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knowledge is the attainment of the real nature, its realization of its nature as the absolute Self. Thus unembodiedness or embodiedness for the Self follows respectively from the fact of discrimination or non-discrimination . . ." (tr. 193) Vacaspati elaborates with yet another image: "By the repeated practice of hearing, understanding and meditating they are liberated by that knowledge which is discrimination. This knowledge which is discrimination has as its result the manifestation of the pure self, its appearing in its own true nature; this manifestation, in the form of a mental process, destroys the evolved world; then, like the kataka fruit, it too is dissolved, because [as mental process] it too is part of the evolved world." (Skt. 304) |
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27. Because jijñasa indicates both the desire to know and the inquiry instigated by that desire, I have generally left it (and the correlate jijñasin) untranslated, to leave open both possible meanings. |
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28. He considers, and rejects, the following four possibilities. First, the inaugural "atha" cannot indicate the beginning of the desire to know Brahman. The desire cannot be identified with the beginning of a text, and necessarily precedes the student's (motivated, purposeful) reading of it. Vacaspati observes that the desire to know always precedes any inquiry which is intended to satisfy that desire; the desire instigates the process, and must be operative before the undertaking of a process. Second, "atha" does not signal the beginning of a new enterprise, as if "something were effected on the mere hearing of that word 'atha,' as on hearing the sound of the drum or the conch." Although knowledge does progress, and new knowledge is acquired, knowing is not an activity that can be inaugurated so expediently. Third, "atha'' cannot indicate that the desire to know Brahman arises only after a knowledge of ritual has been achieved; for it is obvious that the desire to know can arise without ritual knowledge. Fourth, the knowledge of ritual is not even a necessary though subordinate accessory of knowledge of Brahman, necessarily its accompaniment though not a cause for it. Ritual and Brahman are distinct topics and there is no necessary connection between the two. Sankara dismisses all four interpretations and opts instead for a fifth, "proximity" (anantarya). In Mimamsa, proximity (PMS III.1.24) is a weak, noncausal connection, mere sequence. It indicates nearness in time or space, without any further subordination of one of the related elements to the other. In claiming that brahmajijñasa is "after" only in this limited sense, Advaita argues not that knowledge is without precedents or proximate environs, but only that being a proper Advaitin is not connected causally to those precedents. This minimalization of connection is important in several ways. First, it defends the Uttara Mimamsa as an enterprise posterior to and distinct from the Purva Mimamsa, and so justifies it as a separate undertaking. Second, it emphasizes |
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