


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AN INDIAN PRIMER OF PHILOSOPHY  
OR  
THE TARKABHĀṢĀ OF KEÇAVAMIÇRA

TRANSLATED FROM THE ORIGINAL SANSKRIT  
WITH AN INTRODUCTION AND NOTES

BY

POUL TUXEN, PH. D.

D. KGL. DANSKE VIDENSK. SELSK. SKRIFTER, 7. RÆKKE, HISTORISK OG FILOSOFISK AFD. II. 3.

KØBENHAVN

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BIANCO LUNOS BOGTRYKKERI

1914

# Det Kgl. Danske Videnskabernes Selskabs Skrifter,

## 5<sup>te</sup> Række.

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## PREFACE

This little work has a twofold purpose. Its first aim is to furnish readers interested in philosophical matters with some specimens of the problems with which the Indian logicians were occupied. Its second aim is to make easier to the student of Sanscrit philosophy the entering into that most interesting branch of Indian philosophy, the Nyāya-darçana, Keçava's compendium being in my opinion more adapted to this purpose than the later ones, among other things because its polemical parts are less dogmatical in their formulation.

I have endeavoured to make this translation as literal as possible, though, as I hope, without being illegible; but as I had to translate into a language that is not my native, I must, in cases where I could not find anything better, confine myself to make use of some technical terms employed by COWELL and DVIVEDI; of course the meaning of the Sanscrit and European terms very often differ considerably, and therefore I should advise readers to rely more on the definitions in the text than on the translated terms.

My best thanks are due to Professor Dr. DINES ANDERSEN for valuable criticisms and to the Directors of the "CARLSBERG FOND" for the pecuniary support that has made it possible to me to publish this treatise in English.

Regarding the English of my translation I may acknowledge the useful assistance of Miss THORA POULSEN, M. A.

Copenhagen, December 1913.

POUL TUXEN.





## Introduction.

The treatise which follows contains a translation of Keçava-miçra's excellent compendium in the philosophy of Nyāya<sup>1</sup>. Tarkabhāṣā is an elementary exposition of all the mainpoints of Nyāya (and Vaiçeṣika) intended for young people who have studied the common disciplines, such as grammar, poetics etc., but who have not yet ventured to grapple with philosophy, the three disciplines: Sanscrit grammar, poetics and philosophy forming to this day the basis of the education of every Pandit. Setting apart the absolute value which might eventually be ascribed to the work of Keçava, it must be supposed to be of some interest in showing us what was required (and is required) in India of the young man who wants a general basis in the way of philosophical method and phraseology corresponding to 'Philosophicum' with us (The B. A. degree of philosophy). Nyāya is able to give such a general basis of philosophical education through the fact that this system, as Dvivedi says with great truth (Tarkakaumudī 1886, p. 7), is the grammar of Indian philosophy; its phraseology, method and style have exercised a predominating influence on all other branches and schools. Apart from this historical interest, Tarkabhāṣā has for everybody interested in India no small importance in giving, as mentioned, a general view of the systems of Nyāya and Vaiçeṣika, which have not yet found any European exponent<sup>2</sup>; two systems which form such a great part in the culture of both ancient and modern India that the knowledge of them is absolutely necessary to everybody who occupies himself with Sanscrit literature. Of the six so-called "orthodox" Indian systems, Nyāya and Vaiçeṣika are the youngest and most 'scientific' pair; they are complementary as having the main points of view in common, while Nyāya deals in a large measure with dialectics, logic and the art of disputation, and Vaiçeṣika has for its speciality a descriptive treatment of the phenomena of the outer world on a 'physical' basis. The literature

<sup>1</sup> Immediately before the printing of this treatise, which was delivered to the "Kgl. danske Videnskabernes Selskab" April 1913, I have noticed a Tarkabhāṣa-translation made by Pandit Gaṅganatha Jhā (from a different recension of the text ["Pandit" 1901]) and published in the Quarterly "Indian thought" II. Allahabad 1911.

<sup>2</sup> A very detailed and thorough-going survey of the two systems, as they appear in the later compendiums, Professor Suali has now given in his comprehensive work: *Introduzione allo studio della filosofia Indiana*. Pavia 1913.

dealing with the two systems present in the main the grouping usually prevailing in a system of Indian philosophy. The oldest source that we possess is the two Sūtra works which, however, evidently does not form the beginning of a philosophical development but rather to a certain degree, mark the preliminary winding-up and fixing of the results gained in the schools; in their present form they are placed by JACOBI (J.A.O.S. XXXI, 1. 1910), on the basis of their polemics against Buddhistic schools, between A. D. 200 and 450. The standard-works of the two systems belong to the end of the same period, viz. as to Vaiśeṣika the systematic representation of Praśastapāda (ed. Benares 1895, which must be separated from the author of Sūtra, Kaṇāda, by a considerable space of time, and as to Nyāya Vātsyāyana's commentary on Goṭama's Sūtras (ed. Calcutta 1865). Vātsyāyana's Bhāṣya was commented on by Uddyotakara (6th c.) who wished to defend it against the attacks of the Buddhists (Dignāga); Uddyotakara's Nyāyavārtika then was commented on by Vācaspati-miśra (9th or 10th c.) and this again by Udayana. Over against this extensive bulk of literature which stretches over a thousand years and is closely attached to Goṭama's Sūtras, stands another group based on Gaṅgeśa's more systematic exposition of Nyāya, Tattva-cintāmaṇi (12th c.) and elaborated by the so-called Navadvīpa school (Nuddea in Bengal) during the following centuries in works that bear testimony to a brain-exercise, the acuteness or subtlety of which is said to be almost unique, but which, at the same time, by its sterility had a fatal influence on the school of Nyāya.

Nearly coincident with the beginning of this period, that is about the 12th century, a new form of literature begins to assert itself in Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, namely that of the shorter compendiums; they are probably due to a natural desire to find one's bearing in the chief points of the doctrine, in consideration of the ever growing bulk of commentaries. To the last representatives of this direction belong the Tarkasaṃgraha with Dīpikā, translated by HULTZSCH (Abh. d. kgl. Ges. d. Wiss. zu Göttingen. Phil.-Hist. Kl. 1907) and Tarkakaumudī (Z. D. M. G. 1907); among the oldest are Ćivādītya's Saptapadārthī and Keçavamīśra's Tarkabhāṣā.

We do not know anything about Keçavamīśra; Paranjape, in the introduction to his edition of Tarkabhāṣā (Poona 1894), places his lifetime between 1200 and 1400; Chinnabhaṭṭa's commentary on Tarkabhāṣā is namely written in the 14th century, whilst on the other hand Keçava quotes Udayana whom Paranjape and others place in the 12th cent.; the latter is not correct, Udayana lived in the 10—11th cent. (See Venis in Preface to Tārīkarakṣā, Pandit 1899); Keçava must, however, have lived in the interval between Udayana and Chinnabhaṭṭa. The contents of Tarkabhāṣā point to the same period; the book was probably written before Gaṅgeśa's Tattvacintāmaṇi, as it has scarcely been influenced, as far as style or subject-matter are concerned, by this work, which has exercised a predominating influence on afterages; if we compare Tarkabhāṣā with Saptapadārthī (11th—12th cent.), we discover that while this work acknowledges abhāva (non-existence) as seventh category in Vaiśeṣika Tarkabhāṣā mentions only the first six at the place where these categories

are introduced (see note 58 in this translation) but adds, it is true, the seventh as a supplement; this incertitude, too, makes it probable that Tarkabhāṣā belongs to one of the first centuries of the second millennium, for from the time of Saptapadārthī the seventh category is fully acknowledged together with the others.

The great number of commentaries and subcommentaries which the book has occasioned bear witness to the popularity of Tarkabhāṣā. Aufrecht's 'Cat. catalogorum' mentions 26 different commentaries. Of these the publication of Chinna-bhaṭṭa's above-mentioned commentary has long been announced, but, unfortunately, has never appeared. On the other hand I have been able to make use of Govardhana's commentary in Paranjape's edition (1894) and that of Viçvakarman in Surendralāla Gosvāmin's edition (Pandit XXII—XXIII, Benares 1901), besides the fragments of Gaurīkānta's and Mādhavadeva's commentaries, which Paranjape has published in the notes of his edition of Tarkabhāṣā. Viçvakarman lived in the 16th c.; thus also Govardhana as proved by Paranjape; consequently he cannot be a pupil of Keçavamiçra as Surendralāla maintains on the basis of an expression (*vivieya gurunirmitim*) in the introductory verses of his commentary; nor is he, as Colebrooke believed (*Essays* I, 263), the oldest commentator on Tarkabhāṣā; his father Balabhadra, as well, has written a commentary on Tarkabhāṣā. — This translation follows the text which Paranjape has published<sup>1</sup>) together with Govardhana's Tarkabhāṣāprakāṣa, but Viçvakarman's commentary, too, has been a good help to the understanding of the text, which is not quite easy as far as several sections are regarded.

Tarkabhāṣā gives, as mentioned, the doctrine of both Nyāya and Vaiçeṣika, yet without, like later compendiums exhibiting any complete fusion of the two systems; for the book professes to be pure Nyāya and on the points where the two systems diverge it follows the views of Nyāya and is founded on the first Nyāyasūtra; but in mentioning the ninth Nyāyasūtra it goes through the six (seven) categories of Vaiçeṣika (see note 58 of the translation) which fills up a great part of the work. Comparatively by far the greater part of this, more than one half of the work, is dedicated to the first of the 16 categories of Nyāya, e. g. 'Means of Knowledge'. This category is treated of in the beginning, after some remarks concerning the Method which will be applied. The characterisation of 'Means of right Knowledge' gives rise to a short mentioning of the three sorts of Causes, inherent, non-inherent and effective. Then the four means of knowledge follow: Perception and its different forms; Inference, treated of theoretically and practically, with a supplement on Fallacy; Comparison and finally Testimony. Then the establishment of Other Means of Knowledge is rejected and the first half of the work ends in a contemplation on Validity of Knowledge and its substantiation. The second half begins with the second category of Nyāya, Objects of Knowledge, which are considered in accordance with Nyāyasūtra I, 9 in the

<sup>1</sup> To this edition the numerals in the margin refer.

succession: Soul, Body, Senses, Objects (including, as mentioned, the categories of Vaiçeṣika at length: Substance, Quality, Action, Generality, Particularity, Inherence and Non-existence), Notion, Organ of Thought, Activity, Defects, Future Life, Fruit, Pain, and Final Liberation. With these subdivisions of the two first categories we have arrived at page 92 of the 113 pages of the book, the last 14 categories are consequently made short work of with the only exception of a renewed treatment of Fallacy. The succession of the treatment is: Doubt, Motive, Instance, Tenet, Members of Syllogism, Reductio in absurdum, Ascertainment, Discussion, Wrangling, Cavilling; then the renewed, more detailed treatment of Fallacy, as mentioned above, with an additional remark about Criteria and their faults; finally the last three, treating of Faults during Discussion. As this argument has shown, these categories are set up from the point of view: Art of disputation; fortunately this special point of view is of small consequence in the treatment of the subject which, through the matters which are treated of in this connection, is of far greater interest than mere sophistry might reckon upon.

Of the very few modern works concerning Nyāya there is reason for a mention of COLEBROOKE'S short review in *Misc. Essays I* (1837) which is composed just on the basis of Tarkabhāṣā; DEUSSEN'S exposition in *Allg. Geschichte der Philosophie*, I. Bd. 3. Abl. (1908) on the basis of the first book of the Nyāyasūtras; besides, concerning a single phase of the system, an excellent exposition by JACOBI: 'Die indische Logik' in *Gölt. gel. Anz. Nachrichten* 1901, phil.-hist. Kl. The history of the system has been delineated by BODAS in the introduction of Athalye's edition of *Tarkasaṃgraha* (1897)<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> To this must now be added Suali's above-mentioned 'Introduzione', which treats of the history of Indian logic and dialectics p. 3-102.

## Tarkabhāṣā.

‘For him who wishes, though young<sup>1</sup>, to penetrate into the system of Nyāya, but without great exertion and extensive studies, I elaborate the following Tarkabhāṣā<sup>2</sup>, concise, but accompanied by (necessary) argumentation.’

### I. Method.

The first Nyāyasūtra runs as follows: “Final beatitude is attained through acquaintance of the essence of the following categories: means of right knowledge, object of knowledge, doubt, motive, instance, tenet, member (of syllogism), reductio in absurdum, ascertainment, discussion, wrangling, cavilling, fallacy, perversion, futility, and occasion for rebuke.” (2) The meaning hereof is that final liberation<sup>3</sup> is attained by essential acquaintance (3) of the 16 categories: means of right knowledge, etc. Essential knowledge, i. e. right knowledge, of the ‘means of right knowledge’, etc., is, however, not possible, before these (categories) are made the object of statement, characterization, and investigation; as the author<sup>4</sup> of the Bhāṣya says: “The method of this doctrine (6) is threefold: statement, characterization, and investigation.”

Now statement (*uddeśa*) means to indicate the things only by name, and (7) that has been done in the quoted Sūtra.

<sup>1</sup> Bāla means, properly, a boy; Viçvakarman explains the word as signifying “he who does not know the 16 categories, means of knowledge, etc.” The word appears in the introductory verse, in order to indicate the person for whom the work is composed; the fact is that the introductory verse is to indicate the four factors (*ambaudha*) necessary at the composition of such a book: its subject matter (*viṣaya*), its purpose (*prayojana*), connexion (*saṃyati*) and fit reader (*adhikari*): here respectively: the system of Nyāya with its categories; the easy acquirement and further the acknowledgment of truth as means of liberation; the relation between the text-book and its subject, that is what exhibits and what is exhibited; and, finally, the young seeker of truth.

<sup>2</sup> Tarkyante tarkasahakṛtapramāṇajanyapramilitiviṣayīkriyanā itī tarkāḥ padārthas te bhāṣyante uddeśalakṣaṇaparīksadibhir nirūpyante nayeti tarkabhāṣa (Gaurīkānta).

It is strange that the Tarkabhāṣa is not introduced by a prayer as a good omen (*maṅgala*); Viçvakarman takes comfort in the thought that Keçavamiçra may have said the prayer within himself, which we may infer from the fact that the work is finished (*saṃpṛtyā lingena tadānumanāt*).

<sup>3</sup> N. S. I, 1, 2; ‘When of pain, birth, activity, faults, and false notions, by the disappearing of each (member), the preceding disappears, final liberation sets in.’

<sup>4</sup> E. g. Vatsyayana ad N. S. I, 1, 2. (Calcutta 1865, p. 9.)

Characterization' (*lakṣaṇa*) means to indicate a special attribute, as, when the matter in question is a cow, the possession of dewlap, etc.

When a thing is characterized in a particular way, investigation (*parīkṣā*) means deliberation whether the characteristic in question (*lakṣaṇa*) may be applied or not. These two things, therefore, characterization and investigation, must needs (8) be undertaken in order to arrive at an essential knowledge of (the categories) 'means of right knowledge', etc.

## II. Means of Right Knowledge.

As 'means of right knowledge' (*pramāṇa*) is the category first stated, it is also first characterized here: 'means of right knowledge' is instrument of right knowledge; here 'means of right knowledge' is what must be characterized, and instrument of right knowledge is the characteristic.

Now, if 'means of right knowledge' is the instrument of right knowledge, its effect (*phala*) must be capable of being stated, as an instrument must needs be accompanied by an effect. This is also true; the effect, i. e. what is produced, is just the right knowledge; just as cleaving is the effect of an axe as instrument of cleaving.

Now, what is this right knowledge of which the 'means of knowledge' is the (9) instrument? Answer: right knowledge (*pramā*) is the apprehension (*anubhava*) which agrees with its object (*ajathārtha*). By the term 'agrees with its object' processes of knowledge as doubt (*saṃśaya*), error (*vīpariyaya*) and reductio in absurdum (*tarka*) which do not agree with their object, are excluded. By the term 'apprehension' remembrance (*smṛti*) is excluded; apprehension is all knowing (*jñāna*), (10) remembrance excepted.

## III. Causality.

Now, what is instrument (*karāṇa*)? It is the most effective cause<sup>6</sup> (*kāraṇa*); most effective means more than effective; that is to say the extraordinary cause<sup>7</sup>.

Well, but the words 'effective' and 'cause' are synonyms; therefore we do not yet know what cause means! That is now explained: the cause of a product

<sup>6</sup> *Lakṣaṇa* is most often translated by definition, what is wrong. It means the quality which separates the thing from what is not the thing *atattvavyavacchedako dharuo lakṣaṇau*. Vatsyayana ad I, 1, 2: thus chief characteristic, etc. When Keçava explains lakṣaṇa as statement of a special quality (*asadharanadharmavacanam*) it is not, consequently, quite correct: I have been obliged to follow the inaccuracy in my translation ('characterization'). Concerning the three faults with which a characteristic may be beset, as being too narrow, too wide, or impossible, see p. (110).

<sup>7</sup> Pāṇini I, 4, 42.

<sup>8</sup> *Karāṇa* is in the Tarkasamgraha defined as acting, special cause; 'acting' is said in order to exclude inherent cause, 'special' in order to exclude the common causes; these are, according to Vākyavṛtti Nyayakoṣa p. 917: god; his knowledge, wish and acts; former non-existence; time; space; merit and guilt (*adr̥ṣṭa*).

is the thing the existence of which before the product (*pūrvabhava*) is absolutely (11) necessary, and not formerly explained otherwise (*ananyathāsiddha*)<sup>8</sup>, as, for instance, threads and loom as opposed to cloth.

Even if, when cloth is produced, a donkey brought on by chance, for instance, must be said to exist before (the cloth in question), this præ-existence is not absolutely necessary. And the colour of the threads must needs, it is true, exist before (the cloth), but this præ-existence has already been explained in another way, as (the colour of the threads) exhausts its powers in producing the colour of the cloth, and by its being a too complicated supposition to regard it as the cause of the cloth, too.

To be cause, therefore, means to be in possession of a præ-existence which is (13) not already explained otherwise, and which is absolutely necessary: and to be product means to be in possession of an absolutely necessary succession after something which has not previously been explained otherwise.

Therefore it is wrong when it is maintained that to be cause means to have 'præsentia' and 'absentia' corresponding to that of the product (*kāryānukṛtānvaya- (15) vyatirekīva*): for the result hereof would be that eternal and infinite (substances) as space, for instance, could not be cause, as in their case 'absentia' regarding time and place is out of question.

Now the mentioned cause is threefold: inherent, non-inherent, and effective. Of these inherent cause (*samavāyikāraṇa*) is that one in which the product is inherent when it comes into existence, as for instance: the threads are the inherent cause of the cloth, for it is in the threads that the cloth is inherent, when it comes into existence, not in the shuttle, etc. Well, but just as there exists a connexion (16) between the cloth and the threads, thus it is also connected with the shuttle, etc.; why, then, is it only in the threads, not in the shuttle etc. that the cloth is inherent when it is produced? (This objection is so far) true, but there are two sorts of connexion: conjunction and inherence: of those inherence (*samavāya*) is a connexion of two (things) which cannot be supposed to exist apart (*ajutasiddha*); between others only simple conjunction is found (*saṃyoga*). Now, what are two

<sup>8</sup> For the three forms of *ananyathāsiddhi* the following instances may be given. 1. Because of the thread itself the colour of the thread is *ananyathāsiddha* as opposed to the cloth, even if it is seen to exist together with the thread before the cloth. 2. Because of the notion 'The potters father', the potters father is *ananyathāsiddha* in his relation to the pot, even if it is evident that he exists before the potter, and thus also before the pot. 3. A donkey brought on by chance is *ananyathāsiddha* as opposed to the pot here, even if it appears together with stick and disc, which in other cases must be supposed necessarily to exist before the pot. — Thus the cases look, summarily stated; both in the Tarkakaumudī and with the commentators of the Tarkabhāṣa they give rise to elaborate researches, which, however, may be left out here, as the phenomenon itself is only hinted at in Keçava's text. The meaning is that the acting as cause of the concerning factors is already explained and thus exhausted otherwise; if *ananyathāsiddha* is translated by 'unessential', etc., the meaning, in itself perfectly clear, will be vague.

things which cannot be supposed to exist apart? Not existing apart are two things of which the one as long as it subsists remains only relying on the other. As it is said:

‘You shall know that two things are not existing apart when the one, as long as it subsists, remains only relying on the other.’

Instances are: parts and whole, qualities and their possessor, motion and its possessor, characteristic of genus and individual, particularity<sup>9</sup> (*viśeṣa*) and eternal substances; for whole, etc., remain, as long as they subsist, only as far as they rely relatively on parts, etc.<sup>10</sup> In the state in which they are destroyed they remain, however, relying on nothing, as, for instance, the cloth, when the threads are destroyed, or a quality, when its substratum is destroyed. To be destroyed is equal (17) to the presence of the totality of the causes of destruction.

Now threads and cloth stand in the relation of parts and whole; therefore the connexion between them is inherence, as they cannot be imagined to exist apart. Between the shuttle and the cloth, on the other hand, there is no inherence, as, regarding them, not to exist apart is out of question. For a shuttle does not only remain relying on the cloth, and not the cloth, either, relying on the shuttle; therefore the connexion between them is simple conjunction.

The cloth, then, is inherent in the threads; and the thing in which a product inheres, when it comes into existence, is the inherent cause of the product; therefore only the threads and not the shuttle, etc., are the inherent cause of the cloth.

The cloth is, further, the inherent cause as opposed to its own colour, etc., and, likewise, the clay is the inherent cause of the jar, and the jar that of its colour, etc.

Well, but now when, for instance, a jar is produced, its colour etc. is also produced; therefore, because of the contemporaneity (*samānakālīnatva*) between a quality and its possessor, a relation as between product and cause is out of question, as well as between the right and left horn of a cow, succession being precluded, and therefore the jar, etc., cannot be the inherent cause of its own colour, etc., for inherent cause is only a special kind of cause.

Against this line of argument the following consideration must be maintained: a quality and its possessor do not come into existence contemporaneously, but first the substance without qualities<sup>11</sup> comes into existence and then the inherent qualities are produced; if a simultaneous origination was assumed, there would be no difference between the quality and its possessor, as the totality of causes would be (18) the same (for both of them); and it is an established rule that the difference of

<sup>9</sup> See page (87).

<sup>10</sup> The terms parts, etc., must, consequently, be understood relatively; the parts of a whole may, of course, exist independent of the concerning whole, but ceases at the same time to be parts of the same whole: the threads may be imagined separated from the cloth, but then they are not parts hereof and, accordingly, not the inherent cause of the cloth.

<sup>11</sup> This seems not to agree quite with the assertion formerly alleged that a quality and its possessor cannot exist apart; cf., however, the preceding note.



products must be due to a difference of cause. Thus it is the case that the jar at the first moment is without qualities, consequently exists before the qualities, and, therefore, may be the inherent cause of the qualities.

In this way difference of cause will also appear, for the jar is not its own cause, as, on the part of a single object, succession is out of question, because it can exist neither before nor after itself. But as it can exist before its qualities, it can be their inherent cause.

Well, but if this is the fact, the consequence hereof would be that the jar at the first moment was invisible, as it, just like the wind, would be a colourless substance; for only the substance is visible which possesses developed colour<sup>12</sup> at the same time as it has a certain size. (19)

Further, the consequence hereof would be that (the jar) would be no substance, as it would not be substratum of qualities, for the chief characteristic of a substance is: a substance (*dravya*) is substratum of qualities (*guṇa*).

This may be true, but now, when a jar at the first moment is extremely subtle and not apprehended by the eye, where is the harm for us. For if we adopted that opinion that the jar came into existence with qualities, it might no more be apprehended when (only) a moment etc. was in question. So much is therefore an established fact: first the jar comes into existence without qualities, and in the next and following moments it is apprehended by the eye. The consequence hereof is not that it, at the first moment, is no substance, for we apply the following chief characteristic on a substance: substance is what is inherent cause, and it is substratum of qualities by its being capable of (obtaining qualities); to be substratum of qualities means not to be substratum (*adhikarāṇa*) of the absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva*) of qualities<sup>13</sup>. (20)

Now the non-inherent cause (*asamavāyikāraṇa*) is stated: non-inherent cause is the (cause) closely connected with the inherent cause and the power of which (to be cause in the case under consideration) is established. Thus, for instance, the conjunction of the threads is the non-inherent cause of the cloth, for the conjunction of the threads is closely connected with the inherent cause, through the fact that it as quality inheres in its possessors, the threads, which are the inherent cause of the cloth; and it acts as cause in its relation to the cloth, its existence before (the cloth) being absolutely necessary and not already otherwise explained. In the same way the colour of the threads is the non-inherent cause of the colour of the cloth. (21)

Well, but the cloth is the inherent cause of the colour of the cloth, thus is said that every quality<sup>13b</sup>, when it is only found with the cloth, is capable of being non-inherent cause of the colour of the cloth, as it, too, is closely connected with the inherent cause; on the other hand, not the colour of the threads,

<sup>12</sup> Cf. Vaiṣeṣikasūtra IV, 1. 5.

<sup>13</sup> See p. (88). Viçvakarman reads: *yogyata ca guṇātyantābhavābhavāḥ*.

<sup>13b</sup> I read with Viçvakarman's text: *kaṣyacid dharmasya*.

- (22) as it cannot be applied on the latter that it is closely connected with the inherent cause!

Do not say that: for a cause which is closely connected with the inherent cause of a thing's inherent cause is indirectly closely connected with the inherent cause (in question).

- (25) Effective cause (*nimittakāraṇa*) the cause is termed which is neither inherent nor non-inherent, and which nevertheless is cause: thus the loom etc. is the effective cause of the cloth. These three kinds of causes are only relevant to positive categories: when non-existence (*abhāva*) is in question, only effective cause is relevant, as this category inheres in nothing: for inherence is a quality with two existing things (*bhāva*).

Of these kinds of causes that one which in some way or other is most prominent is what we call instrument. Therefore the characteristic alleged is right: 'means of right knowledge' is instrument of right knowledge.

- (26) On the other hand, the characteristic<sup>14</sup> of 'means of right knowledge': that it acknowledges an object not (formerly) acknowledged, is wrong; for the consequence of this would be that a succession of processes of knowledge (*jñāna*) of the following form, 'this is a jar; this is a jar', when one and the same jar was concerned, would not be right knowledge, since these (processes) would perceive something which was already perceived. And it cannot be maintained that (in this case, too) knowledge of an object not (formerly) perceived is at hand, starting from the consideration that (the object) is made the object (of the knowledge), as it is more precisely particularised by ever new fragments of a moment: for through perception it is impossible to grasp the finest difference in time: if it was possible, an illusory understanding<sup>15</sup> of the four (processes): motion, (disjunction, abolition of the former conjunction, and entering of a new) conjunction as coexisting, would be precluded.

Well, but there are so many causes of right knowledge, as for instance the perceiving person and the object of knowledge; are they instruments (of right knowledge) or not?

Answer: As right knowledge needs not come into existence even if a perceiving person and the object of knowledge are at hand, while, inversely, right knowledge will immediately arise when the connexion between organ of sense (and object) etc.<sup>16</sup> has taken place, then only this connexion between organ of sense (and object) etc. is the instrument (of right knowledge); for by this eminence it rises over the perceiving person etc., even if they are like one another in being effective all of

<sup>14</sup> This view is maintained, according to Vidyakarman, by the famous teacher of Mīmāṃsā Kumārīlabhaṭṭa.

<sup>15</sup> Paranjape uses as instance the falling to the ground of a fruit: we apprehend its fall as one process, while there are really four: first a movement in the fruit arises, by that means the fruit and the tree are separated, thus the connexion between fruit and tree is abolished, and finally a new connexion is entered between the fruit and the ground. — Vidyakarman illustrates by that process to pierce 100 leaves at once.

<sup>16</sup> Etc. refers to inference, comparison and testimony.

them; most effective means more than effective, and it was just that which we termed instrument. Therefore the perceiving person etc. is not means of knowledge, but only the connexion between organ of sense (and object) etc. because it is instrument.

#### IV. Perception.

Now there are four<sup>17</sup> means of knowledge: as the Nyāya Sūtra (1, 1, 3) says, (27) 'the means of knowledge are: perception, inference, comparison and testimony'. What is perception? Perception (*pratyakṣa*) is the instrument of intuitive, right knowledge, and the knowledge is termed intuitive (*sākṣātkārin*) which is produced by an organ of sense.

It is two-fold: differentiated (*savikalpaka*) and undifferentiated (*nirvikalpaka*).

Its instrument is three-fold: sometimes an organ of sense, sometimes the contact (*saṃnikarṣa*) between organ of sense and object, sometimes notion (*jñāna*).

When is an organ of sense the instrument? An organ of sense is the instrument when the effect (*phala*) is the right knowledge which has the form of undifferentiated; for the soul comes in contact with the organ of thought (*manas*), the organ of thought with the organ of sense, the organ of sense with the object, it being an established rule that the organs of sense produce the notion after having reached the thing; then arises through the organ of sense connected with the object an undifferentiated notion without connexion with name, genus, characteristic, etc.,<sup>18</sup> which only refers to the thing itself and has the following form: this is something; the organ of sense is the instrument of this notion, as the axe is (the instrument) of cleaving; the contact between organ of sense and object is the intervening operation<sup>19</sup> (*avāntaravyāpāra*) as the connexion of the tree and the axe as the instrument of cleaving; the effect is an undifferentiated notion, just as the cleaving is (the effect) of the axe.

When is the contact between organ of sense and object the instrument? The contact between organ of sense and object is the instrument when immediately after the undifferentiated notion a differentiated notion arises consisting in a connexion with name, genus-characteristic, etc., which has this form: 'this is Dīṭṭha, this is a Brahman, this is black', and which refers to (the relation between) the

<sup>17</sup> Viçvakarman quotes from Varadarāja's Tarkikarakṣa three verses indicating the point of view of the different schools as to the number of the means of knowledge: 'The materialists (*cārvāka*) acknowledge only perception; Vaiçeṣika and Buddhists perception and inference; Sāṃkhya these two together with testimony; some philosophers of Nyāya the same, while others acknowledge in addition comparison; Prabhākara (Mīmāṃsā) acknowledges these four and, besides, implication; Kumarilabhaṭṭa's school of the Mīmāṃsā and the Vedānta moreover non-existence as the sixth; finally Paurāṇikas these Mentioned and, besides, possibility and tradition'.

<sup>18</sup> Etc. signifies quality, motion (Viçv.). The genus-characteristic is the 'general notion' of things, for instance the notion of jar *ghaṭatva*.

<sup>19</sup> *vyāpāra* is what is produced by a thing and which at the same time produces that which is produced by the same thing; for instance the contact between axe and tree is produced by the axe and produces the cleaving produced by the axe. Cf. Viçv.

object and its qualification<sup>29</sup> (*vīcēṣaṇāvīcēṣya*): the undifferentiated notion is the intervening operation; effect is the differentiated notion.

(28) When is, further, a notion the instrument? The undifferentiated notion is the instrument when notions (*buddhi*) of disgust, attraction or uninterestedness arise immediately after the mentioned differentiated notion; the differentiated notion is the intervening operation; the notions of disgust, etc., are the effect.

In this connexion (however) it is maintained by somebody that only the organ of sense is the instrument also of the differentiated (notion), etc.; all the intervening contacts, etc., form (in that case) the intervening operation.

The contact between organ of sense and object which is the cause of intuitive right knowledge is six-fold:

- connexion,
- inherence in something connected,
- inherence in something which inheres in something connected,
- inherence,
- inherence in something which inheres, and finally
- relation between the object and its qualification.

When thus, by means of the eye, a notion with a jar for its object arises, the eye is (the acting) organ of sense and the jar is object and their contact is a simple connexion, as it is out of question that these two might not be found apart.

Likewise, when, by means of the organ of thought, the inner organ of sense, a notion arises with the soul as object, the notion of self, the organ of thought is the (acting) organ of sense and the soul the object, and their contact is also simple connexion.

When (on the other hand) the colour etc. of the jar is apprehended by means of the eye (so that we state:) with this jar black colour is found, then the eye is the (acting) organ of sense, and the colour of the jar the object; and the contact of these two is inherence in something connected, as the colour inheres in the jar which is connected with the eye; the same kind of contact is forthcoming when, by means of the organ of thought, we apprehend the pleasurable sensation etc. inherent in the soul.

(29) When the dimension etc. of a jar is apprehended, we must adopt a four-fold contact as further cause (of knowledge), as we, when it is wanting, are incapable of apprehending the dimension, etc., (of a thing) far away, even if the mentioned inherence in something connected is at hand; this four-fold contact looks thus: connexion between the parts of the organ of sense and the parts of the object, between the organ of sense as a whole and the object as a whole, between the parts

<sup>29</sup> The object (*vīcēṣya*) is for instance a jar, the qualification (*vīcēṣaṇa* or *prakara* the 'form' of a thing) is, then, the notion of jar (*ghaṭatva*); where the relation between these two is perceived, we have the differentiated perception: this is a jar, e. g. this thing is qualified through the qualification *ghaṭatva*. Preceding is always an indefinite, general, undifferentiated perception where the relation between object and qualification is not yet perceived.

of the organ of sense and the object as a whole, and (finally) between the organ of sense as a whole and the parts of the object.

When has, then, the mentioned contact the form of inherence in something which inheres in something connected? When by means of the eye a knowledge of the general notion (the genus-characteristic) of 'colour' (*rūpatva*), etc., inhering in the colour of the jar is produced, then the eye is (the acting) organ of sense and the general notion of 'colour', etc., the object, and the contact between these two is inherence in something which inheres in something connected, for the general notion of 'colour' inheres in the colour which again inheres in the jar connected with the eye.

When is, then, the mentioned contact inherence? When the sound is apprehended by the organ of hearing, then this is the (acting) organ of sense and the sound is the object; and the contact between these two is inherence; for the organ of hearing consists of the space<sup>21</sup>, and the sound is a quality with the space, and the relation between quality and the possessor of the quality is inherence.

When is, then, the mentioned contact inherence in something which inheres? When by means of the organ of hearing the general notion (the genus-characteristic) of 'sound', etc., inhering in the sound is apprehended, then the organ of hearing is the (acting) organ of sense and the general notion of 'sound', etc., is the object; and the contact between these two is inherence in something which inheres, the general notion of 'sound' inhering in the sound which again inheres in the organ of hearing.

When has, finally, the contact between organ of sense and object the form of relation between the object and its qualification (*viśeṣaṇavīśeṣyabhūva*)? When for instance the non-existence of a jar is apprehended in a place connected with the eye (and it is stated): in this place is found no jar, then is the non-existence of the jar, etc., a qualification with the place connected with the eye.<sup>22</sup> And when in the soul connected with the organ of thought (*manas*) the non-existence of joy, etc., is apprehended (and it is stated): I am without joy, etc., then the non-existence of joy, etc., is a qualification with the soul connected with the organ of thought. And when in the g-sound inhering in the organ of hearing the non-existence of the general notion of the 'gh-sound' is apprehended, (that is when it is stated): the g-sound is without the general notion of the 'gh-sound', then the non-existence of the general notion of the 'gh-sound' is a qualification with the g-sound inhering in the organ of hearing. Thus, in short, the non-existence (of a thing) is apprehended by means of an organ of sense, that is through a contact between organ of sense and object, a contact which is characterized through the relation between object and qualification, connected with one of the five (mentioned) con-

<sup>21</sup> See p. (68).

<sup>22</sup> Here the text seems to be corrupted; Viçvakarman's text inserts *bhūtaṃ viśeṣyam* but is, moreover, no more satisfactory as far as the symmetry is concerned. The sense, however, is sufficiently clear.

nexions; and likewise also inference<sup>24</sup> (is apprehended) through the fact that the inherence of the cloth (in the threads) is apprehended by its being a qualification with the thread connected with the eye, (and it is stated): here in these threads the cloth inheres.

Thus is described the contact which takes place in six ways, and (what is here recorded) is summed up (in the following *çloka*):

'The right knowledge depending on an organ of sense is two-fold: differentiated and undifferentiated; its instrument is three-fold, and its 'contact' has six forms.'<sup>25</sup>

Well, be it admitted that the undifferentiated (notion) is perception, as it has a real individual object (*paramārthasatsvalakṣaṇaviśaya*); but how can the differentiated (notion) be perception, (the notion) which has a general notion (genus-characteristic) as object, for 1) it depends like testimony and inference on a form (*ākāra*) (viz. general notion) which is found in several (objects), 2) and only the (notion) produced (immediately) by the object may be called perception, 3) and only a real object is able to produce it? But real is the individual thing, not the general notion<sup>26</sup>; for this one, the positive existence of which is refuted (31) through means of knowledge, is deprived of real existence<sup>27</sup> in consisting only of an exclusion (of the objects concerned) from that which is different (*anyavyāvṛtti*).

(Against this we maintain that this argument) does not hold true, as the general notion belongs to the real essence of the things (*vastubhūta*).

We have thus explained perception.

## V. Inference.

Then inference (*anumāna*) is stated. Inference means consideration of the syllogistic characteristic<sup>28</sup>, for inference signifies the means of inferring, and you infer through consideration of the syllogistic characteristic; therefore consideration of the syllogistic characteristic (*liṅgaparāmarca*) is inference. And it

<sup>24</sup> The philosophy of the Vaiçeṣika denies, however, that inherence may be perceived by perception; it can only be perceived by inference (See *Pracastapadabhaṣya* p. 329).

<sup>25</sup> Viçyakarman's text contains one *çloka* more which sums up what is perceived by means of the six 'contacts', viz. 1) the jar, 2) its colour, 3) the general notion of the colour, 4) the sound, 5) the general notion of the sound, and 6) non-existence and inherence.

<sup>26</sup> The Buddhists acknowledge only the reality of the individual thing, but not that of the general notion. See *Sarvadarçanasamgraha* p. 10 and Viçy. p. 31, who against the assertion that the general notion is found with individual things, makes the Buddhist ask if it is found there totally or partially: in the first case it cannot be found with other individual things; the second possibility is incompatible with its unity. The general notion is namely eternal, one, and is found with several things; see below p. 186).

<sup>27</sup> Like the horns of a hare (Viçy.), *Vidhibhava* Viçy. explains by *astitva*.

<sup>28</sup> Cf. *Nyayavartika* p. 17. On the other hand it cannot be said, according to Viçy. in the words of Udayana, that logical inference is the syllogistic characteristic which is made the object of consideration, for the consequence would be that a logical inference in reference to something passed or future would be impossible, as the syll. characteristic in these cases has no existence.

consists in knowledge of smoke, etc., this (knowledge) being the instrument of logical knowledge (*anumiti*).

Logical knowledge means knowledge of fire, etc., and knowledge of smoke, etc., is the instrument hereof.

Now, what is the syllogistic characteristic? And wherein does the consideration of this consist? Answer: the syllogistic characteristic is that which makes us apprehend the object by virtue of the concomitance. Thus smoke, for instance, is the syll. characteristic of fire; for the concomitance (*vyāpti*) is the invariable companionship (of two things): where there is smoke, there is fire, too; and only when (the concomitance) is perceived the smoke produces the knowledge of fire; therefore the smoke is the syll. characteristic of the fire, as it makes us infer (the existence of) the fire by virtue of the concomitance. (32)

The third knowledge (of the smoke) is termed consideration of the syll. characteristic. At first smoke and (in the same time) fire is seen again and again, for instance, in the kitchen. By this repeated sight an essential connexion<sup>28</sup> between smoke and fire is stated: where there is smoke, there is fire, too. (33)

Even if the repeated sight takes place in the same way by an observation like this: where we have the notion of 'Maitrī's son', we have also the notion of 'black', there does not, however, exist any essential connexion between 'to be Maitrī's son' and 'to be black', but only a conditional (connexion), because the fulfilment of a necessary condition<sup>29</sup> is required consisting, for instance, in the digestion of vegetables. For when 'to be black' is in question, 'to be Maitrī's son' is not the effecting factor, but, for instance, a certain assimilation of vegetables, and the effecting factor is termed necessary condition. (34)

For the connexion between smoke and fire there is found no necessary condition (to be required fulfilled); for if there is any, it must either be perceptible or not; in the latter case there is no reason for admitting its existence, and in the former case it is (in the connexion in question) not seen.

Where a necessary condition is required, it will be seen, too; as, for instance, the presence of wet fuel, when the connexion of the fire with smoke<sup>30</sup> is in question; or like the fact that the action concerned is prohibited when the connexion between 'to commit slaughter' and 'to entail guilt' is in question; or (finally) as a certain assimilation of vegetables, for instance, when the connexion between 'to be Maitrī's son' and 'to be black' is in question.

But here where the fact that the smoke is constantly accompanied by fire is concerned, the fulfilment of no condition is required; if such a one had existed it must have been seen; therefore it does not exist, as it is not seen; by means (35)

<sup>28</sup> If you ask how it is possible to apprehend the concomitance, as we cannot come in contact with all fire and smoke, the answer will be that knowledge of all fire and smoke is possible by virtue of a special knowledge depending on the acquaintance of the general notions 'fire' and 'smoke'. See Siddhantamuktavali ad Karika 63, Tarkadīpika p. 91.

<sup>29</sup> See p. (13).

<sup>30</sup> That means of course, if presence of smoke is inferred from fire.

of this reductio in absurdum (*tarka*), which supports a perception accompanied by non-observation of (the condition), we record that no necessary condition is in question.

Now, when that is the case, we record concomitance between smoke and fire by means of the perception which apprehends their companionship and is attended partly by an impression (*samskāra*) suggested by repeated sight, partly by an impression suggested by the apprehension of the non-presence of this condition. Therefore between smoke and fire is found only an essential connexion, no conditional one, and an essential connexion is termed concomitance.

(36) When by that way we get an understanding of the concomitance between smoke and fire, the first knowledge of the smoke is that which takes place in the kitchen. The second knowledge of the smoke is that which takes place on a mountain or another subject of the syllogism (*pakṣa*). Then the concomitance formerly apprehended between smoke and fire is remembered and the smoke which is found there on the mountain is again considered: here on the mountain smoke is found, invariably accompanied by fire. This is the third knowledge of the smoke.

Thus the matter must necessarily be regarded, otherwise it would only run as follows: where there is smoke there is fire: but how should an admission of fire here be attained? Therefore a knowledge of the form: 'there is smoke here, too', must be required, and just this (knowledge) forms the consideration of the syllogistic characteristic; and this consideration forms the inference, as it is the instrument of logical knowledge; from this (third knowledge) the logical knowledge arises: fire is found here on the mountain.

Well, but why is it not the first knowledge of smoke, that which takes place in the kitchen, which makes us infer the (presence of) the fire? This might so far be true, but we have not yet (at that moment) recorded the concomitance, and only when that is recorded, the logical knowledge may appear.

Well, but let us, then, infer the fire in the kitchen as soon as the concomitance is ascertained. No, for here the fire is beyond doubt, because we have seen it, and the subject of inference must be such as is doubted, as the author of the *Bhāṣya*<sup>21</sup> has said: 'Logical proof takes place neither against an object which is not perceived, nor against a matter which is settled, but only in reference to a matter which is doubted.' ✓

Well, but why is not, then, an inference concerning fire produced by the knowledge of smoke which a man has who simply approaches the mountain; here, to be sure, doubt as to the fire is in question, as doubt becomes a basis of the logical argumentation, neither a conclusive nor a refuting means of knowledge being at hand. This is in so far true; but remembrance of the concomitance is also a (necessary) cause of the logical knowledge, for the man who has recorded but forgotten the concomitance may no more draw a logical conclusion than the person who has

<sup>21</sup> Vatsyāyana p. 3.



not recorded it. When by the sight of the fire the latent impression (*saṃskāra*) (37) has been aroused, then the concomitance is remembered: What is in possession of smoke is also in possession of fire, as for instance the kitchen.

Therefore the third knowledge of smoke is that which arises when the sight of smoke and the recollection of the concomitance are forthcoming and which has the following form: this (mountain) is in possession of smoke. Only this (knowledge) and no other makes us infer (the presence of) fire, and herein the consideration of the syllogistic characteristic consists. Thus (the stated) characterization is established: inference is the consideration of the syllogistic characteristic.

Now inference is twofold: that which takes place for one's own sake, and that which takes place for the sake of another person. The former is that which is the cause of one's own understanding (*pratipatti*). The fact is that when a person in the kitchen or elsewhere has through a qualified<sup>32</sup> perception apprehended the concomitance between smoke and fire, and then has approached a mountain, and doubts the existence of fire thereon, and then sees a streak of smoke which is on the mountain and unbroken ascends from this towards the clouds, then, a latent impression being aroused by the sight of the smoke, he remembers the concomitance: where there is smoke there is fire, realizes now that here, too, is smoke, and attains to the comprehension: accordingly there is fire here on the mountain. This is an inference for one's own sake.

The inference for the sake of another person arises, on the other hand, when, having himself inferred the fire from the smoke, a man applies the proposition with the five members (*avayava*) to make it obvious to another person. It has the following form:

This mountain has fire.

Because it has smoke.

What has smoke has fire, too, as for instance the kitchen.

Thus is also this (mountain).

Therefore it is so.

Starting from the syllogistic characteristic stated in this proposition, and furnished with the five qualities<sup>33</sup>, another person, too, understands the (existence of) fire. Therefore this is called an inference for the sake of another person. (38)

Here what is to be proved (*sādhya*) is that the mountain has fire, and the fact that (the mountain) has smoke is the reason (*hetu*). The latter is in possession of both positive and negative (concomitance), the concomitance taking place both positively and negatively.

The positive concomitance (*avayavyāpti*) runs namely as follows: where there is possession of smoke there is also possession of fire, as for instance in the kitchen; for in the kitchen we find stated the connexion<sup>34</sup> (*avaya*) between smoke and fire.

<sup>32</sup> Qualified through freedom of condition, and through concomitance.

<sup>33</sup> See p. (41). With *Vicy*, must be read *pañcarūpopapannat*.

<sup>34</sup> i. e. simultaneous presence.

In like manner the negative concomitance (*vyatirekanyāplī*) runs: where there is not fire there is not smoke, either, as for instance in a pond; for in a pond we find the exclusion (*vyatireka*) of both smoke and fire. By negative concomitance the regular order is the following: the negation of that which by positive concomitance was accompanied (*vyāpīya*) becomes here accompanying (*vyāpaka*), and the negation of that which (by positive concomitance) was accompanying becomes accompanied. It is expressed (in the following śloka)<sup>55</sup>:

‘(By negative concomitance) is found between the negations of two things the inverse relation of the relation between accompanied and accompanying admitted between two things (by positive concomitance)’.

‘By positive concomitance the reason (*sādhana*) is accompanied, and what is to be proved (*sādhya*) is accompanying; in the other case, the negation of what is to be proved is accompanied, and the negation of the reason is accompanying.’

‘First the accompanied is stated, and then the accompanying; thus examined the true nature of the concomitance becomes obvious.’

(39) Thus with a reason like ‘to have smoke’ the concomitance takes place both positively and negatively. When in the propositions only the positive concomitance is stated, this statement is done because the result is attained by one alone, and because the positive concomitance is the most direct of the two — it being unreasonable, when a result may be arrived at by the straight way, to try to reach it by a roundabout way —; but it is not because no negative concomitance is found. Thus the reason ‘to have smoke’ is in possession of both positive and negative concomitance, and likewise other reasons, too, are found with both positive and negative concomitance, as for instance a reason like ‘to be produced’, when ‘to be transient’ is what is to be proved.

(Another kind of) logical reason has only negative concomitance, as for instance the reason ‘to be in possession of *prāṇa*<sup>56</sup>, etc.’, when ‘to be animated’ is what must be proved. Accordingly:

The living body is animated.

As it is in possession of *prāṇa*, etc.

What is not animated is not in possession of *prāṇa*,

etc., like, for instance, the jar here.

Thus this living body is not.

Therefore it is not so.

In this instance the animation of the living body is what is to be proved, and ‘to be in possession of *prāṇa*, etc.’, is the reason: it has exclusively negative concomitance, as no positive concomitance may be imagined; for no instance (*dyṣṭānta*) of the following form is to be found: what is in possession of *prāṇa*, etc., is ani-

<sup>55</sup> The first one is found in Kumarila's *Śloka-vartika* p. 381 f. (Benares 1898–99).

<sup>56</sup> Breath, one of the five animal spirits: see the translator's ‘Yoga’ p. 86. (Copenhagen 1911): ‘etc.’ signifies the other characteristics of the soul, mentioned in *Vaiṣeṣika-sūtra* III. 2. 1.

mated, as for instance '...'. All what is living body is, namely, (in this case) the subject of the inference (*pakṣa*).

Also the chief characteristic (of a thing) is a reason which has only negative concomitance. For instance the chief characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of the substance (40) of earth is the possession of smell:

The present object of the discussion is to be termed 'earth'.

As it is in possession of smell.

What is not called earth is not in possession of smell, as for instance water.

Or (another instance): the chief characteristic of the means of knowledge — to be instrument of right knowledge. Accordingly:

Perception, etc., must be termed 'means of knowledge'.

As it is instrument of right knowledge.

What is not termed 'means of knowledge' is not instrument of right knowledge, as for instance fallacious perception.

Here no positive concomitance is forthcoming, for no instance of the following form is found: what is the instrument of right knowledge must be called means of knowledge, as for instance such or such, all that is means of knowledge being made the subject of the syllogism.

In these instances the designation (*vyavahāra*) itself is what must be proved, and not the notion of means of knowledge (*pramāṇatva*); for as just this consists in being the instrument of right knowledge and, accordingly, is not different from reason, the fault would occur which consists in (reason) being identic with what is to be proved (*sādhyābhedadoṣa*). Thus the reasons are stated which have only negative concomitance.

Another kind of logical reason has only positive concomitance, as for instance:

Sound<sup>37</sup> may be named.

As it may be made the object of right knowledge.

What may be made the object of right knowledge may be named, as for

Thus this is, too.

instance a jar.

Therefore it is so.

Here the sound's capability of being named is what must be proved; the reason is that it may be made the object of right knowledge. This (reason) has exclusively positive concomitance, as no instance of negative concomitance of the following form may be imagined: what is not able of being named cannot be made the object of right knowledge, either, as for instance this or that. The fact is that an instance must always be stated which is authorized by a means of knowledge, and it must of course be capable of being perceived and named.

Of these three (kinds of) inferences, with both positive and negative concomitance, only with positive, or only with negative concomitance, the reason which

<sup>37</sup> I read with Viçvakarman's text: çabdo bhidheyah.

has both positive and negative concomitance is capable to prove what it must prove only as far as it is furnished with five qualities (*rūpa*), but not if it wants but one of them.

(41) The five qualities are:

- to be an attribute with the subject of the syllogism (*pakṣadharmatva*),
- to be found with analogous instances (*sapakṣe sattva*),
- to be excluded from contrary instances (*vīpakṣād vyāvṛtti*),
- not to have an object which is contradicted (*abādhitaviṣayatva*), and
- not to be counterbalanced (by another reason, *asatpratīpakṣatva*).

These qualities are found with a reason which has both positive and negative concomitance, for instance (with the reason) 'to have smoke'. 'To have smoke' is, namely, an attribute of the mountain, the subject of the syllogism, as it is found with the mountain. Likewise (is here stated): to be found with analogous instances, i. e. it (the reason) is found with analogous instances like the kitchen. (In like manner we have): to be excluded from contrary instances like the pond, i. e. it is not found there. (A reason like) 'to have smoke' has not, either, an object which is contradicted; for the object of a reason like 'to have smoke' is the quality which must be proved, namely 'to have fire', and it is not contradicted, i. e. not overthrown by any means of knowledge whatever. Likewise (the reason) 'to have smoke' is not counterbalanced, i. e. it is not hit by any contradictory reason: the fact is that another reason is called contradictory, which proves the contrary of what has to be proved, and such a one is not to be found as opposed to a reason like 'to have smoke', as we cannot see it. Thus all five qualities<sup>28</sup> are found with a reason like 'to have smoke', therefore this 'to have smoke' is logically conclusive with reference to 'to have fire.'

That the fire is an attribute with the subject of the syllogism is proved by the reason's being an attribute with the same. The logical inference has, namely, two constituents: the concomitance and the (reason's) being an attribute with the subject of the syllogism; of these the concomitance proves what must be proved, in its general form (*sādhyasāmānya*), while the special connexion of what is to be proved with the subject of the syllogism (*pakṣasambandhitvaviṣeṣa*) is proved by the fact that the reason is an attribute with the latter.

By the fact that 'to have smoke' is an attribute with the mountain, we infer the connexion of the fire with just this mountain. Otherwise we might quite do without the inference, as what is to be proved is proved in its general form from the apprehending of the concomitance alone.

All other reasons, too, which have both positive and negative concomitance are only right reasons when they are furnished with these five qualities, otherwise they are fallacies (*hetvābhāsa*) i. e. as much as no reasons. The reason which has merely positive concomitance proves, on the contrary, what it must prove, when only furnished with four qualities, for, as far as it is concerned, to be excluded

<sup>28</sup> Concerning the relation of the five 'qualities' to the five 'fallacies', see p. (110).

from contrary instances is out of question, as such are not found. Also the reason which has negative concomitance only, is merely furnished with four characteristics, for, as far as it is concerned, to be found with analogous instances is out of question, as such are not found.

Now, what are 'subject of the syllogism', 'analogous instances', and 'contrary instances'? It is explained:

Subject of the syllogism (*pakṣa*) is the thing which has an attribute (42) which is doubted, and which must be proved, for instance the mountain in an inference from smoke.

Analogous instance (*sapakṣa*) a thing is called, which is in decided possession of the attribute which must be proved, for instance the kitchen in the same logical inference from smoke.

Contrary instance (*vīpakṣa*) a thing is called, which is in decided possession of the negation of what must be proved, for instance the pond in the same logical inference.

Thus three (kinds of) reasons are stated: with both positive and negative concomitance, with only positive concomitance, and with only negative concomitance. (Reasons) different from these are called fallacies.

Fallacies (*hetvābhāsa*) are reasons which want the characteristics (*lakṣaṇa*) of a reason, but which, nevertheless, look like (real) reasons; they appear under many forms. They are five: the irreal, the contrary, the non-cogent, the counter-balanced, and the refuted.

Of them the irreal one (*asiddha*) is a such the existence of which with the subject of the syllogism is not an established fact. This irreal (fallacy) is divided into three kinds, according to its being irreal (1) as far as its substratum, (2) as far as it itself, or (3) as far as the concomitance is concerned.

That which, concerning the substratum, is irreal (*ācraiyāsiddha*) is (for instance the following):

The sky-lotus is fragrant.  
Because it is a lotus.  
Like the lotus growing in the pond.

Here the sky-lotus is the substratum (of the reason), but such a one does not exist.

A reason, irreal as to the reason itself (*svarūpāsiddha*), (is found in the following syllogism):

Sound is transitory.  
As it is the object of the organ of sight.  
Like a jar.

Here the reason is 'to be the object of the organ of sight', but this (reason) is not found with sound, as sound is the object of the organ of hearing.

The reason, irreal as to the concomitance (*vyāpyatvāsiddha*) is again (43) divided into two subdivisions: one is due to want of a means of knowledge for

apprehending the concomitance, the other to the existence of a condition (which must be required fulfilled).

The first (is found in the following syllogism):

What exists has only momentary existence (*kṣaṇika*)<sup>39</sup> like the clouds.

Now, sound exists, etc. . . .

But there does not exist any means of knowledge which makes us apprehend the concomitance between existence and momentary existence. If it is maintained that (the reason) here is unreal as to the concomitance, because it is conditional, then it has to be admitted that the momentary existence is due to something else.

The second (subdivision appears in the following way):

The killing connected with sacrifices produces guilt.

As it is killing.

Like killing outside sacrifices.

Here it is not namely the thing itself 'to be killing' which occasions the producing of guilt, but it is the fact that (the particular act) is prohibited, which is the producing factor, i. e. the condition (that must be required fulfilled).

For the chief characteristic of a condition (*upādhi*) is the following: a condition is the thing which invariably accompanies what must be proved, but not what proves. This (characteristic) is found with the notion 'prohibited', for the notion 'prohibited' accompanies what must be proved, viz. the production of guilt: where we have production of guilt, we have invariably also the notion 'prohibited'.

(44) On the other hand the notion 'prohibited' does not accompany what proves, viz. 'to be killing': where we have the notion 'killing', we have not invariably the notion 'prohibited', as we have not the notion 'prohibited' when the killing of the animal for sacrifice is in question.

As, consequently, a condition like 'to be prohibited' is required, (a reason like) 'to be killing' is unreal, as far as the concomitance is concerned, and dependent on a concomitance produced by something else.<sup>40</sup>

Contrary (*viruddha*) is the reason accompanied by the opposite of what should be proved. For instance:

Sound is eternal.

As it is produced.

Like space.

For the notion 'produced' is accompanied by the notion 'transient', consequently of the opposite of 'to be eternal', which was what should be proved; what is produced is namely transient and not eternal; therefore the reason 'to be produced' is contrary.

The non-cogent (fallacy — *anaikāntika* — is the reason) which allows another

<sup>39</sup> What Keçava here states as an instance of a wrong logical inference with fallacy is the famous doctrine of the Buddhists on the momentary existence of everything existing. Cf. Sarvadarçanasamgraha p. 7-10.

<sup>40</sup> Viz. by the condition in question.

inference than the intended (*savyabhicāra*). It has two subdivisions, according to its being too general or too particular.

Of these too general (*sādhāraṇānaikāntika*) is (a reason) found both with the subject of the syllogism, with analogous instances, and with contrary instances. For instance:

Sound is eternal.  
As it is the object of right knowledge.  
Like space.

Here the reason is 'to be the object of right knowledge', and it is found with both eternal and transient things.

Too particular (*asādhāraṇānaikāntika*) the (reason) is which is excluded from both analogous and contrary instances, and which is only found with the subject of the syllogism. For instance:

The element of earth is eternal.  
Because it has smell.

'To have smell' is excluded from analogous instances, eternal things, and from contrary instances, perishable things, and is only found with the element of earth.

The counterbalanced<sup>41</sup> reason (*prakaraṇasama*) is the reason opposed to which another reason is found, which proves the contrary of what should be proved. For instance:

Sound is transient.  
As it is without eternal qualities.

And: Sound is eternal.  
As it is without transient qualities.

This (fallacy) is called the neutralized (*satpratīpakṣa*).

Refuted (*kālātyayāpadiṣṭa*)<sup>41</sup> the reason is called the object of which is refuted, the negation of what must be proved being stated with the subject of the syllogism through another means of right knowledge. For instance:

Fire is cold.  
As it is produced.  
Like water.

(45)

<sup>41</sup> As to the two last fallacies, I have used in the translation the terms by which they are later on designated (*satpratīpakṣa* and *badhita*) (and which are found, too, with Keçava), in order to avoid the obscure terms borrowed from the Nyāyasūtra I, 2, 48 and 50, applied with him, with the more reason as Keçava's explanation of these two fallacies agrees with the later conception, and not with the explanation which the Sūtra and the Bhaṣya give of them. The terms of the Sūtras are respectively *prakaraṇasama* which according to Vatsyayana seems to mean 'what does not get further than to assertion and counter-assertion', and *kālātyayāpadiṣṭa* which must mean 'the one stated after the lapse of the favourable moment' or the like. It is evident that none of these designations applies to Keçava's explanation, as, upon the whole, the fallacies mentioned in the Nyāyasūtra I, 2, 46–50 and the Vaiçeṣikasūtra III, 1, 15 foll. might hardly be reconciled with the system given in the compendiums later on.

With the exposition of the fallacies finished here may be compared the more detailed treatment which follows p. (101)–(110).

Here the reason is 'to be produced' and what it must prove is the notion 'cold'. But the negation of this we have stated through perception, perceiving (that fire is) hot through the perception which is called touching.

Thus inference is finished.

### VI. Comparison.

Comparison (*upamāna*) is knowledge of an object characterized through likeness with (for instance) a cow, a knowledge accompanied by the remembrance of the object of a proposition tending to the transfer (of qualities from one thing to another, *atideḥavākya*).

As, for instance, when a man who does not know a buffalo (*gavaya*) but from some inhabitant of a forest has heard 'a buffalo looks like a cow' goes into the forest, and remembering the object of this proposition, sees an object characterized through likeness with a cow, then comparison is the knowledge which takes place with reference to an object characterized through likeness with a cow and accompanied by the remembrance of the object of the above mentioned proposition; for it is an instrument of knowledge through comparison (*upamiti*). Knowledge through comparison takes place immediately after the sight of an object characterized through likeness with (for instance) a cow, and consists in understanding of the relation between denomination and denominated: this object must be denominated with the word buffalo. This is the result (*phala*, of the comparison).

Thus comparison is finished.

### VII. Testimony.

- (46) Testimony (*śabda*) is the statement of a trustworthy man. Trustworthy is  
 (47) the man who states a thing as it is. A statement (sentence) is a collection of words which are in possession of (reciprocal) dependence (strictly speaking: claim), compatibility, and juxtaposition.

Therefore words like 'cow, horse, man, elephant' are no sentence, as they want reciprocal dependence (*ākāṅkṣā*).

No more is 'you shall besprinkle with fire' a sentence, as compatibility is not found here, for between fire and sprinkling there is no reciprocal compatibility for forming a construction (*auvaya*). By the instrumentalis 'agninā' fire is namely given as instrument of the act of sprinkling, and fire is not compatible (with the idea of) being the instrument of sprinkling; therefore there exists between fire and sprinkling no relation as between action and instrument, as there is no compatibility, and therefore 'you shall besprinkle with fire' is no sentence.

Similarly, for instance, the words: 'bring the cow hither' form no sentence when they are not pronounced coherently but one by one, at intervals of three hours, for there is no reciprocal juxtaposition (*sāṃnidhya*) even if it is true that reciprocal dependence and reciprocal compatibility for forming a construction are found.



Only the words which are in possession of (reciprocal) dependence, compatibility, and juxtaposition form a sentence, as for instance 'he who desires heaven must perform the Jyotiṣoma-sacrifice', or 'at the river-bank are five fruits', or the above mentioned words 'bring the cow hither', pronounced without delay.

Well, but here is it not the words which possess dependence, but the things (*artha*), as for instance the fruits, as far as they must abide somewhere (*ādheya*), require a place as for instance the bank on which to abide (*ādihāra*); on a closer examination it is not the things, either, which possess dependence, for as dependence (48) (here) has the character of a desire, it must be the attribute of something conscious.

This is true; but the things are said to have 'dependence', as they suggest with the person who hears the words which signifies them, the desire (*ākāṅkṣā*) of other objects, and thus the words, too, which express the things in a figurative sense are said to have 'dependence'. Or only the words, having expressed the thing, are said figuratively to have 'dependence' in suggesting a desire the object of which is another thing.

Thus the things, when they have dependence, become compatible for forming (49) a reciprocal construction, and thence the expression 'compatible' is, too, transferred to the words.

Juxtaposition means the articulation of the words without delay by the same man; it is found immediately in the words, not (indirectly) through the things.

By that we have arrived at the following definition: a sentence (*vākya*) is a collection of words pronounced immediately one after the other, expressing things the compatibility of which for reciprocal construction is obvious and which by expressing the thing suggests with the listener the desire of another word or another thing.

A word (*pada*) is a collection of sounds; collection (*samūha*) here means to be object of a single cognition.

As we are incapable of apprehending several sounds simultaneously, the sounds in due succession being quickly destroyed, then, at the moment when we, after having apprehended the preceding sounds, hear the last sound, arises at once the (50) comprehension of words depending on several existing or non-existing (no longer existing) sounds, by means of the organ of hearing, which is supported by the comprehension of the conventional meaning of the derivation of words, and, then, is connected with the last sound, and which (finally) is accompanied by the impressions (*saṁskāra*) suggested by the apprehension of the preceding sounds; (this comprehension of words is produced) by virtue of subsidiaries (*sahakārin*), like recognition; for by the perception where a recognition takes place, a former state, though passed, appears.

Then appears the comprehension of sentences, depending on several words, by means of the organ of hearing, which is supported by the notion of the thing that is expressed by the word, and has as its object the last word, and

which is, (finally,) accompanied by the impressions suggested by the apprehension of the preceding words.

Such a sentence, put forward by a trustworthy man is the means of right knowledge which is called right testimony; its result is the knowledge of the object of the statement.

(51) This characterization of the means of knowledge: testimony, is common to ordinary and Vedic tradition; as far as the ordinary one is concerned, the difference exists that many a one may be trustworthy, but not every one; therefore only some ordinary statements are means of right knowledge, viz. such as originate from a trustworthy person, but not all. As to Veda, on the contrary, any statement composed by the most trustworthy supreme God is means of right knowledge, as they are the statements of a trustworthy person, every one and all.

Thus the four means of right knowledge are gone through; what is different from these is no means of right knowledge, as it is comprised under here in so far as it is means of right knowledge.

#### VIII. Other Eventual Means of right Knowledge.

Well, but implication (*arthāpatti*) is a particular means of right knowledge; for when we have seen or heard that the fat Devadatta does not eat during the day, we comprehend that he must eat during the night; for him who does not eat by day it is impossible to be fat without eating by night; therefore 'implication' arisen through the impossibility of explaining the fatness in another way is the means of right knowledge (which makes us comprehend) that (Devadatta) eats in the night. And it is different from perception etc., for eating in the night cannot be the object of perception etc.

(Against this we answer) no, for to eat by night is the object of an inference of the following form:

Devadatta eats by night.

As he is fat without eating by day.

He who does not eat by night is not fat without eating by day, as for instance he who neither eats by day nor by night is not fat.

Thus this person is not.

Therefore he is not so.

(52) As we in this way comprehend that (Devadatta) eats by night by means of an inference with only negative concomitance, why then regard 'implication' as a particular (means of right knowledge)?

Well, but there is another particular means of knowledge called non-existence (*abhāva*); this we must admit in order to be able to apprehend the non-existence (of a thing); for instance, the non-existence of a jar is apprehended by means of the non-apprehension (*anupalabdhi*) of the jar. Non-apprehension means the non-existence of apprehension, and through this non-existence as means of right knowledge we apprehend, for instance, the non-existence of a jar.

This does not hold true; for what is the use of a means of right knowledge like non-existence, when we apprehend the non-existence (of a thing) only by means of perception, accompanied by non-apprehension and supported by a *reductio in absurdum* of, for instance, the following form: if there had been a jar here, it would have been seen just as well as the place (whereon it is not seen).

Well, but the organs of sense make us only perceive an object connected with them; for the organs of sense suggest a notion (*prakāṣa*) when they have reached the thing, because they are instruments of knowledge, like light, or eye and ear suggest a notion when they have reached the thing, because they are exterior organs of sense, like the organ of touch, for instance, and that the organ of touch produces (notion) after having reached (the thing), is a fact on which both parties agree.

But now no connexion takes place between an organ of sense and non-existence; for we have two kinds of connexion: conjunction and inherence<sup>42</sup>, and none of them is found with the two factors in question. It is namely an established rule that conjunction only takes place between two substances (*dravya*), and non-existence is no substance. Neither may inherence be in question as (the two (53) factors) are not known not to be able to exist apart. These (two connexions), moreover, are only found as an attribute with positive things (*bhāva*). Finally the relation between object and qualification (*viṣeṣanaviṣeṣyabhāva*) is no connexion<sup>43</sup>, as (this relation is not different (from the two factors), does not subsist in both, and is not one thing; for a connexion is different from the two connected (factors), subsists in them and is one, as for instance the conjunction between drum and stick; it is namely different from drum and stick, subsists in them, and is one.

Such is not, however, the relation between object and qualification; for the relation between object and qualification, as it is found between a man and a stick, is not different from these two, the fact that the stick acts as qualification not being a different thing (added to it) but even its character. And non-existence, too, appears as qualification, and in non-existence no category (*padārtha*), substance etc., may be imagined subsisting.<sup>44</sup> When, therefore, the character of non-existence is to occasion a notion (*buddhi*) coloured by itself, it is just that which makes it a qualification; and it is no different thing. Likewise the relation between accompanied

<sup>42</sup> See p. (16).

<sup>43</sup> The idea was that a connexion between organ of sense and object must be found in order that a perception might be affected. The Mīmāṃsaka, which is here supposed to deny the possibility of apprehending the non-existence of a thing through perception, asserts that a connexion between organ of sense and object is impossible when the non-existence of a thing as an object is in question. So far everything is clear. But when he at the same time proceeds asserting that the relation between an object and its qualification is not a *sambandha*, he may be right; but it does not seem to concern the matter here, as this connexion by no means may be parallelized with a connexion between an organ of sense and its object and it is not either applied thuswise in the Nyāya.

<sup>44</sup> Which would make it a different thing.

and accompanier (in inference)<sup>45</sup>, between effect and cause, and the like, must be regarded; for with fire, for instance, to accompany (the smoke) is just that character (of the fire), which produces a notion depending on itself, and with the threads, for instance, to be cause (of the cloth) is just that character of them which is in possession of 'presentia' and 'absentia' corresponding to that of the product, and no different thing. And non-existence, too, appears as accompanier and cause, and in non-existence no generality (*sāmānya*)<sup>46</sup>, etc., may be imagined. Thus the relation between object and qualification is not different from the character of the two factors in question.

(This relation) does not any more subsist in both (factors), as with the qualification only to be qualification is found, and not to be object, and as with the object only to be object is found and not to be qualification.

(This relation) is not one either; for the word *bhāva* which appears after the copulative compound thus dissolved: qualification and object, the being qualification and object resp., must be combined with each (of the preceding words), so that we get: to be qualification and to be object; and they are two things, while a connexion is one; therefore the relation between object and qualification is no connexion.

Such is also the case with the relation between accompanied and accompanier etc.

The application of the word 'connexion' depends on a figurative sense and is due to the fact that both relations (i. e. relation and real connexion) are like one another in being produced through two factors.

Therefore it is impossible to apprehend non-existence through an organ of sense, as it is unable of being connected with the latter.

This might so far seem correct; but (the above-mentioned) concomitance<sup>47</sup> is only determined by positive things; an organ of sense which gives a notion of a positive thing gives, it is true, this notion only of a thing that it has reached, but this is not applicable when it gives a notion of non-existence; an organ of sense which gives a notion of the non-existence (of a thing) (does so) by means of the relation between object and qualification; thus the doctrine of our school<sup>48</sup> is. And even through this theory of 'qualification' the fault is avoided that (our conception) might involve a too wide application (*atiprasaṅga*), because we might also apprehend a non-existence not connected (with the organ of sense).<sup>49</sup> The same might, by the way, occur, too, at the admission of the opinion of our opponent; and 'when faulty and refutation of faulty is the same with both parties,

<sup>45</sup> The relation of concomitance, for instance, between fire and smoke; fire is accompanier and smoke accompanied, as we have no smoke without fire. See p. (38).

<sup>46</sup> Or an other from non-existence different category.

<sup>47</sup> Between 'perception' and 'connexion between organ of sense and object'. See p. (52).

<sup>48</sup> See p. (29).

<sup>49</sup> We apprehend, consequently, through this process only the non-existence of a thing that qualifies an object, not the non-existence in general of everything.

the one ought not to be prosecuted further with questions at the consideration of such a matter.<sup>50</sup>

### IX. On Validity of Knowledge.

Here the following consideration<sup>51</sup> is put forward. When a knowledge (*jñāna*) of water, for instance, has arisen, a man approaches the water after having ascertained the validity of the knowledge; another man goes to the place by reason of (56) a doubt and establishes the validity after having moved, viz. when he has obtained the water; thus the matter may be regarded in two ways.

Now here (a Mīmāṃsaka) says: the man moves after having beforehand ascertained the validity of the knowledge, this being ascertained from the knowledge itself (*svatas*).

The idea is the following: the validity of a knowledge is apprehended through the same (process) by which the knowledge itself is gained, and the (process) which makes us apprehend the validity of a knowledge, its attribute, is no other than that which makes us apprehend the knowledge itself; therefore the validity of a knowledge is apprehended from the knowledge itself, what means that it does not require any other (process) than that which makes us apprehend the knowledge.

The knowledge itself is of course apprehended before the person moves. How (57) might otherwise its validity or non-validity be doubted, as no doubt may arise concerning a thing which has not been apprehended.

When therefore a person has apprehended the knowledge before moving, by means of an 'implication' (*arthāpatti*)<sup>52</sup> which arises through the fact that (the attribute) 'to be apprehended' otherwise is impossible, then the validity resting in the knowledge is apprehended, too, through 'implication', and then the man moves.

But it is not so that first the knowledge is apprehended alone, and that then the validity of the knowledge is ascertained by the sight of the result, after the person has moved.

To this we say: when it is said that knowledge is apprehended by means of an 'implication' which arises through the fact of (the attribute) 'to be apprehended' being impossible otherwise, we cannot admit this, and we are also far from the apprehension of the validity of knowledge through 'implication.'

The following is, namely, the opinion of our opponent: when a knowledge has come into existence, for instance with a jar as object, the result as to the jar will be 'to be apprehended' expressed in the following form: 'I apprehend this jar', (58) and hence we infer that, when a knowledge has arisen, an attribute by name 'to

<sup>50</sup> = Kumarila, *Ālokavartika* p. 341 (v. 252, *gunyavada*).

<sup>51</sup> The following exposition will be easier understood if what the Mīmāṃsā teaches is kept in mind, that the validity of a knowledge is established through the apprehension of the knowledge itself, while the Nyāya maintains that it is established independent of the knowledge itself through inference.

<sup>52</sup> Concerning this means of knowledge not acknowledged in the Nyāya see p. (51).

be apprehended' has arisen, too, and we establish through positive and negative concomitance that it arises through the knowledge, as it has not arisen before the knowledge, but (on the other hand) has arisen as soon as the knowledge has come into existence. Likewise this attribute by name 'to be apprehended,' originated with the knowledge, cannot be possible without knowledge, as a product does not arise when no cause is present, and thus (the attribute) 'to be apprehended' proves through 'implication' its own cause, the knowledge.

(All) this is not, however, correct, as no attribute 'to be apprehended' is found (59) beyond the character of being object of the knowledge.

(The Mīmāṃsaka): Well, but when for instance a jar is in question, to be object of knowledge is the same as to be the substratum of (the attribute) 'to be apprehended' which is produced by the knowledge. For 'to be object' (of the knowledge) does not arise through consubstantiality (*tādātmya*)<sup>53</sup>, as we do not admit consubstantiality between the jar and the knowledge. If we further would admit that to be object (of a knowledge) depends on a relation of origin (*tadutpatti*), the consequence would be that for instance the organs of sense, too, would become object (of the knowledge), as the knowledge originates also from the organs of sense. Therefore we draw the following inference: through knowledge something (viz. the attribute 'to be apprehended') arises in the jar by which means just this and nothing else becomes the object of the particular knowledge; (the attribute) 'to be apprehended' is thus proved by the fact, that the being an object cannot be possible (otherwise), but not through a perception alone.

This consideration is not relevant, however, because the being an object may be possible starting from the character (*svabhāva*) (of the particular factor) alone. Object and knowledge have, namely, such a natural particularity (*viśeṣa*) that the relation between object and the vehicle of the latter (*viśayaviśayībhāva*) thus becomes possible between them. Otherwise past and future (things) could not be an object, as (the attribute) 'to be apprehended' in such cases could not arise through knowledge; for the attributes (of a thing) cannot arise when the thing itself (*dharmin*) does not exist. Furthermore a new attribute 'to be apprehended' must be required, as this attribute itself may be the object of a knowledge, and by this we are led to a regressus in infinitum (*anavasthā*). If it is maintained that (the attribute) 'to be apprehended' may be an object of a knowledge by virtue of its character (*svabhāva*) alone without any new 'being apprehended', what is then the use of this attribute when (the knowledge of) the jar, etc., is in question?

Or be it admitted that (such an attribute) as 'to be apprehended' exists, we (60) understand, after all, by that only the knowledge, [not its validity. If it be maintained that all knowledge is perceived through the attribute 'to be apprehended' and its validity through a particular kind of 'being apprehended,' then the know-

<sup>53</sup> *Tādātmya* in the Mīmāṃsā corresponds to the relation of inherence in the Vaiśeṣika (Vieçakarman).

ledge itself is consequently apprehended through 'to be apprehended']<sup>54</sup> and its validity through a particular 'being apprehended', which is infallible in the knowledge of a means of right knowledge, but how do we then get (the result) that the validity of the knowledge is apprehended by the same factor which makes us apprehend the knowledge itself?

If it is maintained that knowledge and its validity are apprehended together by a particular 'being apprehended', which is infallible in the knowledge of a means of right knowledge, the same thing may be asserted over against the non-validity of the knowledge, so that a knowledge and its non-validity would be apprehended together by means of a special 'being apprehended', which is infallible in the knowledge of what is not a means of right knowledge, and thus, too, the non-validity of a knowledge would be apprehended starting from the knowledge itself.

If therefore the non-validity of a knowledge is apprehended by other means (*paratas*) then its validity, too, might be apprehended by other means, i. e. by other means than that which makes us apprehend knowledge itself.

Knowledge itself is, namely, apprehended by a perception through the organ of thought (*mānasapratyakṣa*), but its validity by inference. After the knowledge of water the activity (*pravṛtti*) with the person who wishes water may, namely, be of two kinds: successful or not successful. Of these the activity is successful which is fit (*samartha*), and by means of that we infer the validity of a knowledge (*yāthārthya*). The syllogism runs:

The knowledge of water in question is valid (*pramāṇa*), as it produces a (61) fit activity.

What is not valid knowledge produces no fit activity, like a knowledge only apparently right.

Thus the concomitance runs, which is negative only.

Subject of the syllogism is here the 'knowledge of water which produces a successful activity'; what is to be proved is 'its validity', i. e. its agreeing with its object, not its being the instrument of right knowledge<sup>55</sup>, as the consequence thereof would be a fallacious inference as to recollection<sup>56</sup>. Logical reason is 'to produce a fit activity', i. e. a successful one.

When we by such an inference with negative concomitance only have comprehended the validity of a knowledge the first time it occurs (*anabhyāsadaṣṭāpanna*), we infer, even before the production of activity, the validity of a later knowledge, a such (the like of which, accordingly,) has taken place formerly, by an inference which has both positive and negative concomitance, and which has as syllogistic characteristic 'to be of the same kind as the first one', and which (finally) has this (first knowledge) as an instance.

<sup>54</sup> The words in the brackets are not found in Viçvakarman's text.

<sup>55</sup> Read *pramakarāṇatvam*.

<sup>56</sup> The fact is that a recollection may occasion a successful activity, but it is not an instrument of right knowledge. (Viçv.)

- (62) Therefore the validity of a knowledge is only apprehended by another means and not by the same (process) which makes us apprehend the knowledge itself.

‘The means of right knowledge, which are only four in number, Keçava has thus stated for the understanding of young people, according to the doctrine of the school and accompanied by a little argumentation.’

With this (ends the exposition of) the category called means of right knowledge.

## X. Objects of Knowledge.

Then the objects of knowledge (*prameya*) are stated. The (Nyāya)-sūtra (I, 9) runs, “Object of knowledge is soul, body, organs of sense, objects, notion, organ of thought, activity, defects, future life, fruit, pain, and final liberation.”

### I. Soul.

- (63) Of these soul (*ātman*) is that which is in possession of the genus-characteristic ‘soul’. It is distinct from body and senses, etc., is distributed, one to each body, omnipresent (*vibhu*), and eternal. It is the object of direct perception through the organ of thought; if this is not admitted, then the qualities ‘notion’, etc., are syll. characteristics (which make us infer its existence).

- (64) For notion, etc., are qualities, as they, at the same time as being transient, are apprehended by one organ of sense, like colour; a quality must depend on a substratum (*guṇin*); now notion, etc., cannot be qualities with the elements, as they are perceived by means of the organ of thought; the qualities which are found with the elements are not perceived through the organ of thought, as for example colour; neither may they be qualities with cardinal points (*diç*), time or organ of thought, as they are particular qualities<sup>57</sup>; the qualities in cardinal points, etc., as for instance number, are not peculiar qualities: they are, namely, qualities common to all substances; notion, etc., on the contrary, are particular qualities, as they together with being qualities are perceived by one single organ of sense, like colour. Therefore they are not qualities in cardinal points, etc.

We must accordingly admit a substratum of notion, etc., distinct from the eight (substances at hand), and that is even the soul. The syllogism runs:

- (65) Notion, etc., must rest with a substance distinct from the eight substances:  
earth, etc.  
Because they are qualities without resting with the eight substances:  
earth, etc.

<sup>57</sup> The particular qualities are: notion, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, exertion, colour, taste, smell, touch, viscosity, original fluidity, merit and demerit, together with impression and sound. Karikavālī 90 ff. Bombay 1903.



That which does not rest with a substance distinct from the eight: earth, etc., is not a quality without resting with the eight substances: earth, etc., like, for instance, colour.

Thus with negative concomitance only.

With both positive and negative concomitance:

Notion, etc., must rest with a substance distinct from the eight substances: earth, etc.

Because they are qualities without resting with the eight substances: earth, etc.

That which without resting with (a substance) is a quality, must rest with one distinct from this, as for instance sound, which does not rest with earth, etc., rests with the space (*ākāśa*) distinct from earth, etc.

Thus we have proved (the existence of) a soul as a ninth substance distinct from the eight: earth, etc. This (soul) is omnipresent, as its effects,<sup>58</sup> are found everywhere, i. e. it is in possession of the very largest dimension; as it is omnipresent, it is eternal, like space. Because of the multiplicity of pleasure, etc., (it must be) distributed one to each body.

## 2. Body.

Body (*carīra*) is that which is the basis (*āyatana*) of the enjoying and suffering (of the soul) and is ultimate compound (*antygāyavin*)<sup>59</sup>. Enjoying and suffering (*bhoga*) is sensation of either pleasure or pain; basis of enjoying or suffering is that (66) by which enjoying and suffering are determined, when they appear in the soul, and that is the body.

Or the body is a substratum of motions; motion (*ceṣṭā*) means (here) action for attainment or prevention of (respectively) good and evil, not motion in general (67) (*spandanamātra*).

## 3. Organs of sense.

Organ of sense (*indriya*) is that which is imperceptible, instrument of knowledge, and in conjunction with the body. If there was only said 'organ of sense is that which is imperceptible', the consequence would be that time, etc., were an organ of sense, too; therefore we said 'instrument of knowledge'. This added, the characterisation would, moreover, be too wide, still, (being applicable also) on the contact between organ of sense and object; therefore we said 'in conjunction with the body.' If we had only said 'instrument of knowledge and in conjunction with the body', light for instance might also be called an organ of sense; therefore we said 'imperceptible.' The organs of sense are six: organs of smell, taste, sight, hearing, touch, and thought.

<sup>58</sup> With this is meant notion, pleasure, etc. (Vicy.)

<sup>59</sup> What is not itself a part of a further unity.

Of these organ of smell (*ghrāṇa*) is the organ which is the means of olfactory perceptions, and it has its site in the tip of the nose. As it is in possession of smell, it consists of the element of earth, and it is in possession of smell because it makes (68) us apprehend smell; an organ of sense is connected with that of the five qualities: colour, etc., which it apprehends, as, for instance, the organ of sight, which makes us apprehend colour, has colour: now the organ of smell makes us apprehend smell; therefore it is in possession of smell.

Organ of taste (*rasana*) is the organ which is the means of perception of taste, and it has its site in the tip of the tongue. It consists of the element of water, being in possession of taste, and it is in possession of taste because it of the five (qualities): colour, etc., manifests just taste, like for instance saliva.

Organ of sight (*cakṣus*) is the organ which is the means of perceptions of colours, and it has its site in the tip of the pupil. It consists of the element of fire, as it of the five (qualities): colour, etc., manifests just colour, like a light.

Organ of touch (*tvac*) is the organ which is the means of perceptions of touch, and it is found in the whole body, having its site in the skin. It consists of the element of wind, as it of the five (qualities): colour, etc., manifests just (the perception of) touch, like the wind arising from a fan, which manifests the cool touch of the water on the body.

Organ of hearing (*śrotra*) is the organ which is the means of perceptions of sound, and it is only space (*ākāśa*), i. e. limited by the auditory passage, but no other substance<sup>60</sup>, having the sound as a quality; and that it has, making us apprehend the sound; an organ of sense is conjoined with even that of the five qualities: colour, etc., which it apprehends, as for instance the organ of sight, which (69) makes us apprehend colour, has colour; now the organ of hearing makes us apprehend the sound, therefore it has sound as a quality.

Organ of thought (*manas*) is the organ which is the means of perceptions of pleasure, etc. It has the dimension of an atom (*anu*).

Well, but what is now the proof (*pramāṇa*) of the existence of the organs of sense, organ of sight, etc.? (The proof is) an inference, viz.:

Perceptions of colour, etc., must be produced by an instrument (*karana*).  
As they are actions like the action to cleave.

#### 4. Objects.

Objects (*artha*) are the six categories<sup>61</sup>: substance, quality, action, generality, particularity, and inherence. Even if right knowledge, etc., is comprised under here, they are yet mentioned apart with definite aim.

<sup>60</sup> See p. (75).

<sup>61</sup> Here Keçava introduces in his exposition of the system of Nyaya the six categories of the system of Vaiçeṣika, gives consequently here quite a small compendium of the Vaiçeṣika; some repetitions hence resulting could not be helped, matters being here mentioned which partly have been spoken of, partly will be spoken of in its due place in the survey

a. Substances.

Of (the categories) substance (*dravya*) ist hat which is an inherent cause or that which is the substratum of a quality. The substances are nine, viz. the elements of earth, water, fire, and wind, space (*ākāśa*), time, cardinal points (*diś*), soul, and organ of thought.

Of these element of earth (*pṛthivī*) is that which has the genus-characteristic of 'earth'. It is connected with hardness, softness, etc., according to the special combination of its parts. It has the form of organ of smell, body, lumps of clay, stones, trees, etc., and is in possession of colour, taste, smell, touch, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, distance, proximity, gravity, fluidity and impression. It is twofold: eternal and transient: eternal as an atom, transient as (70) a product. In either colour, taste, smell, and touch are transitory and produced through heating; heating (*pāka*) means connexion with fire; by that means only the former colour, etc., of the earth are destroyed, and new ones arise, therefore they are 'produced through heating.'

Element of water (*āpas*) has the genus-characteristic 'water', it has the form of organ of taste, body, rivers, oceans, snow, and hail, etc., and is in possession of the above mentioned qualities except smell, and with the addition of viscosity. It is eternal and transient; according to its being eternal or transient its colour, etc., is eternal or transient.

Element of fire (*tejas*) has the genus-characteristic 'fire' and is divided into organ of sight, body, sun, gold<sup>62</sup>, and lightning, etc. It has colour, touch, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, distance, proximity, fluidity, and impression. It is eternal and transient as above. It is divided into four groups: 1) with developed colour and touch, 2) with undeveloped colour and touch, 3) with developed colour and undeveloped touch, 4) with undeveloped colour and developed touch. Of these developed colour and touch are found in the densified (*piṇḍita*) element of fire, as for instance common fire. Gold, on the contrary, has developed colour and touch, which, however, are suppressed; if it had not developed colour, it would not be visible, and if it had not developed touch, it could not be apprehended by the organ of touch; the suppression is produced by something prevalent of the same kind, viz. of the colour and touch of the element of earth. Undeveloped colour and touch has the organ of sight. Developed colour and undeveloped touch has the halo round a light. The fire (finally) which is in boiling water has undeveloped colour and developed touch. (71)

of the Nyaya; any essential contradiction we do not find, however. — Here only the six categories are stated which are found in the old writings of the Vaiṣeṣika (Vaiç. Sūtra I, 1, 4 and Praçastapada p. 6), and which, moreover, are known by Vatsyayana (ad I, 1, 9. p. 16). As a supplement is, indeed, mentioned the seventh category 'non-existence' (see p. (88)), which in later Vaiṣeṣika-literature (from Çivaditya) has its place along with the six original ones. — In the Nyayaśūtra I, 1, 13—14 the objects, on the contrary, are the four elements and space together with their qualities.

<sup>62</sup> The proof that gold is fire may be seen in the Tarka-Dīpikā p. 35.

Element of wind (*vāyu*) is connected with (the genus-characteristic) 'wind', and divided into organ of touch, body<sup>63</sup>, breath, wind, etc. It has touch, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, distance, proximity, and velocity. We infer the existence of this (element) from touch. For the touch, neither hot nor cold, which is felt when the wind blows, is, being a quality, impossible without a substratum, and makes us consequently infer a substratum; this substratum is even the wind, as we see nothing of the element of earth, and as the touch, neither hot nor cold, takes place with earth and wind only. It is twofold: eternal and transient; eternal as an atom, transient as a product.

Now is set forth the order in which the four (elements) earth, etc., as products arise and perish<sup>64</sup>. When by action two atoms are in conjunction, a double-atom is produced; its inherent cause are the two atoms; its non-inherent cause is their conjunction; effective cause is fate (*adr̥ṣṭa*), etc. When by action three double-atoms (72) are in conjunction, a triple-atom is produced; its inherent cause are the three double-atoms, the other two as above. Likewise a quadruple-atom (is produced) by four triple-atoms, and so on from the latter the grossest (composition of atoms). By that means the perceptible elements of earth, water, fire, and wind are produced; the colour, etc., found in a product arises from the colour, etc., which is found in the inherent cause of its substratum, according to the rule that the qualities of the cause produce the qualities of the product.

In the parts of a product-substance, for instance a jar, thus brought into existence, an action arises through thrusts or blows, and hence a disjunction (is produced); then the conjunction is destroyed which is non-inherent cause and composes the whole, and then the product-substance, i. e. the whole, for instance the jar, is destroyed. Thus we have showed the destruction of a substance through the destruction of its non-inherent cause. — Sometimes a substance is destroyed through the destruction of the inherent cause. At the time for the withdrawal of the above mentioned element of earth, etc., with Maheçvara (God) who is to draw in (the world), the wish of drawing in arises; then an action in the atoms arises, and because of the disjunction thus produced the conjunction is destroyed; then the double-atoms perish, and next, because of the destruction of their substratums, the triple-atoms, etc., up to the element of earth, etc., are destroyed. Or for instance the cloth is destroyed by the destruction of the threads. Its colour, etc., is destroyed by (73) the destruction of the substratum; in other cases they perish, while the substratum subsists, at the forthcoming of contrary qualities, as for instance the destruction of the colour of a jar, etc., through heating.

Now what is the proof of the existence of atoms (*paramāṇu*)? It is explained: the finest (particle) seen in a sunbeam falling through a lattice, must be composed

<sup>63</sup> When as to the four elements to appear as body is in question, it means respectively in the world of man (earth), in the world of Varuṇa (water), in the world of Aditya, the sun-god (fire), and in the world of Vayu the God of the winds (wind) (Tarkasaṃgraha p. 29—35).

<sup>64</sup> Compare to this Praçastapada's description p. 48 ff.

by a substance of very small dimension, being a substance which is a product, like a jar. Also this (productive) substance must be a product, as what composes a perceptible (*mahat*)<sup>65</sup> substance must of necessity be a product (itself). Thus we have attained to the establishing of a new substance, termed double-atom. This too is composed by a very small inherent cause, being a substance which is a product, like a jar. That which composes the double-atom is even the atom, and it is not composed (by something else).

Well, but how can it be 'not composed', as that which composes a product-substance cannot help<sup>66</sup> being a product-substance (itself)?

To be sure, otherwise we should have the fault consisting in an infinite series of products and the result would be that the mountain Sumeru and a grain of mustard-seed would have the same dimension, as in that case both would have been composed by an endless number of product-substances; therefore the atom is not composed. The double-atom, on the other hand, is composed of two, and only two, atoms, a single one not being able to compose anything, and no proof existing for the admission of three or still more. The triple-atom is composed of three double-atoms, a single one not being able to compose anything, and because it would be impossible to account for the 'magnitude' (*mahattva*) of the product, if it were supposed to be composed of two only; for in a product the 'magnitude' arises through the 'magnitude' of the cause, or through the multiplicity of the cause, and the former not being found<sup>67</sup>, we must admit the latter; there is no proof for the admission of four or still more, 'magnitude' being produced by three only. (74)

Space (*ākāśa*)<sup>68</sup> is that which has sound as a quality. It is in possession of sound, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, and disjunction; it is one, omnipresent, eternal, and has sound as syllogistic characteristic.

How is sound its syllogistic characteristic? Through elimination (*pāriṣeṣya*). For sound is a special quality, as it together with having a genus-characteristic is apprehended by common people by one external organ of sense, like colour. A quality must be in a substratum; now neither one of the four elements beginning with earth nor soul may be a substratum of the sound, as it is apprehended by the organ of hearing; the qualities with the elements of earth, etc., are not apprehended by the organ of hearing, as for instance colour, etc., but sound is apprehended by the organ of hearing; neither may it be a quality of cardinal points (*diś*), time, and organ of thought, being a particular quality. Therefore we must infer a substratum of the sound different from these, and that is even the space. (75)

It is one, no proof existing of its division (*bheda*), and all requirements being fulfilled at the admission of its unity. Because of its unity there is not in space

<sup>65</sup> Literally 'great', i. e. which may be made the object of perception.

<sup>66</sup> I read with Vidy.: *karyadrayatvavyabhicarat tasya*.

<sup>67</sup> For the double-atom is not 'great'; comp. note 65.

<sup>68</sup> Must not be mistaken for the cardinal points (see p. (77)); *ākāśa* is a construction with the aim of attaining an 'element' corresponding to sound, just as the four elements correspond each to its particular quality; it is not like the others composed of atoms.

found any generality (genus-characteristic) termed *ākāśatva*, as generality must be found with more than one.

(76) Space is omnipresent, i. e. of the very largest dimension, its effect being apprehended everywhere; because of its omnipresence it is eternal.

Time (*kāla*) we infer from a distance and a proximity contrary to that relating to cardinal points. It is in possession of number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, and disjunction; it is one, omnipresent and eternal.

How may we infer it from a distance and a proximity contrary to that relating to cardinal points? In the following way: as to an old man who is near to us and who, because of his proximity, ought to be called 'near', (a notion of a remoteness arises contrary to (the proximity relating to cardinal points); and as to a young man, far from us, and who, because of his remoteness, ought to be called 'remote' (a notion arises of a) proximity contrary to (the remoteness relating to cardinal points); being a product, this remoteness and proximity, contrary to that (77) occasioned by cardinal points, makes us infer a cause, viz. time, cardinal points, etc., not being able of being cause.

Even if time is one, it gets the designation 'present', 'past', and 'future' by virtue of conditional factors (*upādhi*) like present, past or future actions, just as a man gets the designation 'cooking', 'begging', etc., by virtue of a conditional factor like the action 'to cook', etc.

Eternity and omnipresence are due to time as above.<sup>69</sup>

Cardinal points (*diś*) are (as substance, means for localizing) one, eternal, and omnipresent; they are in possession of number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, and disjunction. We infer them from notions like 'east', etc., as they can have no other cause, and because a thing is the same, whether it is located in east or west.<sup>70</sup>

Though (as substance) one, cardinal points get the designation 'eastern', etc., by virtue of a conditional factor, viz. the connexion of the sun with different regions.

Soul (*ātman*) is that which is conjoined with the genus-characteristic 'soul'; it is manifold because of the multiplicity of pleasure, pain, etc.; it has been mentioned; its qualities are the five which begin with number, and the nine which begin with notion.<sup>71</sup> Eternity and omnipresence (are due to it) as above.

Organ of thought (*manas*) is that which is conjoined with the genus-characteristic 'organ of thought': it has the dimension of an atom and is in possession of conjunction; it is the interior organ of sense, and is the instrument of the apprehension of pleasure, etc.; it is eternal, has the five qualities: number, etc. (78) the things; therefore it is a means of every apprehension.

<sup>69</sup> I. e. like space.

<sup>70</sup> The difference relating to cardinal points cannot consequently depend on the thing itself.

<sup>71</sup> See the list of the qualities p. (78).

It cannot be apprehended directly through perception, but is attained by inference. Namely the following:

Pleasurable sensations, etc., must be produced by an instrument distinct from the organ of sight, etc.

As they arise without any organ of sense, etc., being present.

This instrument is even *manas*. It is of an infinitesimal dimension.<sup>72</sup>

Thus the substances are treated.

#### b. Qualities.

Then qualities (*guṇa*) shall be spoken of. Quality is that which has genus-characteristic, which is not inherent cause, and the nature of which does not consist in motion.<sup>73</sup> It abides in a substance. There are twenty-four, viz. colour, taste, smell, touch, number, dimension, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, distance, proximity, gravity, fluidity, viscosity, sound, motion, pleasure, pain, desire, aversion, exertion, merit, demerit, and impression.

Of these colour (*rūpa*) is a particular quality, to be apprehended only by the organ of sight. It is found with earth and the two following elements. In earth it is of various kinds: white, etc., and arises here through heating; in fire it is white and bright and does not arise through heating; in water it is white, but without brightness. (79)

Taste (*rasa*) is a particular quality, to be apprehended by the organ of taste. It is found in earth and water; in earth it is of six kinds: sweet, etc., and arises through heating; in water it is sweet, does not arise through heating, and may be eternal or transient; it is eternal in water-atoms, transient in aqueous products.

Smell (*gandha*) is a particular quality, to be apprehended by the organ of smell; it is found only in earth, and is fragrant or ill-smelling. Smell apparently found in water and other things must be regarded (as depending on) inherence in something connected<sup>74</sup> with water, etc.

Touch (*sparśa*) is a particular quality, to be apprehended only by the organ of feeling; it is found in earth and the three following elements. Three sorts are distinguished: cold, hot, and temperate; touch is cold in water, hot in fire, and temperate in earth and wind.

These four (qualities): colour, etc., are called developed (*udbhūta*) when they inhere in the same thing as 'magnitude' (*mahattva*), and may then be apprehended by perception.<sup>75</sup>

<sup>72</sup> According to Viçvakarman's text *manas* has its site in the heart: see his former mention of *manas* p. 106.

<sup>73</sup> Of these three definitions the first excludes the categories: generality, particularity, and inherence which have no genus-characteristic; the next excludes substance which is inherent cause, and the third action which consists in motion.

<sup>74</sup> I. e. earth mixed up with water.

<sup>75</sup> Accordingly not in an atom which, indeed, is not in possession of 'magnitude', i. e. perceptibility; cf. note 65.

Number (*saṃkhyā*) is a general quality, the cause of terms like 'unity', etc. (80) It begins with 'unity' and ends in 100,000,000,000,000,000 (*parārdha*). Of these unity is of two kinds: eternal and transient; eternal in eternal things, transient in transitory things; it depends on the unity of the inherent cause of its substratum. Duality, on the contrary, is transient only; it is produced by a distinguishing notion (*apekṣābuddhi*) of the following form: 'this is one, and that is one', of two objects seen; here the two objects are inherent cause, their unities are non-inherent cause, and the distinguishing notion is effective cause, as duality disappears at its destruction. Likewise triad, etc., arises.

Dimension (*parimāṇa*) is the special cause of the term 'measure'; it is fourfold: small, large, long and short. Number, dimension or aggregation (*pracaya*) produce the dimension of a product; the dimension of a double-atom thus is produced by God's distinguishing notion; it is produced by number, i. e. it has number as a cause, arising from the duality of atoms; the dimension of a triple-atom, too, is produced by number, i. e. by the multiplicity in the inherent cause of its substratum; (81) the dimension of a quadruple-atom, etc., arises by the dimension of the inherent cause of its substratum; the dimension of a piece of cotton is produced by the aggregation of the particles of its cause; the aggregation of the particles means the loose accumulation of the inherent cause of their substratum. The dimension of the atom, and the very largest extension, as it is found with space (*ākāśa*), etc., are always eternal.

Separateness (*prthakत्वा*) is the special cause of the term 'separate'. It is eternal or transient; with a transitory product separateness results from a distinguishing notion as duality, etc., does.

Conjunction (*saṃyoga*) is the cause of the term 'conjoint'. It has two substratums, and is found in them without pervading them altogether.<sup>76</sup> It is threefold: arising from the action of one (substratum), arising from the action of both, or arising from conjunction. As an instance of that which arises from the action of one (substratum) may be mentioned the junction of an immovable post and a moving falcon; for the motion of the falcon is its non-inherent cause. That arising from the actions of both (substratums) is for instance the collision of two fighting rams or of two wrestlers, both being in motion. The conjunction resulting from a conjunction is the conjunction of product and that which is not product, because of the conjunction of cause and what is not cause; for instance the junction of body and tree by means of the junction of hand and tree.<sup>77</sup>

Disjunction (*vibhāga*) is the cause of the notion 'disjoint'. It requires the existence of a conjunction beforehand, and has two substratums. It is threefold: arising from the action of one (substratum), arising from the action of both, or

<sup>76</sup> *avyavyavṛttilva* is in the Tarka-dīpika (p. 55) defined as to have the same substratum as its own absolute non-existence; with a falcon perching on the post 'conjunction' is found in the top of the post, its absolute non-existence, on the contrary, at the foot of the post.

<sup>77</sup> The fact is that the hand is the cause of the body as part of it.



arising from a disjunction. The first of these is, for instance, the disjunction of a rock and a falcon through the motion of the falcon standing on the rock. The second is, for instance, the disjunction of two wrestlers or rams. The third is, for instance, the disjunction of body and tree through the disjunction of hand and tree.

Distance and proximity (*paratvāparatve*) are the causes of the terms 'distant' and 'near'. They are of two kinds: occasioned by cardinal points (*diś*), and occasioned by time.

First it shall be told how the (distance and proximity) occasioned by cardinal points arise; two things being found in the same direction, the (quality) of proximity arises in the nearer (*samnikṛṣṭa*) through conjunction of the cardinal points and the thing, supported by the notion 'this is nearer than that'; in the farther, the (quality) of distance arises through the notion of its being farther (*vīprakṛṣṭa*); nearness means the smaller (number) of conjunctions of conjoined things between the thing and the body of the beholder; remoteness means the greater (number) hereof. (82)

Then it shall be told how the remoteness and nearness occasioned by time is constituted; when a young and an old person stay at fortuitous places, then (the quality) of proximity arises in the young at the notion 'this is connected with a lower degree of time than the other', and in the old man the (quality) of distance arises at the notion 'this is connected with a higher degree of time than the other.'

Gravity (*gurutva*) is the non-inherent cause of the first falling; it is found in earth and water; as it is said<sup>78</sup>: "Where conjunction, velocity, and exertion are not at hand, a falling (arises) through gravity."

Fluidity (*dravatva*) is the non-inherent cause of the first flowing; it is found in earth, fire, and water. In earth and fire as (respectively) butter, etc., and gold is the fluidity occasioned, being produced through connexion with fire; in water the fluidity is original (*naisargika*).

Viscididity (*sneha*) is smoothness and is found only in water. It requires the (same) previous quality in its cause and like gravity, etc., it lasts as long as the substance (it belongs to).

Sound (*śabda*) which is apprehended by the organ of hearing is a particular quality with space.

Well, but how may it be apprehended by the organ of hearing, as the sound (83) arises in the drum for instance, while the organ of hearing is found with (the hearing) man?

This is true, but the sound originating from the drum produces a new neighbouring sound, in the same way as one wave produces a new, or as the buds of the Kadambatree come out<sup>79</sup>; this sound produces another and so on, until the last sound, arisen at the organ of hearing, is apprehended by the latter, but, accordingly, neither the first sound, nor the intermediate. Likewise when a reed

<sup>78</sup> Cf. Vaiṣeṣikasūtra V, 1, 7: samskarabhava gurutval patanam.

<sup>79</sup> They are said to expand in all directions at one time. See Jacobi's *Laukikanyayañjali* (1900) p. 10 and the quotations there given.

is cleft. Then the sound originating from the place where the two parts separate, produces, through a series of new sounds, the last sound at the organ of hearing, and this last sound, but, accordingly, neither the first, nor the intermediate, is apprehended by the organ of hearing. The notion that 'I have heard the sound of the drum' is, consequently, always illusory.

When the sound of the drum is produced, the conjunction of drum and space is non-inherent cause: the conjunction of drum and stick is effective cause, and space is inherent cause. When the cracking sound of the cleaving of a reed is produced, the disjunction of the two parts of the reed and (parts of) space is non-inherent cause: the disjunction of the two parts is effective cause. Thus the first sound arises through conjunction or through disjunction: the intermediate sounds and the last one, on the contrary, have the sound as non-inherent cause, and favourable wind as effective (cause), as it has been said (Vaiṣeṣika-sūtra II, 2, 31), "Sound originates by conjunction, by disjunction, and by sound itself." The only inherent cause of all sounds, the first one as well as the others, is space.

(84) Like action and notion (the sounds) last only for three moments; the first and the intermediate sounds now perish by the sound they produce: (if it now be maintained that) the last one perishes by the last but one, and the last but one by the last like Sunda and Upasunda<sup>80</sup>, this is not correct, for the last but one cannot possibly produce the destruction of the last one, as it only lasts for three moments, accordingly only accompanies the last one to the second moment of the latter, but does not exist in its third moment; therefore the destruction of the last (sound) arises only by the destruction of the last but one.

We infer the destruction of sound: the fact is that:

Sound must be transient.

As it together with having a genus-characteristic is apprehended by an external organ of sense with an ordinary man, like a jar.

Here the perishableness of sound is that which must be proved: — perishableness means that the nature (of a thing) is determined by destruction, but not that it is connected with a being which is determined by destruction, for the result would be that we in 'prior non-existence'<sup>81</sup> would find the negation of transitoriness, as ('prior non-existence') is without being; — (in the syllogism above) the logical reason is 'to be perceived by the external organ of sense of an ordinary man together with having a genus-characteristic'; if we had only said 'as it is perceived by the senses', we would have drawn a conclusion encumbered with exceptions (*vyabhicāra*), viz. (85) as to soul; therefore we said 'external organ of sense'; as such an erroneous inference might nevertheless be forthcoming, because to 'be apprehended by an external organ of sense' might imply that of a Yogi, we said in order to exclude the Yogi 'an ordinary man'.

<sup>80</sup> Two giants who fighting for a woman sent by Brahma for their destruction killed one another. See Jacob, loc. cit. II (1902) p. 48.

<sup>81</sup> See p. (88).

What is, by the way, the proof of the existence of Yogis? It follows here: atoms must be able to be perceived by somebody, being objects of right knowledge, like a jar; the person by whom they may be perceived is even Yogi.<sup>3</sup>

The mentioned inference might after all be erroneous because of 'generality', etc.; therefore we said 'together with having a genus-characteristic', generality and the two following categories are namely without genus-characteristic.

Notion (*buddhi*) is the manifestation of a thing.

Pleasure (*sukha*) is joy, that is what makes a favourable impression on everybody.

Pain (*duḥkha*) is suffering, that is what makes an unfavourable impression on everybody.

Desire (*icchā*) is attachment.

Aversion (*dveṣa*) is anger.

Exertion (*prayatna*) is energy.

Notion and the following five (qualities) are the objects of perception through the organ of thought.

Merit (*dharma*) and demerit (*adharma*) are the special causes of pleasure and pain. They cannot be perceived through the senses, but are attained by inference:

Devadatta's body, etc., must be produced by a particular quality in Devadatta.

Because it together with being a product is the cause of Devadatta's enjoying (and suffering), like the things produced by Devadatta's exertion.

The particular quality in soul which produces body, etc., is even merit and demerit, exertion, etc., not producing body, etc.

Disposition (*saṃskāra*) is the special cause of the term 'disposition.' It is threefold: velocity, impression and elasticity. Of these velocity (*vega*), found (86) in earth and the three following (elements), and with the organ of thought, is the cause of motion. The (form of) disposition called impression (*bhāvanā*) is found in soul, arises through an apprehension (*anubhava*), and is the cause of remembrance. Only when awaked it produces remembrance. Awakening means its obtaining of co-operative factors (*sahakārin*). The co-operative factors of the disposition means the sight of similar things, etc., as it is said:

"Similar things, fate (*adṛṣṭa*), or a thought, etc., awaken the germ of remembrance."

Elasticity (*sthitisthāpaka*) is found in some particular things (*viṣeṣa*) which possess touch; it restores its substratum, for instance a bow, the state of which had been altered, to its former condition.

The qualities: notion, etc., merit and demerit, together with impression, are the particular qualities of the soul. Thus the qualities are treated.

### c. Action.

Now action (*karman*) is stated. Action is that the nature of which consists in motion. Like quality it abides in substances alone, and it inheres in the same

thing in which also the limited dimension of the substance, also called 'bodily form', inheres. It is the cause of the conjunction (of a thing) with a later place, when by disjunction the conjunction with the former place has ceased. Five sorts are enumerated: to cast upward, to cast downward, to contract, to extend, and going; by the expression 'going' is also meant roving about, etc.

#### d. Generality.

Generality (*sāmānya*) is the cause of the notion 'conformity' (*anuvṛtti*). It is found in substance and the following two (categories). It is eternal, one, and found in several things. It is twofold: wider and narrower; of these the wider is 'being' (*sattā*), the latter having<sup>82</sup> many objects; and it is generality only, being merely the cause of the notion of conformity; the narrower (generality) is the notion 'substance', etc., the latter having (comparatively) few objects; it is both generality and particularity, being also the cause of an exclusion (*vyāvṛtti*).

(87) Here someone objects<sup>82</sup>: 'No generality exists different from the individual things' (*vyakti*); to this we answer: on what depends, different objects with different characteristics being in question, the notion of oneness, if not on one thing that is found in all of them; if there is such a thing, it is even generality.

Well, but this notion of oneness may be occasioned by an exclusion from what is not the particular thing: for thus there is found in all objects of cow an exclusion from what is not cow, for instance horses; and thus is found in several objects this notion of oneness, a notion which as its object has an exclusion from what is not cow, but which, on the other hand, has not as its object a positive generality: the notion 'cow'.

This, however, is not correct, as we only by a positive way apprehend the oneness.<sup>83</sup>

#### e. Particularity.

Particularity (*viśeṣa*) is eternal and found in eternal substances: it is the cause of the notion of exclusion only. Eternal substances are space and the four following; moreover (elements of) earth and the following three (elements), when they have the form of atoms.

#### f. Inherence.

Inherence (*samavāya*) is a connexion of two things which cannot be imagined to exist apart; it has been mentioned above.<sup>84</sup>

<sup>82</sup> Comp. note 25.

<sup>83</sup> The translation of *samānya* by 'generality' or 'general notion' is not quite to the point, but perhaps it may pass when it is only understood what *samānya* really is. *Samānya* means the common characteristic found in all individual things belonging to the same kind; *ghaṭatva* is that which makes a jar a jar, *dravyatva* that which makes a substance a substance; compare above the frequent definition of a thing, for instance soul, as that which has the genus-characteristic 'soul' (*atmasamānyavan atma*). Generality is consequently a reality found in the things, why 'genus-characteristic' in itself would have been a more correct translation if the abstract point of the notion had not thus got the worst of it.

<sup>84</sup> See p. (16).

Well, but parts and whole cannot be imagined to exist apart, therefore the connexion between them is inherence; but this is wrong, no whole being found different from the parts; for it is the many atoms which, combined in different ways, are apprehended as, for instance, jar or cloth.

We object to this: the notion of a jar being one and 'gross' (*sthūla*) depends on perception, and the latter would not be possible in that way before many, not 'gross', imperceptible atoms; if it be asserted that this notion (with reference to the jar) is illusory, we say: no, because no (means of knowledge) refutes it.<sup>85</sup>

Thus substance, etc., is described; these (categories) have a positive character, being attained through positive notions.

#### g. Non-existence.

Now the seventh category<sup>86</sup> is stated, viz. non-existence (*abhāva*) which is (88) arrived at by means of knowledge through negative notions. Non-existence is shortly of two kinds: non-existence by connexion and mutual non-existence.

Non-existence by connexion (*saṃsargābhāva*) is three-fold: Prior non-existence, non-existence by destruction, and absolute non-existence.

Prior non-existence (*prāgabhāva*) is the non-existence of a product in the cause before it is produced, for instance the non-existence of the cloth in the threads; it has no beginning as it does not come into existence; but it has an end, the product itself having the form of its destruction.

Non-existence by destruction (*pradhvaṃsābhāva*) is the non-existence, i. e. destruction, of the product which has come into existence, in its cause, for instance when a jar has gone to pieces, the non-existence of the jar in the heap of shards; it is produced for instance by blows of a hammer, has consequently a beginning, but no end, as a thing destroyed does not arise anew.

Absolute non-existence (*atyantābhāva*) is non-existence in all three times, for instance the non-existence of colour in wind.

Mutual non-existence (*anyonyābhāva*) is a non-existence which as a counter-entity has a consubstantiality (*tādātmya*), as for instance 'a jar is not cloth.'

Thus the objects are explained.

Well, but no objects are found outside (our) notions or outside Brahman.<sup>87</sup>

Do not say so, for (the external existence) of objects cannot be denied, being proved through perception and other (means of right knowledge).

<sup>85</sup> The Nyāya and the Vaiṣeṣika maintain that the whole is something different from the parts which compose it.

<sup>86</sup> See note 61.

<sup>87</sup> The first of these two notions is maintained by the Buddhistic *viññānavāda* which teaches that things have existence only as notions in us, but no outward reality; the other is maintained by the Vedānta, which teaches that all is Brahman. The Nyāya and the Vaiṣeṣika on the other hand teach that the external world has reality.

### 5. Notion.

(89) Notion (*buddhi*)<sup>88</sup> is that which is signified by the synonyms: notion, apprehension (*upalabdhi*), knowledge (*jñāna*) and idea (*pratyaya*). Or (it may be said that) notion is the manifestation of a thing (*arthaparakāṣa*). It is shortly of two kinds: apprehension and remembrance.

Apprehension (*anubhava*) is also of two kinds: right and wrong. Of these the right one (*yathārtha*) is that the object of which cannot be disputed; it is produced through perception and other means of right knowledge, for instance the knowledge of a jar by means of indefective eyes, etc., or the knowledge of fire by means of smoke as a syllogistic characteristic, or the knowledge that (an object) must be termed 'buffalo', at the sight of its likeness to a cow, or the knowledge that the Jyotiṣṭoma-sacrifice is a means of attaining heaven, through the sentence, 'he who desires heaven must perform the Jyotiṣṭoma-sacrifice.'

The wrong (*ayathārtha*) apprehension is that which arises through what is not a means of right knowledge and does not agree with the object. It is three-fold: doubt, reductio in absurdum, and error. Doubt and reductio in absurdum will be mentioned later on.

Error (*viparyaya*) is the apprehension of a thing with reference to an object that is not that thing, i. e. an illusory knowledge, for instance the transfer of (the notion) 'silver': 'this is silver' on a thing at hand which is not silver, for instance on mother of pearl.

Also two sorts of remembrance (*smaraṇa*) are distinguished: right and wrong; both occur while awaking; in sleep every knowledge is remembrance and wrong, as through some defect (the notion) of 'this' arises where 'that'<sup>89</sup> rightly ought to be apprehended.

Every notion is without form (*nirākāra*). Well, but the object impresses its form on the notion (of the object). No, for we dismiss the doctrine that notion is encumbered with form.

(90) For the same reason we dismiss (the doctrine that) we infer the objects by means of the form transferred on the notion, as for instance (the outward existence) of a jar is proved through perception. Every notion is determined by the object, for only when connected with the object it is apprehended by the organ of thought, and it appears (under the form): 'I have a notion of a jar,' not only (under the form): 'I have a notion.'

### 6. Organ of thought.

Organ of thought (*manas*) is the inner organ of sense, and it has been mentioned.

<sup>88</sup> Here we follow again the enumeration of the Nyāyasūtra I, 1, 9 (see p. (62)), after having finished the review of the 6 (7) categories of the Vaiśeṣika.

<sup>89</sup> i. e. the things are in dream apprehended as present.

### 7. Activity.

Activity (*pravṛtti*) consists of merit and demerit, and is action through the speech, etc.; it is namely accomplishing of all worldly proceedings.

### 8. Defects.

Defects (*doṣa*) are attachment, aversion, and delusion. Attachment (*rāga*) is desire; aversion (*dveṣa*) is resentment, i. e. anger; delusion (*moha*) is wrong knowledge, i. e. error.

### 9. Future life.

Future life (*pretyabhāva*) is rebirth; it consists in the soul's obtaining the aggregation consisting in a new body, etc.

### 10. Fruit.

Fruit (*phala*) means enjoying and suffering, and it consists in the apprehension of pleasure or pain. (91)

### 11. Pain.

Pain (*duḥkha*) is suffering, and it has been mentioned.

### 12. Final liberation.

Final liberation (*apavarga*) is release, and that means the absolute cessation of the pain comprised under 21 heads. The 21 heads are, comprising secondary and essential: the body, the six organs of sense, (their) six objects, the six notions (based on the objects), pleasure and pain.

Also pleasure is pain, as being encumbered with pain; to be encumbered with means not to appear without; this transfer of sense (*upacāra*) (appears) in the same way as when, honey being mixed with poison, honey too is reckoned as poison.

Now, how is final liberation attained? In the following way: when by studies of the text-books essential knowledge of the categories has been gained, when by the sight of the defects of the objects a person has become indifferent and wants release, when meditation is carried on, and soul is directly perceived by virtue of the ripening of the meditation, when a person is relieved from 'afflictions' (*kleṣa*)<sup>90</sup> and does not acquire new merit and demerit, only uninterested actions being made, when by exercise of Yoga the formerly earned sum of merit and demerit has been acknowledged and (the fruit thereof) is being enjoyed in compressed time<sup>91</sup>, then,

<sup>90</sup> Yogasutra II. 3 mentions the five *kleṣas*: nescience, subjectivism, attachment, aversion, and adherence to life. (Particulars in my book "Yoga", p. 112–121.)

<sup>91</sup> I suppose that this refers to the Yogin's being able to procure several bodies at one time and thus in extraordinary shortness of time pass through the expiation of their deeds. ("Yoga" p. 193).

- (92) previous actions being annulled, when the present body, etc., departs, as no future body is accruing, no connexion is found with the 21 pains, since there is no cause hereof. This, the cessation of the 21 sorts of pain is release, and this is final liberation.

### XI. Doubt.

Then he explains doubt (*saṃśaya*). Doubt is the consideration of diverse contrary objects in regard to one and the same thing. It is of three sorts.

The first depends on a common quality, the particularity (of the thing) not being noticed. For instance: is this a trunk or a man? When concerning the same present thing a man does not perceive the particularity which settles that it is a trunk, viz. crookedness, hollowness, etc., and not that, either, which settles that it is a man, viz. head, hands, etc., but only perceives the quality common to a trunk and a man, which consists in being erect, it becomes a question to him whether it is a trunk or a man.

The next (sort of) doubt depends on a difference of opinion, the particularity (of the thing) being unnoticed. For instance: Is sound eternal or transient? For one says: sound is eternal, another, on the contrary: it is transient. Because of the difference of opinion of these two persons, it becomes a question to a neutral man, who does not perceive the particularity (of sound), whether sound is eternal or transient.

- (93) (A third kind of) doubt depends on a (too) special quality. For instance doubt whether earth is eternal or transient, (its) particularity being unnoticed, as the special quality of earth, viz. to have smell, is excluded from (other) eternal or uneternal (things). Doubt then gets the following form: is earth transient, being connected with 'to have smell', which is excluded from all (other) eternal (things), or is it eternal, being connected with 'to have smell', which is excluded from all (other) transient (things)?<sup>92</sup>

### XII. Motive.

Motive (*prayojana*) is that by which a person is incited when acting. It consists in attainment and prevention of (respectively) pleasure and pain, for the activity of every normal man takes place with that in view.

### XIII. Instance.

Instance (*dr̥ṣṭānta*) is, in a discussion, a topic on which both disputants consent. It is twofold. One is an instance of similarity (*sādharma*), for instance the kitchen, when 'to have smoke' is a logical reason; the other is an instance of dissimilarity (*vaidharma*), for instance a pond, as to the same reason.

<sup>92</sup> Compare: the too particular, non-cogent fallacy p. (44).



#### XIV. Tenet.

Tenet (*siddhānta*) is a matter regarded as authorized.<sup>93</sup> It is fourfold: (1) the tenet admitted by all systems, (2) the tenet admitted by related systems only, (3) the tenet following from (the admission of another) matter in question, and (4) the tenet appearing as merely a preliminary admission.

A tenet admitted by all systems is for instance: something exists. The second kind is for instance: a Naiyāyika regards the organ of thought as an organ of sense, (94) for that has been established in the Vaiṣeṣika-system consistent (with the Nyāya). The third kind is for instance, it being proved that earth, etc., must have a creator, that this creator then must be omniscient.<sup>94</sup> The fourth kind is for instance that of a Mīmāṃsaka: 'Let sound be a quality', it being considered whether sound is eternal or transient.

#### XV. Members of Syllogism.

Members (*avayava*) are the component parts of the syllogism in an inference for the sake of another person.<sup>95</sup> They are proposition, etc., as the Nyāya-sūtra (I, 1, 32) runs: 'Members are proposition, reason, example, application, and conclusion.' (95)

Of these proposition (*pratijñā*) is a statement setting forth the thing qualified by the quality which must be proved, for instance 'The mountain has fire.'

Reason (*hetu*) is a statement setting forth in the ablative or the instrumentalis the syllogistic characteristic, for instance 'As it has smoke.'

Example (*udāharaṇa*) is a statement of the instance accompanied by the concomitance, for instance 'That which has smoke, has fire, too, as for instance the kitchen.'

Application (*upanaya*) consists in establishing by the statement: 'Thus is this, too', (the presence) of the syllogistic characteristic in the subject of the syllogism, for example 'This, too, has smoke', or, 'Thus is this, too.'

Conclusion (*niḡamana*) consists in establishing (the presence of) what must be proved in the subject, for instance 'Therefore it has smoke', or, 'Therefore it is so.'

These five (members), proposition, etc., are called members, being like parts

<sup>93</sup> Notice the expression 'regarded as'; if it really should be authorized, it might at an extreme estimate be applied on the two first sorts only. — The commentaries of the Nyāya-sūtra I, 1, 26–31 are, moreover, mutually contradictory as to the three last sorts of *siddhānta*. My translation of the terms (*sarvānta*-, *pratīkṣānta*-, *adhikaraṇa*-, and *abhyupagamasiddhānta*) considers Keçava's explanation of the matter itself.

<sup>94</sup> This form is clearly illustrated by the instance in the Carakasamhitā III, 8, 37: When the following is under discussion: 'The released makes no action which entails demerit and merit, being without desire, then both actions, their fruit, final liberation, the souls, and future life are thence given.'

<sup>95</sup> See p. (37).

of the syllogism; but they are not its inherent cause, as sound only inheres in space (*ākāṣa*).<sup>96</sup>

#### XVI. Reductio in absurdum.

- (96) Reductio in absurdum (*tarka*) is the indirect consequence of an eventuality not wished for. It consists in (the demonstration) of an accompanier<sup>97</sup> not wished for, occurring at the admission of an accompanied (factor), when two things are in question the concomitance of which is established; for instance: if there had been a jar here, it had been seen as well as the ground.

This reductio in absurdum supports the means of right knowledge; for if a person, when a doubt has arisen whether the mountain here has fire or is without fire, has the opinion that it is without fire, then it is demonstrated to him that the indirect consequence would be that it had not smoke, either: 'If (the mountain) here had been without fire, it would for that reason have been without smoke.' This (demonstration of) the indirect consequence (of what would occur) (*prasaṅga*) is called reductio in adsurdum. Of the stated reductio in absurdum the object is the matter which is to be proved, as it refutes (the thought that the mountain) has not fire; therefore it supports the inference.

- (97) In this connexion someone objects that reductio in absurdum belongs to (the category) doubt; but this is not correct, as it has only one alternative (*koṭi*) as its sphere.

#### XVII. Ascertainment.

Ascertainment (*nirṇaya*) is a knowledge which establishes (something); it is the result of the means of right knowledge.

#### XVIII. Discussion.

Discussion (*vāda*) is the talk of a person<sup>98</sup> who wishes to apprehend truth. It may comprise eight 'rebukes' (*ai-graha*)<sup>99</sup>; these eight 'rebukes' are 'too little' (*nyūna*), 'too much' (*adhika*), 'renouncing of position' (*apasiddhānta*), and the five fallacies.

#### XIX. Wrangling.

- (100) Wrangling (*jalpa*) is an interlocution between those merely contending for victory, but which contains arguments on both sides. It may, according to circumstances, contain all 'rebukes' and, the position of the opponent being overthrown, ends in the application of argument for establishing one's own position.

<sup>96</sup> Otherwise the parts of a thing are its inherent cause.

<sup>97</sup> Of course in a logical sense. See note 45.

<sup>98</sup> Would it not be better to read tattvabubhutsvoḥ: an interlocution between two?

<sup>99</sup> See p. (112).

## XX. Cavilling.

Cavilling (*vitaṇḍā*) is deprived of establishment of a person's own position, and ends in the mere refutation of that of the opponents; the cavilling person has no position of his own which must be proved.

An interlocution (*kathā*) is a collection of statements which put forward objection and position, and which are carried on by different speakers.

## XXI. Fallacies.

Non-reasons want one or other of the (above) mentioned<sup>100</sup> 'qualities': 'to be (101) an attribute with the subject of the syllogism', etc.; but, being connected with some of the 'qualities' of a reason and (therefore) looking like reasons (*hetuvad ābhāsa-mānāḥ*) they are called fallacies (*hetvābhāsa*). They are five, viz. the irreal, the (102) contrary, the non-cogent, the counterbalanced, and the refuted.

As to (the first) the 'irreality' (*asiddhi*) consists, according to Udayana, in the negation of the 'reality', and ('reality') means the notoriety of the (reason) accompanied (by what is to be proved), being an attribute with the subject of the syllogism. Thus the chief characteristic of the irreal (fallacy) is stated.

As this may be applied also on the 'contrary', etc., it is evident that a confusion takes place, and in order to escape that the following is stated: the defect which in a reason is first manifested and which is able to (make us) apprehend its defectiveness (*duṣṭi*), that and no other is the cause of the knowledge of its defectiveness, i. e. it appears as refutation (*dūṣaṇa*), as there is no application for any other secondary (defect), the defectiveness being apprehended at the first mani- (103) fested alone and the discussion thus being discontinued.

When that is the case, we have the contrary fallacy, where it is a contradiction (*virodha*), viz. that (the reason) is accompanied by the contrary of that which was to be proved, which occasions the knowledge of the defectiveness; and in the same way we have the non-cogent, etc., where the fact that other conclusions than the intended are possible (*vyabhicāra*), etc., occasions the knowledge of the defectiveness.

The above mentioned (three) irreal (fallacies) occasion also the knowledge of the defectiveness (of the reason) through the absence of the knowledge of the essence of the reason qualified by concomitance and by its being an attribute of the subject. The irreal (*asiddha*) fallacy thus conditioned comprises three kinds, according to its being irreal, (1) as to its substratum, (2) as to itself, and (3) as to the concomitance.

Of these the reason the substratum of which is not known is 'irreal as to the substratum'; for instance:

The sky-lotus is fragrant.

Because it is a lotus, like the lotus growing in the pond.

Here the sky-lotus is the substratum, but a such does not exist.

<sup>100</sup> See p. (41).

The following is also irreal as to the substratum:

The jar is transitory.

As it is a product like the cloth.

- (104) But as here a substratum is really found, the reason 'as it is a product' is not irreal as to the substratum: but (it may be admitted) that (here) something is proved which is (already) established (*siddhasādhana*), it being proved that the jar is transitory, what is established (beforehand).

This, however, cannot be taken for an objection, for anything whatever cannot in itself be a substratum of a logical inference, but only that which is the object of doubt, according to the rule<sup>101</sup> that 'Logical proof (*nyāya*) takes place neither against an object which is not perceived, nor against a matter which is settled, but only in reference to a matter, which is doubted'; and there is no doubt as to the transitoriness of the jar, as the latter has been established; therefore even if the jar, as far as it itself is concerned (*svarūpeṇa*), is found, it cannot be a substratum, as its transitoriness is beyond doubt, and therefore (the reason in question) is no (real) reason, being irreal as to the substratum.

The reason not found in the substratum is called 'unreal as to itself'; for instance:

Generality is transient.

Being produced.

The reason 'to be produced' is not found in the substratum generality.

The partly irreal reason (*bhāgāsiddha*) also is only 'irreal as to itself'; for instance:

The atoms of earth and the other three elements are eternal.

As they have smell.

'To have smell' is not (however) found in the atoms which are here made the subject of the syllogism, being only found in earth; therefore the 'irreality as to itself' appears in a part (of the reason).

Subdivisions of that fallacy which is 'irreal as to itself' the reasons are, too, which are 'irreal as to qualification', 'as to object', 'as to unfit qualification', and 'as to unfit object'.

Of these the reason irreal as to qualification (*viśeṣaṅgāsiddha*) is for instance the following:

Sound is eternal.

As it being a substance is not in possession of touch.

Here the reason 'not to be in possession of touch', is qualified through 'to be a substance', and not 'not to be in possession of touch' alone; in sound 'to be a substance' is not, however, found, as it is a quality; therefore (this reason) is irreal as to qualification. For when the qualification 'to be a substance' is not found, the notion 'not to have touch', qualified thereby, is not found either, because, a qualification not being found, the qualified is not found either, as for instance 'a man qualified

<sup>101</sup> Vatsyayana ad N. S. I, I. 1. p. 3.

by a stick' is not found when merely the stick is not found, as well as when the man is not found. Therefore even if 'not to have touch' is in hand, no qualified reason is found, and therefore (this is) 'irreal as to itself.'

Irreal as to the object (*viçeşyāsiddha*) is (the following reason):

Sound is eternal.

As it is a substance without having touch.

Here too we have a qualified reason, and when the object (of the qualification) is not in hand we cannot have something qualified in itself; therefore the qualified (105) reason is not found in this case either.

(A reason with) an unfit qualification (*asamarthaviçeşaya*) we have in the following case:

Sound is eternal.

As it has no cause together with being a quality.

Here the qualification is quite unfit, its object, viz. 'to have no cause' alone being able to prove the eternity (of sound); (a reason) therefore, the qualification of which is unfit, is 'irreal as to itself', a qualified (reason) not existing when the qualification is not found.

Well, but the qualification was here 'to be a quality', and that is found in sound; how can it be said that qualification is not found?

That is true; 'to be a quality' is in hand, but not a qualification by means hereof; for the qualification of a reason is that which has as its aim to distinguish it from others; but 'to be a quality' is (here) purposeless, and is therefore called unfit (*asamartha*).

(A reason with) unfit object (*asamarthaviçeşya*) is the following: i. e. the same exemplification with transposition (of the members):

Sound is eternal.

As it is a quality together with being without cause.

Here the qualified object is namely unfit, the qualification alone being able to prove eternity (of sound). (This reason) is 'irreal as to itself', as there cannot be something qualified when the qualified object does not exist, and as the reason was stated as qualified. The rest as above.

Irreal as to the concomitance (the reason) is with which no concomitance is found.

It has two subdivisions; the one is not accompanied by that which must be proved; the other is only through a condition connected with that which must be proved.

Of these the first is found (in the following instance):

What exists has only momentary existence, as for instance the clouds.

Now sound or what else is discussed exists.

Here sound, for instance, is the subject of the syllogism, and its momentary existence is that which is to be proved; existence is the reason, but there is no proof of the concomitance of the reason with momentary existence.

(106) Now the (reason) irreal as to the concomitance accompanied by a condition<sup>102</sup> is put forward. For instance:

This son of Maitrī is black.

As he is a son of Maitrī like all the sons of Maitrī we see.

Here 'to be black' is proved by means of 'to be a son of Maitrī'; but when 'to be black' is in question it is not 'to be a son of Maitrī' that is the effective factor, but, on the contrary, for instance the assimilation of vegetables; and the effective factor is called condition; therefore the assimilation of vegetables or the like is a condition of the connexion between 'to be a son of Maitrī' and 'to be black', as the connexion with wet fuel is that of the connexion between fire and smoke.

A reason like 'to be a son of Maitrī' is thus 'irreal as to the concomitance', for no concomitance is in hand, the (necessary) connexion (of reason and what must be proved) depending on a condition.

Also the following (reason) is 'irreal as to the concomitance':

The killing connected with sacrifices produces guilt.

As it is killing, like killing outside the sacrifice.

The fact is that here 'to be killing' does not produce guilt, but 'to be prohibited' is a (necessary) condition; as thus, just as above, a condition is in hand, (which must be required fulfilled), this reason 'to be killing' is 'irreal as to the concomitance.'

Well, but the chief characteristic of a (necessary) condition is that it invariably accompanies that which must be proved, but not that which proves<sup>103</sup>, and this is not relevant to 'to be prohibited'; how then can 'to be prohibited' be a (necessary) condition?

Do not ask thus: for the chief characteristic of the condition is found also with 'to be prohibited'; for the notion 'prohibited' accompanies that which is to be proved, viz. the production of guilt, as we have the notion 'prohibited' everywhere where we have the production of guilt; and (on the other hand) we have not necessarily the notion 'prohibited' everywhere where we have the notion 'killing', as an exception takes place as to the killing which is a part of the sacrifice; for here with the killing which is a part of the sacrifice we have the notion 'killing', but not the notion 'prohibited'. Thus the (fallacy) 'irreal as to the concomitance' is described.

Now the contrary (fallacy) is stated. The reason is contrary which is accompanied by the opposite of that which was to be proved; for instance:

Sound is eternal.

As it is produced.

Here 'eternity' is that which must be proved, and 'to be produced' is accompanied by the opposite hereof, viz. by 'transitoriness': what is produced is only

<sup>102</sup> Cf. p. (34).

<sup>103</sup> Cf. p. (43).

transitory; therefore the reason 'to be produced' is contrary, being accompanied by the opposite of that which was to be proved.

Non-cogent the reason is which is encumbered with doubt concerning that which must be proved, or which allows an other inference than the intended. It has two subdivisions, as to its being too general or too particular.

Of these the first is that which is found both with the subject of the syllogism, with analogous instances, and with contrary instances; for instance:

Sound is eternal.

As it is the object of right knowledge.

Now here the reason 'to be the object of right knowledge' is found both with the subject of the syllogism and with analogous instances, i. e. eternal things, and with contrary instances, i. e. transient things; for everything may be made the object of right knowledge.

Too particular that reason is which is excluded from analogous and contrary instances; for instance:

Earth is eternal.

As it has smell.

Here the reason is 'to have smell', and it is excluded from analogous instances, i. e. eternal things, for instance space, and from contrary instances, i. e. transient things, for instance water, as 'to have smell' is only found in earth.

Now the possibility of exceptions (*vyabhicāra*) is characterized. When a reason has both analogous and contrary instances<sup>104</sup>, the fact that it must be (108) excluded from contrary instances together with being found with analogous instances, is a necessary rule (*niyama*), as it is that which makes us draw the conclusion. The 'possibility of exceptions' is the negation of this established rule with such a reason which is not accompanied by the opposite of that which was to be proved.<sup>105</sup> It takes place in two ways, (the reason) being found either with both analogous and contrary instances, or being excluded from both of them.

The counterbalanced (reason)<sup>106</sup> is that opposed to which another reason is found as 'opponent' (*pratipakṣa*); it is called the neutralized. For instance:

Sound is transient.

As we (in it) do not find eternal qualities.

or

Sound is eternal.

As we (in it) do not find transient qualities.

The fact is that 'opponent' is here called another logical inference of the same strength which proves the contrary case; but that which has not the same strength is not an opponent.

<sup>104</sup> I read with Viçv. sambhavatsapakṣavipakṣasya hetoḥ.

<sup>105</sup> This definition is necessary, as otherwise the contrary fallacy must be comprised under here (under the non-cogent).

<sup>106</sup> Concerning the designation of this and the following fallacy see note 41.

An inference which proves the contrary may be threefold: 1) that on which (the other inference) depends (*upajīvyā*), 2) dependent (on the other) (*upajīvaka*), or 3) neither.

Of these the first kind is refuting because of its strength; let it be said for instance:

An atom is transient.

As it has bodily form, like a jar.

- (109) This logical inference, which is going to prove transitoriness, is not possible with reference to a thing, for instance an atom which is not apprehended by a means of right knowledge, as (in that case) 'irreality as to substratum' would be the result; by this inference the validity of that which makes us apprehend the atom is (namely) admitted, as it otherwise could not arise; therefore (an inference) on which the other depends, is always refuting.<sup>107</sup>

The 'dependent', on the other hand, is refuted because of its deficiency; as for instance the above mentioned logical inference which will prove transitoriness.

The third kind is the counterbalanced, (the two reasons here) having the same strength.

The refuted (reason) is that in the subject of which the negation of what was to be proved is stated by perception or another means of right knowledge; it is called (a reason) whose object is precluded. For instance:

Fire is cold.

As it is produced, like water.

Here the reason is 'to be produced', and the negation of what was to be proved, viz. coldness, is stated through perception, as we established by the organ of touch that fire is hot.

Likewise also the following (reason) is 'refuted', viz. the above mentioned reason 'existence', when what must be proved is that (for instance) a jar has only momentary existence; that which it had to prove was momentary existence, and the negation hereof, consequently not-momentary existence, is established through perception supported by recognition, as we establish the permanence (*sthāyitva*) of the jar by a recognition of the following form: this is the same jar which I have seen formerly, a recognition which is produced by an organ of sense accompanied by the impression produced by former apprehension, and which extends over the former and the later moment of time.

- (110) These five fallacies, the unreal, etc., do not prove that which they had to prove and are not (real) reasons, as they want one of (the five) qualities<sup>108</sup>, viz. respectively 'to be an attribute with the subject of the syllogism', etc.

<sup>107</sup> The inference as to the transitoriness of the atom is deficient, being dependent on an inference which proves the existence of the atom altogether, and this last inference proves involuntarily at the same time that it is eternal, is consequently *upajīvyā* and the basis of the first dependent inference, which therefore is wrong; in about this way the train of ideas may be summed up.

<sup>108</sup> See p. (41).



The (three faults) which a characteristic <sup>109</sup> (*lakṣaṇa*), which must be regarded as a reason with negative concomitance only, may have, viz. to be too narrow (*avyāpti*), too wide (*ativyāpti*), or impossible (*asambhava*), are also comprised here, and are not something different from the five (fallacies).

A too wide (characteristic) is (a reason) which is irreal as to the concomitance, not being excluded from all contrary instances, or requiring a condition; for instance the notion 'animal' as the chief characteristic of a cow, for to have dew-lap, etc., is the effecting (determining) factor (*prayojaka*) of the notion 'cow', and not to be an animal.

Likewise a too narrow (characteristic) is (a reason) which is partly irreal; for instance to originate from (the cow) *Çabali* as characteristic of a cow.

An impossible (characteristic) is (a reason), irreal as to itself; for instance whole-hoofedness as a chief characteristic of a cow. (111)

## XXII. Perversion.

Perversion (*chala*) is (the proceeding) when, a word having been applied in one sense, another sense then is substituted and the refutation (of the opponent) thus is attained.

When for instance in the proposition: 'this boy has a new garment on' (the word *nava*) is applied in the sense 'new', and then a person takes it for granted that it has another sense, and (starting from this point of view) raises the following objection: 'He has not nine (*nava*) garments, being poor; he can hardly be supposed to have two, to say nothing of nine.'

He who discusses in this way is overthrown by the fact that he makes use of 'perversion.'

## XXIII. Futility.

Futility (*jāli*) is wrong answer. It appears under many forms, *ulkaṣasama*, (112) etc.; but will not be fully set forth here from fear of diffuseness.

The futility called *ulkaṣasama* <sup>110</sup> consists in the transfer of a quality to the subject of a syllogism, because the same quality is found in the instance, but without any relation of concomitance taking place; for instance when a person after the argumentation: 'Sound is transient, as it is produced, like a jar,' raises (the following objection): 'If sound is to be transient for the reason of being produced, like a jar, it must also for the same reason and like the jar, too, consist of parts.'

The futility called *apakaṣasama* <sup>110</sup> consists in the transfer of the negation of a quality (to the subject of a syllogism) because of a quality in the instance, without any relation of concomitance taking place; as for instance when someone to

<sup>109</sup> Cf. p. (7) and note 5.

<sup>110</sup> The designations of the subdivisions of *jāli* are untranslatable: they indicate that respectively a plus or a minus are brought on a thing, starting from false analogy.

the above mentioned logical inference says the following: 'If sound must be transient for the reason of being produced, like a jar, it must also for the same reason and like the jar, too, not be audible; for a jar is not audible.'

#### XXIV. Occasion for Rebuke.

Occasion for rebuke (*nigrahasthāna*)<sup>111</sup> is the cause of overthrow. Though it has many forms: 'too little', 'too much', 'renouncing of position', 'a new object', (113) 'bewilderment', 'approval of opinion', 'contradiction', it will not be fully exposed here for fear of diffuseness. 'Too little' (*nyūna*) consists in the fact that there in a case to be exposed in some way are too few<sup>112</sup> (members). 'Too much' (*adhika*) consists in the fact that there in the case to be exposed in some way are too many<sup>113</sup> (members). Renouncing of position (*apasiddhānta*) consists in the abandoning of a tenet. 'A new object' (*arthāntara*) consists in the stating of an object not connected with that taken in hand. 'Bewilderment' (*apratibhā*) consists in not to understand how to answer (the opponent). 'Approval of opinion' (*matāmujñā*) consists in a person's approval, i. e. admission of a case which is maintained by the opponent and which is at variance with his own.<sup>114</sup> 'Contradiction' consists in being guilty of a rejection of the case approved.<sup>115</sup>

That only the most useful different forms are treated here, and that those which are not most serviceable is not characterized is no fault, as that so far stated is sufficient for the education of young people.<sup>116</sup>

Thus the *Tarkabhāṣā* composed by Keçava miçra is finished.

<sup>111</sup> The term *nigrahasthāna* designates a case where overthrow in the discussion is certain.

<sup>112</sup> I. e. that one or several members are wanting in the form in which the logical inference is arranged (see p. (95)); cf. Vatsyayana ad N. S. V, 2, 12, and Carakasamhita III, 8, 56.

<sup>113</sup> I. e. not only members of the syllogism, but particularly superfluous secondary qualifications, as for instance in the fallacies mentioned p. (101) which are unreal as to qualification, etc. Superfluous repetitions too are classed among these; Carakasamhita III, 8, 57.

<sup>114</sup> According to Vatsyayana ad V, 2, 21 the fault aimed at here seems to be that of a person trying to point out with the opponent a defect demonstrated in his own argument without clearing himself of the defect in question.

<sup>115</sup> According to Vatsyayana ad V, 2, 4 the question here is incompatibility of proposition and reason.

<sup>116</sup> Cf. p. 1 and note 1.

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