|
|
 |
|
|
|
|
(I.13.1, 2) that they have diverse meanings. For the idea (ratio) signified by the name (nomen) is the conception (conceptio) in the intellect of the thing (res) signified by the name.
28But our intellect, since it knows God from creatures, in order to understand God forms conceptions proportional to the perfections flowing from God to creatures, which perfections pre-exist in God unitedly and simply, whereas in creatures they are received, divided and multiplied. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Cajetan summarizes as follows:29 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Our intellect "knows God from creatures;" [1.] therefore, our conceptions of God are "proportional to the perfections flowing from God to creatures;" [2.] therefore, these are varied and multiplied though corresponding to that which is entirely simple; [3.] therefore, ideas of this kind, connected with the names attributed to God, are diverse; [4.] therefore, names of this kind are not synonyms. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The emphasized sentence of Aquinas"for the idea signified by the name is the conception in the intellect of the thing signified by the name"is the basis for Cajetan's third step, "ideas of this kind, connected with the names attributed to God, are diverse." |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
Regarding this he introduces an objection which calls into question Aquinas' apparent equation of "conception" and "idea:" |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The following doubt arises: in Metaphysics IV, it is said that the idea which a name signifies is a definition; however, it is agreed that a definition is not a conception, which is identified with the object of definition. "Idea" names the "second intention," whereas "conception" names the "first intention." |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
If "idea" and "definition" correspond, and "conception" and the "object of definition," it seems inappropriate to identify ''idea" with "conception." Cajetan's defense of Aquinas' usage requires a further set of distinctions: |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
According to philosophers and theologians, the word "idea" in [Aquinas'] proposition can be taken in two ways, formally or denominatively. Thus, "white" formally pertains to "whiteness," but pertains denominatively to some thing |
|
|
|
|
|