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of Brahman and are everywhere pertinent, as fundamental to the very rationale for meditative practice; Sankara cites "One only, without a second,"
22 as an example of this kind of statement. Others"its head is joy, its right side delight,"23 ''uniting all that is pleasant," etc.24are not essential characteristics of Brahman, qualify it only in one meditation or another, and so need not be introduced everywhere. |
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Once the legitimacy of distinction among kinds of qualities is recognized, the question shifts to how one is to determine which qualities are real, everywhere pertinent, and which are merely provisional constructs for the sake of particular acts of meditation. In commenting on UMS III.3.11, Vacaspati distinguishes qualities which belong to the object in itself, of its own nature, from those which humans posit regarding it provisionally. Real qualities of Brahman "mark" it without attributing to it any kind of finitude; they pertain irrespective of any particular meditational situation. By contrast, provisional characteristics include all those which appear to attribute quantity or change to Brahman and which therefore must be taken as extrinsic and not real qualities. These are warranted only where the upanisads explicitly authorize their introduction. In these distinctions, clearly, the composition of a theology of Brahman is beginning to take shape. |
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Amalananda's position warrants close examination.25 He seeks a more refined justification for the distinction among qualities and, consequently, an explanation of why Brahman is better indicated by a series of terms, "true," "conscious," etc., than by just one of them alone. After all, if no word is adequate and if all words are just signs pointing toward a Brahman they cannot express, one might argue that one word suffices as the required though inadequate signifier. He first deals with the problem of why different words deserve different treatment: |
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[Objection:] If bliss, etc., should be introduced from all contexts on the grounds that Brahman is one, then why are "uniting all that is pleasant," etc. [which also refer to Brahman] not thus introduced? |
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[Response:] "Uniting all that is pleasant," etc., are enjoined [only] for the sake of acts of meditation. Because the precise |
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