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of the UMS is one reason why this present volume does not devote more space to a retrieval of Badarayana's system. Modi (1956,) however, lays the foundation for a complete retrieval of Badarayana. |
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9. Ramanuja and other Vedanta commentators join or divide some sutras differently, with a resultant variation in the total number of sutras. |
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10. Renou (1961, p. 207) suggests that sutras are perhaps deliberately obscure, so as to ensure that they will be transmitted properly, only under the guidance of approved teachers. |
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11. Defining the boundaries of an adhikaranahow many sutras constitute the unitis the first task of a commentator, and prerequisite to further analysis. Schools of Vedanta may disagree on the exact definition of adhikaranas; Ramanuja frequently divides adhikaranas differently than does Sankara. Modi's occasionally severe criticism of Sankara's divisions of adhikaranas is instructive. For a discussion of the connections among adhikaranas, see below, pp. 59-63. |
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12. Except where noted, all translations of Badarayana's sutras and of Sankara's Bhasya are those of Swami Gambhirananda (1983), with occasional slight modifications. Only when Sankara's commentary on a sutra is exceptionally long will I give a page reference for the cited portion. All references to the Sanskrit of the Bhasya and the subsequent commentaries are from the 1981 edition. |
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13. Bourdieu is helpful in appreciating the importance of significance of this forensic style. He notes that temporally situated practical thinking proceeds not only or primarily according to the demands of logical coherence, but by the "messier" more expansive procedures of debate and argument: "Those who are surprised by the paradoxes that ordinary logic and language engender when they apply their divisions to continuous magnitudes forget the paradoxes inherent in treating language as a purely logical instrument and also forget the social situation in which such a relationship to language is possible. The contradictions or paradoxes to which ordinary language classifications lead do not derive, as all forms of positivism suppose, from some essential inadequacy of ordinary language, but from the fact that these socio-logical acts are not directed towards the pursuit of logical coherence and that, unlike philological, logical or linguistic uses of language . . . they obey the logic of the parti pris, which, as in a court-room, juxtaposes not logical arguments, subject to the sole criterion of coherence, but charges and defences. . . . Quite apart from all that is implied in the oppositions, which logicians and even linguists manage to forget, between the art of convincing and the art of persuading, it is |
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