavan, Banaras Hindu University, Varanasi. It represents a male and a female, and the sad expression of the female figure suggests that it is Sītā, kidnapped by Ravana. A gold plaque depicting Karttikeya, found at Hulaskheda near Lucknow by the State Archaeology Department, is also a rare piece of the early first century A.D.

The Kushana Period

Excavations at Sonkh, near Mathura in Uttar Pradesh, conducted from 1968 to 1974 by German archaeologists under the guidance of Herbert Härtel, revealed metallic

items from the ninth or eighth century B.C. The bronze sculptural specimens, however, come from the Kushana layers only. One, a standing young man holding a spear (*shakti*), has correctly been identified as Skanda or Karttikeya. Wearing a high diadem with a central jewel, rings in the ears, and a single pearled necklace (*ekavali*), he stands with his left arm akimbo. The sculpture was cast in two flat pieces that were then joined (3.7 in. [9.3 cm] high). The second bronze (4.2 in. [10.6 cm] high, 3.3 in. [8.5 cm] wide) also hails from the same levels of the Kushana period and represents a standing couple within a frame. The male, with high matted hair, raises his right hand in a protective (*abbaya*) pose, while his left hand holds a bowl. He wears a *dhoti* (lower garment), the folds of which are seen between the legs. Beside double earrings (now seen on the left side only), he also wears a loose flat necklace. The woman to his left (probably his spouse) has her right hand raised, while the left one holds a child. The head has been shaped like an animal (perhaps a cat). The plaque may represent Kubera and a mother goddess like Shashthi or Charchika. The frame gives the impression of a gateway (*torana*) with brackets on both sides and a central decorative motif, a variation of Shrivatsa or Nandyavarta. The above two are the earliest bronzes from the stratified levels in India and are similar to the contemporary stone sculptures for which Mathura was famous. There are two small bronze figures in the collection of Vinod Krishna Kanoria of Patna of the early Kushana period. One represents a young man with high fluted headgear, probably blowing some musical instrument and supporting a clublike object behind his raised left hand. The other is a female blowing a wind instrument. It retains the archaic appliqué ornamental technique.

Satavahana bronzes. A good number of metal items were found in a hoard at Brahmapuri, near Kolhapur in Maharashtra, belonging to the Satavahana period (2nd century A.D.), contemporary with the Kushanas. The most striking is a small bronze (2 in. [5 cm] high) representing four riders on an elephant. The two on the front may be explained as a royal or noble couple, as presumed from their jewelry, headgear, and garments. The remaining two on the back may be a female attendant and a page. Their positions are those prescribed by code, that is, the chief, followed by his spouse, her female attendant, and the page at the end. They are, perhaps, going to a shrine for worship. The elephant has been rendered beautifully and may be compared with the depiction in some early western rock-cut sites like Karle. The posture of the animal is noteworthy, as it seems it is about to rise to begin the journey.

The mythical lion from the same site, belonging to the same period (2.4 in. [6 cm] high) is also interesting.

This specimen of *repoussé* technique is significant for its vigor and movement, as indicated by its prancing front right leg. The head is shaped like an eagle; such fabulous figures are also found in early Indian architecture. Another item is a metal ring, which is surmounted by the heads of four mythical beings. The purpose of this piece cannot be explained exactly, but it might have been used as *dharmachakra* (the “Wheel of Law” set in motion by the Buddha in his first sermon at Sarnath).

The Buddha from Amaravati (17.1 in. [43.5 cm] high) in the Government Museum at Madras (Chennai), belongs to the late Satavahana or early Ikshvaku phase (c. 3rd century A.D.). With locked hair, protuberance, elongated ears and eyes, the Buddha wears *ekansika sanghati* (drapery covering the left shoulder only), the hem of which is held in the raised left hand. The right arm is half suspended in a posture of *varada* (bestowing a blessing). The Archaeological Museum, Nagarjunakonda, Andhra Pradesh, houses an excellent bronze figure of a prince (3.3 in. [8.5 cm] high) from the third century A.D. Standing stylistically, the young man wears a fluted headgear, a pair of bangles, earrings and a *dboti* (lower garment). The right arm is held akimbo with some object in the hand; with the left hand he supports a long scepter or a bow. He stands gracefully in a curved (*tribhanga*) pose with his right foot forward.

Chausa bronzes. A hoard of sixteen bronzes was found at Chausa in Bihar. These magnificent sculptures are related to the Digambara (sky-clad) sect of Jainism and are dated from the second century to the third century A.D., a period that can be termed the Kushano-Gupta epoch. Curiously, these figures follow the Mathura idiom in stylistic rendering. The motif of Shrivatsa on the chest, a conspicuous feature of Mathura Jinas, is also noticed in Chausa bronzes. Most figures represent the Tīrthāṅkaras, of whom Rishabhanatha (the first Jina) can be identified by locks of hair falling on the shoulders. They stand in a stiff pose of penance and austerity (*katyotsarga* or *danda*), generally on a pedestal. The size varies from 7.9–18.9 in. (20 to 48 centimeters).

Aesthetically, a *dharmachakra* (12.8 in. [32.5 cm] high) is a unique piece within this group. The sixteen-spoked wheel is encircled by a rim decorated with a band of *nandipada* (taurine) motif. It terminates on the tail of crocodiles that support the female bracket figures (*shalabhanjika*) with their lower jaws. This decorated *dharmachakra* rests on a plain pillar. The Chausa bronzes are housed in the State Museum at Patna.

The Gandhara region. Kushana period or even somewhat earlier bronzes have been recovered from the Gandhara region (now in Pakistan and Afghanistan) as well. These include bold reliefs on caskets from Taxila,

Bimaran, and Shahji-ki-dheri. The figure of Horous Harpocrates from Taxila is an excellent citation of the pre-Kushana era. From the same period came an amorous couple in *repoussé* work. The bronze casting continued for several centuries in the Gandhara region, and some remarkable specimens are on view in the Indian Art Museum of Berlin.

The Gupta Golden Age

The period of a century and half following the disintegration of the mighty Kushana dynasty is shrouded by darkness, and the horizon becomes clear only in the early fourth century when Shrigupta of the Gupta family assumes power of Magadha in A.D. 319. An unbroken chain of success, consolidation of power, expansion of empire, firm administration, peace, religious harmony, and flourishing trade culminated in prosperity and grandeur, and the age of Gupta rule is rightly termed as the golden period or classical age of Indian history. All the components of culture—literature, music, dance, drama, arts, architecture, iconography, coins, garments, and social values—bear the imprint of richness and ascension.

Bronzes fashioned between the late fourth and sixth century narrate the same story of grace and elegance. Even technology was considerably improved, and this is evidenced by the metals used in figures, coins, and especially in the production of the excellent iron pillar installed at Mehrauli (Delhi) by Chandragupta I (r. 320–c. 330). This has not been affected at all by rust, even though it has stood open to the sky for about sixteen hundred years. Produced in any part of India, the bronzes of the Gupta period bespeak a national phenomenon in art creation. We are informed by the travelogues of Chinese pilgrims Fahsien (early 5th century), Hsien Tsang (mid 7th century), and Itsing (late 7th century) that the metal images were kept in the cells of monks at the Nalanda *vihara* (place of learning, stay and worship for Buddhist monks and students) for daily worship.

The noble conventions of art renderings by the great school of Mathura in stone, especially at Sarnath, are also seen amply reflected in the metal sculptures. The youthful, slim and slender body, curly or long hair terminating in curls (*kakapaksha*), light drapery with or without pleats covering the left shoulder (*ekansika sanghati*) or both shoulders (*ubhayansika sanghati*) in case of the Buddha, inexpressive anatomy and masculinity, elongated earlobes and a blissful expression are some of the remarkable features. The harmony of physical beauty and spiritual elevation was the hallmark of Gupta art. It appears that all the endeavors and trends of Indian art reached a stage of fulfillment. The Gupta art innovations were, therefore, practiced, followed, furthered, and imitated in different ways in diverse regions in the following centuries.

Gupta-Vakataka Bronzes

Like the Guptas in northern and eastern India, the Vakatakas in central and western India, from the mid-third to the early sixth century A.D., patronized art, architecture, and painting. With the marriage of Prabhavati Gupta, daughter of Chandragupta II, to the Vakataka prince Rudrasena II, cultural and administrative ties strengthened and expanded. Consequently the art in the Deccan is generally known as Gupta-Vakataka art. The early Guptan bronzes have been discovered from different places, including Phophnar (Madhya Pradesh), Ramtek (Vidarbha, Nagpur, Maharashtra), Akota (near Vadodara, Gujarat), and Buddhapada (Andhra Pradesh). In the main area of the Guptas, northern and eastern India, the important site is Dhanesar Khera (eastern Uttar Pradesh). Some other bronzes from eastern Uttar Pradesh and Bihar are reported, but their exact provenance is unknown.

Phophnar. Seven bronzes were found at Phophnar. All represent the Buddha standing, with the right hand in the *abhaya* (protective) pose and the left hand holding the hem of transparent *sanghati*. The head has full curls of hair with topknot (protuberance). The earlobes are elongated and the eyes are half open, suggesting serenity. Out of seven, two have drapery of *ubbayansika sanghati* (garment covering both the shoulders) and five have drapery of *ekansika* (covering left shoulder) only. The figures have a raised pedestal; one is surmounted by a full-blown lotus and above the head there is a canopy with celestial beings carrying a wreath. Some items display a classical style, while others suggest a folk art touch. The size varies from 10.2–25.4 in. (26 to 64.5 centimeters). The best piece is in the collection of the National Museum of New Delhi. The Brahmi letters on its base resemble the inscriptions of Ajanta.

Eastern Uttar Pradesh. Two Buddha figures from Dhanesar Khera are interesting for their contrasting characteristics. One, now in the Nelson Atkins Museum of Art in Kansas City, Missouri, represents the Buddha standing on a pedestal in *abhaya* (protective pose) with a large nimbus. Some Gandhara influence is discernible in the fabrication. The other, now in the British Museum, London, shows the Buddha seated cross-legged on a multitiered pedestal in a preaching pose. The drapery is smooth and transparent, a feature for which the Sarnath school is known. The facial expression imparts a thoughtful but simple appearance. The inscription on the pedestal records that it was the gift of a Gupta queen. The State Museum of Lucknow exhibits a gold-plated iron head of the Buddha, recovered from Azamgarh, in eastern Uttar Pradesh.

The standing Buddha in *abhaya* pose (27 in. [68.5 cm] high), now in the Asia Society of New York, wears a



Bronze Buddha, 5th or 6th Century. The refined harmony of physical beauty and inner spirituality is the hallmark of all sculpture—whether metal or stone—dating to the heralded Gupta period. NATIONAL MUSEUM / FOTOMEDIA.

garment with schematic folds, following the Mathura tradition. The other Buddha (19.5 in. [49.5 cm] high), in the same collection, wears smooth drapery in the Sarnath fashion. The figures of the Buddha from Nepal, now in the Norton Simon Foundation, Pasadena, California, and the Cleveland Museum, have similar features. The largest statue (7.4 ft. [225 cm] high), now in the collection of the Birmingham Museum and Art Gallery, hails from Sultanganj, Bihar, and belongs to the late Guptan or post-Guptan phase.

The figure of Brahma from Mirpur Khas, Sind (Pakistan), housed in the National Museum of Pakistan, is another superb product of the age. The four-headed deity with matted hair is in the recitation posture. He wears a *dboti* (lower garment) and a deerskin on the left shoulder.

Akota. The bronze figures unearthed in 1951 from Akota, near Vadodara, Gujarat, belong to the Shvetambara sect

of Jainism and are of special interest, as they represent a regional style: Maitraka of the late or post-Guptan phase. In addition to Tīrthāṅkaras, the hoard also includes other figures of the Jain pantheon, like Ambika, Sarasvati, *yakshas*, and *yakshinis*. Mahavira, the twenty-fourth Jina, has been shown as Prince Jivantasvami. The Akota bronzes are dated to the late sixth to the eleventh century A.D. and should not be treated as Guptan period works.

R. C. Sharma

See also **Ajanta; Guptan Period Art; Indus Valley Civilization; Mohenjo-Daro**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Härtel, Herbert. *Excavations at Sonkh*. Berlin: Museum of Indian Art, 1993.
- Khandalavala, K., and Asha Rani Mathur, eds. *Indian Bronze Masterpieces*. New Delhi: Festival of India, 1988.
- Masterpieces from the National Museum Collection*, edited by S. P. Gupta. New Delhi: National Museum, 1985.
- Sivaramamurti, C. *Indian Bronzes*. Bombay: Marg Publications, 1962.

SOUTH INDIAN

The majority of the Tamil bronze sculptures of South India were made to be processional images. Every temple would have a central image that was usually made of stone and was referred to as “immovable” (*achala*). This image would reside in a small dark sanctum in the center of the temple, serving as the conduit through which the divine would manifest themselves to receive the offerings and homage of the devout. As only a small number of people would be privileged by caste to enter the temples and receive the blessings from these images, temples developed yearly ritual cycles in which the deity would manifest in portable bronze images that would be carried out for rituals in different parts of the temple, as well as in processions around the temple and the surrounding city during festivals. Each of these images was fitted onto a pedestal base with either lugs or holes to permit them to be fastened to poles, a cart, or palanquin when they were carried in processions. While individual images were made, there were also processional images made as iconographic groups. These would usually consist of a male deity, his consort, and various attendant figures, depending upon the story being presented.

Persons of stature would have small bronze images of their tutelary deities (*ishtadevata*) in their private residences, which would be worshiped by the head of the family for the well-being and prosperity of the family. These were usually small, a few inches in height, but could be larger depending on the status of the patron.

Development of Style

The earliest Tamil bronze processional images that have been identified were produced by the Pallava dynasty and date from the eighth century A.D., though seventh-century Tamil saints composed songs mentioning processional images. Pallava images are generally smaller than the images produced under the succeeding Chola dynasty, usually no larger than 10 or 12 inches (25–30 cm) in height. Under the Chola dynasty, temples became larger and more elaborate, and the processional images became larger, reaching an optimum size for viewing as they were transported on palanquins and wooden temple carts. The processional images produced under the Chola dynasty range from 2 to 5 feet (.6–1.5 m) high. Tamil metal craftsmen continue to produce processional images for use in religious festivals and ceremonies.

Relatively few Pallava bronze images have survived, and the bronze processional images are generally only 10 or 12 inches in height. Stylistically, they follow the forms of Pallava stone sculpture, but are more fluid and sensual, as the sculptors were able to take advantage of the more malleable medium of wax in fashioning the image before it was cast in bronze. The forms of the garments, jewelry, and sacred thread are often large and clear. As if the sculptors were still learning how to master the new medium, some details like the width of the sacred thread and the garment “tassels” at the waist are much larger and more pronounced than those of the succeeding Chola dynasty. Though there is a sense of grace and ease about many of the figures, they are composed more compactly than their Chola dynasty successors. This is most notable in the images of Shiva as the “Lord of Dance,” Shiva Nataraja. In Pallava examples, the nimbus surrounding the figures rises up in a “keyhole” shape, and the image is fully contained and compressed within it. By the tenth century, when the Shiva Nataraja in the Los Angeles County Museum was cast, the nimbus had opened up more, and Shiva’s arms and legs extend more fully into space. By the eleventh and twelfth centuries, the nimbus had developed into a full circle, and the form of Shiva’s dance determined the space and radius of the nimbus, rather than the nimbus constraining the form of Shiva’s dance.

Only recently has there been a serious attempt to define regional styles within Chola sculpture. Art historian Vidya Dehejia has proposed four main regional groups: Chola Nadu, Pondai Nadu, Kongu Nadu, and Pandi Nadu. Chola Nadu is the region around Tanjavor, the Chola heartland. In this style, the faces are oval, and the shoulders gently and sensuously slope into long slender arms and legs. The figures convey a sense of serene, dignified majesty. The Shiva Nataraja mentioned above exemplifies these characteristics. The



Ardhanarishvara, Chola Bronze Sculpture. Chola bronze sculpture of Ardhanarishvara (form of Shiva that is half-male, half-female), from ninth- or tenth-century South India. Western scholars and collectors alike continue to respond to the naturalistic modeling of Chola bronzes, their deft merging of the sensuous and the sacred. NATIONAL MUSEUM / FOTOMEDIA.

Pondai Nadu style is centered on the region around Madras and north of the Kaveri River basin. These figures are generally more angular and less sensuous than those of the Chola Nadu region. Kongu Nadu is the western region centered around Coimbatore. Images from this region display different bodily proportions than those of Tamil Nadu. Their faces tend to be rounder, and their shoulders are very wide and almost parallel to the ground. Their appearance is not as refined or as elegant as the Chola Nadu images. Pandi Nadu is the region around Madurai. Images made there tend to have bodily contours similar to those from Kongu Nadu, but their proportions are more elongated, like those from Chola Nadu.

As the Chola period progressed, there was a tendency for the images in all regions to become more and more stylized, and more conservative in their forms. Generally, the noses tend to become more pointed and sharp. Crowns become more standardized and less ornate.

Process of Manufacture

In order for an image to be a suitable vehicle for a deity to manifest within, it needed to be made according to precise iconographic requirements and exact, prescribed measurements. These requirements are described in minute detail in the class of texts known as *Silpasastras*. By the Chola period, these same texts also forbade the making of hollow images. They warned that an artist who tried to reduce costs in making an image would bring misfortune not only upon himself, but also upon the entire kingdom.

In Tamil Nadu, more than any other part of India, metal images were made out of a special alloy of five metals (gold, silver, copper, lead, and iron) called *panchaloha*. This alloy polishes to a bright, warm golden surface and resists tarnishing. While prized for its bright lustrous surface by priests, when the images were buried in the ground, the surface often corroded into a deep green patina that is now greatly valued by Western museums and collectors.

Tamil artists have traditionally cast processional images using the lost wax method. Following the precise proportions prescribed in the *Silpasastra* texts, a sculptor would form a torso, arms, and legs from wax. Molding them individually and then joining them together, the sculptor would then add wax to create the image's garments and jewelry. Heating the wax as necessary to keep it workable, the sculptor would raise and incise as many of the final details as possible on the wax core. Tubular struts of wax would then be added to the figure to serve as channels through which the wax and gases could escape and the molten metal enter the mold. The completed figure in wax would then be coated, first with a very fine textured clay, and then with successive layers of fine clay, until it was totally encapsulated. After the clay had dried, the mold would be heated over a fire so that the wax would first melt and then be burned out, leaving a negative space into which the molten *panchaloha* alloy would next be poured. When the pouring was complete, the clay mold would be submerged in water and broken away from the new image. Throughout the Chola dynasty, the wax images were so finely modeled and cast that the only finishing work required was to saw away the struts and to polish the surface of the image. At some point after the fall of the Chola dynasty, the finer details were no longer cast, but were chiseled into the surface of the image after casting.

Worship

During the reign of Rajaraja Chola (r. 985–1016) and his son Rajendra Chola (r. 1016–1044), there was both an elaboration of the rituals surrounding bronze processional images and a dramatic increase in their production. The inscriptions of Rajaraja Chola on the pillars and walls of his Bridesvara temple at Tanjavur document not only the commissioning of bronze processional images, but also the gifts of gold jewelry and silks to adorn the images, and ritual lamps and objects to be used in their worship. Even before the reign of Rajaraja Chola, inscriptions show that when they were employed as a host for a deity during a ritual, processional images were fully robed, garlanded in flowers, adorned with precious jewelry, and shaded from the sun with parasols with all the honor, pomp, and ceremony possible. Processional images would never be displayed unadorned; only their hands, faces, and feet would be visible. During the Chola period, thin plates of silver or silver gilt with gold (*kavachas*) were fashioned and affixed to cover not only the hands and feet of processional figures, but also the central images in temples. Very often it is possible to see only the face of an image carried in a procession or otherwise under worship. Ritual bathing of processional images also assumed a new prominence under the Cholas. Special bathing pedestals, often very elaborate, were created, upon which the images could be bathed with a series of substances: perfumed water, sandalwood paste, milk, and honey. As the images' faces would receive special cleaning, lustration, and anointing every day, the delicate lines delineating the eyes would often wear down. As perfect eyes were required to make the image suitable for worship, the eyes would be recut as needed. The eyes of images that have been under continual worship have often had their eyes recut many times. Many images that were buried in the face of invasions, which have now been placed in museum collections, also have had their eyes recut in the distant past, after generations of use.

John Listopad

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Barret, Douglas. *Early Chola Bronzes*. Bombay: Bhulabhai Memorial Institute, 1965.
- Davis, Richard H. "Chola Bronzes in Procession." In *The Sensuous and the Sacred: Chola Bronzes from South India*, edited by Vidya Dehejia. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002.
- Dehejia, Vidya. *Art of the Imperial Cholas. The Polsky Lectures in Indian Art and Southeast Asian Art and Archaeology*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1990.
- Dehejia, Vidya, ed. *The Sensuous and the Sacred: Chola Bronzes from South India*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002.
- Gangoly, O. C. *South Indian Bronzes: A Historical Survey of South Indian Sculpture with Iconographical Notes Based on*


Original Sources. 2nd ed. Calcutta: Nababharat Publishers, 1973.

- Gravelly, F. H., and T. N. Ramachandran. *Catalogue of the South Indian Hindu Metal Images in the Madras Government Museum. Bulletin of the Madras Government Museum*, new series, vol. 1, pt. 2. Madras: Government Press, 1932.
- Hultzsch, E., Rai Bahadur V. Venkayya, and Rao Sahib H. Krishna Sastri. *South Indian Inscriptions*, vol. II: *Tamil Inscriptions in the Rajarajesvara Temple at Tanjavur and Other Miscellaneous Records of the Chola, Pallava, Pandya, and Vijayanagar Dynasties*. Archaeological Series of India, New Imperial Series, vol. X, pts. 1–5. Madras: Government Press, 1892–1916.
- Nagaswamy, R. "On Dating South Indian Bronzes." In *Indian Art and Connoisseurship: Essays in Honour of Douglas Barrett*, edited by John Guy. Ahmedabad: Mapin Publishing, 1965.
- . *Masterpieces of Early South Indian Bronzes*. New Delhi: National Museum, 1983.
- Sivaramurti, C. *South Indian Bronzes*. Bombay: Lalit Kala Akademi, 1963.

BUDDHA, LIFE OF THE The historical Buddha's life is recorded in numerous texts, depicted in art, and told orally in stories. There is no one narrative, as the stories vary with time and place—with the types of Buddhism, the local languages, and the cultural traditions. Nevertheless, the overall sequence of events and their significance to the Buddha's understanding and ultimate insight are shared by the various versions of the story. There is no way for us to know to what extent these narratives might actually or historically reflect the life of Shakyamuni (Siddhartha Gautama). Even the dates of Shakyamuni's life are not known for sure, with current scholarship placing his death later than many traditional dates (generally c. 563–483 B.C.), perhaps to around 400 B.C. The earliest evidence we have of his life narrative is some three hundred years later, in the relief carvings on the stone fence at Bharhut in northern India, dating to around 100 B.C. It is assumed that various oral versions of his life were circulating at about this date, but the span of three centuries between his death and our earliest evidence makes any assumptions of historical accuracy impossible. This is not to say that the Buddha's historical existence is in doubt, only that the details of his life cannot be historically reconstructed.

Key Events

Most versions of the story of the Buddha's life share these key events: his conception, birth, youth, palace life, departure, asceticism, enlightenment, teaching, and death. In addition, there are a number of miraculous events that became of singular importance and were told and depicted over and over. Each key life event is briefly outlined below, followed by descriptions of two of the more important miracles.



Life Scenes of the Buddha, Stone, 5th Century. At a park in Sarnath, he delivered (around this same time) his first sermon: It set the “wheel of law” in motion. NATIONAL MUSEUM / FOTOMEDIA.

Conception. The Buddha’s mother, Maya, had a dream that a white elephant descended from the sky and entered her womb, conceiving the future Buddha. The metaphor is to the white elephant as the monsoon rain cloud that brings the rain, the male element that fertilizes the female earth.

Birth. The pregnant Maya was on her way to her parental home to give birth when she was overcome by contractions and stopped in a garden at Lumbini. The baby Buddha was born out of Maya’s side while she was standing and holding onto a tree branch. Maya’s unusual posture derives from that of women who performed rituals in spring to bring trees into blossom, and to the worship of female deities (*yakshis*) who were depicted performing the same ritual.

Youth and palace life. The Buddha grew up as the son of a local king, and was given an elite education in preparation for his becoming a ruler. After the Buddha’s birth, he had been taken by his parents to a soothsayer, who read certain unusual signs on his body to say that he would either be a great secular ruler or a great religious teacher. His parents, concerned that he choose the secular life of kingship, built for him a pleasure palace in which he lived separated from all of life’s pain and unhappiness. The gods conspired, however, to show Shakyamuni four sightings that greatly troubled him: a sick man, an old man, a dead man, and an ascetic who had abandoned the householder’s life, and who displayed a gentle beatific countenance. The Buddha thus began to think about leaving the pleasure palace.

Departure. In most versions of the Buddha’s life, he is married, but also has a large harem when living in the palace. Having begun to think about renouncing his secular life, the Buddha wakes one night and looks around his bedroom, where he is surrounded by sleeping women, lying in awkward postures, their heads thrown back, snoring, with spittle dribbling from their open mouths. He realizes one of the most important Buddhist insights: that everything changes. That which is at first fresh and beautiful will inevitably fade and become old, decrepit, and ugly. What we see as attractive and a source of desire is only the surface, which covers what is in reality all that is corruptible and decaying. Shakyamuni calls for his horse and groom. He leaves his wife and sleeping courtesans, and rides his horse out of the palace. Distant from the palace, he dismounts, removes his kingly ornaments and clothing, cuts off his topknot of hair, and dons the clothes of an ascetic.

Asceticism. The Buddha spent six years performing intense ascetic practices and studying with several different teachers. He accomplished each of the goals, at one point reducing himself to a mere skeleton by living on a few dried beans and a sip of water a day, but he then realizes that extreme asceticism cannot bring him to spiritual enlightenment. It is this understanding that leads him to advocate the middle way—that is, neither the indulging of the senses (as in his palace life) nor withdrawing from them (as in his life as an ascetic) will lead to enlightenment.

Enlightenment. Abandoning radical asceticism, there is a long and involved cycle of events that eventually leads to Shakyamuni’s enlightenment. He sits under a tree, the *pipul* or *bodhi* tree, and vows not to move until he reaches enlightenment. At the break of dawn, insight is accomplished, and Shakyamuni becomes a buddha (the enlightened one). This core event of the enlightenment story is preceded and followed by many other episodes, such as

the attack of the king of Karma, Mara, and his army as the Buddha sat below the tree, that are popular in both textual and artistic depictions.

Teaching. After he attained enlightenment, the Buddha was unsure whether to stay on Earth and teach his insights or to go immediately into Nirvāṇa. He decides to find pupils and teach them the newly understood Law (*dharma*), and he walks from the site of enlightenment (Bodh Gayā) to Sarnath, where some ascetics with whom he had spent time were residing in the Deer Park. When he arrives, he teaches them the Law, thus forming the first brotherhood of monks (*sangha*). The Buddha spent the next forty years traveling through northern India, converting monks and teaching laypeople.

Death. The Buddha decided to die in a small village (Kushinagara) at about the age of eighty. After his body is cremated, his bodily relics from the cremation are divided into eight portions and given to different groups of people, who then use them to worship the now absent Buddha. Relics were venerated in several ways, among them placement in reliquaries and in relic mounds (called stupas). Relic worship is of the greatest importance in Buddhism.

Miraculous events. Interspersed throughout the Buddha's life, but particularly during the forty-year period of teaching, are miraculous events, some of which became extremely popular. Once, while walking on a city street with a group of monks, the Buddha's cousin Devadatta, who in the life stories is frequently depicted as at odds with the Buddha, released a large male elephant named Nalagiri who was in must (and thus "mad" and dangerous). The elephant thundered down the street, terrifying the people. The Buddha merely raised his hand and spoke some words of his Law, at which the elephant knelt at his feet. This story underlines that the Buddha's Law is intended for all sentient beings, including animals. A second popular miraculous event took place at Saravastī, where the Buddha performed a series of miracles in a battle of magic with a rival band of ascetics. Included at Saravastī were the Buddha's instant creation of a mango tree from a seed, and the display of rising into the sky with fire springing from his shoulders and water from his feet. This Buddha is frequently shown performing miracles in order to convert people and to defeat rival teachers.

Robert L. Brown

See also **Buddhism in Ancient India**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Brewster, E. H. *The Life of Gotama the Buddha, Compiled Exclusively from the Pali Canon*. Varanasi: Bhartiya, 1975.
Foucher, A. *The Life of the Buddha, according to the Ancient Texts and Monuments of India*. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1972.

Karetsky, Patricia Eichenbaum. *The Life of the Buddha: Ancient Scriptural and Pictorial Traditions*. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1992.

Khosla, Sarla. *Lalitavistara and the Evolution of the Buddha Legend*. New Delhi: Galaxy Publications, 1991.


BUDDHISM IN ANCIENT INDIA Buddhists believe in "three jewels": the Buddha, or the Enlightened One; Dharma, or doctrine combining both truth and law; and Sangha, the order of monks and nuns. Buddhism traces its origins to a historical founder, Siddhartha Gautama Buddha, who preached in the middle of the first millennium B.C., between 550 and 450 B.C., though the precise dates are far from clear. Born a prince in the community of the Sakyas, he left his life of opulence and luxury. Having seen an old man, a sick man, and a corpse, Siddhartha was awakened to the fragile nature of life and worldly pleasures, and he went forth from the palace, leaving behind his beautiful wife and son, in search of a solution to human suffering. After many trials and tribulations, he attained enlightenment at the age of thirty-five. Urged by the gods, he decided to preach the Dharma and chose his five erstwhile companions as his first disciples.

The Buddha's first sermon, delivered in the Deer Park of Sarnath, just outside Varanasi, is known as *dharmacakra-pravartana*, or "setting the Wheel of Law in motion," and the Buddha is often depicted in sculptures as touching a wheel to indicate this event. His message brought him several rich disciples, and he spent his life preaching for over forty years in the urban environment of the middle Ganga valley. An analysis of two collections of religious poems, the *Theragāthā* and *Therīgāthā*, attributed to monks and nuns, respectively, provides data on Buddhism's early patrons. This survey of the biographies of over three hundred monks and nuns reveals that two-thirds of them came from large towns; of these, 86 percent were from just four cities. These early converts belonged to rich and powerful families, and at least 40 percent of them were Brahmins. The Buddha died at the age of eighty, and after cremation his ashes were divided among his followers, who built stupas over the relics.

Some historians regard the Buddha as a social reformer, but it is evident from his teachings that his emphasis was on reforming the individual rather than the world, since he viewed life in the world as suffering, or *dukkha*. To regard him as a socialist who fought against inequality would therefore be a serious anachronism.

The Buddha and His Teachings

The central doctrine of the Buddha came as a response to the teachings of the Upanishads, notably the Brhadāranyaka, in which one of the central issues of



Buddhahead Stone, 5th Century, Buddha enlightens his followers, as depicted in this fifth-century stone carving. Also excavated at Sarnath, an ancient site still revered by religious pilgrims. NATIONAL MUSEUM / FOTOMEDIA.

debate and discussion was the notion of karma, or *kamma*. In the Upanishadic teachings, man is reborn according to the quality of his “works” (*karman*; “works” refer here to ritual prescriptions). Buddha redefined “action” as “intention” and thus, by turning Brahman ideology upside down, ethicized the universe. In the Amagandha text of the Sutta Nipāta, the Buddha argued that defilement comes not from eating this or that, prepared and given by this or that person, but from evil deeds, words, and thoughts.

There were several tenets of karma in existence at the time of the Buddha, though we know very little about them. The only data that we have on the concept of karma are that of the Jains. In contrast to the Hindu concept of ritual act, the Jains also held that karma had an ethical value. For the Jains, however, karma was not either good or bad; it was essentially bad. They conceptualized karma as a kind of dust or dirt, and they argued that for attaining liberation, one had to expunge all karma from the soul. The

transfer of good karma, or merit, was known to Hindu thought and occurs in the Sanskrit epic the Mahābhārata. In Buddhism, however, the concept of karma became a crucial turning point, transforming Buddhism into a religion in which one could be saved by others.

The basic tenet of early Buddhist teachings was the emphasis on “the Middle Way”; this principle, located between indulgence and asceticism, molded the Buddhist approach to life. After enunciating the Middle Way, the Buddha revealed the four Noble Truths that he had realized. These included the awareness that life is unsatisfactory and that *dukkha*, or suffering, arises from desire or want. Suffering can, however, be overcome by following the eightfold path stressed by the Buddha, which helps eradicate desire.

Though the Buddha himself had shown the path of homelessness, Buddhist monks and nuns were enjoined to stay in one place during the three months of the rainy season, and monastic living soon became the norm. This congregation of monks and nuns and the demands of community living required that rules be framed regarding the permitted size and location of monastic buildings. A complex organization evolved to appoint officials to assign rooms, look after stores, and organize the acceptance of meals from the laity. Most important, the Buddha is credited with framing an elaborate set of rules of monastic discipline that governed not only life within the monastic complexes, but also the personal conduct, behavior, and decorum of monks and nuns in public.

Ashoka and the Institution of Buddhist Sacred Geography

Literary references record that within the lifetime of the Buddha as many as twenty-nine sites and buildings had been donated to him: 18 in Rajagaha, 4 in Vaisali, 3 in Kosala, and 4 in Kosambi. Further support for the early association of some of the sites with the life of the Buddha comes from one of the earliest Buddhist texts, the Mahāparinibbāna Sutta (V. 16–22), which mentions four places to be visited and revered. These include: the Buddha’s birthplace (identified with Lumbini); the place where he attained enlightenment (Bodhi Gayā); the site of his first sermon (Sarnath); and the place where he passed away (Kushinagara). The textual references, however, do not match the archaeological data, since a majority of the structures associated with early Buddhism are shrines, which date from the Mauryan period onward; perhaps the only example of a pre-Mauryan stupa is the one from Vaisali.

One of the long-debated topics in Indian history is whether the Mauryan emperor Ashoka himself was a Buddhist, or whether his policies were rooted in the

Hindu tradition, or whether he instead propagated a nonsectarian ethical concept, set within an imperial framework. Some scholars have suggested that it may be useful to view the rock inscriptions of his reign not as historical facts, but as pieces of political propaganda. The major indicators of Ashoka's ideas are the inscriptions or *dharmmalipi*, dated between his eighth and twenty-seventh regnal year, corresponding approximately to 264–245 B.C. A majority of these are written in Brahmi script in the eastern or western (Gandhari) dialects of Prakrit, the exceptions being the northwestern edicts in Kharosthi and those in Greek and Aramaic. The inscriptions may be classified as rock edicts (major and minor), cave inscriptions, and pillar edicts (major and minor). Major pillar edicts have been found at six sites, mainly in central India, while minor pillar edicts were usually situated at Buddhist pilgrimage sites such as Sarnath, Sanchi, Lumbini, and Nigalisagar. Fourteen major rock edicts have been found in peripheral areas including Girnar, while minor rock edicts have been discovered at seven sites in central and southern India. It is generally accepted that Ashoka's minor rock edicts were issued earlier than his fourteen major rock edicts and that the pillar edicts were the last to be promulgated. This then makes the inscriptions of Ashoka in peninsular India the earliest inscribed by the king, thus making them particularly significant for a study of the *dharmma* of Ashoka.

As compared to the diversity of records in the north, a majority of the inscriptions from peninsular India are the minor rock edicts. The homogeneity is particularly noticeable in the cluster in Karnataka, though there are exceptions elsewhere in the Deccan. In his minor rock edicts, Ashoka refers to himself as a Buddhist lay follower, or *upāsaka*, and expresses his desire that Buddhism percolate down to the lowest level to include elephant trainers, charioteers, teachers, and scribes. It would seem that the southern versions all belong to a single recension, which was issued for engraving extensively on the hills at one specific time, as indicated by the reference to 256 nights. The *dharmma* of these records is largely ethical, with injunctions to obey mother and father, obey teachers, have mercy on living beings, speak the truth, and propagate the *dharmma*.

This stress on ethical and moral values in the minor rock edicts of Ashoka is in keeping with Buddhist teachings to the laity. The canonical Nikāya literature makes a concerted attempt to inculcate a sense of moral and ethical values among the laity, based on Buddhist ethics and loyalty to the Triratna (three jewels), that is, the Buddha, Dharma, and Sangha. Discourses contained in the Brahmajāla Sutta and the Samannaphala Sutta of the Dīgha Nikāya emphasize the importance of adhering to the five *śīlas*, or moral values, and stress that the lay devotee

should concentrate on religious talks on the fortnightly *uposatha* days.

Though the Buddhist canon was written down in Sri Lanka around 100 B.C., it is generally accepted that major portions of the Sutta and Vinaya Pitakas belong to the pre-Ashokan period. The Bhabhra edict of Ashoka provides evidence for this in that it refers to specific passages for study by monks and nuns. Four of the passages have been identified as forming part of the first four Nikāyas.

The involvement of Ashoka with the *dharmma* was by no means limited to propagation of an ethical way of life, as is evident from his records. Minor Rock Edict III was addressed to the Sangha and the laity, and it contains an unequivocal expression of the emperor's respect and faith in the "three jewels." In the Bairat rock edict, Ashoka recommends the study of seven texts of the Buddhist canon (*dharmmapaliyāni*) as a way of ensuring that the *dharmma* would last forever. Rock Edict VIII dates his pilgrimage (*dharmayātrā*) to Sambodhi, or Bodh Gayā, ten years after his coronation. Minor pillar inscriptions at Allahabad, Sarnath, and Sanchi (Minor Pillar Edict III), generally referred to as schism edicts, warn monks and nuns against creating schisms in the Sangha. In his edicts Ashoka praises ceremonies performed for religious purposes (*mahā-[pha]le [e] dhamma-mangale*), but decries those performed on the occasion of births, illnesses, and weddings (Major Rock Edict IX). At Bodh Gayā the installation of a polished sandstone throne (*vajrāsana*) in a shrine at the foot of the *bodhi* tree is attributed to Ashoka.

Archaeology of Buddhist Sites in South Asia

In contrast to the scattered shrines of the Mauryan period, large interconnected monastic complexes emerged in the post-Ashokan period. Sanchi and its neighboring sites, including Sonari, Satdhara, Bhojpur, and Andher, provide a good example of this development. A study of the inscriptions on relics and reliquaries shows that these locales were all linked to the person of Gotiputa and formed a tightly knit community that owed allegiance to the Hemavata School. Archaeological surveys conducted in Raisen and Vidisha districts led to the recovery of 120 settlements and 35 previously unrecorded sites and an impressive database incorporating finds of 15 embankments within about 154 sq. mi. (400 square kilometers) around Sanchi. It is suggested that the extensive water system around Sanchi may have been associated with irrigation and rice cultivation, rather than domestic supply.

Perhaps the transformation was nowhere as fundamental as in the western Deccan in the second and first centuries B.C., just prior to the rise of the Satavahana dynasty. In the western Deccan, more than eighty sites

have been recorded, with 1,200 rock-cut monastic centers. While the average number of excavations at a majority of these sites varies from twelve to fifteen, the largest concentrations of more than a hundred are at Kanheri and Junnar. Junnar lies on the Kukdi River, in a cup-shaped valley surrounded by hills, 56 mi. (90 kilometers) northwest of Pune; Kanheri, near Bombay (Mumbai) on the west coast, is located in the fertile basin of the Ulhas River. This divergence in location is also reflected in the nature of donations. Inscriptions at Junnar record the grant of land to the monastic establishment in the nearby villages, and archaeological exploration has led to the recovery of several settlements in the vicinity. Inscriptions at Kanheri recording donations were placed on the side wall of the courtyard and refer to gifts of money by traders, financiers, goldsmiths, blacksmiths, physicians, housewives, stone polishers, and others. Visitors included residents from neighboring coastal settlements such as Sopara, Kalyan, and Chaul, as well as inhabitants of inland centers such as Nasik.

In the eastern Deccan, rock-cut excavations are few, and structural monuments dominate, with concentrations in coastal Andhra and Telengana. Unlike the monuments of the western Deccan, there is no evidence of paintings in Andhra. The Andhra stupas, on the other hand, have yielded a rich treasure of relic caskets in a variety of materials. Another characteristic feature of the Andhra monuments, perhaps in keeping with their status as centers of pilgrimage, is the presence of congregation halls. It is significant that few urban centers have been identified in coastal Andhra, and pilgrimage may have provided an alternative strategy for the mobilization of resources.

Archaeological excavations unearthed a hall measuring 253 sq. ft. (23.5 square meters), with sixty-four pillars, at Thotlakonda on the north Andhra coast. To the southeast of the stupa was a kitchen complex, comprising four rectangular halls of varying dimensions. Three of these may have been used as storerooms, while the fourth was perhaps a refectory. About 2 mi. (3 kilometers) from Thotlakonda lies the site of Bavikonda, where twenty-six structural units have been identified, including stupas, *caitya-grhas* (stupa or place of worship), an *uposathagāra* (hall in a monastery used for ordination ceremonies, measuring 307 sq. ft., or 28.5 square meters), *viharas* (Buddhist monastic residences), and kitchen-cum-store complexes. Two other sites that have provided evidence for the presence of assembly halls are the sites of Ramatirtham, located 43 mi. (70 kilometers) from Visakhapatnam, and Salihundam, near Srikakulam.

An equally impressive series of Buddhist sites is located along the transpeninsular route connecting the lower Krishna valley via Nelakondapalle, Kondapur, and

Dhulikatta to Ter and Paithan. The village of Dhulikatta is located 6 mi. (10 kilometers) west of Peddabankur and is marked by a habitation site 44 acres (18 hectares) in extent. About .6 mi. (1 kilometer) to its north lies a stupa constructed of large-sized bricks decorated with carved limestone slabs. Archaeological excavations at Nelakondapalle in Khamam district of Andhra Pradesh have brought to light an extensive Buddhist site of the fourth to fifth centuries A.D. comprising *viharas*, a *mahacaitya* (great stupa or place of worship), brick-built water troughs, votive stupas, and a profusion of imagery. A large number of Visnukundin coins were found from the site, as were standing images of the Buddha in limestone and bronze.

Nor are these examples limited to India. Inscriptions from Sri Lanka indicate that as early as the second century B.C., land and irrigation works were transferred to the Sangha. In some cases, arrangements for irrigation were also made along with the transfer of land, but in other cases the monastery enjoyed privileged access to irrigation facilities. Fiscal rights and administrative and judicial authority that the king had traditionally enjoyed were transferred to the monastic authorities. The autonomy that these religious institutions enjoyed changed the nature of interaction between them and the lay community.

How does one explain the discrepancy between monastic rules, which disallowed the practice of agriculture by monks, and the presence of clearly identified structures used for agrarian purposes in the vicinity of monastic sites? The dichotomy between theory and practice was easily resolved by employing several laypeople for undertaking and supervising various jobs in the monasteries. In addition, some of them were placed in charge of irrigation reservoirs that belonged to the monasteries to collect the water dues. While this may have resolved functional issues, the philosophic and doctrinal aspects of this change still needed to be addressed and internalized.

From the fifth century A.D. onward, an interesting development in architecture, epigraphy, and literary texts was the unambiguous notion that the Buddha himself was the legal head of the monastery and that donations to monasteries were conceived as gifts to the Master. The language used in the inscriptions suggests the personal presence and permanent residence of the Buddha in Indian monasteries, further corroborated by changes in plans indicating that specific accommodations for the Master was being provided in the monastic sites. For example, while in the early monasteries there was separation between the residence of the monks and the shrine, the later monasteries combined the two. These changes correspond with another development: abstract theories

regarding the person of the Buddha were beginning to take definitive shape. This development provides an interesting example of the intertwining of diverse strands that were associated with functions as varied as agrarian expansion and management and abstruse philosophical discussions.

Buddhism in Sri Lanka

Nowhere, however, does the legacy of Ashoka survive as strongly as in the Buddhist literary tradition, both from North India as well as from Sri Lanka. As with today's historians, there was no unanimity in the past regarding the contribution of Ashoka, and divergent views emerged. One is the Pali version of the legend of Ashoka, preserved in the Sri Lankan Chronicles; the second is the North Indian version, known from Sanskrit and Chinese sources. Few of the missionary activities of Ashoka find mention in the North Indian tradition as preserved in the Sanskrit Avadānas. Instead, these focus on Ashoka's relationship with the Buddhist monk Upagupta, who accompanied him on his pilgrimage to the different sites associated with the life of the Buddha. The Ashokāvadāna is known to have been compiled in the second century A.D. in the Buddhist milieu of north-west India. In the Ashokāvadāna, Ashoka is said to be physically ugly, to have a rough skin, and to have been disliked by his father and the women of his harem. The overall perspective on Ashoka's kingship remains ambiguous. The Theravadin tradition associates the dispatch of missions to the different regions not with Ashoka, but with Tissa Moggaliputta. This is further supported by the finds of relic caskets from Vidisa (Bhilsa), on which have been inscribed names of three of the monks whom the Chronicles credit with missions to the Himalayan region. There is, however, no unanimity among scholars on this point.

In his Major Rock Edict XIII, Ashoka refers to Sri Lanka as one of the countries that received the *dharma*. This mission of propagation and conversion could only have been possible through monks and nuns, since establishment of the local Sangha, with its traditions and ecclesiastical rites, was outside the scope of a ruler. The inscriptions from Nagarjunakonda provide a somewhat different perspective, and the monks from Sri Lanka are credited with the expansion of Buddhism to various regions, including Kashmir, Gandhara, Cina, Kirata, Aparanta, and Vanga. A Sihala-vihara (Sri Lankan monastic residence) is mentioned at the site, presumably for the residence of monks from the island.

The importance of the clergy in the establishment of the local Sangha is evident in the earliest Pali Chronicle of Sri Lanka, the Mahāvamsa (XV, 181) dated to the late fourth or early fifth century A.D. The Mahāvamsa traces

the history of the island from the advent of Vijaya in 483 B.C. Its authorship is attributed to a Buddhist monk, Mahanama, who wrote under the patronage of a Sri Lankan king. The Buddha himself is said to have traveled to the island, and the Chronicle presents detailed accounts of the three visits. Ashoka's concept of Dharma-vijaya is restated in the Chronicle, leading to a symbiosis between the monarch and the Sangha. There are references to Devanampiyatissa (r. 250–210 B.C.) being re-consecrated by envoys of Ashoka, thus marking an integration of the concepts of the universal monarch (*cakkavatti*) and the great man (*mahāpurisa*, the Buddha himself).

This is a model that is known to have been emulated by several sovereigns in Sri Lanka, the most prominent being Dutthagamini (r. 101–77 B.C.). In Burma, kings constantly invoked Ashoka's example, and the Khmer ruler Jayavarman VII (r. 1181–1215) saw himself as the living Buddha. In the Chronicles, the emphasis is on the purification of the Sangha by Ashoka and the dispatch of Buddhist missionaries not only to different parts of the subcontinent, but also to Suvarnabhumi, or Southeast Asia.

Despite the emulation discussed above, the nearly 1,300 inscriptions from Sri Lanka, incised just below the drip ledge of slightly enlarged natural caves donated to Buddhist monks, present a marked contrast to the Ashokan records. The early Brahmi script used for the inscriptions in the oldest Sinhalese language is the same as that used for the Ashokan edicts. Though there is uniformity in script, there is a marked difference in the language and contents of the inscriptions, and there are no parallels to Ashoka's *dharmmalipi*. Instead, the inscriptions of Ashoka's contemporaries on the island, Devanampiya Tissa and his successor king, Uttiya, record gifts of caves to the Sangha and incorporate the stereotyped formula of dedication to the Buddhist monks. The formula reads: *āgata anāgata catudisa sagasa* (of the Sangha of the four quarters, present and not present).

Expansion across the Bay of Bengal

It is crucial to emphasize that the communities that traveled across the Indian Ocean were diverse, including sailors, traders, craftsmen, pilgrims, religious clergy, adventurers, minstrels, and others. The epigraphic record indicates the presence of several Indic languages in Southeast Asia, from the early inscriptions in Prakrit and Sanskrit on carnelian seals, dated to the first and second centuries A.D., to Pali inscriptions from the sixth and seventh centuries A.D. A Tamil inscription of the third or fourth century was identified on a small flat rectangular stone, reading *perumpatan kal* (this is the touchstone of Perumpatan), in the collection of Wat Khlong Thom in south Thailand. The scripts used also varied from

Brahmi and Tamil-Brahmi to Kharosthi. Given this wide range, it would be simplistic to expect neat categories in terms of language, caste, or religious affiliations, though in the past many of these categories have been subsumed under the blanket term of “Indianization.”

The archaeological data also provide a counterposition to this theory, as it is apparent that several competing centers, based on rice agriculture, bronze and iron production, developed in the major river valleys of mainland Southeast Asia dating between 2000 and 200 B.C. It is significant that several aspects of the material culture present similarity across the Irrawaddy, Chao Phraya, and Mekong river valleys. This uniformity is paralleled by the use of artifacts obtained from India and China, and it is through these trade networks that religious ideas and beliefs spread and were adopted, and adapted, by the large polities that evolved in the river valleys. Three large political entities dominated mainland Southeast Asia: the Pyu in the Irrawaddy valley, the Dvaravati in the Chao Phraya, and the Oc Eo culture in the Mekong. A common thread that united them was the belief in Buddhism, as evidenced by the statuary and religious architecture.

A cluster of fifth-century inscriptions of unequivocal Buddhist affiliation was found in Kedah on the west coast of the Malay Peninsula. Three of these inscriptions are made of local stone and bear similar illustrations of Buddhist stupas. Texts very similar to these inscriptions have been found on the island of Borneo and on the coast of Brunei. The most interesting of these inscriptions in Sanskrit is that of Buddhagupta, which refers to the setting up of the stone by the mariner Buddhagupta, resident of Raktamrttika, on the successful completion of his voyage.

The Sarvastivadins are one of the sects of Buddhism known to have developed missionary activity outside India, and one of the missionaries who stayed for many years in Indonesia, as described in the Chinese sources, was Gunavarman (A.D. 367–431). About one and a half centuries after Gunavarman’s visit, the Chinese monk Yijing confirmed that the Sarvastivada school was flourishing in the lands of the South Sea.

This missionary activity was paralleled by pilgrimage to sites associated with the life of the Buddha not only within South Asia, but also by groups from across the Bay of Bengal. One of the monuments that holds an important position in the context of pilgrimage is that of Borobudur. On the basis of the paleography of the fragmentary inscriptions covering the base, the monument has been dated to the late eighth or ninth century A.D. The monument is elaborately carved, with 1,460 sculpted panels, a majority of these depicting scenes from the life of the Buddha. Not only did Borobudur spread the message of acquisition of knowledge and merit, it also became the

center of pilgrimage itself. In the ninth century, central Java had acquired a reputation for being a treasure house of sacred learning, as evident from an inscription from Champa. An indication of the importance of the site of Borobudur for pilgrimage is provided by the finds of more than 2,000 unbaked clay votive stupas and 252 clay tablets to the southwest of the Borobudur hill.

Religious communication continued across the Bay of Bengal, as is evident from gifts of Sanskrit Mahayana and Tantric texts from Bengal to monasteries in Myanmar as late as the fifteenth century. This raises the final question: did Buddhism decline in South Asia in the seventh century, as argued by Marxist historians, or was it reinvented and appropriated?

Transformation or Decline?

In the past, scholars have often suggested a phased development of Buddhism from the early Hinayana form to Mahayana and Vajrayana, but it is increasingly evident that these three vehicles shared more than is usually assumed. For example, even as late as the seventh century, followers of Hinayana and Mahayana lived together in monasteries and maintained the same monastic vows. It is also apparent that, despite the Buddha’s incorporation into the Hindu pantheon as an incarnation of Vishnu, Buddhist monastic centres continued to maintain a separate identity.

The data from inscriptions and textual sources indicate the continuation of several monastic centers well into the thirteenth century, such as the monastic settlement at Ratnagiri in Orissa and those at Nalanda and Bodh Gayā in Bihar. In addition, there is evidence for the repair and renovation of several other Buddhist sites in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The Gadalaeniya rock inscription from Sri Lanka, dated to 1344, records the restoration of a two-story image house at Dhanyakataka, identified with Amaravati in Andhra, by a monk named Dharmakirti. Another contemporary of Dharmakirti, the minister Sena Lankadhikara, is said to have dispatched men and money to the site of Kanci in Tamil Nadu to establish a Buddhist shrine in that city. No Buddhist monuments have survived at Kanchipuram, though several images dated between the seventh and fourteenth centuries have been discovered in and around the city. However, the time gap between the fifteenth century and the nineteenth, when a revival of Buddhist learning was spearheaded by European, Sri Lankan, and Indian scholars, has yet to be bridged. In 1956 Buddhism entered its latest Navayana phase, when B. R. Ambedkar administered Buddhist vows to the low caste masses in their quest for a new world order.

Himanshu Prabha Ray

See also Ambedkar, B. R., and the Buddhist Dalits; Sculpture, Buddhist; Sculpture, Mauryan and Shungan

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bechert, Heinz, ed. *When Did the Buddha Live?* New Delhi: Satguru Publications, 1995.
- Chakrabarti, Dilip. *The Archaeology of Ancient Indian Cities*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Frauwallner, E. *The Earliest Vinaya and the Beginnings of Buddhist Literature*. Rome: Is. M.E.O., 1956.
- Ghosh, Amalananda. *The City in Early Historical India*. Simla: Indian Institute for Advanced Study, 1973.
- Gokhale, B. G. "The Early Buddhist Elite." *Journal of Indian History* 42, no. 2 (1965): 391–402.
- Gokhale, Shobhana. *Kanheri Inscriptions*. Pune: Deccan College Post-graduate and Research Institute, 1991.
- Gombrich, Richard F. *Theravada Buddhism*. London and New York: Routledge, 1988–1991.
- . *How Buddhism Began: The Conditioned Genesis of the Early Teaching*. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1997.
- Gunawardana, R. A. L. H. *Robe and Plough: Monasticism and Economic Interest in Early Medieval Sri Lanka*. Tucson: University of Arizona Press, 1979.
- Guruge, Ananda W. P. *Asoka: A Definitive Biography*. Colombo: Ministry of Cultural Affairs and Information, 1993.
- Kosambi, D. D. "The Decline of Buddhism in India." In *Exasperating Essays: Exercises in the Dialectical Method*, edited by D. D. Kosambi. Calcutta: India Book Exchange, 1977.
- Lopez, Donald S., ed. *Buddhism in Practice*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995.
- Mitra, Debala. *Buddhist Monuments*. Calcutta: Sahitya Sam-sad, 1980.
- Paranavitana, S. *Inscriptions of Ceylon*, vol. I. Colombo: Department of Archaeology, 1970.
- Rao, B. S. L., Murthy Hanumantha, N. S. Ramachandra, B. Subrahmanyam, and E. Sivanagi Reddy. *Buddhist Inscriptions of Andhradesa*. Secunderabad: Ananda Buddha Vihara Trust, 1998.
- Ray, Himanshu Prabha. *Monastery and Guild: Commerce under the Satavahanas*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986.
- . *The Archaeology of Seafaring in Ancient South Asia*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- Salomon, R. *Indian Epigraphy*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Schopen, Gregory. *Bones, Stones, and Buddhist Monks*. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997.
- Seneviratne, A., ed. *King Asoka and Buddhism: Historical and Literary Studies*. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1994.
- Shaw, J. "Ancient Irrigation Works in the Sanchi Area: An Archaeological and Hydrological Investigation." *South Asian Studies* 17 (2001): 55–75.
- Strong, John S. *The Legend of King Asoka*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983.
- . "Images of Asoka: Some Indian and Sri Lankan Legends and Their Development." In *King Asoka and Buddhism: Historical and Literary Studies*, edited by A. Seneviratne. Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1994.

Walters, J. S. "Stupa, Story and Empire: Construction of the Buddha Biography in Early Post-Asokan India." In *Sacred Biography in the Buddhist Traditions of South and Southeast Asia*, edited by Juliane Schober. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1997.

Willis, M. *Buddhist Reliquaries from Ancient India*. London: British Museum Press, 2000.

BUDDHIST ART IN ANDHRA UP TO THE FOURTH CENTURY

Andhra Pradesh has one of the longest and richest traditions of Buddhist art, with its reliefs in white limestone representing a distinctive sculptural and religious tradition. The principal sites in Andhra are Amaravati, Nagarjunakonda, Goli, Gummidurru, Jaggayyapeta, Bhattiprolu, Ghantasala, and Chandavaram. Within each site, sculptures are made in sets with matching borders for decorating individual stupas, some small, some quite large. Each of the sites are satellites of Amaravati, which through its long tradition and many surviving works can document each of the more peripheral styles. It is probable that Amaravati trained a majority of Andhra sculptors. Toward the last phase of the sculptural tradition, artists shifted to other sites, principally Nagarjunakonda and Goli. Andhra sculpture is important in its own right, and it is equally important for the stylistic influence it had on Buddhist art throughout Southeast Asia and even in East Asia.

Buddhism had already come to Andhra Pradesh by Mauryan times, but the second and third centuries A.D. brought a florescence of Buddhist activity. A rising mercantile community brought a great deal of wealth into Andhra, which in significant part resulted from trade with the Roman Empire. This is attested to by numerous Andhran finds of Roman coins and some Roman works of art. It is probable that even a broader range of foreign works of art were known to Andhra artisans than we can ascertain from extant finds. Indian stupa decoration had then reached a high point, and this, combined with new ideas gleaned from Roman imports and knowledge of foreign techniques, produced monuments and stone carvings of unsurpassed beauty.

Second-century patronage of stupa construction coincided with Satavahana rule in Andhra. The Satavahanas were succeeded in the early part of the third century by the Ikshvakus, who ruled through the early part of the fourth century. The bulk of the patronage at Amaravati was by the Buddhist nuns, monks, and laity, while the women of the Ikshvaku royal house, whose husbands were actually Hindus, were active donors to the Buddhist faith at Nagarjunakonda and hoped to attain their own Nirvāṇa through their good works. A final phase of the tradition, extending into the fourth century, may be seen at Goli, a site about which little is known but which has produced fine narrative reliefs.

The Early Andhra Tradition

A four-sided fragmentary pillar, an early work belonging to the second or first century B.C., illustrates scenes from the life of the Buddha. They are labeled, just as in Bharhut, leaving no doubt as to their identification. One side of the pillar illustrates the events that took place in the last three months of the Buddha's life, from his stay at Vaishali to his *parinirvāna* (final attainment of enlightenment and passing away of the Buddha, after which he will not be reborn) at Kushinagara. It is done in an unusual form of continuous narrative, reading from bottom to top. The carving of the relief is exceedingly shallow. Another scene on the same pillar takes place at Dhanyakataka, the ancient name for Amaravati. Amaravati did not have a place in the biography of the Buddha. Nevertheless, the pillar may have something to do with the founding of the stupa there, an event that was given sanctity by placing it near the scenes from the life of the Blessed One.

Another significant early monument is the stupa at Jaggayyapeta, even though it is known from only a few surviving fragments. It must have been extremely important, as it stands on top of a hill and could probably have been seen from a great distance. A stately relief of the Chakravartin (Universal Monarch) with his seven jewels (wheel, elephant, horse, gem, treasurer, wife, prime minister) is the first and finest example of the many Chakravartin representations developed in Andhra. The relief is extremely shallow and the figures unusually tall and slender, features often considered characteristic of the early phase. It is possible, however, that they represented an actual physiological type who lived in the region. The composition uses hieratic proportions so that the seven jewels, even the elephant, are much smaller than the king. The awkward feet of the monarch show no knowledge of perspective, as is common in early phases of Indian narrative.

The Mature Phase Represented by Amaravati

Most of the sculpture that survives from the Great Stupa at Amaravati, one of the most magnificent stupas of ancient India, was made during the second and third centuries A.D. Amaravati was excavated many times, and a large number of reliefs are preserved in the British Museum, the Madras Government Museum, and the Archaeological Museum at Amaravati. These, along with drawings made by early excavators, have enabled us to reconstruct the structure.

Around the entire Amaravati drum (161.7 ft., or 49.3 m, in diameter) was a series of slabs depicting various types of stupas that were then in current use. An example currently in the Madras Government Museum has been one of the sources for reconstructing Amaravati itself. Four

projections, known as *ayaka* platforms, projected from the drum, with each projection bearing five pillars. These are unique to Andhra Pradesh and certainly indicate a change in stupa ritual. Springing from the drum was a huge dome with a series of decorated slabs about 11 feet (3.4 m) high.

The entire stupa compound was set apart from the secular world by the 9-foot (2.7 m)-tall railing, enclosing the *pradakshina* (circumambulation) path. The railing was decorated with enormous lotuses on the outside and crowned by a stone coping. The inside of the railing had magnificent narrative reliefs, often placed in lotus roundel or in surrounding areas. As a worshiper performed *pradakshina*, he was encased between two states of the Buddha's being. On his left are the many events in the present and former lives of the Buddha, issuing forth from lotuses, the symbol of the Buddha's birth. This is contrasted on the right by the stupa, surrounded at its base by numerous stupas, and simple reliefs of the major events in the life of the Buddha on the dome slabs, emphasizing the goal of Nirvāṇa. Consequently, while the reliefs of the stupa itself clearly culminate in the Buddha's final goal, the relief panels on the railing are extremely sensuous, reflecting courtly life.

The dome and drum slabs at Amaravati are in low relief on a flat ground, a technique descended from the earlier Andhra tradition. The railing shows much more variety. In one group of reliefs, the ground is not flat, but is carved in several distinct planes. This strikingly innovative technique lasted only for a brief time, and was probably confined to only one or two sculptors. However, it makes Amaravati unique. Multiplane relief was then abandoned for the traditional mode, only sometimes showing remnants of the multiplane system.

One of the finest examples of the multiplane relief is the Presentation of Rahula on a railing crossbar. In it, the Buddha's son Rahula is being presented to his father to ask for his inheritance. His father is represented by an empty throne with a flaming pillar behind it and a footstool with an impression of the Buddha's feet upon it, common symbols used to represent the Blessed One. Although the pillar and feet are abstract symbols, the throne is naturalistically represented in an approximate single point perspective, with its vanishing point somewhere at the top of the pillar. The perspectival illusion is enhanced by the fact that the back of the throne is at the deepest level of the picture surface. Although not a fully coherent space, the composition is well ordered, for it is anchored by an inverted "v" (or a wedge) created by the central empty throne of the composition, the surrounding figures overlapping and remaining calmly in place. We are reminded that such formulas were used in the classical paintings of Pompeii

and Herculaneum, and it is possible that the artist was trying to reproduce a painting technique by actually carving into the stone, just as was done many centuries later in the Italian Renaissance. There are many variants of this compositional formula throughout the railing.

We know that Amaravati artists were aware of Roman art, for a small Buddhist stone relief panel from Amaravati, showing a woman in classical dress with Indian ankle bangles, was clearly copied with modification from a Roman import. These high points of Amaravati sculpture are almost an anomaly, as later sculptors seem to have lost their sense of depth, and have reverted to single plane compositions, with elongated figures stretched to their limits, but clearly inherited from Jaggayyapeta.

The Final Phase of Andhra Buddhist Art at Nagarjunakonda and Goli

The final phase is marked by the sculptural art of Nagarjunakonda, the capital of the Ikshvakus, with its greatest period of production belonging to the latter part of the third century A.D. It culminates during the fourth century at the site of Goli village. Nagarjunakonda (ancient Vijayapuri) was submerged by the construction of the much-needed Nagarjunasagar Dam. The sculptures in the valley were salvaged and brought to an island museum, which also contains a model of the submerged site. While several of the architectural monuments were reconstructed on the island and on the surrounding hills, others only survive as small models in the museum. In contrast to the Amaravati stupa, the Great Stupa at Nagarjunakonda was only sparsely decorated. However, the stupas in the monastic compounds were decorated fully. There were no railings around the Nagarjunakonda stupas, although they had drum and dome slabs. The most interesting of the sculptures were long low friezes on the *ayaka* platforms that protruded from the drums, illustrating current and former lives of the Buddha. These *ayaka* beams were symbolic substitutes for railings, thus belonging to the world of *saṃsāra*, the cycle of birth and death. Each individual panel was separated by pilasters, and further separated from each other by coquettish *mithuna* couples, many of them illustrating Sanskrit poetry. These couples appear at the beginnings of a long tradition of *mithuna* couples used in Indian temple architecture. Magnificent female bracket figures cap the ends. In the current example, with scenes from the Buddha's life, the scenes read from right to left.

While multiplane carving and western perspective are absent in Nagarjunakonda sculptures, a battle scene whose function on the stupa is unexplained is clearly a reverse copy of a Roman battle scene belonging to the time of Trajan (A.D. 2nd century), now on the Arch of Constantine.

While we know of Roman coins found at Nagarjunakonda, and a stadium using bricks of a standardized Roman size, further research is still needed to explain the presence of this composition and its inexplicable subject.

Perhaps the most beautiful panel from Nagarjunakonda reflects a knowledge of Sanskrit poetry, Canto X of the *Saundarananda* by Ashvaghoṣa, a first-century poem often illustrated in Andhra Pradesh from the second to the fourth centuries. The story concerns the conversion of the Buddha's half brother Nanda, who consequently rejects his bride Sundari. In a quirky detail, the Buddha and Nanda are seen flying up to heaven to inspect the celestial maidens.

This same theme remains popular in Goli village, whose sculpture represents the last major phase of the Andhra Buddhist tradition, extending it into the fourth century. Goli is also known for its *ayaka* panels. In the Goli variant of the story we see Nanda in the grove of Indra staring at the beautiful Apsaras. While the Nagarjunakonda and Goli panels emphasize slightly different episodes of the *Saundarananda*, the Goli artist was clearly conversant with the Nagarjunakonda version. However, the architectural pilasters used as dividing scenes are here almost balloonlike, losing their rigid sense as dividers. The multiplane carving is now a thing of the past, and the shallow relief with elongated figures of the early Andhra tradition has reasserted itself in the final phase of Andhra Buddhist art.

Elizabeth Rosen Stone

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Knox, Robert. *Amaravati: Buddhist Sculpture from the Great Stupa*. London: Trustees of the British Museum, 1992.
- Longhurst, A. H. *The Buddhist Antiquities of Nagarjunakonda, Madras Presidency. Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India*. no. 54. Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1938.
- Ramachandran, T. N. *Nagarjunakonda 1938. Memoirs of the Archaeological Survey of India*, no. 71. Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1953.
- Sarkar, H., and S. P. Nainar. *Amaravati*. 2nd ed. New Delhi: Director General, Archaeological Survey of India, 1980.
- Sarkar, H., and B. N. Mishra. *Nagarjunakonda*. 3rd ed. New Delhi: Director General, Archaeological Survey of India, 1980.
- Sivaramamurti, C. *Amaravati Sculptures in the Madras Government Museum. Bulletin of the Madras Government Museum*. N.S. IV. Madras: Superintendent, Government Press, 1942.
- . *The Amaravati Mode of Sculpture. Bulletin of the Madras Government Museum*. N.S. XI, 1. Madras: Government of Tamil Nadu, 1942.
- Stone, Elizabeth Rosen. *The Buddhist Art of Nagarjunakonda*. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994.

BURMA Characterized by its riverine system and the river valleys of the Salween, Sittang, and, especially, the Irrawaddy, Burma is a country of villages with few large cities. The Burmese people, ethnically related to the Tibetans and the Chinese, are some 70 percent of the estimated population of 43 million in 2005. There are a large number of hill tribes with their own languages and customs. They include Chins, Kachins, Karens, Lahus, Nagas, and the Shans, who organized a Shan State National Army to fight for independence. The country is rich in such products as copper, tin, silver, tungsten, and precious stones, and in rice, rubber, cotton, and teak. Hinduism and Buddhism, via Sri Lanka, came to Burma and mixed with local animistic practices. Ninety percent of the people are Buddhist, 4 percent are Christian, 4 percent are Muslim, and 3 percent are animist. Chinese people make up 3 percent and Indians 2 percent of the population. Since 1989 the military government has called Burma the Union of Myanmar (or Myanmar Naingandaw, “country of Myanmar”). The capital, Rangoon, is known as Yangon. The literacy rate is claimed to be about 80 percent for females and 90 percent for males. The currency is the *kyat*. Burma is the world’s second-largest producer of illicit opium.

British Colonial Period

The Toungoo dynasty (1531–1752) came to an end as Alaungpaya (r. 1752–1760) established the Konbaung dynasty, the last dynasty in Burmese history, which, with its capital at Rangoon, was of an imperialistic nature; it attacked Thailand and conquered Arakan. Arakenese refugees fled to India. In 1819 King Bodawpaya (r. 1782–1819) expanded into Manipur and Assam, frontier territories for India, triggering alarm from the British, who were apprehensive about the security of India on both its northeast and northwest frontiers and across the Bay of Bengal in Malaya and the Indian Ocean in south and east Africa. In addition, warlike tribes from both sides of the border were not averse to raiding in each other’s territories, creating unsettled conditions. There was also great concern about the conditions of investment and trade for British traders in Burma, who felt they were badly treated by the Burmese. Cultural practices also embittered relationships between the British and the Burmese. The British resented the Burmese custom of removing their shoes before entering the royal palace and flatly refused to do so. This angered the Burmese, as proud a people as the British. Before Hong Kong became a British territory, there was hope that a lucrative trade with China would develop through Burma. Finally, the British were wary of diplomatic and economic competition from the French, who were based in Vietnam. All these factors impelled the British to an increasingly interventionist position in Burma and the

absorption of Burma into the empire through three Anglo-Burmese Wars.

The First Anglo-Burmese War broke out in March 1824 after King Bagyidaw (r. 1819–1837) invaded Manipur and annexed Assam. The British pushed 10,000 troops, led by steam-powered gunboats, up to the Burmese capital of Mandalay. The Burmese were forced to sign the Treaty of Yandabo on 24 February 1826 with a number of humiliating conditions, including a £1 million indemnity; the control of Arakan and Tenasserim ceded to the British East India Company; the promise not to interfere in Assam, Manipur, and Cachar; and the stationing of an ambassador in Calcutta and a British Resident at Ava. These conditions, however, did not appease the insatiable Victorian appetite for wealth and power, not to mention missionary impulses for greater freedom to proselytize. The *cassus belli* for the Second Burmese War in 1852–1853, however, was conflict between British traders and the Burmese governor of Rangoon. The result was British annexation of Pegu province, which they renamed “Lower Burma,” the deposition of the king, Pagan (r. 1846–1853), and control of Burma’s access to the sea.

King Mindon (r. 1853–1878) was a modernist, reforming king who introduced in his new capital of Mandalay a measure of industrialization and economic development and the creation of coinage, newspapers, and the building of the telegraph. However, he also attempted to establish diplomatic and trade relations with France, angering the British, who were in competition with the French for influence in neighboring Thailand. His successor King Thibaw (r. 1878–1885) imposed a heavy fine on the Bombay-Burmah Trading Company for its failure to pay for all the teak they had extracted from Burma. His biggest crime in the eyes of the British, however, was his opening of diplomatic negotiations with the French. This was the justification for an attack in November 1885. The conquest of Burma took twenty days. It was absorbed on 1 January 1886 and was ruled from Calcutta as a province of India. Thibaw was exiled to India, his throne was placed in a museum in Calcutta, and his palace in Mandalay became a British officers’ club.

The British brought a modern administrative and police system to the country and its economy was brought into the global system of finance and trade. Rangoon, rather than Mandalay, became the nation’s center. The British also transformed Burma with the clearing of swampland in the south and the creation of a new non-hereditary, urban, Western-educated elite landlord class (the University of Rangoon was founded in 1920), who acquired more and more land as small owner-cultivators fell into debt and lost their land to larger, often absentee, landlords and investors. Indian moneylenders and Chinese

businessmen moved into Burma to provide the credit for this growing market-driven economy. The effect was devastating, as the British attempted to introduce the Indian system of village government and taxation. It was alien to Burma and led to social deterioration and cultural disintegration. The deplorable condition of Burma under the British is famously and realistically depicted in George Orwell's novel, *Burmese Days*. A resistance movement led by monks and ex-monks developed. Until 1942, Burma was under martial law in one form or another, with as many as 40,000 army and police in the field at one time.

Burma's nationalist movement. The Young Men's Buddhist Association was established in 1906. It was a modernist organization concerned with cultural and religious revival but became increasingly political and nationalistic during the next decade. In 1909, when the British introduced the Minto-Morley Act, Burma was given a Legislative Council with a nonofficial majority. The country was excluded from the reforms of the Government of India Act of 1919, but the uproar was so great that the British introduced the Indian system of dyarchy in 1923, and Burma received five seats in the Indian Legislative Assembly in Delhi. Fifty percent of the recruits to the Burmese civil service were also reserved for the Burmese. A peasant rebellion was led by former monk Saya San, originally Ya Gyaw (1874–1931), who crowned himself king of Burma in 1930. His Galon Army tried to resist British machine guns with amulets and charms. It was snuffed out after two years. Saya San was captured, tried for sedition, and hanged, but his trial and death were rallying cries for nationalists. Also in 1930, a nationalist organization the Dobama Asiayone (We Burmese Association) was founded by a group of students who were graduates of the University of Rangoon. They called themselves Thakin (Master) and they, most notably Aung San (1915–1947), became the leaders of the nationalist movement in 1936. In the Government of India Act of 1935, Burma was separated from India and received a fully elected assembly.

When World War II broke out, Aung San fled to China and came into contact with the Japanese, who took him and twenty-nine others, the "Thirty Comrades," to Japan for military training in their Burma National Army. By May 1942 the Japanese had captured all of Burma, and the British retreated to Imphal in India. The Burma National Army was disbanded and the Japanese formed a smaller Burma Defense Force, still with Aung San as its head. A civil administration was set up by Ba Maw (1893–1977) and on 1 August 1943, Burma was declared an independent state. Aung San became the war minister and U Nu (1907–1995) foreign affairs minister. The Burma National Army was formed by Ne Win

("Brilliant as the Sun"), born Shu Maung (1911–2002), in 1943 and later, in March 1945, was led by Aung San. Aung San also formed the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (AFPFL), which was recognized as the leading organization in Burma. The Japanese retreated in May 1945, and in October 1946 Aung San and his allies were appointed to the Governor's Council. In the general elections that followed, Aung San and his party received an overwhelming victory for his proposal for the Union of Burma. In September 1946 he headed a provisional government and reached an agreement with British prime minister Clement Attlee on 27 January 1947 that Burma would become independent. On 19 July 1947, he and six of his colleagues were murdered at a Cabinet meeting. U Nu then headed the government, and on 17 October 1947 he signed a treaty with the British, under which Burma would become independent on 4 January 1948.

Independent Burma

A western parliamentary system was created, with separate states for the Shan, Kachin, Karen, and Kayah, and a division for the Chin peoples. Burma was one of the first states to recognize the People's Republic of China in 1949, and it declined to become a member of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization in 1954. In October 1958, U Nu resigned in favor of General Ne Win, who had remained in the army after the war and had built a loyal following in the 4th Burmese Rifles. U Nu, however, was allowed back as prime minister in April 1960 after general elections swept his "Clean Wing" section, later named "Union Party," of the AFPFL into power. However, on 2 March 1962, Ne Win and the military arrested U Nu and assumed power in an anticommunist Revolutionary Council whose policies were outlined in a manifesto, *The Burmese Way to Socialism*, published on 3 April 1962. Its guiding principle was an isolationist "Burma for the Burmese." Private enterprise was abolished, enterprises were nationalized, and thousands of Indians and other foreigners were expelled from Burma. All political parties were banned in March 1964, and their leaders arrested and imprisoned, except for the sole legal party, the Burma Socialist Program Party, which had been founded by Ne Win on 4 July 1962. Its power was enshrined in the new constitution of 2 March 1974. This began the military domination of every aspect of Burmese life.

Between 1962 and 1988, Ne Win dominated Burma as military ruler until 1972, as president until 1981, and as party leader until 1988. He withstood the antigovernment demonstrations in 1974 that broke out at the funeral of the former United Nations secretary-general U Thant (1909–1974) who was a symbol of opposition to the

military regime. In 1986 and again in 1988 widespread demonstrations against the government led to the death of tens of thousands of protesters. On 18 September 1988, the army seized power and formed the State Law and Order Restoration Council, six days before Aung San Suu Kyi (b. 1945), the daughter of Aung San (and the future 1991 Nobel Peace Prize recipient for her fight for human rights in Burma), who had lived outside the country between 1960 and 1988, became the general secretary of the National League for Democracy. In 1987 Burma sought relief from its massive foreign debt and received Least Developed Nation status from the United Nations. On 27 May 1990, multiparty elections were held for the 485-seat unicameral People's Assembly, and the National League for Democracy won a landslide victory, but the military refused to relinquish power. Aung San Suu Kyi has been under house arrest from 1989 to 1995, 2000 to 2002, and from 2003. Since 3 March 1992, Burma has been subject to annual reports written by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights concerning the lack of human rights for many of Burma's citizens, and in April 1998 Amnesty International published a major

report on human rights violations in Burma. The United Nations, the European Union, the International Labor Organization, and the U.S. government have all condemned the Burmese government. The material, health, and environmental conditions of the people continue to worsen, with a quarter of Burma's people believed to living below the poverty line in a land blessed with abundant natural resources.

Roger D. Long

See also **Southeast Asia, Relations with**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Seekins, Donald M. *The Army-State in Burma since 1962*. Bangkok: White Lotus Press, 2002.
- Steinberg, David I. *Burma: The State of Myanmar*. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2001.
- Tarling, Nicholas, ed. *The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia*, vol. 2, pts. 1–2. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Tucker, Shelby. *Burma: The Curse of Independence*. London: Pluto Press, 2001.



CABINET. *See* **Political System.**

CABINET MISSION PLAN Great Britain's final attempt to transfer its waning imperial power over India to a single independent constitutional entity was launched in March 1946, by three members of Prime Minister Clement Attlee's Cabinet: Secretary of State for India Lord Pethick-Lawrence, Board of Trade President Sir Stafford Cripps, and First Lord of the Admiralty A. V. Alexander. Their Cabinet Mission Plan, had it been accepted in good faith by the leaders of India's National Congress and Muslim League, could have saved millions of lives and averted three disastrous South Asian wars, and more than half a century of constant conflict over Jammu and Kashmir.

The plan was to create a complex confederation of British India's provinces and princely states, all divided into three groups: A, B, and C. Most of independent India's Union would have been integrated into Group A, with its overwhelmingly Hindu majority. To the west of Group A would have been Group B, modern Pakistan, mostly Muslim but also including millions of Punjabi Sikhs and Hindus from the eastern districts of Punjab, not just its Muslim-majority western districts, as well as all of Sind and the North-West Frontier province and Baluchistan. Group C would have included all of Bengal and Assam, with a very narrow Muslim majority, and the much richer real estate of West Bengal's Calcutta, rather than what became impoverished East Pakistan in 1947 and has remained Bangladesh since the 1971 South Asian war.

Those three groups, the modern sovereign states of Pakistan, India, and Bangladesh, would have been the most powerful, virtually autonomous units within the three-tier plan of a South Asian confederation. Elected representatives from each group would join the new federation's constituent assembly as soon as the British left,

roughly one member elected for each million inhabitants, as was later the case for India's Parliament. At the bottom of the plan's three-tier pyramid, provincial officials (elected within the former British provinces and the princely states) would collect most taxes and supervise the administration of local services, as do local governments in Britain and the United States. At the pyramid's top would be a Union umbrella with key representatives from all three groups sharing power only over foreign affairs, defense, communication, and to raise finances enough to run those three central departments. The Cabinet Mission worked tirelessly, trying to persuade the leaders of the Congress and the Muslim League of the brilliance and impartiality of their plan, the last best hope for keeping South Asia unified. It almost worked.

But neither side really trusted the other, Congress leaders suspecting that Muslim Leaguers agreed only in order to buy time until they felt strong enough to break free and establish their state of Pakistan; the League feared that once the British left, Congress would ignore the plan's communal checks, undermining both powerful Muslim-majority groups to bolster the central powers of a Hindu-dominated union. Soon after the Mission went home, its plan fell apart, and by midsummer of 1946, only ashes remained. A year later, the hasty, incompetent partition of Punjab and Bengal shattered South Asia's unity, and during the months of Britain's withdrawal of its forces, over 10 million Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh refugees fled their ancestral homes, leaving almost a million dead.

Stanley Wolpert

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Mansergh, N., and E. W. R. Lumby, eds. *The Transfer of Power, 1942–7*, vol. VII: *The Cabinet Mission, 23 March–29 June 1946*. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1977.

Menon, V. P. *The Transfer of Power in India*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1957.

Moon, Penderel, ed. *Wavell: The Viceroy's Journal*. London: Oxford University Press, 1973.


Rajput, A. B. *The Cabinet Mission*. Lahore: Lion Press, 1946.

CALCUTTA Once the capital of British India and the second-largest city of the empire after London, Calcutta is completely a British creation. Calcutta is a city that defies description, overwhelming each visitor with kaleidoscopic images and scenes from its checkered history, its extremes of wealth and poverty, and its punishingly hot and humid climate. In fact, the British found Calcutta's climate so oppressive that for the better part of each year they shifted the official work of the Raj to Simla (Shimla), north of Delhi, the queen of India's hill stations. After ruling India from Calcutta for 150 years, the British permanently shifted their capital to New Delhi in 1912.

Rudyard Kipling called Calcutta the "City of Dreadful Night"; the Frenchman Dominique Lapierre named it the "City of Joy"; and the Indian novelist Anita Desai described it as the "graveyard of the British Empire." The early British administrators called it the "City of Palaces" because they believed that India could only be ruled from palaces and thus constructed monumental buildings. More recently, V. S. Naipaul declared, "All of [Calcutta's] suffering are sufferings of death. I know not of any other city whose plight is more hopeless."

Calcutta emerged from the union of three villages—Kalikata, Govindapur, and Sutanuti—the first of which housed the shrine of the Indian goddess Kali, hence the name Calcutta. In 1680 Job Charnock, a British agent and head of the English factory in Cassim Bazaar, received permission from the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb to establish an English factory at Sutanuti. In 1698 the British East India Company bought the *zamindari* (rights for land revenue) of Kalikata, Govindpur, and Sutanuti from Subarana Chowdhury. Fort William (named after King William I) was completed in 1699, thus founding Calcutta as the bridgehead of the company's commercial and administrative operations in Bengal. As the Mughal empire started its decline after the death of Aurangzeb in 1707, the East India Company acquired duty-free trading rights in Bengal from the financially strapped Mughal Faruqsiyar for the paltry sum of 3,000 rupees in 1717, much to the chagrin of the *nawābs* (Muslim governors) of the region. By 1735 Calcutta had become an important port and a trading center, and its population burgeoned to over 100,000. Calcutta now rivaled Dhaka (traditional Dacca) and Murshidabad, the two historical capitals of Bengal.

Other Europeans had vied for a foothold in Bengal as well. As early as 1517, the Portuguese had set up a trading



Market in Calcutta. Calcutta was originally planned by the British for a population of 1 million, but today the city and its environs support a population of over 14 million. Two-thirds of its population live in slums, or *bustees*, like that depicted in this chaotic market. EARL & NAZIMA KOWALL/CORBIS.

post in Chittagong (modern Bangladesh's principal port) and Saptagram. In 1580 the Portuguese secured permission from Emperor Akbar to set up Bandel de Hoogly on the Hoogly River, which was later demolished by Emperor Shah Jahan in 1632. The Dutch set up a factory at Chuncura in 1653, but in 1825 ceded it to the British in exchange for Bencoleen in Sumatra (Indonesia). In the early 1670s, the French established Chandannagar (old Chandernagore).

In an effort to bolster their position, the British intervened in wars of succession in Bengal, inviting the wrath of Siraj-ud-Dawla, who marched south to capture Fort William in June 1756, placing 145 Englishmen (and one woman) in the fort's lockup, called the "Black Hole," an airless room measuring 14 by 18 feet (4 × 5 m). By the next morning many of the prisoners had died from asphyxiation, an event that not only served to perpetually prejudice the British against the Indians but that also cast a lingering dark shadow over Calcutta.



Victoria Memorial Hall, Calcutta. Throughout India, particularly in centers of commerce such as Calcutta, architectural relics of the British colonial past remain. Here, the Victoria Memorial Hall (built between 1906 and 1921 at the behest of Lord Curzon). Combining elements of Italian and Greek architecture while incorporating the Islamic dome common to the region, it is constructed of marble from the same quarry that supplied the builders of the Taj Mahal. GRAEME GOLDIN; CORDAIY PHOTO LIBRARY LTD./CORBIS.

Colonel Robert Clive and Admiral Charles Watson recaptured Fort William in January 1757. In June of the same year, Siraj-ud-Dawla was defeated in the Battle of Plassey, and Clive installed Mir Jaffar as the *nawāb* of Bengal in return for £234,000 and an annual salary of £30,000. In 1765 the British defeated an alliance of Shah Alam II and Mir Kasim, then *nawāb* of Bengal, at Buxar. The East India Company was then given the *diwani* (land revenue collection rights) of Bengal, Orissa, and Bihar. To better fortify Calcutta, a new fort was completed in 1773; in the same year, Calcutta became the capital of the British Raj in India. Clive returned to England a rich man in 1767, but committed suicide in 1774.

British buildings in Calcutta, as in other presidency towns and later in New Delhi, celebrated the British triumph in India through monumentality. The British designs, however, appropriated several architectural languages, from Classicism to Baroque to Gothic to Indo-Saracenic. Calcutta's landmark buildings include the National Library of India, the Indian Museum (the oldest in Asia), Victoria Memorial, High Court, Writer's

Building, Marble Palace, Ochterlony Monument (modern Shahid Minar), Kalighat, Government House (the residence of the governor of Bengal, inspired by Curzon's Kedleston Hall), Esplanade Mansion, Howrah Station, and the buildings around Calcutta's Maidan. Under the neonationalist movement, many of these buildings have acquired Indian names, just as Calcutta itself was renamed Kolkata in 2001. Nouveau riche Bengalis imitated Western architecture, even as they cultivated British customs and mastered the English language.

The Asiatic Society of Bengal, founded in 1784 by Sir William Jones, the introduction of the printing press in 1799 by missionary William Carey, and English-language education produced a class of Bengali intellectuals (*bhadralok*) in Calcutta. The city itself became the center of the Bengal Renaissance that embodied English liberalism and indigenous revivalism, both of which contributed to social reform and political activism in the nineteenth century. The Bengali Brahman Ram Mohan Roy (1772–1833) was a pioneer of that Renaissance, promoting new ideas and syncretic cultural concepts that blossomed

in the warrens of Calcutta. Roy's Brahmo Samaj, founded in 1828, and in combination with English education, influenced generations of young Bengali intellectuals, from Rabindranath Tagore to Satyajit Ray to Arundhati Roy. Calcutta thus became an important center of both Hindu reform and the Indian nationalist movement.

Calcutta's dark side has always been in full view—its slums and overcrowded tenements, grinding poverty, and decaying infrastructure—producing popular political support for leftist political parties and the unionization of labor. It has also attracted humanitarians such as Mother Teresa, who founded the Missionaries of Charity in 1950 to help abandoned children and the dying. For her care of the poorest of the poor, she was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1979.

Those who despair over modern Calcutta's misery forget that British interests from the beginning in Bengal were primarily pecuniary. The plunder of Bengal and its complete mismanagement of the province led to a major famine in the early 1770s in which a third of the population died. Famine and drought became a running theme of Calcutta's history, producing widespread disaffection among the peasantry. As everywhere else in agricultural British India, the fundamental source of official finance was land revenue. The British were not prepared to surrender this vital source of income, and the peasants had to borrow at such exorbitant rates to fulfill their tax obligations that many became bankrupt. As a result, many were forced to flee to the city to eke out a living. These rural-urban migrations started early in the British period, and Calcutta's population soared to 200,000 by the late 1770s. Calcutta also became a principal port for the opium trade, from which the British East India Company reaped huge profits, exporting Indian opium to China.

Many of Calcutta's modern problems result from the fact that the city was originally planned by the British for a population of no more than 1 million, whereas by 2004 it supported a population of over 14 million, with over 30,000 people per .4 sq. mi. (square kilometer). Two-thirds of Calcutta's population live in unofficial slums, called *bustees*. A reported 2,000 people migrate daily to Calcutta in the hope of making a living there. The city's overburdened infrastructure dates back to the mid-nineteenth century, its sewerage system was established in 1859, filtered water was introduced in 1860, its telephone exchange was created in 1882, and the electricity supply was started in 1899.

Calcutta, with all its ills, remains one of the most intellectually vibrant cities in India. Bengalis, through their endless heated discussions and political activism, keep hope alive. This eternal optimism helped the city to survive its staggering refugee crisis, produced by the

partition of India in 1947, and again when Bangladesh was created from East Pakistan in 1971. In its three-hundred-year history, Calcutta, or Kolkata, has offered endless possibilities to its millions, along with sorrow and disappointment for others. The dance of hope and despair, of possibilities and misery, continues. Calcutta has always recovered from its worst disasters, moving forward in the footsteps of Roy, Tagore, and Ray. The residents of Calcutta of the past and the present—from all classes—have never failed to take the full measure of their city.

Ravi Kalia

See also **Bengal; British Crown Raj; Clive, Robert; Urbanism**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Lapierre, Dominique. *The City of Joy*. Translated by Kathryn Spink. Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1985.
 Singh, Kushwant. *Kalighat to Calcutta, 1690–1990*. Calcutta: Manjushree Foundation; New Delhi: Lustre Press, 1990.
 Sinha, Pradip, ed. *The Urban Experience: Calcutta*. Calcutta: Riddhi-India, 1987.

CAPITAL MARKET India has had a history of securities trading stretching back almost two hundred years, making it one of the oldest capital markets in Asia. The American Civil War of 1861–1865 (which led to the emergence of an affluent community of brokers who profited from the ban on the import of American cotton) resulted in the capital market becoming more organized, and in 1874 a group of brokers congregated in Bombay's Dalal Street to begin trading in securities. A year later the Native Share and Stock Brokers' Association was formally inaugurated, a precursor to the establishment in 1895 of the first stock exchange, which in 1899 moved to premises at Dalal Street, a name which ever since has been synonymous with the Indian capital market.

The Early Years

Indian brokers profited from the U.S. Civil War, with over two hundred emerging in Bombay alone, but the war proved disastrous for financial investors. Share prices rose rapidly, and fell with equal ferocity by the end of the war. It has been recorded, for instance, that the price of the Bank of Bombay share fell from its high of 2,850 rupees to 87 rupees during this period. Investors experienced, and not for the last time, the familiar sequence of a share mania, generating the seeds of its own destruction, leading to dramatic price volatility and subsequent erosion of investor wealth.

While the capital market through most of the nineteenth century grew in response to the resource needs of



Traders on Dalal Street, Bombay Stock Exchange. With a history of robust securities trading spanning some two hundred years, India is one of the oldest capital markets in Asia. INDIA TODAY.

trade and commerce, and of property development, toward the close of that century it began to provide finance to emerging industrial enterprises. Thus, shares traded in the 1830s were largely of banks and cotton presses; four decades later they encompassed trading enterprises in agricultural commodities such as jute in the 1870s and tea in the 1880s; and by then shares were also issued by joint stock companies which were floated to reclaim and develop land from the sea around Bombay. These were uncertain businesses with the possibility of high returns, and share prices of these companies were accordingly volatile. But by the 1880s, India's textile industry had emerged, with cotton mills in Bombay and Ahmedabad and jute mills in Calcutta set up by domestic entrepreneurs, to be followed in the first decade of the twentieth century by the first Jamsetji Tata iron and steel plant at Jamshedpur. Capital demands of this new industrial entrepreneurship, together with the rise in urban prosperity, led to additional stock exchanges being set up, at Ahmedabad in 1894 and Calcutta in 1908. The Indian industrial class had not merely arrived, but grew profitably

during World War I, diversifying into paper, sugar, and the processing of other agricultural commodities, all of which provided breadth to the capital market.

From Independence to the Late 1980s

Firms were free of controls in raising capital from securities markets until World War II, when controls were first introduced through the Defence of India Rules. Controls continued thereafter with the enactment in 1947, the year of India's independence, of the Capital Issues (Control) Act. The emergence of an increasingly dominant public sector in the first three decades thereafter—underpinned by barriers to entry in certain sectors for companies not owned by the government, barriers to growth in the form of industrial licensing, and the nationalization of several large and listed companies—led to a subdued primary market for equity. Well-capitalized companies in sectors such as banking, insurance, petroleum, power, transportation, and coal were in the public sector and had no need to access the market for capital. With interest rates administered, the bond market also remained undeveloped, and firms typically raised debt from the predominantly nationalized development banks and commercial banks. The Foreign Exchange Regulation Act (FERA) of 1973, which required firms from overseas to substantially dilute their foreign shareholding to the level of a minority stake, did however funnel shares into the Indian capital market, and the shares of such companies were much sought after, consequently providing much needed trading momentum to the market. Several rapidly growing and privately owned Indian companies also accessed the market for equity: the most publicized in the 1980s was Reliance Industries, then a textiles company, which first successfully popularized the convertible bond in India. The Unit Trust of India, established in 1964, also helped in reaching out to a wide body of investors by intermediating household savings into the capital market, and enjoyed a mutual fund monopoly until other institutions were permitted to enter the sector in 1987.

Reform: Regulation of the Market

By the time liberalization and reform of the Indian economy began in the early 1990s, the capital market thus rated impressively in terms of the many institutions that had grown around it, and yet was seen as poorly regulated. Volumes of share trading were dominated by the Bombay Stock Exchange (BSE), ostensibly a self-regulatory organization that periodically resembled a closed cartel of broker-members who acted purely in their own interest with little concern for other stakeholders in the market. In 1991 the BSE's market capitalization rose by 130 percent within seven months, when it was discovered

that funds had been diverted from commercial banks to the stock market by one broker, and the bubble burst. That episode raised crucial questions about the design and enforcement of financial market regulation. The formal regulation of India's capital market can thus be said to have begun in 1992, when a four-year-old regulatory authority, the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI), was empowered by statute to regulate market intermediaries. This included regulating the market for equity issuance, until then directly controlled by the government, which computed the issue price on the basis of an accounting formula rather than what the market might bear, signaling the notion of "fair value" to investors. In practice, however, initial public offerings of equity were severely underpriced in relation to the price upon listing and were accordingly oversubscribed. While the transfer of powers to SEBI led to the removal of price controls when firms sought to raise capital from the market, the early years of pricing autonomy occasionally saw prices swing to the other extreme, with firms overpricing their equity issuance. It took the better part of a decade to correct pricing anomalies, aided by more responsible investment banks and a further reinforcement of SEBI's powers in 1995, transferring to it virtually all capital market regulatory powers formerly vested in the government.

Market Microstructure

The reform of stock exchanges has proved more contentious. The regulatory thrust has been to initially induce, and ultimately coerce, stock exchanges to reform their trading, clearing, and settlement practices. Success in the reform of stock exchange practices in India has been strongly facilitated by changes in market microstructure, best typified by the National Stock Exchange (NSE), an exchange set up in 1994 that created a new microstructure for equities trading. Over four thousand companies now provide for the electronic dematerialization of their shares, encompassing over 90 percent of the market capitalization of listed companies, and trades of such dematerialized shares account for over 99 percent of trades settled by delivery. Problems no longer arise of "bad deliveries" associated with the earlier trading of paper shares. Further, with rolling settlements, trades are now settled on day T+2, where T is the date of trading.

Overall, the first decade after capital market reforms began in the early 1990s appears to have greatly improved the efficacy of regulation. For brokers, SEBI has signaled firmer regulatory intolerance of insider trading and front-running, and faster detection of circular trades on illiquid shares that result in price manipulation. For mutual funds, disclosures compare well with the best international practices, and an elaborately crafted regulatory straitjacket

defines the bounds within which fund managers must discharge their obligations to investors. Finally, investment bankers are also required to display adequate due diligence in the manner in which capital raising and merger deals are structured.

Uncertainties in Raising Capital

Despite the transformation of the market, companies continue to face uncertainties in their ability to raise capital from the market at valuations that they consider fair, except when liquidity surges in the market occur. Very long-term financial savings are also not being intermediated through the market, leading to a paucity of private domestic equity and debt for infrastructure investment, in the absence of pension fund reform. Consequently, commercial banks continue to finance very long-term debt, at some risk to the matching of their assets and liabilities, while private equity funds, typically from overseas, have begun taking an increasing stake in well-managed companies to facilitate their growth. A significant proportion of fresh equity and debt is placed privately, rather than being offered publicly, reflecting the higher transaction costs of public offerings.

Companies similarly face constraints in raising acquisition finance. As competitive pressures have increased consequent to the liberalization of trade and investment in the early 1990s, companies have sought to restructure themselves in ways that have included ramping production capacities and divesting noncore businesses. This has been fertile territory for mergers and amalgamations, and banks have been restrained by regulation from providing such finance, though that restraint has been eased in financing the privatization of government companies.

Globalization of the Market

Economic reforms of the 1990s also liberalized access to overseas capital by Indian firms, the greatest impact being on the structure and depth of the Indian capital market. Portfolio investments were permitted by SEBI-registered Foreign Institutional Investors which discretionarily manage funds of common pools of money. Soon, however, such funds began issuing synthetic instruments overseas to attract wider pools of money to be invested in the Indian market. In addition, Indian companies have been permitted to access capital overseas, initially through the issuance of global depository receipts, and subsequently in the U.S. market (where stronger disclosure standards are mandated) through American depository receipts. So while it is still not legally possible for every investor overseas to hold shares in an Indian company willing to issue its shares, in practice surrogate markets facilitating such investments have arisen.

Another offshoot of financial integration with overseas capital markets has been the rapid change in the capitalization and practices of domestic market intermediaries. There have been several collaborations and strategic alliances since 1993 between domestic financial services companies and investment banks abroad. Overseas brokerage houses, through Indian affiliates, have become members of the larger stock exchanges and thereby entered the domestic broking industry. The financial services industry grew rapidly through the 1990s and is better capitalized than it was at the start of capital market reform.

While the Indian rupee is still not fully convertible on the capital account, portfolio investment from overseas has become large enough to significantly impact the capital market, be it in trading volume, share valuation, or the structure of trading liquidity across stocks. Although India was well insulated from the currency and capital market turmoil that affected East Asia in 1997, periods during which surges have occurred in overseas inflows into the capital markets in the last decade have seen prices of frontline and liquid stocks depart significantly from their fundamental valuations computed on the basis of discounted cash flows. Reversals in these surges have led inevitably to steep erosion in investor wealth. Opportunities for hedging against such a fall in prices, hitherto restricted, are expected to improve as markets for derivatives on stock indexes and select individual stocks become increasingly liquid.

The resident investor is still not permitted to invest overseas, though a limited window has been opened for mutual funds to do so. If India moves closer to full capital account convertibility, overseas funds can also be expected to become a source of investors in the country. It is at this stage that financial product innovation, market liquidity and stock market clearing and settlement efficiencies will need to be internationally competitive if markets are not to move overseas. The compulsions will be strong for regulators and market participants alike to be sensitive to the importance of market microstructure.

Linkages with Other Financial Markets

Further liquidity and depth in the capital markets require the development of a more diversified fund industry. While the liberalization of the insurance sector in the early twenty-first century will provide an impetus to such diversification as new, privately owned insurance companies grow in size, it is the reform of the pension sector that will be more critical. The government has recently initiated a shift in policy for pensions payable to a segment of its own employees with the acceptance of two instrumentalities. The first is the notion of "contracting out," allowing pension monies to be managed by

other asset managers, and to permit employees to switch between asset managers at very low cost. The second is to permit diversification across asset classes (which for the first time are to include equities), so as to enhance returns in the longer term. While the transformation of the pension fund sector is not customarily viewed as an integral part of capital market development, even a modest proportion of retirement savings being invested in the equity markets would significantly impact liquidity in the latter, thereby also reducing the undervaluation of several stocks. This is in addition to other benefits that a diversified pension industry could provide: enhancing earnings at retirement, and so mitigating old-age financial distress; providing long-term funds for the development of infrastructure; and thereby increasing the domestic savings rate. A well-structured reform of the pension fund market provides the opportunity to reach out simultaneously for growth and distributional equity in the next stage of India's capital market development.

P. Jayendra Nayak

See also **Commodity Markets; Debt Markets; Money and Foreign Exchange Markets; Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI); Stock Exchange Markets**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Nayak, P. Jayendra. "Regulation and Market Microstructure." In *India: A Financial Sector for the Twenty-first Century*, edited by James A. Hanson and Sanjay Kathuria. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Parekh, H. T. *Indian Capital Market: Past, Present, and Future*. Bombay: A. D. Shroff Memorial Trust, 1975.
- Thomas, Susan, and Ajay Shah. "Equity Derivatives in India: The State of the Art." In *Derivative Markets in India 2003*, edited by Susan Thomas. New Delhi: Tata McGraw-Hill, 2003.

CASTE AND DEMOCRACY Caste has been a major basis of solidarity, stratification, and conflict in South Asia for many centuries, and it continues to play an important role in Indian politics. While caste was and continues to be a basis of social dominance, mobilization behind caste banners since the nineteenth century has often aided the democratization of Indian society. The important role of caste in democratic India is in some ways similar to the relevance of other axes of historically rooted inequality, such as race and gender, in other democratizing societies.

Anthropologists once understood the caste system mainly with reference to Hindu texts, which prescribe a hierarchical and seemingly static society. According to this view, caste was fixed by ancestry, and it determined a very wide range of rights and responsibilities related to occupation, social status, ritual status, and permissible



BJP- JDU Joint Press Conference. At a press conference before the 2005 assembly election in Bihar, a region steeped in caste politics, Nitish Kumar (activist JDU leader on the left) and Ravi Shankar Prashed (BJP official on the right). The growing political empowerment of the middle and lower castes has not yet resulted in widespread social equality. INDIA TODAY.

forms of social interaction with others. The relevance of caste did mean that Indian society was hierarchical and that for a long period the avenues of social mobility were narrow. However, historians and anthropologists more recently showed that some groups were able to use economic, political, social, and military power to move up the caste hierarchy at different points, while others moved down the caste hierarchy, in ways that Hindu texts did not suggest was possible. Religious texts did not determine how caste operated as a category of social stratification; caste divisions were therefore relevant among most of India's non-Hindu groups—Christians, Buddhists, and Sikhs, and to some extent Muslims—even though the religious texts of these groups do not recognize caste.

The social reality of caste changed in some ways during British colonial rule. Colonial legal institutions understood caste much as the Hindu religious texts did, making the caste system more rigid in some respects than it had been before the onset of colonial rule. For instance, colonial regulation often increased the control of the upper castes over Hindu temples and limited the

space for some religious rituals that departed from upper caste orthodoxy. However, some changes under colonial rule widened avenues of social mobility. The colonial state adopted preferential policies to give the lower castes (called the untouchables, the ex-untouchables, the Harijans, and later the Dalits) and the middle castes greater access to education and the growing bureaucracy. Some middle caste groups gained from the commercialization of agriculture and the growth of trade. The colonial censuses enumerated caste groups, much as they did religious groups, encouraging the widening of networks linking members of particular castes. The state was receptive to claims made on behalf of caste groups, urging the growth of caste associations, which demanded greater resources, status, and dignity for the castes they claimed to represent. Social reform movements emerged, many of which demanded a reduction or end to inequalities based on caste. The growth of mass politics and associational activity increased the political participation and to a lesser extent the political representation of the middle castes. Some leaders of the Indian nationalist movement and the Congress Party, the strongest political forces of the late colonial period, promised to reduce



Political Rally in Delhi. Supporters of V. P. Singh and the Janata Dal (People's Party) rally before the 1989 national elections. With the victor, Congress Party leader Rajiv Gandhi, forced to resign after failing to form a majority government, Singh became prime minister. However, his dependence on a broad coalition of often alienated factions proved untenable and his government collapsed after only four months in office. AMAR TALWAR / FOTOMEDIA.

or eradicate caste-based inequalities once India became independent. However, forces to defend caste privilege remained strong both in society and in the Indian nationalist movement.

Caste associations have been an important part of civic life in India since the nineteenth century. While groups from different points in the social hierarchy formed these associations, the associations of the lower and middle castes became much stronger than those of the upper castes, which account for a much lower portion of the population. Caste associations claimed that the castes they represented once had, and ought to once again enjoy, higher social status. But, they also claimed that these castes were historically underprivileged, to demand greater access to resources. These associations grew through the twentieth century with the growth of mass politics, which often drew upon preexisting caste solidarities.

As the weight of numbers was crucial to their success, caste associations defined caste affiliation in increasingly expansive ways, sometimes bringing together different groups of formerly unequal social status under new caste labels. In the process of claiming greater shares in resources, higher social status, and an end to various social restrictions, caste associations implicitly or explicitly challenged caste as a basis of social inequality. Claims to shares in resources proportionate to their population distribution highlighted implicit claims by the less privileged castes to equal worth. Such claims and mobilization to pursue them were conducive to political equality, but certainly did not end the continued role of caste as a basis of social dominance.

India's postcolonial rulers proclaimed commitments to build democracy and to reduce different forms of social inequality. An important dimension of these tasks was the need to address caste-based inequalities. The postcolonial political elite chose to retain caste rather than shift to income as the basis of eligibility for "affirmative action" preferences and required preferences for the lower castes, but left similar preferential treatment for the middle castes to the judgment of state governments. It was claimed that all preferences would be phased out as the social mobility of the lower and middle castes increased. Preferential policies, however, benefited only a small proportion of the middle and lower castes, partly because they were restricted to education and government employment, the latter accounting for a significant but declining share of the workforce. Caste quotas increased rather than declined after decolonization. This increase was not due to the limited effect of these quotas in promoting social mobility, but because the subsequent growth in the mobilization of the middle and lower castes placed pressures on governments to maintain or expand caste preferences. Eligibility for these preferences became more expansive, and came to include many middle castes that had already experienced much social mobility. The introduction of more tiered preferences in some states partly counteracted the expansion of eligibility, reserving a share of seats in colleges and within the bureaucracy for the less well-off groups among the middle castes.

India's Constitution accorded citizens the fundamental right of protection from discrimination on the grounds of caste, and the practice of untouchability was made punishable. Indeed, the executive and the legislature swiftly initiated official efforts to end caste discrimination in postcolonial India. However, the bureaucracy and the police did not follow up the legislative commitments to any significant extent, especially regarding the practice of untouchability, partly because of the inadequate promotion of the lower castes to the upper echelons

of these institutions. For instance, police officials pursued cases of violent discrimination against Dalits only in a sparing manner, mainly in regions where the lower castes had some political power. Indeed, police officials themselves often discriminated against the lower castes, showing a tendency to imprison and physically abuse them more readily than they did other citizens. The enumeration of castes in censuses changed after decolonization. The earlier practice of counting specific castes was stopped, supposedly to give caste affiliation less official recognition, but the lower castes (now called the “scheduled castes” in official language) continued to be enumerated because of the state’s stated concern to attend to the condition of these groups. Growing pressures from middle caste groups led to a minor revival in the enumeration of all castes in the census of 2001, and this practice seems likely to be fully revived in the next census.

Caste has been among the major criteria governing the choices of many voters since electoral politics began in India in the early twentieth century. Voters focus on various aspects of caste in their political preferences: the caste of individual candidates, the representation of particular castes in the membership or leadership of parties, the castes with which parties might explicitly identify themselves, or the extent to which parties address the demands of particular castes. The significance of caste as a criterion in the choices of many voters did not, however, ensure that the numerically preponderant lower and middle castes enjoyed considerable political power. The political participation of the lower castes remained low in the first two decades after independence. The reservation of many parliamentary and legislative constituencies for lower caste candidates increased the political representation of these groups. It did not, however, give these groups much of an independent political voice, as parties dictate much of the behavior of legislators in India, and many lower caste legislators until recently had little political clout.

The political power of the middle castes grew more rapidly than that of the lower castes. They acquired a strong and independent political voice, mainly in regions in which movements and parties representing these groups became significant. This happened through the 1950s and the 1960s in much of southern India, but the political power of the middle castes grew comparably only from the 1970s onward in northern India, where the middle castes remain weaker than they are in southern India even into the twenty-first century. In other regions, such as West Bengal in eastern India, radical peasant mobilization increased the power of the largely middle and lower caste peasantry, although the Communists and other radical parties did not mobilize behind caste banners.

Parties that either explicitly mobilize a coalition of the less privileged castes, or that draw their support primarily from the middle and lower castes, ruled various states at different points—notably Tamil Nadu, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, and West Bengal. While such parties have not ruled India on their own, some of them were members of the multiparty alliances that ruled India at different points from the late 1980s onward.

The growing political power of the middle and lower castes urged some publicists and scholars to proclaim that this would prove an effective route to social equality. The increased political power of these groups certainly opened routes to social mobility through such means as the expansion of caste quotas, the increased distribution of patronage to the middle and lower castes, and greater receptivity in the bureaucracy to the demands of some of these groups. However, the middle and lower castes did not experience an increase in their income and property comparable to their increased political representation. Besides, the improvements in opportunity resulting from the political empowerment of these groups were concentrated among small sections of these castes. Increases in economic power did not bring about commensurate improvements in social status and reductions in social restrictions. The political empowerment of the middle and lower castes has not as yet made caste irrelevant as an axis of social dominance, nor has it brought in its wake widespread social equality to India.

Narendra Subramanian

See also Caste System; Development Politics; Economic Development, Importance of Institutions in and Social Aspects of

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Dirks, Nicholas B. “Castes of Mind.” *Representations* 37 (Winter 1992): 56–78.
- Galanter, Marc. *Competing Equalities: Law and the Backward Classes in India*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.
- Jaffrelot, Christophe. *India’s Silent Revolution: The Rise of the Low Castes in North Indian Politics*. Delhi: Permanent Black, 2003.
- Mendelsohn, Oliver, and Marika Vicziany. *The Untouchables: Subordination, Poverty and the State in Modern India*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Rudolph, Lloyd I., and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph. *The Modernity of Tradition: Political Development in India*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967.
- Shah, Ghanshyam, ed. *Caste in Indian Politics*. Delhi: Permanent Black, 2002.
- Srinivas, M. N. *Caste in Modern India and Other Essays*. New York: Asia Publishing House, 1962.
- Subramanian, Narendra. *Ethnicity and Populist Mobilization: Political Parties, Citizens and Democracy in South India*. Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 1999.

CASTE SYSTEM The 90th verse of the tenth chapter of the Rig Veda, dating back at least to the second millennium B.C., described the origins of the universe from Purusha's (the Cosmic Being) sacrifice of himself on the funeral pyre. From Purusha's mouth came the Brahman, from Purusha's arms the Rajanya (later referred to as Kshatriya), from Purusha's thighs the Vaishya, and from Purusha's feet the Shudra. By implication, Rig Veda X, 90 assigned status rankings to these four categories of humans. The terms "Brahman" (as priest) and *rajan* (as ruler) were defined in other passages of the Rig Veda, as when the *rajan* was enjoined to respect the Brahman, who might ritually improve the *rajan*'s chances of success when the *rajan* conducted cattle raids or waged war. Subsequent Vedas described how Brahman priests could enhance benefit and reduce harm when performing large public rituals as well as sacred sacrifices (*yajñas*) sponsored by individual sacrificers (*yajamanas*).

The four categories of humans who emerged from the sacrifice of Purusha came to be referred to as *varnas* (colors), a term also used to categorize timber and precious stones. The four categories were not referred to by other contemporary terms such as *kula* (family), *sabha* or *samiti* (assembly), or *shreni* (occupational guild). By the end of the Vedic period, the Brahman authors of the sacred texts agreed that the four *varṇa* divisions of society were cosmically ordained, with Brahmins outranking the other three *varṇas*. This Brahmanical view of society did not go unchallenged. Some persons claiming Kshatriya status maintained Kshatriyas outranked Brahmins. Others denounced the four-*varṇa* system in its entirety as a device conceived by Brahmins to perpetuate their domination over the rest of society. Siddhartha Gautama, the founder of Buddhism, and Mahavira, the founder of Jainism, were both identified as Kshatriyas, and both taught paths to enlightenment that bypassed Brahman priests and the four *varṇa* ranks.

Instructions in the Sūtras and Shāstras Regarding *Varṇa* Conduct

The sūtras ("threads," brief Sanskrit prose aphorisms) and *shāstras* (more elaborate Sanskrit verse instructions) were composed presumably by Brahmins during the centuries following the sixth century B.C. Some sūtras and *shāstras* provided instructions regarding the acquisition of wealth and power (e.g., the *Artha Shāstra*, attributed to Kautilya). Others provided erotic instructions (e.g., the *Kāma Sūtra*, attributed to Vatsyayana). Still others provided instructions regarding morally correct behavior (*dharmā*).

The *Dharma Shāstra* attributed to the sage Manu assigned occupations to each of the *varṇas*. Brahmins were to study, teach, perform sacrifices, and have little to



Nineteenth-Century Lithograph of Butcher or Tanner. In the Indian caste system, such workers are members of the lowest caste, the Shudras or untouchables. FOTOMEDIA ARCHIVE.

do with temple priests. Kshatriyas were to rule, wage war, sponsor sacrifices, and study. Vaishyas were to farm, breed cattle, trade, lend money, and study. Shudras were to serve the three higher *varṇas*. Men in the three higher *varṇas* were considered "twice-born"; their second birth ceremony (*upanayana*) occurred when they received the sacred thread (*janeu*) and could study the Vedic texts. Shudras (who were considered "once-born") and women were barred from studying the Vedic texts. According to Manu, men of the "twice-born" *varṇas* should observe four stages (*ashramas*) of their lives: celibate student, economically active married householder, retiree, and wandering mendicant. As outlined, the *varṇa* system consistently privileged the men of higher ranks over men of lower ranks. Men who failed to follow their prescribed occupations sank in social rank. Men of each *varṇa* were to marry women of the same *varṇa*—thereby making *varṇa* hereditary. In times of distress, men could marry women in lower *varṇas*. Those who engaged in the most serious offenses (e.g., drinking spirituous liquor) were to be treated as outcastes. Relatives were to perform their funeral rites and then neither converse with, nor marry, nor share any inheritance with them. Those who had been "outcasted" could be restored among their relatives only after performing appropriately severe penances.

Manu identified *mlecchas* as barbarians outside the four-*varṇa* system characteristic of the *aryas* (noble

ones). Inside the four-*varṇa* system, men of “twice-born” rank who failed to carry out their sacred duties descended to the status of *vratyas*. Kshatriyas who sank to the ranks of *vratyas* produced offspring like the *yavanas* (Greeks), *shakas* (Scythians), *pahlavas* (Parthians), and *dravidas* (southerners)—all identifiable groups living in various parts of the Indian subcontinent. Higher-*varṇa* men impregnating lower-*varṇa* women “in accord with the direction of the hair” (*anuloma*) received more approval than lower-*varṇa* men impregnating higher-*varṇa* women “against the hair” (*pratiloma*). Offspring of these alliances were stigmatized accordingly.

According to Manu, the mixing or confusion of *varṇas* (*varṇa samkara*) seriously endangered society. Disapproved sexual activities between *varṇas* generated new birth groups (*jatis*) with their own names and occupations. In one Manu sequence, if a Shudra male impregnated a Vaishya female, their offspring was a carpenter. If a Brahman male impregnated a Shudra female, their offspring was a fisherman. If a carpenter male impregnated a fisherman female, their offspring was a boatman (a plausible combination of carpenter and fisherman). According to Manu, one of the most offensive mixing of *varṇas* occurred when a Shudra male impregnated a Brahman female. Manu labeled the offspring of such miscegenation a Chandala. According to Manu, Chandalas were to live apart from other people and never enter villages or towns after dark. They were to eat from broken dishes, carry out the corpses of unclaimed dead, execute criminals, and wear the clothes of the executed and the dead. According to Manu, the *varṇa* into which one was born was a direct consequence of how one performed one’s morally correct behavior (*dharmā*) in one’s previous lives. The concept of reincarnation (*saṃsāra*) and the doctrine of karma (the moral order whereby every virtuous act is rewarded and every evil act is punished) provided an ethical foundation for the four-*varṇa* system and its permutations.

The Four-*Varṇa* System and Oral and Written Narratives

The Jataka tales (stories of Buddha’s previous births) described Chandalas as persons so polluting that a high-status maiden had to rinse her eyes with perfumed water after catching a glimpse of a Chandala. Sanskrit poems like those by Kalidasa, plays like those by Shudraka and Bhavabhuti, and the *Rāmāyaṇa* and *Mahābhārata* epics in their multiple-language versions all referred to the four *varṇas* with their assigned ranks and responsibilities. The *Bhagavad Gītā* described the origin and separate duties (*dharmas*) of Brahmans, Kshatriyas, Vaishyas, and Shudras, and declared: “Better to do one’s own duty imperfectly than to do another man’s well.” Although access to the

written four-*varṇa* heritage was restricted to a literate minority, the concepts of the four-ranked *varṇas*, their assigned duties, and their levels of pollution were widely recognized throughout North India by means of oral transmissions. In South India, similarly, Tamil narratives and instructional texts such as the *Tirukkural* described Brahmans, kings, ministers, warriors, merchants, artisans, musicians, and plowmen. But the South Indian narratives largely ignored the four-*varṇa* system. In fact, the presence of Buddhist and Jain teachers in the Tamil narratives sometimes overshadowed the spiritual stature of Brahmans.

Eyewitness Accounts of the *Varṇa* System Through History

Around 300 B.C., Seleucus Nicator, one of Alexander the Great’s generals, appointed Megasthenes as ambassador to Chandragupta Maurya’s court in Pataliputra. According to Megasthenes, the people of India living near Pataliputra were divided into seven groups with fixed occupations and mandatory within-group marriages. First in honor were philosophers, who officiated at sacrifices to the gods and the dead. Three of the remaining six groups were maintained by the royal treasury. Although Megasthenes’ description of fixed occupations and mandatory within-group marriages paralleled the *śāstras*, the fit between Megasthenes’ seven groups and the four *varṇas* was not clear.

At the beginning of the fifth century A.D., a Chinese Buddhist monk, Fahsien, traveled through northern India. In his journals he described Chandalas as fishermen and hunters who sold meat. In a land where, according to Fahsien, people did not kill living creatures or drink intoxicating liquor, Chandalas were considered wicked. They lived apart from others and struck a piece of wood when they entered a city or marketplace so that people could avoid them.

Two centuries later, another Chinese Buddhist monk, Hsien Tsang, traveled throughout much of India. Hsien Tsang described four classifications of ranked families that paralleled the *śāstras*: Brahmans lived purely, observed the most correct principles, and studied and taught the *Veda Śāstras*; Kshatriyas governed; Vaishyas engaged in commercial exchange and sought profit; and Shudras plowed and tilled the land. Purity and impurity assigned people their places in the four ranks. When people married, they rose or fell according to their new relationships. Hsien Tsang reported that, in addition to the four classifications, “there are other classes of many kinds that intermarry according to their several callings. It would be difficult to speak of these in detail.”

In the eleventh century, Alberuni, a Muslim from the court of Ghazni (in Afghanistan), traveled in India and

wrote in Arabic a description of the four-*varṇa* system. Below the four *varṇas* came eight craft groups who lived outside the towns of the four *varṇas*. Five of these craft groups freely intermarried but refused to marry three of the groups: shoemakers, weavers, and woolen-cloth thickeners. Below these eight craft groups came four groups considered “degraded outcasts” (among them Chandalas) who did “dirty work, like the cleansing of the villages” and who were thought of as illegitimate children of a Shudra male and a Brahman female.

In the early 1600s, al-Badayuni, a historian serving the Mughal emperor Akbar, wrote about a delegation of Brahmans who presented the emperor with Sanskrit verses describing the emperor as a reincarnated Hindu deity, predicted by ancient sages to be a conqueror who honored Brahmans and cows. Al-Badayuni also reported the emperor’s decision to have “learned Brahmans” (rather than Muslim judges) decide Hindu court cases, thereby instituting the Brahman-Kshatriya component of the four-*varṇa* system. In 1674, despite the objections of some Brahmans, the Maratha ruler Shivaji arranged for other Brahmans to perform his sacred-thread ceremony and declare him a Kshatriya, enhancing his authority over rival Maratha nobility.

In the sixteenth century, when Portuguese were settling on India’s southwestern coast, they labeled the local intramarrying groups *castas*. In Brazil and elsewhere in the New World, *castas* referred to groups that were identified by the proportions of Portuguese, Indian, and African “blood” they had in their veins. In time the French and British modified the Portuguese term *casta* to “caste” and applied it to the many intramarrying lineages they found in India.

In 1676 a Frenchman, Jean Baptiste Tavernier, published his journal of several trips he had made to India between 1641 and 1668 as a jewel merchant. He described the common belief that there were seventy-two castes in India, all of which, according to the most accomplished priests, emanated from four original castes: Brahmans (philosophers and astrologers, with a university in Banaras [varanasi]); Rajputs (meat-eating warriors, including all *rajas*) and Ketris (former warriors but currently merchants); Baniyas (vegetarian traders, money hangers, and bankers with extraordinary business acumen); and Shudras (foot soldiers). People who belonged to none of the four castes followed hereditary trades and married their sons and daughters to members of the same trade. The lowest of these castes ate pigs, removed refuse from people’s houses, and consumed other people’s leftover food.

More than a century later (between 1792 and 1823), a French Jesuit missionary, the Abbé J. A. Dubois, described India’s four ancient castes, the Brahmans, Kshatriyas,

Vaishyas, and Shudras, and their ordained occupations. He then reported that in South India each of the three or four principal divisions of Brahmans was further divided into at least twenty subdivisions. The few Kshatriyas and Vaishyas who existed in South India were also divided and subdivided (although South Indian Brahmans maintained that no true Kshatriyas existed any longer). The Shudras were the most numerous of the four castes. When added to the Pariahs and outcastes, the Shudras represented nine-tenths of South India’s population. The highest Shudras were cultivators, who looked down on and refused to eat with such occupational castes as weavers, carpenters, and barbers. Some castes existed in certain districts but not in others. Some castes observed customs no other castes observed, such as the Nairs (whose women had lovers but no husbands), the Nambudiris (who observed special funeral rites for their unmarried women), and the Kallars (some of whom were rulers, while others were robbers). Groups despised in some districts were held in esteem in other districts, depending on their local conduct and power.

The Abbé Dubois also described the “universally and invariably observed” South Indian custom of cross-cousin marriage, wherein one could marry a cousin from one’s mother’s brother or father’s sister, but not a cousin from one’s mother’s sister or father’s brother. South Indian Brahman marriages included the requirement that the bride and groom be descended from different *gotras* (remote priestly ancestors). Although, according to the Abbé Dubois, castes were the paramount distinctions among Hindus in South India, Hindus were also divided into sects (defined by their worship of Shiva, Vishnu, or a large number of other deities). In South India, Hindus were also divided into right-hand and left-hand factions (unknown in North India and with no known scriptural base). The right-hand factions included most of the higher caste Shudras supported by the lower caste Pariahs. The left-hand factions included the Vaishyas, the artisan castes, and the lowest caste leather workers. Clashes between the right-hand and left-hand factions could suddenly explode with shocking violence over matters of privilege. The Abbé reported one near-violent confrontation (settled peacefully) that was incited when a left-hand-faction leather worker inserted red flowers into his turban—a privilege Pariahs maintained belonged exclusively to the right-hand faction.

The British and the Caste System

The caste system became an object of serious British concern when the East India Company established law courts in its Madras, Bombay, and Calcutta presidencies. In civil cases (involving such matters as marriage, adoption, and inheritance), the company courts hired Muslim

and Hindu advisers to help the British judges apply Shari'ā laws to Muslims and *śāstra* laws to Hindus. In 1794 William Jones published his English version of Manu's *Dharma Śāstra* (in which he translated *varṇa* as "caste" and *Dharma Śāstra* as "laws"). The "Laws of Manu" soon acquired almost-canonical status in the company courts. British judges recognized the discrepancies between Manu's and other *śāstras*' instructions for the original four "castes" and the observed practices of the hundreds of "castes" and "subcastes" appearing before them in their courts. After the 1858 transfer of authority from the East India Company to the British crown, British judges decided civil cases on the basis of precedents (as occurred with common law in Britain) and "native customs." Only if precedents could not be found would British judges turn to English translations of Hindu and Muslim "law" books to make decisions.

British officials were encouraged to prepare ethnographic manuals and gazetteers of the people in their districts, including their race, caste, religion or sect, habits, and customs. These materials could be useful when recruiting for military service, identifying "criminal" groups, and controlling the land markets of "agricultural" and "merchant" groups. Starting in 1872, the Reverend M. A. Sherring published his three-volume *Hindu Tribes and Castes*, listing Brahmans and Kshatriyas at the top and continuing down the ranks of the *varṇas* to the lowest castes.

The British recorded their first all-India census in 1871 and 1872. They noted respondents' caste identities and tribal affiliations and tried, often with considerable difficulty, to place each group within the four-*varṇa* framework. W. C. Plowden, who had been responsible for the census report from the North-West provinces, later wrote that securing correct information from the castes and tribes in his region had been so confused and so difficult that he hoped no census would try to obtain similar information in the future. Government offices began receiving hundreds of petitions and memorials by castes and caste groups claiming higher status than that ascribed to them by the census. The 1881 census rendered a population of Brahmans, Rajputs, 207 "other castes" with minimum populations of 100,000 each, and 65 castes with lower populations spread over two or more provinces. The 1891 census abandoned *varṇas* and reported 60 subgroups divided into six broad occupational categories. In 1891 Herbert Risley published his two-volume *The Tribes and Castes of Bengal*, and in 1896 William Crooke published *The Tribes and Castes of the North-Western Provinces and Oudh*. Both authors identified castes, subcastes, tribes, and subtribes, and described their manners, customs, kinship systems, and occupational patterns. The 1901 census, under the supervision

of Risley, reintroduced castes and fit them into a British-constructed eleven-rank *varṇa* system, including four subdivisions of Shudras, three subdivisions of polluting castes, and ending with castes that denied the sacerdotal authority of Brahmans. The 1901 census included measurements of nasal and cranial indices to test the hypothesis that India's highest castes represented the purest racial types (i.e., the "invading Aryans") while the lowest castes reflected the greatest racial intermixing with the "original Dravidian inhabitants." The data failed to support the hypothesis.

The 1911 census commissioner suggested that perhaps the census should record India's lowest castes (referred to as untouchables, outcastes, or depressed classes) as not even Hindus, arousing considerable public agitation. Following the 1921 census, increasing dissatisfaction with the changing figures and overall accuracy of the caste returns and the "pestiferous deluge of representations" by caste groups throughout India filing for higher caste status led J. H. Hutton, the 1931 census commissioner, to announce that beginning with the 1931 census, in most instances castes would no longer be recorded. The 1931 census did report that Brahman castes (about 6% of India's total population) were most concentrated in Jammu and Kashmir (34%) and less concentrated in Madras province (3%). The census also mentioned that during caste enumerations Brahmans were sometimes "manufactured on the spot" from tribal and other local kinds of priests. M. W. M. Yeatts, superintendent of the 1931 Madras census, reported that castes' nomenclatures were changing so fast that exact comparisons could not be made between one census and another.

By 1931 a new factor had entered caste record keeping. E. V. Ramaswamy Naicker, Mohandas Gandhi, B. R. Ambedkar, and others had drawn the wider public's attention to the fact that approximately one-fifth of India's population (variously called untouchables, outcastes, backward castes, exterior castes, *adivasis*, *adi-Hindus*, depressed classes, and in South India *adi-Dravidas*) were being systematically discriminated against. Gandhi referred to them as *harijans* (children of God) in an effort to reverse their designated stigma. Reformers called on the British government to identify these disadvantaged groups in order to end their longstanding historical disabilities. Hutton, the 1931 census commissioner, instructed provincial superintendents to draw up their own lists of groups handicapped on account of their "degraded position in the Hindu social scheme." Handicaps generally included such ritual disabilities as denial of admission to Hindu temples and the perceptions by higher castes that members of these groups caused ritual pollution. Groups meeting local "degraded" criteria were

listed (i.e., “scheduled”) in 1936 to enable them to receive special electoral representation according to the Government of India Act of 1935. Their official designation became “scheduled castes” (SCs) and, later, “scheduled tribes” (STs).

The Caste System after India's Independence

Through its Constitution, the government of India initiated a policy of affirmative action referred to as “protective discrimination” or “compensatory discrimination.” Article 17 of India's Constitution declared that untouchability was abolished and that any disability arising out of untouchability was an offense “punishable in accordance with law.” Articles 330 and 331 reserved seats in the national Parliament and state assemblies, and Article 335 reserved “posts” (jobs) in the central and state governments for members of the scheduled castes and tribes. To address the constitutional guarantees in Article 16 of equal rights for all Indian citizens, the Constitution stipulated that the policies of reserved seats and reserved posts for scheduled castes and tribes would end after ten years. Every subsequent decade, Parliament amended the constitution to extend the scheduled-caste and scheduled-tribe reservations another ten years.

In 1960 the government of India published a nationwide list of 405 scheduled castes and 225 scheduled tribes, arranged in alphabetical order. Some of them were “scheduled” in certain localities but not in neighboring localities. Some were called by different names in different linguistic regions of India (suggesting that these castes were not actually intramarrying groups). In 1976 the government of India published an amended state-by-state list of 841 scheduled castes and 510 scheduled tribes. Some castes were still “scheduled” in certain localities but not in neighboring localities, and some castes were called by two or more names in the same and neighboring localities. When caste identities were unclear, India's Constitution assigned to Parliament and the president the final decisions regarding a group's “scheduled” or “nonscheduled” status. According to the published lists, scheduled castes comprised about 17 percent of India's population and scheduled tribes comprised about 7.5 percent, for a total of 22.5 percent. Members of scheduled castes and scheduled tribes throughout India began labeling themselves Dalits, a Marathi term for “oppressed” used by Dr. Ambedkar. Soon references were being made to Dalit activism and agitation as well as Dalit poetry, literature, drama, art, and film.

Article 15(4) of India's Constitution authorized the state to make special provisions “for the advancement of any socially and educationally backward classes of citizens.” Article 16(4) of India's Constitution authorized the state to provide equal opportunities of public employment for

“any backward class of citizens” inadequately represented in state services. The term “Other Backward Classes” (OBCs) was already in official use to identify groups in different parts of India that were entitled to educational concessions. The Constitution, however, gave no formal criteria to identify the “backward classes” to which it referred.

In 1978 the ruling Janata Party appointed B. P. Mandal to head the Backward Classes Commission. The Mandal Commission's task was to determine the criteria for identifying India's “socially and educationally backward classes” and to recommend steps for their advancement. Between 1978 and 1980 the commission generated an “Other Backward Class” (OBC) list of 3,743 castes and a more underprivileged “Depressed Backward Class” list of 2,108 castes. On 31 December 1980, the Mandal Commission submitted its report, recommending that 27 percent of central and state government jobs should be reserved for OBCs. In 1992 the Supreme Court ruled that “caste” could be used to identify “backward classes,” that “backward classes” could include non-Hindus such as Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians, and that the “creamy layer” (i.e., the wealthiest members) of the backward classes could not receive backward-class benefits.

Ever since India's first elections in the 1950s, party strategies and electoral outcomes were explained partly in terms of castes and caste groups. Castes were sometimes described as “vote banks.” The years following the implementation of the Mandal Commission recommendations saw the emergence, especially in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, of candidates and political parties specifically representing the backward classes or scheduled castes.

Prior to India's independence, a number of anthropologists, including G. S. Ghurye, had suggested that India's caste system stemmed from the efforts of Brahmans (and “invading Aryans”) to maintain their racial purity among the “resident Dravidians.” India's many contemporary castes resulted primarily from fission and segmentation of the original four *varṇas*. After independence, anthropologist Irawati Karve, applying the categories of castes, caste clusters, and groups of caste clusters, used physical anthropological data to argue that some members of the same caste clusters (e.g., Brahmans, Kumbhars) could not be biologically related to other members of the same caste clusters (challenging the fission-segmentation hypothesis).

In 1953 H. N. C. Stevenson presented the thesis that in India a caste's ritual status rested on its purity and pollution behavior patterns. Louis Dumont, McKim Marriott, and others extended and elaborated upon Stevenson's purity and pollution thesis. An awkward nonfitting

observation was that third-ranked Vaishyas consistently observed purity and pollution behaviors more strictly than second-ranked Kshatriyas (who often transgressed purity and pollution norms).

In 1952 sociologist M. N. Srinivas defined “Sanskritization” as low castes’ (and other lower groups’) efforts to raise their status by emulating Brahmins’ (or other *varṇas*) beliefs and ways of life by becoming vegetarians, prohibiting their widows from remarrying, and so on. An alternative to “Sanskritization” was “Westernization”—a many-layered concept extending from Western technology to the experimental method of modern science. Subsequent studies of castes and caste clusters suggested that the *varṇa* hierarchy was one of several widely acknowledged South Asian hierarchies, according to which *jatis* (birth groups, lineages) were ranked by others and ranked themselves, using often-contested ranking criteria. In addition to whichever *jatis* may have evolved from fission and segmentation, *jatis* also became defined through economic and political gains and losses, status manipulation (sometimes involving revised genealogies and Brahmins’ endorsements), “outcasting” by one caste segment of another caste segment (and failures of the “outcasted” segment to be reinstated through apologies, fines, feasts, etc.), alliances between groups seeking larger numbers, migrations, relocations, sponsorships, and a host of other social dynamics associated with groups seeking higher status and other collective advantages within culturally shared status hierarchies.

The Future of the Caste System

Buddhists and Jains have criticized Brahmanical rituals and the four-*varṇa* hierarchy since the fifth century B.C. Between the seventh and tenth centuries A.D., South Indian poets, some from the lowest castes, bypassed Brahman intermediaries and addressed their devotions directly to representatives of the divine who could ignore their low caste origins and release them from their endless cycles of rebirths. In twelfth century Mysore, Basava started the Lingayat movement, whose followers renounced caste, only in the end to become much like an intramarrying caste themselves. In the fifteenth century in North India, Ramanand and Kabir called for the abolition of castes. In sixteenth-century Punjab, Guru Nanak and his Sikh followers stressed interdining and the breaking down of castes. In nineteenth-century North India, both the Brahmo Samaj and the Ārya Samāj denounced caste hierarchies. In 1919 in Tamil Nadu an anti-Brahman “Justice for Non-Brahman” political party was founded, followed in 1925 by the “Respect Movement,” which called for Hindus to stop using Brahmins to conduct their marriages. Mahatma Gandhi denounced caste as a “travesty” of the classical four-*varṇa* system and

called for the “absolute social equality” of the *varṇas* and the abolition of untouchability.

When India became independent, many hoped for a “casteless, classless” society. India’s Constitution called for “equality of status and of opportunity.” Yet throughout the remainder of the twentieth century, India’s caste system continued to flourish socially, economically, and politically. At the beginning of the twenty-first century, India’s caste system was still reflected in employment and voting behavior, the activities of castes negotiating for different SC, ST, and OBC statuses, and in marriage negotiations. The matrimonial sections of newspapers’ classified advertisements continued to list “brides wanted for . . .” and “grooms wanted for . . .” with references to specific castes and *gotras*.

Westerners from philosopher Georg Hegel on foresaw the end of the caste system in India. Karl Marx predicted that the Indian railway system and modern industry would “dissolve” the hereditary occupations “upon which rest the Indian castes.” Christian and Muslim missionaries hoped that conversion to a faith denying reincarnation would undercut the moral legitimacy of the caste system, thereby ending castes at least among Muslims and Christians. Yet scheduled castes, scheduled tribes, and other backward classes continued to exist among India’s Muslims and Christians. Castes and the caste system also continued to exist outside India in neighboring Nepal and Sri Lanka. And castes and the caste system played various complex roles in the diaspora of Indian communities around the world.

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, the term “caste” continued to describe three different phenomena in India: the four *varṇas*; the thousands of publicly identified kinship groups referred to as “castes” in census tracts and other official documents; and lineages of related families from among which parents arranged their children’s marriages. India’s caste system will continue to exist as long as individuals feel that the *varṇa* or census rankings of their castes are important; that their castes are their final bases for educational, sickness, and old-age support; and that their responsibilities as parents include finding suitable brides and grooms for their children from within designated castes.

Joseph W. Elder

See also *Brāhmaṇas*; *Dalits*; *Hinduism (Dharma)*; *Mandal Commission Report*; *Sabhas and Samitis*

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Basham, Arthur Llewellyn. *The Wonder That Was India: A Survey of the Culture of the Indian Sub-Continent before the Coming of the Muslims*. New York: Macmillan, 1954.

- Buhler, Georg, trans. *The Laws of Manu*. Vol. 25 of *The Sacred Books of the East*, edited by F. Max Müller. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1886.
- Dirks, Nicholas B. *Castes of Mind: Colonialism and the Making of Modern India*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2001.
- Dubois, Abbé J. A. *Hindu Manners, Customs and Ceremonies*. Translated by Henry K. Beauchamp. 3rd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906.
- Karve, Irawati. *Hindu Society: An Interpretation*. 2nd ed. Poona: Deshmukh Prakashan, 1968.
- Wheeler, James T., and Michael Macmillan. *European Travellers in India*. Calcutta: Susil Gupta, 1956.

CENTRAL BANKING, DEVELOPMENTAL ASPECTS OF India, like other developing countries, has had a late start in central banking, which evolved under the influence of both international banking practices as well as the imperatives of the emerging domestic economy. Since the overriding focus has been on achieving rapid economic development, inevitably, central banks in emerging economies have had a distinct developmental orientation. Unlike several other developing economies, however, in India the central bank was established before independence from British colonial rule in 1947. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) was established as a private shareholders' bank in 1935. After independence, the subsequent developmental orientation necessitated the conversion of the RBI from a private shareholders' bank into a nationalized central bank.

The primary developmental challenge for the RBI during the 1950s and 1960s was to build a financial network with a wide geographical spread and deep socioeconomic reach. Extending beyond the conventional objectives of central banking, the First Five-Year Plan (1951) noted that "central banking in a planned economy . . . would have to take on a direct and active role, firstly in creating or helping to create the machinery needed for financing developmental activities all over the country and secondly, ensuring that the finances available flows in the directions intended."

An important step toward this objective was the formation of the State Bank of India in 1955. In addition, the RBI promoted long-term industrial financing by establishing term-financing institutions, including the Industrial Finance Corporation of India (1948), State Financial Corporations (1952) and the Industrial Development Bank of India (IDBI; 1964), as well as a mutual fund entity, the Unit Trust of India (UTI; 1964). In accordance with its statutory mandate, the RBI also promoted an appropriate structure of policies, procedures, and institutions in rural financing, including the creation of the Agricultural Refinance and Development Corporation (1963). At the same time, efforts were made

to strengthen the cooperative credit structure and to improve credit delivery at the grassroots level, with the goal of eliminating exploitative informal sources of financing. Furthermore, the RBI offered a number of sector-specific refinance facilities, including export credit and food credit, and established three national funds in order to finance long-term operations in agriculture and industry and to support agricultural stabilization. These measures were supported by the necessary legislative framework for facilitating reorganization and consolidation of the banking system, including the enactment of the Banking Regulation Act of 1949.

In the 1960s and 1970s, the challenge was to ensure that the financial system was able to channel resources from the saver to the investor, in tune with the wider objectives of developmental planning. A major step was the nationalization of fourteen large commercial banks in 1969. Banks were given "priority" sector targets for agriculture and small-scale industries in the 1970s. Special schemes were introduced for the weaker sections, such as the Differential Rate of Interest plan in 1972 and the Integrated Rural Development Programme in 1980. In continuation of the earlier phase of institution building, new specialized institutions were created for rural credit, including Regional Rural Banks (1975) and the National Bank for Agriculture and Rural Development (NABARD), as well as export financing, in the form of the Export and Import Bank of India, both in 1982.

The objective of creating a large financial, especially banking, network was satisfied by the 1980s. Following nationalization, banking in India acquired a broad mass base and emerged as an important instrument of socioeconomic change. The difficulty, however, was that the imperatives of "social control," in the form of credit controls and concessional lending, segmented financial markets and blunted the process of price discovery, thereby impinging on the efficiency of resource allocation and thus the profitability of the banking industry. At the same time, the sharp increase in the government's budgetary gap had to be funded initially by raising resources from the banking system by fiat, first by raising statutory liquidity requirements and later by monetizing the fiscal deficit. In order to neutralize the inflationary effect of deficit financing, the RBI had to raise reserve requirements, thus imposing an indirect tax on the banking system. By 1991 statutory stipulations came to account for as much as over 60 percent of the deposit mobilization by the banking system, further limiting the scope for portfolio optimization by the banking system. Furthermore, the imperative of maintaining low interest rates in order to contain the interest rate cost of public debt and to provide concessional credit to various sectors resulted in a degree of financial repression in the economy.

This repression led to the challenge of rejuvenating the process of price discovery so as to enhance the efficiency of resource allocation, without compromising social imperatives. This involved a three-pronged strategy of dismantling the regime of administered interest rates and directed credit, introducing new financial instruments and making financial markets capable of allocating resources in line with market signals, while at the same time ensuring credit delivery for the relatively disadvantaged sections of society.

A series of policy initiatives were taken in the 1980s, mainly aimed at consolidation and diversification, and to an extent, at deregulation. The consolidation measures included rationalization of branch expansion while emphasizing coverage of spatial gaps in rural areas, institution of comprehensive action plans of organizational development by individual banks, and greater focus on balance sheet strength. Banks were accorded greater operational flexibility in terms of greater discretion in portfolio allocation, especially with the abolishing of the Credit Authorisation Scheme in 1988, as well as fresh business opportunities in equipment leasing (1984) and mutual funds (1987). The process of financial liberalization in terms of rationalization of the interest rate structure and development of financial markets, especially money markets, took root in the late 1980s. The RBI also promoted the Discount and Finance House of India in 1988 to act as a market maker in the money markets. The Small Industries Development Bank of India was set up in 1990 to provide finance for small-scale industries.

The process of financial sector reforms gathered momentum in the 1990s, as a part of the overall program of reforms in the aftermath of the unprecedented balance of payments crisis in 1991. In line with the increasing market orientation of the economy, the very form of the developmental orientation experienced a dramatic change. The earlier regime of administered interest rates and credit controls was replaced by an incentive structure to channel funds in accordance with the spirit of financial liberalization and the imperatives of poverty eradication. The RBI has since spearheaded the modernization of the financial system through the development and diffusion of information technology, and improvement in trading and settlement practices, including the gradual migration to a real-time gross settlement system. At the same time, the conventional monetary policy objective of price stability, which had acquired an important dimension in developing economies, especially since inflation tends to hurt the poor the most, was no longer as relevant. By the mid-1990s, inflation had been reined in, decelerating to around 5 percent between 1995 and 2004 from over 8 percent in the 1970s and 1980s. The challenge is now to consolidate the hard-won gains against inflation by stabilizing inflationary expectations.

The RBI now accords substantial freedom to banks in optimizing their portfolios as well pricing their products, except in specific cases such as interest rates chargeable on small loans and priority sector advances. Statutory pre-emptions have been progressively reduced to the minimum (25% in case of statutory liquidity ratio) or close to the minimum 3 percent (in case of cash reserve ratio). The RBI is gradually divesting its investments in term-lending institutions—including phasing out concessional finance in the form of national funds—and is doing away with sector-specific refinance facilities, which have often resulted in market segmentation. At the same time, prudential norms have been instituted and supervisory framework strengthened for financial institutions to ensure financial stability. The RBI now offers incentives to banks in the areas of infrastructure financing and housing loans.

The RBI has undertaken several measures to strengthen the credit delivery system, especially to the disadvantaged sections of Indian society. Although banks are still required to earmark 40 percent of their advances for the priority sector, the definition of the priority sector has been considerably widened—and besides, the shortfall, if any, can be deposited with NABARD's Rural Infrastructure Development Fund. Another new development is the experiment of micro-finance, through self-help groups funded directly by banks or through intermediaries, such as nongovernmental organizations. The RBI is strengthening the supervisory framework of cooperative banks and nonbanking financial companies, which are able to meet localized and sometimes specialized financing requirements through their local network because of their relative flexibility.

The concept of central banking in India has thus shifted course over the years, responding to the contemporary challenges of economic development. Just as it was necessary to build institutions to monetize the economy in the 1950s, the very process of financial deepening prompted the financial institutions to function efficiently by the 1990s. The RBI thus continues to play a key role in the progress of economic development in India in tune with the changing macroeconomic environment.

Narendra Jadhav

See also **Banking Sector Reform since 1991; Development of Commercial Banking 1950–1990; Reserve Bank of India, Evolution of**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Jadhav, Narendra D. "Central Bank Strategies, Credibility and Independence: Global Evolution and the Indian Experience." Mumbai: Reserve Bank of India Occasional Papers, Summer and Monsoon, 2003.
- Jadhav, Narendra D., Partha Ray, Dhritidutyuti Bose, and Indranil Sen Gupta. "The Reserve Bank of India's Balance

Sheet: Analytics and Dynamics of Evolution." Mumbai: Reserve Bank of India Occasional Papers, Winter, 2003.
 Reserve Bank of India. *Functions and Working of the Reserve Bank of India*. Mumbai: RBI, 1983.
 ———. *Report on Currency and Finance, 2003–2004*. Mumbai: RBI, 2004.

CHAITANYA (1486–1533), Vaishnava mystic.

Chaitanya, the Bengal Vaishnava mystic and "saint" who gave distinctive emotional flavor to the worship of Krishna, is worshiped by many as the joint incarnation of Rādhā and Krishna in the present degraded age of Kali. Born as Vishvambhara Mishra into a Brahman family in Navadvīpa (West Bengal) in 1486, he received training in the complex logical system (Navya-Nyāyā) that had made Navadvīpa an intellectual center. His pursuit of a scholarly career ended in 1508, when he journeyed to Gayā to perform the rites for his deceased father; he returned home immersed in praise of Krishna. In Navadvīpa, he quickly became the leader—and shortly thereafter the focus—of a Vaishnava group that met in courtyards to chant the names of God (*nāma-sankīrtana*) with an intensity that led to dancing and ecstatic experience of the presence of Krishna. The influence of Vishvambhara's group increased as the chanting and dancing moved from private homes into the streets (*nagara-sankīrtana*), where all could join the experience.

After only two years, in 1510, despite pleas from his wife and his mother, Vishvambhara became a *sannyāsi* as Krishna Chaitanya and departed for the pilgrimage center of Puri in Orissa. In 1512 he left on pilgrimage to South India, where he had a significant meeting with Rāmānanda Rāya, in which he learned to appropriate the feelings of Rādhā (*Rādhā-bhāva*) as she lovingly yearned for the absent Krishna (*viraha-bhakti*); this participation in the love of both Rādhā and Krishna led to the belief that he was the joint incarnation of Rādhā and Krishna. In 1514 he journeyed to Vrindāvana, site of Krishna's early life as described in the Bhāgavata Purāṇa; there he lived his ecstatic participation in the divine play. His devotional focus on the holy sites in Vraja (a region spanning western Uttar Pradesh and eastern Rajasthan) paralleled that of other sixteenth-century Vraja "saints"—Nimbārka, Vallabhācārya, Hit Harivansh, Swāmī Haridās—who transformed the meaning of that region and of Krishna devotion itself. By 1516 Chaitanya had settled in Puri, where his increasingly intense ecstasies probably hastened his mysterious death in 1533. Although he was not a theologian and wrote little or nothing himself, Chaitanya directed and inspired an outpouring of poetry, drama, and theological works, which constituted a distinct Vaishnava path or *sampradaya*. After his death, three groups, associated with his Bengali disciples Advaitācārya and Nityānanda and with six theologians (called Goswāmīs) who lived in Vrindavana, developed

Chaitanya's legacy in diverse ways. Three of them, the brothers Rūpa and Sanātana, and their nephew Jīva, wrote the core theological texts for the movement; another, Gopāla Bhatta, provided its devotional and ritual basis.

The biographical tradition reflects the various layers of Chaitanya's character and influence. He was an ardent *bhakti* "saint" (simply called *Mahāprabhu*, "great Lord," by Bengalis) who taught the practice of chanting the divine name (*Hari nāma*), the devotion most apt for the present age. By his ecstatic devotion, he entered Krishna's divine play, tasted the Lord's emotions, and not only communicated this to others but enabled them to participate as well; Chaitanya made Krishna incarnate once again so that his followers could enter their own proper roles in Krishna's divine play. Chaitanya himself focused all of Rādhā's frenzied yearning (*viraha*) for Krishna and thus is Lord *Gaurāṅga*, the "Golden *avatāra*." The biographical traditions in the decades following Chaitanya's death reflected all these dimensions: saint and savior, model of devotional practice, avatar of Krishna for the present age. The final stage appears around 1615 in the Bengali biography *Chaitanya-caritāmṛta*, by a follower of the Vrindāvana Goswāmīs, Krishnadāsa Kavirāja, who incorporated their theology and devotional aesthetics to show Chaitanya as the joint incarnation of Rādhā and Krishna.

Chaitanya's enduring missionary impulse in Bengali Vaishnavism led to three waves of teachers to the West: Bābā Premānanda Bhārati (1859–1914) in 1902; Mahānāmbṛata Brahmachāri (1904–1999) in 1933; and A. K. Bhaktivedānta Swami (1896–1977), founder of the Hare Krishna Movement (ISKCON), in 1965.

Gerald Carney

See also **Devī; Hinduism (Dharma)**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

The most thorough treatment of the biographical traditions about Chaitanya is the unpublished Ph.D. dissertation by Tony K. Stewart, "The Biographical Images of Krishna Caitanya: A Study in the Perception of Divinity" (University of Chicago, 1985). A summary of this biographical development appears in Stewart's introduction (pp. 3–106) to *Caitanya Caritāmṛta of Krishnadāsa Kavirāja*, translated by Edward C. Dimock, Jr. (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999). Other significant historical studies of Chaitanya and the Gaudīya Vaishnava devotional tradition include: Ramakanta Chakravarti, *Vaishnavism in Bengal: 1486–1900* (Calcutta: Sanskrit Pustak Bandar, 1985); Sushil Kumar De, *Early History of the Vaishnava Faith and Movement in Bengal*, 2nd ed. (Calcutta: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1961); David Haberman, *Acting as a Way of Salvation: A Study of Rāgānugā; Bhakti Sādhana* (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1988); and A. K. Majumdar, *Caitanya: His Life and Doctrine* (Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1969).

CHALCOLITHIC (BRONZE) AGE After the initial domestication of plants and animals during the Neolithic period, settled communities in different geographical areas of South Asia began to develop regional cultures that archaeologists group together on the basis of shared pottery styles and technology, subsistence strategies, settlement organization, economic structure, and sociopolitical organization. Although these cultures continued to use stone tools, they also developed copper and eventually bronze metallurgy, leading early scholars to coin the term “Chalcolithic” (copper-stone) to differentiate them from earlier Neolithic and Paleolithic cultures. Some regional cultures remained basically unchanged for hundreds of years, but in other areas they developed trade networks with adjacent regional groups and eventually became integrated into complex chiefdoms or state-level society. Baluchistan and the piedmont along the western edge of the Indus Valley saw the emergence of numerous different regional cultures around 5500 to 4500 B.C. The regionalization process began around 3500 to 3200 B.C. in Gujarat and Rajasthan and 2200 B.C. in the Deccan region of peninsular India. During and after the decline of the Indus civilization (1900–1300 B.C.), copper-using cultures were present in the upper Gangetic Plain, such as the Ochre Colored Pottery culture, the enigmatic Copper Hoards culture, and the early phases of the Painted Grey Ware Culture. The final phases of the Painted Grey Ware culture see the introduction of iron and represent the final stage of Chalcolithic cultures in the northern subcontinent around 1200 to 800 B.C.

Northwest Region

The regional cultures of the greater Indus Valley and Baluchistan, as well as parts of Kutch, Saurashtra, and Gujarat, all contributed to the eventual emergence of the Indus Valley civilization. Because no single site can produce all of the relevant information needed to understand the larger region, archaeologists often group the information of different sites together and refer to them collectively as a cultural phase. For example, many distinctive cultural phases based on pottery styles, figurines, and burials can be identified at Mehrgarh and Nausharo. These sites are located at the interface between Baluchistan and the Indus Valley and some of the cultural phases (Kechi Beg, Damb Sadaat, Faiz Mohammad, etc.) relate to the Chalcolithic cultures of Baluchistan, while others (Hakra, Amri, Kot Diji) relate more to the Indus Valley. Since no state-level society emerged in Baluchistan, the following discussion will focus only on the Indus Valley, using examples from specific sites and phases.

The Ravi Phase (3500–2800 B.C.) is named after the earliest occupation levels at the site of Harappa, located on the Ravi River. The processes represented in the Ravi Phase are found throughout the northern Punjab, but similar

processes are seen at sites in Cholistan, Sind, Baluchistan, and Gujarat, each of which can be identified as distinct phases (Hakra, Bannu, Balakot, Amri, Sothi, Anarta, etc.). The Kot Diji Phase (2800–2600 B.C.) is named after a site that is located just across the Indus from Mohenjo-Daro in Sind. The cultural processes represented in the Kot Diji Phase are found at sites throughout the central and northern Indus Plain, including the regions along the Sarasvatī-Ghaggar-Hakra River that flows to the east of the Indus. During this period of regionalization, Chalcolithic cultures developed the essential subsistence and resource base needed for urban society as well as the trading networks and technologies needed to maintain a complex economic system. Eventually they evolved into highly stratified societies, probably organized as chiefdoms, with the ability to control access to essential resources and maintain a strong political and religious structure, setting the foundation for the formation of urbanism and state-level society.

Ravi Phase (3500–2800 B.C.)

Excavations in the lowest levels at the site of Harappa in the Punjab have provided evidence for the early Chalcolithic communities who lived on the alluvial plain. The early village grew to around 10 hectares and was possibly divided into two settlements separated by a gully. Houses were oriented north-south and east-west, and were constructed using wood and reeds with mud-plastered walls. Hand-formed irregularly shaped mud bricks appear to have been used for pottery kilns in the early period; later, more uniform mud bricks were used for building houses. The bricks measured $4 \times 9 \times 16$ inches ($11 \times 23 \times 40$ centimeters), which corresponds to the ratio of 1:2:4. The Ravi Phase may be interpreted as the beginning of a long tradition of brick proportions that became widespread throughout the Indus Valley.

Wheat, barley, and possibly wild grasses similar to millets were cultivated on the fertile alluvium. The most important domestic animals were the humped cattle, the sheep, and the goat. Some pigs and other wild animals were hunted, and there is evidence for fishing and hunting of small game and birds. A wide variety of crafts were developed at the site, including textiles, probably made from cotton or wool. Specialized crafts include bead making, using locally available terra-cotta and exotic stones, such as carnelian, various types of agate and jasper, amazonite, and lapis lazuli. Steatite beads (yellowish to gray colored steatite) were bleached and fired with both clear and blue-green glazes. The range of objects produced in different varieties of raw material (either terra-cotta or hard stone beads) demonstrates the presence of some social stratification.

All pottery from the early Ravi Phase was hand formed, but in the later levels some of the pottery was made using

a slow potter's wheel. The forms include heavy coarseware cooking vessels and finely made pots with polychrome decorations, using white, brown, red, and black pigments. Painted motifs include fish-scale and intersecting circle designs as well as the pipal leaf motif that becomes diagnostic of later Kot Diji and Harappa Phase pottery. Grayish black to gray brown chert from Baluchistan was used to make blades and blade tools, including microdrills for the perforation of stone beads, wood, or shell. Bone tools, such as spatulas, awls, arrow points, and perforated disks were also produced. Copper was not very common, but some fragmentary arrow points and awls have been found. Terra-cotta bangles and shell bangles from the marine shell *Turbinella pyrum* (identical to the shell used in the Neolithic at Mehrgarh) were also made at the site. Terra-cotta bull figurines and a fragment of a terra-cotta cart suggest that the people of Harappa were among the first to develop wheeled carts for transporting goods across the plains. The numerous varieties of raw materials from distant areas provide evidence for extensive trade contacts with the seacoast, which was over 500 miles (800 km) to the south, and sources of copper, grinding stone, and semiprecious stones that were 60 to over 300 miles (100 to over 500 km) to the north and west.

No burials have been found in the Ravi Phase at Harappa, but early burials with a few ornaments and pottery have been found in the early Chalcolithic levels at Mehrgarh (Period III, 4000 B.C.). Terra-cotta animal and female figurines at Harappa may represent votive images. A bone button seal with a geometric pattern that resembles a swastika may be the earliest evidence for the use of this motif in the Indus Valley. Prefiring "potter's marks" have been discovered on the base and lower body of some vessels and generally consist of single or double strokes or "v" or "x" motifs. Postfiring graffiti that includes many single and some multiple signs represents an early form of the Indus. Some of these graffiti signs are unique to Harappa, while others are common throughout the Indus Valley during this same time period.

During this same general time period, many other sites with similar cultural developments were established along the edges of the Indus Valley and also in the core regions: Amri to the south, Mehrgarh and Nausharo in the Kachhi Plain, Gumla and Rehmandheri in the Gomal Plain to the north, and Sarai Khola in the Taxila Valley. In Gujarat the local Chalcolithic cultures were also emerging and have been discovered at the sites of Loteshwar, Datrana, Nagwada, and Prabhas Patan.

Kot Diji Phase, 2800–2600 B.C.

This cultural phase is very important because it represents the initial phase of urbanism in the Indus Valley, prior to the establishment of the major Harappa Phase cities. Numerous sites throughout the central and northern part

of the Indus Valley provide evidence for this phase. At Harappa, the Ravi Phase settlement grows to over 25 hectares in area, and there are two distinct walled mounds. The perimeter walls were constructed from mold-made mud bricks, $10 \times 20 \times 40$ centimeters (1:2:4 ratio), using clay collected around the site, as well as from more distant sources. Bullock carts would have been needed to bring mud bricks from surrounding villages, and the presence of many different types of toy carts and wheels indicate that this technology was well developed at Harappa. Mud-brick houses were also made with smaller mold-made bricks (1:2:4 ratio) and were oriented along the cardinal directions. Houses were arranged along the sides of wide streets with large sump pots and hearths located in specific areas of the houses, often adjacent to the street. Although no formal drains have been found at Harappa, they are reported from the site of Kalibangan during the Kot Diji phase and were made from baked brick. Most pottery was made on the wheel, and new vessel forms and decorations at Harappa are similar to styles found over a very large area of the Indus Valley. Short-rimmed globular vessels with sandy slip on the exterior are one of the diagnostic forms found at Amri, Mohenjodaro, Dholavira, Kot Diji, Harappa, Kalibangan, and Rehmandheri. The use of polychrome decorations declined and a new style of red-slipped pottery with bold black painted designs became widespread. The most common motifs are the intersecting circle, fish-scale design, pipal leaf, and a distinctive form of buffalo-horned deity.

Trade networks expanded to the south to bring gray-brown and tan cherts from the Rohri Hills to the northern Indus Valley. Larger grind-stone fragments indicate the increase in shipping of heavy goods along the rivers and plains using boats and bullock carts. Copper objects became more common, with distinctive copper arrow points that may have been traded from the Ganeswar-Jodhpura culture in the northern Aravalli Hills to the west. Bead making, bangle production and other specialized crafts begun in the Ravi Phase became more highly refined, and new technologies were developed at Harappa and other sites during the Kot Diji Phase. The first high-quality faience beads were produced during this period, along with large quantities of white steatite disk beads. Trade in carnelian, agate, lapis lazuli, and marine shell continued to grow, and new varieties of colored stones indicates the demand for more diverse and exquisite objects. During this period the earliest gold sequins and beads are found at Harappa. Other sites such as Kunal in India have revealed hoards of gold and silver jewelry that demonstrate the emergence of highly stratified social and economic communities.

Economic stratification is also reflected in the use of weights and seals. A cubical limestone weight corresponding

to the standard weights that became widespread during the Harappan period has been found at Harappa, indicating control of trade and possibly taxation. Glazed square steatite button seals with geometric designs have been found at Harappa and most other Kot Dijian sites. A unique find at Harappa is an unfinished, broken square seal with an elephant motif and a perforated knob on the back. Another important discovery in the same levels is a clay sealing of a square seal with script. This sealing indicates that inscribed seals were being used to seal containers or storerooms. Seals with both animal motif and script have not yet been found, but they become the standard form of seal during the later Harappa Phase. Potter's marks continue to be produced using many of the same signs found in the Ravi Phase. A new type of potter's mark, incised on the outside of molds for making large jars, consists of multiple signs that may in fact be a form of script. The emergence of an early Indus script has been identified at Harappa based on the fact that postfiring graffiti becomes more standardized, and for the first time we see single and multiple signs that appear identical to later Indus script.

During the Kot Diji Phase there is evidence for the emergence and spread of regional ideologies that show important similarities in terms of painted motifs on pottery, styles of terra-cotta animal and human figurines, and geometric designs on seals. Very distinctive styles of female figurines, often referred to as Mother Goddesses, have been reported from the Chalcolithic levels at Mehrgarh and Nausharo and throughout the Zhob and Loralai Valleys in Baluchistan. Some female figurines found at Harappa show distinctive painted ornaments and patterned textiles, but others are almost identical to figurines from the sites of Gumla and Rehmandheri in the Gomai Valley, as well as from Sarai Khola in the Taxila Valley. Painted bull and wheeled sheep figurines may have been used for votive offerings or as toys for children.

Although no burials from the Kot Diji Phase have been found at Harappa, burials at Mehrgarh date to the same general period. In contrast to the earlier Neolithic burials, the Chalcolithic (Period III, c. 4000 B.C.; and Periods V–VII, c. 3500–2500 B.C.) burials show decreasing amounts of burial ornaments. At the same time, the figurines are depicted with many necklaces and elaborate headdresses. The changes in burial tradition may represent a major shift in beliefs about the afterlife or the need to keep wealth in circulation for the benefit of the living.

Chalcolithic of Western and Central India

The Chalcolithic cultures of western India are found in a vast geographical area covering the Deccan Plateau, the entire Gujarat, and parts of southern Rajasthan. Earlier

discussions of pottery sequences have now been replaced with a grouping of major sites and cultural developments according to phases, similar to those discussed for the Indus Valley region. The Chalcolithic period is broken down into three subdivisions based on the most recent excavations. The Early Chalcolithic (3200–2600 B.C.), which includes the early Ahar and Banas cultures of central Rajasthan, as well as the early Ganeshwar-Jodhpura culture in the north. The Mature Chalcolithic (2500–2000 B.C.) is best represented at sites such as Balathal and Gilund, but also includes the Ganeshwar-Jodhpura culture in the north. The Late Chalcolithic (2000–1700 B.C.) corresponds to the final phases of the Harappan and the Late Harappan period of the Indus Valley. Other cultural phases that represent regional aspects of the Chalcolithic in Gujarat and the Malwa and Deccan Plateaus are the Savalda Phase (2200–1800 B.C.), Gujarat Late Harappan Phase (1800–1600 B.C.), Malwa Phase (1600–1400 B.C.), Early Jorwe Phase (1400–1000 B.C.), and the Late Jorwe Phase (1000–700 B.C.). This last phase overlaps with the Iron Age Megalithic cultures and eventually the Early Historic Period.

The geographical diversity of western India, the variable rainfall patterns, and the orientation of major river systems allowed the development of regional cultures that were distinct, but that shared some basic similarities in technology and subsistence as well as levels of social complexity. Most of the region is covered by fertile black cotton soil (*regur*) that is highly water retentive; agriculture can be practiced as a result of the summer monsoon without additional irrigation, though there is some evidence for the construction of small irrigation canals at some sites. Slash-and-burn agriculture may have been practiced in some regions, and opportunistic agriculture was probably carried out along oxbow lakes and riverbanks.

The subsistence economy was based on a combination of farming (wheat, barley, and millet) and animal husbandry (cattle, with some sheep and goat), supplemented by hunting and gathering. The major ceramic tradition is painted black on red pottery, but there are also numerous regional pottery styles that serve to differentiate each major phase. Lithic technology included a stone blade industry, using agate and chalcedony as well as locally available cherts, and ground stone objects such as adzes and axes, as well as mortars and grinding stones. There is only a limited use of copper, and in the absence of any furnaces or manufacturing evidence, it is thought that the copper objects were traded from the Ganeshwar culture of the northern Aravalli or obtained from Harappan sites in Gujarat and Sind. Evidence for cotton, flax, and silk have been discovered at Inamgaon. As at Harappa, the silk thread was used for stringing beads and was made from local wild tussar silk.

During the Chalcolithic, houses were generally built using either a rectangular or a circular floor plan. The lower walls were packed mud and stone, and the upper part of the building was made with reed walls, plastered with clay, and thatch roofs. In some sites such as Kaothe there are circular pit structures for dwelling and storage, as well as for keeping chickens. At the site of Balathal, a monumental fortified enclosure dating to around 2400 B.C. (the same time as the Harappa Phase) was discovered at the center of the settlement. Massive walls constructed of stone rubble with clay and mud-brick filling enclosed an area of approximately 600 square yards (500 square meters). Several large residential structures, found outside the fortified building, have small rectangular rooms used for hearths or storage. A north-south street runs through the settlement and would have accommodated two-way cart traffic. Evidence for the use of carts is based on an inscribed pot from Inamgaon that shows a two-wheeled frame cart pulled by a pair of humped bulls. A fortification wall made of stones set in mud mortar may have enclosed the entire settlement. At the site of Gilund, a large enigmatic building with numerous internal divisions is dated to the Mature Chalcolithic. It was made with parallel internal subdivision or walls that may have been used for storage but were later filled with debris. The precise function of the Gilund structure is unknown. A later pit dug into the building during the Late Chalcolithic period contained numerous clay sealings from geometric stamp seals, and this may indicate that some communities at the site were involved in the control of trade. At present it is not clear what the trade items may have been or with whom they were trading.

Terra-cotta bull figurines, as well as male and female figurines, have been found at most sites and may have been used as votives, as was common throughout the Indus Valley. Chalcolithic burials are quite simple, and during the Savalda Phase at Kaothe, both adults and children were buried beneath or between the huts, laid in extended supine position, in an oval pit with no grave goods. During the Malwa Phase, burials found scattered in the habitation areas of the site at Inamgaon and Daimabad consist primarily of children interred in urns with pottery, ornaments, and tools as burial offerings. In the Jorwe Phase, urn burials became more common, but only a few examples of adult burials have been found. During this phase we also see extended burials oriented north-south, with small pottery vessels as offerings. The feet of adults were usually cut off below the knee, except for the elite burials, which were placed in four-legged clay coffins with pottery offerings.

None of these communities developed into state-level society, but some sites such as Inamgaon, Balathal, and Gilund appear to have been stratified, and possibly were politically organized as chiefdoms. The Chalcolithic cul-

tures of central India show a sudden decline around 1000 B.C., probably due to increased aridity. Though some settlements, such as Inamgaon in the southern Deccan, continue to be inhabited until around 700 B.C., many other regions appear to have been abandoned. Iron-using peoples who built megaliths began to arrive in the Deccan around 800 B.C., and they may have been instrumental in the final demise of sites such as Inamgaon.

Jonathan Mark Kenoyer

See also Harappa; Indus Valley Civilization; Mohenjo-Daro; Neolithic Period

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Agrawala, R. C., and Vijay Kumar. "Ganeshwar-Jodhpura Culture: New Traits in Indian Archaeology." In *Harappan Civilization*, edited by Gregory L. Possehl. New Delhi: Oxford and IBH Publishing, 1982.
- Jarrige, Jean-François. "Economy and Society in the Early Chalcolithic/Bronze Age of Baluchistan: New Perspectives from Recent Excavations at Mehrgarh." In *South Asian Archaeology 1979*, edited by H. Härtel. Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag, 1981.
- . "The Final Phase of the Indus Occupation at Nausharo and Its Connection with the Following Cultural Complex of Mehrgarh VIII." In *South Asian Archaeology 1993*, edited by A. Parpola and P. Koskikallio. Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedekatemia, 1994.
- Kenoyer, Jonathan Mark. "The Indus Valley Tradition of Pakistan and Western India." *Journal of World Prehistory* 5, no. 4 (1991): 331–385.
- . *Ancient Cities of the Indus Valley Civilization*. Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Kenoyer, Jonathan Mark, and Richard H. Meadow. "The Ravi Phase: A New Cultural Manifestation at Harappa." In *South Asian Archaeology 1997*, edited by M. Taddei and G. De Marco. Rome: Istituto Italiano per l'Africa e l'Oriente, 2000.
- Mughal, Mohammad R. "Further Evidence of the Early Harappan Culture in the Greater Indus Valley, 1971–1990." *South Asian Studies* 6 (1990): 175–200.
- Panja, S. "Research on the Deccan Chalcolithic." In *Indian Archaeology in Retrospect*, vol. 1: *Protohistory: Archaeology of South Asia*, edited by S. Settar and R. Korisettar. New Delhi: Indian Council of Historical Research, 2002.
- Possehl, Gregory L. *Indus Age: The Beginnings*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999.
- Shinde, Vasant S. "Chalcolithic Phase in Western India (Including Central India and the Deccan Region)." In *Recent Studies in Indian Archaeology*, edited by K. Paddayya. New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 2002.

CHALUKYAS. *See History and Historiography.*

CHANDIGARH Chandigarh, called the "City Beautiful" by its residents, was built to replace the Indian state of Punjab's loss of its old capital, Lahore. Lahore, the



Secretariat Building in Chandigarh. To the right, the Secretariat, one of a series of government buildings on the northern fringe of Chandigarh designed by Le Corbusier, the French modernist architect, in the 1950s. The buildings' monumental size and scale were consonant with both the aspirations of Prime Minister Nehru who was eager for symbols of greatness for the new capital, and the splendid Himalayan landscape in which they are set. TIME LIFE PICTURES/GETTY IMAGES.

quintessentially Islamic city with its warrens of streets and colorful bazaars, had successfully served for several centuries as the capital of Punjab until India's partition in 1947. The loss of Lahore to Pakistan was felt intensely by Sikhs, Hindus, and Indian Muslims alike.

Chandigarh represents the best urban hopes of independent India. Indian leaders shared a common vision concerning the character of Chandigarh. The charismatic, urbane Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru provided the urban-architectural framework for the new capital city: "Let this be a new town symbolic of the freedom of India, unfettered by the traditions of the past . . . an expression of the nation's faith in the future." Other Punjabi leaders enthusiastically echoed Nehru's sentiment. Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, Nehru's minister of health, noted that as a Punjabi, she wanted "the new capital of the Punjab to be the last word in beauty, in simplicity and in standards of such comfort as it is our duty to provide to every human-being." Punjab's chief minister, Gopichand Bhargava, hoped that Chandigarh would be "the world's most charming capital."

Chandigarh bears the imprint of several Western architects and planners testing out the prevailing trends in architecture and urban planning. The American Albert Mayer drew the initial plan for the city; Matthew Nowicki, a Polish-American architect, was to design the capitol buildings. Nowicki's death in a plane crash in 1950 forced the Indian government to find a new team. In the end, the city has come to be associated with Swiss-born French modernist Le Corbusier. Whereas Mayer had looked to India's villages as his inspiration for the city's plan, Le Corbusier looked to India's industrial potential in detailing the plan, although he made only superficial changes in Mayer's plan. His cousin Pierre Jeanneret and English husband-and-wife architects Maxwell Fry and Jane Drew assisted Le Corbusier. In Chandigarh, Le Corbusier had argued that India's great civilization was essentially agrarian in character, and much of India's building efforts had been directed to building temples and mosques. Through his modernist designs for Chandigarh, he was proposing to expose India to an industrial civilization that celebrated business, industrial

complexes, and modern buildings. This was inherently more appealing to Prime Minister Nehru.

In 1966 Indian Punjab underwent yet another bifurcation: between Hindi-speaking Haryana and Punjabi-speaking Punjab. Chandigarh became the joint capital of both states, while the city itself came to be administered as a Union territory. Because of its relatively new urban infrastructure, clean environment, and good services (including medical), the city has grown rapidly, attracting both corporate enterprises and private citizens. Originally planned for 500,000, the city in 1999 had an estimated population of 800,000 and was still growing. Assuming a conservative 4 percent annual growth rate, Chandigarh's population is expected to grow to 1, 942,329 by the year 2021.

Ravi Kalia

See also **Punjab; Urbanism**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Evenson, Norma. *Chandigarh*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966.
- Kalia, Ravi. *Chandigarh: The Making of an Indian City*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- Prakash, Vikramaditya. *Chandigarh's Le Corbusier: The Struggle for Modernity in Postcolonial India*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2002.

CHANDRA GUPTA. See **Guptan Empire**.

CHATTERJI, BANKIM CHANDRA (1838–1894), Bengali novelist and social reformer. Bankim Chandra Chatterji was born in Kantapur, near Calcutta. He graduated from British Bengal's Presidency College, and then was one of only two Bengali students to receive bachelor of arts degrees from Calcutta University's first graduating class in 1858. He was immediately appointed a deputy magistrate in British Bengal's government, and he remained in the British Indian service for more than three decades, serving as assistant secretary to Bengal's government, and subsequently honored by the British Raj, first with the title of Rai Bahadur (Great Person), and several years later elevated to Companion of the Indian Empire (CIE) before his retirement in 1891.

Bankim Chandra wrote his first novel in English, a romance titled *Rajmohan's Wife*, published in 1864. After that, however, he wrote all fourteen of his other novels and social commentary in Bengali, from *Durgeshnandini*, published in 1865, to *Kamalakanta Duptar*, published in 1885. His greatest novels were social critiques, disguised as romances or fictional history, the most famous of which was *Anandamath* (Abbey of bliss), published in 1882. That story of a Hindu abbey's *sannyasi* revolt against the



Portrait of Bankim Chandra Chatterji. From Chatterji's famous *Anandamath* (Abbey of bliss), the story of a Hindu abbey's revolt against its tyrannical Muslim rulers, came the words for "Bande Mataram" (Hail to Thee, Mother). With nationalist fervor ignited by Britain's partition of Chatterji's Bengali homeland (1905–1910), the song became India's national anthem. K. L. KAMAT/KAMAT'S POTPOURRI.

tyrannical pre-British Muslim rulers of Bengal gave India its first national anthem, "Bande Mataram" (Hail to Thee, Mother), which Gurudev Rabindranath Tagore (1861–1941) set to music during the nationalist struggle ignited by Britain's first partition of Bengal from 1905 to 1910. The words, however, remained those of Bankim Chandra, who has since been hailed by countless millions of Indians as one of the grandfathers of their nation:

Mother, I bow to Thee!
 Rich with thy hurrying streams,
 Bright with thy orchard gleams . . .
 Mother of might, Mother free . . .
 Mother, I kiss thy feet . . .
 Who hath said thou art weak in thy lands,
 When the swords flash out in ten million hands,
 And ten times ten million voices roar
 Thy dreadful name from shore to shore? . . .
 Thou art wisdom, thou art law,
 Thou our heart, our soul, our breath . . .

the love divine . . . that conquers death . . .
 Mother sweet, I bow to thee,
 Mother great and free!
 (Translated from Chatterji's Bengali original by
 Sri Aurobindo)

None of his British colleagues in the Bengal service understood how truly "subversive" a Hindu-Indian nationalist Bankim Chandra was, for unlike his *sannyasi* heroes he never drew a sword against the British Raj, yet his pen proved mightier, inspiring generations of young Indians to march and die, proudly singing his hymn to their "Mother India," demanding "freedom" (*swaraj*) from foreign rule of any complexion or faith. Chatterji also started a Bengali literary magazine, *Bangladarshan*, in 1872, which helped restore faith in Hinduism among many Bengalis who had been educated in English schools, where they were taught to appreciate the primacy of Western science and philosophy, and to denigrate not only their faith but the genius of India's civilization and the glories of its ancient culture. Afflicted with diabetes, Bakim Chandra died on 8 April 1894, only a few years after he retired, almost a decade after he published his last novel. In Bengal he has never been forgotten.

Stanley Wolpert

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bose, Sunil Kumar. *Bankim Chandra Chatterji*. New Delhi: Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India, 1974.
- Das Gupta, Jayanta-Kumara. *A Critical Study of the Life and Novels of Bankimchandra Chatterji*. Calcutta: Calcutta University, 1937.
- Kopf, David. *British Orientalism and the Bengal Renaissance*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1969.

CHAUDHURI, NIRAD C. (1897–1999), renowned Indian writer. Nirad C. Chaudhuri was arguably the greatest writer of nonfiction among Indians in the twentieth century. A self-taught polyglot, vastly learned, he claimed to have "read Shakespeare before I learned to walk." With the publication of his magnum opus, *Autobiography of an Unknown Indian*, in 1951, however, he became widely known for his unabashed admiration for Western, especially British, culture and his acerbic, contrarian views of Indian civilization.

Chaudhuri was born in 1897 in Kishurganj in the Tangail district of present-day Bangladesh. He spent the first twelve years of his life in Kishurganj, and the next thirty years in Kolkata as a student and intellectual with an endless thirst for knowledge. Already proficient in

Bengali and Sanskrit by the time he graduated from college with a first-class degree in history, he had also mastered English, French, German, Greek, and Latin. His scholarly interests ranged from art, architecture, anthropology, and archaeology to biology, geography, classical Western music, and military history. A dropout from graduate school despite his outstanding undergraduate record, he devoted most of his time to studying in the Imperial (now National) Library in Kolkata while supporting himself with a modest job in the Military Accounts Department. He was published in the noted English-language journal *Modern Review* in Kolkata, and later worked briefly as its assistant editor. In Bengali letters, he became known for his conservative views as the editor of *Shanibarar Chithi* (The Saturday letter). He married Amiya Devi in 1932, and they had two sons.

Mostly unemployed in the 1930s, Chaudhuri battled poverty and insecurity while trying to make ends meet. He later recorded the struggles of these years in the sequel to the *Autobiography*, called *Thy Hand, Great Anarch*. In 1939 he became personal secretary to Sarat Chandra Bose, a leading nationalist figure in Bengal and the elder brother of Subhash Chandra Bose. In 1941 Sarat Bose was arrested and sent to prison, and Chaudhuri again became unemployed. In 1942 he went to Delhi with a job at All India Radio.

Chaudhuri published his first book in 1951, at the age of fifty-four, from Delhi—his celebrated and much-maligned *Autobiography*. It was accorded the status of an instant classic as an elegantly written record of life in small-town Bengal and in Kolkata, and a record of the far reaches of the Anglo-Bengali encounters beyond the upper echelons and elites of the social order. It was maligned and reviled in India because Chaudhuri dedicated the book to the British for the blessings of their two-hundred-year rule of India. In 1955 a British Council grant enabled Chaudhuri to travel to England for the first time. He recorded the experience in *Passage to England* (1959). In 1965 he published *The Continent of Circe*, his critical introspection of independent India and its many ills. His first Bengali book appeared in 1968. A handsome advance from the publisher persuaded him to write *Bangali Jivaney Ramani* (Representation of women in Bengali life). The project to work on a biography of Max Müller, the great Sanskrit scholar, took him back to England in 1970. He settled in Oxford, never to return to India. During the last thirty years of his long life, he was remarkably productive, writing both in Bengali and English, and generating storms of controversy with each work.

His books include: *The Scholar Extraordinary* (1974), *Hinduism* (1979), *Thy Hand, Great Anarch* (1987), *From the Archives of a Centarian* (1997), *Three Horsemen of the New Apocalypse* (1997), and four books in Bengali. He was

honored by Oxford University with an honorary doctorate in literature in 1989, and the queen conferred on him the title “Commander of Order of the British Empire” in 1993. In 1996 Visva Bharati University honored him with Desikottama, the equivalent of a doctorate in literature.

Chaudhuri considered the Bengal Renaissance (1860–1910) the high point of Anglo-Bengali encounters. His Anglicist side emphasized steeping oneself deeply in contemporary English and European letters. Chaudhuri quotes from Bankim Chandra Chatterji’s novel *Rajani* to describe a casual conversation between two friends that includes references to classical historians Tacitus, Plutarch, and Thucydides, and the philosophy of Auguste Comte, John Stuart Mill, T.H. Huxley, G.E.L. Owen, Ludwig Buchner, and Arthur Schopenhauer. His Bengali side showed a certain hubris and pride in the acquisition of Occidental knowledge and its articulate expression in modernist literature. In one of his last pieces of writing in Bengali, Chaudhuri says, “I always introduce myself as a Bengali Hindu or a Hindu Bengali, not as an Indian.” Impeccably dressed in European clothes when he went out, Chaudhuri always wore *dhobi* and *kurta* at home. He did not give up his Indian passport in the thirty years he lived in England. In his will, he asked his heirs to give his personal library to the Calcutta Club in Kolkata, not to Oxford University or the National (formerly Imperial) Library in Kolkata. The Calcutta Club was established in the colonial style in 1920 by the elite Bengali professionals who had been denied membership in the European-exclusive Bengal Club.

Dilip K. Basu

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Dhawan, R. K. *Nirad C. Chaudhuri: The Scholar Extraordinary*. New Delhi: Prestige Books, 2000.
 Kamani, Chetan. *Nirad C. Chaudhuri*. Boston: Twayne, 1980.
 Scott, David P. *Perceiving India*. New Delhi: Sterling Publishers, 1986.

CHELMSFORD, LORD (1868–1933), *British politician, viceroy of India (1916–1921)*. Viscount Chelmsford, Frederic John Napier Thesiger, was viceroy of India from 1916 through 1921. Born in London, the eldest of five sons of the second Lord Chelmsford, he was educated at Winchester and Magdalen College, Oxford, and was called to the Bar from London’s Inner Temple in 1893. A fellow of All Souls College, elected to London’s County Council in 1904, Chelmsford was a brilliant student of jurisprudence who served with distinction as governor of Queensland from 1905 to 1909, and of New South Wales from 1909 to 1913.

He returned to England before World War I and joined his 4th Dorset Territorial Regiment, in which he was a captain, sailing with it to India, where in the spring of 1916 he took over as viceroy from Lord Hardinge, who had been wounded by a bomb thrown earlier into his howdah in Delhi. Chelmsford’s name has been historically linked to that of his brilliant Liberal secretary of state, Edwin Montagu, who took Joseph Chamberlain’s job at Whitehall in July 1917, promising Indian reforms in his first important speech to Parliament, to which he and Chelmsford agreed in 1918. Those Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms, embodied in the Government of India Act of 1919, expanded the Imperial Legislative Council in India, making it more representative, transferring several departments of India’s central government to elected Indian members, rather than appointing British officials to run them. Provincial councils of British India would all thereafter have elective majorities, moreover, and elected Indian members were to run their various departments. The separate Muslim electorate formula, however, introduced with the Morley-Minto Reforms (the India Councils Act of 1909), were not only retained, but expanded. Yet British fears of increasingly vocal and violent Indian nationalism led to the extension of the wartime martial law suspension of civil liberties during this postwar period, provoking the boycott of elections by Mahatma Gandhi and his Congress Party followers, thus reducing the value of those “reforms” intended to bring India close to independent Dominion status, leaving it more autocratically ruled and disaffected than ever. Before elections could even be held under the new Government of India Act, Brigadier Dyer’s massacre of unarmed peaceful Indians trapped inside Amritsar’s Jallianwala Bagh in April 1919 radically changed the nature of Anglo-Indian relations, revolutionizing millions of Congress members and converting thousands of hitherto loyal Anglophile Indian professionals into ardent nationalists demanding *swaraj* (freedom).

Despite his fine legal training, Lord Chelmsford’s martial mentality prevented him from promptly and firmly rebuking Dyer for his brutal action in launching such deadly fire at close range against so many innocents, murdering over 400, wounding some 1,200, leaving them all without medical attention as he marched his troops away from that dreadful Punjab garden, over which India’s sun of trust and respect for the British Raj swiftly set. Viscount Chelmsford returned to chair a committee of London’s University College in 1921, briefly served as first Lord of the Admiralty in 1924, and died of heart failure on 1 April 1933.

Stanley Wolpert

See also Amritsar; Government of India Act: 1919; Hardinge, Lord; Montagu, Edwin S.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Brown, Judith M. *Gandhi's Rise to Power: Indian Politics, 1915–1922*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1972.
- Ellinwood, DeWitt C., and C. D. Pradhan, eds. *India and World War I*. New Delhi: Manohar, 1978.
- Montagu, Edwin S. *An Indian Diary*, edited by Venetia Montagu. London: W. Heinemann, 1930.
- Sisson, Richard, and Stanley Wolpert, eds. *Congress and Indian Nationalism*. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988.

CHENNAI. See *Madras*.

CHIDAMBARAM The great temple of Chidambaram, south of Chennai in Tamil Nadu, dates back to at least the tenth century. The oldest inscriptions from that era speak of covering its roof with gold, and literary sources indicate that its construction may have begun several centuries before that. Its humble origins are indicated by its old Tamil name Chirrambalam (Little Temple), which was later sanskritized as Chid-ambaram (Abode of the Spirit). The temple grounds include smaller shrines to Vishnu, Brahma, and Pārvatī/Durgā, but the imperial Cholas, who were its patrons from the tenth to the thirteenth centuries, were ardent devotees of Shiva and sponsored major expansions of the shrine devoted to Shiva. The contribution of the Pallava dynasty to the temple is not clear, but the subsequent Chola, Pandya, and Vijayanagar dynasties added shrines and four giant gateways called *gopuram*, and local rulers finally built a hall with a thousand pillars around A.D. 1600. The temple is unique in that it is owned jointly by the trustees, numbering now about 250. They are an endogamous clan that rules by majority decision, though each trustee has a veto right. The ritual in the shrine is equally unique in that it follows the forms of the Vedic domestic rituals in the Vaikhānasa tradition.

The central shrine marks the place where Shiva, as Natarāja (King of Dancers), is said to have danced the cosmic dance of global creation and annihilation that is celebrated in literature and countless statues in stone and bronze. There are early references to various dances of Shiva at Chidambaram, but the *ānanda tāndava* pose, in which Shiva has four arms (each with a symbolic function) and in which one of his feet stomps on a dwarf symbolizing human depravity, became popular only in the tenth century. It is now the dance closest identified with the Chidambaram temple. An ancient cult of the lingam (phallic symbol) and local cultic dance have been amalgamated in new powerful and popular rituals.

The Chidambaram temple, often considered the “heart” of the earth, was one of the five sites where Chola

kings were consecrated, and it has been a major center of pilgrimages through the ages. It played a central role in the *bhakti* movement from the seventh to the ninth centuries. Several of the *nāyanār*, who composed ardent devotional poetry in worship of Shiva, lived at the temple or addressed their poetry to the deity enshrined there. Their poems are recited or sung regularly in the temple, along with other musical and dance performances in honor of the deity.

Hartmut E. Scharfe

See also **Chola Dynasty; Hinduism (Dharma); Shiva and Shaivism**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Kulke, Hermann. *Cidambaramāhātmya: Eine Untersuchung der religionsgeschichtlichen und historischen Hintergründe für die Entstehung der Tradition einer südindischen Tempelstadt*. Wiesbaden, Germany: Otto Harrassowitz, 1970.
- Younger, Paul. *The Home of the Dancing Śivan: The Traditions of the Hindu Temple in Citamparam*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

CHINA, RELATIONS WITH India and China, two great civilizations and the two most populous countries in the world, launched popular mass movements and became independent nation-states in 1947 and 1949, respectively. Relations between the two countries have ranged from post-independence bonhomie to armed conflict in 1962 to a state of armed peace. Despite a shared Buddhist religious history and an established trade along the Silk Road, there was historically little political interaction between the two. The notable exceptions were during the Han Empire in China (202 B.C. to A.D. 220) and the Kushan Empire in India (A.D. 1–225), when they shared a common border. The boundaries of the Mongol or the Yuan Empire in China (A.D. 1271–1368) also included parts of China and India.

The Early Years

Upon independence, China and India's mutual perceptions were competitive, since they were the largest countries in Asia, each with a glorious past and a shared history of successful anticolonial struggle. Both countries aspired to the leadership of the world's “developing countries” and provided competing models of economic and political development. Under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru, India established a parliamentary democracy and opted for an economic model that combined socialist and capitalist principles. The Chinese Communist Party, under the leadership of Mao Zedong, set up a revolutionary political order with state ownership of all economic assets. The two countries adopted vastly different foreign policies—India embracing a policy of nonalignment, and



Pranab Mukherji, Defense Minister of India. Current Defense Minister Pranab Mukherjee of India welcomes his Chinese counterpart (uniformed man in foreground). Warm greeting notwithstanding, the military relationship between China and Pakistan remains a stumbling block in the development of better relations between New Delhi and Beijing. INDIA TODAY.

China the export of revolution—which brought them into conflict on global issues.

This rivalry came to the fore amid the protestations of Sino-Indian amity during the Bandung Conference of developing nations held in 1955. The major difference between the two sides was on the question of war in international politics. Nehru advocated that war must be avoided at all costs and that the developing countries should not align themselves with either side in the cold war, while Chinese premier Zhou Enlai expounded the doctrine of revolutionary war to fight against imperialism. The personal rivalry between Nehru and Zhou also contributed to the rivalry between the two states. Moreover, since China was allied with the Soviet Union at that time, China was implicitly excluded from the leadership of the nonaligned movement being promoted by India.

Geopolitical concerns. Geopolitics has dominated Sino-Indian relations, with major disputes in the Himalayan region. India perceived the South Asian region—stretching from the Himalayas in the north to the India Ocean in the south and from Persia in the west to Central Asia in the northwest—as a cohesive cultural

unit strongly influenced and defined by Indian culture. China identified Inner Asia, the Far East, Southeast Asia, and South Asia as traditional tributaries paying homage to China's political and cultural supremacy. India and China therefore each considered the region comprising Tibet, Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, and Malaysia as part of its own historic sphere of influence. Both India and China regarded Bhutan and Nepal as strategically placed buffer zones vital to national security. Given these competing geopolitical perceptions, India and China have had numerous disputes in South Asia. Dominant among these are the status of Tibet, Aksai Chin, and the Indian provinces of Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh.

Tibet. Of all the disputes in the Himalayan region, the status of Tibet has had the greatest impact on the Sino-Indian relationship. Historically, India and China have viewed Tibet differently. India considered Tibet a distinct ethnic, cultural, and political entity that shared a cultural and religious identity with India. The spread of Buddhism from India to Tibet created strong historical and cultural links between them. Tibet had also served

as a strategically vital buffer zone, insulating the Indian heartland from invasions from Mongol tribes to its north. India inherited and continued the British policy of simultaneously supporting Tibetan independence while recognizing Chinese suzerainty over it.

China, on the other hand, regarded Tibet as an integral part of its territory, to be reclaimed from Western imperialist forces by the full assertion of its sovereignty, freed from the exploitative feudal rule of the Tibetan Lamaist order. The British-recognized suzerainty was seen as a compromise of Chinese sovereignty, and in 1951 the People's Liberation Army (PLA) moved into Tibet to establish full Chinese control over the region. Chinese forces also occupied the Aksai Chin plateau, claimed by India, and later built a vital road through it linking Tibet to the western Chinese province of Xinjiang. In May 1951, Beijing signed a seventeen-point agreement with the Dalai Lama's government in Lhasa that proclaimed Chinese sovereignty over Tibet while promising autonomy to Tibet. This was followed by the Panchsheel (Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence) agreement between India and China in 1954, which reiterated an autonomous status for Tibet within Chinese sovereignty. Since improving relations with China was a high priority for Nehru, India did not demand a delineation of the disputed Sino-India border in exchange for India's *de jure* recognition of Tibet as part of China.

During the 1950s, Chinese forces consolidated their administrative and logistical position in Tibet, causing much alarm in India. Massive road building opened new routes from the Chinese mainland to Tibet, facilitating the movement of troops, administrative officials, and the supplies required by them. Along with the security implications arising from the massive Chinese military presence along its northern borders, the destruction of Tibetan culture and heritage at the hands of the PLA also became an issue for India. Popular Tibetan opposition to Chinese rule continued to grow, and in 1959 broke into an uprising. The Dalai Lama fled from Lhasa to India, setting up his government-in-exile in Dharamsala in Himachal Pradesh. Tibetans fleeing the Chinese military crackdown were welcomed by the Indian government and were given refugee status. China considered this a violation of the 1954 agreement and protested against India's support of the Dalai Lama as interference in China's internal affairs. India, on the other hand, accused China of not upholding its end of the bargain concerning autonomous status for Tibet. Relations steadily worsened, culminating in war in 1962.

The Border Dispute and the 1962 War

The 1962 war had its roots in the conflicting definitions of the Sino-Indian border. The two states share a 2,520 mile-long (4,056 kilometers) Himalayan border,

large tracts of which are disputed. While China claims almost the entire Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh (34,749 sq. mi, or 90,000 sq. km), India claims the Aksai Chin plateau (2,000 sq. mi, or 5,180 sq. km) currently under Chinese jurisdiction. China has also not recognized the Indian state of Sikkim as part of Indian territory and considers it a separate country.

At a meeting of British, Tibetan, and Chinese representatives held in Simla in 1914, the McMahon Line was concluded to be the border between British India, Tibet, and China. Upon independence, India recognized the McMahon Line as the border between India and China. However, neither the Nationalist nor the Communist governments of China had ratified the 1914 agreement. The People's Republic of China dismissed the McMahon Line as an imperialist imposition on China and called for renegotiation of its border with India. India insisted that since the border was already delineated, there was no question of renegotiation. After China moved militarily into Tibet, the Indian government stressed its territorial claims with greater urgency, taking measures especially in the North East Frontier Agency, or Arunachal Pradesh, to enforce its jurisdiction there. India set up check posts along the McMahon Line and published maps with a clearly demarcated border as claimed by New Delhi.

In the mid-1950s, when the Chinese press published reports of the construction of a road from Xinjiang through Aksai Chin in Ladakh, India protested the construction as violation of its territory. In 1958, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai, in a letter to Prime Minister Nehru, offered that while the border had to be renegotiated, both sides could continue to administer the areas under their control until the dispute was peacefully resolved. Meanwhile, China was facing rising popular discontent in Tibet and blamed India for providing support to the Tibetan "rebels." The Tibetan uprising in 1959 and the flight of the Dalai Lama to India further complicated matters. China sharply criticized Indian support of the Dalai Lama and responded by being aggressive on the border. There were armed clashes between the two sides at the Kongka Pass in the western sector and in the Longju sector of the eastern border. As the Chinese advanced beyond Aksai Chin deeper into western Ladakh, Indian concerns mounted. China proposed a withdrawal of troops on both sides to a distance of 12 miles (20 kilometers) from the McMahon Line in the eastern sector and to the areas under jurisdiction by each side in the western sector. India rejected this proposal. Zhou Enlai visited New Delhi in 1960 and proposed an exchange of the territory claimed by India in the eastern sector with the territory claimed by China in Ladakh. This proposal was made again by China in 1980 but was again rejected by New Delhi.

In 1961, in the face of mounting evidence of a growing Chinese presence in Ladakh, Nehru decided to establish military posts along the border to enforce India's claims. In some places, these posts were north of the McMahon Line. The tension on the border continued to rise, and in September 1962 the Chinese captured the Indian post of Dhola in the eastern sector. Thereafter, Chinese troops advanced into the western and eastern sectors, overrunning Indian posts. The Indian army, ill-prepared for such an offensive, was badly defeated. In November, before winter snows closed the northern passes, China declared a unilateral ceasefire and withdrew its troops to 12 miles (20 km) behind the McMahon Line. After the war, China controlled the area it claimed in Ladakh, and India was left in control of Arunachal Pradesh in the eastern sector. Formal talks for the delineation of India's northern border began only in late 1980s.

At the initiative of Sri Lankan prime minister Sriimavo Bandaranaike, a six-nation Afro-Asian conference was convened at Colombo in December 1962 to negotiate a settlement between India and China. The Colombo Proposals were, however, unsuccessful in brokering an agreement. India and China broke off diplomatic contacts, and no further border negotiations were held between the two parties for the next two decades.

Impact of the war. While this war was essentially a border war, its political impact was tremendous, both in bilateral relations and in cold war politics. Mao Zedong was critical of Nehru's policy of nonalignment, considering it part of a stratagem to move India closer to both the United States and the Soviet Union in order to exert pressure on China. Soviet support to India on the border conflict contributed to the deteriorating relations between China and the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union's supply of transport planes to India in 1960 for use in the Ladakh region strengthened Chinese suspicions of an anti-China front. China also accused India of supporting a covert U.S. operation in Tibet to help the insurgents in their fight against Chinese occupation. The John F. Kennedy administration had concluded an agreement with New Delhi to help in the war effort, deepening China's adverse perception of India.

For China the 1962 war was simply another incident in the series of conflicts that occurred while China renegotiated its borders with its neighbors; for India, however, the war meant a loss of lives and of territory and brought national humiliation. Nehru's policy of "India-China Brotherly Friendship" turned into a policy of suspicion and fear of future Chinese invasions. India thus embarked on a program of military modernization, with U.S. and Soviet help, raising many newly equipped mountain divisions to protect its northern border. In 1987 a dangerous new confrontation in the Sumdorong Chu valley in the

eastern sector was triggered when China reemphasized its claim to the eastern sector of India's northern border after Arunachal Pradesh was granted statehood by Delhi. However, barring this incident, the Sino-India border has been largely peaceful since the 1962 war.

The Pakistan Factor

Growing friendship between Pakistan and China paralleled the deterioration of Sino-India relations. In March 1963 Pakistan and China concluded a border agreement under which Pakistan ceded part of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir to China. After the 1962 war, China offered qualified support to Pakistan in the event of a clash with India and also supported Pakistan concerning its claim to Kashmir. Encouraged by the debacle of the Indian army and the promised Chinese support, Pakistan adopted a more aggressive policy regarding Kashmir. In 1963, Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar to foment a brewing local uprising in Kashmir, infiltrating large numbers of armed and trained Pakistanis into Kashmir. War broke out between India and Pakistan over Kashmir in 1965. During the war, China was critical of India's actions and made several statements supporting Pakistan. As the brief war progressed, China's stand hardened, and it issued an ultimatum to India to dismantle its military installations along the Sikkim-China border. This amounted to a "threat" to attack India's eastern front while the Indian army was engaged in war on its western front. With the threat of Chinese involvement in the Indo-Pak war looming large, the United Nations (UN), along with the United States and the Soviet Union, moved quickly to negotiate a cease-fire after three weeks of heavy fighting.

The 1965 war proved to be a turning point in the geopolitical history of South Asia, establishing a new global alignment of power. After the war, China and Pakistan collaborated on the construction of the "China-Pakistan Friendship Highway" connecting Pakistan-occupied Kashmir with the western Chinese province of Xinjiang. The construction of this road raised security concerns in India regarding direct Chinese military support for another Pakistani attack on India. However, in 1971, when India and Pakistan were yet again at war, this time over East Pakistan, the Chinese failed to support Pakistan. China was extremely critical of Indian interference in Pakistan's internal affairs, and voiced full support of Pakistan at the UN, but it did not pledge or provide any military support in the field. The Indo-Soviet Friendship treaty of 1971 and the Sino-U.S. rapprochement of 1970 restrained China from involvement in the 1971 war, which resulted in the creation of the independent state of Bangladesh.

China-Pakistan military relationship. After the 1965 war, China became Pakistan's primary supplier of military

technology and arms, and has since consistently supplied Pakistan with defense technology and training. When the United States withdrew its military aid to Pakistan in 1965, and again in 1990, China stepped into the breach. China also provided arms to Pakistan in 1965 and 1971, and helped rebuild its army after its defeat in 1971. China helped Pakistan modernize its armed forces and through the 1980s supplied it with modern combat aircraft, including F-5A and F-7A fighter planes and T-59 tanks.

China conducted nuclear tests in 1964, becoming a nuclear weapons state. India conducted its Peaceful Nuclear Explosion in 1974, underground at Pokharan in Rajasthan. Following the Indian test, Sino-Pakistani military and scientific cooperation intensified. While China consistently denied providing any assistance to Pakistan's nuclear program, U.S. intelligence indicated regular interaction of nuclear scientists and technologists between the two countries. According to intelligence reports in the 1980s, China provided Pakistan with weapons-grade uranium, ring magnets, the design for a nuclear device, help with centrifuge technology for Pakistan's plant in Kahuta, and the design for a reactor using enriched uranium. China also built a nuclear power plant at Chashma in Pakistan, which both sides insisted was for peaceful purposes, run according to International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards. In 1990 the United States suspended all military aid to Pakistan over the issue of nuclear proliferation from China to Pakistan, and thereafter China signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992. While China insists that it has not violated the NPT, Indian concerns regarding transfer of nuclear technology to Pakistan continue to be a thorn in Sino-Indian relations.

Along with the transfer of nuclear technology, China-Pakistan cooperation in missile and delivery systems is also an issue in Sino-Indian relations. Reports in India and the United States claim that Chinese assistance to Pakistan's missile program has been extensive. U.S. intelligence reports claim that China supplied Pakistan with nuclear capable M-11 ballistic missiles and related technologies, and provided training to Pakistani technologists and military personnel in the operation of those missiles. Under an agreement signed in 1988, China apparently agreed to build an M-11 missile factory in Pakistan. Satellite intelligence detected the arrival of these missiles in Pakistan in 1995 in violation of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) to which China had agreed in principle. These concerns added to India's perception of a nuclear threat from Chinese missiles stationed in Tibet since 1971.

In 2001 the United States imposed sanctions on both China and Pakistan for violation of the MTCR. The China-Pakistan military relationship was at its height in

1988 and 1989, coinciding with the beginning of normalization of Sino-Indian relations. Given this fact, India insists that the China-Pakistan military relationship continues to hamper the development of trust between China and India. China maintains that India must not try to regulate relations between other sovereign nations, as this violates the 1954 Panchsheel agreement (Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence). China has repeatedly urged India to separate Sino-Indian relations from Sino-Pak relations.

The Normalization of Relations

India and China tentatively began a process of normalization of relations in 1969 but exchanged ambassadors only in 1976. In 1979 the Janata Party, then in power in India, diverged from the Congress Party's practice of nonalignment and close relations with the Soviet Union. The Janata government offered to exchange ministerial visits, a proposal accepted by China; External Affairs Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee visited China in February 1979. While China and India still differed on many issues, Vajpayee's visit started a dialogue between the two countries. His Chinese counterpart, Huang Hua, reciprocated Vajpayee's visit in June 1981, resulting in annual dialogues between delegations from both sides to discuss regional and international issues. In the mid-1980s, the changes in the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev and the impending withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan altered the strategic situation in South Asia and facilitated the process of rebuilding Sino-Indian relations. The Sumdorong Chu valley incident in 1987 was a setback to this process of normalization. But with Indian prime minister Rajiv Gandhi's visit to China in 1988, negotiations on the boundary question were reopened. A Joint Working Group was established to promote peace along the border. Following Prime Minister Gandhi's visit, China and India exchanged a number of high-level visits between 1991 and 1996. These included Chinese premier Li Peng's visit to India in 1991 and Indian prime minister P. V. Narasimha Rao's visit to China in 1993. It was during the latter's visit that the two sides signed an Agreement on the Maintenance of Peace and Tranquility, renouncing the use of force to settle the border dispute. From then on, relations steadily improved, and Jiang Zemin visited India in 1996, the first Chinese president to do so. During his visit, the two sides signed an Agreement on Confidence Building Measures on the border, providing for further troop reductions. Cultural and educational cooperation was also expanded. Trade between the countries resumed, and by 1998 stood at approximately \$2 billion U.S.

For India, a significant change in its improved relations with China was the change in the Chinese stand on

Kashmir. While China's relations with Pakistan were still very strong, Chinese rhetorical support to Pakistan on Kashmir was waning. China adopted a neutral stand during the 1999 Kargil "war" between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. However, India's nuclear tests in 1998 proved a serious setback to Sino-Indian relations.

Pokaharan II and After

In May 1998, India again conducted nuclear tests in Pokharan in Rajasthan and declared its nuclear weapons capability. In a letter to U.S. president Bill Clinton, Indian prime minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee identified China as a major threat to India and justified India's tests in light of this threat. Indian defense minister George Fernandes had earlier identified China as the greatest potential threat to India. The initial Chinese reaction to India's tests was restrained, but after Vajpayee's letter was published in the *New York Times*, China was furious at being called the "reason" for India's nuclear tests. China denounced India for endangering peace and security in South Asia and the world. In response, India launched a damage control mission, led by Brajesh Mishra, the principal secretary to the prime minister, and President K. R. Narayanan, reassuring China that India did not consider it a threat. Indian external affairs minister Jaswant Singh visited China. That diplomatic visit initiated a security summit between the two countries, which focused on vital issues of mutual concern. Chinese foreign minister Tang Jiaxuan reciprocated Singh's visit in July 2000. Indian president K. R. Narayanan and Chinese leaders Li Peng and Zhu Rongji also exchanged visits over the next two years. In 2003 Prime Minister Vajpayee visited China and concluded two important agreements, opening a trade route from Sikkim to Tibet and setting up institutional mechanisms to resolve the boundary dispute. Under the new institutional arrangement for border talks, India's national security adviser Brajesh Mishra and Chinese senior vice foreign minister Dai Bingguo were appointed as special representatives to explore the overall bilateral framework for a boundary settlement. The first meeting between the two representatives was held in New Delhi in October 2003.

There is now a greater convergence of interest between India and China on many global issues, including their concern with growing U.S. unilateralism. Both countries have a strong interest in strengthening the UN as a counterbalance against U.S. unilateralism. China has been highly critical of U.S. intervention in Afghanistan and especially of the invasion of Iraq. India has been more moderate in its official comments on U.S. interventions, but public opinion throughout the country has strongly condemned the U.S. action in Iraq. However, both India and China consider their respective bilateral

relations with the United States as the most important part of their foreign policy and hence are not open to any anti-U.S. alliance. The huge volume of trade between the United States and China (\$90 billion) is the firm foundation of their bilateral relationship, while India and the United States are currently building a relationship based on their democratic politics and rapidly growing trade. On the nuclear front, both China and India have a declared no-first-use policy. The U.S.-China-India equation is especially significant in the development of the National Missile Defense and Theater Missile Defense systems by the United States, which could set off a potentially dangerous domino reaction involving not only China and India but possibly Pakistan.

Sonika Gupta

See also Nuclear Programs and Policies; Nuclear Weapons Testing and Development; Pakistan; Pakistan and India; Sri Lanka; United States, Relations with; Wars

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bhattacharjea, Mira Sinha. *China, the World, and India*. New Delhi: Samskriti, 2001.
- Garver, John W. *Protracted Contest: Sino-Indian Rivalry in the Twentieth Century*. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001.
- Gordon, Sandy. *India's Rise to Power in the Twentieth Century and Beyond*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995.
- Hoffmann, Steven. *India and the China Crisis*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.
- Kapur, Ashok. "China and Proliferation: Implications for India." *China Report* 34, nos. 3-4 (July-December 1998): 401-417.
- Kurien, Nimmi. *Emerging China and India's Policy Options*. New Delhi: Lancer, 2001.
- Malik, Mohan J. "China-India Relations in the Post-Soviet Era: The Continuing Rivalry." *China Quarterly* 142 (June 1995): 317-353.
- Mansingh, Surjit. "India-China Relations in the Post-Cold War Era." *Asian Survey* 34, no. 3 (March 1994): 285-300.
- Maxwell, Neville. *India's China War*. New York: Anchor Books, 1972.
- Ranganathan, C. V., and Vinod Khanna. *India and China: The Way Ahead after "Mao's India War"*. New Delhi: Har-Anand, 2000.
- Robinson, Thomas W., and David Shambaugh. *Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994.
- Sidhu, Waheguru, Pal Singh, and Jing-dong Yuan. *China and India: Cooperation or Conflict?* Boulder, Colo.: Lynn Rienner, 2003.
- Swaine, Michael D., and Ashley J. Tellis. *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present and Future*. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 2000.
- Thomas, Raju G. C. *India's Security Environment: Towards the Year 2000*. Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1996.


Yuan, Jing-dong. "India's Rise after Pokharan II: Chinese Analysis and Assessments." *Asian Survey* 41, no. 6 (November–December 2001): 978–1001.

———. "China's Proliferation Record." *Far Eastern Economic Review* 3 (October 2002). Available at <<http://cns.mii.edu>>

CHOLA DYNASTY The most successful of the royal houses of southern India, the Cholas were first mentioned in the rock inscriptions of the Mauryan emperor Ashoka in the middle of the third century B.C., together with their perennial rivals, the Pāndyas and Cheras. The Cholas figure prominently in the "preclassical" Tamil literature of the Sangam age of the first three centuries A.D. Two rival branches, one centered on Uraiyur, the other on the port city of Pukar in the fertile Kaveri River basin, seemed to compete for Chola supremacy. Under their greatest king, Karikāla, the Cholas dominated their rivals as a regional power. From the sixth century on, the Cholas played a minor role between the Pāndyas to the south and the powerful Pallavas in the north; one branch of the royal family, known as the Telugu-Cholas, probably moved north into Andhra country.

Imperial Cholas

Around A.D. 850 the Cholas gradually shook off the supremacy of their rivals and reemerged as powerful South Indian rulers. Their core territory comprised the cities of Tanjore (Tanjāvr), Kāncīpuram, Chidambaram, Kumbhakonam, and Kāverippattanam. After a period of shifting fortunes, two outstanding rulers led the Cholas to imperial status: Rājārāja I (r. 985–1015) and his son and successor Rājendra I (r. 1012–1044, initially with his father) gained control of their traditional South Indian rivals and expanded their realm northward. Their campaigns also took them to Ceylon (Sri Lanka), of which they conquered the northern part; for a short time, they controlled the entire island. They were a rare example of Indian power overseas; Chola ships sailed to Sumatra and Malaya and as far away as southern China. Their relations with the kingdom of Srivijaya on the island of Sumatra were generally quite friendly, and one Srivijaya monarch even endowed a monastery in the "land of the Cholas." In 1025, however, a naval expedition was sent to Malaya and Srivijaya, perhaps to secure free passage of Indian shipping, perhaps only in search of plunder. The kings of Cambodia and Burma sent delegations, and a large Chola delegation traveled to China. At home, they dominated their rivals, the Pāndyas and Cheras, controlling thus the maritime trade on both coasts of South India. Their ships visited and conquered the Maldiv Islands off the western coast and the Andaman Islands in the Bay of Bengal. On their northern border, they were engaged in constant warfare against northern dynasties, and Rājendra I led an expedition to the north, reaching the



Brihadeshvara Temple in Thanjavur. Granite divinities adorn the walls of the Brihadishvara temple at Tanjore, whose central shrine rises some 216 feet (66 m) to its finial. Completed in A.D. 1009 and declared a World Heritage Site by UNESCO, this temple remains the premier example of Chola architecture. BHARATH RAMAMRUTHAM / FOTOMEDIA.

Ganges (Ganga). The eastern seacoast was secured through a marital alliance with the eastern Chālukyas, and Kulotunga I, an offspring of that alliance, succeeded to the throne when it fell vacant after some dynastic disturbance. In the thirteenth century the Cholas, under pressure from the reinvigorated Pāndyas, held onto their core territory only with the help of the Hoysalas in Karnataka, then vanished toward the end of that century. Only their name survives in the Coromandel coast in southeastern India, originally Chola-mandala (Circle of the Cholas).

An empire as large as that of the Imperial Cholas at the height of their power could not be administrated with a rigid central bureaucracy; much authority was delegated to dependent rulers and governors. It would be an overstatement, however, to call them merely a regional state that depended for sustenance on warfare and plunder rather than tax revenue. There is evidence of royal

inspection and interference in local matters. Their internal administration financed large irrigation projects, fostered overseas trade, and had an impressive program of temple construction.

Religious and Cultural Contributions

The Cholas were ardent devotees of Lord Shiva. They built large temples dedicated to Shiva and expanded the Shiva shrine at the temple complex at Chidambaram, covering the roof of the shrine with solid gold. Their greatest architectural achievement is the Rājārājeshvara or Brihadīshvara temple at Tanjore, whose central shrine rises 190 feet (216 feet with the finial) and is topped by a capstone 20 feet in diameter, said to be a granite monolith weighing perhaps 20 tons (estimates vary). It was completed about A.D. 1009 under Rājārāja I. A few years later, his son Rājendra I founded a new capital called Gangāikonda-Colapuram (The city of the Chola who took the Ganges) and built an even larger Shiva temple there (though not quite as tall). Images and statues of a dancing Shiva in various postures are attested from the middle of the first millennium, but only in the tenth century did Shiva's cosmic dance (as Nata-Rāja, "King of dancers") receive major attention. A special school of artisans produced numerous Shiva Nata-Rāja bronze statues that are among the finest specimens of Indian metal sculpture.

Most Chola rulers, while devotees of Shiva, were not only tolerant of the beliefs of others but even supported the building of temples to Vishnu and Jina. Exceptions are rare: one ruler, possibly Adhirājendra, persecuted Rāmānuja, the famous scholar, and his followers in the tradition of Vishnu worship, and Kulottunga II tried to end the long-established coexistence of the Vishnu and Shiva shrines in great temple of Chidambaram. Both attempts ended in failure, but the old harmony between the sectarian beliefs was never fully recovered. The kings were seen as the earthly representatives of Shiva, and idols and lingams (phallic symbols of Shiva) are sometimes named after a ruling monarch, leading to the mistaken notion that they were themselves worshiped as "god-kings," when they were, in fact, devout worshipers of Shiva. Mausoleums (called *palli-padaī*) were built for several rulers and their family members, where memorial services were held; later disapproval of the practice led to the attempted erasure of the word *palli-padaī* in one such structure.

Some of the crowning achievements of Tamil literature fall into this period. Kamban's Irāmāvatāram, his Tamil version of the ancient Rāmāyaṇa, is a massive epic in an ornate style of great emotional intensity. Though Kamban was a Vishnu devotee and the Rāma legend belongs to the Vishnu mythology, the work is not sectarian but centers on

the human values of valor, generosity, and righteous action. Tamils consider it the highpoint of Tamil literature. Sekkilār's Periya-purānam is an extensive hagiography of saints devoted to Shiva, and the Jīvaka-cintāmani is an epic by a Jain poet who tried to blend a sensuous narrative with the austere teachings of Jainism.

Hartmut E. Scharfe

See also **Bronzes: South Indian**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Hall, Kenneth R. *Trade and Statecraft in the Age of the Cholas*. New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1980.
- Sastri, K. A. Nilakanta. *The Chōlas*, 2nd rev. ed. Madras: University of Madras, 1955.
- Spencer, George W. *The Politics of Expansion: The Chola Conquest of Sri Lanka and Sri Vijaya*. Madras: New Era Publications, 1983.
- Stein, Burton. *Peasant State and Society in Medieval South India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1980.

CHRISTIAN IMPACT ON INDIA, HISTORY OF

It is widely believed that St. Thomas, the disciple of Jesus, first introduced the Christian faith to India nearly two thousand years ago. The subcontinent would not experience the influence of Christianity, however, until the much later arrival of the Europeans. The Portuguese began to settle in Goa from 1498. In 1542 the Jesuit Francis Xavier, a papal ambassador, arrived, and the work of the Roman Catholics began in earnest. Protestant ministry in India was first established in Tranquebar by two German pietists, Bartholomew Ziegenbalg and Henry Plutschau.

Education

Christian missionary activity in India generally involved the establishment of high-quality schools. Obviously the Christian community's impact does not end there. Accompanying the schools came printing presses, which were helpful in the dissemination of literature of all kinds. In fact, the early overseas missionaries were responsible for pioneering English and modern vernacular education. R. L. Rawat, in his *History of Indian Education*, suggests that India will forever be indebted to the missionaries for the production of textbooks, dictionaries, and grammars, and for their zealous pursuit of educational advancement.

The "good works" carried out by missionaries and Christians have always been understood to be an expression of their love and obedience to Jesus. The underlying motivation, of course, was their obligation to proclaim the salvation of God through the Christian faith. Indians have by and large been willing to receive the former, but many have rejected the need for the latter, particularly



Velangani Christian Church in Pondicherry. Completed in 1791, the Church of Our Lady of the Immaculate Conception in the city of Pondicherry was built in the medieval architectural style of other Jesuit constructions of that period. It is known as the Velangani church in Pondicherry because it is an alternate for worshipers unable to visit the Basilica of Our Lady of Good Health in Velangani, about 250 kilometers away. FRANCOIS GAUTIER / FOTOMEDIA.

upper caste Hindus, who would say, “we have our own saviors.” Still, the Christian community has felt that it has contributed to the building of the nation and to an upward social mobility that has changed lives and benefited families and communities, particularly among the Dalits (the former “untouchables”).

In the sixteenth century it was the Jesuits who first established Christian institutions of learning. They were followed by the German Tranquebar missionaries. Later the renowned Friedrich Schwartz began Christian schools in both vernacular languages and in English. William Carey and the British Baptists who arrived in Calcutta in the late eighteenth century pioneered modern education in North India. By 1818 there were 111 schools located as far away from Calcutta as Shimla and Delhi in the north, and Rajputna in the south.

With the renewal of the British East India Company’s charter in 1813 and the arrival of a host of British mission societies, there was a proliferation of schools and printing presses across the country. The first Western-type postsecondary school, Serampore College, was organized in 1818. The American Mission opened schools for boys in Bombay from 1815 and in 1829. John Wilson saw to it that a school was also set up in Bombay for girls.

The arrival in Calcutta of Alexander Duff in 1830 marked the beginning of a new approach to learning, namely, English-language education. Duff was captivated with “the glowing prospects of Christianity in [India],” and with what he referred to as the “ultimate evangelisation of India.” Duff pondered the question of what was to be the future language of learning in India, wondering which would prove to be the “most effective instrument” of a liberal and enlightened education? Not surprisingly, Duff’s idea to set up an English-language school was, at first, controversial. There was significant opposition, but soon Duff’s modest experiment began to catch the imagination of the upper classes and those who possessed aspirations for their children. Duff’s work was a great success and resulted in the expansion of English-language educational institutions throughout British India in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, at the primary, secondary, and university levels; in time English became the veritable lingua franca of India. The widespread and popular adoption of English by people of all language groups and classes has certainly given India an advantage in today’s global economy, as well as in diplomacy, politics, and technology.

Christians were also pioneers in the field of female education. Much of this work was taken up by the wives of early missionaries, and by single women missionaries, of whom there were many. In the nineteenth century the commonly accepted view in India was that formal education was not for women of any kind, much less for those from respectable families. In 1834 it was reported that only 1 percent of Indian women could read and write.

Yet by 1900 an impressive number of schools and colleges had been opened in major cities, towns, and even villages throughout India for both men and women. Christians also went to live and work among both the tribal groups and the Dalits. The former were animists who lived outside the Hindu fold, while the latter were from the “untouchable” caste and were therefore excluded from the orthodox Hindu social structure. Toward the end of the nineteenth century Christian missionaries began to take more seriously the needs of the tribals and the Dalits and went to minister to them. The missionaries began schools and created written forms for many of the languages. In response, people from these

groups converted to Christianity in great numbers. This was particularly so in the Northeast and in the mass movements of Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu.

In 1997 the reputed and secular weekly *India Today* reported on the top ten colleges in the nation. Five of these were Christian: St. Stephen's, New Delhi; St. Xavier, Mumbai and Kolkata; Loyola College, Madras; and Stella Maris College (for women), Madras. There are others equally prestigious: Madras Christian College; Isabella Thorburn College (for women), Lucknow; Sarah Tucker College, Palayamkottai; and Mount Carmel Women's College, Bangalore. Certainly one way to measure the impact of Christianity in India is to observe the masses of people of all religious communities and social classes who use whatever influence they have at their disposal to get their children admitted to Christian schools. The rush begins at lower kindergarten and proceeds through to university colleges. This occurs even when parents—whether Hindu, Muslim, or Sikh—must agree to have their children study the Bible as an integral part of the curriculum.

Language and Literature

Christians have also made a significant contribution in India in the fields of languages, literature, and journalism. Constanzio Beschi (1680–1747) reformed Tamil alphabetical characters, making them more suitable for the printing press. He also produced a fourfold Tamil dictionary, which was divided according to words, synonyms, classes, and rhymes. Bishop Robert Caldwell's (1815–1891) *Comparative Grammar of the Dravidian Languages* and G. U. Pope's (1820–1908) translations of classics of Tamil literature into English are noteworthy. Vedanayagam Pillai (1824–1889) and H. A. Krishna Pillai (1827–1900) are two other Christian writers who produced some of the first Tamil novels.

The French priest Francis Mary of Toure began work on Hindustani as early as 1680, composing a massive dictionary titled *Thesaurus Linguae Indiae*. Modern Hindi, the national language, developed out of Hindustani. Henry Martyn and a Dr. Gilchrist, a professor of Hindustani and an American Presbyterian missionary, and the Reverend S. H. Kellogg all contributed to the formation and popularization of Hindustani. Kellogg, in fact, drew more than a dozen dialects together to assist in creating what is today known as Hindi. He produced in 1893 *A Grammar of the Hindi Language*, which is still in circulation. William Carey and his Baptist colleagues, beginning in 1818, were the first to produce periodicals, journals, and a newspaper. Their publication, the *Friends of India*, lived on and is now an English daily, the *Statesman*, published from Calcutta and New Delhi.

Jawaharlal Nehru in his *Discovery of India* acknowledges the contribution of the early missionaries, especially the Baptists of Serampore, concerning the shift from the dominating influence of both Sanskrit and Persian. The printing of books and newspapers by the missionaries, together with English-language education, no doubt broke the hold of the classics, says Nehru, and allowed regional languages to emerge and blossom. While Nehru saw no difficulty in missionaries dealing with the major languages, he notes that they, “even laboured at the dialects of the primitive hill and forest tribes. . . . The desire of the Christian missionaries to translate the Bible into every possible language thus resulted in the development of many Indian languages. Christian mission work in India has not always been admirable or praise worthy . . . but in this respect, as well as in the collection of folklore, it has undoubtedly been of great service to India” (Nehru, pp. 317–318).

Social Reform

From the very first, missionaries were shocked at the social evils that persisted in India, including the practice of *sati* (the immolation of widows on their husbands' funeral pyres), the killing of lepers, and the sacrifice of children.

William Carey was active from his arrival in 1793 in any issue that he felt needed change or reform. Within a year, near Malda, he reported having found the remains of an infant that had first been offered to a god as a sacrifice and then abandoned to be eaten by white ants. Moreover, children were thrown into the Ganges in fulfillment of vows taken for answers to prayer. Carey used his connections to those in authority and power to campaign for the outlawing of such practices. Governor-General Lord Wellesley asked him to submit a report on the matter and subsequently, in 1802, declared infanticide to be an act of murder; those who performed such horrible deeds, if caught, would themselves be put to death.

Carey employed his publications to educate public opinion on matters of humanitarian concern. The first issue of the *Friend of India* carried an exhaustive report of an actual *sati*. Subsequently he kept the practice before the public eye and did all he could to see *sati* abolished. By 1814 Ram Mohan Roy joined Carey in the campaign against *sati*. Armed with accounts of 438 widow burnings, Carey and his Serampore colleagues implored the government to forbid the rite by law. At first very little progress was made, due to strong opposition from high caste Hindu leaders. The Christians kept up the pressure, and eventually public opinion turned against the orthodox Hindus. In 1829 Lord William Bentinck finally signed an order prohibiting *sati* in the occupancies of the East India Company.

The field of medicine is another area in which Christians have made a significant contribution to the welfare and the common good of India. Jesuits in the late sixteenth century opened infirmaries attached to their living accommodations. John Thomas, an associate of William Carey, began his work in 1799. In the nineteenth century medical establishments of various kinds were created throughout India, set up by almost every missionary society. Two have been internationally recognized. The first, the Christian Medical College Hospital, Ludhiana, was founded by Dr. Edith Brown in 1893; the other, the Christian Medical College Hospital, Vellore, grew out of Dr. Ida Scudder's roadside clinics, first begun in 1895. In time both of these hospitals added to their facilities, becoming the first government-recognized medical colleges for women and subsequently for men.

There have also been programs set up for the mentally challenged and the disabled. The first institution for the deaf was organized by an order of nuns in Bombay in 1884. Since then, Catholic and Protestant Christians have established numerous homes throughout India for the abandoned, the abused, and the exploited. Two of the most impressive of these centers are the Mukti Mission in Kedegoan, near Pune founded by Pandita Ramabai in 1898 for orphaned girls and abused women. The other, the Dohnavur Fellowship, was first organized in 1901 by Amy Carmichael in South India. Its object was to rescue girls who had been forced into temple prostitution.

Another matter of concern among Christians over the years has been the practice of child marriage, whereby alliances are made among Hindus between children as young as five years of age. Carey's solution was to promote female education. Child marriage was legislatively banned in 1929. Christians since then have made a concerted effort to promote the approval of widow remarriage.

Christian reform efforts also included establishing sanatoriums for tuberculosis patients and for those who had contracted leprosy. The Schefflin Research and Training Centre in Karigiri, near Vellore, has carried out much original creative work in the area of leprosy reconstruction and rehabilitation.

While most of the early expressions of Christian social initiatives were pioneered by foreign missionaries, Indian Christians have carried on and even multiplied the legacy handed down to them. This has been so much the case that well into the late twentieth century a preponderance of doctors and nurses in any area of health care and medicine were Indian Christians. Moreover, many Hindus and Muslims still prefer to go to Christian hospitals.

Christians were also involved in rural development. Typical have been the Allahabad Agricultural College, organized in 1910, and the Bethel Agricultural Fellowship

near Salem, Tamil Nadu, in the early 1960s. Their aims were to assist and improve the productivity of farmers. K. T. Paul had similar concerns and came up with the idea of what he called "rural reconstruction." The Basel Mission, which began its work from its headquarters in Mangalore, is well known for introducing into India the manufacture of cheap terra-cotta tiles and other related products to improve village house construction. Such tiles are still popularly known, no matter who produces them, as mission tiles.

Disaster relief is another area in which the Christian community has made an impressive impact. Over the years the Churches Auxiliary for Social Action, the Evangelical Fellowship of India Commission on Relief, Catholic World Relief, World Vision, and others have all been in the forefront of nongovernmental organizations willing to assist in providing both immediate and long-term reconstruction to people and places wherever the tragedy of disaster has struck.

Indian Christians did not participate as much as might have been expected in the national movement for freedom. On the other hand, Kanakarayan Paul was one who deeply regretted the isolation of the Indian Christian community from the political events surrounding them. Bishop Paul Appaswamy added that if the Indian church was to exert any influence upon the life of India, it should take a "definite part in the social and public activities of the country." The *Christian Patriot*, the church's leading Indian weekly newspaper, conceded that with a few notable exceptions Indian Christians kept away from the nationalist movement. It urged Christians to recognize they had a duty toward India and then declared that "a real Christian cannot help being at the same time, a true Indian patriot" (cited in Houghton, p. 203).

V. Chakkarai, a lawyer and a Christian convert, was not surprised that the uneducated masses of Christians took practically no interest in political affairs. What troubled him was that the educated demonstrated so little concern, while he felt they ought to be shining examples of patriotism, leading the way in all movements of national welfare. Bishop Henry Whitehead of Madras explained the very likely reasons for the general Christian apathy toward the freedom movement. He challenged the validity of the Christian church becoming caught up in what he referred to as a "whirlpool of political unrest." Moreover, he felt political agitation was contrary to the spirit of Christ. Even Chakkarai recognized that the Christian community, like all other minorities was, "intensely afraid of being swamped by the Hindu majority."

Nevertheless, there were a number of Christians involved in the freedom movement, including K. T. Paul,

V. Chakkarai and his colleagues, Bishop Paul Appaswamy, Bishop Waskom Pickett, E. Stanley Jones, and to a lesser extent Bishop V. Z. Azariah. In addition, several Christians played an important role in framing the Indian Constitution. There were six appointed to the Minority Advisory Committee by the Constituent Assembly: Raj Kumari Amrit Kaur, Elbar D' Souza, P. K. Salvry, H. C. Mukherji, J. J. M. Nichols Roy, and J. N. P. Roch Victoria. The committee met under the leadership of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel in late 1947. To the surprise of many, the Christian representatives expressed their commitment to the Christian ideal of oneness and their eagerness to participate in the building of the nation, therefore turning down the need for any political safeguards to protect any parochial interests they might otherwise have had. They also gave up any claim they may have requested regarding seat reservations in the new Parliament. To their credit, and on behalf of a majority of the Christian community, they believed that the reservation of seats was not necessary, and in the interests of national integration merged with the constituency at large to become part of the general electorate.

Christians were perhaps less flexible when it came to those sections of the Constitution that dealt with religious prerogatives. Their concerns were threefold: the right to practice and propagate one's faith; the freedom to offer religious instruction in aided schools; and the right of conversion from one religion to another. Obviously, all of these issues generated considerable discussion and debate. Ultimately the Constituent Assembly approved these provisions, which became law on 26 January 1950. The Christian representatives were convinced that these were constitutional rights essential to Christian freedoms and central to the strengthening of India's secular democracy and the Christian contribution to it.

At the center of India's struggle for freedom from the British was the towering figure of Mahatma Gandhi. He was well acquainted with Christianity. However, it was Jesus Christ, more than Christians, that touched his heart. In 1920 he wrote "I revere the Bible. Christ's sermon on the mount fills me with bliss even today. Its sweet verses have even today the power to quench my agony of the soul." Writing in the *Harijan* in January 1939 he said, "Though I cannot claim to be a Christian in the sectarian sense, the example of Jesus' suffering is a factor in the composition of my undying faith in non-violence which rules all my actions, worldly and temporal."

Understandably Gandhi had a host of friends. Among those who were Christians, and most cherished, were Charlie Andrews and the principal of St. Stephen's College, Sushil Kumar Rudra. In earlier times Gandhi wrote of his being a guest in Rudra's home whenever he visited Delhi. When writing a condolence letter upon his death

in 1925 Gandhi said, "[Rudra] and Charlie Andrews were my revisionists. Non-cooperation was conceived and hatched under his hospitable roof."

Christianity in India Today

The 1991 census indicated that there were 23 million Christians in India, making up 2.3 percent of the total population. However, Christian executives and demographers estimate the number of Christians at 50 million, or 5 percent of the population. Whatever the correct figure, the number of Christians in India is growing. This is supported by the fact that there are more than six hundred churches in Delhi, with services conducted in almost any major language. In Bangalore, a city of 6 million, there are 970 churches and at least twelve accredited theological institutions, with three or four offering doctoral degrees. In Chennai (Madras) 10 percent of the population is Christian, worshipping in more than two thousand churches. Some of these congregations are small (60 to 100 people), and some meet in residences rather than churches. However, there are many congregations whose attendance is above a thousand, even five thousand in all of the three cities noted. At the same time there are two churches in Chennai, the New Life Assembly of God and the Apostolic Christian Assembly, whose average attendance on Sundays as of 2004 is 23,000 and 15,000, respectively. Christianity is thus making an impact on India's urban populations as well as on the rural and tribal peoples.

The idea of conversion from one faith to another does not sit well with many Hindus, who are upset by the Christian claim concerning the uniqueness of Jesus Christ as the one and only Savior. Christians, however, believe in the proclamation of Jesus Christ, which can take many forms: social, educational, works of compassion, disaster rehabilitation, and offering forgiveness.

Nita Kumar, writing in September 1993 in the *Economic Times* (Bangalore), took a rather different perspective when expressing her concern that India had not until then been able to successfully forge a path to modernity. The missionaries organized their institutions, she says, in such a way that they did succeed where others had failed in modernizing those who studied in them. The central contribution of Christian missionaries then, she asserts, has not been so much conversion to Christianity as it has been conversion to modernity. This she describes as a no-nonsense rationalistic and humanistic approach to life. Those who are thus converted are what Kumar refers to as "true 'modern' Indians." Moreover she reckons it is they who are "the builders of the new India."

The fact that the Christian community has contributed positively to nation building is uncontested. Today there are Christians integrated into the very fabric

of all areas of Indian society, both in the public and private sectors, from members of Parliament, chief ministers, corporate executives, physicians, engineers, and down to chauffeurs, chefs, and guards at the gate. To paraphrase the late Bishop Stephen Neill of the Trinelveli Diocese, Church of South India: for the Christian Church and its mission in India, the task has been challenging, and along the journey a number of mistakes have been made, but equally surprising, perhaps, is the fact that such a considerable measure of success has been accomplished.

Graham Houghton

See also **Andrews, C. F.; Azariah, Vedanayakam S.; French Impact; Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.; Paul, K. T.; Portuguese in India; Wellesley, Richard Colley; Xavier, Francis**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Anandan, A. J. *God for All, God for Me*. Bangalore: SAIACS Press, 1998.
- Andrews, C. F. *Mahatma Gandhi's Ideas*. New York: Macmillan, 1930.
- Firth, Cyril Bruce. *An Introduction to India Church History*. Madras: Christian Literature Society, 1968.
- Gandhi, Mohandas K. *The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi*, vol. 31. New Delhi: Government of India Publications, 1961.
- Ghose, Joseph H. "Indian Christians and Home Rule." *Social Reform Advocate* 29 (September 1917): 419.
- Houghton, Graham. *Impoverishment and Dependency*. Madras: Christian Literature Society, 1983.
- John, Binu. *Christian Contribution to Nation Building*. Delhi: ISPCK, 2004.
- Kumar, Nita. "The Missionaries Provided the Only Alternative." *Economic Times* (Bangalore) 19 (September 1993): 16.
- Mangalwadi, Vishal. *Missionary Conspiracy*. Mussoorie: Nivedit Good Books, 1996.
- Nehru, Jawaharlal. *Discovery of India*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1981.
- Neill, Stephen. *Call to Mission*. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970.
- Rajendran, K. *Which Way Forward Indian Missions?* Bangalore: SAIACS Press, 1998.
- Rawat, P. L. *History of Indian Education*. Bhopal: Ram Prasad and Sons, 1984.
- Sherring, M. A. *The History of Protestant Missions in India*. London: Trubner Co, 1875.

CINEMA The development of India's film industry—one of the world's largest—is as old, as varied, and as exciting as the history of the medium itself. The Lumière moving pictures that took Paris by storm at end of 1895 were enthralling Bombay audiences by the next July. Shooting for the first Indian feature film, *Raja Harishchandra*, started in 1912, coinciding with the



Poster for SHREE 420, Popular Film. Directed by Raj Kapoor and released in 1955, SHREE 420 is a classic Hindu tale of the struggle between good and evil. AKHIL BAKSHI / FOTOMEDIA.

appearance of full-length features in the United States. The first Indian "talkie" was shown in 1931, two years after the first British and French talkies made their bow.

The Early Years

At the turn of the twentieth century, when cinema dawned, India was poised for major social and political reform. Technological innovations, such as cars, planes, and gramophone records that took classical music to the masses, were transforming urban Indian society. Encouraged by the response to the first Indian films, the exhibitors moved the cinema shows to Novelty Theater and introduced a wide range of prices, appealing to both patrician and plebeian. The cheapest tickets cost four annas (a quarter of a rupee), creating the "four-anna class" audience that in decades to come would dictate the form and content of Indian commercial films.

Enterprising young Indians began to film local events (ranging from wrestling matches and extracts from plays

to the return of Wrangler Paranjpye from Cambridge) with cameras imported from London. With the rise of film magnates in India like Jamshedji Framji Madan and Abdulally Esoofally, films from all over the world were jostling for a slice of the Indian market. But these stagy dramas and comics were not to the tastes of the Indian multitude. The time was ripe for a truly indigenous filmmaker.

In 1910 a depressed Dhundiraj Govind Phalke, whose partners had withdrawn financial support from his fine-art printing business seated himself in the America-Indian cinema showing *The Life of Christ*. This run-of-the-mill production of the silent era, however, had a magical effect on Phalke. As Phalke watched the film unfold, he had a clear vision of his goal: to re-create the world of the rich mythic lore and epic tales of India, peopled with gods, demons, and humans. A Sanskrit scholar, architect, painter, photographer, and amateur magician, Phalke was certainly equipped to do so.

Phalke was his own scriptwriter, cameraman, director and even projectionist and distributor. *Raja Harishchandra*, the story of a king renowned for telling the truth, took six grueling months to complete and was released commercially in May 1913. With subtitles in Hindi and English and 3,000 feet long, the film ran for an unprecedented twenty-three days, or six times the normal run of an Indian film. When Phalke finished *Lanka Dahan* (The burning of Lanka), his box office collections had to be hauled away in bullock carts with police escorts. Many hardheaded businessmen now stepped into the picture, churning out films in the roofless studios (or “factories”) of the early years. Calcutta theater owner J. F. Madan built a chain of cinemas that covered India, Burma, and Ceylon and produced ten films a year.

After World War I, the British colonial regime appointed an Indian Cinematograph Committee of Enquiry, headed by an Indian member, Dewan Bahadur T. Rangachariar. But as many Indians feared, the British authorities were concerned mostly about expression of nationalist sentiments, banning films such as *Bhakta Vidur* (1921) and R. S. D. Choudhury's *Wrath* (1930) in which actors appeared as Mahatma Gandhi. World War II saw the tightening of censorship as never before. Even oblique references to Gandhi or other leaders brought instant censorship and reprisals.

But the silent film industry that Rangachariar so meticulously studied was itself poised for a revolutionary change. The day the committee was appointed—October 6, 1927—was also the day the world's first talkie, *The Jazz Singer*, premiered in New York.

The first foreign talkie in India was released by Madan Pictures in Calcutta in 1928. The first Indian talkie was

made a few years later: *Alam Ara*, an Arabian Nights-style drama, produced by Bombay's Imperial Film Company and directed by Ardeshir Irani. Released on 14 March 1931, the first Indian talkie, with ten songs, featured Zubeida, Master Vithal, and W. M. Khan. On opening night, black-market vendors sold tickets for its premiere at twenty times their actual price.

In Bombay, sound literally changed the complexion of the film industry. Most female stars of the silent era were “Anglo-Indians,” who could not handle Hindi. Even the silent era's “star of stars,” Sulochana (Ruby Meyers), whose salary reportedly exceeded that of the Bombay governor, was toppled from her throne. More liberal attitudes made upper caste actresses available to the once-taboo film industry. In a 1932 version of the Harishchandra story, the female lead was played by a Brahman, Durga Khote.

For dialogue, Indian filmmakers turned to popular playwrights, such as Agha Hashr Kashmiri, who wrote ornate dialogue and flowery verses. But as filmmakers realized that a different craft was evolving, they looked to novels for original material, a practice that seems to have originated in Bengal.

Dialogue has always had a special hold over Indian audiences. Actor-director Sohrab Modi's spirited speech as a Rajput warrior in *Pukar* (1939) had viewers showering coins on the screen. In 1975 over half a million records of the dialogue of the “curry-western” *Sholay* were sold. But film songs were to become even more popular than dialogue—to the extent of acquiring more importance than the films themselves.

Songs above All

A typically Indian result of the coming of sound was the central importance that music and songs acquired in film. By the mid-1930s, movie music was big business. *Indra Sabha* (1932) had nearly seventy songs. In *Devi Devyani*, beautiful Gohar, then in her early twenties, was cast against nearly seventy-year-old Bhagwandas, a famous singer. While the predominance of songs is seen as a continuation of the essentially musical nature of Indian theater, others suggest that songs and music were a means to overcome a linguistic splintering of the Indian audience. The merry mixing of Indian and western traditions, classical and folk, was condemned by some as “hybrid” but the very vitality of film music and its desire to experiment broadened the basis of Indian music.

In film dance too, choreographers combined Western styles with distorted *mudras* of Indian classical dance forms. Two serious attempts to put Indian dance on film were Uday Shankar's *Kalpana* (Imagination, 1948) and

V. Shantaram's *Jhanak Jhanak Payal Baje* (Jangle of anklets, 1955), one of the early Technicolor films in India.

The first two decades of talkies were dominated by "singing stars" like Saigal, Pankaj Mullick, Kanan Devi, Noorjehan, and Suraiyya. But good singing was no guarantee of good acting. "Playback" (or ghost) singing came to the rescue. The most successful playback singer was Lata Mangeshkar (the "Nightingale of India"), whose 30,000 solo, duet, and chorus-backed songs recorded in twenty Indian languages between 1948 and 1987 were noted in the *Guinness Book of Records*.

The Emergence of Studios

From the 1920s to the 1940s, film technicians and performers in India were on the payroll of a studio, making up one large joint family under its roof. The port cities of Bombay, Madras, and Calcutta had become the major centers of commerce and industry—including film production. Major studios developed a personality of their own but by the 1930s, three had attained a prestige that set them above the rest. New Theatres in Calcutta was started by B. N. Sircar, who collected a group of talented men around him. They captured the all-India market with *Devdas* (1935), based on the well-known novel, directed by P. C. "Prince" Barua, who also played the (eponymous) lead role. Many Indian language versions followed.

Himansu Rai and his wife Devika Rani, who made silent films with German backing, followed with an Anglo-Indian coproduction, *Karma*. In 1934 the couple set up Bombay Talkies. Its products were carefully tailored to meet the tastes of its varied audiences, mixing glamour, music, and melodrama with a certain amount of political and social consciousness.

Prabhat Studios in Pune had no elitist pretensions. V. Shantaram directed a majority of its films, notably *Duniya na Mane*, about an elderly widower who marries a young woman, then regrets it. But Prabhat's most successful film was *Sant Tukaram* (Saint Tukaram), directed by Shantaram's copartners Damle and Fatehlal. Made in Marathi, it was a great success throughout India.

Inflation, unleashed by World War II, pulled out the supports of the studio system, already tottering from internal jealousies. Successful directors and actors sought to breakaway and amass personal fortunes. Fly-by-night producers with money made on shady wartime deals lured stars away to work in individual films. Leadership of the industry passed from established producers into the hands of leading stars, exacting financiers and calculating distributors/exhibitors. The *masala* film—which wrapped all salable ingredients together, comedy, melodrama, song, dance, romance—became the widely accepted recipe for success.

As it became economically unfeasible to shoot in the north, studios equipped for sound started coming up in the south. In 1936 Madras United Artists Corporation and Modern Theaters were both founded, soon followed by Vauhini, Gemini, AVM, and others. But till the late 1940s, most Indian cinema was blissfully unconcerned with Madras, capital of the mammoth south Indian film industry. In 1948, however, S. S. Vasan's spectacular *Chandralekha*, with its unforgettable drum-dance sequence, became a stunning success all over India.

At the time, almost half of all Indian theaters were in the four southern Dravidian states (Andhra, Karnataka, Kerala, and Tamil Nadu) and almost 50 percent of all films made were in the Dravidian languages. Most of these films were from Tamil Nadu, where films wielded a power in the social, cultural, and political spheres unequalled in India. The credit for realizing the enormous potential of the medium goes to the DMK (Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam) Party, which advocated a revival of Dravidian culture.

The 1947 partition of Bengal into India's West Bengal and East Pakistan threw the Calcutta film industry, which had always demonstrated political awareness, into turmoil—and politics continued to influence subsequent films. Nema Ghosh's *Chinnamul* (The uprooted, 1951), on the refugee influx into partitioned India, was one such powerful drama. Activist Ritwik Ghatak, of the leftist Indian People's Theatre Association (IPTA) who acted in *Uprooted* went on to make *Nagarik* (Citizen) in 1952, an exhortation to the working class to keep up its struggle.

French director Jean Renoir had visited Calcutta in 1949 to scout locations for his forthcoming film *River*. One of his guides there was Satyajit Ray, a young graphic artist and aspiring filmmaker—who would go on to show a generation of Indian filmmakers that it was possible to be successful outside of India's film bazaar.

Satyajit Ray and Bengali Filmmaking

Metaphorically and literally Satyajit Ray towered over Indian cinema. His *Pather Panchali* (Song of the road, 1955) ran to packed houses in Bengal and won the Best Human Document award at Cannes. He showed aspiring filmmakers that it was possible to make a different kind of cinema with amateur actors, without make up, shoot mainly on location and interpret Indian reality in non-melodramatic style.

Rooted firmly in the literary and artistic tradition of the Bengal Renaissance, Ray had studied at Rabindranath Tagore's Shantiniketan (Abode of Peace) University. He went on to prove himself a master storyteller and observer of the human predicament in classics such as the *Apu Trilogy* (1955, 1956, 1959), *Jalsaghar* (The music

room, 1958), *Charulata* (1964), *Devi* (The goddess, 1960), and *Aranyer Din Ratri* (Days and nights in the forest, 1969).

Another Bengali genius, Ritwik Ghatak, was a passionate practitioner of epic cinema, investing melodrama with tragic depth as he probed the personal and collective impact of Bengal's partition. From this pain were born his masterpieces: *Meghe Dhaka Tara* (Cloud-capped star, 1960), *Komal Gandhar* (E-flat, 1961), and *Subarnarekha*, (1962). Mrinal Sen graduated from his initial agit-prop essays to sensitive explorations of middle-class guilt in well-crafted films such as *Ek Din Pratidin* (And quiet flows the dawn, 1979), *Akaler Sandhaney* (In search of famine, 1980), and *Kharij* (The case is closed, 1982).

Uttam Kumar, who played a film star in Ray's *Nayak* (The hero, 1966), was long Bengal's beloved matinee hero, starring with the inimitable Suchitra Sen. Bilingual filmmakers based in Bombay, like Bimal Roy and Shakti Samanta, lured the two to act in Hindi films. Later popular Bengali stars who made it good in Hindi cinema were Sharmila Tagore and Mithun Chakravorty.

The Golden Age of Hindi Cinema

In the 1950s and 1960s, the dominance of Hindi cinema was unparalleled commercially and critically. V. Shantaram's 1957 film, *Do Aankhen Bara Haath* (Two eyes, twelve hands), about a benevolent jailor who tries to reform six condemned prisoners, won a Silver Bear at Berlin. Journalist-filmmaker K. A. Abbas was one of the few socially committed filmmakers of the day, his brilliant *Dharti Ke Lal* (Red earth) focused on the 1943 Bengal famine. When Nitin Bose and then Bimal Roy moved from Calcutta's New Theatres to Bombay, they brought their social awareness into Hindi films. Bose's *Gunga Jumna* (1961), about the conflict between two brothers, is among the all-time hits of Indian cinema.

Mehboob Khan, who ran away from home to become an actor, emerged as one of Bombay's most distinguished producer/directors. His most popular film, *Mother India* (1957), created an enduring icon of the mother as a symbol of national identity in his protagonist Radha (played by Nargis, who won India's first international acting prize at Karlovy Vary). Bimal Roy made films about social evils. *Do Bigha Zamin* (Two acres of land, 1953) depicting the poignancy of the peasants' losing battles against avaricious landlords won prizes at Cannes and Karlovy Vary. Memorable in the leading role was one of the great actors of Indian cinema, Balraj Sahni, an IPTA member. In Roy's 1955 version of *Devdas*, he cast the reigning tragedy king, Dilip Kumar, as Saratchandra's self-destructive hero.

Raj Kapoor's career coincided with the birth of a new nation state. The early Raj Kapoor, with his romanticized idealism, sought to be the bardic voice of the Nehruvian dream. When he made *Awaara* (The vagabond, 1955), introducing in homage to Charlie Chaplin the lovable Indian "Tramp," his tremendous appeal at home and abroad seemed endless. His songs are still sung in Russia. Kapoor and Nargis shared an electrifying screen chemistry, epitomizing romance for an entire generation of Indians.

Guru Dutt was Indian cinema's tragic poet. He had a superb understanding of the camera and a fine ear for melody. His master films, including *Pyaasa* (Thirsty, 1957), which delved into the despair of a poet unrecognized in his lifetime, and his autobiographical *Kaagaz Ke Phool* (Paper flowers, 1959), have attracted a cult following.

If there is a truly Indian "genre," it is the mythological. Mythology has been a source material for Indian films right from Phalke's *Harishchandra*. In later years, one of the most successful "mythos" was *Jai Santoshi Maa* (Hail to Goddess Santoshi Maa, 1975). Cheaply made and featuring an erstwhile heroine of mainstream cinema, the film was bountifully blessed at the box office. The lives of saints was also a recurring theme in films.

Another typically Indian film genre was the costume drama of refined manners and poetical language—a seeking to evoke a golden glow of nostalgia for the Mughal court. Among the most popular were Guru Dutt's *Chaudvin ka Chand* (Full moon, 1960), Kamal Amrohi's *Pakeezah* (The pure one, 1971), and K. Asif's *Mughal-e-Azam* (The great Mughal, 1960).

New Heroes

The Swinging Sixties brought about a sea change. Icon of the times was Raj Kapoor's younger brother, the exuberant Shammi, who broke the mold of the traditional gentlemanly hero and won for himself the title of "Rebel Star." Reworking his earlier soulful/romantic image in the style of James Dean and Elvis Presley, sporting T-shirts and leather jackets, dancing uninhibitedly to highly hummable numbers, Shammi Kapoor led Hindi cinema's first concerted attempt to woo the Westernized teenage audience. His 1961 color film *Junglee*, set in picturesque Kashmir, elevated him to cult status; his exulting cry of "Yahoo" (part of the theme song) captured the imagination of a whole new generation.

Shammi Kapoor's successor was rather his opposite. He hardly conformed to India's prevailing ideal of robust Punjabi good looks, crinkled his eyes and shook his head vulnerably in what were to become trademark gestures. Yet Rajesh Khanna was dubbed India's first superstar as one sentimental romance after another swept the box

office. The gallant smile with which he faced death guaranteed a collective lump in the audience's throat (*Anand*, 1970; *Namak Haram*, 1973). Coincidentally enough, the rising star who was soon to unseat Khanna was the second lead in both of these films—the lanky, brooding Amitabh Bachchan, blessed with the most seductive baritone of them all.

Bachchan became India's longest ruling star, starting with a series of author-backed roles that cast him as an angry young man. Prakash Mehra's *Zanjeer* (Chains, 1973) and Yash Chopra's *Deewar* (The wall, 1975) were great box office successes. But the curry western *Sholay* (Burning embers, 1975) by director Ramesh Sippy was the biggest hit, chosen in a recent British Film Institute poll as the "best Indian film."


Versions of the vigilante hero, as the upright cop fighting a corrupt system or the avenging outsider free from establishment rules, sprang up everywhere. The films reflected India's turbulent 1970s, when the Nehruvian dream of an egalitarian, secular India collapsed, followed in June 1975 by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's imposition of a "National Emergency" and the suspension of civil rights, after she was found guilty by Allahabad's High court of electoral malpractice. After the "Emergency," Amitabh Bachchan kept the film industry buoyant, delivering hit after hit, spun out by the "Masala moghul" Manmohan Desai (*Amar*, *Akbar*, *Anthony*, 1977), or articulating the anger of youth in *Kala Patthar* (Coal, 1979).

The Southern Connection

The highly politicized Tamil Nadu cinema created real-life rivals. M. G. Ramachandran's swashbuckling "Robin Hood" image won him a large fan following, which propelled him to the post of chief minister of the state. Stage thespian Sivaji Ganesan (who later joined the opposing Congress Party) wowed masses and critics alike with his matchless oratorical skills. Writers great and small, including future Chief Minister Karunanidhi, vied to pen breathless passages of prose for this new star.

The directors who rescued Tamil movies from excessive theatricality were K. Balachander and Bharatiraja. Balachander added a psychological edge to bold themes, creating new stars such as Kamal Haasan (one of India's best actors and dancers, who went on to become a successful writer/director/producer in the 1980s and 1990s), Rajanikant (his mannerisms have a cult following, with new converts in Japan), and the talented Sridevi, whose child-woman image made her an all-India star.

Traffic between Bombay cinema and that of Madras climaxed with Mani Ratnam's *Nayakan* (1987), based on



Indian Film Star Shahrukh Khan. Heartthrob Shahrukh Khan, the "king of Bollywood," with his wife Gauri. INDIA TODAY.

the life of a Bombay organized crime boss, and his 1992 *Roja*, a love story in the time of terrorism in Kashmir.

Andhra Pradesh's Telugu cinema was long dominated by the rivalry between the "godly" N. T. Rama Rao (or NTR) and the more down-to-earth A. Nageshwar Rao. NTR breathed declamatory fire into the Sanskritized phrases of the epic mythologicals, playing the Hindu god Krishna no fewer than seventeen times. Thanks to his godly screen presence and faithful fan following, he led a Dravidian political party, espousing Telugu identity, and became chief minister of Andhra Pradesh.

Telugu and Tamil films reveled in family melodramas, in which modernity (in the form of an educated son or daughter-in-law) threatened the idealized traditional family. That "Madras Formula" was soon applied with equal success to teary Hindi films. Telugu directors Bapu and K. Vishwanath succeeded in Bombay as well. Vishwanath's celebrated ode to Carnatic music in his *Sankarabharanam* (Shiva's raga, 1979) was imitated by northern directors.

Malayalam and Kannada cinema were latecomers. Like Bengal, Kerala is a stronghold of Marxism, and it boasts the highest literacy in the country. Given its thriving film culture too, it was no surprise that many acclaimed directors of art (or "parallel cinema" as it was known) came from Kerala.

A New Wave Touches Indian Shores

Ray had shown the way, and international film festivals opened the doors to worldwide developments. The government of India was alive to the needs for funding non-formula filmmakers, and the Film Finance Corporation or FFC (which was reincarnated as the National Film Development Corporation two decades later) was inaugurated in 1960. In 1961 the Film and Television Institute of India (FTII) rose from the ruins, as it were, of the Prabhat Studios. A National Film Archive followed in 1964. FFC produced *Bhuvan Shome* (1969), an engagingly subversive work, directed by Mrinal Sen. The film marked the arrival of a "New Wave" of filmmaking on Indian shores.

Quite independent of institutional support, a southern theater group made *Samskara* (Funeral rites, 1970) in Kannada, an indictment of Brahman hypocrisy and meaningless ritual. The Kannada cinema now became the hub of "new cinema" developments. Eminent playwright and Rhodes scholar Girish Karnad and theater genius cum music composer B. V. Karanth made memorable films together and on their own. Soon, Girish Kasaravalli, a young pharmacist who chose to train at FTII, surged to the forefront with an accomplished first work, *Ghatasbraddha* (The rite, 1978), which explored the anachronistic world of Brahmanical rituals, with sensitivity and integrity.

From Kerala, an early graduate of the FTII, Adoor Gopalakrishnan, is today India's most distinguished filmmaker, acclaimed nationally and internationally. On his shoulders rests the mantle of Ray. Adoor has created demanding masterpieces that explore the human condition with detachment and delicacy. *Elipattayam* (The rat trap), focusing on Kerala's decaying feudal society, is as disturbing today as it was in 1982, when the British Film Institute Award cited it as "the most original and imaginative film" of the year. Other filmmakers from Kerala include cartoonist turned filmmaker Aravindan, Shaji N. Karun, director of *Piravi* (Birth, 1988), perhaps the mostly widely seen Indian film on the international festival circuit.

In Bombay, two of Ritwik Ghatak's devoted students, Kumar Shahani and Mani Kaul struck out in defense of "pure cinema," eschewing the strong narrative and emotional drama of the conventional cinema. Far less esoteric but equally experimental was FTII's Ketan Mehta whose debut film *Bhavni Bhavai* transposed the folk idiom to the screen.

The New Wave created its own icons to challenge mainstream melodramatics: the luminous Smita Patil, who died tragically young; the perfectionist Shabana Azmi, who combined brilliant acting with activism; the mercurial Naseeruddin Shah and the solid-yet-sensitive Om Puri, both immensely talented, both graduates of the National School of Drama and the FTII.

The director who created and projected these icons worldwide was Shyam Benegal. His early films, starting with *Ankur* (The seedling, 1974), are searchingly humane explorations of the conflict between feudal traditions and modernity, filtered through women placed at the heart of each drama. Benegal is a rarity in that his films do not compromise his integrity and yet pay for themselves. Benegal's cinematographer Govind Nihalani graduated to become one of India's most politically conscious directors with the hard-hitting *Ardh Satya* (Half truth, 1983), a study of the brutalization of an idealistic young policeman (Om Puri). Nihalani continues his explorations of violence, individual and societal; his latest big-budget *Dev* (2004) brings together the two most famous "cops" of mainstream and offbeat cinema: Amitabh Bachchan and Om Puri.

Political engagement is also the hallmark of another distinguished director, Saeed Mirza. His famed quartet (including *Why Does Albert Pinto Get Angry?*) voices the plight of the marginalized minorities. His *Naseem* (1994) cast poet Kaifi Azmi as the despairing Muslim patriarch who remains in India at partition because of his profound belief in India's secular ideals, only to find himself and his family threatened by the demolition of the Babri Masjid by Hindu fundamentalists in 1992.

A trailblazer in this regard was M. S. Sathyu, whose 1973 *Garm Hava* (Hot wind) dared to look at the plight of Muslims in North India after partition. The film was a critical success—accepted at Cannes, recipient of a National Award—but did not succeed financially. Another powerful partition film was Nihalani's *Tamas* (Darkness), which appeared as a television serial.

The New Wave threw up new filmmaking centers with no cinematic tradition to speak of. Assam's Jahnu Barua (*Halodia Choraye Baodhan Khai*, 1987; *Hkbagoroloi Bobu Door*, 1995) carved a niche for himself, exploring the many facets of his seemingly idyllic land torn apart by ethnic strife. Barua has brought Assam into national focus, underlining the feeling of isolation. From Manipur, Aribam Syam Sarma's seemingly simple films (*Imagi Ningthem*, *Ishanou*, *Sanabi*) conceal many layers, with strong heroines who reflect the prevailing matrilineal system. One of Indian cinema's enduring mysteries is what happened to Nirad Mohapatra after his brilliant *Maya Miriga* (Illusion, 1983) a bittersweet unfolding of the disintegration of a traditional family in an Orissa township.

The vigor of the New Wave drew into its fold professionals from the sister arts, like the Pune-based theater director (and pediatrician) Jabbar Patel, who gave shape to a new Marathi cinema with his political and social dramas, *Saamma* (1975), *Sinhasan* (1979), and *Umbartha* (1981), starring Smita Patil as a women's rights activist.

Fellow Maharashtrian and theater enthusiast Amol Palekar first became famous as the “boy next door” in Basu Chatterjee’s light-hearted romances but went on to make serious films tackling unusual themes.

Talented artists from all over the country made their mark in cinema: photojournalist and theater director Gautam Ghose adopted a semidocumentary approach in many hard-hitting political films like *Dakhal*, *Patang*, and *Dekha*. A memorable scene in his *Paar* (The Crossing, 1984) has the heroic couple (Shabana Azmi and Naseeruddin Shah) herding swine across the swirling waters of the river to earn their fare back to their village. Academic poet Buddhadeb Dasgupta combined a lyrical sensibility with politically conscious humanism in films like *Neem Annapurna*, *Bagh Babadur*, and *Uttara*, which won him the Best Director award in Venice in 2000.

The New Wave’s liberating influence brought women filmmakers to the fore. In Bangalore, Prema Karanth’s *Phaniyamma* (Kannada, 1982) was a moving portrayal of a child widow; Bombay-based Sai Paranjpye (*Sparsb*, *Chashme Buddoor*, *Katha*, and *Disha*) constantly sought to conquer new territory, from sensitive love stories and comedy to a journalistic look at Bombay’s hopeful migrants. Noted theater director and actor Vijaya Mehta extended her formidable talents to films (*Smriti Chitre*, *Rao Sabeel*, *Pestonjee*), and, in Calcutta, Aparna Sen grew from mainstream star to accomplished director. Her first, and India’s first English film, *36 Chowringhee Lane* (1981), was a poignant study of the loneliness of an Anglo-Indian teacher. The latest, *Mr. and Mrs. Iyer* (2003), is a brief and tender encounter between strangers caught amidst inter-communal violence.

The Wave Recedes

Around the 1980s, India’s New Wave cinema seemed to run out of steam. Over the years, the progressive agenda of the filmmakers lost its niche audience. FFC and National Film Development Corporation tried without success to set up an alternative distribution system. Many New Wave films survived on the oxygen of the festival circuit and screenings on national television. Independent cinema nevertheless lives on, with new talents joining the established. In Calcutta, the prolific Rituparno Ghosh has established himself as a sensitive director of women-centric dramas; in Kerala, Murali Nair’s black satires and surreal humour have won accolades worldwide (Camera d’Or for *Marana Simbasanam* at Cannes). In mainstream cinema, too, a next generation arose, technically savvy and daring enough to take risks (Farhan Akhtar, Madhur Bhandarkar). Ramgopal Varma, yesterday’s whiz kid from Hyderabad whose 1995 *Satya* (a noir thriller on the Bombay underworld) catapulted him to the top, is currently backing experiments by newer entrants.



Mira Nair, Indian Filmmaker. Her 2000 *Monsoon Wedding* examines the growing phenomenon of “global” Indians, a world where young and upwardly mobile Indians must coexist with their tradition-minded parents and family elders. INDIA TODAY.

In the 1990s, globalization raised the demon of cultural dilution and contamination. The conservative Right echoed the fears of Hindu fundamentalists, who saw the exposure to Western entertainment as detrimental to the “purity” of Indian culture. Mainstream cinema, attuned to these conservative forces, responded with two brands of patriotism: hard and soft. Soft patriotism reinforced the traditional virtues of filial obedience. Bright, glossy films increasingly courted the rich Indian diaspora settled in the West, which looked to India for its cultural identity and value system—values that were often regressive when it came to women’s rights.

Hard patriotism was packaged in films like *Border* and *Gadar* (Chaos), which had a ready audience in a country hit by terrorism and militancy. The message was: how can you love your country without hating your neighbour? In the mainstream cinema, there was no place for introspection, political or social, to probe the roots of

violence. Rare exceptions were Gulzar's *Maachis* (Matches), which explored how young men turned to terrorism under police brutalities in Punjab, and Kamala Haasan's *Hey Ram!* (in Tamil and Hindi), which tried to probe the roots of religious hatred at the time of partition.

Indian cinema is now looking beyond national borders. The urban success of Dev Benegal's *English August* (based on a first novel by a bureaucrat), the international success of Shekhar Kapoor's *Bandit Queen* on a notorious woman dacoit, and Aamir Khan-Ashutosh Gowariker's *Lagaan*, a film that married two of India's great passions, cricket and movies, all fueled Indian filmmakers' ambitions to capture world audiences. Meanwhile, the mushrooming of multiplexes in Indian cities has achieved what years of muddled strategies could not: creating niche audiences for small films that are made in a mix of languages. It seems that the all-India, all-in-one film has become even more of a mirage, like the Rāmāyaṇa's elusive golden deer.

Rani Day Burra
Maibili Rao

See also **Filmīgīt; Film Industry; Lata Mangeshkar; Ray, Satyajit**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Barnouw, Eric, and S. Krishnaswamy. *Indian Film*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1980.
- Bhaskaran, S. Theodore. *The Eye of the Serpent: An Introduction to Tamil Cinema*. Madras: East West Books, 1996.
- Dasgupta, Chidanand. *The Painted Face: Studies in Indian Popular Cinema*. New Delhi: Roli Books, 1991.
- Dwyer, Rachel. *All You Want Is Money, All You Need Is Love: Sex and Romance in Modern India*. London: Cassell, 2000.
- Dwyer, Rachel, and Christopher Pinney, eds. *Pleasure and the Nation: The History, Politics, and Consumption of Public Culture in India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2001.
- Garga, B. D. *So Many Cinemas: The Motion Picture in India*. Mumbai: Eminence Designs, 1996.
- Joshi, Lalit Mohan, ed. *Bollywood: Popular Indian Cinema*. London: Dakinibooks, 2000.
- Kazmi, Fareed. *The Politics of India's Conventional Cinema: Imaging a Universe, Subverting a Multiverse*. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1999.
- Prasad, M. Madhava. *Ideology of the Hindi Film: A Historical Construction*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1998.
- Ramachandran, T. M., ed. *Seventy Years of Indian Cinema: 1913–1983*. Bombay: Cinema India International, 1985.
- Sastry, K. N. T., ed. *Telugu Cinema*. Hyderabad: Cinema Group, 1986.
- Vasudev, Aruna. *The New Indian Cinema*. New Delhi: Macmillan, 1986.

CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS India is one of the few countries in the developing world never to have been under military rule. It has had democratic governance for

over fifty years. Even when a national emergency was declared in June 1975 and democracy remained suspended for over two years, the military remained entirely neutral. Civil-military relations in India have been somewhat atypical. The British kept the military separate, both physically and ideologically, from the rest of the nation and from politics, a tradition that has endured in India. In neighboring Pakistan and in many other postcolonial countries, the military has often taken over governance.

Civil-military relations are not merely about military intervention. It is the interaction between the government, represented by political leaders, and military authorities in the management of national security. The challenge lies in ensuring that the military, while remaining strong, cohesive, and responsive to deal with external aggression and internal threats, is guided and controlled entirely by political leadership. This calls for building structures, procedures, and institutional norms, carefully developed and scrupulously observed by all.

The First Phase

Independent India inherited a large army bred in the colonial tradition and a system of civil-military relationship that was out of tune with a democracy. The new government wisely retained the military precisely as it was and began to set up a structure of civilian control modified to the new requirements. It adopted the liberal model of civil-military relations, with total parliamentary accountability.

Four conditions determined the way in which India's civil-military relations evolved. The first was the ignorance of the political leaders, including Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru (in office 1947–1964), about military affairs, and hence their reluctance to deal with them. Second was Nehru's towering personality and his dedication to democracy and its elective institutions, which ensured that the military could never dare to challenge them. Third, the war in Jammu and Kashmir ensured that there could be no major changes in military affairs. Finally, senior military commanders agreed that the military had no role in civil governance and must remain subordinate to democratic political leadership.

Two options were available to India's government at independence to structure higher command functions. One was to adopt the integrated Joint Chiefs of Staff system with the three services reporting directly to a strong defense ministry, through integrated service councils, as in the United Kingdom. The other option was that service chiefs should function as independent commanders of their respective services, with civilian control exercised over them through a system of committees under a

ministry of defense. The government adopted the latter approach.

The service heads, therefore, initially retained their ranks of commanders in chief. Though the nomenclature was changed in 1955 to “chiefs of staff,” it made no substantive difference. Without simultaneously creating integrated service councils, the chiefs continued to function much as before, which meant that the chiefs retained nearly total autonomy in all purely military matters, including organizations and operations. In all other aspects—finance, policy, and civilian affairs—the services were guided entirely by the Ministry of Defence.

Civilian control was implemented through two committees: the Defence Committee of the Cabinet, presided over by the prime minister, with selected ministers as members and service chiefs, cabinet secretary, and selected secretaries in attendance; and the Defence Minister’s Committee with the three service chiefs, the defense secretary, and the financial secretary as members. For the first decade of independence, these two committees met as required, but very infrequently, as no major issues of policy challenged the nation. Meanwhile a small army of civil bureaucrats entered the Ministry of Defence and studied all military proposals. That committee was headed by a secretary from the civilian administrative service, who in all probability had no military experience. He emerged as the defense minister’s trusted adviser on all military issues, exercising a role, therefore, that should normally have been served by either the senior military commander or the elected political executive.

Civil-military relations were severely strained from 1957 to 1962, when V. K. Krishna Menon was appointed defense minister. Self-confident to the point of “megalomania,” in the opinion of some senior generals, Menon argued angrily and bitterly with his most experienced and popular army chief, General Thimayya, playing favorites in his own appointments to higher military ranks. He was wrongly convinced that China would never attack India. When the Chinese army poured over the Northern Tier and India was roundly defeated, Krishna Menon was forced to resign. Nehru died a year and a half later, shattered by the defeat.

The Second Phase

After the Chinese aggression, the strength of India’s armed forces was increased by more than three times, and there was substantial reorganization in all services. The Ministry of Defence expanded as well, but the changes in higher management were slow. The Defence Committee of the Cabinet never met again and was discontinued. Instead, defense and foreign policy issues were discussed at the Cabinet Committee on Political

Affairs, where service heads were seldom if ever present. A Defence Planning Committee was created, under the Cabinet Committee, consisting of a number of key secretaries and including the three service chiefs. The Defence Minister’s Committee was replaced by the Defence Minister’s morning meetings, attended by the service chiefs, and defense and production secretaries. Those largely informal meetings proved useful for the coordination of major issues and provided a high-level forum for periodic discussions.

Civil-military relations that emerged in the decade following the Chinese invasion and the India-Pakistan wars of 1965 and 1971, has been defined as a Clausewitzian bargain. The political leadership was to set the goals and provide its strategic vision. The military was left to deal with operational matters, virtually without supervision. This allowed the political and bureaucratic leadership to avoid blame if things went wrong and permitted freedom of operations to the military, for which its high command had long clamored. As an example, it was General Chaudhury who recommended the expansion of the war in 1965 to the Punjab, to which Prime Minister Shastri entirely agreed. In 1971 India’s next prime minister, Indira Gandhi, accepted Field Marshal Manekshaw’s advice against those of many members of her Cabinet, to wait for nine months before moving India’s army into the newly independent Bangladesh.

Over India’s first three to four decades, the military’s position steadily declined against their civil counterparts. First to be affected was pay. The special allowances that the military had enjoyed under the British were removed without compensatory benefits, making military salaries distinctly less favorable. Some of these anomalies were corrected only in the 1990s. The other factor was the official “order of precedence,” which, though viewed by many as a superficial matter of protocol, is still quite important in India. The military’s position has declined steadily in both of these areas over the years.

Operational delegation to the military was accompanied by intrusive monitoring by the civil bureaucracy on all other areas of military functioning. The civil bureaucracy vetted all significant troop movements. All officer promotions above the rank of colonel, recommended by a purely military board, had to be approved by the Ministry of Defence. Initially, these were routine vettings ensuring adherence to established norms and precedence. In later years, political connections would lead to special recommendations and waivers, altering the original lists. Civilian officials also emerged as a front-end of the defense establishment. With the object of insulating the armed forces from political interference, civil bureaucrats answered questions from Parliament and the media, and negotiated with the rest of the government on military

issues. Comparatively junior civilian officers were to clear service proposals sent by the chiefs. Civilians would head weapons acquisition negotiating teams and formulate and approve military acquisition contracts. Finally, the civilian defense secretary was made responsible to coordinate interservice issues and report directly to the minister, assuming in fact the responsibilities associated with the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff.

This was possible because in retaining operational autonomy, the armed forces also opted to stay away from the government, becoming in fact a department of the government. All financial authority lay only with the Ministry of Defence. A chief's itinerary for inspection visits within the country had to be cleared by a lowly clerk in the ministry, since such visits had financial implications. Political oversight was also implemented through Parliament. The Public Accounts Committee and the Parliamentary Defence Committee were both entitled to oversee military expenditure and the functioning of the ministry. In recent years, these committees have raised serious questions in their reports, though they have not yet become full-fledged watchdogs.

Other stresses emerged in civil-military relations in the 1980s. Failure of governance caused severe disaffection in the country, leading to a number of internal crises requiring military intervention. The most serious of these was in the Punjab in the 1980s. In June 1984 the army was ordered to assault the Golden Temple, a sacred shrine of the Sikhs, who then constituted some 15 percent of the army's strength, and a higher percentage of its officer corps. The aftermath of the attack led to mutiny by some 2,600 Sikh soldiers. This necessitated a reorganization of the army's regimental system. The army was also called upon to assist the civil government in Assam in 1990 and 1991 in operations Bajrang and Rhino. From 1990, the army would be deeply involved in the state of Jammu and Kashmir.

These situations reflected a breakdown of civil policy, and such repeated use of the army was often resented by the military, though they never opposed it. It also required arrangements for civil-military coordination at the provincial level. A system of unified command was established in the affected provinces. The governors of these troubled states were often retired soldiers or else had senior military officers as advisers. This arrangement, though not always very satisfactory has functioned reasonably well.

Another challenge to civil-military relations has arisen from what has been called the "new militaries." A very large number of police and paramilitary forces have been created in India in recent years to deal with growing internal instability. Their number at independence was below 100,000. By 2004 they were over 1.4 million strong, larger collectively than the army, and may be developed into an

alternate force. At the same time, the army's internal role, always unpopular, will perhaps be reduced in this process.

After 1998

Nuclear tests in the subcontinent required major alterations in higher defense. A Cabinet Committee on Security was established to address all security issues. Individual service chiefs are now likely to be consulted more often. A National Security Council (NSC) was set up, to report to a national security adviser, who is also the principal secretary to the prime minister. Military representation on the NSC is not high.

The Kargil conflict in 1999 led to a major review of the national security system, carried out by a Group of Ministers (GOM) in 2000, facilitated by four task forces. The report of the GOM on "management of defense" comprehensively reviewed organizations and implemented major changes. It decided to create a permanent Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), replacing the principle of rotation among service chiefs. A Chief of Integrated Defence Staff (CIDS) was established, with a senior three-star general at its head and a large interservice staff. Interservice rivalry has not made it possible to agree on a CDS, so the post remains vacant. In turn this has made the CIDS rudderless and somewhat ineffective. A number of boards have been set up facilitating procurement, defense production, and research and development. Defense intelligence has been integrated and brought under a single agency. Finally, much greater financial authority has now been delegated to the military service chiefs.

These changes have helped integrate the services into New Delhi's decision-making structure, accommodating them in policy-making functions. Over fifty years after independence, it was thus clear that civil-military relations had reached a state of cooperative maturity; even where differences may exist between some of these institutions, issues can be resolved firmly within the ambit of democratic governance.

Dipankar Banerjee

See also **Armed Forces**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bhimayya, Kotera M. *Civil-Military Relations: A Comparative Study of India and Pakistan*. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1997. An authoritative monograph by a senior Indian military officer based on careful research and firsthand interviews.
- Dasgupta, Sunil. "India: The New Militaries." In *Coercion and Governance: The Declining Political Role of the Military in Asia*, edited by Muthiah Alagappa. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001.
- Vas, Eric A. "Role of the Armed Forces in a Democracy: A Review of Fifty Years of Politico-Military Decision-Making." Parts 1 and 2 in *The United Services Institution Journal* 129,

nos. 534–535 (October–December 1998; January–March 1999). The views of a senior Indian army general.
 Vohra, N. N. “The State Civil and Armed Police and National Security.” In *The United Services Institution Journal* 131, no. 546 (October–December 2001). Views of a senior civilian bureaucrat.

CIVIL SERVICE, BRITISH INDIAN. *See* **British Crown Raj.**

CLASS. *See* **Caste System.**

CLIMATE. *See* **Geography.**

CLIVE, ROBERT (1725–1774), *the first baron Plassey, governor of Bengal (1758–1760 and 1765–1767)*. At the time of his birth, Robert Clive’s once-respected Shropshire family was in decline. They were, however, able to secure him a clerkship in the British East India Company in 1744. Shortly after his arrival in Madras, war broke out between France and England. Madras fell to the French, and Clive found himself a prisoner of war. This experience gave him an incentive to reflect on the success of the French in outmaneuvering the British by playing the “nabob game,” supporting rival claimants to contested thrones of Indian states and thus expanding European influence. Clive then embarked on a military career in the company’s service, during which he mastered and then bested the French at their own game. He helped topple a key French ally, Chanda Sahib, their *nawāb* of the Carnatic, through bold military actions that restored British prestige and earned him great wealth.

When Clive returned to England in 1753, he was lionized as a military genius. However, after expending virtually all his Indian fortune restoring his family to its former estate, he had little choice but to accept the company’s offer of promotion to lieutenant colonel and appointment to the governorship of Fort St. David. Clive arrived in Madras just in time to hear of disastrous events in Bengal. There, the company agents’ attempt to use the recent wars with France as a cover for expanding the company’s financial interests had become transparent. The young *nawāb* of Bengal, Siraj-ud-Dawla, had retaliated by moving against the British factories in his province. With characteristic speed, Clive sailed to Bengal and quickly found rivals in Siraj-ud-Dawla’s court, eager to supplant him. When an intermediary, the Hindu financier Umichand, threatened to reveal their treachery unless rewarded for his silence, Clive seemingly agreed to his demands, then defrauded him. On 23 June 1757



Robert Clive. In the service of the British East India Company, first as a military officer and then its governor in Calcutta, Clive mastered the art of the “nabob game.” Eventually the subject of a parliamentary inquiry, he later committed suicide on 22 November 1774. FOTOMEDIA ARCHIVE.

Clive’s three thousand mixed European and Indian troops confronted Siraj-ud-Dawla’s fifty-thousand-strong force near the village of Plassey. Though Clive had some last minute doubts, all ran according to plan. The *nawāb*’s army turned against their ruler, who was promptly executed by elements loyal to Clive’s co-conspirator, Mir Jafar, who was then installed as *nawāb*. Clive next secured for the company the twenty-four *parganas* (villages) that were to become Calcutta, while openly arranging for an amount equal to its revenue (£30,000) to be assigned to him by Mir Jafar as his personal *jagir* (feudal land grant). He and other corrupt company officials then gorged themselves on the prostrate state’s treasury, which made many of them “nabobs” but eventually left Mir Jafar bankrupt. Clive then defeated a Dutch assault in Bengal, ending their role in the province, and soon eliminated French influence in the neighboring northern Circars.

In 1760 Clive once again returned to England in triumph and was given an Irish peerage. But tragic events in

Bengal so darkened the company's future that he was asked to return there as governor. In Clive's absence, Mir Jafar had been deposed by company officers. His successor, Mir Qasim, had rebelled and ultimately fled to Oudh where he allied himself with its ruler, Shuja-ud-Dawla, and the Mughal emperor Shah Alam II in a bid to regain Mughal control of the province. However, before Clive's arrival, their combined forces were defeated by British troops at Buxar in 1765. Clive's skills at playing country politics were equal to the challenges that remained. He restored Oudh to Shuja-ud-Dawla in return for the latter giving two of his districts to Shah Alam II, to whom the company then gave a 26 lakh (£30,000) tribute in return for the emperor's grant of the lucrative *diwani* (collector of revenue) for Bengal, Bihar, and Orissa. The settlement of the *diwani* on the company led to a notoriously corrupt "dual government," by which avaricious company agents controlled the civil administration and acted as revenue collector, while the cowed Indian nobility was left with the burdens of the *nawābi*, or executive authority (now virtually reduced to the enforcement of criminal law). The number of "nabobs" multiplied, the company now commanding the affairs and revenues of more than 20 million people, with no money left to those burdened with "governing" them.

Clive did not exploit India's condition to the extent he had previously, which made it easier for him to address his other assigned task: to stop the abuse of company resources by its own agents. Clive had the company's servants sign covenants prohibiting bribery and other corrupt practices, though he stopped short of eliminating their lucrative private trade. He also reduced the allowances enjoyed by officers in the company's army and suppressed a mutiny that this economy spawned. Though limited in scope, these reforms laid the earliest foundation of the Indian Civil Service.

Clive left India in 1767, having established the company as a power on the subcontinent and having initiated its administrative structure; by that time, however, he had made enemies within the company's directorate and in Parliament, which convened a committee of inquiry. Some members of Parliament may have been legitimately alarmed by Clive's situational ethics and self-enrichment. However, since the charges brought against him pertained to events that had occurred a decade earlier, some suggested that the accusations were motivated by a personal or political vendetta rather than genuine reformist zeal. Clive was defiant in his own defense. Questioned as to his acquisition in India of rewards totaling over £234,000 from 1757 to 1759, he declared that, considering the potential wealth he could have acquired by his overthrow of Siraj-ud-Dawla, he was "astonished at my own moderation." The inquiry closed on 21 May 1773

with an ambiguous Parliamentary resolution that censured him for misappropriating company funds but praised him for having done "great and meritorious service to the state." Disheartened by the mixed results of the Parliamentary inquiry, Clive fell into one of the many bouts of depression he experienced throughout his life. He committed suicide on 22 November 1774.

Marc Jason Gilbert

See also **British East India Company Raj; Nabob Game**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Chaudhuri, Nirad C. *Clive of India: A Political and Psychological Essay*. London: Barry and Jenkins, 1975.
 Forrest, George. *Life of Lord Clive*. London and New York: Cassell, 1918.
 Sutherland, Lucy. *The East India Company in Eighteenth Century Politics*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1952.

COMMODITY MARKETS Organized markets for agricultural commodities, which drive price discovery and enable risk management, are of great importance in the modernization of Indian agriculture. India's government plays a major role in the operation and regulation of the "spot markets," called *mandis*. Each state has a state *mandi* board, which in turn governs district-level boards. These district boards authorize the creation of new markets. A market, or *mandi*, is typically a yard with concrete platforms where farmers collect to sell their produce to wholesale dealers at harvest time. Transactions are intermediated by designated brokers. The brokers act as competing market makers who can offer a price to the farmers and take possession of the commodity before selling it to wholesale traders. Farmers generally do not sell directly to retailers and instead sell their products only through *mandis*.

Price discovery at *mandis* takes place by open outcry. Since there is little standardization of the commodity, there is an open-outcry auction for practically every grade of the commodity brought in by farmers. Each *mandi* employs commodity inspectors, in addition to clerical staff. Inspectors, experts on the commodities traded at a *mandi*, certify the standard of a commodity when it is brought to market. If a dispute arises between parties, *mandi* inspectors play the role of arbitrators. Trades generally take place on the same day that a farmer comes to the *mandi*, and settlement is made immediately. There is no strong link between a *mandi* and an organized warehousing facility.

Price discovery across the *mandis* is fragmented, particularly owing to the distances between *mandis*, the lack of grade standardization, and the lack of price



Wheat at a Haryana *Mandi* (Wholesale Market). For an agricultural country like India, trading in over 100 crops, issues of price dissemination, standards, certification, and warehousing abound. But since the 1999 dissolution of regulations preventing futures trading in commodities, the public, and government and industry leaders alike, have become increasingly optimistic about the ability of commodity markets to tackle such problems. INDIA TODAY.

transparency. Farmers are price takers at *mandis* and have traditionally been unaware of prices prevailing elsewhere in the country. A government-run system named Agmarknet tries to capture prices from *mandis* and disseminate the information using computer networks. However, there are serious difficulties in the mechanism of recording prices, and dissemination takes place with a lag of one day, which reduces its importance to farmers selling goods.

Two recent developments have helped alleviate the difficulties of price transparency. First, the dramatic growth of mobile phones in recent years has helped farmers acquire better information. In addition, in 2003, the Center for Monitoring Indian Economy and the National Commodities Derivatives Exchange (NCDEX) have embarked on a process of polling dealers across the country, using the “adaptive trimmed mean” methodology to compute reference prices for standardized grades of many commodities. This polling is done three times a day, and price dissemination takes place within the same day.

Futures

Commodity futures markets have been present in India since 1875. These markets traded forward contracts on spot commodities such as cotton, spices, oilseeds, and food grains. In 1952 the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act was put into place, giving the government powers over commodity futures trading. It banned cash settlement and options trading. In addition, extensive trading by the government on many markets—such as wheat and rice through the minimum support price (MSP) policy—stifled price flexibility. MSPs came to exist on rice, wheat, pulses (legumes), oilseeds, cotton, and sugarcane. Large-scale public sector procurement and storage led to a shriveling of the private sector in trading, storage, and transportation of commodities. These restrictive policies were accompanied by numerous other interventionist policies, including barriers upon movement of agricultural goods, and an extensive system of state intervention for agricultural inputs. These factors created a situation in which the agricultural sector became one of the most repressed sectors of the Indian economy.

As a part of this philosophy, and using the powers obtained under the Forward Contracts (Regulation) Act, commodity futures trading was banned on most commodities in the 1960s. In the 1970s trading was permitted on only six commodities: peppers, potatoes, jute, jaggery (unrefined sugar), castor oil, and turmeric. These commodities traded at futures exchanges, which were open-outcry markets that traded a single commodity and that were governed by the brokerage community.

The Forward Markets Commission (FMC) under the Department of Consumer Affairs (DCA) regulated these markets. The exchanges had to obtain prior approvals before they could trade any new contract, including those in which the old contract had matured and the exchange wished to create a new contract for the next period.

When this restrictive framework was imposed upon the futures market, the liquidity for these contracts went underground. A vibrant set of “illegal” futures markets sprang up, which catered to users in the economy while violating laws that banned commodity futures or imposed stringent restrictions upon them. Illegal markets had the additional advantage of avoiding direct tax and indirect tax provisions, which were often designed in a ways that were incompatible with a modern agricultural sector. At centers like Bhabar in Gujarat, active commodity futures and forward trading took place while violating laws requiring registration and regulation by the FMC.

Recent Initiatives

In 1999 government restrictions that prevented futures trading on commodities were removed. From 2000 onward, the FMC worked on the liberalization of existing rules in an effort to foster new kinds of institutional development. The major focus has been upon “national multi-commodity exchanges,” which would trade in multiple products, for a community of brokers and market participants from all over the country. By December 2003, there were three exchanges—the NCDEX, the Multi-Commodity Exchange, and the National Multi-Commodity Exchange (NMCE)—trading futures on multiple commodities using order flows from across the entire country. The traded products include futures on twenty-two agricultural commodities, as well as on gold and silver. The trading is done using an anonymous, electronic limit order book, with orders being matched using price-time priority. The contracts are cash-settled on the prevailing spot commodity price.

In cases of commodities that were not legally traded earlier, such as gold and silver, the newer exchanges have escalating growth in volumes. When there are local

markets with large volumes on a commodity, the liquidity on the electronic exchanges is much lower. Some exceptions are futures on guar seed trading, in which the liquidity has moved to NCDEX from local exchanges, or pepper, in which NMCE now has a significant share. Overall, futures volumes on the electronic exchanges grew from 1.5 billion rupees in January 2004 to 8 billion rupees in August 2004. This growth in business is likely to continue with new commodities and new products such as options.

Regulatory Architecture

Regulation of spot markets in each state is done by the state *mandi* board, which also acts as a record keeper of the number of *mandis*, commodities traded, and so on. The governance of each *mandi* rests with representatives from the local community of farmers. At the central government, the DCA tracks traded prices and volumes of commodities from the regional markets. The FMC regulates commodities futures exchanges.

Since Indian commodity derivatives share the same contract characteristics of Indian equity derivatives, their regulation and supervision requirements are also similar to those for equity derivatives markets. Due to the overlap in the regulatory requirement, there was a proposal in 2003 to merge the FMC and the securities market regulator, the Securities and Exchange Board of India.

Susan Thomas

See also Debt Markets

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Balasundaram, D. “Prospects for Cotton Futures in India.” In *Derivatives Markets in India*, edited by S. Thomas. New Delhi: Tata McGraw Hill, 1998.
- Kolamkar, D. S. “Regulation and Policy Issues for Commodity Derivatives in India.” In *Derivatives Markets in India, 2003*, edited by S. Thomas. New Delhi: Tata McGraw Hill, 2003.
- Shah, A. “Improved Methods for Obtaining Information from Dealer Markets.” Technical report, IGIDR, 2000.
- Thomas, S. “Agricultural Commodity Markets in India: Policy Issues for Growth.” Technical report, IGIDR, 2003.
- . “The Jaggery Futures Market at Muzaffarnagar: Status and Policy Recommendations.” In *Derivatives Markets in India, 2003*, edited by S. Thomas. New Delhi: Tata McGraw Hill, 2003.

COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES, PAST AND PRESENT

In the early decades of the nineteenth century, extremely limited areas of land were used for cultivation. The rest of the land remained uncultivated and was used as grazing and forest land by villagers

and sometimes by nonresident pastoral people. In this sense, the uncultivated land can be considered a common property resource. In addition to uncultivated land located near villages, large tracts of land and forest, remote from villages, were open to common access by pastoral people and forest dwellers.

The use of uncultivated land, in particular land attached to villages, was generally controlled by communities of landowning villagers. In North India control of such "common land" was exercised by village proprietary bodies. In South India contemporary documents claim that *mirasidars* (influential landowners) had the right to use common land. Villagers who did not own land were not completely excluded from grazing cattle on common land or collecting firewood from it, but they could use this land only under the regulation of the dominant villagers.

Decrease in Uncultivated Area and Deforestation

After 1860 a drastic decrease in the extent of such uncultivated areas (called "wastelands" by British colonial officers) occurred, as well as a decline in other common resources. The British administration demarcated village boundaries. This demarcation of settlements cut across open-range grazing previously used by nomadic pastoralists, reducing the area available for grazing outside villages, and shortened long fallow in open ranges by establishing sedentary cultivation on them. The British Raj declared all the land beyond those boundaries the property of the state. Hence in the montane districts of North India, a large tract of "state property" was carved out of waste and forest land after the enactment of the Indian Forest Act of 1878. The resulting shortage of grazing land made it very difficult for the pastoral people to survive. Many nomads were obliged to seek wage labor, and some became part-time peasants. Others concentrated on trading, though some struggled to continue their earlier pastoral activities.

Eager to increase land revenue, the British promoted an expansion of the cultivation of wasteland. Furthermore, the commercialization of agriculture and its increasing profits, as well as an increase in population, induced more farmers to transform village wasteland into cropped land. The result was a radical shrinkage in the extent of uncultivated land by the end of the nineteenth century. In South India the initiative to convert was taken by the dominant landowning villagers, who had asserted preferential rights to village wasteland. A report from a district in South India has shown that the area of wasteland in the unirrigated area decreased from 42 percent to 26 percent between 1880 and 1911. In the Punjab the population grew between 1855 and 1881 by 24 percent and, responding to irrigation from canals, cultivation

increased by 50 percent between 1868 and 1921, with a considerable decline in uncultivated areas.

This process was accompanied by a rapid deforestation of woodland. Under the 1878 Indian Forest Act, the government classified a large tract of woodland as "reserved forests" and "protected forests." People's customary rights to use forests came under the strong regulations and restrictions set by the Raj, against which local people protested. In spite of the declared policy of "scientific" management of forests, a large amount of wood was cut for the construction of railways, shipbuilding, and other imperial interests, resulting in serious deforestation. Developing urban areas also demanded a large amount of wood for construction and fuel.

Changes in the Management of Common Property Resources

The trend to divide and privatize common land was accelerated by a weakening of cohesion among land proprietors and a decline in communal control over common land, as reported from the Punjab. The government regulated the user rights of tenants and service groups on common land, leading to conflicts between landowners and other residents. In South India a growing number of high caste landowners started moving to urban areas to seek white-collar jobs, weakening their control of village common resources.

Another trend was witnessed in South India from the end of the nineteenth century. A large number of landless agricultural laborers started to migrate to overseas estates. Migration not only provided them with alternative job opportunities but also stimulated the growth of their sense of independence. A new phase in the occupation of wasteland appeared in the 1920s when Dalits (untouchables) and other landless people began occupying wasteland for cultivation, partly under grants from the government. After independence, the Tamil Nadu (Madras) government continued to expand cultivation by encouraging the reclamation of wasteland and assigning wasteland to Scheduled Caste (untouchable) and landless people. Maharashtra witnessed a similar pattern of development. Since the 1960s, Dalits have encroached upon village common land to establish private ownership, and from time to time their encroachment has been regularized by the state governments.

Surveys of village common properties point to differences in the impact of land-assigning policy by region, revealing that villagers, in particular the poor, depend heavily on village common land as a source of fodder, fuel, and food. In most areas, the poor met 66 to 84 percent of fuel requirements and about 80 percent of fodder from common land. Village common land has, however,

been increasingly privatized, and a large portion of land once assigned to the poor was either sold or mortgaged and acquired by the rich. The extent to which the lower strata of village society have attained socioeconomic independence from elite groups is an important factor in areas where there have been movements by the lower classes; encroachment has been an expression of their independence that, with its regularization, reinforces their bargaining power.

In more egalitarian villages with less differentiation by class structure, all segments of the village population participate in controlling and preserving village common resources. An acute class differentiation in the local economy, on the other hand, creates apathy among the landless toward reserving common resources. The empowerment of the landless and other subordinate groups, and their greater participation in the control and use of the village common resources, can be seen as a positive development in terms of environmental preservation. Recent cases of joint forest management and other community-based management of natural resources in various areas in India suggest the growth of such environmental protection, as exemplified by a case in Midnapore district, West Bengal, where small farmers and agricultural laborers of tribal and Dalit origins took initiatives in developing forest protection committees.

In addition to the changes in the local managing system, other factors also have influenced village common resources. The rapid expansion of farm forestry since the 1980s has led to an increased supply of wood, lowering market prices of fuel woods. The main energy sources used by urban households have switched from fuel wood to liquefied petroleum gas, kerosene, and others, leading to a reduction in urban demand for wood and contributing to a decline in the incentive to collect fuel wood from village forest lands. The spread of yield-increasing technologies in agriculture has lessened the pressure to expand cropped areas; the expansion of nonagricultural employment opportunities also has mitigated the pressure on agricultural expansion. Together with the rapid expansion of joint forest management all over India, these factors have contributed to preventing a rapid reduction in the total extent of forest land since the 1980s, and to mitigating the decline in common property resources.

Haruka Yanagisawa

See also **Environmental Consciousness since 1800**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Bhattacharya, Neeladri. "Pastoralists in a Colonial World." In *Nature, Culture, Imperialism: Essays of the Environmental History of South Asia*, edited by David Arnold and

Ramachandra Guha. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Bokil, Milind S. "Privatisation of Commons for the Poor: Emergence of New Agrarian Issues." *Economic and Political Weekly* 31, no. 33 (1996): 2254–2261.

Chakravarty-Kaul, Minoti. *Common Lands and Customary Law: Institutional Change in North India over the Past Two Centuries*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996.

Gadgil, Madhav, and Ramachandra Guha. *This Fissured Land: An Ecological History of India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1993.

Jodha, N. S. "Common Property Resources and the Rural Poor in Dry Regions of India." *Economic and Political Weekly* 21, no. 27 (1986): 1169–1181.

Poffenberger, Mark. "The Resurgence of Community Forest Management in the Jungle Mahals of West Bengal." In *Nature, Culture, Imperialism: Essays of the Environmental History of South Asia*, edited by David Arnold and Ramachandra Guha. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Ravindranath, N. H., and D. O. Hall. *Biomass, Energy, and Environment: A Developing Country Perspective from India*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.

COMMUNIST PARTIES OF INDIA. See **Political System**.

CONGRESS PARTY Founded during Christmas week of 1885 as a "native parliament" for political expression and debate for the educated classes of British India, the Indian National Congress (commonly, the Congress Party of India) became one of the world's major political institutions of the twentieth century. It is one of the world's oldest political parties, having been established two decades before the British Labour Party, which ironically constituted the British government at the time of India's independence on 14 August 1947. Straddling three centuries, Congress continues as a major force in Indian politics.

Few political parties have demonstrated the capacity to persist and govern as has Congress, and it has done so in a system of enormous scale and complexity. In eleven of the fourteen national elections held through 2004, Congress returned the largest number of representatives to the Lok Sabha (House of the People), the lower house of India's Parliament. It received the largest number of votes in all but two elections; in all but five, it received at least twice the vote of the next party. Congress has formed the government at the national level for 45 of the years since independence, while five former leaders of the party have served as short-lived prime ministers for five of the remaining years.

This longevity has occurred in the context of a highly complex political system and diverse society. In the



Portrait of Sarojini Naidu Spinning Yarn. A well-known image from picture postcard, c. 1945. Among India's most visible leaders, the elegant Naidu was president of the Indian National Congress and the first woman governor of a free India, and helped mobilize support for independence abroad. K. L. KAMAT/KAMAT'S POTPOURRI.

parliamentary elections held in May 2004, for example, the 671 million Indian voters, 58 percent of whom went to one or another of over 600,000 polling stations, were faced in one or another constituency by 5,435 candidates representing 261 different political parties, plus numerous independent candidates, contesting for 543 parliamentary seats. Elections were held in twenty-six states and Union territories, the five largest states of which, were they sovereign nations in the international system, would be counted among the ten most populous nations of the world. Many of the states comprise distinct languages, cultures, and social systems, the kinds of social formations that have frequently given rise to nationalism and the creation of sovereign states. The more than 1 billion people who call India home profess a wide variety of religions, Hinduism being the confession of some 80 percent, but with substantial divisions. Muslim communities in

India are more populous than those in all but two other countries, Indonesia and Bangladesh. The character, role, and functioning of the Congress Party has been central in the creation and maintenance of this extraordinary experiment in democracy, though other parties and factors have been important as well.

An understanding of this political phenomenon that is the Congress Party requires an examination of its development, adaptation, leadership, and transformation in its pre-independence and nationalist phase, as well as in its postindependence and governance phase. In the nationalist phase, five dimensions were critical: development of consensus on political strategy, purpose, and creation of a democratic regime; creation of a complex and adaptive party organization; recruitment of successive generations of social groups into its fold; development of a distinctive and effective system of conflict management; and participation in governance. These dimensions became manifest and were prominent in different measure within three general periods: 1885–1920; 1920–1937; and 1937–1947. There are, of course, important demarcations within each.

The Pre-independence Period: Nationalism

1885–1920. For its first two decades Congress served to voice concerns and complaints to the colonial administration and to petition for expanded formal participation for Indians in the civil service and the councils of government. This early generation of activists, which included such luminaries as Dadabhai Naoroji, the first Indian elected to the British Parliament, Surendranath Banerjea, and Gopal Krishna Gokhale, advocated evolutionary political reforms (benefiting largely the Western-educated, professional, and propertied classes) and constructive and cooperative engagement with the British. While the colonial government was slow to reform, party sessions, mail service and the telegraph, and increased travel assisted this generation in their discovery of India and their discovery of themselves as Indians. They came to be known as the Moderates.

Another group, known as the Extremists, came to the fore in the first decade of the twentieth century. Led by the able and learned Bal Gangadhar Tilak, the *Lokmanya* (Leader of the People), they advocated radical action and noncooperation with the British, the selective use of violence for political ends, and the importance of mass support and action, and they portrayed themselves under the banner of Hindu symbols. While barred by the Moderates from participation in Congress after 1907 through the imposition of restrictions on membership and with the “assistance” of the British through arrests and incarceration, the Extremists reentered the party in 1916, less extreme than before, but with greater influence. They



Congress Party Meeting. At a recent meeting of the still powerful Congress Party, Sonia Gandhi (left), its president and widow of Rajiv, makes her entrance. Many had doubted her ability as an outsider (she was born in Italy) to hold the party together. INDIA TODAY.

joined the erstwhile Moderates, who had become less moderate than before with the entry of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi, the Mahatma, who was bent on using his confrontational experiments with truth developed and used so effectively in South Africa, and who saw Gokhale as his political guru.

1920–1937. A new consensus emerged within the Congress Party between 1916 and 1920. In 1920 the party declared *purna swaraj* (complete independence) as its ultimate objective, within the empire if possible, outside if necessary. It also accepted noncooperation and mass civil disobedience campaigns as appropriate strategies to achieve that end, the use of *satyagraha* (soul force), in Mahatma Gandhi's evocative language and deeply original formulation, movements that were to be conducted only under his leadership. Further, there was continued consensus on the institutions of representative democracy as being the appropriate form of government for India, but the Congress leadership found repressive actions by the British, such as the Jallianwala Bagh Massacre in 1919 and its aftermath, as being so egregious that cooperation and participation in political reforms would

have to await another day. Thus, by 1920, the two strands that had both defined and divided Congress in 1907 were joined through Gandhi's genius, achieving consensus on complete independence for the Indian political community and representative democracy as its system of government, with noncooperation and civil disobedience as legitimate strategies for their achievement. These dual elements defined the party's national consensus and were manifest in subsequent political agreements, the political reforms of 1935, the "Quit India" Movement of 1942, and the elections of 1945–1946.

Unlike all other parties of undivided India, the Congress Party arrived at independence with a nationwide organization and web of political affiliations that reached across all geographical regions with organizational connections from nationalist leaders at the center to activists in the village. While its annual meetings drew representatives from the various provinces of British India, at its meeting at Nagpur in central India in 1920, and enshrined in what is known as the Nagpur Constitution, the Congress leadership created a formal party organization for British India (those provinces where the British

imposed direct colonial rule) that established regular membership with dues, formal procedures for selecting delegates to the All-India Congress Committee, an organizational hierarchy that reached from the national to the state to the local (municipal and district) level, and rules that governed the election of representatives from one level to the next. It also set forth the functions and authority of various party committees, leadership positions, and rules for the selection of party candidates for public office. It was here, too, that provincial party institutions in relevant areas were organized on the basis of major language groups, rather than according to the artificial administrative boundaries drawn by the colonial power. The party organization also determined policy and strategy to be pursued by its members elected to legislative bodies. And in 1936 the Congress Party formally extended its domain into the major states of princely India (where the British practiced indirect colonial rule) through creation of the All-India States' People's Congress. Well before the achievement of independence, Congress had established a complex and effective mass party organization throughout the Indian subcontinent.

1937–1947. Congress recruited successive generations of groups into its fold as it launched campaigns to remove the British from Indian soil and as it looked forward to the need for electoral support in a free and independent India. While effective in raising political consciousness and recruiting new groups into politics, civil disobedience campaigns were difficult to sustain. To develop sustained support, Congress pursued three major strategies. The first was to recruit people directly as regular dues-paying members, many of whom came through party portals from mass campaigns. A second was to establish support from various functional groups through the creation of organizations such as the All-India Trades Union Congress, the All-India Kisan Sabha (Peasant Association), and the Harijan Sevak Sangh (Untouchable Service Society). A third and critically important strategy was to act as an entrepreneurial franchise, selectively and adroitly associating the party with a complexity of relatively autonomous provincial and local political and social movements that ranged from caste and depressed classes associations to secular political organizations. The Congress Party provided the latter with the legitimacy of the party's mantle, broader visibility, and an avenue of access to seek favor or redress from the colonial administration, while the latter provided Congress with access and political support at the grass roots. Congress avoided association, however, with movements over which it had limited control, and it did not extend support to others, such as peasant agitations against landed interests well-positioned in the party or strikes against business interests that were a source of financial support for party activities.

The party, in conceiving itself as an "open umbrella," was also home to a wide range of ideologically oriented groups, some of which operated more or less autonomously within the party fold. These groups included the Congress Socialist Party, the Communist Party of India, and for a period of time leaders of the All-India Muslim League, as well as Hindu revivalists of the Hindu Mahasabha, Pan-Islamic and educated Muslim elites, and Gandhian advocates of a communitarian and village-oriented society. In this way, Congress became a composite of much of Indian society and its vast array of caste and communal groups. Its leaders at independence included Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs, and Christians, and while the elite came primarily from higher castes, there were representatives from those lower in the caste hierarchy as well. It included leaders representing political ideologies that ranged across the political spectrum.

Almost sixty-two years old at independence, the party had "learned" to manage internal conflict, and to recruit and socialize new generations of leaders and activists. By 1947 three generations of leaders had passed through the party. The founders had passed away long before independence, most before the party became a mass organization after 1920. Major divisions in the party, such as that between the Moderates and Extremists, were healed. Outcomes for leadership positions in party councils were determined by election, though mediation and arbitration were important elements of the procedural mix. A formal appellate system was established within the party organization, but except for a few notable instances, outcomes were accepted by winners and losers alike.

Conflict resolution was also managed within the party through a distinctive system of arbitration, the origins and legitimacy of which derived from norms and practices of conflict resolution in traditional society. In this system, a highly regarded leader of the party would hear petitions and complaints and render a decision that to the fullest extent possible had only winners, where "victory" for a loser in a particular contest would be postponed or would occur in a different forum. This system, with Gandhi the primary arbiter at the national level until shortly before his death, was maintained for two decades after independence with Jawaharlal Nehru, Lal Bahadur Shastri, Kamraj Nadar, and their authoritative designees effectively performing this role.

With the approach of independence, however, and the prospects of contesting elections and governing imminent, some groups left Congress, some to return, but some to enter into intense opposition. The Muslim League left Congress before independence, its opposition and demands leading to the creation of Pakistan. During World War II, with Congress leaders jailed,

Communists left to establish centers of support in areas where Congress was not strong. Shortly after independence, as the first national elections approached, socialist groups left the party to pursue their political fortunes outside. In many cases, those who left, returned; and in most cases, those who left were not accompanied by all their brethren.

Before independence, a large stratum of the Congress Party had the experience of participating in elections and in legislative institutions. A smaller but significant group had also served as members of provincial cabinets. Congress, of course, had been the principal petitioner of the British to create the institutions of representative government with provision for effective Indian participation. While these demands, even more so the reforms that followed them, were elementary at the beginning, they successively became more consequential. While minimal legislative participation at the provincial level had been established under the Indian Councils Act of 1892, the Morley-Minto Reforms incorporated in the Government of India Act of 1909 were the first of much consequence. A decade later the Montagu-Chelmsford Reforms extended authority by the Government of India Act of 1919, providing for elected majorities in provincial councils with representatives elected from territorial constituencies, and for the appointment of elected representatives to Cabinet positions, with control over such “transferred” policy areas as education, public health, and local government, while control over major “reserved” policy areas such as the police, land revenue, and agriculture was retained by members of the colonial administration. Many members of Congress, calling themselves “Swarajists,” contested the elections, while others chose not to participate but to stay outside the legislative process and protest British policies and actions.

The Government of India Act of 1935 was a watershed in the development of representative institutions, and with a number of amendments and elaborations later became the Constitution of India. Congress’s approach to this new political order had antecedents in the Nehru Report, drafted by Motilal Nehru, father of Jawaharlal, presented to the All-Parties Conference of 1929. The report advocated those institutions and set forth the principles that would be established to serve as the fundamental law of a democratic India. The principles established in the party’s Karachi Resolution of 1931 would ultimately be enshrined in the Constitution as the Directive Principles of State Policy.

The Congress Party contested the elections held in 1937 and 1945–1946 under this act with considerable vigor and success, forming the governments in a number of provinces in 1937 and again in 1946. Leaders of the party were able to hone their skills in the matters of cre-

ating and maintaining legislative majorities, implementing important measures of public policy, and developing facility as political managers in a format of democratic governance. This continuum of demands for democratic political reforms and experience in elections and in governance resulted in a fundamental reservoir of knowledge and political skill.

Thus as Congress assumed the mantle of governance at independence it had established a sense of national political community, consensus on the creation of a democratic regime, a vast national organizational network and communications system, a stronger base of political support than any competitor, and experience as political entrepreneurs mobilizing social groups and as leaders and managers of the institutions of a democratic government. Congress was the embodiment of a new national political class adept in political bargaining, well schooled in the ways of party organizational management and parliamentary government, a class of political leaders and aspirants who had come to pursue politics as a vocation.

After Independence: Governance

As the Congress Party experienced change and transformation before independence, so it did thereafter, facing as it did the challenges of governance, a mass and increasingly demanding electorate, dissidence within its own ranks, new claimants for access to power, the rise of religious and regional sentiment in politics, and ultimately a changed international system with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the expansion of globalization and free markets. The phases of this transformation can be divided into the following periods: party institutionalization, 1947–1967; party division and the rise of the “personal party,” 1967–1989; and the party as core of a shifting national coalition, 1989–2005. Subdivisions, of course, attend each.

1947–1967. Throughout the first period, the Congress Party was the core of a one-party dominant system, the “party of consensus,” as political scientist Rajni Kothari named it, surrounded by “parties of pressure” that attempted to influence policies through contact with like-minded groups within the party, and to serve as a critic though not as an alternative governing party. Party strategy was one of responsiveness and accommodation of various interests within the polity. Cabinets immediately after independence included important non-Congress representatives, members of major religious groups, and leaders representing the wide ideological spectrum within the party. The national government was sensitive to issues that divided the national political community. It withdrew from its commitment to create Hindi as the sole national language, given that this was the mother

tongue of less than half the population and was resisted by many, especially in South India, who insisted, some violently, that this would be akin to a form of internal colonialism. The government also acceded to strong regionalist demands, which were attracting mass support and siphoning party members into the opposition, that the states in India's federal system be reconstituted on the basis of linguistic cultures, a demand seen in some circles as undermining the very idea of a national political community. The government was deeply committed to integrating the more than five hundred princely states into the Indian Union, and did so in some cases by using coercion but also by providing the erstwhile princes with transitional formal positions of public authority, with "privy purses" (provision of public funding for their personal needs), and, continuing the party's long-time commitment to the right to private property, providing for retention of some of their estates. Each of these objectives was of fundamental consequence and required uncommon resolve and political astuteness; the integration of the princely states was one of a number of accomplishments of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, the major contender and alternative to Jawaharlal Nehru for the prime ministership, and the primary leader of a strong conservative wing within the party.

Responsiveness and accommodation was further demonstrated in Congress's efforts to continue to mobilize and absorb the broadest possible scope of social groups into the party, thus continuing to fulfill its pre-independence claim that it and it alone represented the Indian nation. The Congress Party was successful in this regard, and normally enjoyed the "option of first refusal" with respect to new groups entering politics. To expand avenues of access, it increased the size of state legislative assemblies, and established a system of institutions in rural areas, avowedly committed to economic development, called *panchayati raj* (literally, "rule of a council of five").

The expansion of participation within the Congress Party, together with the reality of governance and the absence of effective opposition, resulted in the creation of a two-party system, "bi-factionalism" as it was sometimes called, within the party at the state level. Often, one factional coalition formed the government, while the "opposition" coalition controlled the party organization, awaiting an opportunity, whether through legislative defections or future elections, to replace the governing coalition.

Another major element of the Congress strategy of governance and party-building was public policy. In anticipation of the second national elections, and with socialist parties attracting substantial media and public attention, at its Avadi Session in 1955 the Congress Party adopted a resolution declaring itself committed to "a socialist pattern of society." At the same time, the

government created a system of tariff protection to facilitate the development of Indian business and industry. An aspect of the socialist pattern of society was the establishment of a large public sector, within which the national government established ownership of the "commanding heights" of the economy, areas such as steel, transportation, and natural resources, in which capital investment requirements exceeded the capacity of domestic private resources. As part of its policy of economic protection, and with the avowed intent of encouraging efficient resource utilization, Congress also established a system of permits and licenses that were required in order to conduct business and that had the added result of providing the party with control over public resources, which proved instrumental in developing support at the polls.

1967–1989. With the death of Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru in 1964 and that of his successor, Lal Bahadur Shastri in 1966, the party had lost its two major arbiters of intraparty disputes. Nehru's death marked the end of the "tall leadership" of the party, leaders who had lived their lives almost exclusively in national politics rather than in the politics of provinces and states. Just as consequential was the rise of dissent within the party. Given the social basis of the Congress Party, which had increasingly become a state-level aggregation of locally based factions, conflicts within the party were initially manifested at the state level. What was so striking and had such far-reaching consequences for the Congress, particularly at the time of the 1967 elections, was the magnitude and the simultaneity of factional departures from the party. As a consequence, in the 1967 elections Congress governments were turned out of office in eight of India's sixteen major states.

These state-based defections were encouraged by the intensification of particularistic group identity. With the expansion of the range of public goods allocated and affected by the state, and given the relative scarcity of positions, groups within Congress began to perceive politics increasingly in terms of particularistic interests rather than in terms of a collective good. The party was increasingly seen in instrumentalist terms rather than as an institution with a purpose and role that transcended their own. A series of national surveys clearly established the erosion of party identification over the next two decades and in its stead an increase in voter identification with principal party leaders, initially Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, until her assassination in 1984, and then with her son and successor, Rajiv Gandhi, until his assassination in 1991.

The elections of 1967 thus mark a watershed in the transformation of the Congress Party from an institutionalized organization to one that started to experience division and organizational decline, the dominant successor

being a “personal party,” the cohesion of which was assisted by the actions and aura of Indira Gandhi as prime minister and president of a fictional formal party organization buoyed by mass appeals, the threat of prime ministerial actions to unseat state governments, and the selective use of state resources to attract electoral support. This “new” Congress Party, created in the context of an erosion of voter identity with Congress as an organization, was hastened by the first of a succession of splits in the national party. Congress split in 1969 between Prime Minister Gandhi and a coalition of powerful state leaders known as the Syndicate, who controlled the party organization and who had become disturbed at their inability to control a prime minister whom they had placed in power on the assumption that she would be submissive and attentive to their interests. This division resulted in the creation of two national Congress parties: the Congress (O), for Organization, the party of the Syndicate, which maintained control over most state and local party organizations as well as national party institutions; and the Congress (R), for Ruling, composed of a majority of Congress members of Parliament and which, with the support of Communist members of Parliament, continued to govern until the national elections of 1971.

With the prospect of facing the electorate and selecting party candidates without a party organization, the prime minister and her senior advisers in the Congress (R) Party and the government developed a three-prong strategy. The first was to hold national elections separate from state elections, which had always been held simultaneously in the past. The immediate impact of this arrangement was to de-link local issues, which were the primary basis of voter mobilization, from national ones and to thus buffer national politics from state-level conflicts. A second was to create an informal arrangement of political support through selected leaders at the state and local level, an arrangement that was ultimately formalized with organizational scaffolding for public consumption and for purposes of selecting candidates to contest the elections. The third was to focus the election campaign on the person of the prime minister, the daughter of Jawaharlal Nehru, the “founding” prime minister of India. This effort to develop direct mass support for creation of a new “personal party” included a campaign of public and media events that focused on the person of the prime minister and the use of a new and resonant slogan that had particular appeal to minorities and the dispossessed: *Garibi Hatao!* (Abolish Poverty!).

The Congress (R) Party was returned to power with a two-thirds majority in Parliament on the crest of 44 percent of the popular vote. The Congress (O) Party, on the other hand, which ran 238 candidates, saw only 16 of its candidates return victoriously, with the party attracting

only 10 percent of the vote. After this turn of events, the Congress (O) Party for all practical purposes disappeared, its leaders and activists merging into opposition parties, others being accepted as prodigals back into Congress (R).

The Congress Party during the last three decades of the twentieth century underwent three additional splits. Congress (R) suffered its first major division in the 1977 national elections, which marked the end of Indira Gandhi’s two-year “National Emergency,” during which not only leaders of the opposition parties but also leaders of Congress (R) were jailed for alleged illegal activities or for what was believed to be their proclivity to act in a manner inimical to the public interest. A national coalition that included many former leaders of Congress (R) was established under the banner of the newly formed Janata Party to contest the elections. The results were a ringing indictment of the policies pursued by the national government during the “Emergency.” Congress (R) won but two of 225 parliamentary seats in the Hindi-speaking states of North India. The party lost all ten state elections held three months later.

Subsequent to this severe electoral setback, which witnessed the prime minister and many of her ministerial colleagues going down to defeat, a segment of the party led by some senior members formed a new Congress Party—the Congress (U), named after its leader and chief minister of Karnataka, Devraj Urs. This splinter from Congress (R) contested the elections of 1980, winning but 5 percent of the vote and 13 parliamentary seats, compared to the 40 percent of the vote and 67 percent of the seats for the newly named Congress (I), for Indira, the former Congress (R). Still another split occurred after these elections with the creation of Congress (S), named after Sharad Pawar, former and future chief minister of the state of Maharashtra, its founding leader, along with a number of other “young Turks” who felt their mobility severely thwarted by the iron-fisted control of the prime minister. Each party, however, had but a short life, the first disappearing after the death of its namesake and the latter after its dismal performance in the 1984 elections, where it won less than 2 percent of the vote and 5 parliamentary seats against Congress (I), which received just under 50 percent of the vote and won three-fourths of the parliamentary seats. Again, members of these “opposition” Congress parties in many cases found their way back into Congress (I).

In November 1984, after the apogee of her electoral success, Prime Minister Gandhi was assassinated by her Sikh bodyguards, who were angered that she had ordered the Indian army to invade the Golden Temple in Amritsar to prevent it from continuing as a base harboring Sikh separatists and terrorists. While in deep mourning and with concern for its political future, the leadership of the

Congress (I) Party elected her son, Rajiv Gandhi, as her successor, thus ushering in the third generation of Nehrus as India's preeminent leader. The new prime minister had been a reluctant recruit into politics, having had a career as an airlines pilot, and had agreed only after the death of his younger brother, Sanjay, who had demonstrated an extraordinary appetite for politics. The party declined in popularity under his leadership given his lack of political acumen, his lack of a compelling public presence, and his limited skill in management and in effectively articulating policy initiatives that could excite public interest and imagination. Thus, while winning 40 percent of the vote in the elections of 1989, Congress (I) won under 40 percent of the seats, and forfeited its claim to governance to a minority coalition of parties known as the National Front, led by a former leader of the Congress, Vishwanath Pratap Singh.

1989–2005. The election of 1989 marks the commencement of a tendency toward a two-party coalition in India's national politics. In each election from that time, no single party has won an outright majority of the seats in Parliament. A similar tendency has developed as well in the states. National coalitions for the two years after 1989 were unstable, with two different governments in power before the instability of coalitions prompted a call for new elections in 1991. And while these resulted in the Congress Party receiving the largest number of votes and seats, the party did not win a majority but continued in power for five years with the support of opposition parties. Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated in the election campaign of 1991, a tragic event that had the perverse consequence of benefiting his party at the polls. He was succeeded by P. V. Narasimha Rao, the first person from South India to serve as prime minister. A central cabinet minister of long standing, he initiated what would become far-reaching economic reforms. He selected Dr. Manmohan Singh as finance minister, a highly regarded economist who would himself become prime minister in 2004. The government under their leadership moved to dismantle the socialist infrastructure that had developed over the past half-century and which in their judgment had had a stultifying effect on economic growth. The government acted to remove many bureaucratic constraints placed on entrepreneurship, fostered privatization and private investment, and supported freer entry of the Indian entrepreneur into the global economy. The consequences of these actions included the beginning of sustained and substantial economic growth, as well as the deleterious effect of contributing to the maldistribution of wealth in a country already home to a multitude of the severely impoverished and poor.

The party also faced an increase in communal tension and violence between the Muslim and Hindu communities

and was punished at the polls in its loss of electoral support within the Muslim community for its temporizing response to the destruction of a historically important mosque, Babri Masjid, in northern India, by Hindus who claimed that the mosque had been built on the ruins of a Hindu temple of no less historic and religious importance

to the Hindus. This conflict, which resulted in riots and several thousand deaths in the aftermath, served to alienate important segments of the Muslim community from Congress, as did the inimical economic impact of government economic policy in important agricultural communities. The result in the 1996 election was the defeat of Congress at the polls and the rise of the Hindu-centrist Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), which for the first time controlled a larger number of seats in Parliament than did Congress. Given that no party could sustain a majority coalition, new elections were held in 1998, at which time the BJP again won more seats than Congress, though not a majority; the BJP was successful, however, in putting together a coalition that proved effective in maintaining governmental stability while pursuing policies not unlike those of its Congress predecessor. The Congress in opposition, however, was without strong and effective leadership, and was divided over the question of whether Sonia Gandhi, the widow of Rajiv and Italian by birth, would enjoy popular legitimacy.

Commentary and analysis during its years in opposition and in its preparations for the 2004 elections portrayed Congress as a party in its terminal phase, a party without a distinctive program, without effective leadership, without any justifiable claim to recent accomplishment, and without the electoral base that would enable it to play a significant role in national politics, much less form the national government. While in opposition at the center, however, the Congress had fared better than other parties in elections held in sixteen major states from 1999 to 2004. In seven of these elections, voters gave Congress the largest number of members of the Legislative Assembly (MLAs), while the BJP and state parties had the most in four, with the Communist Party of India (Marxist; CPM) being first in one. State-level parties came in second in eight states, while Congress was second in five, the BJP in two, and the CPM in one. In only eight states, however, was a single party returned with a majority of MLAs. Thus the electoral success of the Congress Party in the 2004 elections came as a surprise. A national coalition of state parties, themselves often fluid coalitions, the party continues as the major "left-of-center" coalition, with the BJP and its allies as the major "right-of-center" coalition in India's national politics.

Richard Sisson

See also Banerjee, Surendranath N.; Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP); Gandhi, Indira; Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.; Gandhi, Rajiv; Gandhi, Sonia; General (National) Elections; Gokhale, Gopal Krishna; Government of India Act of 1919; Government of India Act of 1935; Naoroji, Dadabhai; Nehru, Jawaharlal; Nehru, Motilal; Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai; Satyagraha; Singh, Manmohan; Tilak, Bal Gangadhar.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Brass, Paul R. *The Politics of India since Independence*. 2nd ed. Cambridge, U.K., and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Brass, Paul R., and Francis Robinson, eds. *The Indian National Congress and Indian Society, 1885–1985: Ideology, Social Structure, and Political Dominance*. Delhi: Chanakya, 1987.
- Chhibber, Pradeep K. *Democracy without Associations: Transformation of the Party System and Social Cleavages in India*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1999.
- Hart, Henry C., ed. *Indira Gandhi's India*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1976.
- Kochanek, Stanley A. *The Congress Party of India: The Dynamics of One-Party Dominance*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1968.
- Kohli, Atul, ed. *The Success of India's Democracy*. Cambridge, U.K., and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001.
- Kothari, Rajni. "The Congress 'System' in India." *Asian Survey* 4 (December 1964): 1161–1173.
- Low, D. A. *Congress and the Raj: Facets of the Indian Struggle, 1917–47*. London: Heinemann, 1977.
- Rudolph, Lloyd I., and Susanne Hoeber Rudolph. *In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
- Sisson, Richard. *The Congress Party in Rajasthan: Institution Building and Political Integration in an Indian State*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.
- Sisson, Richard, and Stanley Wolpert, eds. *Congress and Indian Nationalism: The Preindependence Phase*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1988.
- Weiner, Myron. *Party Building in a New Nation: The Indian National Congress*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967.
- Wolpert, Stanley. *Tilak and Gokhale: Revolution and Reform in the Making of Modern India*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962.

CONSTITUTION. See **Political System.**

CONTRACT FARMING Contract farming may be defined as a system for the production and supply of agricultural products under forward agreements. The main feature of such agreements is to obtain a commitment from farmers to provide an agricultural commodity of a specific type, at a specified time, price, and quantity, to a buyer. The arrangement generally requires the buyer to provide a



EFFECT OF ASSURED MARKETS: TOMATO PRODUCTION IN INDIA

Hindustan Lever issued contracts to 400 farmers in northern India to grow selected varieties of tomatoes for paste. A study of the project confirmed that productivity yields and farmers' incomes increased as a result of the use of hybrid seeds and the availability of an assured market. An analysis of the yields and incomes of the contracted farmers, compared with farmers who grew tomatoes for the open market, shows that yields of the farmers under contract were 64 percent higher than those outside the project.

Source: Eaton and Shepherd, 2001.

degree of production support through, for example, the supply of inputs, credit, or the provision of technical advice. Contract farming is becoming an increasingly important aspect of agribusiness, whether the products are purchased by multinationals, smaller companies, government agencies, farmer cooperatives or individual entrepreneurs

Indian Experience

In India, contract farming can be traced back to the nineteenth century, when commercial crops like cotton, indigo, and tobacco were grown under contract. In the late twentieth century, there were contracts for sugarcane and seed production. At the turn of the twenty-first century, some form of contract arrangements existed for several agricultural crops, including tomatoes, potatoes, chili peppers, cucumbers, baby corn, onions, cotton, wheat, basmati rice, groundnuts, flowers, and medicinal plants. Large corporations like Hindustan Lever, Pepsi Foods, A. V. Thomas, Daburs, Thapars, Marico, Godrej, Mahindras, and Wimco used contract farming for many crops, but the coverage is as yet small compared to the potential. Experiences in a few states are discussed below.

Punjab. The state of Punjab has largely grown wheat and rice for many decades. The Johl Committee Report of 1986 recommended that at least 20 percent of the area under wheat and paddy should be brought under new crops, especially fruits and vegetables. Contract farming in Punjab started in the early 1990s with the entry of Pepsi Foods into the production of tomatoes and chilies and Nijjer Agro Foods, a local firm, into tomatoes. Pepsi sold its tomato facility to Hindustan Lever Limited (HLL) in 1995 and entered potato contracting in the mid-1990s. HLL works with 400 contract farmers, while Pepsi Foods works with a few farmers in both chilies and potatoes. The HLL experience shows that contract farming helped both farmers and the processing industry.

Andhra Pradesh. Contract farming has been increasing in Andhra, and is most prevalent in crops like cucumbers, oil palm, and some fruits and vegetables. There is also contract farming between poultry companies and the corn producers. In the Kuppam area of Chittoor district, farmers are practicing the Israeli type of cultivation in 10,000 acres, using little water and reaping higher yields. In the future, it is expected that the cultivated area using this technology will be increased to 55,000 acres. The introduction of cucumber cultivation on a contract basis in the Kuppam area is being undertaken by the Bata Hachita Company Agro India (BHCAI), whose field staff collects a list of farmers willing to take up cucumber cultivation. The processors assess the demand for exports and inform farmers of their requirements. They also supply seeds, fertilizers, and pesticides to the allotted farmers on loan, without interest, at market prices. The BHCAI also advances money if the farmer requires it. This crop attracted considerable attention in Andhra state and became quite popular.

Tamil Nadu. This state is now supporting many new initiatives in contract farming for agricultural exports, particularly sugarcane, cotton, and horticultural crops. Contract farming has also begun for cultivation of medicinal plants, and it is now practiced in the poultry sector as well, with companies supplying chicks, feed, medicines, and technical guidance to the farmers. The firms then buy the birds when they are eight weeks old at a predetermined price. Beginning in a limited way in 2002–2003, EID Parry took tentative steps toward establishing contract farming in rice. EID Parry sold approximately 60 tons of improved seeds for fine quality *ponno* rice and provided extension services to sugarcane farmers who sold sugarcane to the firm's sugar mill and were also willing to grow rice. With improved rice technology, paddy yields were approximately 25 percent higher than normal yields of 3.75 tons/hectare. EID Parry later purchased the output.

Benefits and Problems

Contract farming provides credit, inputs, and technology to farmers, and its pricing arrangements may reduce risk and uncertainty. Some contract farming ventures have led to better crop diversification from cereals to horticulture and floriculture. They have also opened up new markets that would otherwise be unavailable to small farmers. Because of technological improvements, there is improvement in the yields and profits of farmers. In the case of sponsoring companies, contract farming provides a guaranteed supply of agricultural produce in the required quantity and desired quality.

Offsetting the above benefits, there are many problems associated with contract farming. From the farmers' perspective, there are risks of market failure and production problems while growing new crops. The sponsoring

companies may be unreliable, may exploit their monopoly position, and may have inefficient management and marketing teams, resulting in the manipulation of quotas or the nonfulfillment of commitments. Contract farming in India is regulated neither by law nor by an efficient legal system—the most serious constraint to its widespread use in India. Contract farming in Africa, Latin America, and in several Asian countries “has led to many ill-effects in the spheres of livelihoods of producers, community organizations and institutions, environment and gender. . . . Most of the studies which are in the context of relatively less developed regions find contracts inequitable, short-term, and ambiguous” (Singh, 2000).

Requirements needed for successful contract farming include the support of contracts by law and by an efficient legal system. There also must be a reasonably long-term commitment between sponsoring companies and farmers. There must be a market for each product that will ensure profitability.

According to the World Bank, the Indian legal system can be improved with the following legislative measures:

Model contract and code of practice. The governments in different states may wish to prepare and disseminate a model contract and outline a generic code of practice for farmers as well as for the sponsors.

Registration of contracts with marketing committees. Contracts can be registered with the local Mandi Parishad (Marketing Committee) and entered in the revenue records, providing the necessary legal backup. Local tribunal as the last resort of dispute resolution. If the above two policies do not address the concerns of the farmers and sponsors, the governments can constitute local tribunals, which will have the power to arbitrate and settle disputes about the contract.

Contract farming has become a dominant mode of production in agriculture worldwide. With liberalization and structural changes, it is expected to increase in India over time.

S. Mahendra Dev

See also **Land Tenure since 1950**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Eaton, Charles, and Andrew W. Shepherd. “Contract Farming: Partnerships for Growth.” Food and Agricultural Organisation. Available at <<http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/004/Y0937E>>
- Singh, Sukhpal. “Theory and Practice of Contract Farming: A Review.” *Journal of Social and Economic Development* 2, no. 2 (2000a): 228–246.
- . “Contract Farming for Agricultural Diversification in the Indian Punjab: A Study of Performance and Problems.” *Indian Journal of Agricultural Economics* 55, no. 3 (2000b): 283–294.

World Bank. "Tamil Nadu Agricultural Policy Background Paper." Washington, D.C.: South Asia Rural Development Unit, 2003.

———. "Unlocking Andhra Pradesh's Growth Potential: An Agenda to Achieve the Vision 2020 Growth Targets." Washington, D.C.: Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, South Asia Region, World Bank, 2003.

CORNWALLIS, LORD (1738–1805), second earl and first marquis of Cornwallis, governor-general of India (1786–1793 and 1805). Charles Cornwallis was a soldier and Whig politician whose distinguished military career almost ended during a campaign to which he was politically opposed: the repression of Britain's American colonists. Though his command was forced to capitulate at Yorktown, Virginia, Cornwallis was lauded for the strategic vision he had exhibited in the Americas and the loyal and stoic manner in which he bore this defeat. This behavior led to an offer from the Tory Party to succeed his friend Warren Hastings in India. Cornwallis accepted only after receiving pledges of government support and greater authority over his subordinates, which Hastings, to his great cost, had not enjoyed. Cornwallis used this expanded authority to alter the tenor as well as the structure of the British East India Company rule. Whereas Hastings had struggled to find a middle path between Indian and Western political traditions, Cornwallis acted to Europeanize the company's administration.

Much of what was wrong with the company's affairs at that time resulted from the need of its agents to support themselves and provide for their retirement by trading on their own behalf, while ostensibly doing the same for their employer. This conflict of interest encouraged a host of fraudulent practices and was a major drain on the company's profits. Cornwallis's chosen remedy was the creation of what became known as the Covenanted Civil Service. Cornwallis directed the company to provide its agents with a salary generous enough to discourage private trade, which would be strictly forbidden. These agents would also be given commissions on the revenues they collected, and their judicial and executive functions were to be separated as a further check against corrupt practices. All remaining Indian officials of any significant rank were dismissed.

Cornwallis's most controversial measure was the Permanent Settlement of the land revenues of Bengal. This step conferred British rights of land ownership on local *zamindars*, mere tax-gathers. It was taken over the objections of John Shore, a veteran company official and later governor-general (1793–1798). Shore begged Cornwallis to limit the settlement to a preliminary ten-year period. Shore feared, rightly as it turned out, that in time this change might prove disastrous for both the Bengali peasantry and the *zamindars*. For Cornwallis, however, there

were to be no half measures. The settlement was made in perpetuity in 1793.

Cornwallis then turned his attention to ensuring the efficiency of Bengal's judicial system. He largely built upon the hierarchy of civil and criminal courts established by Hastings, but swept away the last vestiges of Indian control over criminal jurisdiction. Further, a Code of Regulations was promulgated to ensure that British standards of uniformity, as well as efficiency, were met.

Cornwallis earned his marquessate, not for these internal reforms, but for his success in following up Hastings's efforts to diplomatically isolate and cripple Mysore, the company's chief remaining rival in the South. Cornwallis personally led the combined forces of the company, several Maratha leaders, and the nizam of Hyderabad against Tipu Sultan in the Third Mysore War (1790–1792), which compelled Tipu to cede half of his territory. This ultimately proved fatal to his later efforts to drive the British from India.

Cornwallis resigned his office in 1793, but in 1805, at the age of sixty-six, he was returned to India to calm the waters roiled by the expansionist policy of Lord Wellesley. He died shortly after his arrival and was buried at Ghazipur.

Marc Jason Gilbert

See also **British East India Company Raj; Hastings, Warren; Wellesley, Richard Colley**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aspinall, Arthur. *Cornwallis in Bengal: The Administrative and Judicial Reforms of Lord Cornwallis*. 1931. Reprint, New Delhi: Uppal, 1987.
- Seton-Karr, W. S. *The Marquess Cornwallis and the Consolidation of British Rule*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1890.
- Wickwire, Franklin, and Mary Wickwire. *Cornwallis: The Imperial Years*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1980.

COWS, SACRED. See **Hinduism (Dharma)**.

CRIPPS, SIR RICHARD STAFFORD (1889–1952), British politician and diplomat. Stafford Cripps, socialist leader of Britain's Labour Party, undertook two impossible Constitutional "missions" to India in the last painful decade of his life. A nondogmatic Christian Socialist, Stafford initially focused his brilliant mind on chemical science at Winchester and Oxford, but later turned his creative powers toward devising formulas to help resolve thorny issues of international law and diplomacy. Cripps was called to the Bar from London's Middle Temple in 1913, elevated to King's Counsel in 1927, and was knighted in 1930. He joined J. Ramsay MacDonald's first



Sir Richard Stafford Cripps (1889–1952). In 1946 the British government dispatched Cripps to India to negotiate the terms of independence, but the failure of his mission is often seen as the point at which partition became inevitable. HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS.

Labour Cabinet in 1929, but refused to serve on MacDonald's subsequent national coalition ministry, preferring to start Labour's radical Socialist League in 1932, advocating a united front with Communists in 1936.

In May 1940, Cripps went as Britain's ambassador to Moscow, where he remained until January 1942. A month later, Prime Minister Winston Churchill invited him to join his War Cabinet as Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons. Then, the shocking fall of Singapore to Japanese invaders induced Churchill's Cabinet to ask Cripps to fly to India to try winning the support of India's National Congress for Britain's global war effort. Cripps had met and befriended Jawaharlal Nehru during one of Nehru's prewar visits to England, and he admired Mahatma Gandhi's emphasis on truth and nonviolence as the greatest twin forces for good. Churchill and Deputy Prime Minister Clement Attlee agreed that if any Englishman could convince India's nationalist leaders that their decision to oppose the war effort was ethically wrong, as well as contrary to India's own best interests, Cripps was the man to do so.

Cripps flew to India in late March 1942 and flew home from Delhi on 12 April, confessing that he had "failed" in

his most important mission. His failure, however, was written into the "nonnegotiable" terms of the Cabinet's offer to India's leaders. India was promised "Dominion Status" after the war ended, but any province of British India that preferred to "opt out" of independent India's Commonwealth Dominion would be free to do so. That option paved the way for M. A. Jinnah's Muslim League to demand a separate Muslim "Pakistan." To Nehru's Congress, that League demand was "madness," and Cripps's offer was viewed as nothing less than "treachery," or, as Gandhi called it, "a post-dated cheque on a bank that is failing!" When he met Cripps, in fact, the Mahatma asked, "If you had nothing better to offer, why have you come so far?" None of Sir Stafford's answers could dispel the Congress leaders' outrage and sense of betrayal at Cripps's "duplicity" in bringing them the British Cabinet's offer.

In 1946, after the end of the war, Cripps returned with Labour's three-member Cabinet Mission, nominally led by the elderly secretary of state for India, Lord Pethick-Lawrence, but intellectually Cripps's own brainchild. A year before the British Indian Empire expired, Cripps made this last brilliant effort to save South Asia from the dreadful tragedy of partition, which would cost India and Pakistan no fewer than a million innocent refugee lives in 1947, and more than half a century of no fewer than three wars. This time the formula he devised was an independent Confederation of India, comprised of three powerful "clusters" of provinces (which are now essentially the independent nations of India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh), all of South Asia held together by a weak "center" with an almost equal number of Hindu, Muslim, and Sikh ministers to keep the peace, guarding the borders and communication networks. It almost worked. Both Congress and the League initially agreed to Cripps's remarkable constitutional formula, but human weakness, mistrust, and ancient fears swiftly shattered the fragile agreement, and for India and Pakistan tragic chaos ensued.

Cripps returned home to serve as Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1947 to 1950, forced to resign soon after launching his rigid austerity program, devaluing the pound. His health broken, he died two years later.

Stanley Wolpert

See also **Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.; Jinnah, Mohammad Ali**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Azad, A. K. *India Wins Freedom*. Bombay: Orient Longmans, 1959.
- Coupland, Reginald. *The Cripps Mission*. London and New York: Oxford University Press, 1942.
- Mansergh, N., and E. W. R. Lumby, eds. *The Transfer of Power, 1942–47*, vol. I: *Cripps Mission, January–April 1942*,

and vol. VII: *The Cabinet Mission, 23 March–29 June 1946*. London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1970, 1977.
 Rajput, A. B. *The Cabinet Mission*. Lahore: Lion Press, 1946.
 Wolpert, Stanley. *Shameful Flight: The Last Years of the British Empire in India*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2005.

CURZON, LORD GEORGE (1859–1925), governor-general of India (1899–1905) and British foreign secretary (1919–1924). The son of Lord and Lady Scarsdale, George Curzon was born on 11 January 1859 at Kedleston, the vast family estate in Derbyshire. He believed, as he wrote in the dedication to his book, *Problems of the Far East*, that Great Britain had been chosen by Providence to be “the greatest instrument for good the world has ever seen.” Elected to parliament as a Conservative in 1886, in 1887 he began to travel to Asia with the intention of making himself the country’s leading expert on Asian affairs. In his personal life, Curzon was known for his many affairs with prominent women, but these seem to have ended with his first marriage in 1895 to a wealthy, beautiful young American, Mary Leiter.

When he was appointed governor-general of India, Queen Victoria wrote to him that he should not, like many British officials in India, be “overbearing and offensive” toward Indians; these qualities, however, were often attributed to him regarding his manner of dealing with not only Indians but British officials as well (Gilmour, p. 137). Curzon’s main objectives, carried out with extraordinary energy, were to reform what he regarded as an inefficient British administration, to rule for the good of the people of India, and to preserve British power, rejecting with contempt the idea that Indians might some day rule their own country. Foreign affairs were a special concern for him, and he forged new links with the Afghan ruler to prevent Russian influence. In internal affairs, he reformed the selection and training of police officers. Confronted by massive famines, he ordered the construction of new irrigation works, and to encourage agriculture and industry, as well to facilitate troop movements, his administration added 6,000 miles of railways to the existing 27,000 miles. He regarded the Indian universities, which had been established in the middle of the nineteenth century, as badly in need of reform; this was carried out under the Universities Act of 1904, but it aroused great animosity because it replaced Indians with government appointees in administrative posts. One of Curzon’s lasting achievements during this period was the preservation of Indian monuments, especially the Taj Mahal and other buildings at Agra, through the Department of Archaeology.

When Curzon’s first term ended in 1904, he was reappointed, but two momentous problems confronted him. One was his decision to partition Bengal into two



Lord George Curzon. As the sitting viceroy of India, Curzon made the momentous decision to partition Bengal into two provinces, a decision that stirred the flames of nationalism. HULTON-DEUTSCH COLLECTION/CORBIS.

provinces, East and West Bengal (one with a Muslim, the other with a Hindu majority); the partition was fiercely denounced by Indian nationalists as a measure designed to foment conflict between the two groups. He insisted that the change had been made strictly for administrative convenience. The other problem was a quarrel with the commander-in-chief of the Indian army, Lord Kitchener, over civil versus military control. Kitchener was supported by the British government, and Curzon resigned in anger in 1905. He served as foreign secretary from 1919 to 1924, but he was bitterly disappointed when he was not appointed prime minister.

Ainslie T. Embree

See also **Bengal; British Crown Raj**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

George N. Curzon, *Problems of the Far East* (London: Longman, 1894), gives his views of Britain’s place in the world. Ian Gilmour, *Curzon* (London: John Murray, 1994), is the most complete biography. David Dilks, *Curzon in India*, 2 vols. (New York: Taplinger, 1970), provides a detailed study of his policies.



DALHOUSIE, MARQUIS OF (1812–1860), governor-general of India (1848–1856). James Andrew Bourn Ramsay was born at Dalhousie Castle, Midlothian, Scotland, and graduated from Christ Church College, Oxford, in 1833. After his elder brothers and his father died, Dalhousie succeeded to his father's title of earl of Dalhousie in 1838. Dalhousie attained high office at a young age (member of Parliament, 1837; House of Lords, 1838; member of the Privy Council, 1843; president of the Board of Trade, 1845). As governor-general of British India, he followed an expansionist policy, annexing the Punjab (1849) and Lower Burma (1852). The First Anglo-Sikh War of 1846 had resulted in the British annexation of Punjab's eastern districts, and Dalhousie annexed the rest of Punjab in the Second Anglo-Sikh War. He supported the brothers Henry and John Lawrence who imposed a tough policy of direct rule on the Punjab. The Second Anglo-Burmese War, which started in 1851, owed its origin to the interests of British traders in the region, which Dalhousie endorsed. In India he curtailed the princely states, whose support seemed to be no longer required after the consolidation of British rule. According to his "doctrine of lapse," states whose princes died without male heirs were merged with British India. This rule was applied to Jaitpur, Jhansi, Nagpur, Sambalpur, Satara, and Tanjore (Thanjavur). Princely "mismanagement" could also be used as a pretext for such mergers, as it did in Oudh in 1856.

When Dalhousie became governor-general, he also held the office of governor of Bengal, as had all his predecessors. He saw to it that the post of lieutenant-governor of Bengal was created in 1854, thus putting an end to this double tenure. Dalhousie had been in charge of railway policy at home and drafted a plan for 5,000 miles of railway track in India when he became governor-general.

The first lines started operating when Dalhousie was still in India. The first telegraph line from Kolkata to Delhi was also installed during his period of office, in 1854. His aggressive policies contributed to the outbreak of the Mutiny of 1857, which had to be faced by his successor, but the telegraph line helped to coordinate the British fight against the rebels. Dalhousie was an enthusiastic "modernizer"; subsequent British administrators of India were more inclined to respect the Indian princes and great landlords as "natural leaders of the people" and shelved the doctrine of lapse. The hill station Dalhousie in Himachal Pradesh is named for him.

Dietmar Rothermund

See also **Princely States**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Baird, J. G. A., ed. *Private Letters of the Marquess of Dalhousie*. 1910. Reprint, Shannon: Irish University Press, 1972.
Das, M. N. *Studies in the Economic and Social Development of Modern India: 1848–1856*. Kolkata: Firma K. L. Mukhopadhyay, 1959.
Lee-Warner, William. *The Life of the Marquis of Dalhousie*. 1904. Reprint, Shannon: Irish University Press, 1972.

DALITS The Rig Veda, which dates back at least to the second millennium before the common era, described the origins of the entire universe from the self-sacrifice of Purusha, the Cosmic Being, on the funeral pyre. From Purusha's body emerged the four categories of humans: from his mouth, the Brahman; from his arms the Rajanya, or Kshatriya; from his thighs the Vaishya; and from his feet the Shudra. These categories were subsequently referred to as *varṇas* (colors), a term also used to categorize timber and precious stones.



Dalits March in Khola. Dalits rallying through Khola 6 December 2003. Increased awareness of the plight of “untouchables” has prompted numerous human rights organizations to appeal to the United Nations on their behalf. ANTOINE SERRA/IN VISU/CORBIS.

During and after the sixth century B.C., Brahmins composed *sūtras* (“threads,” brief Sanskrit prose aphorisms) and *śāstras* (more elaborate Sanskrit verse instructions) regarding morally correct behavior (*dharma*). The *sūtras* and *śāstras* saw the four *varṇa* divisions of society to be cosmically ordained, with Brahmins outranking the other three *varṇas*. The *varṇa* into which one was born was seen as a direct consequence of how one had performed one’s morally correct behavior (*dharma*) in one’s previous lives. The *Dharma Śāstra*, attributed to the sage Manu, assigned occupations to each of the *varṇas*. Brahmins were to study, teach, and perform sacrifices. Kshatriyas were to rule, wage war, sponsor sacrifices, and study. Vaishyas were to farm, breed cattle, trade, lend money, and study. The disadvantaged Shudras were to serve the three higher *varṇas*.

According to Manu, men of each *varṇa* were to marry women of the same *varṇa*. Men of the three higher *varṇas* were considered “twice-born”; their second birth ceremony (*upanayana*) was performed when they received the sacred thread (*janeu*) and could study the Vedic texts. Shudras, considered “once-born,” were not permitted to

undergo the second-birth ceremony, wear the sacred thread, study the Vedic texts, or marry according to the four highest forms of marriage. According to Manu’s *Dharma Śāstra*, Shudras were created to be the slaves of Brahmins; a Shudra who insulted a twice-born man with “gross invective” should have his tongue cut out; if a Shudra taught Brahmins their duty, the king should order hot oil to be poured into that Shudra’s mouth and ears; Brahmins could confidently seize a Shudra’s property; and a Brahman who killed a Shudra needed to perform only the same penance as if he had killed a cat or crow. Manu’s *Dharma Śāstra* predicted that a kingdom with a shortage of twice-born inhabitants and a surplus of Shudras would soon “entirely perish.” The Bhagavad Gītā provided some comfort for Shudras. It stated that Shudras who faithfully fulfilled their assigned duties in this life could be reborn in higher *varṇas* in their later lives. Furthermore, a Shudra who worshiped Lord Krishna with sufficient devotion (*bhakti*) in this life could at the end of this life be freed from the bonds of reincarnation.

The sūtras and *śāstras* agreed that Shudras were the lowest of the four *varṇas*. Nevertheless, Manu's *Dharma Śāstra* identified groups that were even lower than Shudras. These lower groups included the offspring of the mixing or confusion of *varṇas* (*varṇa samkara*), that is, sexual activities between *varṇas*. This mixing of *varṇas* endangered society. According to Manu, these activities generated new birth groups (*jatis*) with their own names and occupations. One of the most offensive mixing of *varṇas* occurred when a Shudra male impregnated a Brahman female. Manu labeled the offspring of such miscegenation a Chandala, considered to be the "lowest of men." According to Manu, Chandalas were to live apart from other people, never entering villages or towns after dark. They were to eat from broken dishes, carry out the corpses of unclaimed dead, execute criminals, and take for themselves the clothes, ornaments, and beds of the executed criminals. They should not look at an eating Brahman or touch a Brahman's sacrificial offerings.

Another offensive mixing of *varṇas* occurred when a Brahman male impregnated a Shudra female. Manu labeled the offspring of their miscegenation a Nishada (also a "living corpse") who subsisted by killing fish. Lower than even a Chandala or a Nishada was an Antyavasayin, the offspring of a Chandala male impregnating a Nishada female. According to Manu, Antyavasayins were employed in burial grounds and were "despised" even by other groups excluded from the four *varṇas*. By establishing morally reprehensible origins for such groups, Manu's *Dharma Śāstra* provided justification for their rejection by much of society and their continuing disadvantages.

Manu's *Dharma Śāstra* also listed occupations "reviled by the twice-born." These included managing horses and chariots, medical healing, doing things for women, trading, fishing, carpentry, hunting, snaring, working with leather, and drumming. Persons subsisting by these occupations were to live near burial grounds or in mountains or groves of trees. Brahmins were not to accept any food from outcastes or persons engaged in "reviled" occupations (although Brahmins could receive uncooked food from Shudras). Those among the twice-born who engaged in the most offensive behavior (e.g., drinking spirituous liquor) were to be branded as outcastes and left to wander over the face of the earth. Relatives were to perform their funeral rites and thereafter neither converse with them, nor marry them, nor share inheritance with them. Only after performing prescribed penances could such outcastes be restored to their former positions among their relatives.

One of the Jataka tales (a collection of stories in the Pali canon about Buddha's former births) described an

occasion when the yet-to-be-Buddha was born as a Chandala in a Chandala village. When he went to the city as a young man, having learned to be a sweeper, he discovered that people called him a "vile outcaste" and that high-*varṇa* women rinsed their eyes with perfumed water after seeing him. He discovered later, when he disguised himself as a Brahman, his inadvertent use of a Chandala form of speech revealed his true identity to a group of genuine Brahmins, who drove him away. In the epic Mahābhārata, during a devastating famine, the great Brahman seer Vishvamitra begged a Chandala to let him eat the dog meat hanging in the Chandala hamlet. In the end, with considerable reluctance, the Chandala gave the dog meat to Vishvamitra. In one well-known narrative, King Harishchandra, fulfilling his promise to a sage, donated his entire kingdom to the sage and left, with his wife and son, for a neighboring country. There a Chandala chief hired Harishchandra to collect the cremation-ground fees and burn the bodies brought for cremation. Harishchandra's subsequent profoundly moral behavior led to his restoration (with his wife and son) to his original kingdom.

Eyewitness Accounts of Disadvantaged Groups

Around 300 B.C. Seleucus Nicator, a general under Alexander the Great, sent an ambassador, Megasthenes, to attend Chandragupta Maurya's court in Pataliputra (present-day Patna). Although none of Megasthenes' writings have survived, in later years other Greeks cited him when reporting on the lands and peoples of South Asia. According to Megasthenes, no one in India had slaves, although a companion of Alexander the Great reported that slavery existed in the Indus River region.

At the beginning of the fifth century A.D., Fahsien, a Chinese Buddhist monk, traveled throughout northern India. In his journals he described Chandalas as fishermen and hunters who sold meat and were considered wicked. They lived apart from others. When they entered a city gate or marketplace, they struck a piece of wood so that people could avoid them. Two centuries later, another Chinese Buddhist monk, Hsueun Tsang, traveled throughout much of India. He reported that meat eating was forbidden. Those who ate meat were "despised." They lived outside the town walls and were seldom seen.

In the eleventh century, Alberuni, a Muslim from the court of Ghazni (in Afghanistan) who had traveled to India, wrote in Arabic his descriptions of the four-*varṇa* system. Below the four *varṇas* he described eight craft groups who lived outside the *varṇas*' towns. Five of these craft groups freely intermarried but refused to marry three of the groups: shoemakers, weavers, and woolen-cloth

thickeners. Below these eight craft groups came four groups considered “degraded outcastes” (among them Chandalas) who did “dirty work like the cleansing of the villages” and who were thought of as illegitimate children of a Shudra male and a Brahman female.

In the 1500s the Portuguese settling on India’s southwestern coast labeled the local intra-marrying groups *castas*. Later the French and British modified this term, calling the groups “castes.” In 1666 M. de Thevenot, a French traveler, reported that in Kerala, if a high caste Nair felt the breath of a Polea, the Nair considered himself polluted and was obliged to kill the Polea; otherwise the local ruler would put the Nair to death or sell him into slavery. Poleas, when working in the fields, called out “Po! Po!” to warn Nairs of their presence. Poleas could not enter towns. If they wanted to buy some commodity, they called it out and left money in a designated spot; a local merchant then left the commodity at the spot and collected the money.

More than a century later, a French Jesuit missionary, the Abbé J. A. Dubois, described Pariahs in South India as lower than Shudras and abhorred by other castes. Pariahs were village scavengers who cleaned the public latrines, swept the streets, and removed the rubbish. A Brahman had to purify himself by bathing if a Pariah’s shadow fell on him. On the Kerala coast, many Pariahs were lifelong serfs of their landlords, who could sell them to other local landlords. Highest among the Pariahs were the Valluvas, who presided over Pariah marriages and other religious ceremonies. Valluvas married only other Valluvas. Among the slightly higher castes regarded as Shudras, the various cultivating castes looked down on, and refused to eat with, occupational castes who were “dependent on the public” such as barbers, washermen, and shoemakers.

The British Colonial Period

In 1871 and 1872, the British recorded their first all-India census, in which they noted respondents’ castes and tribes and tried, often with difficulty, to place each group within the four-*varna* framework. Shortly after the first census, government offices began receiving petitions from castes and caste groups claiming higher status than that ascribed to them in the census. For example, during the 1891 census in Madras presidency, Shanars (a “polluting” caste whose occupation was tapping the sap of palm trees) claimed to be Nadars of the Kshatriya *varna*. The census commissioner rejected their claims. Ignoring the rejection, in 1897 fifteen Shanars entered a temple in Kamundi and worshiped the Goddess Meenakshi. The court case filed against the Shanars demanded financial payments to purify the “defiled” temple. The British courts at every

level, including the Privy Council in London, ruled against the Shanars, resting their case on the fact that no Shanars had entered such a temple before.

The census revealed that significant portions of India’s population were disadvantaged. They were referred to as depressed classes, backward castes, tribes, *adivasis*, *adi-Hindus*, and *adi-Dravidas*. They were also called by the English term “outcastes,” even though few of them had been cast out by their relatives. They were also called by the English term “untouchables.” However, except in a few South Indian locations, pollution by touching was seldom the issue. In most cases, higher castes felt polluted if they ate food cooked by those labeled “untouchables” or used eating or drinking utensils that had been used by them.

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, widely varying groups, including Christian missionaries, the Ārya Samāj, the Servants of India Society, the Justice Party, the Theosophical Society, and the Self-Respect Movement, advocated various forms of uplift for disadvantaged groups. These included admission into temples, access to education and employment, representation on decision-making bodies, and the right to interdine and intermarry. Champions of uplift, though often disagreeing on strategies, included E. V. Ramaswamy Naicker (a non-Brahman from South India), Mohandas K. (Mahatma) Gandhi (a Vaishya from Gujarat), and Dr. Bhimrao R. Ambedkar (a Mahar “untouchable” from Maharashtra).

Reformers called on the British government to identify the disadvantaged groups in order to end their longstanding historical disabilities. J. H. Hutton, the census commissioner in 1931, instructed provincial superintendents to draw up lists of groups handicapped by their “degraded position in the Hindu social scheme.” Criteria by which groups were identified varied from province to province but generally included such ritual disabilities as denial of admission to Hindu temples and higher castes’ perceptions that members of these groups polluted higher castes. The Government of India Act of 1935 entitled the “degraded” groups to special electoral representation. In 1936 provincial governments prepared lists (“schedules”) of local groups meeting the “degraded” criteria, and the official designations of these groups became “scheduled castes” (SCs) and “scheduled tribes” (STs).

Untouchability after India’s Independence

Dr. Ambedkar was appointed chairman of the drafting committee for India’s Constitution. Under his leadership the constitution initiated a policy of affirmative action referred to as “protective discrimination” or “compensatory discrimination.” Article 17 declared that untouchability

was abolished and any disability arising from untouchability was an offense “punishable in accordance with law.” Article 15(2) guaranteed to all castes (including scheduled castes) access to public restaurants, wells, tanks, bathing ghats, and roads and places dedicated to the use of the general public. Article 15(4) declared that the state could make “special provision” for the advancement of scheduled castes and tribes. Articles 330 and 331 reserved seats in the national Parliament and the state assemblies for members of the scheduled castes and tribes. The percentages of seats in the legislative bodies were to match as nearly as possible the proportion of scheduled castes and tribes living in the represented territory. Article 325 declared that all voters—not just SCs and STs—could participate in the election of candidates for the SC and ST reserved seats. Article 335 reserved state- and central-government jobs for members of the scheduled castes and tribes. To address the guarantees in Article 16 of equal rights for all Indian citizens, the Constitution stipulated that these reservations of legislative seats and government jobs for SCs and STs would end after ten years. Over subsequent decades, Parliament periodically amended the Constitution to extend the SC and ST reservations for another ten years.

In 1960 the government of India published an all-India list of 405 scheduled castes and 225 scheduled tribes arranged in alphabetical order. According to this list, some castes were referred to by many different names, some castes were “scheduled” in certain localities but not in neighboring localities, and some castes (often referred to by different names) existed in India’s different linguistic regions. In 1976 the government of India replaced its 1960 all-India list with an amended state-by-state list of 841 scheduled castes and 501 scheduled tribes. Some castes and tribes were still “scheduled” in certain localities but not in neighboring localities, and some castes and tribes were still referred to by various different names. When designations were unclear, India’s Constitution stipulated that Parliament and the president were to make the final decisions regarding a group’s “scheduled” or “nonscheduled” status. According to the published lists, scheduled castes formed about 17 percent of India’s population, and scheduled tribes about 7.5 percent, for a total of 22.5 percent.

The Identification of “Dalits”

After the adoption of India’s constitution, Dr. Ambedkar became increasingly disillusioned with trying to legislate significant changes for India’s “untouchables.” Following his failure to gain passage of the Hindu Code Bill in 1951, or to be elected to parliament in 1952, he turned to Buddhism as a solution to untouchability. In earlier writings he had argued that India’s contemporary untouch-

ables had once been Kshatriyas and Buddhists, whom hostile Brahmans had relegated to the bottom ranks of society. Convinced that Hinduism inherently incorporated caste discrimination, Ambedkar urged India’s untouchables to abandon Hinduism and become Buddhists. In 1955, the year before he died, he himself converted to Buddhism. The millions of untouchables, many of them members of Ambedkar’s Mahar caste, who followed his example were called neo-Buddhists. By becoming Buddhists, they sacrificed their legal benefits as members of the scheduled castes. They and other members of scheduled castes and tribes called themselves Dalits, a Marathi term for “oppressed,” preferring this term to many demeaning alternatives such as “untouchables,” “backward classes,” or even to Gandhi’s term *harijan* (children of God). Non-Hindu (e.g., Christian, Muslim) castes, who as such did not qualify as scheduled castes, also called themselves Dalits. Soon references were being made to Dalit activism and agitation as well as Dalit poetry, literature, drama, art, and film. Dalits’ efforts to assert their rights sometimes met with deadly violence, as higher castes punished them for their assertiveness. Human rights groups became involved, and Dalit organizations appealed to the United Nations to include “caste” with its already established categories of race, color, and sex, to which all human rights applied.

The 1990s saw the appearance of candidates and political parties specifically representing SCs and other backward classes as defined in 1980 by the Mandal Commission. The appearance of these political parties generated reorientations of voting behavior (especially in the states of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh) and the election of candidates, parties, and ministries privileging the Dalits and other backward classes.

Joseph W. Elder

See also Ambedkar, B. R., and the Buddhist Dalits; Caste System; Mandal Commission Report; Scheduled Tribes

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Asia Human Rights Watch. *Broken People: Caste Violence against India’s “Untouchables.”* New York: Human Rights Watch, 1999.
- Buhler, Georg, trans. *The Laws of Manu*. Vol. 25 of *The Sacred Books of the East*, edited by F. Max Müller. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1886.
- Dubois, Abbé J. A. *Hindu Manners, Customs, and Ceremonies*. Translated by Henry K. Beauchamp. 3rd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1906.
- Galanter, Marc. *Competing Equalities: Law and the Backward Classes of India*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.

Gomango, Giridhar, *Constitutional Provisions for the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes*. Mumbai: Himalaya Publishing House, 1992.

Government of India, Office of the Registrar General. *Census of India, Paper No. 2, Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes Arranged in Alphabetical Order*. New Delhi: Publications Division, 1960.

Keer, Dhananjay. *Dr. Ambedkar: Life and Mission*. 2nd ed. Bombay: Popular Prakashan, 1962.

Wheeler, James T., and Michael Macmillan. *European Travellers in India*. Calcutta: Susil Gupta, 1956.

DANCE FORMS

This entry consists of the following articles:

AN INTRODUCTION

BHARATA NATYAM

KATHAK

KATHAKALI

KOODIYATTAM

KUCHIPUDI

MANIPURI

MOHINI ATTAM

ODISSI

AN INTRODUCTION

The multifaceted dance forms of India—both classical and regional—have evolved from the earliest times to the present. Indian dance has permeated all other forms of art, including poetry, sculpture, painting, music, and theater. It is a composite art with distinctive characteristics, reflecting the Indian civilization's worldview, philosophy, religion, life cycles, seasons, and environment. As a dynamic art, dance forms continue to evolve, growing with the imagination of creative artists exploring human movement.

Evidence found in cave paintings and statues—from the “dancing girl” of Mohenjo-Daro to a wealth of later sculptures—and literary references from the Vedas, the Upanishads, and the epics clearly attest to India's flourishing tradition of dance performance. *Nāṭyashāstra*, the classical text of dance and drama (2nd century B.C.–2nd century A.D.), codified India's ancient theatrical arts. With its roots in Hindu religion, as a temple offering to the gods, Indian dance inspired sculptural artists for millennia, from the simple dancing girl to the brilliantly complex and symbolic depiction of Shiva as Nata-raja, “king of the dance.”

Classical dance forms evolved along with a tradition of tribal, folk, and social dances in all parts of India. The

Abhinaya Darpana, a text solely devoted to dance, followed the *Nāṭyashāstra*, indicating that by the tenth century classical dance flourished. Many kings supported the arts, and dance developed in the royal courts as well. An inscription from the eleventh century A.D. in the Brihadiśvara temple mentions four hundred *dēvadāsi* (slaves of the gods) dancers, retained there for the entertainment of Brahman priests. *Dēvadāsi* emerged as an institution, its female members cultivating classical dance and sustaining it as a living tradition.

Classical Indian dance forms are governed by the codification and the aesthetic principles set forth in the *Nāṭyashāstra*. A vigorous “masculine” type of dance is called *tandava*, while the more graceful “feminine” style is *lasya*. There are specific divisions: *nritta*, or pure dance, is performed with abstract movement and rhythm patterns; *nritya*, or expressional dance, includes mime, facial expressions, and hand gestures, used to convey the meaning of a song to which the dance is performed; *natya* is drama, in which four elements of *abhinaya*, the histrionic representations are utilized to communicate a theme.

Those four elements of *abhinaya* are: *angika*, bodily movements; *vachika*, speech and dialogue; *abhaya*, the costumes, stage settings, and properties; and *sattvika*, the mental states. In *angika*, an important role is given to the *hastas*, or hand gestures, popularly known as *mudras*, considered the most distinctive feature of classical Indian dance. A dancer narrates a story using facial expressions and bodily movements; he or she also uses hand gestures that have specific meanings, complementing the facial expressions.

The *Nāṭyashāstra* has also codified all human emotions into nine *rasas* (sentiments): *śringara* (love); *vīra* (valor); *raudra* (ferocity); *bhaya* (fear); *bibhatsa* (disgust); *hasya* (laughter); *karuna* (pathos); *adbhuta* (wonder); and *śanta* (tranquillity). The aim of any representational dance or dance-drama is to evoke *rasa*, a state of sentiment, in the spectator according to the *bhava* (emotions) created by the dancer. This evocation is called *rasanishpatti*, or eliciting the aesthetic flavor.

Pure dance numbers with abstract movements are decorative, creating patterns in space and time. In expressional dance, however, a solo dancer assumes the role of narrator as well as various characters, impersonating many roles. This multifaceted performance is known as *ekabarya lasyanga*.

As one line or a single word may be interpreted in many ways to enhance the basic mood, improvisation further enhances the audience's enjoyment of the themes presented. Since dance dramas are taken from Hindu mythology and the epics, the stories are well known. The emphasis is therefore on the manner in which the dramas are enacted.

Most of the classical dances have close links with religion. Therefore the content of the dance usually concerns gods and goddesses, who behave much like human beings. Though temple dancing is now banned, the spirit of *bhakti* (devotion) permeates classical dance, and exceptional dancers always evoke it. A variety of folk dances and social dances are also performed on festive and religious occasions.

Bharata Natyam is the oldest classical dance style, but seven other regional styles have emerged: Kuchipudi (southeast coast); Kathak (north); Kathakali, Mohiniattam (southwest coast); Odissi, (east coast); Manipuri (northeast); and Sattriya (Assami northeast). Each of these dance forms has its own kinetic dance language, with codification of the hand gestures, movements, specific regional classical music, costumes, and conventions. Mohiniattam is performed only by women dancers, but all the other forms are performed by both men and women. They are neoclassical dance forms, based on oral and shastric traditions. Indian modern dance has also evolved, as classically trained dancers explore contemporary themes. Classical and modern dance exist side by side, continuing to attract modern audiences to the beauty of Indian dance.

Sunil Kothari

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Kothari, Sunil. "Dance-Drama Tradition of Kuchipudi, Bhagavata Mela Nataka and Kuravanji with Special Reference to the Rasa Theory as Expounded in Bharata's *Nāṭyashāstra*." Ph.D. diss., Maharaja Sayajirao University, 1977.
- . *Bharata Natyam*. Rev. ed. Mumbai: Marg Publications, 2000.
- Nāṭyashāstra*. Part 1. Gaekwad Oriental series. Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1956.
- Vatsyayan, Kapila. *Indian Classical Dance*. New Delhi: Publications Division, 1974.
- Venkataraman, Leela, and Avinash Pasricha. *Indian Classical Dance: Traditions in Transition*. New Delhi: Roli Books, 2002.

BHARATA NATYAM

India's classical Bharata Natyam dance form dates back to the Rig Vedic hymns, and even earlier in visual form to the figurine of a dancing girl from Mohenjo-Daro. *Nāṭyashāstra*, the compendium on dance, theater, music, and prosody (2nd century B.C.–2nd century A.D.) refers to Lasya, which includes a solo dance, depicting ten to twelve emotional numbers performed by a dancer. Bharata Natyam is performed today as a solo dance and therefore appears to be a direct derivation of Lasya.

Bharata Natyam was nurtured and developed in South India, where magnificent Hindu temples, built during the reigns of the Pallavas and the Cholas (4th century A.D.–12th



Bharat Natyam Dance Form. Today, the once banned Bharat Natyam is India's most popular form of dance. Meaning is conveyed through stylized hand gestures and facial expressions, mime and action—with the choreography having an almost geometric pattern. BARNABAS BOSSHART/CORBIS.

century A.D.) bear testimony to their love of architecture, sculpture, and paintings, as well as to their devotion to the gods. The Chola kings maintained hundreds of *dēvadāsi* (servants, or slaves, of the gods) dancers in their temples. That tradition was sustained by successive Pandya, Nayaka, and Maratha rulers until the end of the nineteenth century. The *dēvadāsis* were female dancers who performed their ritual dances before the temple idols and the Brahmans, who provided for their care.

British Christian missionaries and officials of the British Raj stigmatized the *dēvadāsis* as "prostitutes" and undermined their position as "servants of the gods," thereby severing the tradition of Hindu classical dance. In 1927 the Devadasi Act banned all dancing in temples in Madras (Tamil Nadu).

The early decades of the twentieth century saw the revival of classical Hindu dance through the pioneering

work of dancers such as Rukmini Devi, an upper-class Brahman woman who studied Bharata Natyam at a time when it was considered unworthy of practice. During the session of the Indian National Congress in 1927 in Madras, E. Krishna Iyer, a lawyer and freedom fighter, organized the first All-India Music conference. The Music Academy was established in 1928, and in defiance of the Anti-Nautch movement (which opposed Indian dances) he presented two *dēvadāsi* dancers on its platform. Rukmini Devi performed before an international gathering at the Theosophical Society in Madras in 1935. She established her Kalakshetra Academy in 1936, institutionalizing training in Bharata Natyam. Since then, the stigma against it diminished, and within a few years Bharata Natyam gained unprecedented popularity. Today it is India's most popular dance form.

According to the *Nāṭyashāstra* treatises, the art of classical dance has three major divisions: *nritya*, which is pure dance; *nritya*, expressional dance; and *natya*, the drama. *Nritya* consists of bodily movements and patterns of dance that are purely decorative. In *nritya*, meaning is conveyed through the *hastas*, stylized hand gestures and facial expressions, and *abhinaya*, mime and actions that heighten emotions and sentiments, conveyed by the dancer in a code language.

The basic dance unit is called *adavu*, a combination of steps and gestures. The basic dance position of Bharata Natyam is *ardhamandali*, similar to the *demi-plié* position in ballet. Movements in Bharata Natyam are geometrical, creating a series of triangles and other forms and patterns with straight lines, diagonals, and cartwheel movements over the head.

Natya, the drama, is seen in dance-drama form known as Bhagavata Mela Nataka, staged traditionally during religious festivals in Tanjore and its environs. The repertoire consists of numbers of pure dances like *alarippu*, *varnam*, and *tillana*. In *sabdam*, *varnam*, *padam javali*, and *sloka*, expressional dances are enacted to a song. A *nayika*, a heroine pining for her lover, symbolizes the desire of the soul to merge with the "super soul" of Brahman.

The most famous dancers were Balasarasvati, Rukmini Devi, and their contemporaries Ram Gopal, Mrinalini Sarabhai, Shanta Rao, and Kamala. The next generation included Yamini Krishnamurty, Sonal Mansingh, Padma Subrahmanyam, as well as the younger generation of Alarmel Valli and Malavika Sarukkai, who have contributed much to the tradition. Chandralekha introduced martial art to her dance, rejecting sentimental themes and creating a new contemporary form.

Sunil Kothari

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Khokar, Mohan. *Traditions of Indian Classical Dance*. Delhi: Clarion, 1979.
- Kothari, Sunil. *Bharata Natyam*. Rev. ed. Mumbai: Marg Publications, 2000.
- Nāṭyashāstra*. Part 1. Gaekwad Oriental series. Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1956.
- Vatsyayan, Kapila. *Indian Classical Dance*. New Delhi: Publications Division, 1974.

KATHAK

Katha means "a story," and one who tells a story, reciting and dancing, is called a Kathak. Prevalent in North India, Kathak dance has a long past. Nurtured in the holy precincts of the Hindu temples, over the centuries Kathak has refined and enriched itself with various hues. References to Kathak are found in the epics Rāmāyaṇa and Mahābhārata. In the medieval period, with the rise of devotional *bhakti*, the Kathaks began to recite and dance in the temple courtyards, performing various dance-dramas, such as Akhyana, Pandvani, Harikatha, Kalakshepams, and Wari-liba, from different parts of India. Kathak developed as a solo dance form in the North. People belonging to the Kathak caste live throughout eastern Uttar Pradesh.

The great Mughal emperors patronized Kathak artists at their courts, but the content of the dance changed dramatically.

Instead of depicting love stories of Rādhā and Krishna, emphasis shifted to pure and abstract dance. The Mughals brought with them Persian cultural influences as well. The Hindu kings of Rajasthan also patronized Kathak dancers, who enacted epic and purāṇic Hindu tales of divine folly. The *dēvadāsi* courtesans played a role in sustaining this Hindu courtly tradition.

Kathak's most striking features are footwork (*tatkar*) and pirouettes (*chakkars*). The dancers perform on a vertical axis, to exacting time measures. Kathak includes *nritya*, or pure dance; *nritya*, or expressional dance; and *natya*, or drama. In the last category we see the relation between Kathak and the Rasalilas of Brindavan and Mathura, keeping alive the ancient tradition in which divine love stories of Rādhā and Krishna are enacted through dance, dialogue, and music. Many Kathak dancers create the illusion of miniature paintings of Krishna springing to life.

Wajid Ali Shah, the last *nawāb* of Oudh, (r. 1847–1856) introduced *thumri*, a light, poetic musical form, to which dancers performed with mime and improvisation. *Ghazals*, poems in the Urdu language recited to music, were also introduced at this time.

Tode, *tukde*, *tibai*, and *parans* are intraforms, recited with mnemonic syllables of the tabla and *pakhavaj*, the accompanying percussion instruments, and a specific



Kathak Dancer. In this 1988 photo, Saswati Sen, perhaps the most famous Kathak dancer trained by Birju Maharaj. Maharaj is a master of the Lucknow school that stresses delicacy of movement, gracefulness, and expression. LINDSAY HEBBERD/CORBIS.

tala, a time measure to which each Kathak is danced. The emphasis is on virtuosity. The music accompanying a Kathak dance is Hindustani classical music. Some gifted dancers also sing while performing *abhinaya*. Both male and female dancers perform Kathak.

Kathak flowered into two major schools (*gharanas*), in Lucknow and in Jaipur. The Lucknow school lays emphasis on delicacy of movement, gracefulness, and expression. Kalka and Bindadin and their descendants Acchan, Lachhu, and Shambhu Maharaj were great performers of the Lucknow school. Achhan Maharaj's son Birju Maharaj contributed graceful new bodily movements to further embellish the Lucknow form of Kathak. The Jaipur school stresses vigor and more forceful movements. It has an astounding quality of rhythmic innovation. Its greatest exponents were Hanuman Prasad, Mohan Prasad, Narayan Prasad, and Sundar Prasad.

Other schools similar to Kathak developed at the court of Raja Chakradhar in Madhya Pradesh and in

Banaras (Varanasi; also known as Janaki Prasad *gharana*), though with stylistic differences.

Kathak, practiced as it was by courtesans, was usually looked down upon by India's upper classes. Under British rule, Kathak was contemptuously referred to as "Nautch" and fell into disrepute. Though it was performed in temple courtyards for wealthy landlords, it was denigrated as the vulgar dance of prostitutes.

When Madam Menaka, an upper-class Brahman dance-artist, embraced Kathak dance, she introduced many reforms and refinements that helped to remove the stigma, bringing social approbation to Kathak. After independence, it received government patronage. Children studied Kathak under great masters, moving its modern performances to the proscenium stage. Ancient Hindu religious stories have, however, remained a part of the Kathak repertoire. Both the pure dance and the expressional numbers are now performed, and new choreographic group creations are also part of its modern development.

Sitara Devi, Birju Maharaj, Roshan Kumari, Durgalal Rohini Bhate, Kumudini Lakhia, Uma Sharma, Urmila Nagar, Ram Mohan, Saswati Sen, and Rajendra Ganagani, are all well-known exponents of this art. Kumudini Lakhia has introduced further innovations by choreographing contemporary themes in Kathak.

Sunil Kothari

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Kothari, Sunil. *Kathak Indian Classical Dance Art*. New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1989.
- Nāṭyashāstra*. Part 1. Gaekwad Oriental Series. Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1956.
- Vatsyayan, Kapila. *Indian Classical Dance*. New Delhi: Publications Division, 1974.

KATHAKALI

Kathakali is a dance-drama form from the state of Kerala. It is the culmination of a long process of evolution and assimilation of different theatrical forms and of both the highly stylized form of theater called Koodiyattam and the martial art form called Kalaripayattu. The most supernatural and mythological aspects concerning the lives and affairs of celestial beings, deities, demons, and sages form the content of Kathakali. Though Koodiyattam can be traced back to the ninth and tenth centuries, contemporary Kathakali emerged as an independent, highly formalistic and elaborate dance-drama form only in the seventeenth century. In Kathakali the actors do not speak. The libretto is sung in Manipravalam, a type of Malayalam enriched with a large number of Sanskrit words.



Kathakali Performance, Kerala Dance Form. Contemporary Kathakali dancer, Kerala. Besides Bharata Natyam (the oldest form of classical dance in India), seven regional forms exist, including Kathakali on the southwest coast. Each has its own technique, style of music and costume. ADITYA ARYA.

Kathakali has an elaborately defined code of body kinetics, combined with eloquent but amazingly elaborate hand gestures, popularly called *mudrās*. During the monsoon months, the actors are massaged with oil to make their bodies more pliable. Kathakali training is strenuous and lasts for nearly ten years, after which time an actor is given a small role to play. It is further enhanced by stylized makeup and costumes to provide the appropriate symbolic nuances that typify Kathakali performance.

A striking feature of Kathakali is its body kinetics accompanied by movements of the facial muscles. No other dance form uses the movements of the eyebrows, the eyeballs and the lower eyelids, as described in the *Nāṭya Shāstra*, as does Kathakali. The face becomes a playground of various conflicting *bhavas*, or emotions.

The principal characters are well-known types, and the elaborate makeup used to identify them is Kathakali's

most famous feature. For the *sattvika* (noble) characters, the make up is *paccha*, a green color. The jaw-bone is exaggerated by white paste. Along the arc of this white paste, paper cut-outs of a false chin and jaw are adhered, enlarging the dimensions of the face. Such dramatic makeup and costuming transform the actor from human proportions to superhuman stature.

For *rajasik* (violent) characters, like the epic Ramayana's demon-villain Ravana, the green makeup is broken by red patches. An oval red-and-white design is added to the nose and the upper cheek. His upturned moustache is called *katti*. Three types of red, black, and white *thadis* (beards) typify antiheroes, villains, and demons: red for characters like Dussashana; black for the *tamasik* (dark) characters like aborigines and forest dwellers; and white for divine allies like Hanuman. *Mudis*, the headgear for the *sattvika* characters, are large, but the demons wear even larger crowns. Women, Brahmins, and sages fall into *minukku* types, whose makeup is only one basic pink color. Except for those of the *minukku* types, all the costumes are elaborate.

In *nritta*, the pure dance, *kalasams* (dance units) alternate with the *nritya*, the expressional aspect, enhancing the *natya*, or drama. Characters appear from behind a curtain held by two stagehands. The music that accompanies Kathakali is known as the Sopanam style of music. There are four musicians; two vocalists, who also play cymbals; and two drummers, one playing a *maddalam*, held horizontally, and the other playing a *chenda*, a conical instrument held vertically. They stand behind the actors. Acting follows the sung libretto, elaborated upon and often improvised; the singing then stops, and only cymbals and drums are played.

The repertoire consists of *purappadu*, a pure dance piece that introduces the characters without mime. Then the play begins. The female roles are traditionally played by men. Women have, however, begun to study Kathakali and to play female roles. Kalyan Sougandhikam, Bali Vijayam, Lavanasuravadham, Nala Charitam, and Sita Swayamvaram are among the well-known plays.

In 1936 the institute Kerala Kala Mandalam was established by the poet Vallathol Narayan Menon to revive Kathakali; he invited renowned masters, like K. P. Kunju Kurup, T. K. Chandu Panikkar, T. Ramunni Nair, Guru Gopinath, V. Kunchu Nair, Chengannur Raman Pillai, M. Vishnu Namboodri, and Kalamandalam Krishnan Nair, to teach there. Contemporary Kathakali performers include Ramankutty Nair, K. Chatunni Panicker, Kalamandalam Padmanabhan Nair, and Kalamandalam Gopi.

Sunil Kothari

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Iyer, K. Bharatha. *Kathakali: The Sacred Dance-Drama of Malabar*. London: Luzac, 1955.
- Nair, Appukuttan, and Ayappa K. Panikar, eds. *Kathakali: The Art of the Non-worldly Theatre*. Mumbai: Marg Publications, 1993.
- Vatsyayan, Kapila. *Indian Classical Dance*. New Delhi: Publications Division, 1974.

KODIYATTAM

According to Kerala tradition, King Kulasekhara Varman (fl. A.D. 900) was responsible for reforming and popularizing the Sanskrit theater in Kerala, assisted by his Brahman minister Tolan. They introduced the use of Kerala's Malayalam language on stage, where only North India's Sanskrit had been spoken. Lay audiences flocked to those plays, which included humorous elements and parodies of the four classical Hindu stages (*ashtangas*) of life.

By meticulous elaboration, Koodiyattam offers limitless possibilities of aesthetic enjoyment. Enactment of one seven-act play would take several months to complete, the staging of a one-act play eight to nine days.

The actual staging of an act is preceded by preliminary rites, and an introduction, which has no direct connection to the theme of the play. The plays employ wit, humor, and sarcasm in brilliant Malayalam, entertaining the audience by making fun of everyone. At the end of the introduction, dancing begins, and verses in Sanskrit are chanted by the characters in monotone. The female roles are enacted by Nangyar women, who also play cymbals to keep *tala*, the time measure. The Nambyars play the large copper drums, called *mizhava*. The plays are staged in temple theatres, known as Koothampalam.

The Chakyars (actors) have through the centuries evolved a superb technique of *abhinaya* (expression), using a threefold presentation of the play. First there is *angika*, the gestural interpretation, followed by the *vachika*, the words or speech, and lastly a repetition of *angika*. Though separate and independent, they complement and amplify each other. The process is rather a long one.

A curtain is held by two persons standing in front of the stage. The actor stands behind it. After the introduction of the main character-hero, the next day begins with a description of his earlier life, prior to the incidents that will be actually staged. The play lasts for many days, with freedom given to the hero to move freely in time—past, present, and future. Dramatic ideas are also explained through hand gestures and bodily poses, as noted in the classical Sanskrit drama text, the *Nāṭyashāstra*, and the theatrical manual of gestures and poses, *Hastalakṣhanadīpikā*. Each word is uttered slowly, the gestures defining it, shown both for its stem and suffix; there are

special gestures to indicate the number and gender, as well as the tense and the mood. Minute facial expressions and the movements of the eyes are also developed to a great extent. Kerala's Kathakali dance-drama has borrowed many of these techniques from Koodiyattam.

Makeup in some respects is similar to that of Kathakali. *Paccha*, a green type, is used for noble heroes like Arjuna and Rāma; *pazhukka* makeup, with the face painted a reddish color, is reserved for kings of magnanimous nature; villains or demons like Ravana have the *katti*, or upturned mustache; and Shurpanakha has *kari*, a black makeup. There are the texts, like *Kramadīpikā*, which explain the procedure to be adopted in staging the plays, including stage directions. *Attaprakaram* texts explain the methods of acting and the meanings of the verses.

Formerly there were eighteen families of Chakyars. Now there are only six, and their number is dwindling. Ammanur, Kitannur, and Painkulam are well-known Chakyar families. Rāma Chakyar, Chachu Chakyar, and Mani Madhav Chakyar were great artists of the past. The living national treasure of Kerala is Ammanur Madhav Chakyar; G. Venu and his daughter Kapila are fine exponents from Kerala's younger generation of actors.

Sunil Kothari

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Panchal, Goverdhan. *Kuttampalam and Kutiyattam*. New Delhi: Sangeet Natak Akademi, 1984.
- Raja, K. Kunjuni. *Kutiyattam*. New Delhi: Sangeet Natak Akademi, 1964.
- Venu, G. *In the World of Kutiyattam with the Legendary Ammanur Madhava Chakyar*. Irinjalakuda: Natana Kairali, 2002.

KUCHIPUDI

Legend has it that in Andhra Pradesh at Kuchipudi village, Siddhendra Yogi, a devotee of Lord Krishna, devised this dramatic dance, and a number of Brahman male actors vowed that they would perpetuate this Kuchipudi tradition as *bhakti*, or devotion, for Krishna. Several inscriptional and literary sources support the existence of this form of dance-drama, which seems to have evolved in the sixteenth century from earlier musical dramas called *yakshagana* that combined elements of opera and dance. A performance was arranged for the *nawāb* of Golconda, Abdul Hasan Tahnishah, in 1678. He was so pleased that he gave Kuchipudi village to the Brahmans who took part in the play. Their families and descendants have carried on the tradition to the present day.

The most popular Kuchipudi drama is the story of Lord Krishna's most jealous wife, Satyabhama, who so

hates having to share her divine husband with any of his sixteen thousand other consorts that she petulantly sulks and enters the “anger-closet” in Krishna’s palace, vowing never to emerge. Sutradhara, the musical conductor, plays the role of Madhavi, the good and wise mediator who works so hard to reconcile Satyabhama and Lord Krishna, finally bringing him down to lure Satyabhama back up to his bed chamber with sweet promises. *Vachikabhinaya*, spoken dialogue, is articulated by the participants in this drama, known as *Bhramakalapam*, the most popular dance-drama of modern India. Traditionally, the female roles are all played by men. Satyabhama’s role is the most coveted one. Other popular Kuchipudi plays are Usha Parinayam, Prahlad Charitram, and Golla Kalapam.

Kuchipudi, like all classical dance forms, has elements of *nritta* (pure dance), *nritya* (expressional dance), and *natya*, (drama). There are songs for the entrance of each main character, in which the actor introduces him- or herself. The tradition is a living tradition, and members of the society in Kuchipudi village continue to stage their plays annually. The movements are quicksilver, lively and sensuous, with a delightful grammar all its own. It has moved from its first tiny South Indian rural temple to the largest urban and metropolitan centers of modern India, including New Delhi.

Lashminarayan Sastri, the great master of dancing and *abhinaya*, or expressions, taught this dance-drama to female exponents. He personally introduced several new numbers, like *tarangams*, balancing on the rim of a brass plate while dancing. These solo performances were introduced as entertainment between acts. His disciple Vempati Chinna Satyam followed in his footsteps, moving to Chennai (Madras) and opening schools for young female dancers. Vempati devised a solo dance form, on the lines of Bharata Natyam, beginning with *rangapravesha*, entrance on the stage; then *jatiswaram*, a pure dance number; followed by excerpts from the dance-dramas, like Satyabhama; and then *javalis* and *padams*, expressional numbers for *abhinaya* (mime), *tillana* (pure dance), and *tarangams*. He has also choreographed several dance-dramas.

Vedantam Satyam is well known for traditional female impersonation, but that tradition is slowly fading. Yamini Krishnamurthy, Sobha Naidu, Raja Radha Reddy, Swapna Sundari, and Mallika Sarabhai are some of the best-known exponents of Kuchipudi.

Sunil Kothari

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Jonnalagadda, Anuradha. “Traditions and Innovations in Kuchipudi Dance.” Ph.D. diss., University of Hyderabad, 1996.

Kothari, Sunil. “Dance-Drama Tradition of Kuchipudi, Bhagavata Mela Nataka and Kuravanji with Special Reference to the Rasa Theory as Expounded in Bharata’s *Nāṭyashāstra*.” Ph.D. diss., Maharaja Sayajirao University, 1977.

Kothari, Sunil, and Avinash Pasricha. *Kuchipudi-Indian Classical Dance Art*. New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 2001.

MANIPURI

Manipur is a small state situated in the northeast corner of India. A centuries-old tradition of dance and music survives in close coexistence with religious life. There is not a single social occasion in Manipur that is not celebrated with dance and music. The ancient Manipuri traditional festival *Lai Haroba*—the merrymaking of the gods—is dedicated to the animistic pre-Hindu deities. *Maibis*, the priestesses, invoke the village gods as ancestors of the various Manipuri subclans. Their ritualistic dance describes a primitive cosmology: the creation of the world, of the human body, and of human activities.

The fifteenth-century Bengali Vaishnavism, a devotional cult of Hinduism, found expression in Manipur in 1764, during the reign of King Bhagyachandra, becoming the state religion. Hence Vaishnavite religious themes—the stories of the childhood pranks of Lord Krishna and of his divine love with Rādhā—form the content of the two classically evolved Manipur dance forms, Sankirtana and Rasalilas.

Manipuri dances are performed in the temple courtyards as night-long performances, attended by the devout. Sankirtana is performed on such occasions as the birth of a child, giving food for the first time to a child, piercing of the ears, the marriage ceremony, and funerals. A collective prayer and a highly codified ritual, it is the strong foundation on which Manipuri dances have been structured. The style is imbued with delicate lyricism and fluid grace, as the movements are rounded, circular, and flowing. It is divided into *tandava*, the masculine and forceful, and *lasya*, the feminine and delicate.

The elements of *nritta* (pure dance), *nritya* (expressional dance), and *natya* (drama) are all found in Manipuri. Human emotions have been codified by the *Nāṭyashāstra* into nine *rasas* (sentiments): love, valor, anger, fear, disgust, pathos, laughter, wonder, and tranquillity. *Shringara*, the sentiment of love, is predominant in Manipuri, and the other sentiments are present in subordinated form. *Shringara* is further divided into two: *vipralambha*, in separation, and *sambhoga*, in union; each is further divided into thirty-two divisions, reflected in the performances of the Rasalilas and Sankirtana. Manipuri gurus have created fascinating varieties of their own *tala*, or time measures, enriching the music for dance. The singing is typical, with women singing in very



Manipuri Dance Form. The ritualistic dance of Manipuri describes a primitive cosmology: the creation of the world, of the human body, and of human activities. Its style is imbued with delicate lyricism and fluid grace, as the movements are rounded, circular, and flowing. ROGER WOOD/CORIBIS.

high pitch in *nupi bashak*, competitions by two groups of women. Original compositions of the Vaishnavite poets of the medieval period like Chandidas, Vidyapati, and Jayadeva and their translations in the Meitei language are also used while performing expressive pieces.

Manipuri is essentially a group dance, but special solo numbers are also found in the Rasalilas. Natasankirtana is performed before the Rasalilas. Basantarasa, Kunjarasa, Maharasa, and Nityarasa are various Rasalilas performed on different and specific festive occasions. Attired in gossamer veils and mirrored skirts and decked with ornaments, the milkmaids (*gopis*) and Krishna create a great spectacle of beauty. Pung *choloms*, the playing on drums by male dancers while dancing with acrobatic feats, and Karatala *cholms*, playing with large cymbals by men, form a part of the repertoire. Women also dance, playing with small cymbals. The variety of Manipuri dances is manifold.

Manipuri continues to be performed in the temple courtyards and the *mandapas*, the special spaces for the Rasalilas and Natasankirtan. It is also being performed in the metropolitan centers, retaining its inherent religious, devotional character while meeting the demands of the theater. Many gurus continue to create new choreographic works, solo numbers within the traditional framework, whereas some have ventured into new works with a shift in

theme. Chaotombi Singh has choreographed Kaibul Lamjao about a vanishing species of deer in Manipur. Priti Patel uses Thang-ta, a martial art, along with traditional techniques of Manipuri dance to create a new kinetic language in her choreographic works. Disciples of Guru Amobi Singh, Mahabir, Jamuna Devi, Ojha Babu Singh, Rajkumar Singhjit Singh, his wife Charu Sija, Priya Gopal Sana, Guru Bipinsingh's wife Kalavati Devi, his daughter Bimbavati, his disciples the Jhaveri sisters, and Priti Patel are all well-known exponents of the art of Manipuri dance.

Sunil Kothari

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Doshi, Saryu, ed. *Dances of Manipur: The Classical Tradition*. Mumbai: Marg Publications, 1989.

Vatsyayan, Kapila. *Indian Classical Dance*. New Delhi: Publications Division, 1974.

Venkataraman, Leela, and Avinash Pasricha. *Indian Classical Dance: Traditions in Transition*. New Delhi: Roli Books, 2002.

MOHINI ATTAM

Mohini Attam, which literally means “dance of the enchantress,” is a solo dance form of Kerala, performed only by female dancers. In Tamil Nadu *dēvadāsīs* (servants of the gods) performed in the temples, but in Kerala women dancers were attached only to Suchindram and Tripunithura temples. References are found in a Nedumpara Tali inscription, dated A.D. 934, to Tali Nangyars performing solo dances. Literary references are found in Manipravala *kavyas* (poems) about dancers. Kunjan Nambiar mentions Mohini Attam in his *Ghoshyatra*. Mattancheri palace and Padmanabhapuram murals suggest the popularity of the Mohini myth, and manuals like *Balaramabharata* deal with the *bastas*, the hand gestures used in Mohini Attam dance. The influence of Dasiattam, the precursor of contemporary Bharata Natyam, on the existing female dance forms in Kerala is clear. By the nineteenth century in the court of the poet-king Swati Tirunal, two dance gurus, brothers Sivanandam and Vadivelu, received royal patronage, and they contributed to the shaping of Mohini Attam on lines similar to solo Bharata Natyam.

Kerala's lovely landscape, lined with swaying coconut fronds, with boats bobbing on its rippling lagoon waters, is reflected in the gentle movement patterns of Mohini Attam dance. The smooth circular movement of the torso forms the central motif. Movement starts at the center of the body and travels to the periphery. Along with the swaying torso, the waist, shoulders, elbows, and wrists move with flexibility and precision. *Nritta* (pure dance) and *nritya* (expressional dance) are both part of

Mohini Attam, and the *Nāṭya Shāstra* principles of *rasa* theory, or aesthetics, govern Mohini Attam.

Formerly, a Mohini Attam recital began with *cholkettu*, a number of pure dances interspersed with expressional poems and the rendering of mnemonics. With the recent revival of Mohini Attam, native classical Sopana music of Kerala has been introduced, and Ganapati prayers are added, as well as the poems of Swati Tirunal and Iriyamana Tampi and songs from the Gita Govinda. Elegant white costumes with gold borders and ornaments enrich the dance.

When the poet Vallathol established Kerala's Kala Mandalam in 1936, primarily for training students in Kathakali, he also rescued Mohini Attam by institutionalizing its training. Exponents like Kalyani, Madhavi, and Krishna Panicker were asked to teach there. Devotional *bhakti* fervor permeates most of the songs used in modern performances of Mohini Attam by such popular artists as Shatna Rao, Satyabhama, Kshemavathy, and Sugandhi. Kanak Rele and Bharati Shivaji have reconstructed this dance form using a scientific approach, choreographing new numbers and enhancing its popularity.

Sunil Kothari

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Rele, Kanak. *Mohini Attam: The Lyrical Dance*. Mumbai: Nalanda Dance Research Center, 1992.
- Shivaji, Bharati. *The Art of Mohiniyattam*. New Delhi: Lancer International, 1986.
- Venu, G., and Nirmala Panikar. *Mohiniyattam: The Lasya Dance*. Irinjalakuda, Kerala, 1983.

ODISSI

In the *Nāṭyashāstra* (2nd century B.C.–2nd century A.D.), the early phase of development of Odissi dance is called *Odra-nritya*. Sculptural evidence dating to the first century B.C. from the Ranigumpha cave of Orissa's Udaygiri hills shows a dancer performing with musicians before a royal couple. Odissi dance was nurtured both in Hindu temples and at the royal court. Innumerable Orissa temples, built over several centuries and adorned with prolific dance sculptures, serve as a veritable lexicon of dance, culminating in the thirteenth-century Konarak temple with its *natamandapa*, or dance hall—which suggests that a vital tradition of Odissi dance was then flourishing. Inscriptional evidence from the eleventh-century Brahmeswra temple in Orissa mentions the dedication of dancing maidens, *dēvadāsīs* (slaves of God), called *maharis* in Orissa at that time. The Anantavasudev temple of the thirteenth century also points to the practice of dedicating *maharis* to Hindu temples.



Odissi, a Classical South Indian Dance. Odissi has a striking sculptural quality. Its precise dance positions may be observed in the carvings of ancient temples in southern India. LINDSAY HEBBERD/CORBIS.

Odissi dance was performed only for the gods in the inner sanctum sanctorum at the Jagannath temple in Puri. Outside the temple, *gotipua* dancers, boys dressed as girls, later danced on festive occasions like Chandan Jatra and Jhulan Jatra. Thus Odissi has evolved as a dance form nurtured in Hindu temples by the *maharis*, in royal courts by the court dancers, and outside the temples for public enjoyment as well.

The fifteenth-century text *Abhinaya Chandrika* by Maheswar Mahapatra set forth the characteristics of Odissi dance, following the tenets of the *Nāṭya Shāstra* governing dance: *nritya* (pure dance), *nritya* (expressive dance), and *natya* (drama). Odissi dance has a striking sculptural quality. It appears much like mobile sculpture. Its basic stance is called *chauka* (the square position); other positions are the *abhangā* (two body twists), the *tribhanga* (three body twists), and the *atibhanga* (many body twists). These positions impart a sculptural quality.

beauty to Odissi dance. *Gotipua* dancers also performed *bandha nritya* (acrobatic feats).

Odissi had declined under British rule, and because of its disreputable social status, girls from good families were not allowed to study the dance. After Indian independence, however, Odissi was revived by its gurus, the most prominent of whom were Pankaj Charan Das, Kelucharan Mahapatra, and Deba Prasad Das. They worked out a repertoire of *bhumi pranam*, *batu*, *pallavi*, *abhinaya*, and *moksha*, incorporating pure dance in the first three numbers, expressive dance in *abhinaya* numbers, and using Oriya songs by modern poets and poems from the *Gita Govinda*. *Moksha* (release) is the finale, with pure dance movements and a Sanskrit poetic prayer.

Sanjukta Panigrahi, Priyambada Mohanty, Kumkum Mohanty, Minati Mishra, and Sonal Mansingh are well-known exponents of Odissi dance.

Sunil Kothari

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Kothari, Sunil, and Avinash Pasricha. *Odissi: Indian Classical Dance Art*. Mumbai: Marg Publications, 1980.
- Natyashastra*. Part 1. Gaekwad Oriental series. Baroda: Oriental Institute, 1956.
- Pattanaik, Dhirendranath. *Odissi Dance*. Bhubaneswar: Orissa Sangeet Natak Akademi, 1970.

DAS, CHITTA RANJAN (1870–1925), Indian nationalist leader. Popularly known as Deshabandhu (Friend of the Land), Chitta Ranjan (C. R.) Das emerged in the early decades of the twentieth century as a prominent moderate nationalist leader. One of the high-profile barristers at the Calcutta High Court, C. R. Das achieved instant fame and name recognition throughout Bengal for successfully defending Aurobindo Ghose (Sri Aurobindo), who was charged with sedition. The Ghose case not only greatly boosted Das's reputation as a trial lawyer, it also inducted him into the public arena and nationalist politics. By the time he passed away in 1925, Das and Motilal Nehru were the two leading "moderates" among the increasingly extreme and cacophonous voices of the Indian nationalist movement.

Das was born in Kolkata in 1870 to an upper middle class Brahmo (reformed Hindu) family. Originally from Bikrampur in the Munshiganj district of Bangladesh, Bhuban Mohan Das, C. R. Das's father, was a solicitor at the Calcutta High Court. Educated at the London Missionary Society School in South Calcutta, C. R. Das passed the entrance examinations in 1885, and graduated from Presidency College in 1890. Thereafter, he went to England to join the Inner Temple and was called to the



C. R. Das. A lawyer catapulted into the struggle for Indian independence, Das became a leading figure in Bengal and initiated the nationalists' ban on European-style clothing. He set an example by burning his own British-made suits and donning traditional "desi" or Khadi clothes. K. L. KAMAT/KAMAT'S POTPOURRI.

Bar in 1894. He returned to Kolkata and started practicing law as a barrister at the Calcutta High Court. His reputation soared as a professional and as a nationalist politician in the aftermath of the *swadeshi* movement in Bengal (the first major phase of a militant nationalist movement protesting against the British authorities' decision in 1905 to divide the province of Bengal in two parts—one with a Muslim majority, the other Hindu); he proved a staunch and successful defender of *swadeshi* activists imprisoned by the British.

Das joined forces with Surendranath Banerjea and Bipin Chandra Pal in opposing the partition of Bengal. After the partition plan was abandoned in 1911, Das appeared not to be politically active, except for presiding over the Bengal Provincial Conference in 1917, until 1921. In that year, he promptly responded to Mahatma Gandhi's call for noncooperation with the government. He took an active part in the boycott of the visit of the prince of Wales to Kolkata in 1921. However, he opposed, even condemned, Gandhi's move to withdraw the noncooperation movement following the outbreak of violence in the country. He called it a "serious mistake."

He opposed the Congress Party's policy decision to boycott the legislative councils. Instead, he proposed in his Council Entry Program to seek noncooperation from within the councils. He resigned from his position as president of the Congress Party in 1922 as his voice and vote did not appear to count. He joined Motilal Nehru, Hakim Azmal, and the Ali brothers (Muhammad and Shaukat) to form the Swarajya Party. As a leader of the new party, he devoted his energies to bringing about Hindu-Muslim amity and unity. He and the Swarajya Party offered to give Hindu-Muslim collaboration a concrete shape with an agreement, signed by leaders of the two communities in Bengal, which became known as the Bengal Pact. However, the Congress Party rejected it, as did some of the senior Hindu Bengali leaders, including Surendranath Banerjea and Bipin Chandra Pal.

During his last years, Das served as the mayor of Kolkata. His death at age fifty-five was mourned by crowds of Hindus and Muslims. It was indeed a blow to the potential of Hindu-Muslim unity in Bengal. He is fondly remembered to this day in Bangladesh and India's West Bengal for his anticolonial and nonsectarian beliefs and policies, and for the personal sacrifice he made for the great cause in which he fervently believed. Known for his lavish sartorial style (he had the reputation of getting his suits tailored and laundered in Paris) and high living, he renounced that lifestyle in 1921 in favor of simple *swadeshi* comportment and living.

Dilip K. Basu

See also **Aurobindo, Sri; Banerjea, Surendranath N.; Congress Party; Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.; Nehru, Motilal**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Broomfield, J. H. *Elite Conflict in a Plural Society*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968.
Gordon, Leonard A. *Bengal: The Nationalist Movement*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1974.

DEBT MARKETS Roughly 90 percent of the Indian fixed income market is made up of bonds issued by the government of India (GOI). The GOI bond market capitalization grew sharply from 1 trillion rupees in 1995 to 11 trillion rupees in 2004. In part, this reflects India's fiscal problem, in which the fiscal deficit grew from 0.48 trillion rupees in 1995 to 1.30 trillion rupees in 2004. Both government and corporate bonds are held and traded locally. There are no GOI bonds that trade in international markets. Indian firms do raise money in international markets, but these are typically held to maturity or are traded in very illiquid markets.

The maturity of GOI bonds ranges from three months to fifteen years. Bonds with maturity greater than a year are issued with a fixed coupon, which is set to roughly obtain a par bond (a price of Rs. 100) at the date of issuance. There are practically no zero-coupon, indexed, or floating rate bonds. While the short-maturity bonds are more or less issued on a calendar fixed at the start of the year, longer-term bonds have no such schedule. New issues tend to create new kinds of bonds: there is little effort to consolidate the liquidity into a smaller set of bonds. On average, there tend to be between 140 and 170 bonds that are available in the GOI bond market. The market is concentrated among five kinds of finance companies: banks, insurance companies, pension and mutual funds, and (as an intermediary) primary dealers. Strong entry barriers exist, which have prevented wider market access.

Bond trading takes place through the telephone. It is an over the counter market with trades negotiated directly between two finance companies or intermediated by a broker. There is no pretrade transparency. Reliable information about the day's trades becomes available only by the end of the day. Roughly half of the trades, particularly those that involve brokers, are reported on the NSE WDM (the Wholesale Debt Market of the National Stock Exchange). Irrespective of whether a trade is reported on WDM, it is transmitted into the systems for clearing and settlement through the Negotiated Dealing System (NDS), which is a computer front-end screen linked to a computer network, run by the Reserve Bank of India.

Most (though not all) trades flow through NDS to the Clearing Corporation of India Limited (CCIL), which was established in 1999 to remove counterparty default risks for GOI trades. CCIL becomes the legal counterparty to both legs of all trades, removing risk and externalities associated with default by one counterparty. This is unusual by world standards, since netting by novation is typically a feature of exchanges and is not found in an over-the-counter market. CCIL has enabled multilateral netting in the settlement of trades, meaning that the multiple fund or securities obligations of a single entity (to pay or receive) are aggregated into a single net obligation. Prior to the creation of CCIL, the bond settlement process was much less reliable.

One significant development has been the emergence of exchange-traded collateralized borrowing and lending obligation (CBLO) contracts at CCIL, similar to funds borrowing backed by securities, or a repurchase agreement (repo), with maturities from a day to a year. However, unlike the repo, which is traded on an over-the-counter market, the CBLO is traded on a limit order book exchange and has had a volume of 25 billion rupees in a very short period. This is India's first accomplishment in

terms of opening up market access, and having a more transparent trading framework.

The turnover ratio, defined as trading volume over a year divided by market capitalization, went up sharply from 8 percent in March 1995 to 192 percent in 2002. Bond market liquidity lacks resilience; when bond prices decrease, liquidity tends to evaporate. The turnover ratio dropped to 152 percent in March 2004, and dropped further in the first half of 2004–2005. Trading was fragmented due to the large number of bonds with heterogeneous maturity and coupons. As a consequence, liquidity tends to be concentrated in a certain maturity of bonds at a given time.

A major driver of the liquidity in the corporate bond market—as well as the GOI bond market—has been the emergence of fixed income mutual funds in the late 1990s. Mutual funds are much more accountable, thanks to daily computation and disclosure of the value of the bond portfolio. In addition, the mutual fund industry has become largely private since the 1990s.

The Indian fixed income markets urgently need instruments to hedge against interest rate volatility. In a market economy, fluctuations of interest rates are innate. At present, there is little flexibility for firms and households to manage this risk. There has been significant growth in the over-the-counter market for interest rate swaps as well as forward rate agreements. Open positions rose from 2.4 trillion rupees in 2003 to 5.2 trillion rupees in 2004. However, this market lacks a modern legal and regulatory framework. There are continued concerns that the contracts on this market are not enforceable under Indian law. There have been attempts to start exchange-traded interest rate futures, but these have been unsuccessful.

The central bank, the Reserve Bank of India (RBI), has a dominant role in defining India's bond market. There is no explicit mandate for this role in the Reserve Bank of India Act of 1934. However, the RBI is the issuer of bonds and debt manager for the government of India. It runs the depository (Securities General Ledger) where GOI bonds are dematerialized and held. Since the RBI is also the regulator of banks, it has an overriding influence on policy questions about the bond market through the use of regulations that prevent banks from moving toward a market design considered unsuitable to the RBI. Therefore, the RBI has become the regulator by default because of all its other roles. Insights into many problems on the bond market can be traced to this institutional framework. The corporate bond market is regulated by the Securities Exchange Board of India, which is the securities market regulator.

Susan Thomas

See also **Capital Market; Money and Foreign Exchange Markets; Mutual Funds, Role of; Securities Exchange Board of India (SEBI); Stock Exchange Markets**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Darbha, G., S. D. Roy, and V. Pawaskar. *Idiosyncratic Factors in Pricing Sovereign Bonds: An Analysis of the Government of India Bond Market*. Technical report, National Stock Exchange of India, Ltd. 3, 2002. Available at <<http://www.nse-india.com>>
- Shah, Ajay. *Improved Methods for Obtaining Information from Dealer Markets*. Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, 2000. Available at <<http://www.igidr.ac.in>>
- Subramani, V. and G. Ananth Narayan. *Derivatives Markets in India 2003*, edited by S. Thomas. New Delhi: Tata McGraw-Hill, 2003.
- Thomas, S., and V. Pawaskar. *Estimating a Yield Curve in an Illiquid Debt Market*. Mumbai: Indira Gandhi Institute of Development Research, 2000.
- Thomas, S., and A. Shah. "Interest Rates and Their Markets." In *India Development Report 2002*, edited by K. Parikh and R. Radhakrishna. New Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

DECCAN. *See* **Maharashtra.**

DECCANI PAINTING Over the centuries, immigrants and traders from East African, Arab, Turkic, Central Asian, and Iranian lands settled on the Deccan plateau along with the indigeneous population. An examination of the relatively small corpus of extant paintings produced in the Muslim courts of the Deccan sultans between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries reveals distinctive styles that often reflected a synthesis of indigenous and foreign artistic influences.

In 1292 'Ala' al-Din Firuz Shah and his forces began the process of wresting control of the region away from the Yadava, Kakatiya, and Hoysala Hindu kings in the name of the Khalji Sultan of Delhi. The first capital of the Deccan sultans was established in 1327 at Daulatabad (in modern Maharashtra) by the Tughluqs (r. 1321–1351), successors to the Khalji Sultans (r. 1290–1321). Only twenty years later, a group of Daulatabad nobles rebelled against Tughluq rule and enthroned 'Ala' al-Din Hasan Bahman Shah (r. 1347–1355), thereby establishing the Bahmanid dynasty (r. 1347–1538), a new line of rulers independent from Delhi. Although the remains of the great fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Bahmanid forts and palaces, such as those at Daulatabad, Gulbarga, and Bidar, display a beautifully designed interplay of stone, wood, and tile mosaic decoration evidencing the creativity of court artisans, there are no extant paintings or manuscripts that can be attributed to the patronage of these Deccan sultans.

During the reign of Sultan Mahmud (r. 1482–1518), the Bahmanid kingdom, weakened by internal and external pressures, split into smaller, independently ruled sultanates. The three most powerful and most significant to the history of Deccan court painting were the Nizām Shahis (r. 1496–1636), who made their capital in the northern Deccan at Ahmadnagar (in modern Maharashtra); the ‘Adil Shahis (r. 1489–1686), ruling from Bijapur (in modern Karnataka); and the Qutb Shahis (r. 1512–1687) at Golconda. Many of the Deccan sultans were great patrons of the arts and maintained artistic workshops and libraries that drew painters, calligraphers, poets, musicians, and scholars from all over the Muslim world. As Shi‘a Muslims, the three sultanates shared a religious affiliation, but their origins differed. The first Nizām Shah had indigenous affiliations, as he was descended from a Hindu slave that had converted to Islam; the founder of the ‘Adil Shahi dynasty was an immigrant who, according to Ottoman sources, was of Turkman origin; and the Qutb Shahis’ founding sultan was a Turkman prince who was forced to flee Iran for political reasons.

Ahmednagar

It was at the Nizām Shahi capital at Ahmednagar that the earliest and perhaps most innovative paintings of the Deccan sultanates were created. These rare works, of which only about twenty survive, indicate that royal portraits predominated as a favorite subject. Perhaps the earliest example of painting at Ahmednagar are twelve illustrations that accompany a manuscript from about 1565, the *Tarīf-i Husayn Shahī* (History of Husayn Shah; Puna, Bharata Itihasa Samshodhaka Mandala), a posthumous history of the reign of Sultan Husayn Nizām Shah I (r. 1554–1556) written by Aftabi. In these early Deccan paintings, the figures, foliage, and architectural features are rendered with a simple but exuberant line that may be related to works produced at Mandu, capital of the Sultans of Malwa (r. 1401–1531, 1534–1561). However, the inclusion of vibrant colors to indicate a profusion of decorative patterning anticipates a later Deccani preference for highly ornamented works. Ghostly silhouettes of a female figure sharing Nizām Shah’s throne included in five of the manuscript illustrations may be abraded images of the sultan’s beloved wife, Queen Khanzada Humayun, who lost favor after her husband’s death, and perhaps represents a rare example within Islamic court art of royal female portraiture.

In the decade following the production of this manuscript, great advances in technical refinement had occurred at the Ahmednagar atelier, as evidenced in three royal portraits from around 1575, possibly painted by the same artist, that exhibit a new interest in naturalistic portraiture. These magnificent works indicate an awareness of artistic developments in the Mughal, Safavid, and perhaps even



Adil Shah Playing Tamboor. Deccani painting of the Tree of Life, a popular motif in Indian culture. With its branches reaching into the sky, and roots deep in the earth, the tree dwells in three worlds—serving as a link between heaven, earth, and the underworld. K. L. KAMAT/KAMAT’S POTPOURRI.

European courts. A fine example of painting from this period includes the *Sultan Murtaza Nizām Shah Enthroned* (Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale), a portrait of Nizām Shah’s son and heir Murtaza I (r. 1565–1588), rendered in minute parallel strokes upon a luminous golden ground. The painting depicts the youthful sultan seated on an elaborately inlaid throne, presenting gold to a courtier. To the sultan’s left is a weapon-bearing attendant fanning him, and a young page who hurries to offer the courtier betel nut, an indication that the audience has concluded.

A small group of exquisite line drawings, rendered with the grace of a Persian master calligrapher’s line, herald the last stage of imperial patronage at Ahmednagar, as in the elegantly rendered *Young Prince Embraced by a Small Girl* (San Diego Museum of Art, Edwin Binney III Collection), from about 1580–1595. Mughal stylistic elements evident in these works may be due to a taste acquired by Murtaza’s brother, Burhan II (r. 1591–1595), who as a prince was in exile at the court of the Mughal emperor Akbar (r. 1556–1605) for attempting to usurp the throne.

Bijapur

The ‘Adil Shahi sultans were great patrons of the arts, and their capital at Bijapur was second only to the Mughal capital at Delhi as a center for artistic creativity.

Among the earliest known Bijapur paintings are those contained in a copy of a Persian manuscript on astronomy titled *Nujum al-‘Ulum* (Stars of science; Dublin, Chester Beatty Library), dated 1570–1571/A.H. 978. Probably created for Sultan ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah I (r. 1557–1579), the subjects are illustrated in an unrefined but highly animated style.

It was under the patronage of Sultan Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah II (r. 1579–1627)—poet, musician, and mystic—that Bijapuri painting came into full flower. During Ibrahim’s rule, elegantly conceived and painted works were created, featuring nobles depicted in languid ease within palatial surroundings, hawking on horseback, or in other princely pursuits set against a foliate dream-landscape. One of four anonymous artists identified as contributing to the small corpus of Bijapur painting was particularly adept at capturing the introspective nature of his patron, as depicted in *Sultan Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah II* (London, British Museum).

A number of illustrations depicting mystics and ascetics were produced for the sultan, including a beautifully conceived portrait titled *Yogini* (Dublin, Chester Beatty Library) painted in the early seventeenth century. Exemplifying the jewel-like works produced during this period, this richly adorned and mysterious *yogini* (female ascetic) stands within a fantastic landscape of deep earth tones juxtaposed with gold-embellished pastel pink, purple, and green. Bijapuri paintings of this period exhibit elements of both indigenous South Asian and contemporary Safavid Persian court painting traditions, evidencing the cosmopolitan nature of Ibrahim ‘Adil Shah’s court, which drew ambassadors, scholars, artists, and musicians from many regions.

By 1600 the Mughals had captured Ahmednagar fort and were preparing to challenge Bijapur and Golconda. Included among the Mughal entourage were Rajput (“sons of kings”) nobles and military commanders from the Hindu princely kingdoms of the western and northern regions of the subcontinent. The Rajputs were also patrons of the arts, and often their artists accompanied them on military campaigns. The influence of Mughal and Rajput artists is apparent in works produced during the reign of Sultan Muhammad ‘Adil Shah (r. 1627–1656), in which the ethereal otherworldliness of earlier paintings has been replaced by a more realistic representation of figures, a placement within naturalistic settings, and the use of a subtle, subdued palette.



Bijapuri Portrait of Yogini (Female Ascetic), c. 1600.

Exemplifying the jewel-like paintings created by this school of artists, the richly adorned and mysterious *yogini* stands within a fantastic landscape. Bijapuri works exhibit the traditions of both indigenous South Asian and contemporary Safavid Persian paintings, evidencing the cosmopolitan nature of Ibrahim Adil Shah’s court. THE TRUSTEES OF THE CHESTER BEATTY LIBRARY, DUBLIN.

Although portraiture continued to be a popular subject, rulers and nobles were now depicted in profile within Mughalized compositions such as formal court ceremonies and parades. In more intimate compositions, they were shown seated or standing, equipped with shield, sword, and dagger—the accoutrements of power—or displaying the sensibilities of a connoisseur by holding a delicate flower. During this time, works often included notations identifying both subject and artist (or artists), influenced no doubt by Mughal artistic tradition, as the portrait *The African Prime Minister Ikbilas Khan and a Page* (San Diego Museum of Art, Edwin Binney III Collection), from the mid-seventeenth century, which contains the inscription “work of Muhammad Khan, son of Miyan Chand.”

Just before Bijapur fell to the Mughals in 1686, under the patronage of ‘Ali ‘Adil Shah II (r. 1656–1672) and Sikandar ‘Adil Shah (r. 1672–1686), there was a revival of

brilliant, fantastically colored paintings. The last extant painting attributable to Bijapur imperial commission is a genealogical painting *Sultans of the 'Adil Shahi Dynasty* (New York, Metropolitan Museum of Art), from about 1680, by the artists Kamal Muhammad and Chand Muhammad. Sultan Yusuf 'Adil Shahi, the dynasty's founder, is shown enthroned between his seven descendants, including Sikandar 'Adil Shah (r. 1672–1686), the last sultan of Bijapur, depicted here as a dark-skinned youth.

Golconda

The Qutb Shahis apparently had a great appreciation for Central Asian and Iranian artistic modes, perhaps influenced by their descent from the Qara Qoyunulu (Black Sheep) Turkman sultans of Anatolia and western Iran. Some of the earliest paintings in Golconda under Qutb Shahi patronage are attributable to the reign of Ibrahim Qutb Shah (r. 1550–1580). Illustrations to a 1569 copy of Hatifi's *Khusrau and Shirin* (Bankipur, Patna, Khuda Bakhsh Library) are of varied quality but betray links to works produced in the late-fifteenth-century Turkman and Timurid artistic centers at Bukhara, Shiraz, and Herat, and to sixteenth-century illustrations produced in the Tabriz and Qazvin ateliers of the Safavids.

The *Kulliyat* (Collected works) of Sultan Muhammad Quli Qutb Shah (r. 1580–1612), from about 1590 (Hyderabad, Salar Jung Museum), is one of the first illustrated manuscripts under imperial patronage at Golconda to combine successfully Indo-Persianate artistic modes. Cluttered compositional schemes, a preference for surface patterning, and the use of thickly applied rich, vivid colors indicate a prototype for future developments in Golconda painting. Sultan Muhammad was an important patron of the arts, and this lavishly painted manuscript of his own Urdu verses may have been commissioned as a personal copy.

Works attributed to the reign of Sultan Abdullah Qutb Shah (r. 1626–1672) exhibit the lively interplay between contemporary Safavid and Mughal artistic influences implemented in the Golconda atelier, where indigenous and foreign artists may have worked side by side. One of the most beautifully rendered paintings from this period is the *Darbar of Sultan Abdullah Qutb Shah as a Youth* (London, British Museum), dated about 1630. The representation of *darbars*, or formal court gatherings, became an important subject for depiction by Mughal artists under Emperor Jahangir (r. 1605–1627). Here, however, their Golconda counterpart has interpreted the theme to suit local tastes. Eschewing the Mughal penchant for realism and psychological insight into subjects, Sultan Abdullah,

his courtiers, and attendants are rendered with idealized features and stare vacantly at the viewer. Although the composition is restrained, the artist has successfully presented the opulence and power of the Qutb Shahi court through the use of bold coloration and the lavish application of gold throughout.

An expanding Mughal military presence in the Deccan led to an increased exposure to Mughal iconographic traditions. Golconda's court painters, however, continued to interpret their works through the lens of Deccani aesthetic preferences. This tendency is evident in a handful of portraits attributed to the reign of Sultan Abdullah, such as the compositionally animated and realistically rendered *Procession of Sultan Abdullah Qutb Shah Riding an Elephant* (St. Petersburg, Saltykov-Shtshedrine State Public Library), dated about 1650.

In a rare portrait of the last Golconda ruler, Abu'l Hasan Qutb Shah (r. 1672–1687), *Sultan Abu'l Hasan Walking in a Garden* (San Diego Museum of Art, Edwin Binney III Collection), from about 1672–1680, the robust sultan is dressed in multiple layers of exquisite garments, enjoying the scent of a flower just plucked from his garden. Although Abu'l Hasan is depicted in profile and is centrally positioned within the composition, conforming to Mughal painterly ideals, he is not a static figure. Indeed, the Golconda artist has conveyed the relaxed and almost sensual demeanor of the sultan with fluid line, embellished by rich coloration and opulent patterning.

In 1687, after an eight-month siege, Abu'l Hasan ceded the Golconda fort to the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb (r. 1657–1707). Mughal control of the region was thereafter centered at Hyderabad (in modern Andhra Pradesh), where Mughal nobles ruled as governors of the Deccan from 1685 to 1724. During this period, it is thought that Deccan artists and works of art made their way to northern courts in the company of Mughal and Rajput nobles returning from the Deccan campaigns. Evidence of Deccan artistic influence can be seen particularly in works of art produced at the Rajasthani ateliers in Bikaner and Kishangarh.

Hyderabad and the Provinces

In 1724 Nizām al-Mulk, the Mughal viceroy of the Deccan at Hyderabad, declared independence from the Mughal emperor at Delhi and took the title of Nizām Asaf Jah I, establishing the Asafiya dynasty (1724–1950). Portraiture continued to be popular at Hyderabad and provincial Deccan centers such as Kurnool, but increasingly courtly themes, featuring idealized ladies of the court, were included in the Deccan artistic repertoires. A

complete set of thirty-six *ragamala* (garland of musical modes) paintings called the "Johnson Ragamala" (London, India Office Library, Johnson Album 36) is considered by some to be the finest and most sophisticated example of Hyderabad painting. Painted sometime in the third quarter of the eighteenth century, the acquisition of this *ragamala* set by Richard Johnson, the British Resident at Hyderabad in 1784 and 1785, heralds a new clientele for artists in the Deccan and other parts of the subcontinent: English, Dutch, and French traders and adventurers.

Rochelle Kessler

See also **Rajput (Rajastani and Hill) Painting;**
Sultanate Painting

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Barrett, Douglas. *Painting of the Deccan*. London: Faber and Faber, 1958.
- . "Some Unpublished Deccan Miniatures." *Lalit Kala* 7 (1960): 9–13.
- . "Painting at Bijapur." In *Paintings from Islamic Lands*, edited by R. Pindar-Wilson. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1969.
- Binney, Edwin, III. *Indian Miniature Painting from the Collection of Edwin Binney III: The Mughal and Deccani Schools with Some Related Sultanate Materials*. Portland, Ore.: Portland Art Museum, 1973.
- Kramrisch, Stella. *A Survey of Painting in the Deccan*. 1937. Reprint, New Delhi: Munshiram Manoharlal, 1983.
- Leach, Linda L. *Mughal and Other Indian Paintings from the Chester Beatty Library*, vol. II. London: Scorpion Cavendish, 1995.
- Michell, George, ed. *Islamic Heritage of the Deccan*. Bombay: Marg, 1986.
- Michell, George, and Mark Zebrowski. *Architecture and Art of the Deccan Sultanates*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Mittal, Jagdish. "Paintings of the Hyderabad School." *Marg* 16, no. 2 (1963): 43–56.
- Welch, Stuart C. "Mughal and Deccani Paintings from a Private Collection," *Ars Orientalis* 5 (1963): 221–233.
- Zebrowski, Mark. *Deccani Painting*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.

DELHI SULTANATE. *See* **Islam's Impact on India.**

DEMOCRACY. *See* **Political System.**

DEMOGRAPHIC TRENDS SINCE 1757 The Indian subcontinent is the seat of one of the world's oldest agrarian civilizations, and has long sustained a sizable population. Before the explosive growth of the European population in the 1800s, only China exceeded India in

size and density of population. The period of almost continuous warfare that accompanied the establishment of the British Empire in India between 1756 and 1818 seriously affected the population in almost every major region of India. Thus the baseline population in 1757 was probably about 180 million for the subcontinent as a whole.

On the basis of scattered observations and anecdotal records, it seems that this population—like most pre-modern ones—was characterized by early marriage, relatively high fertility, and (by today's standards) high mortality, quite like what was found in the subcontinent the mid-nineteenth century. Some mortality was intentional, especially through the neglect or outright infanticide of female babies in North India. Nonetheless, sources suggest that the population generally maintained an overall excess of births over deaths. There is evidence of a steady trickle of immigration over both land and sea frontiers. Emigration was limited, though all the European powers exported slaves (it is likely, however, that larger numbers were imported from Africa by both European and other merchants). Overall, migration was not of great significance for the large Indian population. Internal migration however, was important since labor was still scarce relative to land. Rulers and landlords sought tenants and taxpayers, and emigration was the major strategy by which merchants, artisans and peasants could resist political and economic oppression. It was also a way to reduce, if not eliminate, the consequences of crop failures. (Climatologists observe that the monsoon is much more uncertain in the arid zones of the subcontinent.) In addition, extensive transregional networks of trade and credit also mitigated the effect of regional crop failures. Still these would certainly cause terrible hardship for many, and significantly increase mortality, especially among the young and the old.

Heavy mortality occurred when political conflict prevented these mitigating mechanisms from operating. So the western peninsula saw a devastating famine in 1702–1703 because the monsoon failed in the twentieth year of a protracted war between the Marathas and the Mughal empire. Manucci, an eyewitness, thought that 2 million people perished. In 1769–1770, the predatory maladministration of the English East India Company in eastern India helped convert a regional crop failure into a serious famine in which 8 million to 10 million people, or over a quarter of the population of Bengal, died. Between 1780 and 1783, British wars with the Marathas in northern and central India, and with Mysore in the south, contributed to catastrophic famines that left hundreds of ruined and deserted villages in the affected regions. Internecine warfare among the Marathas culminating into war with



An Indian official described the aftermath of the 1783 famine in North India:

wilderness covered with grass. . . . Such is the state of the territory! The local administration was already oppressive—on top of that came the failure of the rains and the peasants died en masse, so that entire villages were left uninhabited. Entire households of ten to twenty persons all died! No one remained to dispose of the corpses! Heaps of bones lay in the houses! This is the condition of the country from the Chambal river to the borders of Kashmir and Lahore in the west; in the east up to Lucknow or perhaps even beyond. Many people have perished. The survivors are those who abandoned their homes early and emigrated to other provinces. Many went to the east; lakhs moved south. They came past the encampment at Gwalior—bands of thousands came, one after the other. But Marwar was in the same state; so the bands of refugees travelled on through Malwa, Nemar, Burhanpur.

(cited in Guha, p. 36)

the British led to widespread depopulation in south-western India from 1801 to 1803.

Establishment of the Colonial Demographic Regime

The gradual establishment of British rule led to a significant improvement in population statistics. The statecraft of the era was anxious to promote population growth: Sir James Mackintosh, a leading scholar-official, proposed in 1804 that the comparative success or failure of governments worldwide might be measured by the reproductive success of the populations they ruled. The British colonial government moved beyond the established Indian practice of enumerating only households, rather than individuals, and for the first time began population counts ordered by approximate age and sex—basic inputs for demographic analysis. These sources allow us to estimate a population of 161 million in 1800, down from a probable 180 million in 1757. Recovery from this nadir was generally swift, and by 1860 the aggregate population of India had reached 250 million, despite the occurrence of at least one serious crop failure in every region, except the humid central and eastern Gangetic Plain. From 1868 to 1872 the British government coordinated population counts on a relatively uniform standard throughout British-administered India, and in 1881 a simultaneous enumeration covered the subordinate (princely) states as well. Thus began the series of decennial censuses that have been conducted in India to the present. Statistically speaking, we now enter the modern era, but the populations counted would not

derive the benefits associated with modernity for decades to come.

The Demography of the Colonial Era, 1860–1947

The impressive administrative achievement of enumerating hundreds of millions of highly diverse people, spread over thousands of miles, was but one aspect of an energetic drive to remake colonial India. It was also exemplified by the construction of a network of railroads and the revival and development of irrigation works on many major rivers. Yet, paradoxically, this period saw severe demographic catastrophes, and life expectancy at birth hovered around twenty-four years until 1901 and then fell in the next two decades, reaching the lowest ever recorded in 1911–1921, when crop failures, inflation, and the worldwide influenza pandemic struck in the same decade (see Table 1). The population increased by only 20 percent in fifty years, or about 0.35 percent a year. Only after 1921 did growth speed up to approximately 1.0 percent and then 1.4 percent per annum. As far as we can tell, growth was determined by variations in the death rate, since there is no evidence that marriage or birth rates changed significantly. Thus the decades of colonial modernization up to 1921 were marked by increases in death rates. This paradox may be understood in terms of three effects:

Global transport networks now ensured the rapid spread of epidemics, like the bubonic plague and influenza, that would earlier have burned themselves out in isolated locales;



COLONIAL FAMINE: A VICTIM'S ACCOUNT

(Ramabai was raised in a formerly affluent Brahman family. In the famine of 1874 she was forced to beg food for her mother after her father had died of starvation.)

The lady spoke kindly to me but I could on no account open my mouth to open my mouth to beg for that piece of *bajree* (millet) bread. . . . With superhuman effort I kept the tears back, but the expression on my face told its own story. The kind Brahman lady, guessing what was on my mind, asked me if I would like to have some food, so I said "Yes, I want only a little piece of *bajree* bread." She gave me what I wanted, and I felt very grateful, but could not say a word to express my gratitude. I ran to my mother in great haste and gave it to her. But she could not eat, she was too weak.

(Kosambi, p. 252)

In 1896, Ramabai was herself attempting to relieve famine victims in Central India:

The first [British Government] Poor House we saw was no house at all. It was a grove in the outskirts of the town. Groups of famished people were seen sitting or lying in ashes on dirty ground. Some had rags to cover their bodies, and some had none. There were old and young men, and women and children, most of them ill, too weak to move about, and many suffering from leprosy and other horrible diseases. . . . They slept in the open air or under the trees at night, and ate the scanty and coarse food provided by the Government. The food was nothing but dry flour and some salt. There were several starving orphan children who could not cook for themselves, and had no one to work for them. So they had either to eat the dry flour or depend upon the tender mercies of their fellow sufferers, the older persons, who took as much of their food as they could. . . . Parents can be seen taking their girl children around the country and selling them for a rupee or a few annas, or even for a few seers of grain.

(Kosambi, p. 254)

The same transport networks efficiently distributed food in response to prices, but the famine-affected poor lacked the purchasing power to buy it (resulting from what Amartya Sen has termed "entitlement failure");

The new irrigation works often resulted in waterlogging, which increased the incidence of malaria, a major killer of infants and children.

These impacts were mitigated, but not nullified, by a colonial government that ultimately considered balancing its budget more important than preventing famine. If so, why did the population increase through the interwar decades? First, these two decades escaped widespread crop failures. Furthermore, elected politicians and the press had more authority as power gradually "devolved" into Indian hands, which may have led to the more liberal disbursement of relief in areas where the scarcities

occurred; and finally, India benefited from the global recession of bubonic plague and lethal influenza. Thus the death rate fell significantly below the birthrate for the first time since the 1880s, and the population grew by 27 percent in twenty years. But the country was not secure against famine: renewed warfare and a downturn in the weather cycle again brought famine to Bengal, which had escaped it since 1770. Amartya Sen (1981) has emphasized the importance of political processes in preventing famine, and these now conspired to intensify it. The Indian National Congress had opposed the war, and its leaders were out of office and in jail. The leaders of the Muslim League and the Hindu Mahasabha alternately allied and feuded over office, while a succession of colonial governors were more concerned with repressing the nationalists and supplying Allied forces reeling from the Japanese onslaught than with feeding the rural poor. So food scarcities and associated epidemics resulted in at

TABLE 1

Population of India statistical summary, 1880–1950						
Period	Life expectancy		Deaths	Annual rates per thousand		
	Male	Female		Births	GRR	NRR
1881–1890	24.6	25.5	41.3	48.9	—	—
1891–1900	23.6	24.0	44.4	45.8	2.99	1.09
1901–1910	22.6	23.3	42.6	49.2	3.14	1.06
1911–1920	19.4	20.9	48.6	48.1	2.83	1.03
1921–1930	26.9	26.6	36.3	46.4	2.99	1.25
1931–1940	32.1	31.4	31.2	45.2	2.76	1.30
1941–1950	32.5	31.7	27.4	39.9	—	—

Notes: Births and deaths per thousand of the mid-year population are referred to as the crude birth and death rates, respectively, because they are heavily influenced by the age-structure of the population—an older population will have more deaths and less births than a younger one with identical conditions and behavior. The gross and net reproduction rates (GRR and NRR) measure the likelihood that, under the prevalent conditions, a woman of childbearing age will bear girls to replace herself and continue the population. The gross rate ignores the likelihood of interruption by premature death; the net rate takes that into account and is a better measure of trend population increase.

SOURCE: Adapted from Davis, Kingsley, *The Population of India and Pakistan*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951, Tables 36 and 87; Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP), *Population of India*. New York: United Nations, 1982, Tables 49 and 89.

least 2 million deaths in the Bengal famine that rang out the colonial era.

Population Policies and Impacts

While there is little doubt that the establishment of colonial rule brought enormous socioeconomic changes, few colonial policies directly targeted major demographic variables. In the nineteenth century, population growth was often viewed benignly and was cited as evidence of British beneficence. So, for example, Walter Hamilton, publicist for the East India Company, could write of Bengal: “It is pleasing to view the cheerful bustle and crowded population by land and water . . . evincing a sense of security, and appearance of happiness, seen in no part of India beyond the Company’s territories” (*Report on the Population Estimates of India (1820–1830)*, 1965, p. xii).

On the other hand, the enormous population could always be invoked to unburden the government of responsibility for anything negative, from famine to soil erosion. Perhaps the only demographic initiative taken in the nineteenth century was the effort to suppress female infanticide. This practice was widespread among some communities of northern and western India; it is probable that state penal measures led to the substitution of neglect for outright infanticide. Northwestern India and Pakistan are still characterized by heavily skewed sex ratios. Other than that, the 1892 law that raised the age

of consent to twelve years could hardly have had measurable demographic impact; the 1929 legislation that raised the marriage age to sixteen for women went unenforced.

Most medical interventions before the 1920s were focused on the health of colonial personnel and the new urban environment; interventions for the benefit of rural Indians began only between the two world wars. The joint impact of ignorance and parsimony limited their effects. At best, in the absence of state intervention, the unplanned growth of the early colonial cities would probably have led to large increases in urban mortality. As late as 1941, however, only 4.2 percent of the population lived in cities with over 100,000 people. Perhaps the most important development was the creation of a basic structure for medical education, the beginnings of a hospital network in the cities and of health centers in rural India. World War II also saw the beginnings of a food rationing system in the cities. These were the early measures that a more activist and less parsimonious Indian government would later build on.

India, 1947–2002

The successor states created by withdrawal of the British in 1947 had to mobilize swiftly to cope with the catastrophic population displacement that accompanied the partition of British India. A recent study calculates that between 1947 and 1950, 6 million to 7 million Muslims left India, and 4.7 million non-Muslims entered from West Pakistan and 2.5 million from East Pakistan. Hundreds of thousands perished in the violence that generated this flight and from their sufferings on the way. The flow from East Pakistan continued for several decades.

Demographically, the new Indian republic was more urban and industrial than undivided India had been, but it had lost its only reliable food surplus region (West Punjab). For the next two decades, India was to live precariously “from ship to mouth.” The leaders of the new republic had long been critical of the stock British explanation of Indian problems as resulting from its population. Jawaharlal Nehru commented caustically in 1940: “And what they propose to do about this population I do not know, for in spite of a great deal of help received from famines, epidemics and a high death rate generally the population is still overwhelming.” He did not oppose the spread of voluntary contraception, but added that “[e]ven in India, the food supply has increased and can increase more than proportionately to the population.” (*Toward Freedom*, p. 283) Mahatma Gandhi was firmly opposed to contraception; confronted by Margaret Sanger in 1935, he would go no further than the “safe period” method. He said, “Why should people not be taught that it is immoral to have more than three or four children and that after they have had that number they

should sleep separately?" (Green, ed., *Gandhi in His Own Words*, pp. 233–235).

The directive principles of the new Constitution enjoined the state to improve the health and nutrition of its people. This injunction came at a time when cheap and effective public health technologies were becoming available; in the Indian context, the most dramatic was the insecticide DDT, which in its early years left surfaces lethal for mosquitoes for several weeks after spraying, and which had the collateral benefit of destroying plague fleas, flies, and other insects. A dramatic drop in malarial infections occurred during the 1950s. There were also great strides in the production and availability of the newly developed synthetic antimalarials and antibiotics. Access to older techniques such as vaccination jumped dramatically. (Smallpox was eradicated in 1975.) The health system grew considerably with over 3 percent of the outlay under the First and Second Five-Year Plans being allocated to it. Finally, the "ship-to-mouth" process was managed competently enough to avert famines, though chronic malnutrition remained common. In conformity with Nehru's prewar outlook, some government clinics began offering family planning services, and contraceptives were distributed free or were subsidized for low-income groups.

Life expectancy increased sharply from age thirty-two in the years 1931 to 1951 to age forty-four in 1960. The Planning Commission underestimated its own success in this sector, complacently assuming that the population would grow at 1.2 percent annually, even slower than in the 1930s. The 1961 census, however, found an increase of 78 million, a growth rate of 2 percent, with only 0.1 percent (the excess enumeration over natural increase) being net immigration, such as refugees from East Pakistan and "repatriated" Tamils from Sri Lanka. Not surprisingly, the Third Plan perspective declared that the "objective of stabilising the growth of population over a reasonable period must therefore be at the very centre of planned development." The planners now realized that mortality would continue to decrease and so policy had to be directed to reducing fertility. The 1960s saw further efforts in this direction, with wider outreach for family planning. The emphasis was on intrauterine devices and sterilization as contraceptive methods; the commercial distribution of condoms was introduced in 1968. The population grew even faster than in the 1950s: a birthrate of 41.1 and death rate of 18.9, yielding an annual natural increase of 22.2 per thousand. Legislation passed in 1972 lowered the legal obstacles to abortion. The Fifth Plan (1969–1974) aimed to reduce the birthrate to 30 by 1979 and 25 by 1984 by propagating a range of barrier and terminal methods of contraception. In 1975, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi,

beset by legal, economic, and political problems, established a semidictatorial regime ("the National Emergency"). In an interesting revival of colonial rhetoric, most problems were now attributed to the undisciplined nature and feckless reproduction of the Indian people. Coercion was liberally deployed to correct both, and—especially in North India—to achieve arbitrary sterilization targets. The targets were inaccurately reported as achieved and overachieved (by 8.3 million). But Gandhi's regime dramatically lost the national election of 1977, and its successor immediately declared that "family planning" was to be entirely voluntary. Presciently, the new government also introduced a new emphasis on maternal health, immunization, and the improvement of women's education. But the 1981 census enumerated 684 million people, an increase of 24.8 percent since 1971; in 1991 the total was 846 million (+23%); and in 2001, 1,027 million (+21.9%). Life expectancy at birth mirrored these improvements, reaching sixty-three years for men and sixty-four for women in 2002, twice the 1931–1951 level but still a decade below China and Sri Lanka.

In the gloomy stock-taking that followed the 1981 census, a few bright spots emerged: certain parts of the country had achieved dramatic reductions in fertility and mortality, and were within striking distance of zero growth. The most famous (and now, much-cited example) was the southern state of Kerala. Gandhi had been fond of saying that development was the best contraceptive; yet this state had gained little from the large industrial projects of the Nehru-Gandhi era, and its income was below the national average. Kerala's high level of literacy and quality of general public services were soon invoked as the explanation. Even though the Constitution of 1950 had directed the state to provide free and compulsory education up to the age of fourteen, only 55 percent of men and 26 percent of women over that age were literate nationwide in 1981. In Kerala, however, the percentages were 86 and 71. Even as demographers were studying fertility trends, advocates for women's rights pointed out that:

[t]he right of women to decide freely on the number and spacing of her [sic] children and to have access to the information and means to enable them to exercise that right has a decisive impact on their ability to take advantage of educational and employment opportunities and to participate fully in community life as responsible citizens. (*Objectives of International Women's Year*, cited in ESCAP, p. 359)

A major national survey in 1992–1993 found that total fertility rates varied inversely with educational attainment,

ranging from a fertility rate of 4.03 for women who were illiterate to 2.15 for women who had completed high school.

More sophisticated analyses by Jean Drèze and Sen have confirmed this effect at both the state and district level across the entire country. Declines in fertility continued as the national female literacy rate inched up. Thus, in the 2001 census, 76 percent of men and 54 percent of women were returned as literate, and the overall population increase had slowed to well below the 1961–1991 rate. The 2001 census found that the target of bringing the crude birthrate to 25, set for 1984, was almost achieved (25.4). Of course, the enormous cohorts born between 1961 and 1981 were still in their childbearing years, and this masked the true extent of the decline in fertility. Encouragingly, the Kerala pattern seemed to be spreading, and in 2001 no less than 11 out of 20 major states had annual rates of natural increase (CBR-CDR) below 15, with Kerala and Tamil Nadu close to each other at 10.6 and 11.4.

On the other hand, the four northern states with the worst social and educational indicators (Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan, and Uttar Pradesh) had rates of increase exceeding 20. These kept the national rate from falling below 17, a rate at which the population would still double in forty-one years. The only hopeful sign is that the rate of natural increase in 2001 was significantly lower than the average increase through the previous decade in these states; since out-migration predominates in them, immigration cannot explain the difference. This signals that fertility is beginning to fall even in these regions. There is evidence that given even minimal support, women would seek to limit their fertility. In 1992–1993 no less than 30.1 percent of women not using contraception in Uttar Pradesh desired to either postpone or prevent pregnancy, but only 17.7 percent planned to use contraceptives. Presumably the remainder were too powerless to make that decision. But by 1998–1999, 53.8 percent of those unprotected in Uttar Pradesh intended to resort to contraception in the future; 22.9 percent planned to do so within the next year. In the country as a whole, 58.8 percent of women planned to use contraception in the short or longer term. Obviously the fulfillment of such intentions depends on the ability of the administration—and the nongovernmental organizations active in the field—to deliver access to usable methods to millions of rural women who cannot travel far from their homes. In addition, it is likely in many cases to depend on protecting women from violence within the household. Both aspects are illustrated in the following anecdote from a woman journalist.

When a team of researchers visited a village in Uttar Pradesh to ascertain its health needs, several women walked up to inquire shyly whether contraceptive pills were being distributed. For many of these women, asking their husbands to get contraceptive pills meant inviting violence. (Jain)

Thus, successful trials of weekly- and daily-dosage oral contraceptives open the door to the adoption of contraception by women too powerless to use other methods. Overall, therefore, the long-awaited demographic transition in India seems finally to be setting in, but it is likely that the population will stabilize only after outstripping that of China in the middle of the twenty-first century. Still, as the experience of several countries has shown, effective improvements in governance and infrastructure can immensely accelerate such transitions to a low-fertility, low-mortality pattern. As of 2002, the total fertility rate had dropped to 3.1, down from 3.7 in 1992.

A disquieting feature of the Indian transition has been the markedly unequal distribution of its gains between the sexes. The sex ratio (women/men x 1,000) declined steadily from the 1901 census (when it was 972) to the 1971 census (925). In 1981 it showed a small increase (930), but dropped to 927 a decade later, and was at 933 in 2001. Analysis has established that the deficiency of women is concentrated in, but not confined to, the northwestern states of India. In most populations, women—biologically more resilient—outnumber men in the older age groups. Therefore, unbiased increases in longevity should raise, not lower, the proportion of women. But in fact, women lost ground exactly when longevity began to increase. The explanation lies in the systematic neglect of female children, and in the heavy toll of childbearing in adult life. It is only after 2000 that female life expectancy again exceeded male (64 and 63 years in 2002). But this is calculated from live births. In the last decade of the twentieth century, the growing availability of in utero sex determination tests allowed parents to selectively abort female fetuses, and the 2001 census found an adverse sex ratio below age six.

Looking at the situation as a whole, the picture is more hopeful than it has been for many decades. The population of India is well into the demographic transition to a modern regime, but only sustained efforts to maintain and develop the institutions of governance—especially those concerned with health and education—can ensure that it completes that transition.

Sumit Guba

See also **Economic Development, Importance of Institutions in and Social Aspects of; Food Security; Population, Gender Ratio of**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bhattacharya, Durgaprasad, ed. *Report on the Population Estimates of India (1820–1830)*. New Delhi: Office of the Registrar-General, 1965.
- Boquerat, Gilles. “Geopolitics of Refugee Flows in India.” In *Essays on Population and Space in India*, edited by Christophe Z. Guilmoto and Alain Vaguet. Pondicherry: Institut Français, 2000.
- Davis, Kingsley. *The Population of India and Pakistan*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951.
- Drèze, Jean, and Amartya Sen. *India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Dyson, Tim, ed. *India's Historical Demography*. London: Curzon Press, 1989.
- Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP). *Population of India*. New York: United Nations, 1982.
- Government of India. Planning Commission. *The Third Five-Year Plan*. New Delhi: GOI, 1960.
- Green, Martin, ed. *Gandhi in His Own Words*. Hanover, N.H., and London: University Press of New England, 1987.
- Guha, Sumit. *Health and Population in South Asia from the Earliest Times to the Present*. New Delhi: Permanent Black; London: Charles Hurst, 2001.
- Gupta, Monica D., Lincoln C. Chen, and T. N. Krishnan, eds. *Health, Poverty and Development in India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- . *Women's Health in India: Risk and Vulnerability*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Jain, Kalpana. “Cruelty Begins at Home.” *Times of India* (Mumbai) 21 April 2000.
- Kosambi, Meera, trans. and ed. *Pandita Ramabai through Her Own Words*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Mackintosh, James. “A Discourse at the Opening of the Literary Society of Bombay 26th November 1804.” Reprinted in *The Miscellaneous Works of the Right Honorable Sir James Mackintosh*. London: Longman, Green, Brown and Longman, 1851.
- Nehru, Jawaharlal. *Toward Freedom: The Autobiography of Jawaharlal Nehru*. New York: John Day, 1941.
- Registrar-General of India. Available at <<http://www.censusindia.net>>
- Sen, Amartya. *Poverty and Famines*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981.

DEMOGRAPHY AND CENSUS-TAKING India, the second most populous country in the world, had a population of over 1 billion (1,102,900), according to its 2001 census. The publication of India's census results attracts worldwide attention due to its population's sheer size. The population growth rate in the country has hovered at around 2 percent per annum since 1961. The estimated growth rate between the 1991 and the 2001 census was almost 2 percent (1.93%), but there is a strong indication that the rate of population growth in the country is now falling compared to that of earlier decades (see Table 1).

TABLE 1

Total population and growth rate in India, 1901–2001

Census year	Population (thousands)	Average annual growth rate (percent)
1901	238,396	—
1911	252,093	0.56
1921	251,321	–0.03
1931	278,977	1.05
1941	318,661	1.33
1951	361,088	1.25
1961	439,235	1.96
1971	548,160	2.2
1981	683,329	2.22
1991	846,388	2.14
2001	1,028,610	1.93

SOURCE: Courtesy of author.

India had a very low increase in population until 1921, as a result of famines, epidemics of plague and cholera, and the influenza epidemic of 1918–1919. The influenza epidemic is estimated to have killed almost 5 percent of the Indian population. The control of many communicable diseases since 1921 has significantly reduced mortality in India, resulting in a slow but steady increase in population. The pace of population growth accelerated after 1961, with mortality rates declining substantially without any commensurate decline in fertility. The rapid increase in its population was one of the most serious challenges India faced after independence.

The last quarter of the twentieth century also recorded a significant fall in fertility throughout India. The trend in fertility and mortality rates reveals that the pace of decline in fertility was slower than the decline in mortality from 1921 to 1971. The trend reversed thereafter, and fertility is now also on a course of rapid decline. The 2001 census results presented a downward trend in population growth rate. India is also a vast and diverse country with significant variation in demographic indicators across regions. While the south and to some extent the west of the country experienced rapid declines in fertility and resultant declines in population growth, the highly populous states in the northern part of the country recorded relatively high fertility levels and lack of significant declines in the population growth rate.

India has a population of multilingual and multiethnic communities. Caste and religion play important roles in Indian social life. There is a very clear demographic difference between upper and lower castes in India. The upper castes have very low mortality and fertility rates, while the lower castes have adverse demographic

outcomes, an indirect indication of the socioeconomic vulnerability of India's lower castes.

Women occupy considerably lower positions throughout the country. As an exception to the international pattern, different decadal censuses taken throughout the last century present deficits of females in India. This is a reflection of discrimination against females in Indian society. India has about 6 to 8 percent more men than women. The sex ratio (m/f) showed a consistent upward movement until 1971 (except in 1951) and has fluctuated thereafter. The sex ratio recorded even in the 2001 census (1.07) was highly unfavorable to females.

Population Census

The population census is the basic national population data available in India. It is important for administrative purposes and for many aspects of economic and social research and planning. Indian census taking is a massive operation, which takes a number of years to organize, though the actual enumeration takes place within a month. Hundreds of reports are brought out in each census, and massive statistical materials have been published.

The Indian census operation is one of the largest in the world. Prior to independence, in 1931 the undivided British Indian empire had the world's largest population. Attempts were made to collect population data in India from the beginning of the Mauryan empire in the third century B.C. for the purpose of taxation. Similarly extensive records were maintained on land, production, population, and famine during the Mughal period. There were several assessments of India's population by the British East India Company, aimed at assessing its manpower for purposes of defense, taxation, and employment.

With the introduction of the first census in 1801 in Great Britain, it was expected that a census would be taken in India as well. It took, however, another eighty years to plan and execute a synchronous census in India. The first census along modern lines was taken in the North-West provinces in 1853. Although not systematic, population counts were taken since 1820 in several regions of India.

The year 1872 marked the beginning of modern census taking in undivided India. However, a synchronous census began only from 1881 and continued at ten-year intervals. The 1872 census was not synchronous or systematic. It was held at different dates in different parts of the country. It also did not cover all the provinces of India. The original idea was to count the population throughout the country on a particular day, but the census operation went on for several months. The reference date of the census was finally recorded as 21 February

1872. The problems of coverage and cartography that the 1872 group of censuses had presented were ably followed up by W. W. Hunter's Statistical Survey and the Survey of India, which helped plan for the 1881 census.

The Indian census was undertaken on the same day on a de facto basis until 1931. Each person was counted at the place where the person was actually found on the reference date of the census. However, it became increasingly difficult to conduct the entire enumeration on a single day. Hence, census taking moved from de facto to de jure, that is, counting a person according to his or her usual residence. Of these two types of enumeration, the de jure method is more difficult to accomplish without the risk of omission or double counting.

Census taking had been a strenuous effort in India. Certain areas had to be excluded from census taking, and special efforts had to be made in remote or mountainous regions. The 1881 census, for instance, was not taken in Kashmir. Further, in the princely states, except Hyderabad, Baroda, and Mysore, full information was not obtained. The censuses prior to independence thus missed some regions due to specific problems encountered in those areas.

The census of British India provided valuable insights into various aspects of Indian life. The results of each census have been published in detail, except in 1941, when detailed census reports could not be published due to constraints imposed by World War II. Hundreds of volumes have been written on various aspects of the census.

The British census commissioner of 1941, W. W. M. Yeatts, remained in India after independence in 1947, and he was appointed the first census commissioner of independent India. After his death in 1948, R. A. Gopalaswami was appointed to take his place.

When the preparation for the 1951 census was underway, it was clear that a complete count was impossible with the conditions prevailing in Jammu and Kashmir. The government therefore decided not to attempt a census in that state. However, using available past census figures, estimates were arrived at for Jammu and Kashmir for the 1951 census. Similarly, census taking could not be conducted in Assam in the 1981 census, nor in Jammu and Kashmir in 1991.

In 1951, when the first census of independent India was taken, the census commissioner created a compromise between an omnibus type of report and the almost bare presentation of tables made in 1941. His general report was fairly lengthy, but it concentrated on one central theme: the food problem in the context of rapid population growth. The 1961 census commissioner also

followed this practice and chose levels of regional development as the main theme of his report.

The 1971 census used electronic computer facilities for the first time. This use of technology raised the hope that the publication of census results would become much faster. But modern computer technology without a matching printing technology created substantial delays in the publication of census tables. Census reports or tables printed five years after the census enumeration are usually shelved by readers in anticipation of the next census.

Soon after independence, India's census organization became permanent under the Ministry of Home Affairs. From 1961, the census of India began to publish a monograph series on various aspects of the field. The Census of India Act was passed in 1948, providing adequate support to the census organization, making it obligatory for every person occupying a house or enclosure to allow access to census officers and to allow them to paint on or to affix such letters, marks, or numbers as may be necessary for census purposes. The law further makes it mandatory for citizens to answer census questions truthfully. The law also ensures the privacy of the information collected during the census operation.

The aim of the census is to count each individual, although operationally the entity of enumeration is the household. In the 1951 census, a uniform definition was adopted for households throughout India. A "household" was defined as a "group of people who lived together and took their food from a common kitchen" (Census of India, 1951).

The village and town are considered the smallest territorial units in rural and urban areas, respectively. Maps of these areas would be useful, but have been rare in the history of the Indian census. Only in the North-West Frontier provinces were maps used to help in the enumeration. Since 1961, however, the use of maps has become more common.

Once the territorial location is demarcated clearly, the next important task in the preparatory stage is to locate every household within the smallest administrative units. Since 1941, during the house-listing operation, information was also gathered concerning the head of the family, type of house, and, recently, details of amenities. Such data provide valuable insights into many aspects of Indian domestic life, and increase knowledge of living standards throughout the country. Trained enumerators visit every household in every corner of the country to gather information. The enumeration now takes about twenty days to complete.

The census organization carries out data processing, tabulation, and analyses of their data; this data processing

has been computerized since 1971. Provisional census figures are published within months of the enumeration. However, there is an enormous delay in releasing other detailed tables, which may take six to seven years.


Problems of the Census Count

The aim of the census organization is to gather accurate information from every individual in the country. However, in India, social and cultural traditions often prevent people from revealing accurate information. Nearly 72 percent of the population in India live in rural areas, according to the 2001 census. Many villages, especially tribal villages, have very limited accessibility. It is widely accepted that most censuses in the world undercount people to a certain extent, particularly young children. In India, sociocultural habits are said to result in a significantly higher undercount of females.

In the past, the primary motive for census taking was for assessing taxes. This general perception has remained a serious barrier to the gathering of accurate information from most rural homes. It is, however, expected that the data collected over a number of censuses are likely to become more accurate and dependable. Even after several years of census taking in India, however, it is the experience of field workers in villages that the most common misgiving about any census or sample survey is fear of the imposition of taxes. As early as in the 1872, the census reports observed that many misapprehensions prevailed on the subject of an approaching census. A number of wild rumors were usually spread about the objectives of census taking, with the levy of taxes being the major concern. In Madras it was feared that houses were numbered to levy a house tax.

In many parts of India, land is largely held by dominant castes, who have economically exploited low-ranking landless laborers and poor artisans. Early censuses did not provide an accurate count of people of the lower castes. The censuses taken after independence removed questions on caste and limited them only to scheduled castes and scheduled tribes as a constitutional requirement. The major contribution of the census of independent India was in the field of internal migration and urbanization. For the first time in the history of the census, the 1951 census gave the rural-urban makeup for all tables.

The poor status of women in India gives them a higher likelihood of being uncouned in censuses. In some parts of the British India, people thought that the British government conducted censuses to find wives for British soldiers. Women were often concealed from census takers to avoid the possibility of exploitation.

FIGURE 1

Indian censuses since the beginning of the twentieth century reveal a continuous increase in the masculinity of the population, at least until 1971 (see Figure 1). After a detailed examination of the various factors accounting for the falling sex ratio in the country, Pravin Visaria (1961) concluded that it was the result of higher mortality among females than males.

The sex ratio (m/f) of the population has been fluctuating since the 1971 census. An assessment of the underenumeration in the census by Mari P. N. Bhat in 1998 observed that there has been an excessive undercount of females, approximately 1.8 percent in the 1991 census as compared to the 1981 census, leading to an increase in the sex ratio. According to Tim Dyson (2001), the brief reversals of the trend toward increasing masculinity in the censuses of 1951, 1981, and 2001 happened mainly because females in particular were better counted in these censuses than in the immediately preceding enumerations. This gives credence to the notion that, even after independence, a fairly large proportion of females in the country remain unreported.

Given the sociocultural conditions prevailing in India, and the vastness of its census operation, conducted under extremely difficult conditions, census underestimates are not surprising. Skepticism still persists regarding the purpose of census taking, and widespread illiteracy, particularly among the lower classes, especially women, contributes to the possibility of underenumeration. Post-enumeration surveys, however, indicate levels of underenumeration varying between 1.5 and 2.0 percent. It is

possible that even postenumeration surveys underestimate the magnitude of the census undercount. Hence the true population of India may be larger than the census data indicate.

K. S. James

See also **Demographic Trends since 1757; Population, Gender Ratio of**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bhat, Mari P. N. "Demographic Estimates for Post Independence India: A New Integration." *Demography India* 27, no. 1 (1998): 23–55.
- Bose, Ashish. "The Census of India: A Historical Perspective." *Demography India* 2, no. 1 (1973): 18–32.
- Census of India. *India, Vol. 1, Part II A, Demographic Tables*. New Delhi: Office of the Registrar General of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, 1951.
- Davis, Kingsley. *The Population of India and Pakistan*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951.
- Dyson, Tim. "The Preliminary Demography of the 2001 Census of India." *Population and Development Review* 27, no. 2 (2001): 341–356.
- Mitra, Asok. "Census 1961: New Pathways." *Economic and Political Weekly* 29, nos. 51–52 (1994): 3207–3221.
- Natarajan, D. *Indian Census through a Hundred Years*. Census Centenary Monograph no. 2, part 1. New Delhi: Office of the Registrar General of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, 1971.
- Srivastava, S. C. *Indian Census in Perspective*. Census Centenary Monograph no. 1. New Delhi: Office of the Registrar General of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, 1971.
- Visaria, Pravin. *The Sex Ratio of the Population of India*. Monograph no. 10. New Delhi: Office of the Registrar General of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, 1961.

DESAI, MORARJI (1896–1995), prime minister of India (1977–1979). Born in 1896, Morarji Ranchodji Desai began his political career by taking part in the Indian Nationalist Congress's freedom struggle against British rule. Like Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru, Desai spent many years in British jails for his part in the civil disobedience movement. He was a Gujarati Hindu from the Bombay presidency province of British India, which included the present-day states of Gujarat and Maharashtra. A strict vegetarian expounding high moral values, Desai was a staunch Gandhian in his philosophy and practice. Desai had his early education in Gujarat and then at Bombay University.

Desai rose to prominence when he became the Congress Party chief minister of the state of Bombay (formerly the Bombay presidency) from 1952 to 1956, before the province was divided into Gujarat and Maharashtra. He later held ministerial positions in Jawaharlal Nehru's

Congress government and assumed that he was the rightful heir-apparent for the position of prime minister after Nehru's death in 1964. However, the Congress Party chose Lal Bahadur Shastri to become prime minister. When Shastri died in January 1966, Desai again sought to become prime minister, but was again bypassed, this time in favor of Nehru's daughter, Indira Gandhi. Desai became finance minister and deputy prime minister in Indira Gandhi's Congress government. He defected in 1969 to start a rival Congress Party, known as Congress (O), signifying that this new party represented the "old" Congress Party, which had brought freedom to India. The ruling Congress Party of Indira Gandhi then became identified as Congress (I), with the "I" standing for Indira. The public recognized the party of the daughter of Nehru as the continuation of the Congress Party of Nehru and Gandhi, and Indira Gandhi's Congress (I) was swept back to power in the elections of 1971, with a two-thirds majority in Parliament.

When Prime Minister Gandhi declared the "National Emergency," suspending the democratic Constitution and imposed authoritarian rule, Desai was imprisoned under the drastic provisions of the emergency. His Congress (O) Party then joined the alliance of opposition parties to form the Janata Party to challenge the Congress (I) Party in the national elections of March 1977. The Janata Party won, and Morarji Desai finally achieved his ambition, becoming prime minister of India. He was the first non-Congress Party prime minister of India, heading the Janata Party government from 1977 to 1979. Critics, however, claimed that having reached the pinnacle, he was content merely to sit on top of it. High inflation and intense rivalry among members of the Janata Party led to its defeat in the 1979 elections.

Often perceived as an eccentric, Desai gained notoriety when he claimed that he drank his own urine as a form of health therapy. He even wrote a book, titled *Nature's Cure*, about this odd belief. His bizarre practice was jokingly referred to by the public as "Morarji Cola." In 1974, before he became prime minister, he also published an autobiography, *The Story of My Life*. Morarji Desai died in 1995 at the age of ninety-nine.

Raju G. C. Thomas

See also **Congress Party; Gandhi, Indira; Gandhi, Mahatma M. K.; Nehru, Jawaharlal**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Ayer, Subbier Appadurai. *The Lone Sentinel: Glimpses of Morarji Desai*. New Delhi: Popular Depot, 1960.

Bakshi, S. R. *Morarji Desai: The Man and His Ideas*. New Delhi: South Asia Books, 1993.

Desai, Morarji Ranchodji. *In My View*. New Delhi: Thacker and Company, 1966.

———. *The Story of My Life*. London: Pergamon, 1979.

Karaka, D. F. *Morarji Desai*. Bombay: Times of India Press, 1965.

DEVADASIS. See **Dance Forms; Devī.**

DEVANAGARI. See **Languages and Scripts.**

DEVA(S). See **Vedic Aryan India.**

DEVELOPMENT OF COMMERCIAL BANKING

1950–1990 When India attained independence in 1947, it inherited a weak and unwieldy banking structure. The rudimentary nature of the legal framework had allowed the haphazard growth of indigenous banking institutions, with the number of banks mushrooming in some periods, followed by sizable numbers of bank failures, especially during World War II. The structure of banking underwent a significant change during the war, with the semiofficial Imperial Bank of India and the foreign-controlled exchange banks yielding ground to the new Indian joint stock banks. With the preponderance of banks with miniscule capital and rampant unhealthy business practices, banking development during this period was considered uncontrolled and indiscriminate.

The stresses and strains faced by the Indian banking system during the immediate postwar years were compounded by the postpartition travails, particularly in West Bengal and Punjab, the provinces that suffered the worst impact. Two hundred and five banks went out of business from 1947 to 1951; of them, 83 were in West Bengal, with outside liabilities of 260 million rupees, and 24 were in Punjab, with much larger outside liabilities of 620 million rupees. Of 194 nonscheduled banks listed with the Reserve Bank of India at the end of March 1953, 146 were defunct or untraceable.

The subject of the inadequacy of banking laws had received probing attention in the report of the Central Banking Enquiry Committee (1931), which recommended a full-fledged bank act, but this could be implemented only with the passage of a regular Banking Companies Act (1949). After these early steps, the Indian banking system experienced far-reaching changes in the post-1950 period. These changes have been primarily



State Bank of India. The Ballygunge branch of the State Bank of India, Kolkata. Known as the Imperial Bank of India until 1955, it is the largest state-controlled bank in India. INDIA TODAY.

influenced by public policies that evolved over different phases, which may be broadly described as: consolidation of banking and strengthening of banking regulations (1950–1967); credit initiatives and social control over banking (1955–1967); bank nationalization and significant structural and institutional changes (1969–1990); and the current period of banking reforms (1991 onward).

Banking Consolidation

The task of consolidation and strengthening of the banking system, which the Reserve Bank of India took up in earnest after 1950, required multilayered actions. Toward this end, even the new law was found to be insufficient; it was amended ten times between 1950 and 1967. The multilayered processes of consolidation and strengthening first required the execution of a wide set of measures of supervision and control over banking

TABLE 1

Growth and structure of commercial banks in India, 1951–1990

	1951	1969	1980	1990	2002
Number of all commercial banks	566	85	276	290	298
Scheduled banks including regional rural banks	92	71	273	287	294
Regional rural banks	—	—	194	196	196
Nonscheduled commercial banks	474	14	3	2	4
Share in bank deposits (in percentages)					
Publics sector banks	—	84.5	91.9	90.8	79.0
Foreign banks	—	9.2	2.9	5.0	5.0
Private banks	—	6.3	5.2	4.1	16.0

SOURCE: Reserve Bank of India.

companies, including control over management, board membership, and voting rights; there followed varied attempts at amalgamations, mergers, transfers, reconstructions, and even liquidations of fragile banks. The process of consolidation through amalgamation—voluntary until 1960—was slow. The failure of two major banks in 1960 brought home the inherent risks involved in allowing substandard banks to continue to function. An amendment to the banking law enacted that year facilitated the compulsory reconstruction and amalgamation of banks considered to be unviable and reluctant to enter into voluntary merger arrangements. During this phase, efforts were made to reorganize fifty-four state-associated banks in the erstwhile princely states.

As a result, between 1960 and the end of 1969, there were 48 compulsory mergers, in addition to 20 voluntary amalgamations, 17 mergers with the State Bank of India, and 125 transfers of assets and liabilities. These various measures of consolidation drastically reduced the number of banks from 566 in 1951 to 295 in 1961 and finally to 85 in 1969 (see Table 1). The process brought an end to the institutions that had been called nonscheduled banks, with limited capital size and unsustainable banking practices.

Social Orientation

To encourage the growth of regional and functional banking, the social orientation of commercial banking was conceived in the founding law of the Reserve Bank of India itself, which was entrusted with the responsibility of enlarging the supply of agricultural finance through scheduled commercial banks or cooperative institutions. Until the early 1950s, the cooperative movement was considered appropriate for this purpose. But, on the basis of the recommendations of the Rural Banking Enquiry

Committee (1950) for involving commercial banks in rural credit, the former Imperial Bank of India agreed to open 114 offices in rural and semiurban areas (against 274 branches recommended); it opened only 63 branches in the five years following July 1951. It was concluded, therefore, that without government intervention, banking facilities would not be extended to such areas. Hence, the Imperial Bank of India was brought under public ownership as the State Bank of India from July 1955, with the central bank of the country holding 92 percent of its shares and with a statutory responsibility to establish at least 400 additional branches within a five-year period; it fulfilled these and other branch expansion targets it set for itself. In September 1959 major state-associated banks of the former princely states were taken over and vested with the State Bank of India as subsidiaries.

Even so, many perceived weaknesses of the commercial banking system, such as poor population coverage of bank branches, vast sectoral credit gaps, excess control over banks by industrial and commercial interests, and a poor capital base, came to be aired in political circles, suggesting reorientation of the banking system. This led to the adoption of several measures, during the period from 1965 to 1969, that have been described as establishing “social control” over commercial banks. They included introduction of the credit authorization plan (1965) requiring scheduled banks to obtain prior authorization for granting new credit limits of 10 million rupees or over to any single party; initiation of a social control plan in 1968, with the objectives of achieving a wider spread of bank credit, preventing its misuse, and directing a larger volume of credit to priority sectors; and the statutory reconstitution of commercial bank boards with a majority representation to informal sectors.

Bank Nationalization

The sociopolitical undercurrent of the second half of the 1960s was one of disenchantment with the functioning of the commercial banking system, even after the initiation of social control over banks. Two major institutional developments took place during the period that followed. First, effective 19 July 1969, fourteen major Indian scheduled banks having public deposits of 500 million rupees or over were nationalized. On 15 April 1980 six more Indian banks of the same size were nationalized. In 1975 a new type of commercial bank, the regional rural bank, was established in underbanked districts of the country as an institution that could combine local familiarity with modern banking methods. By the end of December 1983, 150 regional rural banks had come into existence, covering 265 districts out of the country's then 400-odd districts. These were set up with central government, state government, and commercial bank partnership.

TABLE 2

Number of offices of scheduled commercial banks according to population group

	1969	1990	2002
Rural	1,833	34,791	32,481
(percent of total)	(22.2)	(58.2)	(49.1)
Semiurban	3,342	11,324	14,723
(percent of total)	(40.5)	(19.0)	(22.2)
All-India	8,262	59,752	66,208
(percent of total)	(100.0)	(100.0)	(100.0)

SOURCE: Courtesy of author.

By the middle of the 1980s, public policies began to focus on facilitating banks to undertake diversification into “para-banking” and other financial service activities. Many banks had set up specialized subsidiary companies and asset-liability management companies, and either through these entities or on their own, they entered into new activities, such as merchant banking, mutual funds, hire-purchase, housing finance, venture capital, equipment leasing, factoring, securities broking and trading, and other financial services.

These institutional developments have brought, along with the State Bank of India and its subsidiaries, commercial banks with over 90 percent of deposits into public ownership (see Table 1). At the same time, a series of policy initiatives brought about many other structural changes, such as the fast growth of bank branches, the spread of branches to rural, semiurban, and underdeveloped regions, and a higher proportion of bank credit extended to agriculture, small-scale industries, and other defined priority sectors. By the end of March 1990, over 46,000 bank branches (or 77 percent) were located in rural and semi-urban areas (see Table 2). A large number of these branches were opened in underbanked and underdeveloped eastern, northeastern, and central regions of the country. Over 93 percent of bank branches represented public sector banks, including regional rural banks; the balance belonged to Indian private banks (6.5 percent) and foreign banks (0.2 percent). An equally sharp change occurred in the sectoral distribution of bank credit, with the share of agriculture, small-scale industries, and other informal sectors rising significantly, from less than 10 percent in March 1968 to about 40 percent in March 1990 (see Table 3); the share of medium and large-scale industry declined from about 60 percent to 37 percent during the same period.

Growing ailments. Even as the postnationalization policies for commercial banks were underway, many efforts were made to examine their functioning (James Raj Committee, 1978); to undertake their restructuring (Banking Commission, 1972, and James Raj Committee,

TABLE 3**Distribution of advances of scheduled commercial banks by sector**

(Percentages to total advances)

Sector	March 1951	March 1968	March 1980	March 1990	March 2002
Agriculture	2.1	2.2	14.5	15.9	9.8
Industry	34.0	67.5	47.9	48.7	41.4
Small-scale industries	—	7.9	12.2	11.5	4.9
Commerce	36.0	19.2	28.5	22.2	26.7
Personal	6.8	3.7	4.8	6.4	12.6
Other	21.1	7.4	4.3	6.8	9.5

SOURCE: Reserve Bank of India.

1978); to enhance productivity, efficiency, and profitability (PEP Committee, 1997); and to improve customer service in banks (Varadachary Working Group, 1977). In retrospect, many of their substantive recommendations remained unimplemented or were implemented half-heartedly. As a result, the deterioration in the working of commercial banks persisted.

As various studies and committee reports have demonstrated, the vast quantitative progress of commercial banking with a directed and forced pace was accompanied by growing problems of deterioration in the quality of loan portfolios, resulting in sizable nonperforming assets, declines in productivity and profitability, serious management weaknesses, and trade union pressures, giving rise to overstaffing, weaknesses in organizational structures, inadequate internal controls, deterioration in “housekeeping,” and poor customer service. These issues of deterioration in financial health called for urgent remedial measures, which the two versions of the Narasimham Committee (1991 and 1998) subsequently proposed. Almost all of the committee’s recommendations, except that to reduce the 40 percent target for directed credit to 10 percent, have been under implementation since the beginning of the 1990s; these, along with other reform measures, have served as a check on the postnationalization structural changes and have overall contributed to an improvement in the working of the commercial banking system.

Sadanand Shetty

See also **Banking Sector Reform since 1991; Central Banking, Developmental Aspects of**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Balachandran, G. *The Reserve Bank of India, 1951–1967*. Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 1998.

Government of India. *Report of the Banking Commission*. (Chairman: R. G. Saraiya.) New Delhi: GOI, 1972.

———. *Report of the Committee on Banking Sector Reforms*. (Chairman: M. Narasimham.) New Delhi: GOI, 1998.

Indian Banks Association. *Final Report of the Working Group on Customer Service in Banks*. (Chairman: T. R. Varadachary.) Mumbai: Indian Banks Association, 1977.

Panandikar, S. G. *Banking in India*. 12th ed. Mumbai: Orient Longman, 1975.

Reserve Bank of India. *Report of the Productivity, Efficiency, and Profitability Committee on Banking*. (Chairman: J. C. Luther.) Mumbai: RBI, 1977.

———. *Report of the Committee on Functioning of Public Sector Banks*. (Chairman: James S. Raj.) Mumbai: RBI, 1978.

———. *Report of the Committee on Financial System*. (Chairman: M. Narasimham.) Mumbai: RBI, 1991.

DEVELOPMENT POLITICS The politics of development, or development politics, has always been at the core of modern economic activity, despite claims to the contrary. In India, a developing and democratic country, one can never fully understand the process of economic development, or of liberalization, without deciphering the politics and power that envelop it, even if market-oriented reforms pretend to rid economic activity of “political interference.”

Traditionally, development was understood as outcomes: economic wealth or economic progress measured in terms of gross national or domestic product. By this criteria, India performed badly despite its early potential; its per capita income in 2002 was \$470, while its per capita gross domestic product grew at 3 percent in 2001–2002 and its rank for purchasing power parity gross national product was quite low, around 146th. Indian leaders wanted significantly more. Jawaharlal Nehru, India’s first prime minister, had declared that independence in 1947 “is but a step, an opening of opportunity, toward the great triumphs and achievements that await us.” He noted that the tasks of development included “the ending of poverty and ignorance and disease and inequality of opportunity.” Important philosophical debates in the 1970s and 1980s expanded the notion of development to incorporate equality of opportunity as well as the expansion of human freedoms. The main idea was that one must see what “goods and services do to the actual opportunities and freedoms of people, categorized according to class, gender, location, and social status” (Drèze and Sen). Thus, development must be viewed in the broader sense as encompassing both economic and social opportunities and affecting different social groups—women and lower castes and minorities—differently. Unfortunately, India’s performance by these more expansive criteria also remained quite limited. About 363.8 million people (out of 1.2 billion) earned

less than \$1 a day in 2003–2004. Its infant mortality rate was one of the lowest, around 90 per thousand live births, while life expectancy at birth was sixty-three years. Illiteracy remained endemic: around 38 percent of India's population cannot read or write, while the figures for women were much higher, around sixty-four percent. Malnourishment inflicted around 53 percent of children. Gender-related indicators were among the worst in the world: in 2004 there were only 933 women to 1,000 men in the population, an exceptionally low sex ratio; life expectancy of women was sixty-four years, and female mortality rates during pregnancy remained high. Eighty-six million members of scheduled castes and tribes, Dalits and indigenous communities, forming 25.6 percent of the population, continued to suffer from caste (status) inequality in addition to many other forms of inequality, despite constitutional protections. According to the United Nations Development Program, India's human development index's rank was 134th, below almost all the countries of the Middle East and behind many African countries with lower per capita incomes. Social and economic deprivation has found a home in India, despite Nehru's wishes and a surplus of state capacity. Thus, India is a bundle of contradictions: its government is all-pervasive and strong; yet, its capacity to affect the long-term developmental prospects of its citizens or to increase growth remains limited.

Development Theory and India

India's developmental experiment is unique for a number of reasons: for its grand ambitions, in aiming to achieve simultaneous economic progress with social and distributional equity, but also for its attempt to achieve these goals through democratic means. Thus, India's developmental trajectory figures prominently in larger comparative debates about the role of the state in economic development, the contests between states and markets as prime movers of growth, the complementarity or lack thereof between democracy and development, as well as the impact of overt centralization in subverting local and market potentials.

India has been compared unfavorably with East Asia and Southeast Asia, although its protection from the Asian financial crisis of 1997, as well as its rapid growth in the late 1990s, has given pause to such negative assessments. The consensus of the 1980s and 1990s seemed to be that India's developmental failure is attributed to its governmental failures, which overwhelmed its intrinsic potential. Rapid growth in the 1990s seemed to confirm this picture, since it coincided with liberalization policies that sought to reduce the power of the state and replace them with market forces and international competition. Yet, India's state institutions and its administrative structure remain the

envy of many developing countries: its meritocratic selection system, the quality and reach of its civil servants, and its revenue capacity led the Indian state to create a public sector and a self-reliant economic policy in the 1960s that became a model for many other countries.

This puzzle led scholars such as Alva Myrdal to characterize the Indian state as "soft" and as "weak-strong." Lloyd Rudolph and Susanne Rudolph noted that the Indian state defies easy generalization in that it has "alternated between autonomous and reflexive relations with the society in which it is embedded" (p. 1). Baldev Raj Nayar, in a pithy description noted the "paradox of state strength and policy weakness" in India (p. 145). In the words of Pranab Bardhan: "It is, by now, obvious to most people that in spite of some measure of political autonomy and its direct command over vast economic resources, the Indian state is rather weak in shaping the economy" (p. 323). Others have argued that the Indian state is a rent-seeking state that uses its regulatory power to extract rents from the private sector. In this view, the strength of the Indian state was exploited by its occupants to augment illegitimate power and hurt its developmental prospects.

Despite this apparent consensus, recent interpretations note certain anomalies. Ronald Herring notes that unlike the Latin American states, India was prudent in its international debt management before the 1980s, and the cycle of high inflation and high growth rates escaped its citizens (1999). Vibha Pingle (1999) and Eswaran Sridharan (1996) outline the specificity of different sectors; state intervention in some sectors was more enhancing than others; dimensionality of state intervention needs to be incorporated rather than a blunt analysis of the Indian state. Aseema Sinha (2005) and Patrick Heller (1999) focus their attention on another kind of variation: regional variation in developmental prospects. Sinha argues that subnational developmental states lead us to rethink the national frameworks of most assessments. In India the failure of the national state and pervasive market failures were complemented or mitigated by some subnational developmental states. Heller's study of Kerala state highlights the fusion of labor-oriented class mobilization and development. He argues that class mobilization is not antithetical to the wholesome developmental prospects of a subnational state. Correspondingly, the well-being of people in Kerala is among the highest in the world. Thus, recent reevaluations urge a more nuanced and careful analysis of India's developmental failures.

A Historical Perspective

India's developmental experience took birth in a moment of nationalist hope and global postcolonial enthusiasm. At that time, it was believed that states can

make a difference to long-term economic performance as well as address social and equity needs of a poor and underdeveloped population. India embarked on a path of planned industrialization, relying on the public sector to steer ahead, while a strong private sector was expected to aid the state's efforts toward larger developmental goals.

India's developmental trajectory has evolved simultaneously with the state and the Congress Party. India, after gaining independence in 1947, launched an ambitious developmental strategy that sought to achieve rapid economic growth and industrialization while improving the economic and social well-being of its citizens. The role of the central government was seen to be preeminent and strong. This strategy faced its first serious challenge in the 1960s with a persistent food crisis, combined with political instability and eventual recourse to a currency devaluation in 1966. Soon after, in 1969, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi moved the country's economic strategy toward stronger state intervention, nationalization, and self-reliance. A populist emphasis on poverty and welfare programs allowed the regime to acquire political and electoral legitimacy. Foreign economic policy turned inward, and trade with the external world was limited to the Communist bloc. India's share of world trade started to decline in this period. In 1977 a new Janata Party government took power and moved the economic trajectory more toward agriculture and small business. Yet, the overall orientation stayed state-led and centralized. Indira Gandhi, on returning to power in 1980, loosened some economic controls on the private sector and technology imports; her son, Rajiv Gandhi, who took power after her assassination, strengthened these hesitant steps.

Rajiv Gandhi's economic vision was different in two crucial respects: it was technocratic, and outward looking. Although he could not carry forward many of his reforms in his brief tenure (1984–1989), he can be credited with introducing many significant ideational shifts in India's economic policy, thus setting the background for far-reaching reforms that were to come in 1991. In 1991 the minority government of P. V. Narsimha Rao, faced with a balance of payments crisis, was forced to seek an International Monetary Fund (IMF) loan. The finance minister at the time, Dr. Manmohan Singh, took this window of opportunity to initiate systemic economic reforms that went far beyond reforms required by the IMF structural adjustment package. Regulatory controls over the private sector were dismantled and India's relations with the external world opened up. Since the 1990s, reforms have proceeded in fits and starts; yet by 2004 most observers agreed that the reforms had been consolidated.

Before India's independence, developmental choices were crucially shaped by Mahatma Gandhi, who put his

stamp of village democracy on India's developmental thinking so indelibly that, even after the ascendance of Nehruvian thinking, Indian politicians still evoke some of those ideas in their defense of local governance institutions such as *panchayat raj*. Critics of India's development experience, such as the recent anti-Narmada Dam movement, also evoke Gandhian ideas. Powerful regional voices gave different interpretations that shaped regional traditions of development in the colonial era: M. Vishveshvarayya, the *diwan* of Karnataka, and Sardar Patel, a leader in Gujarat, represented diverse views on development.

Yet, it was Jawaharlal Nehru's vision that proved most deeply consequential in the new nation's developmental thinking. He combined the goals of democracy, industrial development, and social and economic equity in a distinctive way. His stamp lies over the institutions of the Planning Commission, the Congress Party, and the national state as they grappled with these tripartite tasks. During the Nehruvian period, key regional leaders articulated their own visions, including Dr. B. C. Roy, the chief minister in West Bengal, Pratap Singh Kairon in Punjab, K. Kamaraj in Tamil Nadu, and Jivraj Patel in Gujarat. Intellectuals—largely economists and technocrats—also played key roles in the formative years of India's development, as policy makers consulted and involved “experts” in its policy process. P. C. Mahalanobis, the chief adviser to the Planning Commission from 1955, was the chief architect of the Second Five-Year Plan.

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's role in India's developmental evolution is usually seen to be negative, but it is important to remember that she implemented an unparalleled populist reform program embodied in ameliorative antipoverty programs, as well as a move toward state capitalism of a distinct kind. Rajiv Gandhi, together with his group of technocrats such as Sam Pitroda, played a crucial role in laying the conditions for India's engagement with more current technologies and more generally with globalization. His technocratic vision, even if shorn of political realism, was an important turning point in India's developmental trajectory. Since then, the role played by Prime Minister V. P. Singh (1989–1991) and Finance Minister Manmohan Singh in initiating liberalization, facilitated quietly by the subsequent prime minister, Narsimha Rao, is crucial in understanding the peculiar, internally driven trajectory of economic reform in India.

To this list of national leaders one must add the newly important role played by regional leaders who, in the 1990s, not only shaped national policies but also engaged the global political economy in new and different ways. Chadrababu Naidu, the chief minister of Andhra Pradesh,

along with Jyoti Basu, chief minister of West Bengal from 1977 to 2000, and S. M. Krishna, chief minister of Karnataka, as well as Digvijay Singh of Madhya Pradesh, evolved distinctive regional responses to the ongoing process of liberalization in India. Naidu became famous for his ease with technology as much as for his ability to bargain effectively with the World Bank for loans for his state. Basu oversaw one of the most successful transitions in a subnational state as his party and state government, in 1994, embraced the central policy of liberalization while welcoming it for ensuring more “regional autonomy.” Digvijay Singh was temporarily successful in making “human development”—literacy, infrastructural development, and health—the goal of his state.

Institutional Framework of India's Development

From rural development to agricultural development. “India lives in its villages” had long been the constant refrain of the country's politicians. In 2003, 60 percent of the country's population was still rural. Yet, India's leaders never linked agrarian reform to broader development goals or adequately addressed the linkages between distributive aims, rural well-being, and agrarian productivity. Mostly, each of these elements—redistribution, agrarian well-being, technical improvements in the service of agrarian growth—were treated separately at different moments, a product of the crisis of the day rather than of long-term strategic thinking about how they fit together into a coherent developmental strategy.

India's initial years of independence (1947–1955) saw the implementation of land reform legislation and the creation of community development institutions with the goal of achieving broader well-being for India's citizens. It was not clear, however, how that strategy would fit with the emphasis on large-scale industrialization that was so prominent at the time. Moreover, land reform was left to the states, given the pressures by landlords and powerful notables in India's ruling Congress Party. Its uneven and indifferent implementation robbed land reform of its radicalizing promise to change agrarian relations or to improve agrarian income and well-being.

The failure to address the core of India's agrarian problem created a food crisis in the early 1960s that led India's policy makers to move toward a limited technocratic and intensive solution aimed at agrarian productivity and self-reliance in food grain production. The New Agricultural Policy concentrated resources (credit and the Intensive Agricultural District Programme) and technology (high-yielding varieties of seeds, irrigation, fertilizers, pesticides, etc.) in the already advanced areas of the country and

among progressive farmers. It also sought to involve foreign—largely U.S.—aid with research institutions set up for this purpose. The strategy paid off in increasing agrarian productivity, and India's dependence on imports of food grain became a thing of the past. By 1988–1989, India was producing 170 million tons of food grain. Regionally, the greatest improvements occurred in the wheat-growing regions of Punjab, Haryana, and western Uttar Pradesh. Yet, this newfound self-reliance could not address the problems of the rice-growing regions of the country, thus creating new regional disparities in agrarian patterns. Even more tragically, large sections of India's populace have continued to suffer from chronic malnutrition and hunger despite the self-sufficiency in food grain production, highlighting the role of institutions that mediate the production process to the consumption of food; distribution of food continues to be a persistent failure of India's “Green Revolution.”

Industrial development as the lynchpin of the modern developing state. Industrial development was the centerpiece of India's developmental strategy; its instrument was a strong public sector and regulation of the private sector for public purposes. Thus, India adopted an import-substitution industrial strategy (ISI), rather than developing its comparative advantage in agricultural and textile goods. Exports were neglected. This strategy was to be implemented by the central government, the licensing system, the constitutionally mandated Finance Commission, and the Planning Commission, which acquired disproportionate power in the early years.

The centerpiece of the regulatory state came to be identified with the licensing system—the so called “license-quota-permit raj”—that set up licensing regulations to direct the flow of industrial investments to desired locations and sectors and with the desired mix of product and technology. The purpose of the act was to regulate the entry of firms, to keep industrial capacities in line with plan targets, to achieve regional balance in the creation of industrial capacities, and to diversify the industrial base. Such applications were also reviewed for suitability of the proposed enterprise or expansion plans from the point of “national” and economically rational objectives.

Despite such rationality and preeminent power, the regulatory system became a combination of policy and patronage, wherein different groups established privileged channels of access to state policy. These distributive coalitions received subsidies, concessions, and benefits in return for their political support. As a consequence, the developmental health of the nation suffered.

Class, Capitalism, and Development

In its early years of India's development, private business, it was believed, would serve a subordinate, although

important role. Colonialism had stunted the growth of capitalist enterprise in particular ways: it had ensured that Indian capitalists were reliant on state finances, in sectors like consumer goods and textiles rather than capital good industries, and were located in few coastal centers like Mumbai, Kolkata, and Chennai. Thus, the preeminent role of the state was seen to be natural, given the insufficient development of capitalist enterprise in colonial India and its dependent and uneven character. Largely foreign companies or the already strong business groups exploited the new opportunities for investment opened up by the newly independent Indian state: the Marwari, Gujarati, and Parsi business communities. Moreover, these business groups came to rely on state initiatives for finances, markets, and international connections. As state regulation proceeded, business learned to cope with a highly regulated system in subtle yet powerful ways, so that informal connections were established between the national bureaucracy and the large and powerful business houses. The influence of business on state policy took many informal forms wherein personal connections, party finance, and “briefcase politics” infiltrated the state-led system from within.

Democracy and Development

In comparative terms, India poses a puzzle to most accounts that link development with democracy. Most stable democracies are industrialized and wealthy; India is a large poor democracy, but one which has persisted and has been consolidated over time. Most of the world's stable democracies arose together with capitalism, as middle classes and the bourgeoisie challenged aristocratic privilege in favor of commoners and masses. Indian democracy arose in an agrarian colonial country, where poverty was endemic and capitalist development was nascent. India's failure to fit into this neat generalization has given pause to many an analyst.

In one view, democracy serves as an obstacle to growth. Democratic politics reduces developmental politics into populist and symbolic channels as office seekers subordinate the long-term collective ends to popular pressures and short-term electoral goals. Most observers believe that India's chaotic democracy, with multiple social groups, prevents the movement toward developmental politics. In 1997 Prime Minister Inder Gujral said: “India had to pay the economic price of political democracy.” Yet, Adam Przeworski's research on the political foundations of economic growth finds no strong correlation between regime type and positive economic growth. Development is hurt by entrenched political-economic interests that acquired vested linkages with the license-quota-permit raj. Democracy may be an innocent bystander to this corruption of the development process.

Federalism and Development

The Indian strategy of development was not only led by the central government but gave enormous formal power to central institutions. Nehru saw planning in terms of its national scope, where central institutions of power would rationally direct development in the right way. Nehru, in contrast to Indira Gandhi, saw the power of regional chief ministers as embodying these goals in the most effective manner. Yet, over time, regional leaders gained prominence, and claims of regional redistribution came to animate public discussions and the work of the Planning Commission, which was responsible for allocating public expenditure to states in the most rational and equitable manner. This led to the formation of the National Development Commission, with chief ministers as members, and the modification of national plans to accommodate regional claims. Thus, the Third Plan incorporated regional development and regional equity as important goals, and many commissions were set up in the mid- to late 1960s to deal with the issue of backward states and backward districts.

The role of regional states in shaping and modifying central policy was not insignificant, since they were the actual implementers of most economic policy. This meant that regional politicians sought to maximize their influence within the central developmental process in widely differing ways, mitigating central constraints, where needed, but enhancing central policy where beneficial for regional agendas. Thus, regional states evolved complex and multi-layered economic policies—incentives, tax breaks, and developmental goals—while creating new institutions to manage economic development in their regions. Also, numerous policy domains—most notably, industrial estates, small-scale sector, infrastructural development, agricultural development, and labor policy—were under the direct control of regional states. Thus, the role of regional states in India's development process was pervasive and consequential. Local politics and regional political economy variables thus shaped the nature of regional responses to central policies and regional developmental strategies. Kerala relied on public action-led social development, while West Bengal relied on a public sector-led industrial strategy combined with sustained reform of rural institutions. Other states, most notably, Gujarat and Maharashtra, followed hybrid strategies that emphasized rapid growth and capital accumulation. Thus, centralization in economic policy engendered divergent regional responses; this served to enhance the role of regional actors and accelerate the process of regionalization of national developmental institutions.

Conclusion

India's developmental experiment has been a unique one: the attempt to achieve broader developmental goals within a democratic framework. While its achievements

in improving the well-being of the large majority of its people leave much to be desired, its developmental achievements in ensuring a self-sufficient economy that has a self-generating industrial and global agenda are notable. An assessment of India's developmental trajectory yields some interesting and counterintuitive conclusions about the role of the state in economic life, the relationship between democracy and development, and the federalization of India's developmental vision.

While the central state has not created facilitative conditions for the development of private enterprise, one cannot rule out the role played by regional states and local governments in creating positive conditions for industry to flourish. Thus, an assessment of India's government-led path must pay attention to the federal nature of its polity and the autonomy often displayed by subnational units. A negative correlation between democracy and growth, while at first glance plausible, also must be avoided; there is no necessary link between some of India's developmental problems and its democratic institutions, but the nature of its governmental institutions, including federalism, shaped the nature of India's development.

Aseema Sinha

See also **Kerala, Model of Development**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Ahluwalia, Isher J. *Industrial Growth in India: Stagnation since the Mid-1960s*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1985.
- Bardhan, Pranab. "A Political-Economy Perspective on Development." In *The Indian Economy: Problems and Prospects*, edited by Bimal Jalan. New Delhi: Penguin Books, 1992.
- Bhagwati, Jagdish. *India in Transition: Freeing the Economy*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993.
- Drèze, Jean, and Amartya Sen. *India: Development and Participation*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Echeverri-Gent, John. *The State and the Poor: Public Policy and Political Development in India and United States*. New Delhi: Sage, 1993.
- Evans, Peter. *Embedded Autonomy*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995.
- Frankel, Francine R. *India's Political Economy, 1947–1977: The Gradual Revolution*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978.
- Friedman, Edward. "Development, Revolution, Democracy, and Dictatorship: China versus India?" In *Democracy, Revolution and History*, edited by Theda Skocpol. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998.
- Heller, Patrick. *The Labor of Development; Workers and the Transformation of Capitalism in Kerala, India*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999.
- Herring, Ronald. "Embedded Particularism: India's Failed Developmental State." In *The Developmental State*, edited by Meredith Woo-Cumings. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999.
- Jenkins, Rob. *Democratic Politics and Economic Reform in India*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Kochanek, Stanley A. *Business and Politics in India*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1974.
- Kohli, Atul. *Democracy and Discontent: India's Crisis of Governability*. New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1990.
- Nayar, Baldev Raj. "The Politics of Economic Restructuring in India: The Paradox of State Strength and Policy Weakness." *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 30 (1996): 145–171.
- Pingle, Vibha. *Rethinking the Developmental State: India's Industry in Comparative Perspective*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999.
- Rudolph, Lloyd I., and Susanne H. Rudolph. *In Pursuit of Lakshmi: The Political Economy of the Indian State*. Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
- Sinha, Aseema. *The Regional Roots of Developmental Politics in India: A Divided Leviathan*. Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2005.
- Sridharan, Eswaran. *The Political Economy of Industrial Promotion: Indian, Brazilian, and Korean Electronics in Comparative Perspective 1969–1994*. Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996.
- Varshney, Ashutosh. *Democracy, Development and the Countryside: Urban-Rural Struggles in India*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- Wade, Robert. "The Market for Public Office: Why the Indian State Is not Better at Development." *World Development* 13, no. 4 (1985): 467–497.
- Woo-Cumings, Meredith, ed. *The Developmental State*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1999.

DEVĪ Special women and men who serve as possession ritualists in India today often insist there are 101 goddesses. For clients seeking answers to their personal problems, these ritualists may assume the facial, bodily, and vocal guises of one or more than a dozen goddesses who briefly descend on and enter them. It would not be difficult to solicit from their oral narratives the names of far more than 101 goddesses, and some Sanskrit texts declare 1,008 is the right number. Possession ritualists often mention one particular goddess who is Ādishakti—primal "energy" (*śakti*), the original, a goddess who is Parashakti, the transcendent source of all others and the ground of being itself. Sometimes this Ur-goddess is given a name, Devī, a great Goddess behind all manifestations, as Vishnu is the transcendent god behind all *avatāras*. Devī, the feminine form of *deva*, or "god," occurs in the Rīg Veda and subsequent Brahmanical texts. Devī continues to hold two meanings, one an alternate name for a particular known goddess, another as generic term for "the goddess," sometimes augmented as Mahādevī, or "great goddess." Goddesses in general are called "mother" (*mātā* or *amma*), and it is significant that with respect to *śakti* as her nature, every female, regardless



Men Carrying the Hindu Goddess Durgā. During the Hindu festival of Durgā pūjā, devotees carry the image of the goddess Durgā. Her name, which means “invincible” in Sanskrit, is invoked when evil forces loom large. REUTERS/CORBIS.

of age and experience, is also “mother” and therefore a goddess representation. This overview identifies major goddesses of the Hindu textual and ritual tradition but keeps in view the yellow circle on a wall in millions of kitchens, a patch of turmeric paste known simply as Devī.

Goddesses in Prehistory and the Vedas

Recent archaeology has interpreted upright triangular stones in a nine-thousand-year-old hunter-gatherer site as evidence of a goddess cult, an altar not unlike those still in use today. Substantial excavations in urban levels of Harappa and Mohenjo-Daro revealed multitudes of terra-cotta female figurines, indicating widespread popularity of goddess cults in the Indus Valley in the third and second millennia B.C. One of many remarkable Indus seals (DK 6847) seems to depict a goddess in a fig tree about to receive the sacrifice of a *markhor* goat, a kneeling male worshiper with hands raised in reverence, and a line of seven female figures beneath. Another seal has a female giving birth to a tree, and many show a powerful buffalo-headed god. Until the Vedas, however, there are no texts to provide names, myths, or rituals.

Although gods such as Indra, Varuṇa, Agni, and Soma take the lion’s share of Rig Vedic hymns, some of the most beautiful poems are addressed to goddesses, many of them in contexts of creation, primal energy, elemental powers, and motherhood. An archaic primal pair invoked in the dual is Dyāvaprithivī (Dyaus-Prithivī), literally sky and earth, but also bull and cow, father and mother, immortal parents of the gods. The earth, Prithivī, is also known as Bhūmi, as in 10.18.11, a funeral hymn beseeching her to cover the deceased as gently as a mother covers her child. Invoked in the Rig Veda, although rarely mentioned in Vedic literature as a whole, is Sītā, the plowed “furrow.” Ushas, or “dawn,” is addressed in twenty hymns celebrating her as lovely daughter of heaven and sister of the starlit night, Rātrī, another goddess. Aditi, the “boundless,” free of all restraints, is mother of eight Ādityas, including Mitra, Varuṇa, and Aryaman, gods of sovereignty, order, and principle. As personifications of speech, Vāc and Sarasvatī are both key figures whose roles remain prominent through Hindu tradition. On the cosmic plane, it is Vāc who forthrightly declares supremacy as the first being worthy of worship, a queen with multiple forms and locales (Rig Veda 10.125), and at the personal level, according to the later Grihya Sūtras, her name should be heard three times at birth in an infant’s first appropriation of sacred wisdom. Like Puruṣa, three-quarters of Vāc remains unmanifest. Vāc has recently been interpreted not merely as goddess of ritual speech but as goddess of victory in war. In addition to her link to speech, Sarasvatī is associated with sacred rivers, both celestial and terrestrial. An entire assembly of the wives of the gods, *devānāṃ patnībḥ*, is addressed in early Saṃhitās and receives special offerings in twice-monthly sacrifices according to Brāhmaṇa texts.

In the early Saṃhitās, *shrī* is a term denoting royal power, prosperity, good fortune, radiance, and beauty. Personified as a goddess in Shatapatha Brāhmaṇa 11.4.3.1-18, born of Prajāpati’s creative heat, she astonishes an assembly of nine gods and the goddess Savitrī, each of them lacking, then appropriating, one of her ten potent qualities. This myth is a prefiguration of later accounts of the collective powers of Devī, unique among deities. The Shrī Sūkta (hymn) praises the goddess along with elephants and lotuses, symbols of abundant rain and fertility. As Shrī is Lakshmī, or good fortune, her sister Alakshmī is a negative power, misfortune. In post-Vedic texts, Shrī-Lakshmī, alongside Pārvatī and Durgā, becomes one of the three most popular goddesses of classical Hinduism and is most frequently paired with her husband Vishnu.

In addition to explicit goddesses, the Rig Veda and Atharva Veda mention more than fifty names of those who might be described as feminine powers. A markedly

contradictory pair is Nirriti and Anumati, the former concerned with denial, destruction, and death, the latter with assent, prosperity, and life. The two are ritually balanced in a manner found later in a single goddess. The Gnaḥ is an archaic group connected with speech and poetic meters. Rākā, Sinīvālī, and Kuhū (e.g., Atharva Veda 7.46–48) are shadowy females who may carry an Indo-European heritage as midwives of destiny, a trio similar to the Moira, Parcae, Norns, and Dieves Valditoyes of ancient Greece, Rome, Scandinavia, and Lithuania, respectively. As guardians of the embryo and shapers of human fate, their concerns are sacred space, time, and life substance. Already in the early Saṃhitās there appears a tension between the sacrificial cult with supervisory masculine deities and cosmic concerns and the folk religion of the Atharva Veda, which permits glimpses of unchecked feminine powers, particularly concerning life-cycle mysteries and certain other domestic rituals, charms, and spells.

The Saṃhitās do not name Durgā. However, myths and cults of Sumerian Inanna (the later Akkadian Ishtar), the powerful goddess of sexuality, fertility, and war, may have influenced the growth of similar goddess traditions from the Mediterranean and Anatolia eastward through Iran to the Indus and adjacent regions. Inanna's ally as mount or companion was a lion, and her central narrative included the death and resurrection of her lover/husband Dumuzi (Akkadian Tammuz). Myths and cults of a goddess similar to Durgā of the later Purāṇas may have been fundamental to some regions of northwest India and Afghanistan prior to, and then contemporary with, the Rīg Vedic Aryans.

Epics and Purāṇas

Although composition of the two great Sanskrit epics occurred in the broad period between about 500 B.C. and A.D. 400, certain archaic features suggest an older legacy for some myths. Several Vedic goddesses and feminine powers endure in the Mahābhārata and Rāmāyaṇa, numerous others appear for the first time, and heroines such as Savitrī, Draupadī, and Sītā live on to become favored goddesses many centuries after their initial epic roles.

A goddess not in the Vedas who becomes as popular as Lakshmī is Pārvatī, daughter of the mountain Himālaya. As Lakshmī is wedded to Vishnu, Pārvatī is best known as the consort of Shiva. She goes by many names, including Gaurī, Umā, and Kālī. Frequently she is said to be a reappearance of Satī, the wife of Shiva who immolated herself in a sacrificial fire when Shiva was insulted by her own father, Daksha. Shiva went berserk at this cruel loss and bore her body into the skies until Vishnu, tasked with returning Shiva to order, sliced Satī into pieces, which fell

to earth and became her *pīṭhas*, or centers of worship. This myth, taken up in several of the Purāṇas, explained the origin of more than fifty sites of Devī scattered throughout India, and reinforced in Satī-Pārvatī the connections with earth that had begun with Rīg Vedic Prithivī, Bhū, and no doubt hundreds of nameless regional goddesses.

Despite the ascetic-minded Shiva's opposition to fathering a child, and without a normal birth, Pārvatī's maternal cravings were satisfied by the creation of two sons in separate myths. Kārttikeya (or Skanda) was born of Shiva's fiery semen spilled in the Ganges. Like a doll, Gaṇeśha was made by Shiva from cloth for Pārvatī to nurse as son. Shiva and Pārvatī reveal the same tension between creative asceticism, fueled by the performance of austerities (*tapas*) for extensive periods, and thunderous lovemaking, also for vast ages until all the gods are alarmed by earthquakes. According to the Purāṇas, the sometimes fractious pair engage in endless games of dice, with throws corresponding to the cycle of *yugas*. Pārvatī always wins. She is credited with the emergence of Shiva's third eye when she playfully covered his eyes during his meditation.

For the most part, the benign aspects of Pārvatī are sufficient to stabilize and domesticate the wild side of Shiva, the outsider god. When seated in her *yoni*, his permanently erect *liṅga* represents totality, an order canceling chaos. In the language of philosophy, she is *prakṛiti*, primal matter that complements his transcendent spirit, *puruṣa*. As the left side of Shiva when he becomes Ardhanaṛīśvara, the god who is half female, Pārvatī provides the same completeness as when her *yoni* encircles his member in myth and in the temple and shrine altars that later became standard for Shaiva worship.

Like Durgā, Sāvitrī is a goddess who may have had pre-Vedic Indus Valley Civilization roots before surfacing in the Mahābhārata. She is the indomitable heroine who outwits Death himself to resurrect her young husband, Satyavān, in a myth that was expanded in many Purāṇas and served as the source for a woman's *vrata* (vow), widely practiced today. Sāvitrī is associated with another archaic female, Rohiṇī, both the "red girl" or bride at menarche and the "red star" Aldebaran in solar-stellar time reckoning.

The two principal figures in the Rāmāyaṇa of Vālmīki, perhaps the earlier of the two epics, are Rāma, heroic warrior prince of Ayodhyā, and his wife Sītā, who was said to have appeared as a "furrow" in a crop field. To the central narrative belong the abduction of Sītā by the demon Rāvaṇa, king of Laṅkā, the subsequent battle for her rescue, Rāma's doubts about her chastity during captivity, her exile to the forest, and two conflicting endings to the narrative. In one she voluntarily steps into a funeral fire and is consumed, then is restored to a royal

life by Brahmā, who declares her to be the virtuous goddess Lakshmī, even as Rāma is Vishnu. In the other version, a late addition, the earth, her mother, opens to accept her back, and the epic continues without her. Later regional versions of the Sanskrit Rāmāyaṇa followed in Tāmil, Hindi, Bengali, and other languages from the twelfth century on, and Sītā became not only a permanent member of the pantheon but also a role model of loyalty and suffering for all women.

The Mahābhārata perpetuated particular groups known as *mātāras* or *mātrikās* (Mothers), variously seven, eight, nine, ten, or sixteen in number, usually considered to be on the dark side of feminine power. One prominent list of seven is the *saptamātrikās*, often identified as wives of the seven Rishis, as well as the constellation Pleiades. Along with Skanda-Kārttikeya, *mātrikās* can be demonesses afflicting a fetus or child with disease or death up to the age of sixteen. They are *grahas* (seizers), often confused in popular etymology with the nine celestial *grahas* of astrological reckoning.

It is the Purāṇas that elevated to greater prominence the goddesses Lakshmī and Pārvatī, wives of the two greatest gods, Vishnu and Shiva, along with Sarasvatī, now the wife of Brahmā, and a number of other goddesses, including great rivers such as Gaṅgā (the Ganges) and Yamunā. Lakshmī was featured in both epics as a treasured product of the churning of the ocean by warring gods and demons and this myth became a stock reference in the Purāṇas. But one Purāṇa, the Mārkaṇḍeya, emerged with a definitive set of myths of Mahādevī, the great goddess. Chapters 81–93 are an oft-recited sixth-century text known as the Devī Māhātmya. In the ongoing wars between gods and demons, the latter, the Asuras, are victorious and the world imperiled. No god, not even Vishnu or Shiva, can stand against Mahisha, the buffalo-headed Asura champion. The salvation of the world occurs only when the combined *tejas*, fiery splendor, of all the gods merges into a woman who becomes the invincible Devī. In detailed descriptions of horrific combat, Devī, aided by her ferocious lion, is called Caṇḍikā, Ambikā, Shrī, Durgā, and some thirty other names as she easily dispatches demon hordes and generals with trident, spear, arrows, sword, noose, thunderbolt, discus, and other weapons provided by the powerless gods. First, Mahisha is beheaded by her sword, then as Devī turns into the dreaded Kālī, with black face and lolling tongue, the demon pair Caṇḍa and Muṇḍa meet the same fate. Next, Raktabīja, whose every drop of spilled blood becomes yet another demon, falls lifeless as the insatiable goddess with cruel laughter drinks his blood. Finally, in ultimate victory, she spears to death the last demon pair, Shumba and Nishumba, kings who had foolishly attempted to woo this beautiful, deadly goddess.

While the majority of goddesses are married and more or less subordinate to their divine husbands, it is the independence of ferocious and warlike Durgā and Kālī that sets them apart and suggests an indigenous, non-Aryan heritage. Durgā became known as Mahishamardinī, slayer of the buffalo-headed Mahisha, and her autumn festival, Durgā-pūjā, celebrated her victory, complete with the beheading of a buffalo. Some versions of her career have Mahisha as her lover or husband, slain and resurrected as her devotee, and still today Pōtu Rāju takes that role in Andhra Pradesh. Tales of impassioned warriors who decapitate or disembowel themselves in self-sacrifice before the goddess are extensions of this motif, literal variants of the symbolic themes of *ātmayajña* in epic as well as later *bhakti* traditions.

In classical Hinduism, neither Durgā nor Kālī is a mother, the two sons of Pārvatī are born without her assistance, and Shrī-Lakshmī, while closely associated with agricultural fertility and the ideal wife to Vishnu, is not celebrated as a mother. And yet first the epics and then the Purāṇas featured groups of *mātrikās* (mothers), many of them destroyers of children. A late assembly, documented from the tenth century, is said to haunt every cremation-burial ground. Popularly known in North India as Mahāvidyās, they are another illustration of a great goddess with multiple forms, in this case ten. They include Kālī as leader, Tārā, Tripura-sundarī, Bhuvaneshvarī, the self-decapitating Chinnamastā, Bhairavī, Dhūmāvatī, Bagalāmukhī, Mātāṅgī—all fierce—and one benign cohort, Kamalā, a variant of Srī-Lakshmī. Tantric worship centers upon them, particularly the *vāmācāra*, or left-hand path, whereas the comparatively benign Durgā may be favored by the moderate right-hand path of *yoga*. The seven mothers lived on, often as neighborhood goddesses of epidemic disease. One of the most deadly on the subcontinent until the mid-1970s was smallpox, Mother Pox: Shītalā Mātā in the North, Māriyamman in the South, and Manasā the serpent goddess in Bengal.

The tenth-century Bhāgavata Purāṇa contains popular myths of Krishna and the *gopīs*, the souls of humans who adore him and, although married women, long to unite with him, deplore his absence, and go as a lamenting group to find him. Until Krishna eventually multiplies himself to dance with all the *gopīs*, one among them seems to be successful in love-play with the god. It remains for the *Gītā govinda*, a twelfth-century Sanskrit devotional poem by Jayadeva, to provide her name, Rādhā. Like Sāvitrī, Draupadī, and Sītā, this singular heroine is elevated to goddess status in the Brah-mavaivarta Purāṇa and the Devī-bhāgavata Purāṇa. A portion of the latter work, known as the Devī Gītā, became popular as an independent text at some point

between the thirteenth and sixteenth centuries. The emphasis in the Devī-Bhāgavata and its Gītā encapsulation is on Devī as cosmic Mother, sovereign of all, nurturer, and provider of saving wisdom.

Major Purāṇas were adapted into Tāmil, and numerous *sthalapurāṇas* focusing on regional temple and pilgrimage traditions of South India were produced in Sanskrit, Tāmil, or both languages. Several great temples became known for annual festivals celebrating the sacred marriage of goddesses and gods. Best known is the Madurai temple tradition, observing the wedding of Mīnākshī and Sundareshvara and following a Tāmil text titled *Shiva's Sacred Games*. Mīnākshī, the “fish-eyed goddess” and queen, is a form of Pārvatī, as Sundareshvara is a manifestation of Shiva; their marriage lasts for ten or more days in the month of Citrā (April–May). The heroine-goddess of the Tāmil epic Shilappatikāram is Kannaki, punisher of an unjust kingdom, who destroys Madurai in her all-consuming wrath by tearing off her left breast and hurling it at the city.

Goddesses in Action

Only a fraction of existing goddesses have been mentioned at this point. And new goddesses do emerge. In the 1950s the goddess of contentment Santoshī Mā was worshiped by a small following. In 1975, however, a film-musical, *Jay Santoshī Mā*, expanded her circle of devotees nationwide, and vows, fasts, tracts, shrines, temples, and pilgrimages quickly followed. And living goddesses also appear. Ammachi, born in Kerala in 1953, has traveled with devotional musicians throughout the United States to give *darshan* (sight) to her devotees. The ecstatic career of Anandamāyī Mā (1896–1982) spread her following from East Bengal in the 1920s to more than a score of ashrams and gained the attention of India's ruling elite.

One feature of goddesses in India is their high visibility in daily life. They do not remain passive images waiting for worship. Knowing that goddesses specialize in *māyā* (illusion), people may glimpse them in the night, or hear ankle bells when they pass by. Every village, town, or great metropolis has multiple neighborhood goddesses, each belonging to a specific zone—literally, her turf—connecting crop fields, the food given by her soil, and her devotees who reside and work upon her. Her borders are well defined, even in a crowded city, and her festivals—for example, the nine nights of Durgā-pūjā—are ritual occasions to reinforce her lines of control vis-à-vis other goddesses, gods, and demonic powers. In South India, those who are possessed by a fierce neighborhood goddess may rage from border to border demanding blood; the culminating rituals before her image are the beheadings of goats, surrogates in modern times for the

buffalo (Mahisha) of a few decades ago. All goddesses, gentle vegetarians as well as the passionately horrific, may be carried in processions to circumambulate the neighborhood or entire village. The most violent may be extremely reluctant to leave their temples, particularly ancient ones, and must be coaxed, coerced, then forced out to maintain the borders. The goddess Gaṅgamma, a heap of coiled and knotted jute ropes in a grain basket, will be lowered once a year from her guardian post high in the rafters. Goddesses of epidemic diseases such as poxes, cholera, and plague may live right on the neighborhood border. Once a year, in the hot season when diseases strike, they will be invited into the neighborhood, where each becomes “sister” to all residents. In some regions, the goddess sleeps on every hearth, and no cooking can be done. The expectation is that each honored guest (and her dread disease) will depart with as little damage as possible.

Neighborhood possession ritualists capable of harboring goddesses and spirits of the dead will be routinely consulted by people who desire to know the well-being of their deceased loved ones, particularly children, or who crave answers to everyday problems such as oppressive dreams, a lost watch, “body weakness,” and the like. Those possessed will exhibit in speech and movement all the mood swings of the goddess between states of rage and repose. Devotees expect consistent ambiguity, the very nature of *śakti* in a world that betrays malevolence and benevolence in unforeseen measure.

Suffixed with the honorific “Mother” (*mātā* in the North, *amma* in the South), neighborhood goddesses may have personal names known only to a limited region. A farmer, fisher, or washer-caste person may, for example, find in a plowed field or the river an old goddess image or a curiously shaped stone, set it up for the community, and someone will provide the name by which it will be worshiped. Traits in her local lore or iconography may link her to a classical, textual goddess, but in some cases she appears to stand alone in a private oral tradition.

Today innumerable goddesses receive worship in home shrines, usually located close to cooking and dining areas. They are represented by small framed lithographs or images of brass, wood, terra-cotta, or a patch of turmeric paste on the wall with saffron lines and dots. Most goddesses receive special *pūjā* (worship) during the bright half of a lunar month, sometimes as many as half a dozen different goddesses in fourteen days. But even the inauspicious dark half will contain days, such as every eighth for Kālī, or the seventh of Shrāvaṇa (July–August) or eighth of Phālguna (February–March) for the pox goddess. In many regions, Thursdays or Fridays of certain

months are days to leave the house and worship in a temple or roadside shrine of Lakshmī, while certain Tuesdays are reserved for Gaurī, who also has multiday festivals, depending on regional customs, in Vaishākha (April–May) and Bhādrapada (August–September). The Sāvitrī *vrata* (vow) is fulfilled in Jyeshṭha (May–June) when women water, then wrap thread around a banyan tree as many as 108 times while hearing again of the cleverness and persistence of Sāvitrī in resurrecting her husband Satyavān from the grasp of Yama. This vow shelters her own husband from death and therefore herself from painful widowhood. Sītā's birthday is in Vaishākha, and in Shrāvaṇa (July–August) the swinging festival for Rādhā and Krishna is a joyous five-day celebration. The busiest festival of the year is Navarātra, the “nine nights” of Durgā-pūjā at autumn harvest time in Āshvina (September–October), when neighborhoods create on bamboo frames paper and clay images of Durgā that are worshiped, paraded, then abandoned in a river. As goddess of learning, Sarasvatī is worshiped earlier in the same month, particularly by teachers, students, and musicians. Kārttika (October–November) is exceptional for Lakshmī and the festival of lamps, but there is also a special Kālī pūjā. Caitra (March–April) begins the new year and the hot season with another Navarātra featuring goddesses on the move every night, and the bountiful harvest-mother Annapūrṇā is honored in the home or a local shrine.

David M. Knipe

See also **Goddess Images; Shiva and Shaivism; Vishnu and Avatāras**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Brown, C. Mackenzie. *The Devī Gītā, the Song of the Goddess: A Translation, Annotation and Commentary*. Albany: State University of New York, 1998. Sanskrit text translated with detailed comments on this brief portion of the much longer Devī-bhāgavata Purāṇa.
- Erndl, Kathleen M. *Victory to the Mother: The Hindu Goddess of Northwest India in Myth, Ritual, and Symbol*. New York: Oxford University, 1993. A study of Sherānvālī, the Lion Rider, in the Panjab, Haryana, Chandigarh, Delhi, and Himachal Pradesh; 20 illustrations.
- Harman, William P. *The Sacred Marriage of a Hindu Goddess*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989. Madurai is the locus of the annual ten-day festival marriage of Shiva and Mīnākshī; appendix with translation from Tamil of the chapter on sacred marriage from *Shiva's Sacred Games*; 20 illustrations.
- Hawley, John S., and Donna M. Wulff, eds. *Devī: Goddesses of India*. Berkeley: University of California, 1996. Thirteen essays divided between the “goddess as supreme and goddess as consort” and “goddesses who mother and possess”; 31 illustrations.
- Hiltebeitel, Alf. *The Cult of Draupadī*. 2 vols. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988–1991.
- . *Rethinking India's Oral and Classical Epics*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999. These three volumes track Draupadī from her origins as heroine in the Sanskrit Mahābhārata to her career as goddess of a popular South Indian cult; the third volume also considers numerous other oral epics, including Muslim as well as Hindu; 34, 38, and 18 illustrations.
- Kinsley, David. *Hindu Goddesses: Visions of the Divine Feminine in the Hindu Religious Tradition*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1986. A comprehensive and reliable introduction, with chapters devoted to major goddesses and groups; 17 illustrations.
- . *Tantric Visions of the Divine Feminine: The Ten Mahāvīdyās*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997. Monograph on Kālī and other fierce goddesses known since the tenth century in North India as a group called the Mahāvīdyās; 41 illustrations.
- Knipe, David M. “Balancing Raudra and Sānti: Rage and Repose in States of Possession.” In *Vidyārnāvanandanam: Essays in Honour of Asko Parpola*, edited by Klaus Karttunen and Petteri Koskikallio. Helsinki: Studia Orientalia, 2001. Study of possession ritualists who embody and speak as goddesses in coastal Andhra; 4 illustrations.
- Kumar, P. Pratap. *The Goddess Laksmī: The Divine Consort in South Indian Vaisnava Tradition*. Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1997. A study of Shrī Lakshmī from the Pañcarātra Āgamas through Rāmānuja to contemporary Shrī Vaisnavism.
- Meyer, Eveline. *Āṅkālaparamēcūvari: A Goddess of Tamilnadu, Her Myths and Cult*. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1986. Detailed monograph on myths and rituals of the fierce goddess Āṅkālamman and her devotees; 25 illustrations.
- Michaels, Axel, Cornelia Vogelsanger, and Annette Wilke, eds. *Wild Goddesses in India and Nepal*. Bern: Peter Lang, 1996. A good introduction discusses the choice of “wild” in the title; 18 essays from Sanskrit and vernacular sources on a variety of regional and classical goddesses, including Durgā, Kālī, Draupadī; 45 illustrations, 9 in color.
- Parpola, Asko. “Vāc as a Goddess of Victory in the Veda and Her Relation to Durgā.” *Zinbun: Annals of the Institute for Research in Humanities, Kyoto University* 34 (1999): 101–143.
- . “The Religious Background of the Sāvitrī Legend.” In *Harāmandalabari*, edited by Ryutaro Tsuchida and Albrecht Wetzler. Reinbek: Dr. Inge Wetzler Verlag für Orientalistische Fachpublikationen, 2000. These two essays summarize and update his earlier works with important insights on pre-Vedic and Vedic roots of Sāvitrī, Gāyatrī, Rohiṇī, Vāc, Durgā, Kālī, and traditions of sacrifice.
- Pintchman, Tracy. *The Rise of the Goddess in the Hindu Tradition*. Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994. A survey of the feminine principle in Vedas and Purāṇas, with attention to *prakṛti*, *māyā*, and *śakti* in philosophical discourse.
- Shulman, David D. *Tamil Temple Myth: Sacrifice and Divine Marriage in the South Indian Saiva Tradition*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University, 1980. Chapter 7 examines in detail Tamil motifs of Devī as bride—reluctant, lustful, murderous, maternal, and double; 6 illustrations.

DEVI, SIDDHESHVARI (1908–1977), Indian vocalist. Siddheshvari Devi was one of the greatest exponents of semiclassical forms of Hindustani music.

She received unqualified acclaim from maestro Faiyaz Khan. “Next to Gauhar and Malka, you are the brightest jewel in the diadem of *thumri* music,” he told her (Devi and Chauhan, p. 75). She was conversant with the idiom of the Khayal form, but *thumri* (a semiclassical form of Hindustani music closely associated with dance, dramatic gestures, mild eroticism, evocative love-poetry and folk songs of Uttar Pradesh) was her forte, and her renditions of that music overflowed with emotion and vitality.

Siddheshvari Devi was born into a family of professional musicians from Benares (Varanasi). Her mother died when Siddheshvari was an infant. She was brought up by her grandmother, Maina Devi. Other singers in the family included Vidyadhari Devi, Rajeshwari Devi, and Kamleshwari Devi. Siyaji Maharaj, a singer and teacher who had been employed to train her cousins, discovered Siddheshvari's talent when he heard her singing at her daily chores. After twelve years of study with Siyaji Maharaj, she trained under Rajab Ali Khan of Dewas, Inayat Ali Khan of Lahore, and Bade Ramdasji of Benares.

Siddheshvari Devi's voice was famed for its pathos. She effortlessly blended the musical notes with a lyrical and poetic mood of love and loss, transforming the gestures of Kathak dance into their corresponding musical language. She was famous for the impassioned “voice throw” (*pukar*), which sounded like a cry from an anguished heart. The style of *thumri* singing that she popularized is known as the *purab*. Although the *thumri* emanated from the Lucknow court of Wajid Ali Shah as a song accompanying dance, it later attained autonomous status as a musical form. The *purab* (east) style derived its name from its geographical location, since Benares is east of Lucknow. The main feature of the Benares *thumri* in which Siddheshvari Devi specialized is *bol-banav*, which means evoking subtle shades of mood through a combination of words and phrases. It also extensively exploited the musical potential of the dialects of eastern Uttar Pradesh, which gave it a unique appeal. Siddheshvari Devi also sang *chaiti*, *kajari*, and *tappa* forms as well, which are a cross between the semiclassical and folk music. A recipient of many honors and awards, she left a few commercial recordings for posterity. The hypnotic quality of her voice and its eloquent expressiveness continue to enchant music lovers.

Amarendra Dhaneshwar

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Banerjee, Projesh. *Dance in Thumri*. New Delhi: Abhinav, 1986.
- Bose, Sunil. *Indian Music: Essence and Emotions*. New Delhi: Vikas, 1990.
- Devi, Savita, and Vibha S. Chauhan. *Maa Siddheshwaridevi*. New Delhi: Roli Books, 2000.

Dhar, Sheila. *Here's Someone I'd Like You to Meet: Tales of Innocents, Musicians, and Bureaucrats*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Ranade, Ashok D. *Keywords and Concepts: Hindustani Classical Music*. New Delhi: Promilla, 1990.

DHARMA. See **Hinduism (Dharma).**

DHARMA SHĀSTRA *Dharma Shāstra* (Texts of righteous legal conduct) in the wider sense is an important element of Indian tradition, and its literature is a genre of more than two thousand titles. Hinduism is less an orthodoxy than an “orthopraxy”: Hindu society is less concerned with what a person thinks than with his or her adherence to traditional social norms. In the narrower sense, *Dharma Shāstra* is the name of several ancient texts, composed about two millennia ago, in several Vedic schools that sought to establish social norms. They grew out of school traditions that preserved and cultivated the sacred Vedic texts: some devoted to the Rig Veda, the oldest sacrificial hymns; others to the Yajur Veda, the collection of formulae used during rituals; others to the Sāma Veda, a collection of melodies, with their attendant dogmatic and ritualistic works. Technical works that dealt with the proper execution of official rituals (*Shrauta Sūtra*), the domestic rites and life cycle obligations (*Grihya Sūtra*), and the rules of righteous conduct (*Dharma Sūtra* or *Dharma Shāstra*) together were called *Kalpa Sūtra* “ceremonial manuals” and formed one of the later layers of Vedic works. Among them, the texts dealing with *dharma* are generally the youngest, dating perhaps from the third century B.C. to the second century A.D. All dates assigned to these texts are tentative; though attributed to fictitious authors, the texts actually grew within their school traditions, often quoting one another. Texts whose core may be very old also contain some rather recent statements, make any exact dating impossible.

The fact that these works originated in a religious and ritualistic tradition explains their emphasis on ritual purity, virtue, and avoidance of acts considered sinful. The aim was the attainment of heaven, spiritual betterment, or bliss, which could be defined in different ways. The authors and compilers of these works were Brahmans, members of the priestly class that was generally entrusted with the preservation of tradition and the education of the young. Though many of their rules were clearly aimed primarily at their fellow Brahmans, they took note also of prevailing customs and attitudes concerning societal problems. There were three major topics: proper conduct, legal procedure, and atonement. Legal problems concerning inheritance, marriage, and adoption gained more prominence in time, and criminal

acts, which were first considered sins requiring expiation, were gradually regarded as antisocial acts that required punishment by the king or his judges. Yet, in spite of their growing legal sophistication, the authors of *Dharma Shāstra* never lost sight of the spiritual roots of their tradition: medieval authors based their rules on the priority among heirs on the question of which of them would confer greater spiritual benefit on the deceased. Texts that could be called legal texts emerged around the middle of the first millennium A.D., and the second millennium saw the creation of several large compendia by courtiers, who under royal orders tried to summarize and harmonize the traditional rules as they applied in their time and to their regions.

The *Dharma Shāstras* in a narrower sense were the basis of all later Hindu legal developments, and their authority was never challenged directly. The principles of righteousness (*dharma*) are unchanging—though a good number of rules no longer apply in our decadent age (*kali yuga*). The ritual killing of cows that was enjoined in Vedic ritual is no longer practiced, and other practices are nowadays “decried by the world” (Manu, *Mānava Dharma Shāstra*). Over the centuries, many commentaries were written on the authoritative texts, often clarifying difficult or ambiguous passages, at times giving a new interpretation more in tune with contemporary customs. While commentators would not challenge the authority of the basic text, their interpretation could become authoritative, even if later judged erroneous. In British India, the courts employed Indian pandits to advise judges on traditional law as embodied in *Dharma Shāstra*. Gradually the growing body of case law and, after India gained independence, the passing of new laws limited the role of *Dharma Shāstra* in the Indian courts, though it still plays a role in cases involving religious groups.

Conflicts and Interpretation

Some of the old *Dharma Shāstras* (e.g., those ascribed to Gautama, Āpastamba) were composed in a terse form of prose, the so-called sūtras (threads), others (e.g., that ascribed to Manu, *Mānava Dharma Shāstra*) in verse; both forms were chosen with a view to aid memorization. Contradictions caused by gradual growth sometimes remain: Manu gives rules regulating the levirate (when a man begets a son with the widow of a close relative), then condemns the practice; the killing of animals is alternately allowed and condemned. In cases of conflict, a rule for which a reason is clearly visible is not as potent as one for which it is not; the author might have possessed insight into a higher metaphysical truth that we have no right to challenge. Interpretative skills were honed in the exegesis of Vedic rules, and ambiguous passages were discussed with great sophistication. Current customs that

could not be traced to any of the *Dharma Shāstras* could, it is argued, be based on lost Vedic texts, since it was known that not all Vedic texts survived into later times.

Many *Dharma Shāstras* explicitly refer to some divine authority who revealed the rules to a holy man in the distant past. There is no reasoning or reference to historical cases. The reasoning was presumably worked out long ago; the existing custom was idealized and systematized and handed down in this state to all future generations. The same attitude is evident in the Indian science of grammar: the wonderful descriptions of the Sanskrit language presuppose a penetrating analysis that is never revealed—we see only the application in the production of correct form. There is a characteristic difference in Buddhist canonical law, which based itself on alleged instances and reasoned rulings by the Buddha himself, fictitious though they might be.

Hartmut E. Scharfe

See also **Hinduism (Dharma); Judicial System, Modern**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Derrett, J. Duncan M. *Dharmaśāstra and Juridical Literature*. Wiesbaden, Germany: Otto Harrassowitz, 1973.
 Kane, Pandurang Vaman. *History of Dharmaśāstra*. 5 vols. Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1930–1962.
 Lingat, Robert. *The Classical Law of India*, translated by J. D. M. Derrett. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973.
 Olivelle, Patrick. *The Āśrama System*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1993.

DHRUPAD *Dhrupad* (Sanskrit, *dhruva pada*, “fixed words,” i.e., “refrain”) is a North Indian vocal and instrumental musical genre and one of the oldest documented South Asian mediums of performance. The modern *dhrupad* probably descends from a form (*dhurva*) mentioned in the *Nāṭyashāstra* that developed in the Gwalior region (central Indo-Gangetic Plain) and probably reached a peak of popularity in the sixteenth century. Most *dhrupads* are religious in nature, praising Hindu gods (particularly Krishna) although some texts praise kings.

The *dhrupad* tradition is arguably a consequence of both secular and sacred contexts, playing an important role in the multitude of royal courts in pre-independence India and in sacred traditions such as *havelī sangīt*, the devotional music of the Vallabhacarya Vaisnavas of north-central and northwestern India. In *havelī sangīt*, *dhrupad* still serves as liturgical praise, with its text drawn primarily from the *Gītā Govinda*. The musicians (often hereditary), who lead the worship, sing each line of the devotional *dhrupad*

(accompanying themselves on the *pakhāwaj*), and then repeat the line with the congregation. The twentieth century saw a resurgence of interest in *dhrupad* as a concert feature through performances by members of the Dagar family and artists such as Ustad Asad Ali Khan.

Musical Structure

The performance of *dhrupad* almost always begins with an introductory, free-time *ālāp*, which can range from a brief affirmation of the melodic underpinnings of the performance (in religious contexts) to elaborate note-by-note explorations of the possibilities inherent in the underlying pitch resources of *rāga* (melody). The concert *dhrupad ālāp* generally has two sections: the first (the *ālāp* of the *ālāp*) has the usual pattern of a growing pitch ambitus in free tempo, and the second (the *nomtom* or *jor*), an unmeasured, but pulsed, presentation of the *rāga*.

The metered portion (i.e., involving *tāla*, cyclical musical time) of the *dhrupad* begins with the *bandish* (“contrivance,” or “plot”), a fixed musical statement generally composed of four sections, although some *dhrupads* have only the first two parts. The first and most important section is the *sthāī* (stable), the phrase to which the composition repeatedly returns and that usually occupies the *purvang* (lower tetrachord) of the *rāga*. As with many Indian musical terms, *sthāī* has more than one meaning. *Sthāī* is similar to the Karnatak term *pallavi*.

The second part of the *bandish*, the *antarā* (Sanskrit, “intermediate,” or “contrast”), complements the *sthāī* and often occupies the *uttarāṅg* (upper tetrachord) of the *rāga*, ideally stabilizing the upper tonic. In instances where the *sthāī* occupies the *uttarāṅg*, the *antarā* may reside in the *purvang* or subtonic range (*mandra*).

In a full *bandish*, the two additional sections parallel and imitate the *sthāī* and *antarā* in form and function. The first, the *sañcārī* (Sanskrit, “wandering”), occupies the *mandra* and is often parallel to or nearly identical with the *sthāī*. The second, the *ābhog* (Sanskrit, “fullness”), often contains material from the *antarā* and returns the composition to the *sthāī*.

At the completion of the *bandish*, *dhrupadiyas* (performers of *dhrupad*) in a concert setting generally launch into a series of improvisations based on material that they juxtapose with the *sthāī*. Many describe this section of improvisation as the *bolbanao* (Hindustani, *bol* “syllable” + *banna* “composed”), mentioning three kinds of improvisation: *laykāri*, *bol-bānt*, and *bol-tān*.

Laykāri (Hindustani, *laya* “tempo” or “rhythm” + *kārṇā* “to do”) is an improvisational style in which the performer concentrates on the *tāl* and on rhythmic

figures that complement the listener’s rhythmic and metric expectations.

Bol-bānt (Hindustani, *bol* “syllable” + *bāntnā*, “to distribute” or “to apportion”) or *bol-banāo* (word making) are variations on the composition involving the partition or distribution of words. Commonly, a performer will present an entire section of the composition as a unit in its given tune (or in other configurations suitable to the *rāga*) and then systematically reduce the time values by a half, a third, and a quarter of their original length (*dugun lay*, *tigun lay*, and *caugun lay*).

Bol tān (Hindustani, *bol* “syllable” + *tān* “exercise”) is a melodic embellishment with words from the composition. In this type of variation, the original words of the composition are vehicles for the presentation of phrases showing the *rāga* (usually in *laykāri* style).

Performance Practice

The accompaniment for *dhrupad* has some interesting and unique features. In addition to the ubiquitous drone of the *tamburā* common to almost all classical music, the most characteristic accompaniment for *dhrupad* is the double-ended, hand-beaten drum, the *pakhāwaj*. Unlike other performance idioms within the *Hindustāni sangīt paddhati*, the drummer often plays elaborate passages (usually extended cadences) for much of the metered performance (depending on the repertoire and the tastes of the soloists).

When *dhrupad* singers look for melodic instrumental accompaniment, they often chose the *sārangi* (a bowed, short-necked lute with three gut melody strings and a host of sympathetic strings), although in some cases the *bansri* (flute) or harmonium appears in the ensemble. The principal method of melodic accompanying is to heterophonically trail the singer in improvisations, to play in unison during the *bandish*, and to fill in during those times when the singer(s) are silent.

Solo instrumental performances of *dhrupad* commonly feature the *bin* (Sanskrit, *vīṇā*, “lute”), a practice that attests to the historic ties of this genre with India’s musical heritage. These performances, commonly with *pakhāwaj* accompaniment, parallel vocal performances, substituting a *jor* section (melodic notes and phrases alternating with strokes on an instrument’s drone strings) in place of the *nomtom* (composed of rhythmic nonlexical syllables) for the pulsed but unmetered exploration of the *rāga*.

Gordon Thompson

See also *Ālāp*; *Music*; *Rāga*; *Vina*

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Meer, Wim Van Der. *Hindustani Music in the Twentieth Century*. New Delhi: Allied Publishers, 1980.
- Thielemann, Selina. *The Darbbanga Tradition: Dhrupada in the School of Pandit Vidur Mallik*. Varanasi: Indica Books, 1997.

DIASPORA

This entry consists of the following articles:

ECONOMIC IMPACT

HISTORY OF AND GLOBAL DISTRIBUTION

ECONOMIC IMPACT

Although Indians have been migrating to other lands for thousands of years, large-scale migration only began following the end of slavery in the 1830s. Most migrants went to South or Southeast Asia; about 42 percent settled in Burma, another 25 percent in Ceylon, 19 percent in British Malaya, and the rest in Africa, the Caribbean, and the Pacific.

The vast majority of Indian emigrants went as indentured labor. Contract length varied with distance with short-term arrangements more common within South and Southeast Asia. The *kangani* system (the *kangani*, or “head man,” was a professional recruiter, who often recruited whole gangs from a village) characterized migration to British Malaya and Ceylon (Sri Lanka), which constituted two-thirds of early Indian emigration. A variant of this practice, known as the *maistry* system, played a similar role in migration to Burma (Myanmar). British colonies (Burma, Ceylon, and Malaya nearby, as well as distant Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Fiji) were the primary destinations for overseas migration. Dutch and French colonies in Reunion Island, Guadeloupe, Martinique, Mauritius, and Suriname also became home to considerable numbers of Indian migrants.

The migrants were mostly unskilled, from the lower castes, and hailed primarily from the United Provinces (present-day Bihar and east Uttar Pradesh), Tamil Nadu, Andhra Pradesh, and Maharashtra. As with the great trans-Atlantic flows of the nineteenth century, substantial wage difference (from five to eight times what they would earn in India) was the key driver. The risks were large, however. Mortality rates during passage were high. Contracts were routinely abused, and suicide rates were also high, which might partly explain the high return rates. Of the 30.2 million who left India between 1834 and 1937, 23.9 million returned, resulting in a net migration of 6.3 million. As with contemporary migration, migrants sent remittances home (using postal savings) and usually returned with considerable savings. The average cash

savings brought back by indentured Indian migrants returning from Mauritius in late 1870s was equivalent to about four years of income at home.

The second wave of migration was the “free” or “passage” migration of traders, clerks, bureaucrats, and professionals, mostly to East and South Africa, and, in smaller numbers, to other British colonies where indentured laborers had settled earlier. This migration continued in small numbers into the first half of the twentieth century. Following the end of World War II, postwar reconstruction and an acute labor shortage created a large demand for unskilled and semiskilled workers in the United Kingdom. These labor shortages drew large numbers of Indians, mainly from Punjab and Gujarat. A modest number of professionals and traders also migrated during this period. These numbers were considerably supplemented by “twice migrant” East African Asians (especially of Gujarati origin) into the United Kingdom in the late 1960s and early 1970s.

Two unrelated events sparked the next major flow of emigration from the late 1960s onward. First, the sharp increase in global oil prices and the resulting economic boom created a large demand for overseas labor in the Middle East. The majority of Indian emigrants were unskilled or semiskilled, although in comparison to earlier migration waves there were considerable numbers of skilled migrants as well. Since the policies of the Middle East countries made permanent settlement extremely difficult, Indian migration to this region has been inherently temporary. Migrants to these countries, especially women, have also been vulnerable, with limited civil rights and protections. While most eventually returned home, some skilled migrants often moved on to countries like Australia and Canada.

Second, the liberalization of U.S. immigration law in 1965 led to a large emigration of highly skilled Indian professionals and students seeking to study in and eventually immigrate to the United States. The large demand for information technology workers in the United States in the late 1990s led to another wave of young professional immigrants. However, since most came with temporary work visas, a relatively larger, though still modest, fraction returned home. The Indian-origin population in the United States grew from around 10,000 in 1960 to nearly 1.7 million by 2000. This migrant stream has been the most highly educated, compared both to other immigrants to the United States, as well as to any other Indian migrant streams.

By the beginning of the new millennium, it was estimated that the Indian diaspora consisted of about 20 million people and spanned over 110 countries. There were 10,000 or more overseas Indians in 48 countries, and



Kerala Airport. Referred to as the “gateway to paradise” in its advertising, modern-day Kerala Airport. Although migration has not abated, return home is on the upswing, drawn by (and fueling) India’s improving economy. AMIT PASRICHA.

11 countries had more than half a million persons of Indian origin. More than fourth-fifths of the diaspora lived in middle- and high-income countries, and more than 90 percent of those who lived in low-income countries were concentrated in just one (Myanmar). The diaspora from the first two waves of migration (in the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries) has enjoyed mixed fortunes. On the one hand, this immigrant group on average is better off in terms of per capita income, when compared to both the society from which it emigrated, as well as in many cases that into which it settled. The latter holds true for many countries where there is a significant Indian-origin population (Malaysia and Trinidad are notable exceptions). On the other hand, the diaspora suffers from ethnic tensions in many countries and, periodically, has been politically disenfranchised in the Caribbean, East Africa, Fiji, Myanmar, and in South Africa under the apartheid regime. The large “generational distance” of this diaspora means that its economic and family ties to India are quite weak, but it continues to draw religio-cultural sustenance from its Indian roots.

In recent years, international migration and the establishment of a significant diaspora have had considerable political, economic, and cultural effects on India. This is particularly true of the migrant streams of the post-independence period. During this time, international migration and the diaspora’s engagement with India have progressed through three distinct phases. Initially, optimism in independent India’s future led many of those who went to study abroad to return and help build domestic institutions, especially public institutions in higher education and research and the public sector. By the mid-1960s, the optimism had begun to fade and, as opportunities opened up first in the United States and later in the Gulf countries, as well as in Canada, Australia, and New Zealand, one-way high-skilled migration, or the so-called brain drain, increased significantly. This pattern continued into the early 1990s. Although migration has not abated during the most recent phase, circulatory and return migration has increased, drawn by (and fueling) India’s improving economic prospects. Unlike the generation immediately following independence, however, the

principal institutional mechanism of return has been the private, rather than public, sector.

Financial remittances, which emerged as an important part of India's balance of payments since the mid-1970s, constitute the diaspora's most visible economic contribution to India. By the late 1990s, remittances were about six times net capital transfers from international capital markets and official sources such as the World Bank. Before this time, India's policy makers operated under conditions of foreign exchange scarcity. Attracting inflows from nonresident Indians (NRIs) has been a part of official policy since 1970, when the first plan to attract NRI flows was devised. Inflows from NRIs have come through both the current account (remittances) and the capital account (NRI deposits), in contrast to the Chinese diaspora, which invests directly in the country of origin. The rate of foreign direct investment (FDI) by the Chinese diaspora is nearly twenty times that of the Indian diaspora, while remittances by the Indian diaspora have been about seven times those from the Chinese diaspora. Until the early 1990s, most NRI remittances came from the Middle East. Since then, North America has also become a prominent source. Both remittances and NRI deposits surged in this period and, by the end of 2003, NRI deposits were one-third of India's foreign exchange reserves, or about one-sixth of the total deposits by resident Indians in commercial banks. For the most part, NRI capital flows have been relatively stable.

Financial remittances have had multiple effects, ranging from increased consumption levels to providing social insurance, both for households and at the national level, by mitigating the effects of external shocks. They have also had considerable distributional consequences, affecting income inequalities across states, social groups, and households. In Kerala, the largest recipient state, remittances account for nearly a quarter of state net domestic product and appear to have had considerable policy incentive effects as well, by reducing pressures for policy change. The use of remittances to build places of worship appears to have contributed to both an increasingly competitive dynamic of religious consumption and support for more extreme groups.

By the 1990s, India's human capital-rich diaspora, especially in the United States, emerged to become an international business asset for the country. Indians' success in the Silicon Valley provided broader and improved global perceptions of Indian technology and talent. These global "reputation" effects also translated into political leverage in both source and destination countries, with positive spillovers for Indo-U.S. relations. In addition to information technology, diasporic networks (mostly Gujarati Palanpuri Jains) have also played an

important role in India's rising status as a world leader in the diamond industry.

The Indian diaspora and migration have also had considerable political and social consequences. Negative political effects have manifested themselves through financial contributions and moral support for extremist political parties, reactionary social and religious groups, and separatist movements. Whether financially backing hard-line Hindutva organizations, insurgencies in North-East India, Sikh separatism in the 1980s, or militant Kashmiri groups, the diaspora has periodically fished in troubled Indian waters. Conversely, support for the diaspora led India to covertly back the separatist Sri Lankan Tamils in the 1980s.

Perhaps the most important effects of migration have been the subtle and dynamic effects of "social remittances" on reshaping individual preferences and social norms at both local and national levels. There is anecdotal, though little hard evidence, that Indian political leaders, both local and national, are paying more attention to the policy preferences of the Indian diaspora. So many Indian elites now have global family portfolios that their preferences are changing as well, affected by their overseas family networks.

In the cultural sphere, the diaspora has had influence ranging from music (such as *bhangra-rap*) to literature (especially in English). But its effects are most evident in India's most potent contemporary cultural force, namely Bollywood films, which have consciously sought to cater to the tastes of the diaspora.

Official government policy has taken note of such changes. Until the 1980s, government policies and the diaspora's attitudes reflected mutual apathy and disdain. The Indian government did little to press for better treatment of the diaspora when it faced discrimination or expulsion (as in Uganda). India's fears of the outside world were reflected in not only its policies toward international trade and FDI, but also in an apathy, bordering on resentment, toward its more successful diaspora. In the 1990s the transformation of the ideological climate in India and the success of the diaspora, especially in the United States, instilled much greater self-confidence in both. The diminished defensiveness that resulted has been an important reason for the growing links and stronger bonds that have transformed relations between the two. In 2003 the government of India organized the first Pravasi Bharatiya Divas, officially sealing India's recognition of its diaspora. Members of the diaspora were granted dual citizenship, although this privilege was confined to those living in a select group of rich countries, excluding virtually all of the diaspora that had migrated prior to independence. Whether and in what ways this changes the diaspora's self-identity and its relationship

with India remains to be seen. However, given India's demographics and those of industrialized countries, international migration from India will continue to grow—and with it the diaspora's effects in reshaping both India and the countries of its destination.

Devesh Kapur

See also **Demographic Trends since 1757; Kerala, Model of Development**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Davis, K. *The Population of India and Pakistan*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1951.
- Government of India. *High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora*. New Delhi: GOI, December 2001.
- Kapur, Devesh. "The Indian Diaspora as a Strategic Asset." *Economic and Political Weekly* 38 no. 5 (1–7 February 2003): 445–448.
- Northrup, D. *Indentured Labor in the Age of Imperialism, 1834–1922*. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 1995.
- Tinker, H. *A New System of Slavery: The Export of Indian Labour Overseas, 1830–1920*. London: Hansib, 1993.

HISTORY OF AND GLOBAL DISTRIBUTION

The Indian diaspora, with an estimated strength of 20 million in 2005, spans the globe. Overseas Indians live in different countries, speak different languages, and are engaged in different vocations; despite their differences, they share a common bond: a pride in their cultural heritage and a deep attachment to India.

Undoubtedly, the Indian diaspora is a microcosm of India. Barring a few exceptions, Indian émigrés zealously maintain their regional, ethnic, linguistic, and caste identities. They are known for their resilience, hard work, thrift, and family values. Placing an emphasis on education has enabled them to excel in academic fields and professions like medicine and engineering. Even the descendants of indentured laborers and unskilled workers have relied on education for upward social mobility. Indian communities, particularly Gujaratis and Sindis, have also shown business acumen and entrepreneurial spirit. These qualities, combined with proficiency in English, distinguish the Indian diaspora as an influential group worldwide.

Evolution of the Indian Diaspora

Indians have migrated since the dawn of history. There is evidence of Indian migration to Central Asia, Southeast Asia, and Africa. Migrants included traders, Brahman priests, Buddhist monks, and adventurers. Early Indian migration was entirely peaceful and not a product of military conquest. As a result, Indian culture and civilization deeply influenced these regions.

People of Indian origin began to migrate overseas in significant numbers only in the nineteenth century, driven by economic compulsions. In a uniquely diverse pattern, Indians spread initially to Africa, the Caribbean, Southeast Asia, and Fiji. They migrated in small numbers to the West Coast of Canada and the United States, succeeded in the second half of the twentieth century by a steady outflow of some of India's best professionals to the developed countries of the West. In the wake of the oil boom in the 1970s, India's skilled and semiskilled labor moved to West Asia and the Gulf. Because of their open borders and geographical proximity, Nepal and Sri Lanka have millions of persons of Indian origin; this group is not included within the scope of this article.

Colonial period. The abolition of slavery in the British, French, and Dutch colonies in 1834, 1846, and 1873, respectively, created extreme shortages of labor in these plantation economies. A large number of Indians were recruited as indentured labor and were transported to various parts of the empire. The majority of indentured migrants were induced by unethical, illegal contracts. Most Indians were unaware of the provisions of the contracts, and in many cases were not even correctly informed of the location to which they were being transported. A number of workers did not survive the arduous voyage. Mortality rates were high because of the inhuman conditions of the camps and the cruelty of their employers. Indentured labor was, therefore, nothing but a euphemism for slavery. The extraordinary achievements of Indian workers in the face of these heavy odds were described by Vishwamitra Ganga Aashutosh, a Mauritian poet:

No gold did they find
Underneath any stone they
Touched and turned,
Yet
Every stone they touched
Into solid gold they turned.

In the first phase, beginning in 1834, the majority of emigrants were recruited in the "hill coolie" district of Chota Nagpur division and the Bankura, Birbhum, and Burdwan districts of the Bengal presidency. Soon the recruiting areas were pushed westward into the Hindi-speaking zones, which remained the leading recruiting area, with most of the indentured labor hired from eastern and central Uttar Pradesh and western Bihar, and later from the Madras presidency. They left India by ships from Calcutta and Madras. Subsequently, Indian labor was taken to Sri Lanka and Malaysia under the *kangani* system (in which a foreman acted as a recruiter) and to Burma (Myanmar) under the *maistry* system (in which a labor supervisor was responsible for recruitment) system. France sent labor

from its colonies in Pondicherry and neighboring areas to Reunion, Martinique, and Guadeloupe. Holland recruited indentured Indians for its colony in Suriname. Portugal also recruited Indians from its possessions in Goa, Daman, and Diu for its colonies in Africa and Macao. In the early phase of this migration, the overwhelming majority of migrants were males. It was only in the later period that special efforts were made to recruit females. The indenture system came to an end in 1917. Traders and other enterprising people who voluntarily followed these migrants at their own expense in search of greener pastures came under the “free passage system.”

Indian emigration to what was once the East African Community (Kenya, Uganda, and Tanzania), as well as to the former Northern and Southern Rhodesia (Zambia and Zimbabwe), was necessitated in the nineteenth century by the extension of the British colonial empire to Africa. Eastern African Railways was constructed through the sweat and blood of Indians. Four workers died for each mile of the railway line laid. Indians introduced organized commerce in East Africa, replacing the barter system and establishing regular shops; they were known as *Dukawala* (shopkeepers).

The migration of Indians to North America began in 1903, when Sikh male immigrants from Punjab settled in Vancouver, British Columbia, to work in lumbering, agriculture, and the railroads. Most of these migrants had served in the British army or in the lower echelons of the colonial bureaucracy. As there was a steady increase in the number of Indian workers, the Canadian government passed several laws to limit their entry into Canada. The *Komagata Maru* (a Japanese ship) tragedy of 1914 brought into sharp focus the fortitude of Indian immigrants and the blatantly discriminatory and racist attitude of the Canadian authorities.

Some of these workers radiated southward to California and neighboring areas, as the United States had not yet passed discriminatory legislation. A small number of students who had come to pursue higher education chose to stay in the United States. As a result of lobbying by Indians, the U.S. Congress in 1946 passed an act that gave Indians the right to naturalization and allowed a token quota of one hundred immigrants. This act enabled Dalip Singh Saund, who had come as a student, to become the first Asian member of the U.S. Congress in 1956.

The rule of the British Raj led to the emergence of an Indian community in Great Britain. Some Parsis and Bengalis settled there in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as professionals. The number further increased, as many soldiers of the British Indian army emigrated to Britain. Dadabhai Naoroji was elected as a liberal member to the House of Commons in 1892.

Post-independence period. A steady flow of migration took place after independence that included skilled and unskilled laborers and highly qualified professionals who went to the United Kingdom and other countries of the West to meet the shortages of labor in the wake of World War II. Indian health-care professionals became the backbone of Britain’s national health-care service. Post-independence migration to the United States and Canada was primarily education driven. The U.S. Immigration Act of 1965 and the regulations introduced in Canada in 1967 paved the way for the settlement of a large number of professionals in both countries. The term “brain drain” was coined, primarily in reference to the migration of highly qualified professionals from India to the United States.

Skyrocketing oil prices in 1973 opened new opportunities for India in the Gulf states. The massive requirement of both professionals as well as skilled labor resulted in the emergence of large Indian communities in the oil-producing Arab countries. Indian migrants to the Gulf, however, are unique in that they remain citizens of India, with no prospect of acquiring local citizenship. The presence of Indians in the Gulf countries was an important factor in India’s economic development, particularly with regard to foreign exchange reserves.

Regional Profiles of the Indian Diaspora

Africa: Mauritius and Reunion. The French administration brought about three hundred artisans for the development of their newly acquired colony from 1729 to 1731. Later, from 1816 to 1820, the British government of India dumped some prisoners there to serve out their terms of rigorous imprisonment. With more than 700,000 persons of Indian origin, Mauritius is the only country of the diaspora where Indians constitute 70 percent of the total population. This, coupled with their stewardship of the independence movement, has enabled them to achieve political preeminence since the country’s independence. Beginning with Sir Shivesagar Ramgulum, all the prime ministers of Mauritius until October 2003 were of Indian origin. Indian migrants maintain a commitment to their linguistic and cultural heritage, even creating a lake called Ganga Talaab, into which water from the Ganges and the other sacred rivers of India was poured.

The Indian community in Reunion was estimated to be over 220,000 by 2005, constituting around 30 percent of its population. After 1920, Indians were granted French citizenship and full civic and political rights, giving them a prominent position in civic and political life. The Indian community there is trying to recapture its cultural heritage, which had become somewhat diluted

because of the policies of the colonial rulers and religious conversions in the earlier stages of migration.

South Africa. Indians started arriving in South Africa in 1653, when Dutch merchants sold them as slaves in the Dutch Cape Colony. The pattern of immigration in the nineteenth century was similar to that in other parts of Africa and indeed the world. The indentured labor on plantations was mainly from Bihar, eastern Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Andhra. They were followed by Gujarati traders, who went as “free passengers.” The colonial administration enacted discriminatory laws and inflicted petty humiliations to curtail the progress of Indians, who were emerging as competitors to whites in trade and commerce. Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi’s arrival in 1893 heralded the beginning of a long struggle for equality and dignity by the Indian community and led to the establishment of the Natal Indian Congress (NIC) in 1894, the forerunner of the Transvaal Indian Congress (TIC). Mahatma Gandhi’s legacy of struggle against injustice and racial discrimination inspired the next generation of leaders, including Y. M. Dadoo of the TIC and G. M. (Monty) Naicker of the NIC, to launch a prolonged joint struggle, in cooperation with the African National Congress.

Both President Nelson Mandela and President Mbeki appointed a number of Indians to important offices. Despite the fact that about 60 to 70 percent of South Africa’s Indian diaspora community live below the poverty line, misperception of the affluence of the Indian community among black South Africans has given rise to some resentment. This resentment, coupled with affirmative action policies, has created a sense of vulnerability among Indians, leading many to support the Democratic Alliance Party.

The Indian community of South Africa is proud of its cultural heritage. There are large numbers of places of worship, and all Indian festivals are celebrated with great enthusiasm. Caste divisions have been substantially diluted, and affluent Indians have maintained a strong tradition of philanthropy that has benefited both blacks and Indians. As South Africa is in a state of transition, the future of the Indian community there will depend on its ability to play a positive role in South African reconstruction.

East Africa. The prosperous Indian community of East Africa plays a dominant role in the economy as well as in the professions, and made a significant contribution to the independence movement. The prosperous lifestyle of affluent Indians generated some resentment among Africans. Idi Amin’s brutal treatment and expulsion of Asians deepened the sense of insecurity that had been growing among Indians since the independence of the

former colonies, and many migrated to the developed world. Because of their resilience, professional skills, and dominant role in the economy, the community has managed to overcome this crisis, retaining considerable influence in Kenya and Tanzania. The community maintains close interaction with India and is committed to preserving its cultural heritage. Indians in East Africa have undertaken several philanthropic projects benefiting both Africans and Indians.

Israel. The Indian community in Israel, numbering about 45,000 in 2005, is in a unique position in that country, as its members have not migrated because of any persecution or discrimination. Even though they are losing their distinct identity, the Indian community has considerable interest in maintaining its cultural links with India.

The United Kingdom. Indians constitute the single largest ethnic minority in the United Kingdom. In addition to about 1 million migrants from India, there are about half a million migrants of Indian origin from Africa and the Caribbean. The Asians and Afro-Caribbean communities in the 1950s and 1960s experienced difficulties in assimilation in the United Kingdom owing to their distinct lifestyles and cultures, thereby introducing a new concept of multiculturalism to the U.K. public agenda. From humble origins in the industrial and retail sectors, Indians have risen to become one of the highest-earning and best-educated groups. They have excelled in all spheres of life. Indians are the backbone of the national health service. In the political arena, five Indians have been elected members of Parliament and eleven have been members of the House of Lords, including two baronesses. There are a large number of Indian entrepreneurs and business people in Britain, including steel magnate Lakshmi N. Mittal, Lord Swaraj Paul, and Lord R. K. Bagri.

In addition to the celebrated Indo-Caribbean Sir V. S. Naipaul, the community has produced a number of well-known authors, including Salman Rushdie, Vikram Seth, Amitava Ghosh, and many more. The community takes great pride in its religious and cultural heritage. The United Kingdom is dotted with temples, *gurudwaras* (Sikh temples), and mosques. The Swami Narayan temple, on the outskirts of London, is among the finest examples of Indian architecture. The all-pervasive influence of the Indian community is perhaps best illustrated by its cuisine; chicken *tikka* is one of the most popular dishes in Britain.

The Indian community has formed a number of social, cultural, and political organizations. Almost all wealthy Indians in the United Kingdom have individual trusts or charities for projects pertaining to health, education, or infrastructure in their home states and villages in India. In times of national crisis or natural calamities

in India, these associations and charities raise generous contributions for relief.

Continental Europe. The presence of approximately 200,000 Indians in the Netherlands, 70,000 in Portugal, and 50,000 in France is primarily a product of secondary migration from their former colonies. Small Indian communities in Germany, Italy, and Greece are mostly semi-skilled and unskilled workers, small traders, and restaurant owners. Spain and the Canary Islands have prosperous Sindi communities. The Gujarati community in Antwerp plays a major role in the diamond trade.

The United States. The Indian community in the United States has emerged as the largest and fastest-growing constituent of the diaspora. In addition to 1.7 million people of Indian origin, a large number of secondary and tertiary migrations have taken place from countries in Africa, the Caribbean, Fiji, and other parts of the world. Their achievements and status have earned them the respect of other communities in North America. Nobel Prizes winners Hargovind Khorana (1968, for medicine) and Subramaniam Chandrashekar (1983, for physics) are outstanding examples of the noteworthy first generation of the Asian diaspora.

Thanks to the knowledge-driven migration from the 1950s, Indians have a significant presence of 37,000 doctors of Indian origin in the United States. Indian academics have done particularly well in science, engineering, and management faculties. Indian Institutes of Technology (IIT) graduates are highly respected for their extraordinary achievements. The technology-driven growth of the U.S. economy in the 1990s facilitated the emergence of an entrepreneurial class of Indians in knowledge-based industries, and the synergy between them and their Indian counterparts facilitated the impressive growth of the information technology sector in India. Today India is known as a quality source of technology and service sector workers.

A large number of migrants from East Africa belonged to the Gujarati community, which is known for its business acumen and entrepreneurship. The Patels, a sub-community of Gujaratis, occupy such a dominant position in the hotel industry that sometimes motels are jokingly called “potels.”

Indo-Americans have become more active in the U.S. political arena. Bobby Jindal, a thirty-two-year-old politician, narrowly lost the race for governor of Louisiana. He was subsequently elected to the U.S. Congress. The community has effectively mobilized on issues ranging from the Indian nuclear tests in 1998 to Kargil in 1999 (the conflict with Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir).

They have played a major role in the creation of an India caucus in the U.S. Congress.

Indians in the United States have demonstrated a strong desire to give something back to India. They have contributed generously in times of natural calamities. Influenced by the American tradition of alumni contributions to their alma mater, many Indians, particularly IIT graduates, have established chairs and schools in institutions in India. Some Indo-Americans have also helped establish chairs in Indian studies in universities in the United States. The community has founded a number of nongovernmental organizations engaged in projects in the fields of education, health care, and rural development.

The Indo-American community reflects the diversity of India. Remarkably, their first generation has been able to transmit some of their attachment to culture and traditions to their second generation. Religion plays an important role in the affairs of the Indian community, and they have given priority to the construction of *gurdwaras*, temples, mosques, and a few churches. More than 87 percent of Indo-Americans have completed high school, while 62 percent have some college education. The rate of divorce in the community is also lower than the national average. The per capita income of the Indo-American community is estimated at U.S.\$60,093, compared to the average per capita income of U.S.\$38,885. It is hardly surprising that the Indian community is often referred to as the “model minority.”

Canada. The Indian community in 2005 constituted approximately 3 percent of Canada’s total population of 30 million. In addition, there are 200,000 people of Indian origin who have migrated from Africa, the Caribbean, and Fiji. Indo-Canadians are highly regarded in the fields of medicine, academia, management, and engineering. A large number of migrants from the rural areas of Punjab are employed in sawmills and farms and as taxi drivers. Many migrants from Africa are engaged in small and medium businesses. The community is urbanized, and the majority live in metropolitan areas, especially Toronto, Vancouver, and Montreal. The average annual income of the community is nearly 20 percent higher than the national average.

Indo-Canadians have made their presence felt in mainstream Canadian politics in a relatively short time. Herb Dhaliwal’s appointment as federal cabinet minister and Ujjal Dosanjh’s election as the first nonwhite premier of British Columbia are important landmarks in Canadian politics. There are six Indo-Canadians among the 301 members of Canada’s Parliament. Because of close interaction among first-generation migrants and their families in India, reverberations of developments in Punjab are felt in Canada. Misperception about India’s policies led to

sections of the Sikh community extending substantial support to the separatist movement in the 1980s.

Indo-Canadians adhere to their religions, maintain their cultural identity, and celebrate their festivals with great enthusiasm. More than a hundred *gurdwaras* and temples throughout Canada provide a haven to migrants who face problems of adjustment. A number of Indo-Canadians have been awarded the Order of Canada. They have also contributed generously to various causes in both India and Canada.

The Caribbean: Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, Suriname, Central and South America. As of 2005, an Indian diaspora community of 1 million in the Caribbean had settled in Trinidad and Tobago, Guyana, and Suriname, constituting over 51 percent, 40 percent, and 35 percent of their total populations, respectively. Indentured laborers attained both economic status and some share of political power after a difficult struggle both during and after colonial rule. Most of the migrants in the Caribbean have zealously retained significant elements of their cultural heritage, having resisted attempts at conversion to Christianity at considerable economic and social cost. They have an emotional bonding with India and regard it as their cultural and spiritual home. However, their social exclusivity and the nature of politics in these countries has set them apart, except in Jamaica, where interracial marriages have taken place. The Indo-Caribbeans do, however, participate in the region's three "Cs": cricket, calypso, and carnival.

At the time of independence, a large number of Surinamese Indians migrated to Holland. Many educated Indians from the Caribbean have also migrated to the United States and Canada in search of better opportunities. The Indo-Caribbean community has produced outstanding leaders in the political arena, including Cheddi Jagan, Bharrat Jagdeo, Basdeo Panday, and Jaggernath Lachmon. The French Caribbean islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique also have around 45,000 and 5,000 Indian migrants, respectively.

Southeast Asia. Indians have migrated to Southeast Asia since the beginning of the common era. The Indian imprint is visible even today in the region's language and literature, religion and philosophy, and art and architecture. The major portion of the migration, however, took place during the British Raj. The British relied heavily on Indians for the workforce in plantations as well as for various services such as clerks, teachers, craftsman, and health care workers. Indian moneylenders and the trading community played a significant role in the economy of the colonies.

The Indian community in Burma suffered heavily as a result of the policy of "Burmanization" (replacing English

with Burmese in all teaching establishments and in government administration). This policy led to a large-scale exodus of the professional and educated segments of the Indian community between 1962 and 1964. The present-day community is not prosperous and lags behind in education and the professions, areas they had dominated until independence. A number of Indians in Burma are stateless and have no identity or travel documents. Muslims constitute a large segment of the Indian community.

The Indian community in Malaysia, numbering around 1.6 million, is primarily from South India; approximately 80 percent are Tamils. A large portion of the community are engaged in plantations. However, a small number are involved in services like the police, railways, and education, as well as the legal and medical professions. They have particularly excelled in the fields of medicine and law. A number of these professionals have pursued higher studies in India. Malaysia is, however, one of the few countries where the per capita income of the Indian community is lower than the national average. The Indian community constitutes approximately 9.7 percent of Singapore's population. The current president, S. R. Nathan, is of Indian origin.

In 2005 the Indian community numbered around 85,000 in Thailand, 55,000 in Indonesia, 38,000 in the Philippines, and 7,600 in Brunei. Geographical proximity has facilitated regular interaction with India and has enabled the community to maintain its cultural heritage. Indians throughout Southeast Asia have maintained their religious, cultural, and ethnic identity.

The Asia-Pacific region. The history of migration from India to the Asia Pacific regions dates back to the nineteenth century. A common feature is that the Indian community has mostly adapted itself well to local conditions and is generally regarded as law-abiding, educated, and responsible. Indians are present in significant numbers, with 190,000 in Australia, 55,000 in New Zealand, and 50,000 in Hong Kong by 2005. There has been a shift in the nature of the migrants, from camel handlers and agricultural workers to professionals.

The Fiji archipelago. The history of the Indian community in Fiji (numbering about 340,000 in 2005) has been quite tragic, from the days of indentured labor to the post-independence period, which saw anti-Indian coups. The two coups in Fiji, by Sitiveni Rambuka and George Speight, brought into sharp focus the vulnerability of Indians and the reluctance of the natives to share power.

About 75 percent of the indentured Indians were recruited from Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, and 25 percent from Andhra Pradesh and Tamil Nadu. They were compelled to work under deplorable conditions on the sugar

plantations that had begun to dominate the local economy after the demise of cotton as the preferred cash crop. Gradually, “free immigrants,” mainly farmers from Punjab, craftsmen and traders from Gujarat, and some professionals began to arrive. There was also an awakening of political awareness and a desire to remedy their skewed position in the country’s social and political life. The British tried to keep the native Fijians and Indo-Fijians apart as far as possible, not even permitting the establishment of racially mixed schools. Race was the prevailing factor of colonialism in Fiji. At the top of the pyramid were the whites; the natives occupied the intermediate position; and the Indians constituted the lowest rung.

The constitution that was created after independence perpetuated the special status of the indigenous Fijians. Indians overcame these hurdles and acquired a share of power during the government of Prime Minister Timochi Bavadra, but this shift in status led to coups in May and November 1987. The cycle was repeated when Mahendra Chaudhry became prime minister with the support of small Fijian parties. These coups led to the emigration of many educated Indians to Australia, New Zealand, and Canada.

The Indians in Fiji have an uncertain future, which can change only with the intervention of Fijian leadership. Like other indentured laborers in Mauritius and the Caribbean, Indians in Fiji have also zealously preserved their religious traditions and cultural and linguistic heritage. Discriminatory treatment by the whites and subsequently by native Fijians has accentuated this phenomenon.

India and Its Diaspora

India’s policy toward its diaspora communities has been governed by the prevailing circumstances. In pre-independence years the Indian National Congress took an avid interest in the welfare of overseas Indians, particularly indentured laborers. Congress sent delegations to meet overseas Indians and actively lobbied with the colonial administration for improvement in their conditions. Mahatma Gandhi led agitation for the abolition of indentured labor. India broke diplomatic relations with South Africa in protest of the policy of apartheid.

As a champion of the struggle against colonialism, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru accorded high priority to relations with the oppressed nations. He exhorted Indian migrants to completely identify with the country of their adoption, and the Indian diaspora actively participated in freedom struggles in Commonwealth countries. Many were therefore disappointed by India’s lack of support when Indian diaspora communities received patently discriminatory treatment in Burma (Myanmar), Sri Lanka, East Africa, and the Caribbean.

The destinies of India and its diaspora are intertwined, and this fact is perhaps best illustrated by the achievements of both since the 1990s. It was during this period that India registered its most impressive economic performance and became a nuclear power. Collaborations between India and Indo-Americans in the information technology sector provided impetus to the development of a mutually beneficial relationship. These developments enhanced the prestige of both India and the diaspora. During the 1990s, Indians became presidents, prime minister, and ministers in a number of countries and attained positions of leadership in academia and the corporate world. Indian writers of English won many laurels; Amartya Sen and V. S. Naipaul became Nobel laureates in 1998 and 2001, respectively. The Ispat Group of Lakshmi Mittal became the second-largest producer of steel in the world.

India’s government recently opened a new chapter in its relationship with the diaspora. A plan that included identification cards was created for all segments of the diaspora in 1999. The government also created a Non-Resident Indian/Person of Indian Origin division in the ministry of external affairs. In a major initiative, the government appointed a high-level committee on the Indian diaspora in September 2000. The committee’s six-hundred-page report is the most exhaustive study thus far conducted on the Indian diaspora and its relationship with India. The ninth of January was declared the Pravasi Bharatiya Divas (Indian Diaspora Day) in recognition of the achievements of the diaspora (Mahatma Gandhi had returned to India on 9 January 1915 after his twenty-one years in South Africa). New Delhi also considered the demand for dual citizenship by Indian migrants in a number of countries, and a bill was introduced in the Parliament in March 2003.

Prime Minister A. B. Vajpayee inaugurated the first Pravasi Bharatiya Divas on 9 January 2003. Approximately two thousand diaspora Indians from sixty-two countries attended the event, witnessing unprecedented enthusiasm in India for fostering a relationship with its diaspora communities. The event increased the perception of a global Indian family and was a major step in the development of India’s relationship with all the constituents of its diaspora.

After the elections of 2004, the new coalition government, led by the Congress Party, created a ministry for Overseas Indians Affairs. The third Pravasi Bharatiya Divas was celebrated in Mumbai, and the policy for dual citizenship was further liberalized. The diaspora is poised to play an important role in the realization of India’s aspirations worldwide.

Jagdish Sharma

See also **Scientists of Indian Origin and Their Contributions; United States, Relations with**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Dubey, Ajay, ed. *Indian Diaspora: Global Identity*. New Delhi: Kalunga Publications, 2003.
- Government of India. *Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora*. New Delhi: Indian Council of World Affairs, 2001.
- Mesthrie, Uma Dhopelia. *From Cane Fields to Freedom: A Chronicle of Indian South African Life*. Cape Town, South Africa: Kwela Books, 2000.
- Mishra, Pramod, and Urmila Mohapatra. *South Asian Diaspora in U.K.: A Bibliographical Study*. New Delhi: Kalunga Publications, 2001.
- Sandhu, K. S., and A. Mani, eds. *Indian Communities in Southeast Asia*. Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1993.
- Singh, Shubha. *Fiji: A Precarious Coalition*. New Delhi: Har-Anand Publications, 2001.
- Tinker, Hugh. *The Banyan Tree: Overseas Emigrants from India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh*. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1977.

DĪKSHITAR, MUTTUSVĀMI (1775–1835), South Indian poet and composer. Muttusvāmi Dīkshitar was the youngest of three nineteenth-century poet-composers (*vāggēyakāra*) hailing from Tiruvārūr, reverentially called the “Trinity” of South Indian music. He used the *mudrā* (signature) “Guruguha” in his lyrics, and he contributed more than four hundred songs to the concert repertoire of Karnātak music. Compared with the lively and emotional style of Tyāgarāja, many of Dīkshitar’s songs are more tranquil, though they conclude with a distinct feature called *madhyama kāla sanchāra* (phrases in a faster tempo). His songs are based on the *kṛitī* format (the principal compositional form of Karnātak art music) and have Sanskrit lyrics, except for some in Telugu.

In his *kṛitī* “Bālagōpālā” (*rāga* Bhairavi), Dīkshitar refers to himself as *vainika gāyaka*, a “singer and player of the long-necked lute” (*vīnā*, the principal instrument of Karnātak art music). Interestingly, several embellishments (*gamaka*) of Karnātak music are reminiscent of the playing of a vina, and through Dīkshitar’s songs both vocalists and instrumentalists stay sensitized to the aesthetic value of intricate *gamakas*.

Dīkshitar was initiated into *Srī vidyā upāsana*, the Tāntric Dēvī cult, followed by five years of studies in North India (Varanasi). To modern listeners, his Sanskrit lyrics may be reminiscent of a remote past, as they describe specific images and stories of deities associated with the temples he visited. Yet he also subscribed to Vedānta philosophy, which postulates an impersonal Absolute (*parabrahma*) behind all phenomena, including the various deities he praised in his lyrics. It is evident that frequent pilgrimages and exposure to diverse cultural traditions left their mark on his personality and

music. Several of his famous songs are based on Hindustani *rāgas*. His progressive outlook is corroborated by the rapid integration of the violin in South Indian music: his brother Bālusvāmi Dīkshitar and Vādivēlu, one of his famous disciples, became the first South Indian violin exponents to become known by their names. At the request of the Collector (the British chief administrator of district), he even wrote Sanskrit lyrics for about fifty English tunes (*nōttusvara sāhitya*, or note-lyrics).

Through his compositions he defined the melodic “shapes” (*rāga rūpa*) of several rare *rāgas* for the first time, particularly those derived from the *mēlakarta rāga paddhati* (scheme of 72 scale types). In contrast to Tyāgarāja, he did not embrace a later version of the *mēlakarta rāga* scheme, one that is entirely based on heptatonic scale types (*sampūrṇa paddhati*). Dīkshitar adhered to the earlier scheme known as *asampūrṇa paddhati* (nonheptatonic arrangement), and the *rāga* nomenclature is therefore peculiar to his compositions. This difference is ascribed to the fact that through his father, the composer Rāmasvāmi Dīkshitar, he belongs to the *parampara* (musical lineage) of Venkatamakhī. This influential theorist had outlined his innovative *mēlakarta* scheme in a treatise titled *Chaturdandī Prakāśhikā* (Four-fold explanation) as early as 1660.

Through his disciples, notably the four brothers known as the Tanjore Quartet, Dīkshitar also contributed to the field of dance music. Being leading figures in the fields of dance and music, the Tanjore Quartet succeeded in redefining and enriching the repertoire of temple and court dance. As demonstrated by T. Bālasarasvati, the legendary dancer, this program format continues to inspire *Bharata Nāṭya* dancers and their accompanists.

Ludwig Pesch

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Govinda Rao, T. K. *Compositions of Muddusvāmi Dīkshitar*. Madras: Ganamandir Publications, 1997.
- Raghavan, V. *Muttuswami Dīkshitar*. Mumbai: National Centre for the Performing Arts, 1975.
- Seetha, S. *Tanjore as a Seat of Music*. Chennai: University of Madras, 1981.
- Srivatsa, V. V. *Monograph on Muttuswami Dīkshitar*. 54th Annual Festival of Music and Dance. Tirupati: Sri Tyagaraja Festival Committee, 1996.
- Srivatsa, V. V., ed. *Bhava Raga Tala Modini: Monograph cum Index of Muttuswami Dīkshitar's Compositions*. Chennai: V. V. Srivatsa, 1996–1998.
- Venkatarama Aiyer, T. L. “Muthuswāmy Dīkshitar.” In *Composers*, edited by V. Raghavan. New Delhi: Publications Division, 1979.

DISEASE. See *Health Care*.

DĪVĀLĪ Dīvālī (the modern contraction for Sanskrit *dīpāvalī*, “garland of lamps”) is a very popular festival, celebrated annually in most parts of India. It takes place at the end of the “dark” half of the month of Kārttika (October–November), thus beginning just before the new moon and lasting from three to five days, when the sky is the darkest. Rows of bright candles and lamps in the temples, halls, on roofs and in windows of houses, hanging in small baskets from poles, and lined up along roads and in parks, contrast with the dark sky, and fire-crackers are set off. Tiny rafts carrying earthen lamps are sent sailing down the rivers. People celebrate mythological victories of the gods over evil, as well as the reunion of brothers and sisters who had been separated when the girls left their parental homes after marriage.

Dīvālī is actually a cluster of several events, some of which have been attested for nearly two millennia. Among these is the propitiation of Yama, the god of death, so as to ensure a long life, and the lighting of a lamp for *naraka* (hell), that is, for the avoidance of hell.

The propitiation of Yama is now generally omitted, though a lamp is still lit for *naraka*. There is also the celebration of the slaying of the demon Naraka by Krishna, and an oil bath is taken to ward off hell. Noise making at midnight is thought to drive out bad luck, and the worship of the goddess Lakshmī ensures good fortune; a small clay lamp, filled with clarified butter (ghee), is lit in her honor. In some regions the worship of the good demon Bali, who has been banished to the netherworld, is included in the festivities; since Shiva is believed to have been defeated in gambling on that day by his wife Pārvatī, men (and even women) are encouraged to gamble that morning.

In some provinces, houses are cleaned and painted and metal vessels are polished during Dīvālī. Shops are decorated and illuminated, and merchants worship their books of accounts and host friends, customers, and other traders. Indeed it was sometimes alleged that divine Brahmā granted Dīvālī especially to the traders as their festival; but it is enjoyed by all with new clothes, sweets, socializing, and a sumptuous feast.

Hartmut E. Scharfe



Festival of Lights. Boy illuminating candles on the eve of Dīvālī, the “festival of lights,” in the northern city of Chandigarh. During Dīvālī, Hindus and Sikhs in India, and worldwide, perform the same ritual in their homes to mark the victory of good over evil. AJAY VERMA/REUTERS/CORBIS.

See also **Hinduism (Dharma)**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Sharma, Brijendra Nath. *Festivals of India*. New Delhi: Abhinav Publications, 1978.

DMK AND AIDMK. *See* **Dravidian Parties; Political System.**

DRAVIDIAN. *See* **Languages and Scripts.**

DRAVIDIAN PARTIES The Dravidian movement and the parties that emerged from it played important roles in the state of Tamil Nadu in southeast India since World War I, and these parties ruled the state from 1967 onward. Aside from their major roles in this state, which is currently inhabited by over 60 million people, these organizations were exceptions to some trends in Indian politics, and forerunners in other respects. Caste and language were central to their political vision, and some of the Dravidianist organizations criticized religion, or at least some religious practices and beliefs. The Dravidian movement of the late colonial period aimed to mobilize South Indians (especially speakers of the Tamil language), other than those of the upper Brahman caste, against the alleged dominance of Brahmans and North Indians. Its support was initially restricted to small pockets of society. However, the Dravidian parties grew after Indian independence, effectively mobilizing the less-privileged groups and changing social policies in ways that gave middle and lower social groups greater representation and power. Dravidianism came to express ethnicity in ways that strengthened democracy and enriched civic life.

The Dravidian movement mobilized South India's middle castes (often called the "other backward castes") and, to a lesser extent, the lower castes (called the "scheduled castes," Dalits, or Harijans) before political movements and parties did so outside South India. The Dravidian parties introduced the most extensive preferential policies for these castes in Tamil Nadu, setting aside 69 percent of college admission and government employment for these groups after 1980. Preferential quotas were instituted in other parts of South India as well, but were introduced later and were not as extensive in other parts of India.

The Dravidianist organizations linked caste appeals to language appeals in the late colonial period by claiming that South Indians (especially Tamil speakers), other than Brahmans, belonged to the "Dravidian race," distinct from the Aryan race, to which they claimed both North

Indians and South Indian Brahmans belonged. They were among the first to demand secession from India, doing so as early as 1938, even before decolonization. While the major Dravidian parties demanded secession until 1963, they did not engage in armed insurgency or much violent protest to press this demand, unlike many of the secessionist organizations that emerged (most of them some decades later) in northern and northeastern India. The Dravidianists later abandoned secession, though the national and state governments neither subjected them to much repression nor granted some of their major demands, such as greater autonomy for the states and the acceptance of Tamil as one of India's official languages.

The Dravidian parties contributed to some changes in language policy and language use. The national government continued to use English and Hindi, as languages of administration, contrary to the Indian Constitution's commitment to replace English with Hindi for this purpose by 1965 because the Dravidianists led popular protests in Tamil Nadu against a complete shift to Hindi from the 1930s to the 1960s. The government of Tamil Nadu did not promote the instruction of Hindi in the state after the Dravidian parties came to power, while continuing to accept instruction in English. The Tamil used in Tamil Nadu's media changed, drawing more extensively from the dialects of the middle castes, from which the Dravidian parties drew much of their support.

Party competition was regionalized much earlier in Tamil Nadu than elsewhere in India because the Dravidian parties became dominant in this state early on. Pan-Indian parties ceased to be major contenders in the state as early as the 1970s, when the Congress Party still dominated much of India. Besides, Tamil Nadu was Hindu nationalism's weakest spot because of the influence of Dravidianist mobilization. This limited violent conflict further in Tamil Nadu, as Hindu nationalist organizations resorted periodically to violence against non-Hindus and other opponents in their regions of strength elsewhere. As the Dravidian parties built close political and social links between different religious groups and castes, they helped restrict mass violence along religious lines, and to a lesser extent along caste lines.

The ideology and some of the activities of the early Dravidianist organizations had considerable potential to promote intolerance, while also having the potential to promote social equality. The most popular Dravidianist organization of the late colonial period (the Self Respect Association, later renamed the Dravidar Kazhagam, or DK, the Party of the Dravidians) opposed religion, especially Brahmanical Hinduism, as the foundation of caste-based social oppression. It highlighted its atheism through heretical gestures such as breaking Hindu idols



Muthuvel Karunanidhi, President of the DMK. Now in his eighties, the still charismatic and popular leader has been accused of running the party like an extension of his family. INDIA TODAY.

and depicting Hindu deities in demeaning ways. The DK opposed Indian nationalism even when it was the most popular political force in much of India. After decolonization, it criticized the Indian Constitution's provisions for religious freedom, meant to ensure tolerance in a multireligious society, on the grounds that allowing free exercise of the Hindu faith would inevitably involve the official acceptance of caste discrimination. While such gestures were meant to shock society into insight about caste-based dominance, they evoked widespread outrage, even among some from the middle and the lower castes. While critical of Hinduism, the DK mainly mobilized some Hindus of the middle castes.

The strategies of the DK might have evoked considerable intolerance and violent conflict along the lines of religion, caste, and language. Brahmans and non-Tamil speakers could have faced violence and intolerance, as could the lower castes and non-Hindus. However, the later Dravidianist organizations altered their social vision and approaches to mobilization to give greater value to various aspects of popular culture without promoting

much animosity along ethnic and religious lines. Indeed, the Dravidian party formed in the 1970s, which ruled Tamil Nadu for five terms over the next three decades, was initially led by one of non-Tamil ancestry and later by a Brahman, though earlier Dravidianists had upheld the Tamil language and had opposed Brahman dominance.

The two most popular Dravidianist organizations of the post-colonial period were the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and the All-India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam. These parties promoted civic associations, such as literary and debating societies, reading rooms and film fan clubs, and engaged with other organizations that were independent of political parties or affiliated with other parties, such as caste associations, farmers' associations, and unions of white collar workers. Such engagement with civic life linked the Dravidian parties closely to society and promoted their growth. However, civic associations remained somewhat independent of the Dravidian parties.

The Dravidian parties addressed the demands of various groups through policies such as caste-based preferences, agrarian subsidies, subsidized housing, and a free lunch program, which has fed over a fifth of the state's population (especially schoolchildren) since 1983. Such forms of patronage and political empowerment of some lower- and middle-status Tamils increased their upward social mobility.

Aspects of the Movement's History

Certain intellectual and cultural currents of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries influenced early Dravidianist ideology. Some European Orientalist intellectuals, who were colonial bureaucrats or missionaries, grouped South Indian languages in a Dravidian family, and claimed that South Indians, other than Brahmans, were descended from a distinct Dravidian race. Tamil revivalists recovered the two-thousand-year-old history of the Tamil language and its literature made available to the public old Tamil literary works, and attempted to develop a Tamil that was purged of words originating in Sanskrit. Dravidianist ideologues of the early twentieth century drew from Orientalist linguistics and Tamil revivalism the ideas that a Dravidian community, composed of South Indians, spoke a non-Sanskritic Tamil and had no caste distinctions prior to the arrival of Brahmans from the North and the growth of Hinduism in southern India toward the end of the first millennium A.D. They called for the revival of such a community in opposition to Brahmans, North Indians, and Indian nationalism.

The first Dravidianist political organizations—the Dravidian Association and the South Indian Liberal Federation (popularly called the Justice Party)—emerged in

the 1910s to increase the presence of “non-Brahmans” in Western education and the professions, and to compete in provincial elections, based on a very limited franchise. Much of their leadership and support came from affluent princes, landlords, and merchants of the upper non-Brahman castes. The Justice Party ruled the provincial legislature through parts of the 1920s, when it increased caste-based preferential policies. It became ineffective once the franchise was increased and the Congress Party contested provincial elections in 1936.

The Self Respect Association, which emerged from the Congress Party in 1925, became the first mass-based Dravidianist organization, under the leadership of E. V. Ramaswami Naicker (1880–1974; popularly called Periar, or “Respected Leader”). Periar’s sharply worded opposition to Brahman and North Indian dominance struck a chord among many of the middle castes and some of the lower castes. However, his heretical gestures against Hindu orthodoxy, his opposition to all religious beliefs and practices, and the popularity of Indian nationalism restricted the Self Respect Association’s support. While Periar pointed to the goals of a society without caste distinction, and less consistently to reducing class and gender inequalities, the organizations he led consisted mainly of middle caste men. Nevertheless, many later lower caste organizations claimed Periar as their inspiration.

Many younger activists of the Self Respect Association developed an outlook somewhat different from Periar’s through the 1930s and the 1940s. They gave the Tamil language greater importance, accepted popular culture (including popular religion), and used the cultural media effectively for political communication, opposing social elites more consistently and valuing more democratic practices. Their attachment to the Tamil language came to the fore when the Self Respect Association successfully agitated in 1938 against the efforts of the provincial government, led by the Congress Party, to introduce compulsory Hindi instruction in schools. During this agitation, the demand emerged for the first time for the secession of a “Dravida Nadu,” a Dravidian state. Led by C. N. Annadurai, this faction initiated a change in the party’s name to the Dravidar Kazhagam in 1944, and welcomed India’s independence in 1947, in opposition to Periar. Inclined to use the political opportunities presented by India’s postcolonial federal democracy, this faction formed a separate party in 1949, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (Party for the Progress of Dravidam, or DMK).

The DMK grew rapidly through the 1950s and 1960s and was elected to control the state government in 1967. It drew support particularly among the intermediate and lower Tamil castes and classes. As it grew, the DMK

opposed social elites linked to the state and the ruling Congress Party more than it opposed Brahmans or non-Tamil speakers. It built close social and political bonds between many Hindus and Muslims, and so inhibited the growth of religious nationalism. The party’s leaders abandoned their demand for secession in 1959, viewing it as a hindrance to building popular support, and made the decision public in 1963. The DMK’s association with major language agitations in the 1960s and its celebration of Tamil and middle caste cultural pride aided its rapid growth. The growing popularity of a film star who promoted the party, M. G. Ramachandran (known as MGR), was crucial in attracting groups that had not previously supported the Dravidian parties.

Ramachandran maintained some distance from the DMK’s caste and language appeals, but in his film career systematically chose to play roles of champions of the underprivileged, protectors of women, and idealized lovers. This especially attracted the poor, the lower castes, and women, groups that could readily watch films but had limited access to the printed word. Ramachandran’s admirers associated him closely with the roles he played in his films, and were attracted to visions of him as a leader of his party and state, benefactor of the poor and the powerless.

The DMK distributed patronage among its middle-caste and middle-class supporters, and to a lesser extent among the lower castes and the poor. It increased the state’s preferential quotas from 41 percent to 49 percent, especially benefiting upwardly mobile groups, with which the DMK became more associated. In the early 1970s, the DMK government abandoned or reduced the scope of policies attractive to the poor, such as food subsidies and temperance laws, and the corruption of many DMK leaders became widely known. This created an opening for Ramachandran, who did not enjoy a stature in the DMK commensurate with his mass popularity, to criticize DMK leadership for failing to provide welfare and clean governance. In 1972 he founded a new party, the Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (ADMK, or Anna’s Party for the Progress of Dravidam, named after the DMK’s founding leader, Annadurai, who had since died).

Starting from the base of Ramachandran’s fan clubs, the ADMK became Tamil Nadu’s most popular party in its very first year of existence. The DMK retained the support of many of its early followers, but the Congress Party became marginal to Tamil politics thereafter. The ADMK drew its greatest support from the poor, from women, and from non-Tamil speakers until the 1990s. To highlight its acceptance of Indian nationalism, the party changed its name to the AIADMK (the All-India ADMK) in 1976. The AIADMK assumed power after the next state assembly

election of 1977, and retained power for three terms until Ramachandran's death in 1987. It expanded caste preferences from 49 percent to 69 percent, and introduced welfare policies that benefited the poor most, notably a free lunch program in all public schools. Such policies reinforced Ramachandran's preexisting image as a patron of the poor and helped the AIADMK retain its early support, even while building its following among the propertied.

The association of the two major Dravidian parties with particular social visions and social groups weakened from the late 1980s, reducing the strength of these parties. Some lower and middle caste Tamils felt the DMK did not effectively represent them, and they formed distinct caste parties. This was particularly true of the Vanniar, the majority of whom supported a caste party formed in 1989. Other DMK activists were critical of the inconsistency of the party's support of the secessionist insurgency that emerged among the Tamil minority of Sri Lanka, and of the gulf between party leaders and modest social groups, forming a separate party in 1994, the Marumalarchchi Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (MDMK, the Revitalized DMK). This highlighted the DMK's departure from its origins, although the MDMK drew only limited support. Cohesion declined among the DMK's supporters across caste and religious boundaries, leading to increased caste violence from the 1980s and greater violence between religious groups from the 1990s. It also created space for a minor growth of Hindu nationalism from the 1990s, leading the DMK and the AIADMK to tactical electoral alliances with the Bharatiya Janata Party from the late 1990s.

The leadership of the AIADMK passed after Ramachandran's death to his former lover, who had acted with him in many films, J. Jayalalitha. During her first term in office in the early 1990s, Jayalalitha did not retain Ramachandran's image as a champion of the underprivileged, and the AIADMK lost support among all groups because of its repression of dissent and the open corruption of its leaders. This especially reduced support among the lower castes, and two minor lower caste parties emerged in the 1990s. The recently formed caste parties claim inspiration from the early Dravidian movement, although each of them directs its appeals to particular castes, accounting for 10 percent of the state's population or less. As the newer parties are restricted to particular social niches, the DMK and the AIADMK remained Tamil Nadu's two strongest parties, alternating in power from 1989 (the DMK from 1989 to 1991 and from 1996 to 2001, and the AIADMK from 1991 to 1996 and since 2001). However, their support is less extensive, less consistent, and more vulnerable to erosion than was the case before the 1990s.

Narendra Subramanian

See also **Caste System**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Barnett, Marguerite. *The Politics of Cultural Nationalism in South India*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- Irschick, Eugene F. *Tamil Revivalism in the 1930s*. Chennai: Crea-A Publishers, 1986.
- Nambi Arooran, K. *Tamil Renaissance and Dravidian Nationalism, 1905–1944*. Madurai: Koodal, 1980.
- Pandian, M. S. S. *The Image Trap: M. G. Ramachandran in Film and Politics*. New Delhi: Sage, 1992.
- Subramanian, Narendra. *Ethnicity and Populist Mobilization: Political Parties, Citizens and Democracy in South India*. Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999.
- . "Ethnicity and Pluralism: An Exploration with Reference to Indian Cases." *Canadian Journal of Political Science* 32, no. 4 (December 1999): 715–744.
- . "Beyond Ethnicity and Populism? Changes and Continuities in Tamil Nadu's Electoral Map." In *India's 1999 Elections and Twentieth Century Politics*, edited by Paul Wallace and Ramashray Roy. New Delhi: Sage, 2003.
- . "Identity Politics and Social Pluralism: Political Sociology and Political Change in Tamil Nadu." *Journal of Commonwealth and Comparative Politics* 40, no. 3 (November 2002): 125–139. Republished in *Decentring the Indian Nation*, edited by Andrew Wyatt and John Zavos. London: Frank Cass, 2003.
- Washbrook, David L. "Caste, Class and Dominance in Modern Tamil Nadu: Non-Brahminism, Dravidianism and Tamil Nationalism." In *Dominance and State Power in Modern India*, vol. 1, edited by Francine Frankel and M. S. A. Rao. Delhi and New York: Oxford University Press, 1989.

DUBOIS, JEAN-ANTOINE (1765–1848), *French Catholic missionary*. Jean-Antoine Dubois, known as Abbé Dubois, was ordained in the diocese of Viviers in 1792, joined the Missions Étrangères, and then fled the French Revolution to Pondicherry. In contrast to the Madura Jesuits, Dubois dressed like an Indian peasant to identify with local custom, became an accomplished Tamil scholar, and was well acquainted with Sanskrit.

Upon the fall of the Muslim ruler, Tipu Sultan, in 1799, Dubois was asked by Colonel Richard Colley Wellesley to go to Srirangapatana to reorganize the Christian community in Mysore. This was more of a challenge than might be expected, as many Christians had abandoned their faith because of Tipu's brutality in forcibly converting them to Islam. For Dubois this was a scandal. "Not a single individual among so many thousands," he writes, "had courage enough to confess his faith under this trying circumstance" (Dubois, 1982, p. 40). In fact Dubois was so depressed with the state of affairs that he reckoned that the greater number of Christians with whom he had come in contact presented "nothing but . . . a hollow

mockery of Christianity" (Richter, p. 94). Nonetheless, Dubois did all he could to communicate the compassion of his faith to the local population. He was the first to introduce smallpox vaccination in the state. His own records indicate that 25,432 people were vaccinated in eighteen months, including the members of the raja of Mysore's household. Moreover, he tried to address rural agricultural problems by organizing farming communities. As a result, he was greatly respected by the local population.

Abbé Dubois's most memorable contribution was the publication of his *Hindu Manners, Customs and Ceremonies*. The original manuscript in French was purchased by the East India Company and is now held in the India House Library in London. In 1823 Dubois returned to France totally shattered. He published *The State of Christianity in India; During the Early Nineteenth Century*, a series of letters in which he related his devastating experiences; the work was severely criticized, especially by Protestant missionaries.

Dubois believed that Hindus were resistant to Christianity in part because the biblical accounts and sacrificial ceremonies deeply offended their sensibilities and prejudices. He was convinced that Hindus were so "peculiarly circumstanced" that it was "next to impossible to make them real and sincere Christians" (Dubois, 1982, p. 36). In spite of this, Dubois never allowed himself to be drawn into personal confrontation or recriminations against Hinduism. Dubois spent the last years of his life as director of foreign missions. He died in 1848 at the age of eighty-three.

Graham Houghton

See also **Christian Impact on India, History of**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Dubois, Jean-Antoine. *Hindu Manners, Customs and Ceremonies*. 3rd ed. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968.
 ———. *The State of Christianity in India*. New Delhi: Associated Publishing House, 1982.
 Hambye, E. R. *History of Christianity in India*, vol. 3. Bangalore: Church History Association, 1997.
 Richter, Julius. *A History of Missions in India*. London: Oliphant Anderson and Ferrier, 1908.

DUFFERIN, LORD (1826–1902), first marquis of Dufferin and Ava, viceroy of India (1884–1888). A descendant of the acerbic playwright R. B. Sheridan, Frederick Templeton Blackwood, or Lord Dufferin, possessed enough of his ancestor's literary gifts and political bile to gain a reputation for having "an iron hand inside the velvet glove." Urbane and erudite, if somewhat indolent,

Dufferin triumphed in roles where the velvet glove sufficed. He excelled as a diplomat, particularly as British ambassador in St. Petersburg and as governor-general of Canada, leading to his appointment as India's viceroy. The home government expected Dufferin to smooth over the ruffled feathers of the British Indian Civil Service which had revolted against the efforts of his predecessor (Lord Ripon, viceroy 1880–1884) to give Indians an opportunity to gain experience in modern government. Dufferin proved equal to that task. Rudyard Kipling later extolled Dufferin's respect for the men who ruled India, especially Sir Frederick Roberts, British India's commander-in-chief. Roberts, however, exploited Dufferin's favor by pushing the administration into a more active policy along the northwest frontier of India, leading to the deterioration of relations with the amir of Afghanistan and countless "little wars" among the people of that borderland. Dufferin the diplomat anticipated these results, but lacked the ability to impose his will as an administrator, failing to write the comprehensive dispatch on frontier policy sought by his superiors. When the short-lived jingoistic Conservative ministry of Lord Randolph Churchill came to power in 1885, Dufferin obediently fulfilled the prime minister's desire to annex Upper Burma, though the high cost of that venture forced Dufferin to drain India's famine fund and to impose an income tax. These steps alienated Western-educated Indians—whose continued loyalty Ripon had wisely identified as the key to the continuance of the Raj—and led directly to the formation of the Indian National Congress.

The emergence of the Congress alarmed the home government, which urged Dufferin to find some harmless means of answering its critiques of British Indian administration, such as through the appointment of token Indians to the Council of India. He responded by holding a brief dialogue with Congress cofounder Allan Octavian Hume, but Dufferin's own hatred of nationalism among subject-peoples—borne perhaps of his experiences as a harsh northern Irish landlord—resulted in a deeply racist antipathy for its Indian counterpart. He refused to believe that there was "one Indian fit" for any high public office. At the urging of his likeminded subordinates, Dufferin approved of their two-stage plan, which would reform the Provincial Councils of India, but on such harsh terms that India's nationalists would oppose it, thus justifying new draconian antinationalist legislation accompanying the council's reform measure. This scheme was sent to London in draft form; even here, Dufferin was avoiding the role of policy maker. However, to clear the way for his successor and leave "New India" in no doubt as to the government's future political policy, Dufferin closed his term of office with a reactionary speech on St. Andrew's Day to a British audience in Calcutta (Kolkata) that became the standard against

which future British antinationalist remarks would be measured.

Marc Jason Gilbert

See also **British Crown Raj**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Gilbert, Marc Jason. "Insurmountable Distinctions: Racism and the British Response to the Emergence of Indian Nationalism." In *The Man on the Spot: Essays on British Empire History*, edited by Roger Long. Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1995.
- Lyall, Alfred. *Life of the Marquis of Dufferin and Ava*. London: John Murray, 1905.
- Martin, Briton. *New India, 1885*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969.
- Nicholson, Harold. *Helen's Tower*. New York: Harcourt Brace, 1938.

DUNDAS, HENRY (1742–1811), the first viscount Melville, Baron Dunira, president of the Board of Control for Indian Affairs (1793–1801). Henry Dundas earned his place in British politics by being able to deliver the Scottish vote to the Tory Party, whose leader, William Pitt, was also a close personal friend. His connection with India began in 1781 with his chairmanship of a secret Parliamentary committee investigating wars in the Carnatic and Rohilkhand and continued during his service as home secretary (1791–1795), as secretary at war (1794–1801) and as first a member and then president of the Board of Control (1784–1801).

Dundas's preeminent concern was to curb the British East India Company's tendency to wage costly wars of expansion and consolidation. He was not opposed to such measures where they served Britain's imperial interests, but he believed that these and the company's dominant shipping interests were best served by increasing the company's revenues by trade. Wars for dominion could be profitable, but in Dundas's opinion, they had in the past filled the pockets of the company's agents, not the company's coffers. Accordingly, Dundas praised Warren Hastings as the savior of India when that governor-general's military operations appeared to him to be in the defense of empire, but he opposed Hastings whenever other motives could be attributed to his diplomacy or war-making. This ambivalence was exploited by one of Hastings's successors, Richard Colley, the marquis of Wellesley (governor-general, 1798–1805). Wellesley regarded the company's revenues as best secured by actively reducing its many rivals, foreign and indigenous, thus consolidating its political influence. As a former member of the Dundas-led Board of Control, Wellesley well knew of Dundas's prejudice against such a policy, but events

played into Wellesley's hands. Napoleon Bonaparte's invasion of Egypt in 1801, the presence of French officers advising Tipu Sultan in Mysore, and the threat of an Afghan invasion from the north left Dundas with little choice but to support intervention in Mysore and other Indian states.

Wellesley promptly translated Dundas's security concerns into a mandate for a series of campaigns, including the Fourth Mysore War and a Second Maratha War, which he supplemented with annexations and subsidiary alliances that collectively secured for the Company either the possession of, or control over, virtually the entire subcontinent, except Sind and Punjab. These steps won Wellesley his marquissate. However, they had proven very costly, and Wellesley had pressed them to their conclusion long after the French and Afghan threats had evaporated. These were sufficient reasons for Dundas to withdraw his support and for the company's directors to recall Wellesley in 1805.

Dundas was by then himself in some difficulty. In 1802 he had been elevated to the English peerage as Viscount Melville and Baron Dunira, but that same year his political enemies accused him of misappropriating funds during his long tenure as treasurer of the navy (1782–1800). In 1805 a report of a Parliamentary committee of inquiry led to his impeachment and trial. He was acquitted of all charges in 1806 but did not again hold public office.

Marc Jason Gilbert

See also **British East India Company Raj; Hastings, Warren; Wellesley, Richard Colley**

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Furber, Holden. *Henry Dundas, First Viscount Melville, 1742–1811: Political Manager of Scotland, Statesman, Administrator of British India*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1931.
- Ingram, Edward, ed. *Two Views of British India: The Private Correspondence of Mr. Dundas and Lord Wellesley, 1798–1801*. Bath: Adams & Dart, 1970.

DUPLEIX, JOSEPH FRANÇOIS (1697–1763), influential governor-general (1742–1754) of the French East India Company. During his three decades in India, the Marquis Joseph François Dupleix expanded the commercial, political, and military operations of the French East India Company (La Compagnie perpétuelle des Indes), and his administration marked the apex of French colonial ambitions in India. His accumulation of an enormous personal fortune led to suspicions about his integrity and, eventually, his recall to France. Nonetheless, Dupleix



Joseph François Duplex. Engraving of the Marquis Duplex, based on drawing by Antoine-François Sergent-Marceau, 1789. A decade after his lucrative dealings in India came to an end, Duplex died a broken man, his wealth spent and honor impugned. STAPLETON COLLECTION/CORBIS.

successfully protected French interests from threats from local authorities such as the Marathas, the *nawābs* of Arcot, and nizams of Hyderabad. His lifestyle and methods defined the paradigm of the “Nabob Game.” He also led the French in a war with the British East India Company and prevailed on the ground at first. The high point occurred in 1746, when French forces captured nearby Madras (Chennai) and held it until the Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle restored it in 1748. Many of Duplex’s practices were imitated by the British East India Company, most notably by Robert Clive.

As did many of those who went to India, Duplex came from the merchant class; he was the second son of an ambitious tax farmer and capitalist who aspired to the minor nobility. His father, a director of the French East India Company in 1721, arranged an appointment for Duplex to the Superior Council of Pondicherry, the governing council of the nexus of the company’s Asian

trade. Duplex soon caught his stride as a merchant, rapidly proving his worth to the company while simultaneously engaging in the lucrative “private” or “country trade,” that is, trading between ports east of the coast of Africa.

In 1730 Duplex became the company’s governor of Chandarnagar, a remote and rough trading post near Calcutta. Its trade was small, competition stiff, disease rampant, and security tenuous: a perfect opportunity for energy and ambition if tempered with good judgment. Over the next dozen years, Duplex turned Chandarnagar into a profitable and habitable trading colony by linking the Ganges country trade with the rest of Asia and Europe. He made a considerable fortune participating in country trade. He found new goods and markets and increased the volume of established items such as cottage-industry silks and cottons from Bengal and saltpeter from Patna. Because of his improvements to the trading and living facilities, he was able to attract and retain good agents.

To improve security, he developed diplomatic relations with Mughal authorities. Contact with the Mughal seat of power in Delhi allowed Duplex to play an instrumental role in obtaining the Mughal rank of *mānsabdar* for Governor-General Pierre-Benoist Dumas. The title bestowed upon the company official stature, land revenues, and the legal right to maintain armed forces, greatly increasing the impact of the French in India and greatly changing the rules of the Nabob Game.

In 1739, already in his early forties, Duplex married Jeanne Vincens, a Creole of Tamil and Portuguese extraction and the widow of his best friend. For the rest of his life, Jeanne provided invaluable insight and advice and reputedly drafted much of his most sensitive correspondence in Persian and Tamil. Duplex was also enormously aided in Pondicherry by his *dubash* (interpreter and agent), Ananda Ranga Pillai, whose diaries provide invaluable insights into Duplex’s commercial and political affairs.

The following year, the directors in Paris appointed Duplex governor-general in Pondicherry. When he finally arrived in 1742, he was faced immediately with several perils that characterize his tenure. Duplex was facing potential threats from Indian forces, especially the Marathas, and was soon presented with a potential threat from the English. Unfortunately, the company was passing through one of its periodic crises in cash flow, and both the directors and the king opposed spending on Pondicherry’s defenses. Duplex therefore drew funds from his own considerable fortune to strengthen the bulwarks. This act was praised at the time but later became the basis for his lawsuit against the company.

Threatened depredations from Indian armies were only part of his security concerns, however. More dangerous perhaps was news of the outbreak of the War of the Austrian Succession (1740–1748). When the news of war between France and England arrived in 1744, Dupleix proposed that the French and British East India Companies remain neutral, but he was rebuffed. When the news arrived that the British Royal Navy had taken French East India men as prizes, war with the English was inevitable. In league with a French fleet commanded by Mahé de la Bourdonnais, Dupleix's forces captured Fort St. George (Chennai) in 1746.

The fighting provoked the *nawāb* of Arcot, Anwār-ud-din, who had forbidden both sides to fight, to issue an ultimatum demanding the French withdraw. When Dupleix refused, Anwār-ud-din dispatched an army to take it. A thousand soldiers under French command dispersed the enemy host, and the already intimidating reputation of European military might was reinforced; henceforth European armies were rarely challenged.

Dupleix then engineered the overthrow of Anwār-ud-din by backing a rival for the throne of Arcot, Chanda Sahib. Two years later, Nizām al-Mulk, the nizām of Hyderabad, died, and Dupleix cultivated the successors on the throne, propping them up with French soldiers and installing French political agents in the court. With French puppets now on the thrones of two of the most powerful states in South India, Dupleix was at the top of the Nabob Game.

The Treaty of Aix-la-Chapelle (1748) returned India to the status quo ante. The English quickly emerged as implacable competitors for power and trade. They challenged the installation of Chanda Sahib as *nawāb* of Arcot by backing Muhammad Ali, Anwār-ud-din's son. When Chanda Sahib laid siege to Muhammad Ali in Trichinapoly (Tiruchchirappalli), English forces under Robert Clive boldly counterattacked Arcot. Eventually, Marāthas decided the succession by killing Chanda Sahib, but the struggle between the French and the English in India was now for complete control.

Meanwhile, the directors in Paris had become deeply concerned with the mounting expenses of war even while trying to recover from trading losses suffered during the

War of the Austrian Succession. Dupleix was dramatically recalled to Paris in 1754, his successor handing him the letter as he stepped off the ship. Thenceforth, French influence in India vis à vis the English declined ceaselessly throughout the Seven Years' War (1756–1763). Pondicherry was captured in 1761 and although returned with the peace never again posed a threat to British interests.

Dupleix had returned amid hints that his wealth had been obtained by abusing his position and privileges. A scandal erupted when Dupleix submitted a demand to be repaid for the vast out-of-pocket expenditures he had incurred building defenses for Pondicherry and purchasing cargoes during the years of conflict with the English. His lawsuit alienated many friends and allies and dragged on until his death in 1763. He died a broken man, his wealth spent and his honor impugned.

Dupleix's role in the colonization of French India is cloudy even today. Clearly, as the governor-general in dynamic times, he rose heroically to the challenges posed to him. It is not as clear, however, whether Dupleix was a grand visionary of empire, designer of the Nabob Game, brilliant military commander, and shrewd businessman, who redesigned the paradigm between European and Indian powers, or merely an opportunist reacting to events. Dupleix's legacy is an ironic one: to be the intellectual founder of Britain's Indian empire.

J. Andrew Greig

See also French East India Company; French Impact; Nabob Game


BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Cultru, Prosper. *Dupleix: Ses plans politiques, sa disgrâce*. Paris: Hachette, 1901.
- Dodwell, Henry. *Dupleix and Clive*. London: Methuen, 1920.
- Malleson, George. *Dupleix*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1890.
- Martineau, Alfred. *Dupleix et l'Inde Française, 1722–1741*. 4 vols. Paris: Société de l'Histoire des Colonies Françaises, 1920–1928.
- Pillai, Ananda Ranga. *The Private Diary of Ananda Ranga Pillai*. 12 vols. Translated and edited by J. F. Price and H. H. Dodwell. Reprint. Delhi: Asian Educational Services, 1985.
- Vigié, Marc. *Dupleix*. Paris: Fayard, 1993.

ART, ARCHITECTURE & SCULPTURE *India*



Serene Maitreya ("Future Buddha"), a contemporary idol once consecrated by the Dalai Lama. In the fifteenth-century Thikse Monastery near Leh, the capital of Ladakh. IPSHITA BARUA/FOTOMEDIA




TOP: Illuminated manuscript, c. eighteenth century, of the *Gita Govinda*, India's last great devotional text. Written in Sanskrit as an allegorical lyric poem six centuries earlier, it describes through the recounting of Krishna and Radha's love the union of a human soul with God. In the Maharaja Sawai Man Singh II Museum, also known as the City Palace Museum, in Jaipur, Rajasthan. ADITYA PATANKAR / FOTOMEDIA

MIDDLE: The majestic white marble carvings of Dilwara, a Jain temple built on the order of Vimala Shah, trusted adviser to Gujarat's kings, in 1031. AMIT PASRICHA/ FOTOMEDIA



BOTTOM: With the Himalaya Mountains beckoning in the distance, tourists file to and from the Bhimkali palace and temple, in Sarahan, Himachal Pradesh. A monument to India's Rampur Bushahr rulers, the stone and timber complex's exact date of construction is unknown, but its age has been estimated at eight hundred years. AMAR TALWAR/ FOTOMEDIA





TOP: In Rajasthan, vibrant colors and patterns come together seamlessly, as the façade of this home in Jaipur attests. DINESH KHANNA/FOTOMEDIA

BOTTOM LEFT: In Jaipur, Rajasthan, site of the Jantar Mantar, one of five monolithic observatories constructed at the behest of Sawai Jai Singh between 1728 and 1734. Within this sculptural setting, some of the observatory's original weather-forecasting instruments remain in use. TOBY SINCLAIR/FOTOMEDIA

BOTTOM RIGHT: Constructed in 1784 as part of a famine relief project, in an effort to foster employment, the perfectly symmetrical exterior of the Bara Imambara ceremonial hall. Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh. AMIT PASRICHA/FOTOMEDIA





TOP: Close up view of a stucco figure in the Meenakshi Temple in Madurai, Tamil Nadu. The figures represent deities from Hindu mythology and are sculpted onto the towering gateways (called *gopura*) of the temple. V. MUTHURAMAN/FOTOMEDIA

BOTTOM: Site of the Meenakshi Temple in Madurai, Tamil Nadu. Built by the Pandyas between the seventh and tenth centuries, the temple complex is enclosed within high walls beyond four gateways (like the one shown here) with distinctly ornate stucco detailing. TOBY SINCLAIR/FOTOMEDIA






TOP: With twin minarets framing its central arch, the Jamid Masjid in Delhi welcomes Muslims for Friday prayers. India's largest mosque (the legacy of Emperor Shah Jahan from 1656) features a courtyard that can accommodate up to twenty thousand worshippers. AMIT PASRICHA/FOTOMEDIA

BOTTOM: Beyond these calm waters sits the Golden Temple, spiritual home of the Sikh religion in Amritsar, Punjab. Punctuated by a lotus-shaped dome, it is a unique blend of Islamic and Hindu architectural styles, erected between 1589 and 1601. AMIT PASRICHA/FOTOMEDIA





TOP: Dating to 1799, the red façade of the Hawa Mahal (“Palace of the Winds”) in Jaipur, Rajasthan. Behind the screens of its balconies, a veiled harem would have observed the activities on the street below. AMIT PASRICHA/FOTOMEDIA

MIDDLE: Transformed into a major trading center and gateway in the nineteenth century, Bombay, now known as Mumbai. With a skyline merged of stately Victorian architecture and sleek skyscrapers—symbols of India’s colonial past and present-day burgeoning economy—it remains the nation’s most dynamic city. AMIT PASRICHA/FOTOMEDIA


BOTTOM: Close-up of the Kadal Alagar, temple in Madurai, Tamil Nadu, to which followers of Vishnu continue to flock. Madurai is one of the oldest cities in South India (about 2,000 to 2,500 years old), and although no historical evidence yet exists to support the claim, it is believed that this temple dates to the same period. TOBY SINCLAIR/FOTOMEDIA




TOP: Recently constructed home of Ericsson in Gurgaon, Haryana. With its sleek surfaces, a symbol of India's bright economic future. AKHIL BAKSHI/FOTOMEDIA



BOTTOM: The fifteenth-century Adinath Temple, part of the Ranakpur complex and one of the five most important holy places of the Jain faith. Located in the Aravali Hills in the Rajasamand district of Rajasthan, the temple is constructed of white marble, boasting some 1,444 pillars, each carved with a different floral motif. TOBY SINCLAIR/FOTOMEDIA





TOP: Mud homes in Jodhpur, Rajasthan, their resonating blue walls the result of a traditional paint mixture of lime and indigo. TOBY SINCLAIR/FOTOMEDIA

BOTTOM LEFT: The imposing Gwalior Fort, Madhya Pradesh. Built in the eighth century and stretching for almost 2 miles, the fort encloses within its high walls a series of palaces and temples with stone carving and lattice screens in the Rajput style. TOBY SINCLAIR/FOTOMEDIA

BOTTOM RIGHT: Situated on the south bank of the Tungabhadra River in Karnataka—Hampi, the capital of the Vijayanagar Empire that reached its zenith in the sixteenth century. The core of the city was fortified and separated from its sacred center by an irrigated valley through which ancient canals and waterways still run. TOBY SINCLAIR/FOTOMEDIA

