|
|
|
|
|
|
|
ety which mattersis subordinated to the proper, orthodox reading of texts. "Renunciation-as-textualized" is presented as the presupposition of "renunciation-in-itself," not the reverse. What might be thought on these issues by illiterate renunciants, or by those who despise the upanisads, is irrelevant to Advaita. |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The response to the three questions can be summarized briefly. First, it is decided that the Chandogya text at least refers to asramas beyond that of the householder. Second, it is decided that the text does actually enjoin them: they are spoken of authoritatively here, as if enjoined, and since we do not know of any other text in which they are enjoined, we may legitimately presume that this text enjoins them, even if it does not literally state that injunction. (UMS III.4.20)
26 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
The third questionis there a formally recognizable fourth asrama?prompts an analysis focused on the meaning of the word "established in Brahman" (brahmasamstha), asking whether this word describes an established asrama, by entrance into which one is designated "established in Brahman," or whether the word refers to the group of those who are in fact spiritually advanced, whichever socially recognized asrama they may occupy, or however they are described. The question is resolved by an arduous textual analysis, in which various subsidiary issues are debated in relation to the question of the meaning of ''established in Brahman:" there is, Sankara says, a fourth asrama, with its own characteristics and rights, which differs qualitatively from the prior three.27 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
This authorization of radical renunciation is immediately restricted. Vacaspati, for instance, comments that the radical act of renunciation is possible only for those who have acquired the requisite textual knowledge: "That ripening of the knowledge of Brahman which is born of word is that direct manifestation which is the means to liberation; to it renunciation is enjoined as a subsidiary; but the injunction does not intend persons who are not competent [i.e., who lack the proper textual knowledge.]"28 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
We are not considering "renunciation in itself," nor merely about it, when we read UMS III.4.18-20.29 The point is not merely that we are compelled to rely on texts to learn about a set of |
|
|
|
|
|