Amalananda
[Objection:] If bliss, etc., should be introduced from all contexts on the grounds that Brahman is one, then why are "uniting all that is pleasant," etc. [which also refer to Brahman] not thus introduced?
[Response:] "Uniting all that is pleasant," etc., are enjoined [only] for the sake of acts of meditation. Because the precise demarcation of the result connected with an injunction is not known, then all the details connected with that result must be organized precisely according to the injunction [since there is no other standard by which to make sure that they contribute properly].
By contrast, truth, consciousness, etc. serve to ascertain the essence of the object; wherever the essence of that object is pertinent, there they are to be introduced . . .
[Objection:] Regarding what is "without qualities" [Brahman] words other [than that single marker "without qualities''] are useless, and so they should not be introduced [from other meditation contexts.]
[Response:] [i] truth, [ii] consciousness, [iii] bliss, [iv] infinity and [v] self are terms which mutually qualify one another, [respectively] overturn the flaws of [i] falsity, [ii] non-consciousness, [ii] sorrow, [iv] limitedness and [v] lack of self, and so define that single bliss, which is the common basis for truth, etc. It is just like the words "existent," "material thing" and "pot" [all define] a single pot.
The definition that Brahman is of this sort cannot occur due to one word alone, since if only one word is used, there will be no conflict [of meanings] and no indirect signification. Hence, other words must be used. Insofar as errors are possible, a whole string of words capable of ending those errors must be introduced; in order to end those errors [in every case], the string of word-meanings must be everywhere introduced. | Aquinas
[Objection: It seems that all the names which are used for God are synonyms.]
On the contrary, all synonyms united with ach other are redundant, as when we say, vesture clothing". Therefore if all names applied to God are synonymous, we cannot properly say "good God," or the like, and yet it is written, "O most mighty, great and powerful, the Lord of hosts is they name."[Jeremiah 32.18]
I answer that, These names spoken of God are not synonymous. This would be easy to understand, if we said that these names are used to remove, or to express, the relation of the cause to creatures; for thus it would follow that there are different ideas as regards the diverse things denied of God, or as regards diverse effects connoted.
But even according to what was said above(ST I.13.2), that these names signify the divine substance, although in an imperfect manner, it is also clear from what has been said (ST I.13.1,2) that they have diverse meanings. For the idea signified by the name is the conception in the intellect of the thing signified by the name. But our intellect, since it knows God from creatures, in order to understand God, forms conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from God to creatures, which perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and simply, whereas in creatures they are received, divided and multiplied.
As, therefore, to the different perfections of creatures there corresponds one simple principle represented by different perfections of creatures in a various and manifold manner, so also to the various and multiplied conceptions of our intellect there corresponds one altogether simple principle, according to these conceptions, imperfectly understood. Therefore althought names applied to God signify one thing, still, because they siginfy that [one thing] under many and difference as pects, they are not synonymous. |