



DISCUSSION
and
DEBATE
in
INDIAN PHILOSOPHY

ISSUES IN VEDĀNTA, MĪMĀMSĀ AND NYĀYA

Edited by
DAYA KRISHNA

Discussion and Debate in
Indian Philosophy

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Issues in Vedānta, Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya

Edited by
Daya Krishna

INDIAN COUNCIL OF PHILOSOPHICAL RESEARCH
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Preface

The present selections from the Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research deal primarily with issues relating to Vedānta, Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya in the Indian Tradition. Normally, most writers on Indian philosophy, including acknowledged scholars of the subject, present a picture of these 'schools' as if there were no issues or problems in respect of the 'understanding' of what they are supposed to have said. But this just is not the case, and the present collection is the 'story' of this discovery. It documents, step by step, the unfolding of the drama which, in retrospect, is unbelievable even to one through whose 'instrumentality' the events may be said to have unfolded.

The story started, as it always does, by a 'chance' encounter with a 'stray' quotation from Staal by Wendy O'Flaherty¹ in her Introduction to the Volume on *Karma* edited by her. The quotation seemed to present, at least *prima facie*, a view of oblation in the Vedic sacrifice, or *dravya-tyāga*, which was mistaken. The obvious solution was to find from reputed Mīmāṃsā scholars the 'authoritative' view on the subject and in case it conflicted with Staal's interpretation, send the same to him so that he could defend his own interpretation against theirs. Accordingly, Staal's view was translated into Sanskrit, sent to Pt. Pattabhīram Sastri, Remella Suryaprakasa Sastri, Ramanuja Tatacharya and Professor K.T. Pandurangi. They

all cooperated in the experiment and their comments along with Professor Staal's reply were published in different issues of the JICPR and are reprinted in this collection for the reader's benefit.

The 'exploratory' and 'dialogical' character of the 'experience' so gained and the cooperative response it elicited from the traditional masters of the philosophical craft in India led us on into the unending adventure whose results are reported in this Volume.

The discussion on Karl H. Potter's article *The Development of Advaita Vedānta as a School of Philosophy* and Daya Krishna's 'Vedānta in the First Millennium AD' and their replies to the comment on what they had written constitute the centre piece on the School of Vedānta in this collection. Similarly, besides the piece on **Dravya-Tyāga** we have detailed discussion on such important issues in Mīmāṃsā as whether the doctrine of Karma is treated as a *pūrvapakṣa* in the system, while in Nyāya we have the continuing controversy on the issue whether Nyāya is realist or idealist in the current accepted sense of these terms.

The Section on Nyāya contains besides the controversy about its being 'realist' or 'idealist', issues regarding 'identity statements' such as 'ghaṭo ghaṭaḥ', the nature of *āhārya jñāna*, the problem of *Śābdabodha* in the case of complex sentences where it is difficult to distinguish between the main and the subsidiary clauses, or what is *mukhya* or *pradhāna* and what is *gauṇa* in the linguistic construction. The exposition of a little-known genre of Nyāya writing called the *Krodapatras* and the discussion thereon is an added bonus in this section.

There has perhaps never been a galaxy of such illustrious participants in the exploration of an issue, such a sustained questioning of the beliefs which were held to be indubitable by almost everybody up till now, or such an 'open' debate in which traditional pandits who knew only Sanskrit or their regional language engaged on 'equal' terms with those who only wrote in English, the later including in their fold both Indians and foreigners.

*Samvāda*² was the first experiment of this type, planned and executed by Professor M.P. Rege, who is now no more. His death on the 28th of December, 2000 has deprived the philosophical world of one of the most 'imaginative' experimenters who brought the active practitioners of the two philosophical traditions, the Indian and the Western, in a dialogical situation where each was 'forced' to 'existentially' face the 'living' tradition of a different way of philosophizing.

The Rege experiment which occurred at Poona has had slow, but lasting, effect on the 'understanding' of Indian philosophy in this country. The discussions and debate collected in this volume are a continuation of that 'experiment' and an evidence of its influence over the intervening years. An 'invisible' change has, however, occurred during this period as the focus of attention has shifted from the 'external' 'reference point' of Western philosophy to something that was 'internal' and immanent to the tradition of Indian philosophizing itself. The debate with the exponents of Indian philosophy in the West is still marginally there, but gradually the students and practitioners of Indian philosophy in India are discussing and rediscovering a rich field of diversity, conflict and ambiguity in the tradition that challenges debate, discussion and exploration resulting in a 'new' partnership between traditionally trained Pandits and modern University trained philosophy persons in the country. This has already resulted in incalculable benefit to both the parties concerned, as Indian philosophy becomes once again, a matter of 'living concern' to the practising 'philosophers' in the country. Who could have imagined even a few decades ago, that Pandits of the status of Pattabhirāma Sastri, Ramanuja Tatacharya, Remella Suryaprakasa Sastri, D. Prahalada Char, V. Venkatachalam would engage in an active controversy on issues in Vedānta, Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya with scholars such as Fritz Staal, Karl H. Potter, V.N. Jha, N.S. Dravid, G.C. Pande, R. Balasubramanian, J.N. Mohanty, Sibajiban Bhattacharyya and others whose names are well-known to the English-knowing 'world' of Indian philosophy.

The debate and the discussion in these pages makes Indian philosophy alive once more and it is hoped that the philosophically-inclined readers will not only enjoy the arguments and counter-arguments on the issues debated, but themselves participate in carrying the unending enterprise of philosophising in the Indian tradition further.

It may be added that all the issues raised and debated in the pages of the JICPR have not been included in this collection. The interesting discussion on Professor Hesterman's thesis that renouncing practices are found in the Veda as an intergral part of the Vedic ritual and hence need not be ascribed to the Śramaṇa traditions as has been done up till now, is one such example.

There are others scattered in the pages of the *Notes and Queries* Section of the various issues of the Journal. They have not been included as they did not evoke much controversy or response from those interested in the subject. The responsibility for the selection is that of Professor R.S. Bhatnagar who has been associated with the JICPR in perhaps the most 'intimate' way possible as he, and he alone, has prepared its Subject and Author Index over the last so many years. He has been helpful in many ways, and it has been his suggestion that the material on Indian philosophy be published separately from the one on Western philosophy.

Accordingly, the discussion and debate on issues in Western philosophy has been deferred and it is hoped that they will be brought together and published in a separate volume later.

DAYA KRISHNA

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2. *Samvāda: A Dialogue between two Philosophical Traditions*, Pub. Indian Council of Philosophical Research, New Delhi. In association with M/s Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1991.

Part I
Vedānta

1

The Development of Advaita Vedānta as a School of Philosophy

KARL POTTER

When we examine the rise and fall of philosophical schools, whether in European or Asian contexts, regularly find, it seems to me, a pattern which may be said to have five major phases. The time taken for a school to pass through all five phases varies widely. Some schools rise and fall in a matter of a few decades, perhaps less. Consider the school of logical positivism, or perhaps we should better say, reconstructive analytical philosophy, which had its inception not much before Frege at the end of the nineteenth century, and appears to decline from Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* in the 1940s: a period, then, of fifty years of life. Again, the Cartesian philosophy originated in the seventeenth century with Descartes but soon disappeared as such, replaced by variations as widely divergent as continental rationalism and British empiricism, each of which arose less than a century after Descartes' *Meditations*. On the other hand, there are other, particularly the

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more ancient schools—e.g. that of Aristotle and the Peripatetics—which arguably maintain themselves for a period of several centuries. Thomism, which originated with Aquinas, lives on intermittently and is alive today as a school of philosophy.

Of course, these generalizations depend essentially on what our conception of a 'school' of philosophy is. In each of the above examples some will argue that the rubric ('logical positivism', 'Cartesianism', 'Thomism') is the result of confused thinking, of mixed categories, and that some other historical unit, or none at all, is the more meaningful one. What are the marks of a 'school' of philosophy?

I should list, among relevant features which indicate a school, first, its having one or more *fundamental insights*—an allegiance to which, binds together those who subscribe to the school's doctrines whatever variations they may otherwise be able to discern amongst themselves. Secondly, these insights must be taken, both by the followers themselves and by others, to demarcate the position of the school from positions taken by others. Thirdly, its self-awareness as a school should be historically discernible; there will usually be institutional factors which serve to bring the theoretical insights and commitments into relation with life pursuits.

These three characteristics do not serve to settle once and for all questions of the sort I alluded to a moment ago, for example, about whether the proper way to view the Cartesian philosophy is as inclusive or exclusive of movements, such as occasionalism, rationalism and empiricism, that followed Descartes. But then, perhaps these questions do not much matter for my present purpose. For let us allow that a school may comprise subschools, and that schools may overlap each other. Still, one can discuss the development and deterioration of schools while taking into account such further complexities of their identification.

In India, even more than in the West, philosophy is organized by schools. There are fundamental insights, recognized as such by followers and by rivals as demarcating the position

of that school from others, and these schools are, or were, in every case connected with institutional mechanisms by which the school was maintained and made a living reality to its members. Classically, these institutional supports included traditional training grounds and methods, ranging from a single teacher-pupil arrangement through *āśramas* and *maṭhas*—perhaps a small group of teachers and a larger set of pupils—to large universities such as Taxilā and Nālandā in ancient times. Other support was provided in many cases by religious affiliation to temples or monastic orders. Various features of religious organization were assembled around the fundamental insights of the philosophy, and worship paid to the founders, divine and human, who discovered those insights and/or promulgated them.

All of the three features of philosophical schools that I mentioned can easily be seen to apply to the great classical Hindu *darśanas* (as they are now-a-days termed) of Indian thought. These included Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya and Yoga, Pūrvamīmāṃsā and Vedānta, each of which is born around fundamental insights taken as distinctive by followers and rivals, and each of which was passed on through traditional institutions of learning. The features also apply to the various types of Vedānta, such as the Advaita of Śaṅkara, Viśiṣṭa-Advaita of Rāmānuja, Dvaita of Madhva, and the myriad others of which perhaps those associated with the names of Nimbārka and Vallabha are the best known. It also applies to the many sectarian philosophies such as those associated with Kashmir Śaivism, Śaiva Siddhānta Vīraśaivism, Bengal Vaiṣṇavism, etc. Jain philosophy is identifiable in these terms also, as is Buddhist philosophy generally, and some of the main schools within Buddhism such as Mādhyamikā, Vijñānavāda, *Theravāda*, though there are special problems connected with the precise limitations of some of these schools because of our lack of clarity about the precise nature of their fundamental insights.

It has been regularly pointed out that in India philosophical schools have a much longer life than in the West. Indeed,

institutional support for most if not all of the schools just named still exists today, if only to a minimal degree, and a survey of Indian philosophy of today can still to a great extent be organized in terms of schools by which such a survey would have been, and sometimes was, carried out 500 years ago. (For an example, look at the *Sarvadarśanasamgraha* of Mādhavācārya.) Nevertheless, it seems to me that we can find the same pattern of rise and fall in Indian schools of philosophy that I suggested we can find in Western schools. The difference is not so much in the patterns of rise and fall, but in the Indian versus the Western attitude toward a school which has 'fallen', and is now in a state of decline. In India, such schools are maintained; in the West they tend to be forgotten. This says something about comparative attitudes in India and the West toward progress, toward whether ultimate value is to be found in the future or by a rediscovery of the past. But this is not my concern at the moment.

I suggested there are five phases in the 'life' of a philosophical school. What are they?

First, and obviously, there is the 'Discovery Stage', where the Fundamental Insights of the school first appear to its founders. Very frequently, though not always, this stage is identified with the experience and work of a single great individual. And where we have sufficient historical information, there is a strong tendency to try to find the single individual to whom the credit should be given. Thus Platonism, Aristotelianism, Thomism, Cartesianism, Buddhism, Jainism and many others, are actually named after their founders. In the case of some of the Indian schools, a founder is invented and made responsible for the composition of a basic text—characteristically a set of aphoristic utterances in which the fundamental insights are briefly set forth. Such seems to have been the case with Nyāya (Gautama), Vaiśeṣika (Kaṇāda) and Sāṃkhya (Kapila). In the case of Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta, since a characteristic doctrine there involves the beginninglessness of language, the origination of their fundamental insights is not credited to a

person—being embedded in the natural things and represented in language—but those who first represented it linguistically are sometimes named, such as the sages Yājñavalkya and Uddālaka in the older *Upaniṣads*, or Jaimini for Pūrvamīmāṃsā. In most cases a founder is identified—probably not always with great accuracy—and the entire credit for arriving at the fundamental insight goes to him, to the disparagement of others who in some cases should undoubtedly get as much, or more, credit. We find this the case for Mādhyamika Buddhism, the Fundamental Insight of which is credited to Nāgārguna, though it is present extensively in the *Prajñāpāramitā* literature; for Viśiṣṭa Advaita, where Rāmānuja was far from being the first to recognize the point of the school; and for Advaita, where Śaṅkarācārya has received all the credit to the detriment of Maṇḍana Miśra, or for that matter Gauḍapāda.

In fact, this first stage, of discovery, characteristically takes some time, and the combined efforts of several persons over that period. The first stage of the histories of the Hindu *darśanas* seems in every case to have spanned several centuries. We cannot be sure just how far back the beginnings of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, Sāṅkhya and Yoga, Mīmāṃsā and Vedānta should be traced, but it seems likely they all had their origins in the thought of pre-Christian era India. The *sūtra* or aphorisms which constitute the supposed beginnings of these systems are actually redactions of views already in place. Indeed, it is a problem how to distinguish any precise point at which this first stage of discovery should be said to end and the second stage, of development, begin. However, it is of no great importance to find such a precise point; indeed, the stages I am delineating are not so much chronological periods, as they are overlapping tendencies as displayed in the literature of the schools.

In the second or development stage, the Fundamental Insight begins to be set forth in a self-conscious way as doctrine. Most frequently, this stage finds its writers occupied with the following sorts of things.

First, there is usually a concerted attempt at legitimization. Only in unusual circumstances will the early propounders of an insight attempt to divorce it from all that went before, even though the Fundamental Insight may indeed have been revolutionary and represented as such. Rather, the attempt is to show the continuity of the Fundamental Insight with the features in prevailing or preceding ways of thinking. There may be appeals to authorities likely to be accepted by one's audience. One can easily guess that if such legitimization does not occur, the Fundamental Insight may fall on deaf ears and so be lost to posterity; indeed, one may well opine that there are many such Insights that have been lost for that reason.

Secondly, the style of development is characteristically un-systematic. In India, it frequently took the form of commentaries composed on the *sūtras* in which the Fundamental Insight was taken to be formulated. In the West, this was sometimes the case, depending on current notions of philosophical style, but even where it was not, there are only infrequently found early attempts to present a full-blown systematic account of the world keyed to the Fundamental Insight. This is partly because of the requirements of style posed by the previously mentioned aim: one who is desirous of legitimization will not normally gain his ends by publishing a self-contained tract in which the accepted precepts are compendiously overthrown in favour of unfamiliar corollaries of the new Fundamental Insight.

Thirdly, though the exposition is unsystematic and the continuity with the accepted wisdom of the age stressed, there is little attempt to give due attention and respect to the nuances and variations possible within the limits of the Fundamental Insight. To attempt this would spoil the force of the exposition, the purpose of which is to show the superiority of the Fundamental Insight over its predecessors' insights. To emphasize or even spend much time on internal variations within the school, blunts the cutting edge of the development. There may be implicit or even explicit rehearsals of arguments with

opposing points of view, but these are likely to be guarded. Polemics, though it may be presaged here, is not strategically the best line as yet, and for the same reason, attention to internal variations, which may suggest to the audience the possibility of internal inconsistency, or worst of all, squabbling, is minimized.

Fourthly, the standpoint of the writer of a development stage treatise is likely to be that of a specialist addressing an audience of non-specialist pupils from whom the Fundamental Insight is being elicited in the fashion made famous by Plato/Socrates when he elicited the Pythagorean Theorem from the slave boy. That being the purpose, there will be less drawing of hard lines of definition and distinction, and more general characterizations of the Fundamental Insight in ways which enable the reader to warm to it and make it his own. Arguments and definitions, then, the standard counters in systematization, are only sparingly adduced at this stage.

Fifthly and finally, there will likely be an attempt to relate the theoretical aspects of the Fundamental Insight to practical concerns and aims, and specifically to those concerns and aims that others are not yet convinced of as worthwhile in themselves or as ends to be achieved. The emphasis will, therefore, be on pragmatics. The Fundamental Insight will be justified by its being shown to be relevant to accepted concerns. Though the eventual upshot will be to specify new categories in which a world-view incorporating the Fundamental Insight can be couched—categories which will then come to replace those in current use—the writer of a development stage work will avoid addressing himself to that aspect of the matter explicitly, contenting himself with hinting at the possibilities for clarification and the new horizons of explanation stemming from the acceptance of the Fundamental Insight. Thus there are certain categories and concepts, whose recognition is required by the nature of the Fundamental Insight itself (and the exigencies of exposition) that the author in this stage will work with—and other categories and concepts,

related to but different from those in use in the rival established systems, that he will avoid. The strategy is, first, to make the Fundamental Insight plausible, indeed compelling; then the system will develop naturally.

As the school becomes established by these methods, transition to a third stage occurs, which I shall call the polemical stage. We can usefully compare the five features of the development stage with five features of the polemical stage which show some similarities but mainly differences to the preceding ones.

First, whereas the development of the school emphasized continuity with the previously established views in order not to frighten off possible converts, in the polemical stage there is a concerted attempt to distinguish the school's position on all relevant matters from those of others, both from the previous establishment as well as any rivals which have sprung up to challenge the Fundamental Insight. The Fundamental Insight no longer needs to be legitimized, but it does need to be defended. Consequently, in literature characteristic of this stage it is the priorities of the *opponents* addressed, and the contrasting views of the school, which dominate the *organization* of the work. For the same reason, great effort may be made to marshal the best possible case for the opponent in order to gain greater credibility for the superiority of one's own school, so that the reader realizes the strength of the arguments and counter-arguments that stem from the standpoint of the Fundamental Insight in overcoming the opponent's formidable-sounding case.

Secondly, the *style* in which these polemical works are written, is a function of the order of the arguments offered—of that order as conceived by the author. It may reflect the priorities of the opponents, especially if the opponents are conceived to be only of one rival school, or it may be organized according to the categories now offered by the school as preferable to the traditional categories of the established view or views of the rival(s). Or it may be organized in a more

traditional manner, say, as a commentary, but with the emphasis now shifting from the exegesis of the Fundamental Insight to the introduction and clarification of distinctions designed to round out the position into one which promises an adequate account of the entire subject-matter to which the philosophy addresses itself.

Thirdly, there is likely to be a greater self-awareness of the nature of and possibilities in the school's views taken as a system, i.e., as an interconnected set of concepts which, as a whole, explain things better than any rival does or could. Thus in this stage we find more attention paid not only to the specific historic accounts of rival views—so that references are made by name to authors and works of other schools—but there is also more awareness of the flexibility of one's own school's doctrines, of the variations within the views of those who developed the view in the second stage, and of the possible alternative ways of making sense of things while remaining within the limits of the Fundamental Insight.

Fourthly, the standpoint is not now that of a teacher to a pupil, but rather that of a debater. The purpose of the literature is to win the argument, and by so doing to prove the supremacy of the Fundamental Insight. Thus, in a sense, both opponents and *aficionados* are addressed, the former explicitly and the latter implicitly. The arguments are such as should convince the unbeliever; in any case, they will reinforce the believer in case of any doubts he may have. As a debater, the writer in this stage makes whatever distinctions he needs which are consistent with his other views, and he will develop definitions to keep these distinctions clear in his and his reader's minds.

Fifthly, whereas in the development stage, the approach was dominated by practical concerns, in the polemical stage the emphasis is clearly on theory. The writer is rationalizing the Fundamental Insight by showing its superiority through argument. Special attention is paid to what may appear to its detractors to be its most vulnerable aspects. There is every

reason to glory in the ability of the system to handle all the topics that the rival views treat, to delineate just which concepts of the opposition are totally wrong-headed, which ones are thus partially mistaken, which ones can be incorporated into the school's categories and by what sorts of revisions and excisions. The ultimate purpose of the Fundamental Insight is taken for granted but is not at this stage much on ones mind. The tensions in this polemical stage however inevitably lead (so my hypothesis suggests) to a fourth stage, the systematic state.

Here, first attention swings back from the opposition to the inner workings of the school's doctrines themselves. If the work of the previous stages has been done well, the school is itself now the establishment. It no longer requires legitimization nor defence. What it now requires is justification of another sort, in which its future stature is guaranteed against overthrow by new insights to come. The task, then, is on the one hand to strip the doctrines down to their essentials and to provide handbooks with which to instruct future generations in the system, and secondly, by demonstrating that the system is rigorously accurate, adequate, consistent and economical, to induce conviction on all sides, that will carry such weight in the future as to preclude doubts, at least among those who are intelligent enough to understand the system.

Secondly, the style of treatises stemming from this stage is, as one would expect, systematic, not expository or polemical. There may well be expository and polemical material embellishing the systematic material, but it is the latter around which the work gathers itself. And the sense of 'system' here is indicated by the interconnectedness of definitions. The organization tends to be dictated not by pragmatic considerations, not by the order of things conceived in rival accounts, but rather by the connections among the definitions of the key concepts in the school itself. Before, technical concepts and definitions were, as it were, forced on the school by the exigencies of exposition and argument; now there is a stripping

down of all the concepts—whether those accompanying the Fundamental Insight or those which came to the fore during the polemical stage—to a bare minimum.

Thirdly, though the exposition of the system may continue to be in the terms of a dialogue between opponent and author, thus continuing the appearance of polemics, this style is now made subservient to the clarification and explanation of the technical concepts and their definitions. It is a spring-board for demonstrating the interconnectedness, and so the systematicity, of the system. Likewise, though variations corresponding to factional opinions within the school may be introduced on occasion, the general thrust is toward streamlining the system in such a way that only one of the rival internal views prevails—being the one called for by the rest of the system's definitions and their connections. There is once again, as in the second stage of development, little concern for the details of the opposition or, for that matter, for the details of development within the system. But whereas in the development stage this was because the Fundamental Insight was what mattered, in the systematic stage the same kind of indifference to detail arises for a different reason—because of the requirements of system-building.

Fourthly, the stance of the writer is neither that of teacher to pupil, nor of debator. Rather it is that of the scholastic systematizer. Definitions are central, arguments and explanations ancillary. The works produced from this stage may be shorter or longer depending on the extent to which the author wishes to combine systematic economy with expository clarity and polemical argument. Thus it may be difficult to place a given work entirely or unreservedly in one stage rather than another. But the extent to which a work belongs in the systematic stage depends on the extent to which its author is guided, consciously or unconsciously, by a concern for satisfaction of systematic criteria of success—accuracy, adequacy, consistency and economy, as mentioned earlier.

Fifthly, inasmuch as the concerns are oriented toward the criteria of systematic success just mentioned, and not to the practical concerns which led to the Fundamental Insight in the first place, the systematic stage is super-theoretical, not pragmatic. Still, it may be argued, and I think correctly, the entire systematic edifice is intended to contribute to the final justification of the Fundamental Insight, and thus its necessary triumph consists in its providing the best means for getting the ends desired, whatever they are. The systematic stage, while super-theoretical, is also super-pragmatic.

The fifth and final stage in the history of a school is the stage of decline. The decline may take several forms. The school may be overthrown by a new Fundamental Insight; this is the kind of case which has been viewed by Thomas Kuhn as constituting a paradigm shift and which he illustrates by adducing certain key turning points in the history of science. In such a case, the school in decline will merely cease to produce any more literature, to have any more believers. In short, it will terminate as a school. Or, the community may lose interest in the purpose which the school proposed to serve. Or, for other reasons, the school's doctrines may be muzzled, its members successfully persecuted, or just ignored. Or, the school may be merged into another and lose its identity. In any case, the termination is not the decline. The decline is the period, however long or short, following the systematization and preceding termination. During the decline stage nothing much happens, or at any rate, nothing new and different. Old territory may be explored, introductions written, specific small points discussed and clarified or obfuscated. This is the period of 'scholasticism' in that sense of the term which suggests degeneration and decay. It may take the form of gradual or sudden mergence with other schools, of a watering-down process in which the distinctions from other schools are disregarded, or of the development of a gap between the philosopher and the Fundamental Insight such that we find the members of the school doing history rather than contributing further to the system itself.

These five stages, then, are proposed as calibrations of the life-history of a philosophical school. I should emphasize that I am not claiming that every school's history displays all five stages, or that the stages are so patently discrete that one can easily discover which stage the school is in at a given point in time. There can be, and frequently there are disputes about such questions. However, the specification of the detailed features of each stage should help one to make a case, as a historian, that a school is in that stage at a certain point in its history. To show this I need to discuss some illustrations.

I shall make these illustrations brief, and once more, I realize that the details of classification in each case are, or may be, controversial. Part of the controversy turns on just what constitutes a particular school with an accepted rubric; another part turns on which authors and works belong to which of the stages I have distinguished; still another source of controversy may arise as to whether a given school is presently in decline or indeed is defunct. My present purpose is not served by debating these points about my examples: these examples are offered merely to suggest that it is not far-fetched to view the history of a school in my way.

Let me begin with the 'school' which in America we sometimes call 'analytic philosophy' or 'philosophical analysis', more specifically 'rational reconstruction' or the 'ideal language' movement. By and large, it is this (as contrasted with the movement of 'ordinary language philosophy' associated with the later Wittgenstein) that is discussed in books on philosophical analysis. Its Fundamental Insight may be taken to be the idea that symbolic logic (perhaps among other things) provides the key to the development of an improved way of discovering and expressing truths, so that philosophical progress, and indeed ultimate success in philosophy, stems from precise analyses of concepts using the tools of mathematical logic. Though it is quite arguable that this Fundamental Insight was founded prior to the end of the nineteenth century, it is now fashionable to consider Gottlob Frege to be the

first champion of the movement, so we may associate him with the discovery phase of this movement.

The acknowledged master of the development stage that follows is Bertrand Russell. Reading, for example, his *Problems of Philosophy* one can see the attempts at legitimization by tracing aspects of the Fundamental Insight back to more classical empiricist, rationalist and even ancient origins. The style is unpolemical and unsystematic, the conception of where the movement is going amorphous. The triumph of this stage is the putting forward of certain paradigmatic analyses which, by their alleged success, show the virtues of the approach discovered in the Fundamental Insight. Of these paradigmatic analyses, the best known is Russell's theory of descriptions, although there are numerous others, such as the theory of types, which are offered in the same spirit.

The third stage, of polemics, is found in the Vienna Circle positivists, and in England in A.J. Ayer's *Language, Truth and Logic*. These writers attacked metaphysics as practised by the absolute idealists. They emphasized distinctions rather than similarities, were self-consciously aware both of the contrasts between their approach and that of their rivals, as well as of the varieties of points of view within their own school. The style is argumentative. The Fundamental Insight becomes identified with the positivists' push toward a unified science.

As for the fourth stage, the systematic stage, its best-known document is Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, but a less well-known example is to be found in Rudolf Carnap's *Die Logische Aufbau der Welt*, a work in turn emulated and improved upon by Nelson Goodman in his *Structure of Appearance*. In these works a system is created, an interlocking set of definitions which is consciously intended to provide an holistic explanation of a subject-matter answering to the criteria of successful system-making. In the school presently being discussed, the three works I have just mentioned are probably the most clearcut instances of system construction, but there is a sizable literature that concerns aspects of these systems,

and of others like them but with differences brought out in specific discussions of key points. That is, there are discussions of what alternative systems, reflecting the Fundamental Insight, would be like if they were to be constructed.

With Wittgenstein's change of mind—or heart—the fifth stage, of decline, may be said to begin. The pattern of decline in this case combines a kind of revolution; that of the ordinary language as of Wittgenstein, J.L. Austin and others, with a mergence (in this case with pragmatism) through such figures as Clarence Irving Lewis, Willard Van Orman Quine, and Nelson Goodman. Even Carnap himself contributes significantly to this merger, and thus to this phase. When I say that this group contributes to the decline, I should emphasize that what I mean is that the allegiance to the Fundamental Insight wanes, not that the philosophers are themselves deficient. The Fundamental Insight, as I explicated it, involved a certain programme which it was hoped would lead to an improved way of discovering and expressing truths through dependence on symbolic logic and precise analyses of concepts. Ordinary language philosophy revolted against this dependence on symbolic logic, and the pragmatist tendencies soften the precision of certain key concepts (e.g. 'analyticity' at the hands of Quine; the positivist insistence on the difference between natural and normative concepts). The resulting amalgam may or may not represent an improvement; in any case, its Fundamental Insight has shifted to such an extent that it is hard to say whether the school is in decline or had terminated. And this, it seems to me, is typical of the decline of schools in general; it is the exception, rather than the rule, when we can identify a school that has ceased altogether, in the sense of having no adherents whatsoever.

Speaking of pragmatism, one can find my five stages exemplified in that school also. Once again, it is unclear where the Fundamental Insight is first formulated, but it is clearly formulated by Charles Sanders Peirce. This Fundamental Insight, put in its simplest form, is the notion that the meaning of a

concept is the difference it makes to action. That thought is developed (the second stage) by William James, George Herbert Mead, John Dewey, F.S.C. Schiller and others in the early twentieth century. James and Dewey, in particular, write in their later years in polemical vein (stage three), e.g. when James addresses his critics in *The Meaning of Truth*, and in Dewey's many polemical exercises in the 1920s and 1930s such as *The Quest for Certainty*, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, and so on. The systematic stage is exemplified in Charles Morris's work, and in C.I. Lewis's *Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation*. Goodman's *Structure of Appearance* may also count as a systematic work in the pragmatist tradition, one in which the confluence noted above between pragmatism and philosophical analysis is well illustrated. Again, it is unclear whether pragmatism is in a decline or not; in a certain way it has received a shot in the arm from the later Wittgensteinian doctrine of meaning as use, and one might well picture the dominant strain in contemporary Anglo-American philosophy as combining into a single amalgam elements of all three of the following: philosophical analysis, pragmatism, and ordinary language philosophy. It is difficult for one whose own convictions are involved to assess the extent to which the Fundamental Insight of present-day Anglo-American philosophy is itself an uncertain combination of these three schools, or whether there is or is about to be a recognition of a new Fundamental Insight which has its source, in some manner or other, in the Fundamental Insights of these schools.

I have cited philosophical analysis and pragmatism as examples mainly because they are the schools I know best outside of Indian philosophy. They are also schools which flourish today, or did so recently, and thus it is relatively easy to appreciate their Fundamental Insights and stages. When one turns to older schools one has more difficulty in identifying what should count as a 'school', in part because it is no longer known to us in an immediate way what the participants in the tradition thought of as the real key to their allegiance. For

example, if Cartesianism is a school, as reported to us by historians, it is either a very vague movement which comprehends both British empiricists such as Locke, Berkeley and Hume, as well as the continental rationalists such as Spinoza and Leibnitz, or else it is a very brief movement, or better perhaps, three distinct brief movements, one taking up Descartes's thoughts on physics (Regius, Clauberg, Huygens), another his positive epistemological notions (Malebranche, Foucher, Arnauld), and a third his metaphysical thoughts (de la Forge, Cordemoy, Geulincx, the occasionalists). Thomism, another alleged 'school', waxes and wanes at least three times over the centuries, and it is hard to tell whether one should treat these as three distinct schools or as one overall school.

I shall not try to perform further exercises to test my hypothesis in Western philosophy concerning the five-stage process characterizing the rise and fall of philosophical schools. The purpose I do wish to put it to, to which I will now turn, is to give some shape to the history of Advaita Vedānta through distinguishing these five stages within it. I should perhaps conclude here by reiterating and emphasizing that I hold no particular store for these five stages, and certainly not for the specific characteristics of each stage that I have distinguished. I suspect those better acquainted with the broad expanse of the history of philosophy will be able to improve on my suggestions in a number of ways. The tool I have fashioned here is intended to shed light on Indian philosophy, which is organized in schools to a degree significantly greater than in Western thought. Even so, the purpose is mainly to provide handles on which to hang the names and contributions of a number of Indian writers, handles without which it is difficult to appreciate their place in the tradition they represent.

I turn to consider the history of that school of Indian philosophy which is regularly identified by contemporary Indian intellectuals as the most powerful among the several viewpoints (*darśana*, or schools) into which Indian philosophy is regularly classified. The name of the school is Advaita Vedānta. Its

founder is regularly said to be India's most famous and powerful philosopher, Śaṅkarācārya, who probably lived in the late seventh and early eighth centuries AD.

There is no question that Advaita, as I shall refer to that school for short, is and has been for many centuries a school. Earlier I listed three features of a philosophical school: first, that it pays allegiance to one or more Fundamental Insights; secondly, that these Insights are taken to demarcate the school's position as distinct from other positions; and thirdly, that its self-awareness as a school should be discernible by organizations and institutions around which the activities of the philosophers and their students and followers tend to revolve. Advaita satisfies these criteria. I shall in a moment outline the Fundamental Insights it promulgates, and at length describe the stages in the processes of development, defence and systematization it went through. As for the third feature, there have been since at least Śaṅkara's time, perhaps earlier, teaching institutions, called *mathas* or *āśramas*, committed to instructing solely in Advaita in some cases, or committed to Advaita while serving other further goals in others. A famous Brahmanical tradition claims to descend from Śaṅkara, who is credited with having founded four (or perhaps more) *pīṭhas*, central *mathas*, in the four corners of the subcontinent of India, and who is also credited with initiating a famous monastic line, that of the 'ten-named ones' or *Dasanāmin*. Though there is some doubt, at least in my mind, that Śaṅkara the philosopher did these things, there is evidence that a tradition enshrining the tenets of Advaita did exist in those days, whoever was actually responsible (if indeed it was any one person) for establishing these organizational accompaniments. And it is evident that a line (*paramparā*) of *guru*-pupil relationships extends from Śaṅkara the philosopher through many centuries of instruction.

However, the Fundamental Insights of Advaita are clearly not Śaṅkara's invention, as he himself insists. They go back to time immemorial, probably at least to the period of the

Upaniṣads, nowadays dated by scholars as stemming from the early part of the first millennium BC. The oldest *Upaniṣads* make pronouncements which Advaita philosophers interpret as enunciating their Fundamental Insight. While other schools of Vedānta question that interpretation, it seems reasonably clear that the following characterization of the Advaita interpretation is known to some writers by the beginning of the Christian era, if not well before.

Advaitins, whatever else they believe, are committed to the following four propositions, which I shall take as the Fundamental Insights of Advaita. First, there is only one Reality (*sat*), which they call *brahman*, and it is unchanging, undifferentiated, free from any distinctions which might separate It from another Real—since there is no other Real. Secondly, this Reality, *brahman*, is pure consciousness (*cit*), the real Self. Thirdly, the differences that we observe and conceive as distinguishing things, persons, etc. from others are imposed upon our consciousness by or through a power called *avidyā* or *māyā*. Both the power and its apparent products are not real. Fourthly, it is the removal of this *avidyā* (literally, ‘lack of understanding’; popularly translated ‘ignorance’) through self-knowledge that constitutes liberation, the supreme purpose of sentient beings, and this liberation is bliss (*ānanda*).

The basic terminology in which these propositions are couched is in place at the time of the *Upaniṣads*. The so-called ‘great sentences’ (*mahāvākya*) of Advaita are Upaniṣadic utterances which enunciate one or another aspect of the propositions just summarized. For example, ‘That art thou’ (*tat tvam asi*) enunciates the second (the identification of *brahman* with *ātman*), while ‘*satyam anantaṃ brahma*’ expounds the first point, that *brahman* is Real, as well as implying the third and fourth points, that differences (which have an end) are due to that *avidyā*, whose removal unveils the pure endless *brahman* (whose unveiling amounts to the realization of the bliss of liberation).

Whether the Advaita propositions represent the correct interpretation of the message of the *Upaniṣads* is of course a much-debated point over which the various Vedāntic philosophies diverge. The very term 'Vedānta' means the concluding portions of the *Vedas*, i.e. the *Upaniṣads*. Every Vedāntist, in the proper sense of the term at least, is engaged in exegesis of the *Upaniṣads*' message. Vedānta is sometimes termed 'Uttaramīmāṃsā', that is, the later exegesis, for that reason. Like the Pūrvamīmāṃsā on earlier exegesis, Vedāntins apply principles of exegetical interpretation to *Śruti*, that is, the Vedic scriptural literature. This process of exegesis has been going on ever since the time the *Upaniṣads* were enunciated (Mīmāṃsakas and Vedāntins deny it was ever composed). By a time shortly after the first century AD we know of writers by name, whose works are now lost, who developed an interpretation of the *Upaniṣads* featuring the propositions which make up the Advaitin's Fundamental Insight.

The earliest extant document which clearly expounds Advaita tenets is attributed to Gauḍapāda, a personage whom Śāṅkara twice refers to as his teacher's teacher. Gauḍapāda's *Kārikās* on the *Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣad* develop the Advaita Fundamental Insight, though not without some puzzling features, one of the most notorious being the extensive use of Buddhist terminology in the fourth and final chapter of the work. It is, I believe, appropriate to consider Gauḍapāda's *Kārikās* as the first known work in stage two, the development stage of Advaita. It is clear that Gauḍapāda didn't discover Advaita. He considers himself to be expounding the doctrine of the *Upaniṣads*, and we hear elsewhere of Advaitins prior to Gauḍapāda. The Buddhistic nature of the latter portion of his work might be considered as pertinent to one of the features I have associated with this stage, namely, the attempt to legitimize. It is possible, that is, that Gauḍapāda is addressing an audience of Buddhists or of those influenced by Buddhism, and the use of Buddhist terminology may be calculated to indicate continuity of Advaita with Buddhist ways of thinking. The *Kārikās* display

the other marks of stage two to which I alluded; it is unsystematic in style, disinterested in internal varieties of Advaita thought and yet not excessively polemical. There is in it a spirit of leading the listener or the reader on from his acceptance of more general notions—the Buddhist ones mentioned, and in the earlier portion of the work, some very ancient and somewhat mysterious technical terms for various aspects of the cosmos. And there is no attempt to develop new categories or distinctions. Gauḍapāda's purpose is to convince, not to defend or systematize.

A large problem in assessing Śaṅkara's own place in his system is created by the difficulty of identifying his authentic writings. Recent scholarship, by Paul Hacker and Sengaku Mayeda in particular, has suggested that only a small number of the hundreds of works ascribed by tradition to Śaṅkara were in actuality composed by the same person. The paradigmatic work, by definition that of the philosopher Śaṅkara, is the *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya*, a commentary on the *Brahma Sūtras* which are themselves a condensation of the Upaniṣadic teachings the authority of which is claimed by each of the several Vedāntic schools. Hacker and Mayeda's work strongly suggests that Śaṅkara wrote a few commentaries on the older *Upaniṣads* and probably portions of a treatise entitled *Upadeśasāhasrī*, 'a thousand teachings'.

Confining ourselves to these authentic works, we can find various features of Śaṅkara's work which indicate his role as a developer of the school. We find there various strategies for linking Advaita with traditional elements, strategies which add up to a penchant for legitimization. First and foremost, Śaṅkara is a Mīmāṃsaka. His concern is to interpret the scriptural texts so as to reflect the Fundamental Insight of Advaita. In doing this, he utilizes the exegetical rules developed by Pūrvamīmāṃsā. Though his main themes—repeated almost obsessively throughout his writings—is to urge that the *karmakāṇḍa*, the section of scripture enjoining actions, and the *jñānakāṇḍa*, the section providing knowledge are actually aimed at

different audiences, he is in no way a radical as far as his attitude toward scriptural authority goes. His position is that the Advaitin insights are precisely those that the *Upaniṣads* express.

In other ways Śāṅkara is also a legitimizer, not an innovator. At the opening of the *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya*, as has been noticed by many scholars, Śāṅkara begins by contrasting the self and the not-self in a way which is reminiscent of Sāṃkhya. When he talks of causality it is in terms of *pariṇāma* or transformation, a technical Sāṃkhya term describing how the basic stuff of the universe, *prakṛti*, transforms itself into the mental and material evolutes which constitute the Sāṃkhya scheme of categories. And in so far as he talks at all about mundane matters having to do with the makeup of the empirical world, his language is largely borrowed from Sāṃkhya, a habit adopted in turn by practically all Advaitins from his time forward. It is only gradually that he shows us the vast gulf that actually separates Advaita from Sāṃkhya.

Another aspect of his conservatism concerns his attitude toward the nature of the *saṃnyāsin*, or the renunciate. Hindu tradition identifies the *saṃnyāsin* as the fourth of four stages of an ideal life, the stage following studentship, householdership and retirement to the forest. In that fourth state the ideal man is held by tradition to turn his thoughts to liberation and to abandon all his belongings (except those required for modesty and cleanliness) as a symbol of his non-attachment to desires. The *saṃnyāsin* is the holy man, the wandering mendicant still found in the Indian countryside today. The traditional notion of this holy man is that he is seeking liberation by combining desireless action with study and meditation. Śāṅkara's position, which he forcefully argues is a direct corollary of Advaita tenets, is that it is impossible to combine action with knowledge. If one acts, one cannot know, and if one knows, one cannot act. Therefore, the traditional way of understanding the holy man is antithetical to Śāṅkara's understanding of Advaita. Still, Śāṅkara does not straight-forwardly

challenge the traditional notion of *saṁnyāsa*. Instead, he reinterprets *saṁnyāsa* as the stage of self-knowledge, which for him is identical with liberation-while-living or *jīvanmukti*. He finds a different classification of stages of life in the *Chāndogya Upaniṣad*, one which suits his understanding better. According to it, there are four ways of life conducive to merit, the first involving sacrifice, study and charity, the second requiring asceticism, the third consisting of commitment to a teacher, and the fourth described as being 'fixed in *brahman*' (*brahmasaṁstha*) and reaching 'immortality' (*amṛtatva*). Śaṅkara, in his commentary on the *Chāndogya*, interprets the first as the householder, the second as the wandering mendicant or holy man, the third as the lifelong student, and the final one as the liberated person. In all the first three, renunciation of one sort or another is to be practised; so in different ways those three are *saṁnyāsa*. The final stage, however, since it precludes acting, is not a stage of renunciation at all. This position of Śaṅkara's is a very radical one: even Maṇḍana Mīśra, the other great Advaitin of Śaṅkara's time, does not go so far. Despite the extreme nature of Śaṅkara's interpretation, however, he only reverts to it when he has to, e.g. when commenting on passages like the *Chāndogya* passage where the text itself clearly favours his account, or when resolving difficult points, such as in his commentary on the *Bhagavad Gītā* passage where Arjuna asks: 'You recommend both renunciation and activity. Tell me for sure which of these is the better way.' (*Samnyāsam karmaṇam kṛṣṇa punar yogam ca śaṁsasi. Yac chreya etayor ekam tan me brūhi suniścitam.*) Śaṅkara utilizes his extreme doctrine to resolve the puzzle by interpreting Kṛṣṇa's answer (that action is better, so fight!) as addressed only to non-knowers.

Śaṅkara's reputation over the centuries has been so powerful that it has over-shadowed another equally important figure in the development stage of Advaita, Maṇḍana Mīśra. Maṇḍana is probably an elder contemporary of Śaṅkara's (and probably not identical with Śaṅkara's pupil Sureśvara, despite Advaita tradition). Maṇḍana started out as a Pūrva Mīmāṃsaka, and

only wrote one treatise that we know of on Advaita. But the *Brahma-siddhi* is an extremely important work, anticipating as it does some of the most notable tendencies in the later polemical and systematic stages. It is a difficult work, and one which only scholars are likely to warm to. But it too has elements of compromise: long sections on Pūrvamīmāṃsā rules of exegesis and a remarkable passage in which Maṇḍana propounds the doctrine of *śabdabrahman*, of *brahman* as Language, a view most notably associated with Bharṭṛhari and the Vyākaraṇa of the grammarian philosophical school.

Maṇḍana's style compares favourably with that of the best Mīmāṃsā and Nyāya works of his time, and is in a certain sense somewhat systematic; Śāṅkara's style is commentarial and thus unsystematic; even the *Upadeśa-sāhasrī* is written as a charming set of dialogues between teacher and pupil.

In philosophical works of classical Indian philosophy there is a regular use of a form of presentation in which an opponent, called a *pūrvapakṣin*, is answered by the proponent or author, called the *siddhāntin*. In the development stage one regularly finds no identification of who the *pūrvapakṣin* in a given argument is, certainly not by name, and most frequently not by title either. One has to guess whether the opponent being presented is a Naiyāyika, a Mīmāṃsaka, a Sāṃkhya or a member of some other school. This reinforces the continuity between Advaita and other schools, since it provides an opportunity to show an alleged natural development from the opponent's position to that of the proponent. But it also allows for another typical feature of the development stage, an indifference to internal variation within the school. Śāṅkara, for example, considers several opponents to his main thesis that action and knowledge are incompatible. These *pūrvapakṣins* would appear to be various sorts of Mīmāṃsakas, various sorts of Vedāntins of the sort traditionally called '*bhedābhedavādins*', and proponents of a third view, titled by commentators as '*Prasamkhyānavāda*'. The position of this last theory is that in liberation one must still at least practise meditation, and it

turns out to be a view that Maṇḍana espouses. Thus Śaṅkara appears to be alluding to Maṇḍana or Maṇḍana's type of view among his opponents. Maṇḍana likewise alludes to views of Śaṅkara's sort in his work, again avoiding any explicit identification of the source of that view.

Still another illustration of this feature of indifference to internal variation can be found in Śaṅkara's use of variety of analogies, the logic of each of which would, if followed out strictly, take the Advaita in different directions. Śaṅkara is not bothered by this. Later on, in post Śaṅkara Advaita, one subschool of Advaita fastens on one type of analogy, another on a different one, as we shall see.

The fourth feature of the development stage was that of the standpoint adopted by the author toward his audience. Śaṅkara clearly takes a position of specialist addressing non-specialists—pupils and others—who are nevertheless insiders. They see, or can be made to recall, the Advaita insight, and so it is a matter of leading them on from what they accept to what they have forgotten but really knew before. So definitions, where offered at all, are provided merely in the spirit of demarcations, that is, giving just enough of the characteristic marks of a kind of thing to enable the hearer to recognize it and to distinguish it from whatever is, in the context, apt to be confused with it. Arguments, in Śaṅkara, are likewise offered for edification only: though there are polemical passages, they are always in the service of a larger cause. Though less true for Maṇḍana, who has lengthy passages which are overtly polemical, Śaṅkara's way is taken up by his pupils and the later members of the development stage.

Finally, fifthly, the entire exercise is practical for Śaṅkara. It is as if he were saying to his audience, 'We are all aiming at the same end, but perhaps we are at different junctures along the way. So here is what may help you with your particular hangup.' Thus the meaning of the expositions offered by writers of this stage are best analysed in pragmatic terms, perhaps in terms of their functions as speech-acts. Śaṅkara is not really much

interested in the classical topics of Indian philosophy—the sources of knowledge, the problem of universals, even the nature of difference—for their own sake. He takes them up more or less in passing, in order to clear them out of the way, as if they were generically likely to distract the audience from the main pursuit, the gain of self-knowledge. (This feature is just not true for Maṇḍana, who in many ways, most notably this one, looks forward to the future stages.)

Śaṅkara had at least two pupils who wrote Advaita treatises, named Padmapāda and Sureśvara. In different ways, we already begin to see a transition from the development stage features characterizing Śaṅkara's work toward the polemical state to come.

Padmapāda carries forward Maṇḍana's more systematic style. There is greater emphasis in Padmapāda on problem areas of Advaita, e.g. the theory of error, how *avidyā* works, its locus, the implications of the various analogies Śaṅkara used, the nature of perception and the other sources of knowledge or *pramāṇas*. Padmapāda also polemicizes more pointedly and accurately against Buddhists, Mīmāṃsakas and others. His interests do seem to be geared to the standard problems of Indian philosophy. We only have the first portion of what was probably an extended subcommentary on the *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya*. Though Padmapāda is still a developer inasmuch as he is taking his mentor's stances of necessity, if we had more to go on we might grant him a place with Maṇḍana as an avant-garde polemicist.

Sureśvara, by contrast, though he sometimes polemicizes, avoids most of the classical problems of Indian philosophy. He argues mainly with Mīmāṃsā and over the same questions on which Śaṅkara concentrates. He is very clearly continuing the note struck in the *Upadeśasāhasrī*: as Mysore Hiriyanna remarks, the *Upadeśasāhasrī*, Sureśvara's *Naiṣkarmyasiddhi*, and Sureśvara's follower Sarvajñātman's *Samkṣepasāhīraka* make up a related group of texts.

This takes us to the middle of the eighth century AD. A gap now appears, of over a century, during which no works were written of which we have any knowledge. Furthermore, what may seem surprising in hindsight, the other classical schools of Indian philosophy seem not to know of an Advaita school as yet. There is no mention of Śaṅkara, and only an occasional awareness of Maṇḍana. It is only in the tenth century that there is a revival of Advaita, or at least the production of new Advaita treatises, and the school begins to be recognized by other philosophers.

Five major works of the tenth century should be mentioned briefly. Two are important commentaries, the titles of which became the names of the two major subschools of post-Śaṅkara Advaita. One of these is by Vācaspati Miśra, a commentary on the *Brahma Sūtra Bhāṣya* named after his wife, *Bhāmatī*. The *Bhāmatī* school of Advaita becomes one of the major subschools in later years. The other commentary is by Prakāśātman; it is called *Vivarāṇa* and is a commentary on Padmapāda's *Pañcapādikā*. There are attempts by subsequent scholars in the tradition, right up to the present, to classify each subsequent writer on Advaita into either the *Bhāmatī* or the *Vivarāṇa* tradition.

The other three works of the tenth century deserving notice are independent treatises—i.e., not commentaries. I have already mentioned Sarvajñātman's *Samkṣepasārīraka*, which continues the type of development found in Sureśvara and in Śaṅkara himself. A little-known work called *Tattvaśuddhi*, by Jñānaghana, seems—on the basis of references to it by others—to develop the line of Maṇḍana and perhaps Padmapāda. Most interesting of the three, perhaps, is the *Iṣṭasiddhi* by Vimuktātman, a treatise on epistemology dedicated to exploring and vindicating the theory of *māyā* by positive argument. Topics treated here include; the *pramāṇas* and the doctrine of the intrinsic validity of knowledge; the degrees of truth and/or being; the theory that the empirical and dream worlds have an ontological status which is neither real nor

unreal, and so is technically labelled *anirvacanīya*; the critique of difference as necessarily not real; the existence of the external world; the positive rather than negative nature of *avidyā*; theories of error; how *avidyā* can be removed. These topics are ones more or less ignored by Śāṅkara himself; they become the major preoccupation of later post-Śāṅkara Advaitins.

The next important text in the Advaita literature ushers us directly and totally into the polemical stage. This is probably the most celebrated (dialectical treatise in Hindu philosophy, Śrīharṣa's *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, dating from the twelfth century. Śrīharṣa identifies his opponent very clearly; it is the Nyāya, and most notably the great Udayana, a pivotal figure in the history of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school. Apparently Udayana had criticized Śrīharṣa's father; and so this work was written by way of revenge. It is self-consciously patterned after the arguments of Nāgārjuna, one of the greatest names in Buddhist philosophy, whose method consisted in showing up the pretensions of all positive philosophical systems by a negative dialectical method. While other Hindu philosophers had criticized Nāgārjuna as being a *vaitanḍika*, a wrangling sophist who argues merely for the purpose of victory, having no positive theses to put forward in place of those he refutes, Śrīharṣa extols the method of *vitandā*, holding in a similar vein with Nāgārjuna that removal of the veil of *avidyā* from the pure consciousness that is *brahman* requires a negative method. As a result, Śrīharṣa takes up practically every Nyāya tenet of any consequence and subjects it to extensive criticism, mainly of the *reductio ad absurdum* variety.

Śrīharṣa's work is one of three recognized widely by Advaitins and Advaita scholars as the triumphant masterpieces of Advaita polemical literature. The other two are the *Tattvaprakāśikā* of Citsukha (fourteenth century), popularly known as *Citsukhī*, and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's (sixteenth century) *Advaitasiddhi*. While Citsukha and Madhusūdana are not as exclusively negative in their polemics as Śrīharṣa, it is clear that the major sections of their works are devoted exclusively to refutations.

Citsukha, like Śrīharṣa, takes as his prime opponent the Naiyāyikas, while Madhusūdana is answering a direct challenge by a polemical Dvaita Vedāntin, Vyāsarāja. The three works here cited are only the most famous of a genre which comprises many other treatises.

These three works, and the others like them, have a style that is determined in the main by the arguments of their opponents. This is most true of the *Khaṇḍanakhaṇḍakhādyā*, which is confessedly exhaustively polemical. Here the topics treated are in the main Nyāya topics, only tangentially Advaitin, and the arguments are connected and organized by the logic that the Naiyāyikas accept rather than by any Advaita concerns. By contrast, Citsukha's and Madhusūdana's treatises provide a combination of Advaita exposition with polemics. Their organization, too, reflects Advaita priorities. Nevertheless, the style is unsystematic in the sense that there is no attempt to organize either Advaita tenets, or those of the opposition, according to an interconnected set of rubrics or definitions or even arguments. The style runs from one thing to another as the author happens to think of them.

A second point about polemical stage works. Whereas in the development stage the continuities with other doctrine and arguments was emphasized where possible, the polemical writers emphasize the *contrasts* between Advaita and the other *darśanas*. The purpose is no longer, as Śaṅkara's was, to justify the Fundamental Insight. Rather, these writers are defending that Insight indirectly by parrying every objection posed to Advaita by its most intelligent opponents. That these opponents are intelligent is made evident by picking arguments which relate to the most abstruse aspects of Advaita thought, such as those developed by Maṇḍana, Padmapāda, in the *Bhāmatī* and *Vivaraṇa* literature, and in works such as we saw the *Iṣṭasiddhi* to be, where technical concepts and problems were gloried in. There is very little common ground admitted with any opponent.

The style used is still that of *pūrvapakṣa* and *siddhānta*, a sort of dialogue, but now there is more willingness to identify the opponents by name or by school, so that the contrast with Advaita positions will be the more evident. Concomitant with this admission of the identity of other schools and authors, there is a recognition shown of the varieties of views comprehensible within one's own position, a willingness to allow diversity within Advaita. Especially in the *Advaitasiddhi* we find references to various views in past Advaita literature. To a lesser extent this occurs as well in *Citsukhī*. Other works of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries also show this feature, for example, Madhusūdana's *Siddhāntabindu* and Appayya Dīkṣita's *Siddhāntaleśasamgraha*. It is from works such as these that scholars can best guess at the way in which an Advaitin of that period and the preceding several centuries may have viewed his own school. The emphasis, then, in works of this stage is on a show of scholarship. But there is no eclecticism, Advaita *per se* is defended, the particular version being that deemed most effective in meeting the positions of the opponents.

Whereas the style of the works of the previous stage was didactic, addressed to those within the fold, the works of the polemical stage are scholastic. They address both opponents and *aficionados*, but not pupils. Authors expend much effort in developing many arguments to make the same point. The emphasis is on the arguments. But the arguments are not for edification only. They are part of the polemics.

Another aspect of this feature is the polemical stage attitude toward definitions. Definitions are offered in the course of argument to meet the challenge posed by an opponent's offering of a definition, or the requesting of one from the Advaitin. Frequently, one will find one party in a discussion in these texts asking the other party for a definition of a term. However, unlike in a Platonic dialogue, where Socrates will explore to what extent the definition is satisfactory, examining not only whether its application fits the definiendum but also

whether the definition's sense—its intension—coincides with that of the definiendum, definitions when offered in Advaita polemics are clearly at the service of arguments. They are not themselves arguments, but merely serve as springboards for argument. Śrīharṣa, as a matter of fact, takes an extreme position against definitions, no doubt motivated by the Naiyāyika's penchant for providing them. He says flatly at one point: 'No definitions are acceptable', meaning that it is impossible to specify a definition which will be entirely satisfactory.

The polemical exercises of this literature are theoretical, not practical. In contrast to Śaṅkara and the writers of the development stage, the polemicists are caught up in the attempt to rationalize the system, especially its putatively vulnerable aspects, and to show Advaita's superiority in explaining those topics that every *darśana* is expected to address. Though liberation, and the progress toward it, are not altogether forgotten, the action is elsewhere.

During the period from the twelfth through to the seventeenth centuries, while polemics were dominating the Advaita scene, and while commentaries of the development stage continued to be composed, there is another type of literature which begins to become more frequently assayed. That is the handbook, the succinct introduction of Advaita. I believe this type of literature provides a transition from the third, or polemical stage, to the fourth, or systematic stage, by habituating Advaita writers to the charms of brevity in exposition and thus, perhaps inadvertently, forcing them to pay attention to the problem of finding an economical method of presenting the Fundamental Insight and its most important corollaries within brief compass.

Probably the three most famous handbooks produced in this period are the *Pañcadaśī* of Vidyāraṇya (fourteenth century), the *Vedāntasāra* of Sadānanda (sixteenth century), and Dharmarāja's *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* (seventeenth century). As we shall see, the last of these is a lot more than merely a handbook: in fact, I shall argue, it is the most important, possibly

the only, developed treatise of the systematic stage in Advaita. But it, and the other two, are handbooks which are regularly read first by those uninitiated in Advaita views.

The *Pañcadaśī* is organized into three chapters: the first on Reality (*sat*), the second on consciousness (*cit*), and the third on bliss (*ānanda*). Its approach expounds the Fundamental Insights with little detail about the categories of the later polemical stage. Where such matters are broached, there is only brief discussion and what there is is carried on mainly through metaphors.

The *Vedāntasāra* is even briefer, and it is not at all concerned with the categories and problems of the polemical stage. It is a piece typical of the commonest Advaita genre, repeated over and over by countless authors, many unidentified. A large number of these brief works have been attributed to Śaṅkara (e.g., the *ātmabodha*, the *Vivekacūḍāmaṇi*), though there is no firm evidence to suggest he wrote any and internal stylistic evidence to suggest he did not.

Which brings us, then, to the fourth stage, of system. As I mentioned, I know of only one work which clearly stems from this stage, and that is the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* of Dharmarāja. This is a handbook of a quite different sort. Unlike all previous Advaita works, it has a style that is neither expository and commentarial nor polemical and historical. Rather, Dharmarāja's style features *interconnected definitions*. The organization of the work is dictated essentially by the nature of such a system. Its logic, its primitive terms, determines which concepts will be explained first, which later, and this is a choice made by the system's creator. Polemics, where they are indulged in, arise from the system rather than *vice versa*, as was the case in the preceding stage.

Both the Fundamental Insight and the polemical categories are expounded in Dharmarāja system. By this time it is not necessary to legitimize the school: it is entirely confident of its superiority. Nor is it now necessary any longer to develop many arguments to refute the opponent. Arguments are provided

only where it is helpful to compare or contrast an Advaita notion with those of others in order to explicate the notion being explained. The difference between a systematic treatise, like Dharmarāja's and the handbooks such as *Pañcadaśī* and *Vedāntasāra* is that the systematic treatise not only serves to introduce neophytes to the Fundamental Insight but it also systematizes the categories in a way which will stand up in the future as a monument to the worth of the school's views, as well as a challenge to any rivals who will have to refute not merely a few arguments but the entire interconnected set of definitions in order to remove Advaita from the scene.

The use of the dialogue (*pūrvapakṣa/siddhānta*) style is made subservient here to the definitions themselves. The *pūrvapakṣin* is one who finds fault with a definition offered by the *siddhāntin*. He alleges that the proffered definition over-extends (*ativyāpti*) to things other than the definiendum, or under-extends (*avyāpti*) by failing to encompass a part of the definiendum. His complaints are used either as a foil to point out the merits of the definition, or as an occasion to improve the definition through added qualifications. A measure of the confidence with which Dharmarāja operates is that he is willing to admit a fault in a definition. A *prima facie* defect in a definition causes no demerit, provided the fault is reparable through qualification. This attitude contrasts sharply with that of say, Śrīharṣa, in whose exposition no fault will be allowed at all, all faults being found in the opponent's definitions, and ones own position being ultimately safeguarded by disallowing its dependence on any definitions whatsoever.

In the development stage internal variations within the Advaita school were ignored or intentionally overlooked, and in the polemical stage they were subsequently noticed and accepted. In the systematic stage, Dharmarāja shows no concern for internal variations, though occasionally he will indicate alternative definitions to encompass cases where genuine and important internal disagreements are known to him. But these constitute only a kind of aside: the emphasis is rather on the

extent to which the system adjudicates between successful understandings and less successful ones, in the light of the overall adequacy, accuracy, and economy of the system.

Dharmarāja's standpoint combines the scholastic and the specialist in the systematizer. Definitions are central. They are not merely demarcative, though they are certainly that too. The approach, in fact, is that found in the sophisticated treatment of things by *Navya-Nyāya*, and indeed, Dharmarāja's training was in *Navya-Nyāya* and he wrote some treatises explicating that school's doctrines. Dharmarāja addresses himself to the smart student who knows some logic of the sort he might have learned from a Naiyāyika.

The exercise is certainly not practical. It is rather super-theoretical. The progress from insight to further and further rationalization, a process informing the history of the school throughout its various stages, reaches its pinnacle here.

I know of no other systematic work like Dharmarāja's in Advaita though the *Bhāṣāpariccheda* and *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* occupy a similar position in Nyāya. Advaita literature from the seventeenth century to the present, although vast, is with little exception a non-systematic literature. Writers return to rehearse over and over the Fundamental Insights, and with little imagination. Toward the end of the nineteenth century we have a recurrence of the scholastic touch, but it is essentially at the hands of pandits responding to a surge of interest in tradition as India comes face to face with western thought, the presence of British academics and scholars (followed by others from the European continent).

What happened? Why did Dharmarāja's work suddenly (apparently) terminate the systematic development of Advaita? Here are some possible answers, and some problems with each answer.

1. 'Dharmarāja was a Naiyāyika as much as an Advaitin. His *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* may have been a kind of *tour de force* emanating from a "foreign" source, viz., Nyāya. This was

recognized, and Dharmarāja was not emulated. Writers returned to the basics.' The trouble with this explanation of the Advaita decline is that Dharmarāja was hardly rejected by posterity: his is one of the most popular and frequently used handbooks.

2. 'Dharmarāja was so successful that nothing was left to be done. The critics were silenced. Writers returned to simple expositions of the truth, realizing that nothing more needs to be done along systematic lines.' The trouble with this is that if it were correct, Dharmarāja's stature among Advaitins ought to be much higher than it in fact is. The fact is that among modern Advaitins of a scholarly bent it is Citsukha and Madhusūdāna who were regularly held up as the paragons of post-Śāṅkara Advaita scholasticism, not Dharmarāja.
3. 'Advaita scholasticism was merely swallowed up by Nyāya, or more specifically, *Navya-Nyāya*, which was also at the same time invading and permeating not only philosophical schools but a variety of other disciplines such as literary criticism, jurisprudence and grammar.' Though this explanation may have some merit, the lack of any other work to achieve anything like the systematic stature of Dharmarāja's gives one pause for thought.
4. 'Systematization is regularly followed by a paradigm shift, as Thomas Kuhn calls it. This is a sort of historical law. Here the shift was from intellectualism of the Advaita sort to devotionism, a shift which can also be seen in the history of Nyāya in this period in Bengal, where logicians and dialecticians "got religious" and embraced Bengal *Vaiṣṇavism*, for example.' There is probably something in this answer; it certainly seems that devotionism is increasingly explicit as we come toward the present in all the philosophical schools.
5. 'The original premiss is incorrect. There *are* other systematic works like Dharmarāja's—it's just that we haven't found them yet, or at least if they've been discovered they haven't

been properly noticed.' This is possible, though not terribly likely, it seems to me. It is clear that there are a very large number of Advaita works still in manuscript form, unpublished, and certainly unstudied. Whether they are unnoticed is less clear. Currently, there is a research project in progress geared to photographing every known *Advaita* work in manuscript form. When this project is complete, it will be possible to assess the extent to which this answer is feasible.

6. 'As is usual, the development of Dharmarāja's systematic work should be sought in the commentarial literature.' The trouble is that there are not a great many commentaries on the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*.
7. 'Advaita died, for other reasons, and was only resurrected in the nineteenth century because it most closely resembled the reigning Western doctrine, namely, absolute idealism.' There is probably some truth in this: certainly, the inordinate attention paid to Advaita by British and European scholars who considered it the most advanced philosophy in India derived in part from their belief that Hegel and Bradley represented the pinnacle of achievement in philosophy generally.
8. 'We are victimized by a foreshortened historical perspective. Development of systematic *Advaita* is going on, but (a) the time between one giant—like a Maṇḍana or a Dharmarāja—and the next one can be several centuries, so we need not expect to have another Advaita giant in the time since Dharmarāja (although one may soon appear); (b) We may have had some giants without recognizing them. Philosophers are frequently only discovered posthumously.' However, between Maṇḍana and (say) Vimuktātman, two and a half centuries later, there was little Advaita literature at all, whereas since Dharmarāja there has been a great deal, so that if a giant is sleeping there, we should be able to wake him.

9. 'Systematizing is an unimportant task, or at least unrecognized, and hard at that. No one wanted to make the effort it takes to construct new and more complex systems. And it didn't matter. It is the Fundamental Insight that counts. Systems are frills.' That is a standard anti-intellectual response, and there is no brief answer to it that can be calculated to convince or even satisfy the sceptic. One must show that the system—or at least some kinds of system—necessarily satisfies worthwhile goals, worthwhile even for the sceptical anti-intellectual.

KARL POTTER

Comments

V. VENKATACHALAM

I first take up Professor Potter's basic concept of five stages for in-depth scrutiny. The five stages of development of philosophical schools—European or Indian—posed by Potter may be summarized as follows:

1. The *Discovery* stage, where a single great individual visualizes the fundamental insight or insights which eventually go to make the future school.
2. The *Development* stage, where the school is apparently in the making. Professor Potter has spoken of five special characteristics of this stage: (i) attempt to legitimize; (ii) unsystematic style (in India, style of writing commentaries); (iii) no effort towards internal variations and very little of polemics, as it is likely to hamper the force of the exposition; (iv) attitude of a specialist (teacher) addressing non-specialists (pupils); (v) stress on practice as opposed to mere theory.
3. The *Polemical stage*, also marked by five features, which are similar in some respects to those of the Development stage

but have some sharp dissimilarities: (i) a concerted effort to defend (in place of legitimizing) the standpoint of the opponents of the Fundamental Insights and to uphold their superiority; (ii) in point of style, emphasis shifts from exposition to finding new distinctions or categories or clarifying them with a clear orientation towards meeting the arguments of the opponents; (iii) clear awareness as a school, taking advantage of internal variations and flexibility of doctrines; (iv) attitude of a debater addressing an opponent, in place of the attitude of a teacher and pupil; (v) stress reversed from the practical to the theoretical.

4. The *Systematic* stage. This stage too has five features, like the two previous stages, and most of them concern the same points: (i) the effort is not to legitimize or to defend but to seek justification of another sort, to protect it from being overthrown by new insights; (ii) the style is not expository or polemical, but systematic, showing interconnectedness of definitions; (iii) though the approach has an appearance of polemics, it is made subservient to clarification and explanation; (iv) the attitude is not that of teacher to pupil or debater to opponent, but of scholastic systematizer; (v) in terms of practice versus theory, it is 'super-theoretical, not pragmatic'. But it is also possible to argue differently, in which case, it would be super-theoretical *and* super-pragmatic.
5. The stage of *Decline*. This is the period between systematization and termination, which may be caused by one or more of the following four factors: (i) overthrow by a new Fundamental Insight; (ii) decline of people's interest; (iii) suppression by force; (iv) merger with another school and consequent loss of identity. During this period no original or significant contribution is made.

I have made this summary somewhat long, so that nothing of consequence is omitted. I have also tried to put it in the author's own words, as far as possible, so that the hypothesis

is faithfully projected without overplaying or underplaying anything. In this I have tried to emulate the example of our illustrious *śāstra-kāras*, who are, by and large, scrupulously fair in presenting the strong points of the *pūrvapakṣa* and do full justice to the opponent's point of view before exposing its weaknesses or hollowness from the standpoint of the *siddhānta*.

I shall now proceed to examine, first, how far the basic hypothesis of a five-stage development for philosophical schools is itself logically sound, and second, how far this five-stage hypothesis holds good in the case of Advaita Vedānta, which has been singled out by Professor Potter as a particularly apt illustration for his hypothesis.

Taking the hypothesis first, the one glaring thing that struck my attention on a close perusal of the presentation of his hypothesis by Professor Potter is that he himself is not quite sure of the need for the five stages he advocates.

The following statements made by Professor Potter, read with my comments thereon, will clearly bear this out:

1. The very opening sentence of his article, in which he spells out the final upshot of his hypothesis, highlights this uncertainty. He speaks here of a regular pattern of 'five *major* [*sic*, emphasis mine] phases'. Does this not imply that he admits the possibility of some more stages, though they may be minor? If he concedes that there are, or can be, more minor stages, in addition to the five stages he has posited, what happens to his hypothesis of five stages of rise and fall, which he is at great pains to propound for all philosophical schools in the European and Asian contexts, with added emphasis in the case of all Indian philosophical schools and which he is anxious to prove with substantial evidence in the case of Advaita Vedānta? Furthermore, he has not explained or even dimly hinted anywhere in his article what the minor stage or stages could possibly be and where they could be fitted in his five-stage scheme. This leaves the inevitable impression that, not being sure of his final count of five stages,

he has chosen to take shelter behind the expression 'major phases', employing 'major' as a sort of safety-valve to save his hypothesis, in the event of anyone posing a sixth or even seventh stage. Should anyone succeed in making a reasonable case for an additional stage, he could still save his hypothesis by simply branding it as 'minor'.

2. Apart from this diplomatic use of the epithet 'major' to describe the five stages of his hypothesis, the language Professor Potter uses to spell out his final opinion here also shows the same hesitation, diffidence or even indecision. He speaks of it as 'a pattern which *may be said to have* [emphasis mine] five phases'. Mark his tactful phraseology here too. He is unable to muster the confidence required to say, 'which *has* five phases' or even 'which *may have* five phases', but settles for '*which may be said to have*'. His vacillation about his own five stages is so patent here that there is no need to labour the point any further. It leads to an inescapable feeling that the learned professor has, in his zeal for propounding a novel thesis, hurried it through, without himself making sure of all its details and implications.
3. Here is a third instance—an even more glaring one, at that—of the prevailing uncertainty clouding his exposition of the five stages. Before proceeding to apply his five-stage hypothesis to Advaita Vedānta, he concludes his discussion on Western philosophical schools by 'reiterating and emphasizing' that he holds 'no particular store for these five stages and certainly not for the specific characteristics of each stage' (p. 83). Here is an unequivocal and emphatic statement from the very propounder of the five-stage hypothesis that all the five stages are not obligatory for all philosophical schools, let alone the distinctive characteristics by which they are to be identified and distinguished. What is particularly noteworthy is that, by this declaration, he has not only diluted his five-stage hypothesis, but has sought to *reiterate* and *emphasize* the

dilution of his five stages to anywhere less than five. This obviously implies that he does envisage the possibility of some philosophical schools with only four or three of his stages. Many questions arise here. If Professor Potter does not hold particular store for all his five stages, does he do so for four, three or at least two of these stages? Moreover, if he does hold any store for some of the five stages, what are the stages which could be dispensed with in either of these cases? Professor Potter has not addressed himself to questions such as these. Short of admitting the possibility of schools with less than five stages, he has not drawn the line anywhere to indicate his idea of the minimum number of stages essential to make a philosophical school or what these stages are. It is possible to argue—if only for the sake of the argument—that he has deliberately left such questions unanswered and conveniently allowed it all to remain vague, so that his hypothesis would still be safe, without this or that stage in any particular school or schools. But I shall not make the mistake of casting the slightest aspersion on the sincerity of Professor Potter's effort and the considerable pains he has taken to unfold a new hypothesis. I would rather put it down as the result of unceremonious haste in proposing his hypothesis without applying himself to all its relevant aspects and the issues connected with it.

Since Professor Potter is silent about the minimum number of stages, the only course open to us is to consider the three possible alternatives of four, three and two stages and see how the hypothesis fares in each case.

1. If he would admit the possibility of a philosophical school with only two stages, the stages should obviously be Discovery and Decline. It will then turn out to be a sort of still-born school, discovered only to decline and die! Though such a contingency cannot be summarily ruled out and it may be possible to think of such developments

in the history of Indian philosophy also when an apparently new insight died with its founder, these do not merit any serious attention in a survey of philosophical schools, as such.

2. Assuming that he holds the position that there should be at least three stages, the stages would perforce be Discovery, Development and Decline. The question, then, is: have we to look to a professor of philosophy from the USA to propound a separate hypothesis to say that Indian philosophical schools pass through the three stages of Discovery, Development and Decline? Is it not a simple natural law that anything under the sun is born to grow for a time and decay at last—irrespective of sharply contrasted variations in the period covered by growth and decay, which could, as the poet says, be precious brief with ‘a lily of a day’ or ‘three hundred year’ with an oak?
3. The case for two and three stages having been thus discredited, only the case for a four-stage rise and fall remains. In fact, this appears to be the only logical alternative of less than five stages. And in all probability, Professor Potter had only this in mind, when he wrote about not holding store for all five stages. Here again, the question is, which could be the four stages? I am inclined to think that Professor Potter could have it both ways; namely, the three basic stages mentioned earlier along with the Polemical stage *or* the Systematic stage. Following this line of thinking, it should be possible to locate philosophical schools with only one out of these two stages, Polemical and Systematic.
4. I wish to draw attention to a certain oddity that is inherent in Professor Potter’s treatment of his hypothesis. On the one hand, he is constrained to provide for more than five stages; on the other hand, he admits the possibility of philosophical schools with less than five stages. Placed in such an awkward situation, where he finds it necessary to concede both possibilities, of more than five stages as well as less than five stages, he has to make his hypothesis cut

both ways. He has successfully contrived to do so by the subtle stroke of first calling them 'major' stages and then by affirming that he holds 'no particular store for the five stages'. The moot question is, if he tacitly admits that the stages can be more than five in some cases and less than five in others, where does his five-stage hypothesis stand?

I do not think it proper to justify this vacillating attitude by saying that it is after all a hypothesis and that a little looseness or flexibility partakes of the character of hypotheses. It should be remembered that the five stages form the pivotal point of his hypothesis. Flexibility in a hypothesis ought not to be carried to such an extent that the hypothesis itself collapses. I have already shown that if you make the number of stages flexible and admit less than five stages, nothing is left of it and the hypothesis itself melts into thin air.

There is yet another hazard in letting such basically unacceptable hypotheses pass muster on the score that they are, after all, only hypotheses. Though the authors of such hastily conceived hypotheses propose them with many reservations and do not wish to claim any finality for them, they are often passed off later as their accredited opinions and tend to be taken as proven theories. This is precisely what happened with what Max Mueller first proposed as a mere conjectural hypothesis, as a possible approach to find a date for the *Ṛgveda Samhitā*. He made two purely arbitrary assumptions: that (1) there were four distinct epochs in the evolution of the entire Vedic literature, and that (2) each of these epochs extended up to two hundred years. He then arrived at 1200 BC as the date for the earliest hymns of the *Ṛgveda* by calculating backwards from 500 BC as the time of Buddha. What started in this form as mere speculation came to be quoted by his blind followers as his view and gradually became known as Max Mueller's theory of the date of the *Ṛgveda* and passes off as a theory to this day, in spite of some sane voices like those of Whitney that were raised against making a theory out of what was just a tentative hypothesis.

Such a risk becomes all the greater, when the author of the hypothesis is an eminent person like Professor Max Mueller. One would not be surprised if a similar favourable wind confers on this halting hypothesis of Professor Potter the stature of Potter's theory of five-stage development of Advaita Vedānta, thanks to the high esteem he has already earned, quite deservedly, as the compiler of the *Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies*.

G.C. PANDE

Professor Potter's paper is clearly divisible into two parts. The first part argues that the history of philosophical schools shows a 'regular pattern' of 'five major phases' and looks like a theory of history. The second part deals with Advaita Vedānta and seeks to present a thumbnail sketch of its history as a school. Although the second part looks like an application of the 'model' in the first part, there is a certain hiatus between the two where Professor Potter appears to discount the seriousness of his own model, saying,

I hold no particular store for these five stages, and certainly not for the specific characteristics of each stage that I have distinguished ... The tool I have fashioned here is intended to shed light on Indian philosophy, which is organized in schools to a degree significantly greater than in Western thought. Even so, the purpose is mainly to provide handles on which to hang the names and contributions of a number of Indian writers.

This is modest indeed and should disarm all critics. However, if this is all that Professor Potter means, more than 40 per cent of his paper would be grossly depreciated. No one need dispute a scheme so general that it could be freely modified in different cases.

Any historical presentation today tends to use some kind of general and flexible scheme of presenting the 'development' of its subject. In earlier ages when the concept of 'development' in human society and culture was unknown, history as a story of action tended to adopt the perspective used in more literary narratives or dramatic works. Action begins, moves towards some central climax or crisis and ends in happy resolution or tragic catastrophe. Indian dramaturgists conceived of five *sandhis*, viz., *mukha*, *pratimukha*, *garbha*, *vimarśa* and *nirvahana*, though it was admitted that all dramatic action does not show all the *sandhis*. Modern development theories have appealed to a variety of processes of change ranging from the biological to the logical. The names of Comte and Spencer, Hegel and Marx, Vico and Spengler may be picked up at random to illustrate the variety of development theories over the last two centuries. In India diverse traditions are occasionally conceived as manifesting, growing, declining, disappearing, though they might be revived, re-formed. Usually, however, they are contemplated only in their classic and static forms. It is possibly true that the developmental aspect of philosophy is not a fashionable subject even now among either historians or philosophers, except for those who belong to the 'schools' of Hegel or Marx. Most histories of philosophy are a series of philosophical summaries in chronological order plus some comparisons and biographical material. They could rise to the level of serious history only to the extent they are able to trace the logical development of philosophical ideas and locate them within the larger context of intellectual trends, social attitudes, religious faith and scientific knowledge. The understanding of the logical processes of formulating, discussing and systematizing ideas is doubtless of central importance but it is not a historical necessity that philosophers should always actually follow the path of universally acceptable logic or dialectic. As a result, to understand the history of philosophy one must attend not only to the force of logic but also to that of general circumstances. Philosophy is not merely the expression of the

logical Idea but also of the unpredictable human Spirit. Since philosophical ideas function in a dual context—logical and cultural—it is difficult to discover any simple or common pattern in their history.

Professor Potter suggests that philosophical schools begin with the discovery of one or more Fundamental Insights. This is the first or the Discovery stage. Usually some single, great individual is responsible for it but it may also be the work of many carried on even anonymously over centuries. Realizing that this makes the hypothesis of a recognizably distinct Discovery stage unconvincing, Professor Potter remarks,

Indeed, it is a problem how to distinguish any precise point at which this first stage of discovery should be said to end and the second stage, of development, begin. However, it is of no great importance to find such a precise point; indeed, the stages I am delineating are not so much chronological periods, as they are overlapping tendencies as displayed in the literature of the schools.

This, again, has the effect of putting Professor Potter's hypothesis beyond the pale of criticism. If the phases are merely overlapping tendencies, accepting them could not be objectionable especially when one has the freedom to modify them.

'In the second or Development stage, the Fundamental Insight begins to be set forth in a self-conscious way as doctrine.' This stage is unsystematic and avoids definitions and arguments, but shows an attempt at legitimization and at relating the theoretical aspects of the Fundamental Insight to practical concerns. If the *sūtras* represent the first stage, the commentaries represent the second stage. The third stage is Polemical which is predominantly theoretical and argumentative. The fourth stage is the 'Systematic' stage, the fifth is that of Decline.

It would be obvious that formulation, elaboration, argumentation and systematization are simultaneous tendencies. Professor Potter himself calls them overlapping. Even if it were

argued that the different phases are characterized by the relative predominance of one of these different processes, it is not necessary that such phases must actually be historical and constitute a unique sequence. Professor Potter thus regards the history of Advaita from the *sūtras* to Gauḍapāda as its Discovery stage, from Gauḍapāda to c. AD 1000 as the Development stage, from Śrī Harṣa to c. AD 1600 as the Polemical stage, Dharmarāja as representative of the stage of Systematization, followed since then by the stage of Decline. This is not very different from what is normally accepted—scriptural Vedānta, Pre-Śaṅkara Vedānta, Śaṅkara, Post-Śaṅkara Vedānta. The polemical aspect of Śrī Harṣa, Citsukha and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī is well-recognized. Dharmarāja's VP is used as a standard and introductory text-book, but rarely given the honour which Professor Potter bestows on it. But the *sūtras* themselves could well be described as the final systematization of a long period of anterior formulation, elaboration and argumentation. Bādarāyaṇa's *sūtras*, for example, appear to have been preceded by other similar attempts and debates with rival schools. It could be argued that when new challenges arose the 'system' had to be re-formulated and re-argued, which was done by a series of commentators from Upavarṣa to Śaṅkara. When the Buddhist challenge was replaced by that of the Dualists and a new philosophical idiom came into vogue, the medieval polemic of Advaita was produced. It is not clear why *Vedāntaparibhāṣa* should be regarded as *the* systematization of Advaita Vedānta. It is doubtless a popular and concise text written in an intellectual milieu dominated by Navya-Nyāya but it is distinctly odd to think of it as the last word on Vedānta. Its detailed concern with *pramāṇa*, in fact, makes it an introduction to philosophy from a Vedāntic point of view.

Professor Potter's conception of the ideal state of philosophy seems to be that of a set of interconnected definitions (*vyavasthita lakṣaṇāvalī*) bringing out the implications of certain primitive terms and propositions (*mūla-padār-thānvīkṣā*). But this conception is too formalistic to account for the vitality

or felt significance of philosophy. It is difficult to think of actual historical schools of philosophy as simply deductive systems in the making since their insights and their assessment of reasons function within a context of cultural attitudes. This is implicit in the traditional conception of *īkṣa* or *śravaṇa* preceding *anvīkṣā* or *manana*. If a philosophical school perfects a pseudo-formal system, it is likely to be bogged down in formal or logical enquiries in place of substantive philosophical enquiries, which is what appears to have happened to late medieval Indian schools.

Perhaps Professor Potter has been inspired by attempts to build models about the history of science. However, as hardcore science remains closely attached to empirical testability, its history shows marked linearity, despite a certain relevance of the notion of paradigm shift. The history of philosophy, on the other hand, regularly shows numerous alternative ways of thinking in chaotic conflict.

It is not merely that Professor Potter begins with a scheme of the historical development of philosophical schools which is too abstract and general to yield any specific insight into them. His focus of attention in philosophy too tends to be on its formal side so that its cultural context being neglected its history becomes unreal. The emphasis on the institutional aspect of the school is only an identifying device for Professor Potter but it has the unfortunate effect of identifying Advaita with the teachings of the Śāṅkarite monasteries. If *Vedāntaparibhāṣa* represents the climax of Vedānta and these monasteries the Advaitic school, what doubt can there be that the school is dead and fossilized? On Professor Potter's assumptions, his final question is really rhetorical, 'What happened? Why did Dharmarāja's work (apparently) terminate the systematic development of Advaita?'

The *Prasthāna-trayī* and Śāṅkara constitute the major sources of *Advaita* and it is these which continue to be its living roots. The work of monasteries between the fourteenth and seventeenth centuries is coloured by a medieval monastic-scholastic

ethos which is far from Śaṅkara. But *Advaita* is not simply a system of definitions for *śāstrārtha* or the monastically regulated life of *saṁnyāsa*, it is a widely prevalent religious philosophy as well as a philosophical religion. Numerous academic and monastic schools professing it have appeared and disappeared in the course of its history of three millennia. Its fundamental insights are not logically formulated, unambiguous propositions, but foundational intuitions or spiritual vision. Its innovative intellectual expression since the eighteenth century has largely occurred outside the traditional monastic or modern educational institutions. Rammohun Roy and Vivekananda recognized the challenge of new social conditions to Advaita. Ramana Maharshi has historically rediscovered its spirituality. As for what is taught as *Vedānta in the pāṭhaśālās* or colleges, it is professedly the dead learning of the past as understood in the eighteenth century.

Indeed, Professor Potter's question is amazing. He seems oblivious of the obvious fact that the whole of Indian civilization has been declining since the eighteenth century. How could schools of philosophy be an exception? It is not merely *Advaita* but *all traditional schools* of philosophy, education, art, literature and science which have ceased to be areas of creative social interest. During the last two centuries in India there have been many great religious, social and political leaders but the realms of intellectual creativity have been relatively barren. Traditional education was profoundly and adversely altered by its re-organization under the East India Company. Real innovation was discouraged by a new system of examinations, degrees and official recognition, and few ambitious, rebellious or creative minds were attracted to it. The creative rediscovery and progressive interpretation of traditional insights has taken on directions outside the sphere of official or academic recognition. This is true of *Advaita* too which should not be put into the Procrustean bed of monastic schools or scholastic textbooks.

S.L. PANDEY

Dr Potter's synoptic article entitled 'The Development of Advaita Vedānta as a School of Philosophy', in the Radhakrishnan Centenary Volume (edited by G. Parthasarathi and D.P. Chattopadhyaya, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1989), deserves the attention of every student of Advaita Vedānta, coming as it does from the pen of the reputed and dedicated editor of the *Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies*. He has developed there a theory of five stages in the history of every school of philosophy and applied it meticulously to Advaita Vedānta. The stages he sets up are those of Discovery, Development, Polemics, Systematization and Decline. At the first stage there appear certain fundamental insights which are legitimized through commentaries at the second stage. They are further defended by debates with their adversaries at the third stage, after which they are systematized according to logical requirements at the fourth stage, which leads to the decline of the school. The classical Upaniṣads and their pre-Gauḍapāda commentators are placed in the first stage; Gauḍapāda, Maṇḍana, Śaṅkara, Padmapāda, Sureśvara, Vācaspati, Prakāśātmā, Jñānaghana, Sarvajñātma Muni and Vimukātmā in the second stage; Śrī Harṣa, Citsukha and Madhusūdana in the third stage; and Vidyāraṇya, Sadānanda and Dharmarāja, all authors of Vedāntic handbooks, in the fourth stage. Dharmarāja's *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, a manual of a subschool, is disproportionately eulogized as a 'super-theoretical' exercise informing the history of the school throughout its various stages, where the progress from insight, is further and further as rationalization reaches its pinnacle (p. 97). After it Dr Potter sees the end of Advaita Vedānta in the seventeenth century and tries to give reasons why Advaita died after *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*.

The theoretical formulations of Dr Potter, however, are unlikely to be accepted in India, where Advaita Vedānta 'lives on intermittently and is alive today as a school of philosophy'

(p. 71), a description that he himself reserves for Thomism, but fails to see as being also true of Advaita Vedānta. His account, in fact, suffers from many flaws, some of which may be shown here.

First, it is too naive and simplistic, and does not explain the development of a single concept, category, definition or argument that has been advanced throughout the history of Advaita Vedānta. Take for example, the argument for Advaitic Absolutism which is not the same from the Upaniṣadic period to modern times. But not even a mention of it or reference to it is made in his article, to speak nothing of explaining its variation and vindication. Similarly, take the doctrine of *māyā* or *avidyā*. Dr Potter's model fails to account for how this concept originated and developed and how *māyāvāda* was stipulated, supported, opposed and restrengthened through refutations of its refutations. The development of philosophical concepts and arguments does not follow the linear development of the origin, growth and decline of a plant, as their texture is too complex and multilateral to conform to such linearity. Furthermore, Dr Potter's theory does not explain the rise and development of the subschools of Advaita Vedānta like *Bhāmāṭī Prasthāna*, *Vivaraṇa Prasthāna* and *Vārttika Prasthāna*. To take them as merely internal variations at the level of legitimization is simplistic, if not fallacious.

Secondly, Dr Potter's approach is primarily theological. The ascertainment of the fundamental insights from the Upaniṣads, their rational exposition, their critical defence and finally their logical systematization—all these are basically the activities of theologians. But Advaita Vedānta is not theology. Śaṅkara himself has rejected theology in his comments on the first and fourth *Brahmasūtras* and formulated an epoch-making theory that Advaita Vedānta is independent of Pūrvamīmāṃsā, the paragon of all Indian theologies. Post-Śaṅkara Vaiṣṇava theologians disputed with Śaṅkara and his followers over this issue for several centuries. Hence it has become a criterion of demarcation between Advaita Vedānta and other schools of

Vedānta. Dr Potter overlooks this criteriological divide and handles all schools of Vedānta with the same theological brush. Furthermore, Advaita Vedānta is not an attempt *to explain* the insight that Reality is one and without a second, but to *gain* the insight, *to comprehend* the Reality that is one and without a second. It is a philosophical exercise for conceptualization of the Absolute and not a theological exercise for vindication of the Upaniṣadic propositions which are found to be irrelevant by a philosopher who has got even a tentative glimpse of the Absolute. Advaita Vedānta treatises are for *darśana*, *manana* and *nididhyāsana*, like Locke's *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Descartes' *Meditations* or Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*, and not like Paul Tillich's *Biblical Religion and the Search for Ultimate Reality*, Martin Buber's *Prophetic Faith* or Karl Barth's *Evangelical Theology: An Introduction*.

Thirdly, Dr Potter seems to have less than needed awareness of the continued debate between Advaita Vedānta and Navya Nyāya, otherwise he would not have recognized the *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* of Dharmarāja as the most systematic work of Advaita Vedānta, since it has made none too right concessions to Navya Nyāya, as for example, over the interpretation of the statement 'That Thou Art'. It has, therefore, been rejected or ignored by many Advaitins, chief among them being Mahādeva Sarasvatī of the eighteenth century, whose *Tattvānusandhāna* has become more popular than *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* among the seekers after truth, as it has four commentaries in Sanskrit and is one of the earliest works to be translated into Hindi in the early nineteenth century.

Fourthly, Dr Potter's perception that Advaita died after *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* is historically incorrect. He is blissfully ignorant of the Advaitic works of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, such as *Tattvānusandhāna* of Mahādeva Sarasvatī, an important vade-mecum; *Bodhasāra* of Narahari, an encyclopaedia of Advaitic doctrines and disciplines; *Svārājyasiddhi* of Gaṅgādharendra Sarasvatī; *Brahmasūtravṛtti* and *Ātmavidyāvīlāsa* of Sadāśivendra Sarasvatī and many other

prakaraṇa granthas which are already published. Furthermore, he has not noticed the Hindi classics of Niścaladāsa, Vicārasāgara and Vṛtti Prābhākara, written in the mid-nineteenth century and translated into Sanskrit on account of their original contributions to Advaita Vedānta which was fully alive when the Britishers introduced English education in India in the nineteenth century. The Advaitins did not receive any patronage from the British rulers and academicians or Christian missionaries. As a matter of fact, their philosophy was often criticized or even ridiculed in those circles. But truth does not live on patronage or regard. It is self-sufficient and powerful and needs no external stimulus for its survival. Consequently, Advaita Vedānta is recognized as a perennial philosophy in India even today. There has been no question of its death or termination at any time.

Fifthly, Dr Potter does not recognize the *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa as an Advaita Vedānta tract, apparently because it has several non-Advaitic commentaries. But this betrays his bias against Advaita Vedānta. The number of Advaitic commentaries on this work is far greater than all non-Advaitic commentaries put together. Moreover, the growth of non-Advaitic commentaries has not stopped even today and their target is not to refute the formulations of any previous non-Advaitic commentary but those of the commentary of Śaṅkara. This shows that Śaṅkara is still alive or relevant today, whereas his earlier detractors like Rāmānuja, Madhva, Vallabha and Nimbārka are, by and large, dead and irrelevant; they may still be alive and relevant for their followers, undoubtedly, but the point that is to be specially stressed concerns Dr Potter's omission of the *sūtra* literature. He has failed to indicate any *sūtra* manual of Advaita Vedānta. How can a school of Indian philosophy live without a *sūtra* treatise? If *Śārīraka Bhāṣya* is accepted, then the *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa cannot be set aside as non-Advaitic.

Furthermore, no attempt to explain the history of Advaita Vedānta can be credible unless it takes into cognizance its

sūtra and the *bhāṣya*, *vārttika*, *ṭīkā* and *ṭīpannīs* thereon. Dr Potter refers neither to the *sūtra* of Advaita Vedānta nor to its *vārttika*. It is well-known that Śaṅkara wrote commentaries on three *prasthānas*: the *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa (*Nyāya Prasthāna*), the Upaniṣads (*Śruti Prasthāna*) and the *Bhagavadgītā* (*Smṛti Prasthāna*). In the case of *Śruti Prasthāna*, *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, Śaṅkara's commentary and Sureśvara's sub-commentary on it are usually regarded as its *sūtra*, *bhāṣya* and *vārttika*. Similarly, in the case of *Nyāya Prasthāna*, *Brahmasūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa, Śaṅkara's *Śārīraka Bhāṣya* and Sarvajñātma Muni's *Samkṣepa Śārīraka* are regarded as its *sūtra*, *bhāṣya* and *vārttika*. Likewise, in the case of *Smṛti Prasthāna* the *Bhagavadgītā*, Śaṅkara's commentary on it and Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's commentary thereon are regarded as its *sūtra*, *bhāṣya* and *vārttika*. Thus these three original sources of Vedānta are continuing vigorously. Particularly the *Smṛti Prasthāna* of the *Bhagavadgītā* has been pursued more widely during the last three centuries than the other two *prasthānas*. Consequently *Gītā*-literature has become the focus of Advaita Vedāntists. Unfortunately this fact is totally missed by Dr Potter. Lastly, there is the growth of *Prakaraṇa granthas*. Dr Potter has mixed some of them with the literature of *Nyāya prasthāna*. But they can be allied with the literature of *Śruti prasthāna* or *Smṛti prasthāna* also. Or, alternatively, their origin, growth and development can be explained independently of this triple literature. At any rate, Dr Potter's model leaves out a number of Advaita works which do not suit the main purpose of his demonstration, i.e., the legitimatization of Advaita Vedānta by Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara and its termination in the seventeenth century after its systematization in *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*.

Sixth and final, Dr Potter shows his awareness of Thomas Kuhn's historical law of paradigm shift, but he applies it only to the shift of Advaita Vedānta from intellectualism to devotionalism (p. 98). He does not perceive that Kuhn's law provides a better model to explain the entire history of Advaita Vedānta than his own theory, for there are at least five earlier

paradigm shifts determined by the confrontations of Advaita Vedānta first with Mīmāṃsā, second with Sāṃkhya, third with Buddhism, fourth with Vaiṣṇava theologians and fifth with Navya Nyāya. These encounters cannot be brushed aside as mere debates or polemics, for they are essentially accompanied with the strategies of re-systematization and re-organization of the prevailing ideas of Advaita Vedānta. In fact, discussion with opponents and re-systematization of ones own system are simultaneous adventures. Contemporarily this is taking place between Advaita Vedānta and the prevailing systems of Western philosophy. Moreover, paradigm shift is not only conceptual but linguistic also. The shift from Sanskrit to English or from Sanskrit to Hindi does not spell the death of Advaita Vedānta. These conceptual and linguistic shifts indicate that Advaita Vedānta is ever alive and the declaration of its death or termination in the seventeenth century is nonsense. The human urge to be free will always keep Advaita Vedānta alive, for no curtailment of freedom is tolerable for long. Even a few utterances expressing freedom have more worth than a billion of books on its negation.

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RAM MURTI SHARMA

I appreciate the keen interest shown by Professor Karl Potter in his treatment of *The Development of Advaita Vedānta* as a School of Philosophy. In this article the renowned author has made an effort to trace the development of the Vedānta school on the criterion of the external development of the school. Accordingly, his method is to trace the morphology of its development, the original shape of Advaita, for instance, and its developmental positions, numbering them. In numbering the developmental positions such as Fundamental Insights, the

following of these insights by followers of the school and by others, demarcating the position of the school from others' positions, its self awareness as a school and institutional factors are significant. While setting forth the developmental history of Advaita, Professor Potter has exemplified the developmental positions of schools of Western philosophy like Cartesian philosophy and the philosophy of Platonism, Aristotelianism and Thomism. Through this approach Professor Potter reaches the conclusion that Advaita has passed through various stages in its development. For instance, there is the stage of Fundamental Insight discovery, the stage of the *sūtras*, the stage of legitimatization, minimizing the possibility of internal inconsistencies and squabbling, the style of a specialist who addresses mainly his pupils as did, say, Socrates and Plato (*guru-śiṣya paramparā*), and finally an attempt to relate the theoretical aspects of the Fundamental Insights to practical purposes and aims. With regard to the development of Advaita, Professor Potter says that decidedly Śaṅkarācārya is the most famous and powerful philosopher. He says that the school of Vedānta was not known as a school for many centuries. Tracing the historical development of 'Advaita', he says that it was Śaṅkarācārya who developed it into a school. He says that, 'confining ourselves to these authentic works we can find various features in Śaṅkara's work which indicate his role as a developer of the school.' He further says, 'Śaṅkara is also a legitimizer, not an innovator.' In this regard, Professor Potter quotes the opening of the *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya*, which contrasts the self and non-self. This is reminiscent of Sāṅkhya. 'When he (Śaṅkara) talks of causality, it is in terms of 'pariṇāma' or transformation—technical Sāṅkhya term, describing how the basic stuff of the universe, *prakṛti*, transforms itself into the mental and material evolutes which constitute the Sāṅkhya scheme of categories.' Thus, Professor Potter finds a great influence of Sāṅkhya thought and terminology on Vedānta. 'It is only gradually that he (Śaṅkara) shows us the vast gulf that actually separates Advaita from Sāṅkhya.' In

this connection, it may be mentioned that Śāṅkara nowhere indicates his view of causality in terms of *pariṇāma*. He only says that the world is *vivarta*. On the other hand, he refutes the *Pariṇāma* or *Vikāra* theory of Sāṅkhya. To support this view, he may be quoted as follows:

‘न हि परिणामवत्त्व विज्ञानात् परिणामनत्व मात्मनः फलं स्यादिनि वक्तं युक्तम्।’
(*Brahmasūtra, Śāṅkarabhāṣya, 2.1.14*)

Thus, Potter’s statement that Śāṅkara was not an innovator, but only a legitimizer, is wrong because it was he mainly who propounded the doctrine of Advaita on the basis of innovations like *Adhyāsa*, and *Vivarta*. Also, Potter’s statement that Śāṅkara’s beginning of the ‘*Adhyāsabhāṣya*’ by making a distinction between *ātman* and *anātman* is reminiscent of Sāṅkhya is not quite correct. A scholar like Potter should remember the fact that Śāṅkara’s elaboration of *ātman* and *anātman* in the *Adhyāsabhāṣya* is based on *Adhyāsa* and, needless to say, that the *Sāṅkhya-Vādin* is not a believer of *Adhyāsa* at all. Furthermore, Potter’s flat statement that Śāṅkara is a Mīmāṃsaka, is entirely erroneous. To support his statement, he says, ‘He (Śāṅkara) utilizes the exegetical rules developed by Pūrva-mīmāṃsā.’ This is unreasonable, for it is the method of Śāṅkara’s exposition that prior to expounding his own version he exhaustively presents the viewpoint of the *Pūrva-Pakṣin* and it is in this way that the Mīmāṃsā-rules are quoted by him. But this does not make Śāṅkara *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsaka*.

While tracing the history of the development of Advaita, Potter unjustly comments on a prominent pre-Śāṅkara Advaitin, Gauḍapāda, the grandguru of Śāṅkarācārya, when he says, ‘it is clear that Gauḍapāda did not discover Advaita. The Kārikās display the other marks of stage two, to which alluded.’ It is unsystematic in style and disinterested in internal variety of Advaita thought. ‘Gauḍapāda’s purpose is to convince, not to defend or systematize’ (p. 86). On these comments, it may be remarked that it is not proper to say that Gauḍapāda did not discover Advaita as a doctrine. No doubt

there were some *ācāryas* like Bodhāyana and others who spoke from time to time in their commentaries about Advaitic tenets, but it was Gauḍapāda who presented the concept of Advaita on the basis of the tenet of *ajāti*: 'अद्वैतः सर्व भावानां देवस्तुर्यो विभुः स्मृतः' (*Gauḍapāda-Kārikā*, 1.10). On the basis of this concept of the unborn he propounded the eternity of *ātman* and *brahman* and justified the status of the world with the help of his concept of *māyā*. The *jīva*'s existence has been mentioned by him as based on *upādhi*. Hence, it cannot be said that Gauḍapāda did not give a systematic exposition of Advaita or that the *Gauḍapāda-Kārikā* does not take into account the internal variety of Advaita thought as claimed by Potter. The sound scholarship and original as well as systematic expounding of Advaita by Gauḍapādācārya can be further evinced by the following statement of Śāṅkarācārya who very respectfully mentions him (Gauḍapāda), as *Sampra-dāyavit*, a scholar of the Advaitic school: 'अत्रोक्तं सम्प्रदाय विदभिराचार्यैः' (*Brahmasūtra-Śāṅkarabhāṣya*, 2.1.9).

On the style of Śāṅkarācārya, Potter's comment that it is commentarial and thus unsystematic, that even the *Upadeśa-Sāhasrī* is written as a charming set of dialogues between teacher and pupil (p. 89), is not reasonable. It can be said that Professor Potter has not tried to understand the difference between a *bhāṣya* and a commentary. While a *bhāṣya* makes an essay-type exposition of the subject, a commentary highlights in its study some particular terms or words. Had the distinction been clear to Potter, he would not have described Śāṅkara's style as commentarial. The adverse comment on the *Upadeśa-Sāhasrī*'s style is further unreasonable. One must understand that the *Upadeśa-Sāhasrī* is one of the hand-books (*prakaraṇa-granthas*) of Śāṅkarācārya through which he has made the subject easy to understand; the reader is able to grasp the contents easily because it is set forth in a convincing manner. Thus the style of the *Upadeśa-Sāhasrī* is quite natural and appropriate for the purpose for which it is written.

On page 92, Potter writes, 'Topics treated here include the *pramāṇas* and the doctrine of the intrinsic validity of knowledge; the degrees of truth and/or being; the theory that the empirical and dream worlds have an ontological status which is neither real nor unreal, and so is technically labelled *anirvacanīya*; the critique of difference as necessarily not real; the existence of the external world; the positive rather than negative nature of *avidyā*; theories of error; how *avidyā* can be removed. These topics are more or less ignored by Śaṅkara himself; they become the major pre-occupations of later post-Śaṅkara Advaitins.'

Regarding the above, it may be said that the doctrine of the intrinsic validity of knowledge has been treated very well by Śaṅkara in his *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya*: that the supreme knowledge or *Ātmabodha* is the subject of intuition and thus has self-validity. As for the degrees of truth, Śaṅkara does not believe in that doctrine, as there is only one reality, the permanent truth or *Brahman* in his Advaitic philosophy. He defines truth as 'यद्विषया बुद्धिर्न व्यनि चरति तत्सत्' (*Gītā-Bhāṣya*). So far as the question of the phenomenality and illusoriness of the world is concerned, they are not accepted as truth in the philosophy of Śaṅkarācārya. Their existence is merely empirical and illusory respectively. To clear the concept of *vyavahāra* (experience) in his *Adhyāsa-Bhāṣya*, Śaṅkara clearly says that it (worldly experience) is the result of the combination of *satya* and *anṛta* (*Brahmasūtra Śāṅkarabhāṣya*, 1.1.1).

Potter's comment that 'empirical and dream worlds have an ontological status which is neither real nor unreal ... has more or less been ignored by Śaṅkara', also does not seem correct. Śaṅkarācārya in his *Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā Bhāṣya* clearly finds the waking state and the dream state as being similar, and then describes their falsehood, and also propounds their *anirvacanīya* character. He says: 'जाग्रद दृश्यानां भावाना नेतध्या मिति प्रतिज्ञ, दृश्यत्वादिति हेतुः स्वप्नदृश्य भाव वदिति दृष्टान्तः। यथा तत्र स्वपने दृश्यानां भावानां वैतण्यं तथा जागस्तिरेऽपि दृश्यत्वः मिति निगमनम्।' (*Māṇḍūkya-Kārikā Śāṅkarabhāṣya*, 2.4).

To say that Śāṅkara ignores the positive nature of *avidyā* is again groundless, because, in his *Brahmasūtra Bhāṣya* (1-4-3) Śāṅkarācārya clearly says that *avidyā* is the seed power (*Avidyātmikā hi Bījaśaktiḥ*). It is also unreasonable to say that he has ignored the theories of error and the way of removing *avidyā*. It is in the *Adhyāsa-Bhāṣya* where the *khyātis* are studied; he has very clearly mentioned that *avidyā*, the *bījaśakti* can be removed by *vidyā* or knowledge; *Vidyayā tasyā bījaśakterdāhāt* (*B.S.S.B.*, 1-4-3). In his *Adhyāsa-Bhāṣya* too, he mentions the nature of *vidyā* which is realized after realizing the discrimination between the real and the unreal; for example between *śukti* (conch-shell) and *rajata* (silver).

Potter has expressed some doubt and difficulty regarding the authenticity of Śāṅkara's work, and has referred to the studies made in this respect by Paul Hacker and S. Mayeda in particular. Quoting the same scholars, he further says that it is only some portions of the *Upadeśa-Sāhasrī* that has been written by Ādi Śāṅkara (pp. 86-87). To prove this point Mayeda says that the *Upadeśa-Sāhasrī* is written both in prose and verses and hence cannot be by the same author. To my mind, this argument is not convincing. The reason for writing the Vedāntic teachings in prose is that they are more convincing because of the lucidity of exposition in prose, which is not possible in verse. It may also be added that the Vedāntic views explained in prose and verse in the *Upadeśa-Sāhasrī* do not contradict one another.

As regards the date of Śāṅkara, Potter places him in the late seventh and early eighth centuries AD, while AD 788-820 is generally accepted by most scholars. While presenting a brief history of Advaita, the author also says that works like *Advaita-Siddhi*, *Citsukhī*, *Siddhānta-bindu*, and *Siddhāntaleśa-Saṁgraha* are merely a show of scholarship (p. 94). As far as I understand these works, in them, the Advaitic tenets have been studied in minute detail and so they cannot be regarded as a mere display of scholarship.

Thus, it may be said that Professor Potter has studied the development of the Advaita-Vedānta school of philosophy according to his own personal views and according to the methodology usually adopted by Western scholars to judge the suitability of a thought or system to be designated as a school. To me, it appears that for any Indian thought or system to be regarded as a school it should be done on the basis of the principles of scholarship generally accepted in the Indian philosophical tradition itself. This is the reason why Gauḍapāda has been counted by Śaṅkara himself as *sampradāyavit*, while according to Potter he is merely a 'legitimiser'. Likewise, to describe Śaṅkara as a 'stylist' and not a sound propounder of Advaita also does not seem correct. A great number of scholars both from the East and the West have accepted Śaṅkara as a great Advaitin on the basis of his exposition of Advaita in his *Bhāṣya-Granthas*. Perhaps, the history of Advaita Vedānta has to be written differently than the way Potter has done. But there can be little doubt that this is the first challenging formulation of it, demanding attention from all scholars interested in the subject concerned.

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Professor Karl Potter has distinguished five phases in the 'life' of a philosophical system: (1) the 'Discovery stage' where the Fundamental Insights of the school first appear to its founders; (2) the Development stage where the Fundamental Insight begins to be set forth in a self-conscious way as a doctrine; (3) the Polemical stage; (4) the Systematic stage which is super-theoretical; and (5) the last stage which is the stage of Decline. These five broad stages are, again, analysed into many

sub-stages.* I shall offer some brief comments on Potter's analysis.

1. It is not clear about the first stage whether the Fundamental Insights of a system are to be credited to someone or to none in particular. 'In the case of some Indian schools, a founder is invented and made responsible for the composition of a basic text—characteristically a set of aphoristic utterances in which the fundamental insights are set forth.' It seems that the Fundamental Insights are expressed in the aphorisms. But Potter does not accept this view as correct. 'The *sūtras* or aphorisms which constitute the supposed beginnings of these systems are actually redactions of views already in place.'

But to trace the first stage beyond the *sūtras*, in many cases even of the *āstika darśanas*, is to make the Discovery stage itself mythical. In the case of the Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems, for example, it is not clear whether there were views already in place. It seems Potter wants to go beyond the *sūtras* to find the Discovery stage because in the *sūtras* of all the systems there are polemics against rival theories. It is not clear if the discovery of the Fundamental Insights of a system cannot come from critical reflection on rival theories, if the discovery has always to be made by intuition or in any direct, non-critical, way. Potter has not mentioned

*It is interesting to note that this kind of study has been done long before in the case of religions. 'If you study the history of any religious movement, you will trace three stages, three periods. The first period is the period of the Teacher, the Reformer, the Prophet... Then comes the second period: after his death, the true disciples, apostles, try to systematize the teachings and to promote them as faithfully as possible... In the third period the priest comes and organizes out of the teachings another religious creed' (quoted from 'a Christian mystic' by Swami Tejasarananda in his address on 'Sri Ramakrishna and the Unity of Religions' delivered on 22nd February, 1958).

the *Vedānta Sūtras* of Bādarāyaṇa on which Śaṅkara wrote his commentary. In the section called 'Tarkapāda', the author of the *sūtras* argues against rival theories. Moreover, the *sūtras* themselves are often written in the manner of arguments, having the fifth declension of compound words (*hatvārthe pañcamā*). Potter has traced the Discovery stage of Advaita Vedānta to the Upaniṣads. This is not unwarranted because Advaita Vedānta claims to capture the insights embodied in the Upaniṣads. To go beyond the *sūtras* to trace the Discovery stage of the Fundamental Insights of all the systems is fraught with difficulties.

2. I am not sure if the Discovery stage cannot reappear after the Systematic and even the Polemical stage. The Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems developed and were systematized as different systems; still very late in the history of the systems they were united into the 'syncretic school' of Navya-Nyāya. Gāṅgeśa had fundamental insights of various new topics, like *viśeṣaṇa* and *upalakṣaṇa*, *vypāti*, *parāmarśa*, etc. and they were discovered, developed and systematized by criticizing the views of opponents, especially the Prābhākara-Mīmāṃsā philosophers.
3. Potter has mentioned that in *Vedāntaparibhāṣā*, 'the approach in fact, is that found in the sophisticated treatment of things by Navya-Nyāya.' But he has not noticed that Madhusūdana Sarasvatī's *Advaitasiddhi* is written in the language of Navya-Nyāya. As a matter of fact, all philosophical systems used the language of Navya-Nyāya when it was developed. So whether in the Systematic stage or in the Polemical stage, the use of the Navya-Nyāya conceptual system and language was almost universal. The conceptual system and technical language of Navya-Nyāya made systematization (for example, by refining the concept of relevance, *saṅgati*) and refutation of rival theories more rigorous.
4. There is a peculiarity of the Sāṅkhya system. The *sūtras* and the commentaries on them, as published, are very defective. The only text that was, and is, widely used is the

Sāṃkhyakārikā of Īśvarakṛṣṇa and Vācaspati's commentary on it. The discovery of *Yuktidīpikā* gave a new impetus to studies in Sāṃkhya; yet the published text is very defective. The point is that systems like Advaita Vedānta and Nyāya criticize various aspects of the Sāṃkhya system in detail; yet there has been no attempt on the part of the Sāṃkhya philosophers to reply to them. But the system had not declined; its influence on Indian culture is pervasive, and there are many who practise, even now, the Sāṃkhya method of self-realization.

5. In the second stage of development, there is an attempt to 'relate the theoretical aspect of the Fundamental Insights to practical concerns and aims'. It is interesting to note that both Gautama and Kaṇāda have explicitly stated that by studying these systems one realizes the *summum bonum* (*nihśreyasa*). Yet there has been no one studying Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika systems who has followed the methods of realizing the true nature of the self as propounded in these systems. As a matter of fact, of the six orthodox systems, only Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika have not been able to draw anyone to the practice of self-realization. On the other hand, Nyāya was regarded as *ānvīkṣikī*, the science of argumentation and debate, and Vaiśeṣika as systematic ontology, but not as spiritual disciplines. Thus the stated practical aim in the *sūtras* was never recognized as constituting the value of the system.

Response to Comments on 'The Development of Advaita Vedānta as a School of Philosophy'

It is kind of Daya Krishna and the members of the panel to consider my comments on Advaita worthy of the attention they have given them. As is usual in such cases, the disagreements noted by Bhattacharyya, Pande, Pandey, Sharma and Venkatachalam seem to me to derive from a combination of

mistakes on my part, misunderstanding of my intentions, and some genuinely debatable matters. Let me start by summing up and clarifying what I said and its context.

My paper 'The Development of Advaita Vedānta as a School of Philosophy' (hereafter 'Development') originated in certain portions in an extended set of lectures delivered in Naples almost ten years ago now. Another section of these lectures was later published as '*Vedāntaparibhāṣa* as Systematic Reconstruction' in *Perspective on Vedānta: Essays in Honour of Professor P.T. Raju* (edited by S.S. Rama Rao Pappu), Leiden, 1988. As a reader of this latter paper can easily confirm, part of my intention in developing these lectures was to attempt to combat the common misconception of Indian philosophy, and especially Advaita Vedānta, as mystical and un- or anti-systematic. The *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* is perhaps the best known—though far from the only—attempt to provide a rigorously systematic presentation of Advaita. In my paper about it I labour to emphasize the parallels between the method Dharmarājadhvarīndra follows and very contemporary analytic methods in logical philosophy.

What I was attempting to do in the entire set of papers, of which the two mentioned were prominent but not the only parts, was to defend Indian philosophical systems, and in particular Advaita Vedānta, as serious attempts at systematic philosophy to be placed among other such systems. And it was in this context that I depicted a system as going through the five stages I describe in 'Development'. Despite all the efforts of classical and modern Indian philosophers and scholars it is still taken for granted by far too many, at least in my country, that 'Indian philosophy' is a misnomer, not being worthy of attention by serious philosophers.

Perhaps my basic mistake lay in publishing a portion of these papers in India. For the papers were written for a western audience, in the hope of winning or renewing interest in systematic Indian thought. Still, it is perhaps not without interest for Indian readers, since the implication of what I was

attempting to say is that classical Indian philosophy is as defensible as systematic philosophy as anyone's thought. This is not something easily accepted by Westerners and, though I wish I were wrong about this, it is becoming less commonly believed in India.

In 'Development' I am proposing a very broad view about the rise and fall of philosophical systems. A system is born as one or more fundamental insights—the Discovery stage; it (perhaps after a while) is developed into a doctrine—the Development stage; it gets debated and defended—the Polemical stage; it becomes codified for various purposes—the Systematic stage; and it becomes so familiar it is taken for granted—the stage of Decline. I give one or two western illustrations of this process, and attempt to apply it to Advaita. Here is where I am afraid I am being misunderstood.

Sibajiban wonders whether the Discovery stage is not made mythical if it is located prior to *sūtras*. I suspect that the Discovery stage is always pre-*sūtra*. Certainly in the case of Vedānta it is evident that Bādarāyaṇa was a late comer, but of course there is no 'Vedānta' system, only Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dvaita, etc. The basic insights of Advaita seem to stem from portions of the early Upaniṣads or even before. Whether this makes the Discovery stage mythical is a moot point, in that we will probably never know who had the seminal ideas first. The *sūtras* may record the discovery, but they most likely did not constitute that discovery. This also addresses others (Sharma, for example) who defend Gauḍapāda as the discoverer of Advaita.

I also appear to some of my critics to have proclaimed the demise of Advaita. I claim nothing of the sort. Advaita is very much alive. However, it is in the fifth stage, as I see it, the stage where it is so familiar it is taken for granted. Of course, in so far as Advaitins protest at this finding they are resisting progress toward the demise of Advaita, keeping Advaita alive. If my efforts have provoked such signs of life I am indeed happy!

G.C. Pande thinks I am doing theology. He evidently understands 'theology' as not requiring belief in God, since he tells

us that the atheistic 'Pūrvamīmāṃsā (is) the paragon of all Indian theologies'. He also says Advaita is 'not an attempt to explain the insight that Reality is one and without a second, but to gain that insight....' I should say Advaita is neither attempt. It is Advaitins who attempt to explain, gain or comprehend the Fundamental Insight. I was speaking of the rise, maintenance and decline of the philosophical school committed to the promulgation of that insight and to its defence.

I plead guilty to misrepresenting Śāṅkara by seeming to imply he uses the term *pariṇāma* at the outset of the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. The term he actually uses is *adhyāsa*, referring to the customary habit of attributing different properties to the self. What I was attempting to suggest is that the entire opening section of the *Bhāṣya* starts from a premiss Śāṅkara rejects, viz. that the differences we naturally assume in order to get on with ordinary life and thought are 'established' (*siddha*). In due course, after characterizing this 'beginningless and endless superimposition' (*anadhiranantas ... adhyāsa*) as generally accepted, he announces that it is the understanding of the oneness of the Self (*ātmaikatvavidyā*) which destroys *adhyāsa* and which he will now go on to explain. Prior to that point, however, he is, as I suggested, characterizing the view he will reject. I don't think, as a matter of fact, that Śāṅkara uses either the term *pariṇāma* or *vivarta* in their technical senses in developing his position; these came later to Advaita.

I called Śāṅkara a Mīmāṃsāka, not a Pūrvamīmāṃsaka. It is common among Vedāntins to speak of their view as Uttaramīmāṃsā. Vedāntins, like the Pūrvamīmāṃsakas, appeal to the various principles of exegesis that constitute the Mīmāṃsā methods, and thus Vedāntins, including Śāṅkara, are appropriately called Mīmāṃsaka, though not Pūrvamīmāṃsakas.

Sharma refers to a number of Advaita works as Śāṅkara's. At least one of them, the *Ātmabodha*, is clearly not by the author of the *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya*. Others, such as the *Bhagavadgītābhāṣya* and the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikābhāṣya*, may be by Śāṅkara, but the ascription is not altogether certain. Indeed,

my assessment of Śaṅkara does depend to an extent on which are Śaṅkara's authentic works, and since Sharma doesn't limit those works to the ones I do it is not surprising we come to different conclusions.¹

Sibajiban and I may have different views about what constitutes a 'decline'. I am not aware of active Sāṃkhya *mathas* and *āśramas* (though there may be such), and the 'Sāṃkhya method of self-realization' is, I believe, very often the method of Pātañjala Yoga. Sāṃkhya terminology is still used by Yoga as well as by Advaitins, but as Sibajiban himself suggests, Sāṃkhya lacks very much polemical literature, and perhaps we may say that it failed to develop far beyond the second stage before being taken over by other systems. So, in a sense, that system has not declined—it never reached a point after which the Decline state could occur. I am not, however, entirely convinced by this account, for there *were* a few attempts to systematize Sāṃkhya, though perhaps not very convincing ones, and so perhaps we say that the Sāṃkhya system ran its full course. But I realize this way of applying my five-stage analysis may tend to make it so broadly applicable as to be empty. I take it that is what my critics tend to think. All I can ask at the moment in response is for them to reread the earlier sections of 'Development' where various specific aspects of each stage are described, and ask themselves whether these do in fact apply.

Notes and References

1. Those interested in my views about Śaṅkara may consult K.H. Potter, 'Śaṅkarācārya: the myth and the man' in *Charisma and Sacred Biography*, edited by Michael A. Williams, Chicago, California, 1982, pp. 111–25.

KARL H. POTTER

Vedānta in the First Millennium AD: The Case Study of a Retrospective Illusion Imposed by the Historiography of Indian Philosophy

DAYA KRISHNA

Vedānta is supposed to be the most dominant and distinctive philosophy of India, accepted and propagated as such by innumerable writers on Indian philosophy. And yet, if one searches for its presence in the first millennium AD, one is surprised to find very little evidence of its presence before Śaṅkara and even for quite some time after him. The Upaniṣads that are supposed to be the source of Vedāntic philosophy had flourished sometime during the later half of the first millennium BC or even some centuries earlier than that. It is commonly supposed that as the Upaniṣads form the last part of the Vedic corpus, the term Vedānta is applied to them, literally meaning the end of the Vedas or the concluding portion thereof and the thought propounded therein. This, of course, is a myth as many of the Upaniṣads do not form the concluding portion of the Vedic corpus and also continued to be composed till as late as the thirteenth century, that is, a long time after Śaṅkara wrote his commentaries on them. As

we argued in an article written some time ago entitled 'The Upaniṣads—What are They?' many of the major Upaniṣads do not occur as a last part of the Vedic corpus, that is, the Saṁhitās, the Brāhmaṇas or the Āraṇyakas but rather in the middle followed by other portions which are sometimes regarded as separate Upaniṣads with a different content, or, what is the case many a time, are regarded as not Upaniṣads at all. It is well known, for example, that the *Aitareya Upaniṣad* consists of chapters 4, 5 and 6 of the second *adhyaḥya* of the *Aitareya Āraṇyaka*, excluding the third *adhyaḥya*, even though it explicitly proclaims itself as a Upaniṣad.¹

However, in any discussion of Vedānta in the first millennium AD the status of the Upaniṣads and of the thought propounded by them in the philosophical scene of those times is a secondary matter as what is of relevance in the assessment of the position of Vedānta in the first millennium AD is the attempt at a coherent, unified presentation of their thought by Bādrāyaṇa in his *Brahma-sūtras* (50 AD). The presence of Vedānta in the first millennium AD thus can only be understood in terms of what happens to the *Brahma-sūtras*, and the attention they aroused in the philosophical world of India after they were composed. Normally, the impact of the foundational *sūtra* literature of the various schools of Indian philosophy is known by the commentaries that they generated and by the discussions and refutations they met at the hands of their opponents. Surprisingly, the *Brahma-sūtras* remained entirely unnoticed until the appearance of Śaṁkara who wrote his commentary on them along with the Upaniṣads and the *Bhagavadgītā* which resulted in the famous myth of the *Prasthāna Trayī*, that is, the view that the source of Indian philosophy lies in these three texts when even the so-called different schools of Vedānta do not treat them in this way, as except for Śaṁkara and Madhva, no one else has commented on all the three so as to establish his position as to what Vedānta really means.

Before Śaṁkara, the only thinkers who are mentioned in connection with the *Brahma-sūtra* in Potter's new Bibliography

are Bodhāyana (350 AD), Dramiḍācārya (525 AD), Bhartṛprapañca (550 AD), Viśwarūpadeva (600 AD), and Brahmadata (660 AD). As for Bodhāyana, it is doubtful whether he wrote anything on the *Brahma-sūtra*, though there is sufficient evidence that he wrote on the *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra*, particularly on the Saṅkaraṣaṅga-Kāṇḍa, according to Nakamura in his work on early Vedānta philosophy.²

Dramiḍācārya, mentioned after Bodhāyana in Potter's bibliography, finds no mention in Nakamura and Potter's work only says that he wrote a Bhāṣya which exists in manuscript form which has neither been seen nor published by any one. Also, it appears that the work has not been referred to by subsequent thinkers in the tradition.

As for Bhartṛprapañca, he is supposed to be an exception to the general position held by most Vedāntins that Brahman cannot be known by reasoning, and that it can only be known through the *Śrūti* or perhaps even through intuition. As for Viśwarūpadeva he is not mentioned by Nakamura in his comprehensive work on early Vedānta, though he is mentioned in Potter's bibliography and is supposed to have written a work called *Vivekāmāraṇḍa*.

As for Brahmadata, he is supposed to have held a position regarding the relations between self and Brahman as both identical and different, a position held by thinkers who have been referred to in the *Brahma-sūtras*, and generally not supported by it.

The earlier thinkers referred to in the *Brahma-sūtras* are, as is well known, Kārṣṇājini, Kāśakṛtsna, Ātreya, Auḍulomi, Āśamarthyā, Bādari and Jaimini.

Besides the five thinkers who have been mentioned in Potter's *Bibliography* between Bādrāyana and Śaṅkara, there is the independent work of Gauḍapāda who occurs in 600 AD (new) and 550 AD (old) and whose *Māṇḍūkyakārikā* is a well-known work in the tradition of Advaita Vedānta strongly influenced by Buddhism and is by common consent supposed to have influenced Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras*

in a significant manner. However, his is an independent work which has nothing to do with the *Brahma-sūtra* and thus is an independent source of Vedāntic thinking in later times. In fact, Nakamura mentions him along with Bādarāyaṇa and Bhartṛhari as precursors of Śaṅkara and specifically assigns the strong advaitic position to him rather than to Bādarāyaṇa.³

Thus in the pre-Śaṅkara period the total presence of thinkers who could even be remotely designated as Vedāntins is not only negligible but many of them have to be included just because they have been mentioned by some one else or because their work has a marginal reference in the tradition. As for the notice of the Vedāntic thought being taken seriously by others, that seems to be even less for, according to Nakamura, we find direct references only in the *Vaiśeṣika Sūtras* where the Vedāntic position is supposed to be refuted twice and while, according to him, there is no mention of it in the *Nyāya-Sūtras*, it is referred to in Vātsyāyana's *Bhāṣya* on the *Nyāya-Sūtras* and by Udyotakara in his *Vārtika* on the *Bhāṣya*.⁴

The situation does not seem to improve much even after Śaṅkara for, if we exclude his immediate disciples, he does not seem to have made as much of an impact as is made out by his admirers and the author of the *Śaṅkaradigvijaya*. In fact, there is little evidence of the so-called *Digvijaya* as it is the philosophers of the other schools who continue to outnumber the Vedāntins in the centuries after Śaṅkara. Not only this, even the Buddhists are ahead of the Vedāntins, both in quantity and quality, thus nullifying the myth that they were defeated by Śaṅkara. Hastāmalaka, Troṭaka, Padmapāda and Sureśvara are the well known disciples of Śaṅkara and Maṇḍana Mīśra, the author of *Brahmasiddhi* can be regarded as almost half his disciple. If we exclude these, then in the post-Śaṅkara period, we have, besides Bhāskara, who has written an independent *Bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtras*, Gopālāśrama (780 AD), Jñānaghana (900 AD), Jñānottama Bhāṭṭāraka (930 AD), Vimuktātman (960 AD), Vācaspati Mīśra (960 AD), Prakāśātmana (975 AD) and Jñānottama Mīśra (980 AD). Thus we have only

eight Vedāntins listed in the post-Śaṅkara period in the first millennium AD, if we exclude his disciples and Maṅḍana Miśra. Within almost the same period we have 117 Buddhist thinkers and 27 Jain thinkers. As for the so-called orthodox schools of Indian philosophy, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika number about 13 (9+4).

The first serious notice of the advaita position seems to have been taken by Jayanta Bhaṭṭa in his explicit refutation of that position in *Nyāyamañjarī*. But he does not refer to Śaṅkara by name. As his date is supposed to be 870 AD, it can be assumed that the presence of Śaṅkara and his disciples on the philosophical scene had established the advaitic position as one of the philosophical positions to be taken into account. Udayana, whose date is supposed to be around 984 AD is another example of this as he not only refutes the Vedānta position but also seems to give the Vedāntic realization of non-difference a position just below the Naiyayika realization of mokṣa. However, he is supposed to have referred only to Bhāskara and not to Śaṅkara, thus suggesting that Śaṅkara's preeminence was not established by that time.⁵ In fact, it appears that Udayana in his *Ātmatattvaviveka* has given six stages of realization of the self in ascending order and at least two of which are ascribed to Advaita Vedānta. The first stage is characterized by the appearance of object in consciousness wherein it alone is treated as real. This, according to him, is the stage of Cārvāka and Mīmāṃsā thought in philosophy which treats action for the satisfaction of oneself through the acquisition of objects alone, as *real* and meaningful. The second stage is characterized by the appearance in consciousness of the meanings of objects and is associated, according to him, with the Yogācāra school of Buddhism where it is not objects but their meanings which alone are considered as real. The third stage is supposed to be characterized by a realization of the unreality of all meanings by consciousness and is closely related to the position of Sūnyavāda Buddhism on the one hand and Advaita Vedānta on the other. The fourth stage is the arising of a discriminatory consciousness where the

consciousness becomes aware of its radical distinction from the object. This stage he attributes to Sāṃkhya. The fifth stage of realization is where the focus of consciousness shifts from the discriminatory awareness and centres on the self luminosity of consciousness itself. This, according to him, is also the state of advaitic realization, though it is different from the advaitic realization of the third stage. The last stage of realization goes beyond this where the self is not aware even of its own self and abides completely in its own reality. This, according to him, is the highest stage and is characterized by the realization which Nyāya postulates for the self at its highest level.⁶

There seem however some problems regarding the delineation of these stages and the association of the third and the fifth with Advaita Vedānta. It is not clear to whom the third position is being ascribed. As for the fifth stage it is difficult to say that it is the exact position held by Bhāskara as it seems to describe more correctly Śaṅkara's position. In any case, it seems from all this that the positions of Vedānta are only vaguely known and not in the sharp, focal manner in which they were formulated by the advaitins in the second millennium AD.

We thus have to divide the question regarding the presence of Vedānta in the first millennium AD in two parts, the first relating to the period after the *Brahma-sūtra* and before Śaṅkara's Bhāṣya on it in the early eighth century AD and the second after Śaṅkara, that is, roughly from 700–1000 AD. There can be little doubt that the *Brahma-sūtras* had little impact on the philosophical scene in India after their composition and in fact were practically absent from the philosophical scene if we compare them with the influence exercised by the other sūtras, particularly those relating to Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika. Even the impact of Sāṃkhya, which may be regarded as independent from the traditions deriving from the Vedic corpus, was far, far greater in the period than that of the *Brahma-sūtras*. We have, for example, between 50–750 AD ten Sāṃkhyan thinkers, many of whom have written independent

works of their own. In fact, if we take *Ṣaṣṭitantra* as the first important Sāṃkhyān work, then we have in the first millennium AD not only the *Sāṃkhyakārikā* around 350 AD but Svārṇasaptati, 655 AD and other works totalling eight in number before Vācaspati Miśra's work on Śāṃkhyā.⁷

The situation is no different if we try to find the presence of the *Brahma-sūtras* in non-Vedic traditions of philosophizing such as those of the Buddhists and the Jains. Nāgārjuna who occurs around 150 AD and is the first great thinker belonging to the Mādhyamika School of Buddhism shows hardly any awareness of Vedānta as propounded in the *Brahma-sūtras*, even though more than 100 years had elapsed since its composition. The situation does not seem to improve later as his disciple Āryadeva (180 AD) shows no awareness either. The Yogācāra School which seems to start with Maitreya-nātha (270–350 AD) and develops through Asaṅga (360 AD) and Vasubandhu (360 AD) also does not show any awareness of the *Brahma-sūtras*. This is specially significant as they do discuss other schools of Indian philosophy such as Nyāya. The first clear cut reference to Vedānta as a distinctive school of philosophy occurs in the work of Bhavya or *Bhāvaviveka*⁸ in 550 AD, that is, more than five hundred years after the composition of the *Brahma-sūtras* and about 150 years before Śāṃkara appears on the scene. However, in his presentation, the elements of the Vedāntic doctrine of the Ātman seem to be inexplicably, intermixed with the doctrine of the Puruṣa which finds no place either in the *Brahma-sūtras* or in Gauḍapāda or Śāṃkara. Also, though he is aware of the distinction between the Jīva and the Ātman or the embodied self and the liberated self, and treats the distinction between the two as analogous to the way the infinite space is limited by adjuncts such as a pot etc., he is still not aware either of the doctrines of *Avidyā* or *Māyā* which were later to play such an important role in Śāṃkara's thought. In fact, the situation does not seem to improve even with Śāṃtarakṣita who occurs a little later than Śāṃkara, though he discusses both *puruṣa* and *Ātman* he hardly refers to Śāṃkara.

The same seems to be the case with Kamalaśīla who has written a prose commentary on Śāntarākṣita's *Tattasamgraha*.⁹

It seems that the composition of the *Brahma-sūtras* had hardly any effect on the philosophical scene of India as it remained unnoticed at least till five hundred years after its composition. And even after that its major attempt to present in a unified manner the conflicting positions of the Upaniṣads and to give a Brahman-centric interpretation of it was not clearly grasped in the philosophical world of India.

The non-existence of Vedānta as a significant philosophical force in the first millennium AD will become even more clear if we notice the fact that Haribhadra Surī, the great Jain thinker belonging to 750 AD, who wrote perhaps the first survey work on the various schools of Indian philosophy, did not even mention Vedānta as a separate, distinctive school of Indian philosophy, even though he mentions not only Buddhism but also Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya explicitly and even Lokāyata which certainly was not regarded as a major school of philosophy by anybody in India. As both Śāntarākṣita and Kamalaśīla belong to this very period, it appears that the influence of Śaṅkara and his disciples had not permeated the philosophical atmosphere as is usually alleged by those who regard *Śaṅkara Digvijaya* as an authentic work descriptive of his triumph over all other philosophical schools of India. However, as the millennium moves towards its closure there seems some evidence of the spread of the influence of Śaṅkara's thought as one finds, for example, in Udayana's *Ātmatattvaviveka* in which there seems to be a distinctive attempt to come to terms with the Advaitic position as regards ultimate realization. Within the Nyāya framework, particularly the one relating to the denial of the self-luminosity of the Ātman. Udayana's work comes closest to an advaitin position even though it does not declare itself to be such. But even if one does not accept such a characterization of Udayana's work, there can hardly be a debate about the presence of powerful advaitic leanings in that work. The whole work in fact closes

with a recommendation to meditate on the self and suggests the gradual stages of realization which would occur during the course of the meditation. It is interesting to note in this connection that the Mīmāṃsā position is equated almost with that of the Cārvāka and that the Śāṅkhya position of discrimination between the self and the object is placed very high in the scale of meditational realization on the self. The millennium which had shown, during most of its course, no signs of Vedānta closes with signs of its impending dominance in the forthcoming millennium where it establishes its supremacy, particularly after the disappearance of Buddhism in east India with the destruction of Nālandā. The only rival that it has in the second millennium AD is Nyāya on the one hand, which repudiates Udayana's attempt of advertising the Nyāya position and Rāmānuja and Madhva Vedānta on the other. There is thus practically no Vedānta in the first millennium AD and the idea of its dominant presence there is a super-imposition by the historiography of Indian philosophy due to its being dazzled by the picture in the second millennium AD. The propounders of the theory of Adhyāsa have perhaps themselves imposed one on the history of philosophy in India.

Notes and References

1. See on this whole point my article 'The Upaniṣads—What are They?' in *Indian Philosophy—A Counter Perspective*, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1991.
2. Upavarṣa who occurred around 150 AD is sometimes mentioned in this connection. However, according to Potter he is only supposed to have written a *Vṛtti* on the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra while according to Nakamura he has also written on the Saṅkarṣaṇakaṇḍa.
3. Hajimae Nakamura, *History of Early Vedānta Philosophy*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1983, p. 127.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 330–56.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 67.

6. *Ātmatattvaviveka*, Translation, Explanation and Analytical critical summary by N.S. Dravid, Indian Institute of Advanced Study, Shimla, 1995, pp. 455–58.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 335.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 184.
9. *Ibid.*, pp. 226–29.

(a) Daya Krishna's Retrospective Delusion

R. BALASUBRAMANIAN

I

Once again Daya Krishna has succeeded in producing a provocative paper which is unfortunately a blend of the true and the false.¹ The title of the paper is intriguing; and he provides the justification for the title in the concluding part of the paper. I will, therefore, begin my comments on this paper with his conclusion. Daya Krishna observes:

There is thus practically no Vedānta in the first millennium AD and the idea of its dominant presence there is a superimposition by the historiography of Indian philosophy due to its being dazzled by the picture in the second millennium AD. The propounders of the theory of *adhyāsa* have perhaps imposed one on the history of philosophy in India.²

It is not correct to say that there was practically no Vedānta in the first millennium AD or that 'there is very little evidence of its presence before Śaṅkara and even for quite some time after him'. No Advaitin believes it for the evidence is to the contrary. I will revert to this point a little later. Let us, for the sake of argument, concede Daya Krishna's claim that there was practically no Vedānta in the first millennium AD. If the Advaitin who writes the history of Advaita knows the truth as averred by Daya Krishna, but still maintains that Advaita was not only dominant, but also triumphant in the first millennium AD, he does not suffer from any delusion. In such a

situation others like Daya Krishna who have been successful in uncovering the past may present the real state of affairs of Advaita in the first millennium AD and say that the Advaitin has deliberately distorted the truth. If, on the contrary, he does not know the truth of the absence of Advaita in that period, we can only say that, being ignorant of that fact, he deluded himself into thinking that Advaita was dominant at that time. So a critic like Daya Krishna can accuse the Advaitin of either distortion or delusion in respect of what he claims. While distortion is mispresentation of facts, delusion is false or mistaken belief. My mispresentation of facts that prevailed in the first millennium AD or my mistaken belief about it cannot be considered to be a case of *adhyāsa* as understood in Advaita. The theory of *adhyāsa* (superimposition) as formulated in Advaita is well known. *Adhyāsa* is perceptual error, which is different from errors in reasoning as well as errors in interpretation. In the Advaita tradition *adhyāsa* is spoken of in several ways as *jñānādhyāsa* and *arthādhyāsa*, as *svarūpādhyāsa* and *samsargādhyāsa*, as *sopādhikādhyāsa* and *nirupādhikādhyāsa*; and all these are cases of perceptual error known as *bhrama*. Since there is no scope for *adhyāsa* in the context of historiography of Indian philosophy, it is wrong to say that the Advaitin has imposed his theory of *adhyāsa* on the history of philosophy. The expression 'retrospective illusion' makes no sense because illusion in the sense of *bhrama* is neither of the past nor of the future, but of the present. It seems to me that Daya Krishna wants to beat the Advaitin with his own stick, but he does not succeed since he has chosen an instrument which has no use in the present case.

Of the various idols which Daya Krishna seems to worship, that of the number is very conspicuous. We know that in politics the strength of a view is dependent on the number of persons who support it. A particular view becomes dominant and prevails over others if its supporters are numerically in a majority. However, the politics of number has no place in philosophy. It will be of interest to listen to Śaṅkara who has something to

say about the fallacy of number, of numerical strength, in philosophy. In the course of the discussion of a particular view which Śaṅkara defends, the opponent maintains that Śaṅkara cannot establish his point of view on the ground that those who hold the opposite view are numerically more. The dialogue proceeds as follows:³

Śaṅkara: What! Is there a Vedic commandment that the point shall not be established?

Opponent: No.

Śaṅkara: Why then (do you say that I cannot establish the point)?

Opponent: Because there are many opponents. You are a monist, because you follow the Vedic teaching. But many, indeed, are the pluralists who are outside the Vedic pale and who are opposed to you. So I doubt that you can establish your point.

Śaṅkara: You brand me a monist surrounded by many who are pluralists—this itself is a benediction to me. Therefore I shall conquer all; and I shall now commence the discussion.

An important point which Śaṅkara wants to drive home here is that a philosophical position cannot be considered to be sound just because the number of its votaries is legion. A philosophical view is strong only if it is sound or tenable; and the soundness of a view is not decided by the number of its votaries. In the same way the strength or dominance of a philosophical system is not decided by the number of philosophers and their writings at a particular time.

It appears that Daya Krishna relies on number and seems to think that we can decide whether a philosophical system is dominant or not by the number of its champions: the more the champions for a system, the more dominant it is; the less the champions, the less dominant it is—this seems to be his line of reasoning. Let us consider his argument based on number. For the purpose of assessing the importance and

influence of Advaita both in the pre-Śaṅkara and post-Śaṅkara period, he starts with Bādarāyaṇa's *Brahma-sūtras*, which is undoubtedly a landmark in the history of Advaita. He says that between Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara there were only five Vedāntins according to Potter's *Bibliography*. He does not take into consideration Gauḍapāda on the ground that the latter's *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, which is an independent work, has nothing to do with the *Brahma-sūtras*. So we do not have more than five Vedāntins connected with the *Brahma-sūtras* in the pre-Śaṅkara period. Apart from Śaṅkara's four direct disciples and Maṇḍana, the author of the *Brahma-siddhi*, there were, says Daya Krishna, only eight Advaitins in the post-Śaṅkara period in the first millennium AD. Then, how about the non-Advaitins during this period? Daya Krishna is ready with the number. 'Within almost the same period', says Daya, 'we have 117 Buddhist thinkers and 27 Jain thinkers. As for the so-called orthodox schools of Indian philosophy, the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika number about 13 (9+4).'⁴ As for Sāṅkhya, there were about ten thinkers during this period.⁵ Since we find a large number of non-Vedāntic thinkers during this period, Daya draws the conclusion that the *Brahma-sūtras* had little impact on the philosophical scene in India after its composition and that the Vedānta was not the dominant system in the first millennium AD. Though his argument based on number seems to be impressive, it has to be rejected as the dominance or otherwise of a philosophical system cannot be decided by the number of its champions. The prejudice for number is deep-rooted in human nature, and Daya Krishna's argument in this case shows how he is a victim of the *Idola tribus*.

II

Daya Krishna is fond of projecting his own myths in Indian philosophy. There is, according to him, a myth about the Upaniṣads being the end portion of the Vedas. There is, again,

he says, the myth of the *prasthāna-traya*. I will confine myself to a certain issue that he raises in respect of the latter. He maintains that Śaṅkara's commentary on the Upaniṣads, the *Brahma-sūtras*, and the *Bhagavad-gītā*:

resulted in the famous myth of the *Prasthāna-trayī*, that is, the view that the source of Indian philosophy lies in these three texts when even the so-called different schools of Vedānta do not treat them in this way as, except for Śaṅkara and Madhva, no one else has commented on all the three so as to establish his position as to what Vedānta really means.⁶

First of all, it is not correct to say that these three texts are the source of Indian philosophy. We know that Indian philosophy includes not only systems of Vedānta, but also other systems such as Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and so on, which are characterized as Vedic systems, and also non-Vedic systems such as Buddhism. Only the systems of Vedānta are grounded in the *prasthāna-traya*, but not the non-Vedāntic systems.

Secondly, it is not required of the Vedāntins that they have to write separate commentaries on the *prasthāna-traya* which they accept as their sourcebooks. Let us confine ourselves to the three model or typical systems of Vedānta, namely, Advaita, Viśiṣṭadvaita, and Dvaita. It is true, as Daya Krishna says, that Śaṅkara and Madhva wrote separate commentaries on the *prasthāna-traya*. Though Rāmānuja wrote *bhāṣyas* on the *Brahma-sūtras* and the *Bhagavad-gītā*, he did not write one on the Upaniṣads. What does it matter if he has not written a separate commentary on the Upaniṣads? Does it in any way damage the collective authority of the *prasthāna-traya*? Does it in any way affect the status and authority of Rāmānuja? The followers of Rāmānuja do not think that the great *bhāṣya-kāra* has either slighted or side-tracked the Upaniṣads. If it is admitted that the *Brahma-sūtras* strings together in a coherent and condensed manner the scattered teachings of the Upaniṣads and that it is, therefore, integrally connected with them, then to write a commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras* amounts to writing a

commentary on the Upaniṣads. In his *Śrībhāṣya*, the celebrated commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras*, and *Vedārtha-saṁgraha*, an authoritative exposition of the basic doctrines of Viśiṣṭādvaita *vis-à-vis* other systems, Rāmānuja interprets the important Upaniṣadic texts, reconciles the apparently conflicting passages through *ghaṭaka-śrutis*, emphasizes the need for, and the importance of, *pramāṇa-samuccaya* reconciling *śruti* and other *pramāṇas*, and shows that the Upaniṣads purport to teach that the supreme Brahman which is one is *viśiṣṭa* inasmuch as it is qualified by *cit* on the one hand and *acit* on the other. There is nothing wanting in his position even though he has not written a separate *bhāṣya* on the Upaniṣads.

Thirdly, Daya Krishna is of the view that one has to comment on all the three texts in order to establish one's position as to what Vedānta really means. This view too is untenable. One may comment on all the three texts or on any one of them and establish Vedānta, though it is not necessary to write a commentary on one, or more than one, or all of these texts for the purpose of bringing out the meaning of Vedānta and vindicating it. Let me cite a few well-known texts of Advaita. Neither Maṇḍana's *Brahma-siddhi* nor Sureśvara's *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* is a commentary on the *prasthāna-traya*. But still they bring out the purport of Advaita, controvert the views of others, and establish the final position of Advaita. What Śāṅkara, Rāmānuja, and Madhva did need not be a model for others in every respect. Nor has any of them given an injunction that no one should write on Advaita without writing a commentary on the *prasthāna-traya*.

III

Daya Krishna has a hypothesis which he wants to establish at any cost. He has his own cave from which he operates and looks at the Vedāntic scenario in the first millennium AD. His hypothesis is that the *Brahma-sūtras* had little impact on the

philosophical scene in India after its composition; and he resorts to the ingenious strategy of bifurcating the Upaniṣads and the *Brahma-sūtras* for establishing his hypothesis. The separation of the *Brahma-sūtras* from the Upaniṣads is the thin end of the wedge. This is what he decrees:

... in any discussion of Vedānta in the first millennium AD the status of the Upaniṣads and of the thought propounded by them in the philosophical scene of those times is a secondary matter as what is of relevance in the assessment of the position of Vedānta in the first millennium AD is the attempt at a coherent, unified presentation of their thought by Bādarāyaṇa in his *Brahma-sūtras* (AD 50).⁷

Daya Krishna fails to achieve his objective by adopting a strategy which is defective. The relation between the Upaniṣads and the *Brahma-sūtras* is such that it is neither possible nor desirable to separate them. The story goes that a young girl who was fond of glittering golden bangles wanted to have only bangles without the gold and in a complaining mood told her mother to take away the gold from the bangles. Daya Krishna's problem is in no way different from that of the young girl in the story for both of them would like to separate the inseparables. Let me now explain the two reasons I have mentioned for their inseparability. First, the illustration. The bangle is related to the gold in two ways. It is, first of all, the modification or manifestation of the gold which is its cause or source. Secondly, it is a meaning or an explanation of the gold; it speaks for, provides us an insight into, and declares its dependence on, the gold. What is true of the illustration is equally true of the illustrated. The Upaniṣads serve as the source of the *Brahma-sūtras*. The latter would not have come into existence in the absence of the former. The name and the form which it has are provided by the Upaniṣads. It is called '*Vedānta-sūtras*' in order to emphasize its intimate relation with the 'Vedāntas', by which the Upaniṣads are also known. Just as the expression '*mṛd-ghataḥ*' (clay-pot) conveys the intimate

relation between clay and pot, even so the term 'Vedānta-sūtras' brings out the close relation between the Vedāntas and their sūtras. More important than the name is its form. The shape it has is determined by the material drawn from its source. To say that it has four chapters, each of which is divided into four parts, is to take a superficial, outward view of its structure or form. One must pay attention to its content (*viśaya*) in order to appreciate its structure. Bādarāyaṇa who composed the sūtras and planned the form or structure of the work must have done so on the basis of the content of the work. Where did he get the content from? From the Upaniṣads. This will be obvious if we pay attention to *viśaya-vākya*s. When we explain the structure of the *Brahma-sūtras*, we cannot just stop with *adhyāyas* (chapters) and *pādas* (parts); we must also go further down to the level of *adhikaraṇas* (topics). An *adhikaraṇa* may consist of one sūtra or more than one sūtra as the case may be. Every *adhikaraṇa* takes up a certain Upaniṣadic text and discusses its purport and purpose; and the text taken up for discussion in a topic is called *viśaya-vākya*. If it is admitted that there is a scheme in the structure of the *Brahma-sūtras* and if it is further admitted that the content determines the scheme, then the relation between the source, namely, the Upaniṣads, and the manifested structure, namely, the *Brahma-sūtras*, that is to say between matter and form, is such that the two cannot be separated. Daya Krishna himself admits that the *Brahma-sūtras* presents the thought of the Upaniṣads in a coherent, unified way; but at the same time he says that the thought of the Upaniṣads is a 'secondary matter'. If the thought propounded by the Upaniṣads is not primary and can, therefore, be ignored when assessing the position of Vedānta in the first millennium AD, then the *Brahma-sūtras* will be contentless. If so, it makes no sense to say that Bādarāyaṇa systematizes the thought of the Upaniṣads. Consequently he will not have any work to do as he has no material. This is the *reductio ad absurdum* of the attempt to separate the Upaniṣads and the *Brahma-sūtras*. It is, therefore, not desirable to separate them.

Daya Krishna's argument is vitiated by the fallacy of separating the inseparables.

IV

Following Daya Krishna, let us focus our attention on the period between Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara with the view to find out the status of Vedānta at that time. Daya Krishna makes two observations in this connection. He says: 'Surprisingly, the *Brahma-sūtras* remained entirely unnoticed until the appearance of Śaṅkara who wrote his commentary on it ...'⁸ After listing five Vedāntins of this period, who were 'supposed' to have written commentaries on the *Brahma-sūtras*, he goes on to say:

Thus in the pre-Śaṅkara period the total presence of thinkers who could even be remotely designated as Vedāntins is not only negligible, but many of them have to be included just because they have been mentioned by someone else or because their work has a marginal reference in the tradition.⁹

While the first statement is not true according to his own account, the second one defaces the image of Vedānta. He mentions five Vedāntins—Bodhāyana, Dramidācārya, Bharṭṛprapañca, Viśvarūpadeva, and Brahmadata—who wrote commentaries on the *Brahma-sūtras*. If so, he contradicts himself when he says that 'the *Brahma-sūtras* remained entirely unnoticed until the appearance of Śaṅkara'. In justification of his statement he may say that he doubts that all these five Vedāntins, or some of them, wrote commentaries on it. In other words, he doubts the tradition. For example, he doubts that Bodhāyana wrote anything on the *Brahma-sūtras*. However, we get a different picture of Bodhāyana in the writings of Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja. Though Śaṅkara does not refer to Bodhāyana, he refers to a *vṛtti* by Upavarṣa. In the '*Ānandamayādhikaraṇa* (1.1.12–19) he refers to the view of the

Vṛttikāra, from which he differs in his explanation of *ānandamaya*. The *vṛtti-kāra* is identified as Upavarṣa. Bodhāyana and Upavarṣa are identical. In the beginning of his *Śrībhāṣya*, Rāmānuja says that he follows Bodhāyana's *vṛtti* in his explanation of the *Brahma-sūtras*. To quote Rāmānuja:

The lengthy explanation (*vṛtti*) of the *Brahma-sūtras* which was composed by the reverend Bodhāyana has been abridged by former teachers; according to their views the words of the *sūtras* will be explained in this work.¹⁰

In his *Vedārtha-saṁgraha* he mentions Bodhāyana, Ṭaṅka, Dramida, and others as the authorities who followed the ancient commentaries on the Veda and Vedānta.¹¹ The non-availability to us of Bodhāyana's *vṛtti* on the *Brahma-sūtras* is no reason to say that he did not write it.

Again, he makes a cursory remark that 'Dramiḍācārya has not been referred to by subsequent thinkers in the tradition',¹² totally ignoring the evidence available in the tradition. Surprisingly, both Advaita and Viśiṣṭādvaita traditions claim that Dramiḍācārya was one of their teachers. Anandagiri in his gloss on Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā* identifies a passage quoted by Śaṅkara as that of Dramiḍācārya.¹³ Sarvajñātman in his *Samkṣepa-śārīraka* refers to the views of the Vākya-kāra and the Bhāṣya-kāra.¹⁴ Commentators on this work identify the former as Ṭaṅka and the latter as Dramiḍācārya. Mahadevan's observation is worth quoting here: 'If Ānandagiri and the commentators on the *Samkṣepa-śārīraka* are right in what they say, Dramiḍācārya must have been a leading Advaitin of the pre-Śaṅkara era, upholding the *niṣprapañca* or *nirguṇavastu-vāda*.'¹⁵ References are to be found to Dramiḍācārya in the writings of Yāmuna, Rāmānuja, and Vedāntadeśika. For example, Rāmānuja in his *Śrībhāṣya*, 2.2.3, quotes the authority of Dramiḍācārya (mentioning the name) in support of his position. Suffice it to say that Dramiḍācārya was a greatly respected Vedāntin who flourished in the period we are considering.

Daya Krishna's comment on Bhartṛprapañca is baffling. He seems to doubt that Bhartṛprapañca is a Vedāntin though he does not openly say so. Look at his carefully worded comment.

As for Bhartṛprapañca, he is supposed to be an exception to the general position held by *most* (emphasis mine) Vedāntins that Brahman cannot be known by reasoning, and that it can only be known through the *śruti* or perhaps even through intuition.¹⁶

Every Vedāntin holds the view that Brahman can be known only through *śruti* and not through reasoning. If Brahman can be known through reasoning, then there is no need for *śruti*. The work of *śruti* cannot be performed by any other *pramāṇa*; and so all Vedāntins without any exception hold the view that *śruti* alone is the *pramāṇa* for knowing Brahman, as conveyed by the *sūtra*, 1.1.3, '*śāstra yonitvāt.*' Daya Krishna is, therefore, wrong when he says that 'most' Vedāntins hold this view. Daya Krishna's aim is to separate Bhartṛprapañca from the school of Vedānta on the ground that he holds a view different from that held by the Vedāntins. So the question to be considered is whether Bhartṛprapañca is an exception to the Vedāntic view that Brahman can be known only through *śruti*. The answer is no. There are evidences to show that Bhartṛprapañca wrote an extensive commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*. Also, he wrote commentaries on two other Upaniṣads, *Īsa* and *Chāndogya*. In addition to these, he wrote a commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras*. Unfortunately, none of these works are available to us. Hiriyanna has reconstructed his philosophy on the basis of the discussion of his views in Śaṅkara's commentary on the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad* and Sureśvara's *Vārtika* thereon; and his reconstruction is both delightfully insightful and fairly informative.¹⁷ What is relevant for the present discussion is Bhartṛprapañca's theory of *pramāṇa-samuccaya* according to which perception is as valid as *śruti*. While perception reveals diversity and also validates it,

śruti gives us knowledge of unity as well as diversity. The difference between Bhartṛprapañca and Śaṅkara comes to this:

Śaṅkara explains the reference to variety in the Upaniṣads as a mere *anuvāda* of what is empirically known and so, as carrying no new authority with it. Thus he restricts the scope of the scripture, as an independent and primary *pramāṇa*, to the teaching of unity alone.¹⁸

Bhartṛprapañca does not differ from Śaṅkara and others in upholding the view that Brahman which is one and which is the sole cause of the entire manifested universe can be known only through *śruti*. In addition to *pramāṇa-samuccaya*, he also advocates *jñāna-karma-samuccaya* which is an entirely different matter. There is no need to discuss about 'intuition' mentioned by Daya in this context as it does not find a place in the *pramāṇa-vicāra* of the Vedāntin. For knowing anything through *śruti* or through any other *pramāṇa* what is required is the *vṛtti* of the mind, and nothing more.

It appears that Brahmadata wrote a commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras*.¹⁹ Yāmuna in *siddhi-traya* refers to him as one of the commentators on the *Brahma-sūtras*.²⁰ But Brahmadata's work is not available to us. It is difficult to say whether Brahmadata was a Bhedābheda-vādin like Bhartṛprapañca. Probably he was. It is equally difficult to say whether he was an Advaitin or not. In so far as he identifies the *jīva* and Brahman, we can say that he is an Advaitin. However, he holds the view that the *jīva* is non-eternal (*anitya*) because it originates from Brahman and merges into it at the time of liberation. No Vedāntin of any school would accept this view of Brahmadata. Like Bhartṛprapañca, he too stresses the importance of meditation, variously called *upāsanā*, *bhāvanā*, *prasāṅkhyāna*, for attaining immediate knowledge of Brahman from the Upaniṣadic texts. Sureśvara in his *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi* refutes Brahmadata's view regarding *bhāvanā*.²¹ The theory of *jñāna-karma-samuccaya* advocated by Bhartṛprapañca and Brahmadata is rejected by Śaṅkara and other Advaitins. The

point to be noted here is that Brahmadaṭṭa was a Vedāntin like Bhartṛprapañca, but not an Advaitin. Dvaitins and Advaitins, Bhedābheda-vādins and Viśiṣṭādvaitins—all of them hold that their position is supported by the Upaniṣads and also by the *Brahma-sūtras*. If Brahmadaṭṭa is an advocate of *bhedābheda*, as mentioned by Daya Krishna, his standpoint, too, one may argue is supported by the *Brahma-sūtras*.

Daya Krishna excludes Gauḍapāda from his purview as the latter did not write a commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras*, acknowledging at the same time Gauḍapāda's contribution to Advaita. But he makes a damaging statement about the five Vedāntins listed by him. I have two comments here. First, the thinkers listed by him must have been foremost Vedāntins in the period between Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara. Otherwise Śaṅkara, Yāmuna, Rāmānuja, and others would not have discussed their views and acknowledged their indebtedness to them. That we do not have access to their writings is, indeed, a severe handicap to us, and so we have to rely upon these authorities to whom their writings were available and who were highly competent to evaluate their contribution. This should not be dismissed as a case of *argumentum ad verecundiam* as Daya seems to do when he says that 'they have been included just because they have been mentioned by someone else'. Second, it is wrong to say that their standing in the tradition is marginal. With some imagination and open-mindedness it will not be difficult for us to visualize the kind of personalities that Bodhāyana and Bhartṛprapañca (to consider only two of the five Vedāntins mentioned earlier) must have been to have caught the attention of Rāmānuja, Śaṅkara, and others. As stated earlier, Rāmānuja says that he follows, like others before him, the explanation of the *Brahma-sūtras* given by Bodhāyana. Śaṅkara will not pick up Bhartṛprapañca's point of view as his *pūrva-pakṣa* quite often if it is poor, unsubstantial, and inconsequential. It may be mentioned here that we have inherited four models for explaining the relation among Brahman, *jīva*, and the world. They are: the *bheda* model, the

abheda model, the *bhedābheda* model, and the *viśiṣṭādvaita* model. We owe the *bhedābheda* model to Bhartṛprapañca. Bhāskara modified and developed it in his own way later on. This model has influenced philosophical thinking throughout the ages down to the present day. In the words of Hiriyanna:

It is strange that the name of this old Vedāntin should now be all but forgotten, though references to him are fairly plentiful in Indian philosophical literature; and the strangeness of it will appear all the greater when we remember that Brahman or the Absolute, as conceived by him is of a type that has commended itself to some of the most profound philosophers. Like so many other old thinkers, Bhartṛprapañca appears not as the author of an independent system, but as an interpreter of the Upaniṣads.²²

It must be emphasized here that the influence of these traditional Vedāntins is not marginal, but central.

V

Daya Krishna argues that the Vedāntic thought as embodied in the *Brahma-sūtras* was not seriously taken by other systems. He mentions in this connection the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* and the *Nyāya-sūtras*. Depending on Nakamura, he says that, while the former refutes the Vedāntic position in a couple of places, the latter does not. According to Radhakrishnan, the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* is probably 'contemporaneous' with the *Brahma-sūtras*. There are reasons to think that the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* must be earlier than the *Brahma-sūtras* because the latter, after answering the Vaiśeṣika objection that Brahman cannot be the first cause in 2.2.11, criticizes the atomic theory of the Vaiśeṣika in 2.2.12–16. Dasgupta is of the view that the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* is probably pre-Buddhistic.²³ In any case the fact remains that, even though Kaṇāda was familiar with the Vedānta concepts such as *avidyā* and *pratyagātman* and also with the Vedānta standpoint

generally, he did not criticize Vedānta in his *sūtras*. If the *Nyāya-sūtras* does not refer to the *Brahma-sūtras*, the reason must be, as many scholars have suggested, that it was also earlier than the *Brahma-sūtras*. If both Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and Udayana who refute Advaita, do not mention the name of Śaṅkara, it does not follow that Śaṅkara's pre-eminence was not established by that time. When the views of others are refuted, sometimes the names of those who hold them are mentioned, and very often they are not mentioned. Since both the conventions have been followed in the tradition, the absence of specific reference to Śaṅkara in the writings of Jayanta and Udayana does not prove Daya's hypothesis.

VI

Daya Krishna tries to support his thesis by citing a passage which forms the conclusion of Udayana's *Ātmatattva-viveka*.²⁴ A few observations will be helpful before we consider his comment on this passage. The context is about the attainment of release and the means thereto; and Udayana sets forth some preliminaries in this connection. He says that first of all one should know the nature of the Self from scripture. Following this one should know that the Self is different from the objects to be discarded such as the mind, the senses, and the body through the help of reasoning. Thirdly, one should practise moral and spiritual discipline for the purpose of controlling the mind and reflect on the Self. It looks as though Udayana describes the preliminary discipline as an Advaitin would do. The process of reflection may be such that the practitioner may think of the external world alone oblivious of the Self, or of the Self manifesting itself as the external world, or of the absence of the external world, or of the Self as different from the manifested world along with its cause, or of the Self as the sole reality, or of the Self as the indeterminate reality devoid of all distinctions. Thus, there are six stages of reflection of

which the succeeding one is intended to replace the preceding one. Each stage is supposed to be a means, a gateway (*dvāra*) to release. According to Udayana, the last one alone, which represents the standpoint of Nyāya, is the right means to the goal whereas the remaining ones are the wrong ones (*apadvāra*) to be discarded, even though one can find a *śruti* text in support of each standpoint. Interestingly, each stage of reflection is presented against a metaphysical standpoint. The Mīmāṃsaka who is brought in first of all believes in the reality of the things of the external world. Bhāskara, the *tridaṇḍin*, who is presented next, holds the view that the external world is the manifestation of the supreme Self. Then comes the view which denies the reality of the external world (*arthākāra-sūnyam paramārthataḥ*). Udayana characterizes this view as the gateway to *Vedānta-sāstra*. The point that is sought to be conveyed here is that the spiritual aspirant should meditate on the Self which is devoid of the world (*niṣprapañca ātmā dhyeyaḥ mumukṣubhiḥ*). After this is the turn of the Sāṃkhya who holds that the Self or *puruṣa* is different from *prakṛti*. Thereafter the view of the Advaitin, according to whom the Self alone (*kevala ātmā*) is real and nothing else, is presented. And lastly there is the Nyāya view which holds that the Self free from all distinctions is not apprehended in a determinate way. On the contrary, it shines or shows itself in its indeterminate form (*nirvikalpakenaiva pratibhāsate*). Since the Nyāya standpoint is the final one (*caramāvasthā*), Udayana speaks of it as the *caramavedānta-upasamhāra*. Since the Self is indeterminate, the Upaniṣad says that it is beyond the grasp of both the mind and speech. This indeterminate cognition of the Self will cease of its own accord in course of time; and Udayana elucidates this Nyāya position by citing the Upaniṣadic text which says: 'Of him who is without desires, who is free from desires, the objects of whose desires have been attained and to whom all objects of desire are but the Self—the organs do not depart. Being but Brahman, he is merged in Brahman.'²⁵

It may be noted that Mīmāṃsā, Bhāskara-mata, etc. are not the only systems mentioned by Udayana in the meditative scheme. In addition to them, he also mentions Cārvāka, Yogācāra, Śūnya-vāda, and Śākta-mata in the scheme associating them with the first, second, third, and fourth stages respectively. Though Udayana is clear in presenting the scheme as well as in his understanding of the systems, the addition of four more systems has created some problems to the readers. To think that Udayana has placed Mīmāṃsā and Cārvāka, or the Bhāskara-mata and Yogācāra, or the gateway position of Vedānta and Śūnya-vāda or Sāṃkhya and Śāktism on a footing of equality is wrong. Udayana carefully distinguishes the systems mentioned first from those mentioned thereafter in each pair by using two different words when he introduces them in the scheme. He uses '*upasamhāra*' when he speaks of Mīmāṃsā, Bhāskara-mata, and so on, which are the systems first in each pair, and '*utthāna*' in respect of Cārvāka, etc. which are second in each pair. While the former conveys the sense of validity (*prāmāṇya*) for the system based as it is on a scriptural text, the latter suggests the pseudo-validity (*prāmāṇyābhāsa*) of the system which has arisen.²⁶ The mentioning of two systems at a particular meditative stage does not mean or imply that the two systems are equated by Udayana. It must be borne in mind that the two systems mentioned at each stage are not at all allied systems (*samāna-tantras*): they are neither metaphysical cousins nor spiritual partners. It requires extraordinary courage even to imagine the possibility of an alliance, as in the case of Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika, or Śāṃkhya and Yoga, between two systems mentioned in each pair. Nor is it possible to equate one system with another listed in the pair. It is, therefore, surprising when Daya Krishna says that 'the Mīmāṃsā position is equated almost with that of the Cārvāka' in the scheme.²⁷ The idea of equation or near equation between Mīmāṃsā and Cārvāka is untenable since they have different metaphysical bases, different epistemological theories, and different soteriological perspectives. One has to

extend this line of reasoning with suitable modifications with regard to the remaining systems which are paired. Udayana has not committed this egregious blunder of equating the Mīmāṃsā position with that of the Cārvāka, or of the Bhāskara philosophy with that of the Yogācāra, and so on in the scheme.

Udayana has listed a total of ten philosophical perspectives. One will get into trouble if one enumerates these perspectives one after another in a series. Consider the following passage which gives a summary statement of the text we are discussing:

While meditating upon the Self there are stages of realization through which one has to pass. Karma Mīmāṃsā, materialism, the Vedānta of Bhāskara, idealistic Buddhism, the Vedānta system in general, nihilistic Buddhism, Sāṃkhya, the Śākta cult, the Advaita system, and the final stage, which Udayana calls 'final Vedānta', equating it with the Nyāya school, are shown to be the stages, each succeeding stage being superior to the precious one²⁸

To take only the first two systems, would it be right to say that the materialism of Cārvāka is superior to *Karma Mīmāṃsā* as stated above? Does Udayana say that? Anyone with a little acquaintance with Indian philosophy will shudder to think that Udayanācārya, a great luminary capable of shedding light on abstruse metaphysical issues and subtle logical problems, will provide us with a hierarchy of disciplinary scheme which will show the Cārvāka position to be superior to that of Mīmāṃsā.

The standpoint of Advaita is mentioned only once in the fifth stage and not in the third and the fifth, as stated by Daya Krishna. Since Udayana uses the expression '*Vedānta-dvāra*' and not just 'Vedānta', there is the need for extra care in explaining the third stage. Also, one should take into consideration the fact that Advaita is specifically mentioned in the fifth stage and that there is no reason why a system should be accorded a special status by listing it in two places in the scheme. Nārāyaṇācārya Ātreya in his commentary on the text explains

the expression as follows: ‘*dvārasābdena nānārthābhāve tātpariyam, śāstrasya dvāramātram tat.*’²⁹ An important attitude of the mind, a certain conviction arising from *nityānitya-vastu-viveka*, which is an indispensable preliminary to Advaita, is mentioned in the third stage. The description of the stages as well as the identification of each one with a certain system is clear. This does not mean that this is the only way in which the stages of meditative discipline can be presented. One can present a different scheme. However, our aim here is to understand Udayana who undoubtedly has a plan underlying the sequential arrangement of the stages of meditative discipline.

I shall close my review of Udayana’s meditative stages with two comments from the standpoint of Advaita. First of all, the distinction that Udayana seeks to make between Advaita and ‘*carama-vedānta*’ can be questioned. According to Advaita, the fifth stage itself where the Self is left alone transcending the distinction between the seer and the seen, the witness and the witnessed, and so on, is the final one. There are many Upaniṣadic texts which, making a distinction between the stage of *avidyā* and that of *vidyā*, point out that all kinds of distinctions which are made in the former are absent in the latter. Consider, for example, the following text from the *Bṛhadāraṇyaka*:

When there is duality, as it were, then one smells something, one sees something,... one knows something. But when to the knower of Brahman everything has become the Self, then what should one smell, and through what, what should one think and through what?³⁰

Śaṅkara argues that an entity which is *saguṇa* can be known through the mind and also can be described through words, but not an entity which is *nirguṇa*. Since the Self which is one and non-dual is *nirguṇa*, it falls outside the scope of both the mind and speech; it is, that is to say, both trans-conceptual and trans-linguistic. That is why the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad* describes the Self as that ‘from which words, along with the mind, turn

back as they fail to reach it'.³¹ What Udayana characterizes as 'carama-vedānta', in support of which he cites the *Taittirīya* text mentioned above, is no other than Advaita. A person who has realized the distinctionless Self which is trans-conceptual and trans-linguistic, remains as the Self, free from all desires (*niṣkāmaḥ*), having attained the Self (*āptakāmaḥ*) which is everything, and so on as described by the Upaniṣad which Udayana finally quotes.³² So, the *carama-vedānta* about which Udayana is legitimately eloquent is not different from Advaita. The fifth is not the penultimate, but the final. By appropriating the Advaita position and making it his own, Udayana has paid the highest tribute to Advaita; for, to borrow the felicitous expression used by Suryanarayana Sastri in some other context, what is good enough to be appreciated is good enough to be appropriated.

Secondly, the reason given for discarding the Advaita standpoint is not satisfactory. The Advaitin, Udayana seems to argue, speaks of the Self as real, knowledge, and bliss, as one and non-dual, and so on; and the spiritual aspirant attains the 'determinate knowledge' of the Self. But the Self *per se*, maintains Udayana, is indeterminate because it is devoid of all distinctions and determinations: the Self, that is to say, is *nirvikalpa*; and so what is required is the indeterminate cognition of the Self (*ātmaviśaya-nirvikalpa-jñāna*). For attaining this cognition one has to move, according to him, beyond the stage of Advaita. There is no substance in this argument. Just as the Naiyāyika speaks of *nirvikalpaka-jñāna*, the Advaitin speaks of *akhaṇḍākāra-vṛtti-jñāna* which is final. The Self or Brahman is *akhaṇḍa*, that is, a homogeneous whole; and the final cognition which arises through the unfragmented, impartite *vṛtti* is *akhaṇḍa*. Cognition reflects the nature of the object: that is to say, as the object, so the cognition. That is why Śaṅkara says that knowledge is *vastu-tantra* with a view to showing how knowledge is totally different from *upāsanā*, which is *puruṣa-tantra*.³³ So, the *akhaṇḍa-jñāna* of the Advaitin is the same as the *nirvikalpa-jñāna* of the Naiyāyika; and the

explanation of the cessation of *akhaṇḍa-jñāna/nirvikalpa-jñāna* given by the Advaitin/Naiyāyika is surprisingly the same. The transition from the fifth to the sixth stage which Udayana suggests is uncalled for.

VII

Daya Krishna tries to get support for his thesis from Haribhadrasūri (AD 750), the Jaina thinker who wrote the famous *Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya* which gives an account of six philosophical systems.³⁴ Scholars are of the view that Haribhadra's work is a valuable one. In the beginning he states that Buddhism, Nyāya, Sāṃkhya, Jainism, Vaiśeṣika, and Mīmāṃsā are the six systems which he proposes to expound in his work.³⁵ He explains the systems in the same order in which he mentions them. Concluding the exposition of Mīmāṃsā, he observes that he has given a brief account of *āstika-darśanas*.³⁶ His connotation of *āstika-darśana* is different from the one that is usually given in the classification of systems into *āstika* and *nāstika*. A system which accepts the authority of the Veda is said to be *āstika*, and that which does not accept the authority of the Veda is *nāstika*. Following this principle, Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Sāṃkhya-Yoga, Pūrvamīmāṃsā, and Uttaramīmāṃsā are called *āstika-darśanas*, while Jainism, Buddhism, and Cārvāka are labelled *nāstika-darśanas*. It may be noted that the term '*āstika*' is also explained without reference to the Veda. According to this explanation, a person who believes in the other world which is attained in accordance with one's stock of *adṛṣṭa*, etc. for which Īśvara is the *sākṣin* is an *āstika*. One can even drop reference to Īśvara and explain the term with the remaining ideas, as done by Maṇibhadra in his commentary called *Laghuvṛtti*.³⁷ The six systems mentioned by Haribhadra in the beginning of his work are undoubtedly *āstika* because they believe in *paraloka* to which merit and demerit are the means. Haribhadra further says that we will have only

five *āstika* systems if we accept the view of those who hold that Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika which are allied systems may be treated as one. However, since there is the general view that there are six *darśanas* and not five, we may, Haribhadra suggests, make up the number by adding Lokāyata to the list.³⁸ In that case we will have six *darśanas*, but not six *āstika-darśanas* since Lokāyata is not an *āstika* system. In whatever way we identify the systems, either as *āstika-darśanas* or as just *darśanas*, there is no place for Advaita in the list. This proves, according to Daya, the non-existence of Vedānta as a significant philosophical force in the first millennium AD; otherwise, how should one account for the omission of Vedānta in the list given by Haribhadra?

The problem here is not about the connotation of the term 'āstika', but about the non-inclusion of Advaita as a system in the survey. It is surprising that the Yoga system also does not find a place in Haribhadra's survey. Even if one accepts AD 300 and not the second century BC as the date of the compilation of the *Yoga-sūtras* by Patañjali, there was a gap of more than three hundred years for anyone to take notice of it. It must be borne in mind that the yoga practices were well known even before Patañjali compiled them in the form of sūtras. The Upaniṣads, the *Mahābhārata* including the *Bhagavad-gītā*, Jainism, and Buddhism accepted yogic practices. Therefore, the Yoga system should not have been unknown to Haribhadra. In fact, because of its antiquity on the one hand and its influence on both Jainism and Buddhism on the other, Yoga should have been dominant during the period before Haribhadra. But still he does not discuss it in his work. The non-inclusion of the Yoga system does not mean its non-existence in the first millennium AD. Keeping the Upaniṣads in the background, the *Brahma-sūtras*, which gave an impressive shape and structure to the Vedāntic thought, received the attention of Bodhāyana, Bhartṛprapañca, and others. It must have been a formidable force to be reckoned with not only because of its coherent and comprehensive exposition of Vedānta, but also

because of its critique of other systems—Sāṃkhya and Mīmāṃsā, Vaiśeṣika, Buddhism, Jainism, and so on. If so, what could be the reason for the non-inclusion of Advaita and Yoga by Haribhadra in his survey? Though Sāṃkhya and Mīmāṃsā are *āstika-darśanas*, they have not provided a place for the Creator-God in their systems: both of them are anti-theistic. The historical development of the Vaiśeṣika shows that it was anti-Vedic in its pre-Buddhistic stage. Though the pre-Buddhistic Nyāya was in close association with Vedic exegesis, it gradually developed a secularized logic and slowly freed itself from its Vedic association. Thus, Nyāya was moving away from its Vedic moorings. Kuppaswami Sastri gives an account of the background of Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika, and Sāṃkhya, which is worth quoting *in extenso*:

Before the end of the Upaniṣadic period and prior to the advent of the Buddha, the Vedic scriptures embodying the results of the intuitive insight of the Vedic and the Upaniṣadic seers had asserted their authority so far as to persuade a large section of rationalistic thinkers to agree to play second fiddle to scriptural authorities. This should have resulted in the development of the pre-Buddhistic *nyāya* method in close association with Vedic exegesis and accounts for the earlier use of the term '*nyāya*' in the sense of 'the principles and the logical method of Mīmāṃsā exegetics'. This also accounts for the fact that, even after the disentanglement of the Nyāya logic from Vedic exegetics, the legislators of ancient India like Manu and Yājñavalkya emphatically recognized the importance and value of logical reasoning (*tarka*) in a correct comprehension of *dharma* as taught by the Vedas (*Manu*, XII. 105 and 106; *Yājñavalkya*, I. 3). Another section of rationalistic thinkers who did not agree to play second fiddle to scriptural authorities, perhaps developed and expounded rationalistic doctrines on independent lines, without subjecting themselves to the thralldom of Vedic religion and philosophy. Some of these doctrines perhaps

shaped themselves into the Sāṃkhya thought of the pre-Buddhistic stage, with a marked degree of hostility to Vedic ritualism. Some other doctrines of this kind gave rise to the pre-Buddhistic logic and metaphysics of the Vaiśeṣika, with a special leaning in favour of the inductive method of reasoning based on observation and analysis and with a simple rationalistic scheme of two sources of valid knowledge—perception and inference (*pratyakṣa* and *anumāna*). It is very likely that the anti-Vedic speculations of the pre-Buddhistic Vaiśeṣika paved the way for the development and systematization of Buddhism.... Thus, the *nyāya* of the Vedic exegesis and logic and metaphysics of the early *anti-Vedic Vaiśeṣika* came to fraternize with each other and gave rise to two sister-schools of philosophical reasoning—the Vaiśeṣika school mainly concerned with inductive observation and analysis, and the Nyāya school chiefly concerned with the formulation and elucidation of the principles of ratiocination on the basis of inductive reasoning.³⁹

Buddhism was openly anti-Vedic. Haribhadra was willing to admit Lokāyata, which is anti-Vedic, as one of the six *darśanas*. It follows that the six systems which receive Haribhadra's attention in his work are non-Vedic, overtly or covertly as the case may be; and so he elucidates them in his work. Yoga and Advaita stand apart from these systems. Though Yoga has borrowed its metaphysics from Sāṃkhya, it is not atheistic as it has provided a place for God as an object of meditation in its scheme of spiritual discipline. That is why it is characterized as '*śeśvara-sāṃkhya*'. So far as Vedānta is concerned, it holds that Brahman is both the material and efficient cause (*abhinna-nimittopādāna-kāraṇa*) of the world. According to the Upaniṣads, Brahman is not only cosmic (*saprapañca*), but also as acosmic (*niṣprapañca*). Advaita which has developed both these aspects

non-Vedic; and so Haribhadra could have omitted them in his survey. From this one should not draw the conclusion that both Yoga and Vedānta did not count very much in the first millennium AD. Buddhism has borrowed a great deal from the Upaniṣads. Just as it has influenced Advaitins such as Gauḍapāda, even so it has been influenced by the Upaniṣadic ideas. One can trace the idealistic thinking of Mahāyāna Buddhism in the Upaniṣads. So, if Nāgārjuna, Maitreya-nātha, and others 'do not show any awareness of the *Brahma-sūtras*',⁴⁰ it does not mean that Vedānta was not dominant during that period. Buddhism did not come into existence in a vacuum. It came in the wake of the Upaniṣads. If so, why should it not be said that Nāgārjuna and others who were aware of the idealistic trend in the Upaniṣads and who were benefited by it did not feel the necessity to discuss it in their writings?

VIII

The Vedāntic thought of the Upaniṣads constitutes the *philosophia perennis* which has endured through the ages. Bādarāyaṇa's attempt to shape and synthesize the Upaniṣadic ideas in his *Brahma-sūtras*, perhaps the last, is easily the best that is available to us. He has provided a strong philosophical base for theism and absolutism, which have influenced the development of Indian philosophy in general and the systems of Vedānta in particular. To deny the influence of the *Brahma-sūtras* at any period of time is to deny the influence of the Upaniṣads on the divergent schools of thought. The Vedānta philosophy of the Upaniṣads is, indeed, the Rock of Ages, which one has to encounter and reckon with in doing philosophy.

Notes and References

1. *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research (JICPR)*, Special Issue: Historiography of Civilizations. June 1996, pp. 201-7.

2. Ibid., p. 207.
3. See Śaṅkara's Commentary on the *Taittirīya Upaniṣad*, 2.8.
4. *JICPR* (Special Issue), p. 204.
5. Ibid., p. 205.
6. Ibid., p. 206.
7. Ibid., pp. 200–1.
8. Ibid., p. 202.
9. Ibid., p. 203.
10. *Śrībhāṣya*, 1.1.1. See also S. Dasgupta, *A History of Indian Philosophy*, Motilal Banarsidass, reprint, 1992, Delhi, Vol. 1, p. 433.
11. See S.S. Raghavachar (ed. and tr.), *Vedārtha-saṁgraha*, Sri Ramakrishna Ashrama, 1978, Mysore, sec. 130, p. 102.
12. *JICPR* (Special Issue), June 1996, p. 202.
13. *Māṇḍūkya-kārikā*, 2.32 with Śaṅkara's commentary and Ānandagiri's gloss thereon.
14. Sarvajñātman's *Samkṣepa-sārīraka*, 3. 220–21: 'The Vākyakāra first explains the theory of transformation, and then gradually giving it up holds the view (of transfiguration which is) nearer (to the Advaitic doctrine than the previous one), and then says that all the modifications are only empirically real. Thus he maintains the Advaita standpoint.' (220) 'The venerable Bhāṣyakāra also states that the adorable supreme Self is of the nature of the inward Self. And this holds good in the view of Advaita and not when the theory of transformation is maintained.' (221)
15. T.M.P. Mahadevan, *Gauḍapāda: A Study in Early Advaita*, University of Madras, fourth edition, 1975, Madras, p. 234.
16. *JICPR* (Special Issue), June 1996, p. 202.
17. M. Hiriyanna, *Indian Philosophical Studies I*, Kavyalaya Publishers, Mysore, 1957, pp. 79–94.
18. Ibid., p. 87.
19. See M. Hiriyanna's article, 'Brahmadatta: An Old Vedāntin', *Journal of Oriental Research*, 1928, pp. 1–9.
20. See Yāmunācārya's *Siddhi-traya* edited with an English commentary by R. Ramanujacharya, Ubhaya Vedanta Granthamala Book Trust, 1972, Madras, pp. 9–10 (Sanskrit text).
21. *Naiṣkarmya-siddhi*, 1.67.

22. M. Hiriyanna, op. cit., p. 79.
23. S. Dasgupta, op. cit., p. 280.
24. N.S. Dravid (ed. and tr.), *Ātmatattva-viveka* by Udayanācārya, IAS, 1995, Shimla, pp. 435–36; also *matattva-viveka* with the *Nārāyaṇī* commentary, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, 1940, pp. 448–52. I am thankful to Professor S. Sankaranarayanan of Adyar Library who was kind enough to read with me the problematic passage from the *Ātmatattva-viveka* and explain its purport in the light of the commentaries thereon.
25. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 4.4.6.
26. See the *Nārāyaṇī* commentary on the text, op. cit., p. 448.
27. *JICPR* (Special Issue), June 1996, p. 207.
28. Summary stated by V. Varadachari in Karl H. Potter, *Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies*, Vol. II, Indian Metaphysics and Epistemology: The Tradition of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika up to Gaṅgeśa, Motilal, Delhi, 1977, pp. 556–57.
29. *Nārāyaṇī*, op. cit., p. 449.
30. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 4.5.15.
31. *Ibid.*, 4.4.
32. *Bṛhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad*, 4.4.6.
33. See his commentary on the *Brahma-sūtras*, I.1.4.
34. *Ṣaḍdarśana-samuccaya* with Maṇibhadra's commentary on it called *Laghuvṛtti*, Chowkhamba Sanskrit Series, No. 95, 1905. I thank Professor V.K.S.N. Raghavan of the Department of Vaishnavism, Madras University, who helped me by making available the texts I needed in this connection.
35. *Ibid.*, v. 3.
36. *Ibid.*, v. 77.
37. *Ibid.*, commentary on v. 77.
38. *Ibid.*, v. 78.
39. S. Kuppaswami Sastri, *A Primer of Indian Logic*, KSRI, 3rd edn., Madras, 1961, pp. ix–xi.
40. *JICPR* (Special Issue), p. 205.

(b) An Illusive Historiography of the View that
the World is *Māyā*: Professor Daya Krishna on
the Historiography of Vedānta

SURESH CHANDRA

A common practitioner knows Vedānta, not through its intricate philosophical arguments concerning the identity of 'I' with 'Brahman' or through the subtleties of Brahman-consciousness, but through its view that all that appears to one's senses is *māyā*. And very few of these practitioners seem to know Śaṅkara. The Śaṅkara they know is not a historical figure; he is a mythological figure identified with Lord Śiva. However, their ignorance of historical Śaṅkara does not prohibit them for believing that the phenomenal world that appears to their senses is deprived of all reality; it is the product of *māyā*. *Māyā* is distinguished from an ordinary illusion. An illusory bread cannot satisfy the hunger of any practitioner, because it cannot be eaten. But the bread that is baked in the oven of *māyā* is not only eaten, it also satisfies ones hunger. Of course, one can stretch the word 'illusion' to such an extent that not only is the bread illusory, but also its eating and the consequent satisfaction of hunger. But the psychologists would not allow such a use of 'illusion'. *Māyā* may be illusion-like, but not technically an illusion. The responsibility for the generation of *māyā* is given to *avidyā* or 'ignorance'. It is the *avidyā*, or act of ignorance, that has led to the generation of such diverse objects as ducks and rabbits. Once knowledge dawns on us, the products of *avidyā* will be destroyed. There would then be no phenomenal world, the world that distinguishes and differentiates ducks from rabbits.

Concerning Vedānta, Professor Daya Krishna accepts that it is 'the most dominant and distinctive philosophy of India' of our days.¹ Its present impact and dominant position can be seen by the fact that some Indian scholars have converted even Wittgenstein into a kind of *Māyāvādin*—a 'grammatical *Māyāvādin*'. If Śaṅkara was a 'metaphysical *Māyāvādin*',

Wittgenstein would appear as a 'grammatical Māyāvādin'. 'Avidyā' creates the reality that is presented to our senses, the reality of ducks as distinguished from the reality of rabbits, says a Śāṅkarite. 'Grammar' creates the reality that is presented to our senses; it is the grammar that distinguishes ducks from the rabbits, says an Indian Wittgensteinian. It hardly matters that an Indian looks at Wittgenstein through some alien eyes. It is quite a difficult, if not an impossible, task to alienate oneself from one's roots. Wittgenstein's remarks on grammar can easily be given a Māyāvādin interpretation. A Śāṅkarite finds 'avidyā' as the index of what happens in the world. Not very unlike him, an Indian Wittgensteinian is found remarking, 'The grammar of language is the index of what happens in the world, that is, 'Grammar tells what kind of object anything is' (*Investigations*, sect. 373).² Remove *avidyā*, the phenomenal world would wax and wane as a whole, there would remain no more ducks to be distinguished from the rabbits, says a Vedāntin. Remove the grammar of language, the other one means, the world would wax and wane as a whole, there would remain no more ducks to be distinguished from the rabbits. 'Grammar' is a good substitute for 'avidyā', their creative powers are the same.

Wittgenstein introduced the duck-rabbit picture to introduce us to the puzzles of perception.³ Panneerselvam, an Indian Wittgensteinian, got the opportunity to compare Śāṅkara with Wittgenstein by extending the duck-rabbit imagery to the snake-rope imagery of Śāṅkara. What was a duck at one time later appears as a rabbit in Wittgenstein's picture. Snake appears as a rope in Śāṅkara. 'It is seen as snake first and later as rope.'⁴ But it is also possible that one person sees the same picture as the picture of a duck which the other sees as the picture of a rabbit. Similarly, the snake for one is the rope for the other. Hanson presents this possibility by imagining Kepler and Tycho seeing the sun. Kepler saw the sun stationary, and earth moving round the sun. Tycho, on the other hand, saw the earth stationary and the sun moving round

the earth.⁵ Wittgenstein's own aspect-analysis is possible. A German may be looking at Wittgenstein in one way, an Indian in another. They have their own 'world-pictures'; they have taken their birth in two different cultures; all their traditions are different. Wittgenstein's notion of a 'world-picture', developed in *On Certainty*, is even more interesting than the duck-rabbit picture or Hanson's Kepler-Tycho pair. The world-picture that I have inherited 'is not based on grounds. It is not reasonable (or unreasonable). It is there.'⁶ And 'I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness.'⁷ This is not the occasion for expounding Wittgenstein's notion of a world-picture. It has been done elsewhere.⁸ What I wish to emphasize is that I have been thrown into a pre-established tradition. My thinking has taken its shape and form in this tradition. Of course, it is possible for me to change the world-picture that I have inherited, to jump out of my tradition. But then I have to look at the world quite differently; I have to create a different understanding of the world.

Daya Krishna may not appreciate my analogy of 'grammar' with '*avidyā*', that grammar has the same creative power as *avidyā*. For the simple, but good reason that he does not subscribe to the view that Vedānta is the most pervasive and persuasive philosophical thought of India. The propagandists of Vedānta, though few in number, have successfully misled the educated elite of India into thinking that Indian philosophy means Vedānta philosophy. The truth, according to Daya Krishna, is that Vedānta philosophy plays a very minor role in the historical growth of Indian philosophy. To prove his point, Daya Krishna has not conducted any kind of survey of the practitioners of Vedānta, either from the cities or from the countryside. He is not concerned with the common or uncommon practitioners of the faith. His project is theoretical; he concentrates on the theoreticians of Vedānta. Those theoreticians who had the abilities wrote books, and the less able ones had to remain contented with writing commentaries on those books. Of course, some of these commentaries were

thicker than the original works of which they were commentaries. Daya Krishna has restricted himself to certain texts and the commentaries on those texts.

Daya Krishna wishes to isolate for study those classical texts in which Vedānta was expounded or preached or propagated in any fashion. The historical position of the text would also establish the historical position of Vedānta. So Daya Krishna has clearly avoided the pre-textual age, the age before the invention of two-dimensional script. Even during the age of script some people might have preferred oral delivery, as in our days some people continue talking without having any ability to write. However, these issues cannot and should not be raised. For Daya Krishna thinks that the historical origin of Vedānta can be established with conviction by studying the relevant classical texts. And these texts would also establish with conviction whether Vedānta ever had a powerful sway over the Indian philosophical thought. Quite interestingly he has taken up those classical texts which were handled by Śaṅkara himself. For Śaṅkara, the *Bhagavad-gītā*, the Upaniṣads and the *Brahma-sūtras* were embodiment of all philosophical virtues, which for him were the same as Vedāntic virtues. Therefore, Śaṅkara wrote commentaries on these texts. According to him, as Daya Krishna points out, 'the source of Indian philosophy lies in these three texts.'⁹ By Indian philosophy, as is obvious, Śaṅkara meant Vedānta. All else was nothing but playing cards. Daya Krishna wishes to prove Śaṅkara wrong.

Out of the three texts on which Śaṅkara commented, Daya Krishna gives his full attention to one, side glance to the other, and no thought given to the third. The text to which no attention has been paid is *Bhagavat Gītā*. May be because Daya Krishna fixes the First Millennium AD as the time when Vedānta, according to him, raised its head in the philosophical scene of India, but no precise date for *Bhagavad-gītā* has yet been fixed. So even if this text embodies Vedāntic thought we remain ignorant about its origin, therefore, perhaps Daya

Krishna ignores it. Upaniṣads too have been brushed aside. They too have a fluid history. They 'continued to be composed till as late as the thirteenth century, that is, a long time after Śaṅkara wrote his commentaries on them.'¹⁰ So only *Brahma-sūtras* remain to be attended, two other important texts were given only first-aid and released. They were not serious cases. Daya Krishna fixes AD 50 as the probable date for the birth of *Brahma-sūtras*. If this date is reliable then Vedānta takes its birth when all the orthodox and heterodox systems were already in their youth. And this new-born babe was certainly not looked after properly by the philosophers for centuries to come. Whether a text has been looked after or not, depends on the fact whether it has been commented or not. For centuries to come *Brahma-sūtras* remained uncommented upon. Daya Krishna gives no importance to certain commentators, who for him may be minor or slightly deviated from the ideal interpretation of Vedānta, namely, Bodhāyana (AD 350), Dramiḍācārya (AD 525), Bhartṛprapāṅca (AD 550), Viśwarūpadeva (AD 600), and Brahmadata (AD 660). Therefore, he is surprised: '*Brahma-sūtras* remained entirely unnoticed until the appearance of Śaṅkara who wrote his commentary on them.'¹¹ Being noticed by minor commentators was as good as not being noticed at all. Daya Krishna wishes to show that all the centuries from the time *Brahma-sūtras* were composed till the arrival of Śaṅkara on the scene, the Indian academic world had no impact of Vedānta. No standard commentaries were written, so no impact is demonstrated. But what about the practitioners of the Vedānta faith? Did they also require commentaries? Were they also removed from the scene because no commentaries on *Brahma-sūtras* were coming to them? In the context of India, philosophy has been detached from its practitioners only from the time of the colonial invasion. But no philosophical system that has been discussed by Daya Krishna is the product of colonial subjugation. Too many commentaries do not necessarily imply that they would attract the practitioners. Too many cooks spoil the

broth is a well-known saying. There is every possibility that too many commentators may confuse the practitioners, and instead of conversion to the system they may run away from the system. Vedānta attracted its practitioners, not through its abstract logical argumentations but through its simple analogies, so simple that even a child could understand them. And in this direction Śāṅkara made things easier.

So far as the Vedānta academic world is concerned, it was dull not only between *Brahma-sūtras* and Śāṅkara, according to Daya Krishna, the situation was no better during the post-Śāṅkara days. Even the days of Śāṅkara were not as rosy as were 'made out by his admirers and the author of the *Śāṅkaradigvijaya*.'¹² Daya Krishna simply gives no importance to the so-called *Digvijaya* of Śāṅkara. According to him 'there is little evidence of the so-called *Digvijaya* as it is the philosophers of the other schools who continue to outnumber the Vedāntins in the centuries after Śāṅkara.'¹³ According to the statistical analysis of Daya Krishna, the period in the first millennium AD that produced only 'eight Vedāntins' produced '117 Buddhist thinkers', '27 Jaina thinkers' and Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers, 13 (9+4)'.¹⁴ Perhaps the situation of Vedānta had been little improved if Śāṅkara had conducted his *Digvijaya* in a slightly different fashion. There is a story that Śāṅkara had to face a woman in discussion. Being a bachelor monk he had no experience of a family life. In order to defeat the woman in discussion he decided to have the required experiences. So he entered into the body of a prince, and lived the life of a married prince. He should have stayed in the body of the prince a little longer. He should have completed his *Digvijaya* as a prince. Then he had a chance to physically exterminate the Buddhists, the Jainas and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas who were trying to outnumber the Vedāntins. An academic war was no good. A political war would have brought better results. But this is a possibility which was quite risky. The bigger kings of the first millennium AD used to run over the territories of the smaller kings. But the defeat of these smaller kings was always

short-lived. They faced only temporary humiliation. As soon as the big king returned to his capital, the smaller kings declared themselves free. Perhaps the political victories were more short-lived than the academic victories. In having an academic war against the opponents Śāṅkara decided the right course of action. The fact that the opponents of Vedānta outnumbered the Vedāntins 'in the centuries after Śāṅkara' cannot be produced as an evidence against Śāṅkara's *Digvijaya*. People change loyalties. 'Śāṅkara had a grand *Digvijaya*; he might have defeated all his opponents, including the Buddhists, the Jains and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas. But the disciples of Śāṅkara failed to retain the academic empire of Śāṅkara. It was too big for them. And they did not have the abilities of Śāṅkara. So the empire might have collapsed.

The question that does not occur to Daya Krishna is to see whether there was any other scholar belonging to any other school who was as much academically competent as Śāṅkara. Was there any Buddhist or Jaina or Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika scholar who could challenge Śāṅkara on his face? Of course many of them challenged him, and they were also defeated. But we are not to accept the words of the drum-beaters of Śāṅkara. Let us use our own faculty of judgement. Was there any other scholar of Śāṅkara's time whose work excelled that of Śāṅkara both in quality and quantity? Was there a Buddhist scholar who established his credentials in Buddhism as much as Śāṅkara established in Vedānta? Or, a Jaina who produced as much work on Jaina philosophy as Śāṅkara produced on Vedānta philosophy. If we see the quality and quantity of Śāṅkara's work, then no scholar of Śāṅkara's time, belonging to any other school of thought, produced a matching work. Daya Krishna has not cited the name of a single other scholar who was a match to Śāṅkara during his lifetime. Then why should he doubt *Śāṅkaradigvijaya*. Instead of bringing the big list of scholars belonging to different schools, Daya Krishna should have unearthed only one such scholar who did better academic work than Śāṅkara, then so far as we are concerned

Śaṅkara's *Digvijaya* was only a fraud. So long as the name of such a scholar is not brought to our notice, for us *Śaṅkaradigvijaya* would remain genuine. We simply have no reason to doubt Śaṅkara's credentials. Of course, Daya Krishna has succeeded in exposing Śaṅkara's disciples.

In order to win his case Daya Krishna has presented some 'post-Śaṅkara' philosophers as 'the contemporaries of Śaṅkara'. According to Daya Krishna, 'The first clear cut reference to Vedānta as a distinctive school of philosophy occurs in the work of Bhavya or *Bhāvaviveka* in AD 550, that is, more than five hundred years after the composition of the *Brahma-sūtras* and about 150 years before Śaṅkara appears on the scene.'¹⁵ So AD 700 is Śaṅkara's time. This is further confirmed when Daya Krishna divides 'the presence of Vedānta in the first millennium AD in two parts, the first relating to the period after the *Brahma-sūtras* and before Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* in the early eighth century AD and the second after Śaṅkara, that is, roughly from AD 700–1000.'¹⁶ So Śaṅkara's time is roughly AD 700. The time of Śaṅkara's *Bhāṣya* is 'early eighth century'. Śaṅkara certainly did not survive beyond early eighth century. It is said that he died quite young, in his early 30s. By no stretch of imagination the year AD 750 can be described as 'early eighth century'. Daya Krishna refers to Buddhists and says 'even the Buddhists are ahead of the Vedāntins, both in quantity and quality, thus nullifying the myth that they were defeated by Śaṅkara.'¹⁷ But Daya Krishna has not given the name of a single Buddhist scholar whose work excelled that of Śaṅkara in both quality and quantity, who challenged Śaṅkara on his face, except mentioning that the post-Śaṅkara period saw the emergence of '117 Buddhist thinkers'. None of those 117 Buddhist thinkers came to face Śaṅkara when he was on his war-path, the path of *Digvijaya*. So they were quite irrelevant even if they were several times more than the statistical figures of Daya Krishna.

The case is not very different when Daya Krishna refers to Jains. He refers to Haribhadra Sūrī, the great Jaina thinker.

But Daya Krishna himself accepts that this great Jaina thinker belonged to AD 750.¹⁸ This date itself shows that Śāṅkara belonged to one age and Haribhadra Sūrī to another. Of course, the age of the latter immediately succeeded the age of the former. But there was no occasion for Śāṅkara to have challenged Haribhadra Sūrī, or for Haribhadra Sūrī to have faced Śāṅkara. So was the case of Śāmtarakṣita and Kamalaśīla mentioned by Daya Krishna. Both of them belonged to the age of Haribhadra Sūrī, and not to the age of Śāṅkara, therefore, none of them created any kind of road-blocks when Śāṅkara was marching to complete his *Digvijaya*. How could any post-Śāṅkara philosopher be any kind of threat to Śāṅkara's supremacy in argumentation? They could be supreme only after Śāṅkara's death. Might be that the post-Śāṅkara Jaina thinkers defeated the post-Śāṅkara Vadāntin thinkers. But this would not be the defeat of Śāṅkara in the hands of Jainas, or any kind of argument against his *Digvijaya*.

Though in a subdued language, Daya Krishna has made the charge of academic dishonesty against the author of *Śāṅkaradigvijaya*. Of course, academic dishonesty is not a phenomenon restricted to our own age; it is a universal phenomenon. Daya Krishna has drawn our attention to the fact that Haribhadra Sūrī 'did not even mention Vedānta' when on the other hand 'he mentions not only Buddhism but also Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya, Vaiśeṣika and Sāṅkhya explicitly and even Lokāyata which certainly was not regarded as a major school of philosophy by anybody in India'.¹⁹ Haribhadra Sūrī's handling (or mishandling) of Vedānta means a lot, because he appears on the scene immediately after Śāṅkara. Haribhadra's neglect of Vedānta has led Daya Krishna to infer that 'the influence of Śāṅkara and his disciples had not permeated the philosophical atmosphere as is usually alleged by those who regard *Śāṅkaradigvijaya* as an authentic work descriptive of his triumph over all other philosophical schools of India'.²⁰ The best way to reject a philosopher is to ignore him. But motives should not be imputed. However, we have to know

that Śaṅkara was not the prime mover of Vedānta. That credit cannot be given even to Bādarāyaṇā. Haribhadra's work cannot be considered as the 'general survey' of the schools of philosophy existing at his time. It was simply a survey of the philosophical systems of his choice. His choice included Lokāyata that failed to produce any text of any repute, and produced only stray-remarks of doubtful origin, but excluded Vedānta that produced several well-commented texts from AD 50 to AD 750. If Haribhadra Sūrī cannot be blamed, Vedānta too cannot be blamed. Blame goes only to Haribhadra Sūrī's choice.

Daya Krishna's method of isolating Vedānta for attack is to refer to all those works that failed to refer to Vedānta. The works that praised Vedānta, or in any significant way referred to it, are not of much use to him. Thus Daya Krishna's critique of Vedānta rides on the shoulders of Buddhist and Jaina thinkers who ignore Vedānta. Thus the pre-Śaṅkara Buddhist scholars Nāgārjuna, Āryadeva, Maitreyanātha, Asaṅga and Vasubandhu have been cited because they did not 'show any awareness of *Brahma-sūtras*'.²¹ If the Buddhist thinkers are used for pre-Śaṅkara period, Jaina thinkers have been used for the post-Śaṅkara period. The works of Haribhadra Sūrī, Śāntarakṣita and Kamalāśila have ignored Vedānta, have shown no awareness of this system of philosophy. The progress of Buddhism and Jainism in the first millennium AD and their act of ignoring Vedānta have led Daya Krishna to the shocking conclusion that there is 'practically no Vedānta in the first millennium AD.'²² The conclusion is shocking because throughout his writing Daya Krishna kept the balance of Vedānta quite high, but in the end he tilted against it. In his writing he wished to be faithful to history, but in the end he deserted it.

Consider why his conclusion is shocking. For the pre-Śaṅkara period he has brought out a set of five Buddhist thinkers who exhibited no consciousness of *Brahma-sūtras*. This set was balanced by the set of Vedāntin thinkers brought out with the help of Potter and Nakamura. This set has also five members.

Of course, the set of Vedāntins is quite weak. That weakness is compensated by three big Vedāntins, namely, Bādarāyaṇa, Gauḍapāda and Bhartṛhari. So the pre-Śaṅkara period has fared quite well. And the Śaṅkara and post-Śaṅkara period fares even better. Daya Krishna may have in his mind a big list of philosophers who ignored or opposed Śaṅkara during the post-Śaṅkara period. But in his paper he has mentioned only three names, those of the Jaina thinkers mentioned above. All these thinkers belonged to AD 750. We should rely on paper, and not on what is in Daya Krishna's mind. As against these three Jain thinkers, Daya Krishna has mentioned so many Vedāntin thinkers belonging to Śaṅkara and post-Śaṅkara period. Let us quote him in full. He points out 'Hastāmalaka, Troṭaka, Padmapāda and Sureśvara are the well known disciples of Śaṅkara and Maṇḍana Miśra, the author of *Brahmasiddhi* can be regarded as almost half his disciple. If we exclude these, then in the post-Śaṅkara period, we have, besides Bhāskara, who has written an independent Bhāṣya on the *Brahma-sūtras*, Gopālāśrama (AD 780), Jñānaghana (AD 900), Jñānottama Bhaṭṭāraka (AD 930), Vimuktātman (AD 960), Vācaspati Miśra (AD 960), Prakāśāmana (AD 975) and Jñānottama Miśra (AD 980).'²³ This shows that the Vedāntins were spread out in the whole of the first millennium AD, starting from the time of Śaṅkara till 980. Then how has Daya Krishna tilted the balance against Vedānta, how could he have come to the conclusion that 'there was practically no Vedānta in the first millennium AD'. From the names he has mentioned in his paper it seems that there was hardly any opposition to Vedānta in the first millennium AD. Vedānta had a kind of walk-over as regards its opponents.

In order to show that there was practically no Vedānta in the first millennium AD Daya Krishna is required to spell out the names of all the 117 Buddhist thinkers, 27 Jaina thinkers and 13 Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika thinkers to whom he refers. It is only when their names are written down that we can judge whether any of them was a match to Śaṅkara or even to Bhāskara or

Vācaspati Miśra. Daya Krishna has not hesitated in mentioning the names of the Vedānta thinkers. Then why should he hesitate in mentioning the names of those thinkers who opposed Vedānta or overlooked it?

In providing the historiographical details of Vedānta Daya Krishna has not transcended the limits of the first millennium AD. But Vedānta as a thought might have originated much earlier in the past than the first century of the first millennium AD. Bādarāyaṇa's *Brahma-sūtras* might have functioned as the occasion for the foundation of the Vedānta school of thought. But before the formation of the school, those thoughts were expressed by so many philosophers. Daya Krishna himself refers to the names mentioned in the *Brahma-sūtras*. They are Kārṣṇājini, Kāsakṛtana, Ātreya, Auḍulomi, Āśamarthya, Bāduri and Jaimini.²⁴ These names take us deeper into the past, before the birth of Christ. How long before Christ cannot be decided so easily. But it seems that the Vedāntic thought exactly in its *Māyāvāda* form was floating in the air when Alexander the Great invaded India. Daya Krishna gives the impression that the doctrines of 'avidyā or māyā' were unique features of Śāṅkara's thought.²⁵ The expression *māyā* might have been a new invention. Once a school comes into existence so many new expressions are coined, which later become a part of the technical vocabulary of the school. But the coinage of these expressions pre-supposes a state of things behind it.

When Alexander invaded India he was accompanied by his court-philosopher Anaxarchus. Anaxarchus brought with him his pupil Pyrrho, who later became the leading philosopher of Greece. He became the father of Greek scepticism, called Pyrrhonism. 'For the Pyrrhonists', according to Brinda Dalmia, 'doubt is the *summum bonum* of our intellectual and ethical lives. The true sceptical method is of generating counter-arguments of equal strength to any and all claims which in turn, results in a suspension of judgement (epoché). This, it is claimed, is a state of ultimate peace (*atraxia*)'.²⁶ Doubt for Pyrrho was only a means for the suspension of judgement. If

all our claims are open to counter-claims, then the futility of making claims is demonstrated. Silence or suspension of judgement is the result to which doubt leads, and this suspension of judgement would bring *atrasia*, a complete peace of mind. According to Nisha Rathore, Pyrrho comes very close to Buddhism. Buddha 'recommended the suspension of judgement on such metaphysical questions as "Is the universe destructible or indestructible? Is the soul same as the body? Is the universe finite or infinite?"'²⁷ Pyrrho extended the suspension of judgement to all kinds of situation. Pyrrho's *atrasia* comes very close to *nirvāṇa*. Pyrrho might have been influenced by Buddhism, but not his teacher Anaxarchus. Anaxarchus was influenced by the thought that was Vedāntic in spirit. He considered the physical world illusory and 'compared existing things to stage-painting and took them to be like experiences that occur in sleep or insanity'.²⁸ If this is not Māyāvāda then what is it? Not only were Buddhism and Jainism popular when Alexander invaded India, perhaps Vedānta was no less popular. Of course, for the Greeks all of them were 'naked philosophers'; all of them were 'gymnosophists'. But the philosophical views of these naked philosophers differed. From where did the Vedāntic thought emerge before Alexander invaded India? Among other sources, *Bhagavad Gita* and Upaniṣads formed two major sources as Śaṅkara thought. Not all Upaniṣads were post-Śaṅkara, some of them might have been pre-Alexander. Incidentally, what would happen to a country if the practitioners of Vedānta join hands with the practitioners of Buddhism and Jainism?

Daya Krishna is aware of the fact that, at present, Vedānta is the most dominant philosophy of India. Its māyāvāda has influenced even the minds of those Indian philosophers who are working on alien philosophical systems. According to Daya Krishna's own acceptance 'innumerable writers on Indian philosophy' have given their time to Vedānta. What has brought into existence this mushroom growth of Vedāntins to the twentieth century AD of India? It seems that the Vedāntic thought has progressed in fits and starts. A period of intense activity

was followed by a period of extreme depression. Vedānta might have passed through several rounds of progress in this fashion. Is this true only about Vedānta? Have the other systems of Indian philosophy progressed in a different fashion? Certainly not. It seems that all the systems of Indian philosophy have progressed in fits and starts. At present, Vedānta is the most dominant and distinctive philosophy of India, because the other systems of Indian philosophy are passing through their state of extreme depression. So there is a hope for India to have a bright future for those who are currently passing through a depression.

Notes and References

1. 'Vedānta in the First Millennium AD: The Case-Study of a Retrospective Illusion Imposed by the Historiography of Indian Philosophy' in *JICPR*, Special Issue on Historiography of Civilizations, June 1996, p. 201.
2. R.C. Pradhan 'Seeing and Seeing As: A Response to Suresh Chandra', *JICPR*, May–August 1995, p. 127.
3. See *Investigations*, II, ix.
4. S. Panneerselvam. 'Seeing and Seeing As: A Reply to Suresh Chandra', *JICPR*, May–August 1995, p. 136.
5. N.R. Hanson, *Patterns of Discovery*, Cambridge, 1958, p. 5.
6. *On Certainty*, 559.
7. *Ibid.*, 94.
8. This refers to my paper on 'Wittgenstein on Religious Beliefs and World Pictures' in *Wittgenstein: New Perspectives*, an unpublished project submitted to ICPR. Wittgenstein's notion of a 'world-picture' is similar to the notion of a 'paradigm' later developed by T.S. Kuhn.
9. 'Vedānta in the First Millennium AD', p. 202.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 201.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 202. One possibility is that Śaṅkara's interpretation was so unique that the earlier interpretations became unimpressive and out of the way.
12. *Ibid.*, p. 203.

13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., p. 204.
15. Ibid., p. 206.
16. Ibid., p. 205.
17. Ibid., p. 203.
18. Ibid., p. 206.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid., p. 205.
22. Ibid., p. 207.
23. Ibid., pp. 205–6.
24. Ibid., p. 203.
25. Ibid., p. 206.
26. Brinda Dalmia 'Benefit of Doubt', *Indian Philosophical Quarterly* special number on René Descartes, January–April. 1996, p. 20.
27. Nisha Rathore 'Indian Philosophers and Greek Scepticism', *New Quest*, July–August 1995, p. 224.
28. Quoted by Nisha Rathore, p. 221. Anaxarchus remained an unknown figure in Greek philosophy. He is known because he was the teacher of Pyrrho.

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SURESH CHANDRA

(c) A Rejoinder to Daya Krishna*

Professor Daya Krishna's thought-'provoking' and scholarly approach to Indian philosophy is well-known.¹ Now in his recent article, 'Vedānta in the First Millennium AD: The Case Study of a Retrospective Illusion Imposed by the Historiography of Indian Philosophy',² he has given scope for the Vedāntins to answer some of the issues raised by him. This rejoinder is an attempt to answer him.

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No doubt, Daya's article is excellent and anyone who reads it with all seriousness would definitely appreciate him for his neat and systematic presentation. But it must also be admitted that the approach of Daya, unfortunately has not taken into account some of the important points. First of all, it is not clear whether his attack is on Bādarāyaṇa or on Śāṅkara. The first three pages are directed towards Bādarāyaṇa and to prove his claim, Daya takes support both from Vedic and non-Vedic systems and concludes, rather hastily, that there was no Vedānta in the first millennium AD. He could not stop himself with this. By his sarcastic remarks he concludes his paper by saying that in the 'idea of the presence of the Vedānta in the first millennium AD, there is a superimposition by the historiography of Indian philosophy due to its being dazzled by the picture in the second millennium AD (p. 207). This remark of Daya definitely disturbs the Vedāntin and let its see how a Vedāntin would react to Daya.

I

Daya Krishna's problem arises due to his approach to Indian philosophy from the standpoint of mere historical time. He approaches Indian philosophy in the chronological order and hence lands himself into trouble, thus making the distinction between the first and second millennium AD. Daya need not find fault with the Advaitins for this 'superimposition', because historical facts are always interpreted and theorized. This historical approach to Indian philosophy will not help anyone; especially it will not help a philosopher. It is because a philosopher is not merely interested in the succession of events which are accidentally connected; he is concerned with the ultimate cause of events. A philosopher disentangles the essential truths of history from the purely local and temporal accretions, and discerns the inner reality or the inwardness behind the outer expressions. ³ Thus, a philosopher is not merely interested in

analyzing the data on the basis of chronological order. S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri's remarks on this is very interesting.

In philosophy too there has been no consistent or steady advance. For the Advaitin, his own non-dualism stands for the high water-mark of philosophy and revelation alike. If we lost all records relating to Indian history from the fifth to the thirteenth century AD, and were left only with the three main varieties of Vedānta, an Advaitin reconstructing their order of development would, it has been said,⁴ place Madhva's first, Rāmānuja's next and Śaṅkara's last; extreme pluralism would appear to him the attitude of naive common sense; a stress on identity without being able to give up difference in some form would appear to be the next stage; last would come the realization of pure identity as the absolute truth. The actual course of history has tended in just the reverse direction. Pluralism comes last instead of first. Can the Advaitin be blamed if he sees history as anything but a tale of progress.⁵

R.G. Collingwood's approach to the idea of history will help us here. For him,⁶ there are two features of the idea of history: (i) the emphasis on thought, and (ii) the unimportance of time. 'Historical knowledge has for its proper object thought; not things thought about, but the act of thinking itself', says Collingwood.⁷ The study of history has for its aim, self-knowledge and not the knowledge of objective events. Similarly, time is not *the* important factor in history. Hence the question of 'before' or 'after' is not very much important. If we accept Collingwood's idea of history according to which, time is not the important factor in history, it can be said that for the Advaitins for whom the reality itself is timeless, the distinction between the first and the second millennium AD is really insignificant.

Daya Krishna, following Bādarāyaṇa, acknowledges earlier thinkers like, Kārṣṇājini, Kāśakṛtsna, Ātreya, Auḍulomi, Āśamarthya, Bādari and Jaimini. From these thinkers one can

understand the prevalence of Advaita prior to Bādarāyaṇa. T.M.P. Mahadevan mentions about the importance of Kāśakṛtsna, for whom, the immutable supreme Lord himself is the individual soul and the soul is not a product of the supreme and it is non-different from the supreme.⁸ Śāṅkara expounds this view of Kāśakṛtsna in his commentary, on the *Brahma-sūtras*. T.M.P. Mahadevan also mentions about another pre-Śāṅkara teacher of Advaita, namely, Draviḍācārya (or Dramiḍācārya), whom Daya also refers to. But what is important is that Draviḍācārya seems to have written a commentary on the *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad-Vārtika*.⁹ Daya states that *Brahma-sūtras* have very little impact on the philosophical scene in India for a very long time and reference to it has been made only after five hundred years of its composition. But there is no reason for the Advaitins to worry over this remark of Daya because the Upaniṣads which form the crux of the *Brahma-sūtras* emerged in the philosophical scene much before the origin of other schools of philosophy.

Quoting Haribhadra Sūrī, Daya Krishna argues that in it there is no reference to Vedānta as a separate, distinctive school of philosophy. From here he takes a leap into Śāṅkara Digvijaya to make a claim that it may not be authentic. But a close study of important works like¹⁰ Govindanātha's *Śāṅkarācārya-carita*, Cidvilāsa's *Śāṅkaravijaya-vilāsa*, Vyāsācala's *Śāṅkaravijaya* and Anantānandagiri's *Śāṅkaravijaya* would prove how Śāṅkara's thought was prominent over other schools. Anantānandagiri's work which is said to be the earliest and important one, gives a detailed account of the places and of the discussions Śāṅkara had with the different schools and cults of philosophy. Especially chapters, 4-5, 6-10, 12-13, 25-26, 29, 36, 40-41, 42, 49-51, etc., will go to show how Advaita was predominant over the other schools of thought.¹¹

Daya Krishna approaches the question, namely, whether Vedānta was predominant in the first millennium AD, under two periods: (i) the period after the *Brahma-sūtras* and before Śāṅkara's *Bhāṣyas* and (ii) the period of Śāṅkara. But very

conveniently he has not taken into account the pre-Śāṅkara Advaita works and authors. Scholars have fixed the age of pre-Śāṅkara Advaita from the first century to the eighth century AD, that is, a period of 700 years at least. This was the period of the rise and fall of Buddhism and the debate between pre-Śāṅkara Advaita philosophy and Buddhism must have taken place. 'If Śrī Śāṅkarācārya is credited to have extirpated Buddhism from India, his success is largely due to the forces of pre-Śāṅkara Advaita that had strongly resisted Buddhism', says S.L. Pandey.¹² It is true that pre-Śāṅkara Advaita works and authors are little known but researches made by modern scholars like Kuppuswami Sastri, M. Hiriyanna, Gopinatha Kaviraja and others, have shown the importance and the role of pre-Śāṅkara Advaita.¹³ For example, these scholars have collected the fragments of pre-Śāṅkara Advaita from later works of Śāṅkara and others. This means reconstructing pre-Śāṅkara Advaita authors and their works on the basis of their references and quotations in the later works.¹⁴ The pre-Śāṅkara Advaita is sometimes called *Kārikā Advaita*, as most of pre-Śāṅkara Advaita thinkers have used *Kārikā* as their medium of expression.¹⁵ A distinction between aphoristic Advaita Vedānta and pre-Śāṅkara Advaita is also maintained.¹⁶ For example, Kāśakṛtsna and Bādarāyaṇa are the aphoristic Advaitins and others like, Upavarṣa, Sundarapāṇḍya, Brahmanandin, Draviḍācārya, Bhartṛprapañca, and Brahmadata are pre-Śāṅkara Advaitins. The contributions of these pre-Śāṅkara Advaitins have really shaped the Advaitic thought. For example, that in Upavarṣa, one can see the epistemology of Advaita. The six means of valid knowledge and the concept of intrinsic validity of knowledge are said to be his contribution. Similarly, Brahmanandin's doctrine of *vivarta*, Draviḍācārya's argument for the existence of the soul, Bhartṛprapañca's doctrine of *bhedābheda* have really shaped the Advaitic thought considerably.¹⁷ Daya, undoubtedly, has not taken these points into consideration while discussing the predominance of Advaita

in the first millennium AD. Since Advaita was dominant even in the first millennium AD, the question of its superimposition on any period of history does not arise at all.

Notes and References

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4. C. Kunhan Raja, paper presented in the IPC, Lahore 1929, quoted by S.S. Suryanarayana Sastri, 'Advaita and the Concept of Progress', in the *Indian Philosophical Annual*, vol. xvi, p. 79.
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6. R.G. Collingwood, *The Idea of History*, Oxford University Press, 1946.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 305.
8. T.M.P. Mahadevan, *Invitation to Indian Philosophy*, Arnold-Heinemann Publishers, New Delhi, 1974, p. 361.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 362.
10. R. Balasubramanian, 'Identity of Maṇḍanamīśra' in the *Journal of the American Oriental Society*, vol. lxxxii, no. 4, 1962, p. 522.
11. See Anantānandagiri's *Śrī Śaṅkaravijaya*, (ed.) N. Veezhinathan, Introduction by T.M.P. Mahadevan, University of Madras, Chennai, 1971.
12. S.L. Pandey, 'Pre-Śaṅkara Advaita', in the *Indian Philosophical Annual*, vol. xxi, Special number on *Śrī Śaṅkara*, 1989–90, University of Madras, Chennai, p. 66.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 69.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 66.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 67.

16. Ibid., p. 65.

17. Ibid., p. 71.

The Parliament of Philosophies—Majority View Condemned

*A Critique of Daya Krishna's Views on Vedānta in the
First Millennium AD**

G. MISHRA

Professor R. Balasubramanian's twenty page rejoinder to Professor Daya Krishna's eight page article on Vedānta in the First Millennium AD shows how academically, the former has come down upon the latter in defending the presence of Vedānta in the First Millennium AD and in showing the appropriate place of illusion in doing philosophy of Advaita. Two points are worth mentioning here. (1) Daya Krishna's assimilation of Indian thought and his capability to trace a missing thread and appropriate it to provoke some thinking and criticism so that the otherwise low-lying Indian philosophy gains some life and spirit and generates some spicy discussion among scholars, (2) Balasubramanian's rising up to the occasion and offering stronger arguments to refute the ill-conceived views. I, as a student of Indian philosophy, would like to offer my views on this, taking caution not to repeat any of the criticisms already offered by Professor Balasubramanian.

In this interesting and provocative article Daya Krishna tries to show the unpopularity of Vedānta in the first millennium AD which are based on the following arguments:

1. There is negligible presence of Vedānta in the first millennium AD. Even the *magnum opus* of Bādarāyaṇa, i.e.,

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Brahma-sūtras were not well known till Śaṅkara wrote a commentary on it. Vedānta, as the end of the Vedas, as it literally means, is a myth and hence there is no need to stretch Vedānta from the Upaniṣads (JICPR, June 1996, pp. 201 and 202).

2. Nakamura and Potter record that there were a few Advaitins in between Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara, and they have marginal or even no importance at all.
3. Even in the post-Śaṅkara period, the scenario did not change. The *Śaṅkara-digvijayas* testify to this fact. There were in total eight Vedāntins in the post-Śaṅkara era excluding his disciples and Maṇḍana Mīśra (including them it would be 13), whereas we have 117 Buddhist thinkers and 27 Jaina thinkers (pp. 203 and 204).
4. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa (AD 900) has not mentioned the name of Śaṅkara even though he has refuted the Advaita view. Udayana in his *Ātmatattvaviveka* has enumerated six stages of self-realization in an ascending order, and Advaitin's view has been overtaken by some other view.
5. The *Brahma-sūtras* had little impact on the philosophical scene in India after their composition and, in fact, were practically absent when compared with Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya or Vaiśeṣika Sūtras.
6. Even the Buddhist literature of that period did not make much reference to *Brahma-sūtras*, and hence the latter did never have any impact on the philosophical scene in India.

Hence he comes to the conclusion that the Advaitin not only imposes illusion on the empirical world, but the theory of illusion or *adhyāsa* has also been imposed on the History of Philosophy in India.

I would like to take up the above points in sequence to examine their authenticity.

One. Daya Krishna gives a profuse encomium to Vedānta when he says in the beginning:

Vedānta is supposed to be the most dominant and distinctive philosophy of India, accepted and propagated as such by innumerable writers on Indian Philosophy.

But this supposition is not favoured in the second statement when he looks for its presence in the first millennium AD as he does not find much evidence of its presence in the pre- and post-Śaṅkara period. Here I would like to differ from the learned author as the arguments given by him are neither sufficient nor convincing.

Daya Krishna wants to suggest that the first millennium closes with the signal of the impending dominance of Vedānta in the forthcoming millennium where it establishes its supremacy. First of all, taking this point for granted for the sake of discussion, I fail to understand why the most distinctive philosophy needs necessarily to be the oldest philosophy making its appearance in the remotest past. The strength, value and utility of a philosophical school lies not in its ancestry or antiquity but in its adaptability to the needs of life, nay in its eternal character and eternality or otherwise of the truth it elucidates. For example, Buddhism sought to gain importance at the time of the Buddha and a few centuries afterwards. I don't think it is necessary to engage ourselves in a dialogue as to how Buddhism became so famous even though there was no trace of it before Buddha. It may not be the case with Vedānta, as there are claims that it is Upaniṣadic and hence has its roots in the hoary past. Daya Krishna confronts this view saying that Vedānta as the end portion of the Vedas is a myth as the Upaniṣads don't necessarily form the end portion as in the case of *Aitareya Upaniṣad*. Subscribing to the view that they form the final portion of the Vedas, charges are levelled to divorce the Upaniṣads from Vedānta. Daya Krishna's impending fear is that if Vedānta and Upaniṣads are taken together and *Brahma-sūtras* and *Gītā* are brought in to the fold, he would not be able to prove his hypothesis that Vedānta was not there in the First Millennium AD. So there is a necessity as far as he is concerned, to give a segmental treatment to all these texts.

Subscribing to the view that the Vedānta forms the final portion of the Vedas charges are levelled, pointing out exceptions. Actually, the instances pointed out are only exceptions. Even granting that the charges are valid, Vedānta is understood more significantly as the purport (*nirṇaya*) of the Vedas. So it may not necessarily be of much consequence whether those great revelations occur in the middle of the book, or at the end of the book or anywhere else. What is more important is: what is that they seek to convey. Sadānanda defines Vedānta: *vedānto nāma upaniṣat pramāṇam tadupakāriṇi śārīrakaśāstrādini ca*,¹ Vedānta is the evidence furnished by the Upaniṣads. The *Brahma-sūtras* are the texts correlating the views of the Vedānta. While commenting on the word 'ca' in the above text, Nṛsiṃhasarasvatī says that Texts like the *Bhagavadgītā* may be understood by the word 'ca'. I would also like to make a mention of the *Vidvanmanorañjanīṭikā* of Rāmatīrtha on the same text, which says that in the word *Upaniṣad*, the word 'upa' means proximity, *ni* means certitude (*niścaya*) and *sad* is understood in several senses like 'to take away' or 'affirm.'² Hence the word *Upaniṣad* means the text which definitely affirms the knowledge of the self because the self is the most proximate thing to a person or because of one's acquiring it out of his nearness to his teacher or the preceptor. My attempt here is to show how Vedānta is used in the sense of Upaniṣads and also as a thinking based on the Upaniṣads throughout the tradition. Let's now go to the term Vedānta which comprises of two words viz., *Veda* and *anta*. The word *anta* has been understood as the final portion and hence creates a confusion in Daya Krishna as there are Upaniṣads, such as *Aitareya Upaniṣad*, which do not occur at the terminating sections of the Vedas. The word is representatively used as most of the Upaniṣads occur at the final portion of the respective Vedas. Secondly, the word *anta* has been interpreted in different ways in the different texts. In the *Medinikośa*, the word *anta* stands for 'form' or 'nature' (*svarūpa*, *svabhāva*).³ What is meant is that the Vedānta is not something outside

the purview of the Vedas, but is in the form of the Vedas, or of the nature of the Vedas. According to Hemacandra, the word *anta* means definite, limit, boundary.⁴ In the *Bhagavadgītā*, the word *anta* is used in the sense of certitude (*niścaya*):

*nāsato vidyate bhāvo nābhāvo vidyate sataḥ
ubhayaorapi dr̥ṣṭo'ntastvanayostattvadarsibhiḥ* [II. 16]

(The unreal never comes into being, the real never lapses into non-being. The determinative meaning (*anta*), i.e. the truth about both these has been perceived by the seers of reality.)

Here, the word *anta* is taken in the sense of truth, purport, by all the commentators. Śāṅkara explains *antaḥ* as *nirṇayaḥ*,⁵ Rāmānuja restates the same meaning in his commentary on this verse—*nirṇayāntatvāt nirūpaṇasya nirṇaya iha antaśabdenocyate*.⁶ Uttamūr Vīrarāghavācārya defines *anta* in the term Vedānta as the concluding view without any doubt. '*tathā vedārthanirṇayopayogītvādapi; antaḥ avasānaṁ samśayāpagamo nirṇayaḥ iti*.'⁷ Hence there is nothing wrong to view Vedānta as the truth or the purport of the Vedas. Secondly, we cannot also say that Vedānta has nothing to do with Upaniṣads and that *Brahma-sūtras* are not related to this. In the *Vedāntasāra* it is clearly mentioned that the texts supplementing *Vedānta* are *Brahma-sūtras* and the like.⁸ After all, what are the aphorisms for? Those are not independent or solitary texts; they stand for or represent some other existent text in an aphoristic manner.⁹ Śāṅkara in the commentary on the second *sūtra* states that the *sūtras* are meant for stringing together the flowers of the sentences of the Upaniṣads for it is precisely the sentences of the Upaniṣads that are referred to and discussed in the Upaniṣads. (*vedāntavākyaakusumagrathanārthatvāt sūtrāṅgām, Śāṅkarabhāṣya, I.i.2*).¹⁰ Even in the *Bhagavadgītā* we find the mention of the term *Brahma-sūtra* in the verse:

*ṛṣibhirbahudhā gītām chandobhir vividhaiḥ pṛthak
brahmasūtrapadaīścaiva hetumadbhirviniścitaiḥ* (13.4)

(It has been sung variously by seers in varied hymns; as also stated in the reasoned and definitive words of the *Brahma-sūtras*.)

Śaṅkara explains the word *Brahma-sūtra* as the statements referring to Brahman which also refers to the Upaniṣadic statements. The word *hetumad*—‘logical’ in the text refers to the *Tarkaprasthāna* which is designed in a logical manner to expound the statements of the Upaniṣads.¹¹ This verse also can be understood in the sense of availability of some other *Brahma-sūtras* which were known to the author of the *Bhagavadgītā*. Rāmānuja gives the meaning of the term *Brahma-sūtra* as *Śāṅkarakasūtras*,¹² which makes it clearer that even the author of the *Bhagavadgītā* was aware of *Brahma-sūtras* as expounding the meaning of the Upaniṣads. Thus, Daya Krishna’s attempt to treat them separately does not have either the sanction of the tradition or logical tenability.

Two: Coming to the views of Potter and Nakamura, Daya Krishna has given the list of few Vedāntins who are well-known in the pre- and post-Śaṅkara period. According to Daya Krishna, ‘Before Śaṅkara, the only thinkers who are mentioned in connection with the *Brahma-sūtra* in Potter’s New Bibliography are Bodhāyana (AD 350), Dramiḍācārya (AD 525), Bhartṛprapañca (AD 550), Viśvarūpadeva (AD 600), and Brahmadata (AD 660).’ Just because Nakamura and Potter did not mention or even if we don’t find, we cannot conclude that there were a few Vedāntins in that age. Vidyāraṇya (AD 1100) a Śākta author, in his work called *Śrīvidyāṛṇava* says that there were five famous Ācāryas between Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara (*gauḍādiśaṅkarāntāśca sapta samkhyā prakirtitāḥ*).¹³ Potter says that there were five thinkers in between Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara but the evidence cited in *Śrīvidyāṛṇava* shows there were five important thinkers between Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara. And it must be borne in mind that the orthodox Advaita tradition does not make any mention of the above five thinkers, listed by Potter and quoted by Daya Krishna as the true representatives, or the preceptors,

of the school. The same text also mentions, that Śaṅkara had fourteen direct disciples who were famous ones. (*śaṅkarācāryaśiṣyāśca caturdaśa dṛdhavratāḥ, divyātmāno dṛdhātmāno nigrāhānugrahakṣamāḥ*).¹⁴ But traditionally, and as per the accounts given by the *Śaṅkaradigvijayas* only four disciples were famous as the pontiffs of the four Maṭhas. Hence a more rational way to explain the position of a few available Vedāntins would be to believe that only the prominent names have been preserved by the tradition. The *Śrībhāṣyaprakāśikā* of *Śrīnivāsācārya*, mentions that there existed Ninety-six *bhāṣyas* on the *Brahma-sūtras* before Rāmānuja who refuted all those views in composing his *Śrībhāṣya*.¹⁵

*bhagavatā bhāṣyakṛtā sūtrākṣarānanugunānyapaṇyāyamūlakāni
saṅga-vatibhāṣyāni nirākṛtyedam bhāṣyam praṇitamiti hi
sampradāyah* (page 5)

Those commentaries might have been lost due to the ravages of time and numerous other factors such as constant quarrels among the scholars nourished by their patrons, kings, which went to the extent of destroying the existing literature of opposing schools. In this regard, we can take the case of *Mahābhāṣya*. The *Mahābhāṣya* speaks of *Dhātupārāyaṇa* and *Nāmapārāyaṇa* and a host of other texts which were once popular. Today, these texts are not known through any other source. Now, are we to suppose that there never existed any such texts, just because some of the manuscript collectors did not come across them and consequently didn't record them in their bibliographies? Similarly, the *Bhāṣyas* prior to Śaṅkara also might have been lost for which we cannot say that there were no *bhāṣyas* at all. There is one more point that has missed the notice of Daya Krishna. In his 'History of Early Vedānta Philosophy' Nakamura's main focus is Advaita Vedānta and hence there is a casual mention of Bodhāyana and no mention of Dramiḍācārya. These two are the standing edifices in Viśiṣṭādvaita Vedānta school and have been venerated by all the writers of that school starting from Yāmuna and Rāmānuja.

In the Śrīvaiṣṇava tradition, the *Bodhāyanavṛtti* is not available excepting its summary given by Ṭanka. Rāmānuja at the beginning of his *Śrībhāṣya* observes that the *vṛtti* of Bodhāyana on the *Brahma-sūtras* was very lengthy, which was condensed by many other earlier preceptors (*Pūrvacāryas*).¹⁶

*bhagavadbodhāyanakṛtām vistīrṇām brahmasūtravṛttim
pūrvacāryāḥ saṁcikṣīpuḥ, tanmatānusāreṇa sūtrākṣarāṇi
vyākhyāsyante*

Hence, the arguments put forth by Daya Krishna are based on a hurried generalization and thus cannot be accepted.

Thus, I would like to point out that there are sources other than Nakamura and Potter to determine the works of Indian philosophy. Daya Krishna implies that unpublished or inaccessible works are of little importance (p. 202) and appears on these flimsy grounds to dismiss Dramiḍacārya as insignificant. It is not so. Bādarāyaṇa and following him Śaṅkara mentioned a number of thinkers whose literature is not available to us. In fact, it is inherently plausible that the enormous success of Śaṅkara Vedānta was the cause of the obliteration of many of the Vedāntic currents of thought from which it emerged. This is one of the reasons why the numerical breakdown of first millennium thinkers belonging to different Vedāntic schools seems pointless.

Three. The evidences cited in the *Śaṅkaradigvijayas* are of less historical importance. These were written hundreds of years after Śaṅkara and are in the form of eulogies to the great master. That does not mean that these contain no truth at all. I have already shown how the important disciples of Śaṅkara, who were the pontiffs of the Maṭhas were taken up in these texts and not all others. But, I have difficulty in accepting Daya Krishna's statement that 'even Buddhists are ahead of the Vedāntins, both in quantity and quality, thus nullifying the myth that they were defeated by Śaṅkara.' As per the numerical evidence, he gives, the Buddhists outnumbered the

Vedāntins and hence qualitatively they were of large numbers. What does he mean by 'quantitatively?' Śāṅkara's confrontation with Buddhists was in the form of śāstraic dialogue and not physical fight where number of persons taking the side of each fighter would matter, or a political assembly where head counting, or hand raising is taken as the criteria to win. In his writings and in the writings of Sureśvara, we find the strong logic, that is employed to refute Buddhism and I am yet to come across any literature where Buddhists have offered any rejoinder to Advaitin's claims. Hence in all probability, Śāṅkara might have defeated the Buddhists in scholarly debates and what impact he made cannot be simply made by the head count of scholars.

Four. Daya Krishna refers to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa and Udayana's *Ātmatattvarivēka* to prove that the former does not make a mention of Śāṅkara and that the latter does not accept Advaitic liberation as the ultimate in his scheme of liberation. This point has been discussed by Balasubramanian in detail and I only would like to add one point which I feel pertinent to this. In Kashmirian writings, up to the period of Abhinavagupta (AD 1200), we don't find any reference to Śāṅkarācārya. But there are a number of references to Vedāntic systems and Maṇḍana's writings are quoted at times. Sadyojyoti (AD 700) in his *Nareśvaraparīkṣā* refers to Vedānta which is not of an Advaita type in the strict sense of the term. The commentator of this text, Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha points out that 'this tenet is similar for the knowers of Vedānta and Pāñcarātras. They also view that the merger of the Jīvātmā in Brahman, that is Nārāyaṇa or the transcendental being is liberation.'¹⁷

eṣa ca prasaṅgaḥ vedāntavidām pāñcarātrāṇām ca samānaḥ, tairāpi brahmaṇi nārāyaṇākhyāyām ca parasyām prakṛtau jīvātmanām layaḥ muktiḥ abhyupagatā. (Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha's commentary on *Nareśvaraparīkṣā*, verse 1.67)

In the Kashmirian writings, we find mention of a *Pariṇāmavedānta*, a type of Vedānta which is similar to Bhartṛhari's position. In my view, they had a type of Vedānta

which was the earlier form of Advaita, rigorously formulated by Śaṅkara. Hence, there is nothing wrong if Jayanta or Udayana did not mention Śaṅkara by name. The problem comes when we try to equate Vedānta with Śaṅkara which is why Daya Krishna fails to identify Vedānta in the *Ātmatattvaviveka*.

Five. Daya Krishna points out that *Brahma-sūtras* had little impact on the philosophical scene in India after their composition and, in fact, were practically absent when compared with the Sūtras of Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya and Vaiśeṣika schools. My submission here is that even in the Vedic period there were thinkers who tried to understand reality on the basis of logic and reason without involving the Vedic doctrines. The Sāṅkhyas were one such group who showed the path and there soon appeared a number of thinkers who discovered independently new ways of emancipation quite independently of the Vedic tradition. As they discarded Vedic authority, they had absolute liberty of their conscience and soon there emerged too many different views followed by a large number of followers. It was a period of Indian dialecticians after the period of the epics and because of their (non-Vedic) logical stand, the *sūtra* literature evolved and became famous instantaneously and worked out thoroughly and elaborately in the following centuries. The result is that since there is no end to logical reasoning, there are bound to be further and further refinements. This perhaps justifies the greater number of thinkers, which actually is no glory to these philosophies. Nor is it a defect for other philosophies to have lesser number of thinkers. Śaṅkara in his commentary on the *Tarkapāda* shows how these schools are riddled with internal inconsistencies and those positions have been defended by refining and modifying the original positions in the wake of attacks from other schools. That is the reason, I feel, why the Sūtra literature becomes so prominent in Mīmāṃsā, Nyāya and other schools as they become the most important source of information overtaking the earlier existent texts. This is not the case with Vedānta. In Vedānta,

Sūtras were based on the Upaniṣads, which are taken as the primary source giving a place of second fiddle to Sūtras which show their referents to the Upaniṣadic passages. Moreover, the oral tradition of transmission of the knowledge did not leave behind much of writing material for the modern scholars to refer to. For example, there are no writings available of Govinda Bhagavatpāda, the illustrious teacher of Śaṅkara, who must have taught *Brahma-sūtras* to the latter. Hence not finding enough references cannot be a deciding factor to prove Daya Krishna's point.

Six: Coming to Buddhism, Daya Krishna points out that there were not many references made to the *Brahma-sūtras* in Buddhist literature. I would like to submit that a sincere and reconciliatory interaction between Vedānta and Buddhism was attempted by Gauḍapāda who tried to link the two schools. Bhāvaviveka (AD 500) in his commentary *Tarkoḥvalā* on the *Mādhyamakahrdayakārikā* quotes four passages which closely resemble *Gauḍapādakārikās*. Śāntarakṣita (AD 700) in his *Mādhyamikālamkārikā* quotes ten *kārikās* to show the Upaniṣadic views and Kamalaśīla (AD 750) a disciple of Śāntarakṣita refers to those as *Upaniṣat-śāstra*.¹⁸ In all these cases, since the purpose is to refer to Upaniṣads and their tenets, there is no need to refer to sūtras which need elaborate explanations to understand what they stand for. The Indian dialecticians are usually of the habit of not mentioning their opponents by name, they only refer to their views and refute them to avoid direct confrontation. That also may be one of the reasons why we don't have reference to Bādarāyaṇa in the literature of other schools.

Conclusion

In fine, it may be stated that, due to some reason or the other, the *Brahma-sūtras*, as Daya Krishna points out from the available sources, have not made their presence felt in the first

millennium AD. Sometimes, some of the profound ideas propounded by some great thinkers, remain dormant for decades, nay centuries, and are actively embraced when the general intellectual climate acquires the appropriate sensitivity and capability to understand those truths. If others are not aware of *Brahma-sūtras*, that is not the problem of Bādarāyaṇa or Śaṅkara. Any great philosopher is interested, not in publishing his philosophy, but in symbolizing the truths he experienced. He documents them in order to share his experience with posterity. The immediate posterity at times may not understand and utilize that knowledge. That is not the problem or shortcoming or even a deficiency of the thinker. He could well be far ahead of his times. The posterity may be in a position to appropriate the work much better and benefit from it. Regarding this, it may be pointed out that it is no great merit in having a plethora of thinkers and writers on a given philosophy, and to have a lesser number of thinkers in another school is not a matter of disgrace or unpopularity.

Notes and References

1. *Vedāntasāra* of Sadānanda, edited with commentaries by Colonel G.A. Jacob, Chaukhamba Amarabharati Prakasana, Varanasi, 1975, pp. 2 and 66.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 65.
3. *antam svarūpam svabhāvaḥ*; *Medini* quoted in the *Vācaspatyam* (1962 edn.), Vol. 1, p. 195.
4. *antaḥ niścayasimāprāntaḥ*—Hemacandra, quoted in the *Vācaspatyam*, *Ibid.*
5. *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* on the *Gītā*, verse 2.16.
6. Rāmānuja's *Gītābhāṣya*, on the verse 2.16.
7. *Śrībhāṣya* with *Śrutaparakāśikā*, edited by U. Virarāghavācārya, Śrīviśiṣṭādvaitha-pracāriṇī sabhā, p. 1.
8. The line goes thus: *vedānto nāma upaniṣatpramāṇam tadupakārīṇi śāriraka-sūtrādini ca. Vedāntasāra*, p. 2.

9. A sūtra is defined as:
*alpākṣaram asandigdham sāravadviśvato-mukham
 astobhamanavadyam ca sūtram sūtravido viduḥ*
 (oft-quoted verse).
10. *Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* of Śāṅkara, translated by Gambhirananda, Advaita Ashram, 1993, p. 15.
11. *Śāṅkarabhāṣya* on *Bhagavadgītā*, 13.4.
12. *Rāmānujabhāṣya* on the *Bhagavadgītā*, 13.4.
13. From the *Digvijayas* we find the mention of Govindabhagavatpāda and none else. For details refer *Gauḍapādakārikā* edited by R.D. Karmarkar, BORI, Poona, 1973, p. ii.
14. *Ibid.*, p. ii.
15. भगवता भाष्यकृता सूत्राक्षराननुगुणान्यपन्यामूलकानि षण्णवतिभाष्यानि निराकृत्येदं भाष्यं प्रणितमिति हि सम्प्रदायः। *Śrībhāṣyaprakāśikā* of Śrīnivāsācārya, edited by T. Chandrasekharan, GOML No. 38, p. 5.
16. भगवद्बोधायनकृतां विस्तीर्णां ब्रह्मसूत्रवृत्तिं पूर्वाचार्याः सन्चिक्षिपुः। तन्मतानुसारेण सूत्राक्षराणि व्याख्यास्यन्ते॥ *Ibid.*, p. 5.
17. For details refer Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha's Commentary on *Kiraṇāgama*, edited by Dominic Goodall, French Institute of Indology, Pondicherry, 1997, pp. 190–91.
18. *Gauḍapādakārikā*, edited by R.D. Karmarkar, BORI, Poona, 1973, p. iv.

(e) 'Shock-proof', 'Evidence-proof', 'Argument-proof' World of Sāmpradāyika Scholarship in Indian Philosophy

(Some reflections on the comments and responses to the article entitled 'Vedānta in the First Millennium AD: The Case Study of a Retrospective Illusion Imposed' published in *JICPR*, Special Volume)

It is both 'gratifying' and 'shocking' to read the responses and comments of well known scholars to the article that I wrote some time ago. 'Gratifying' because such outstanding scholars of Advaita Vedānta as Professor Balasubramanian, Professor

K. Saccidananda Murty and Professor G.N. Mishra not only read the article but chose to respond to it. 'Shocking' as I thought I was merely recording 'facts' which could be hardly be objected to be anybody as they were from sources which are accepted to be authoritative by the scholarly world in the field of Indian philosophy all over the world. Potter and Nakamura are highly respected for their objectivity, impartiality and comprehensive scholarship in respect of the things they have written about. Potter's is the most comprehensive bibliography of Indian philosophy that exist in the English language. There is no other source of information available at present except that of Thangaswami Sarma's which have been written in Sanskrit and covers only Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, Advaita Vedānta and Mīmāṃsā up till now. As for Nakamura, who would dare dispute his commitment to the cause of Indian philosophy spread over his whole life time resulting in monumental works of scholarship and insight such as was evident long ago in the one entitled *Ways of Thinking of Eastern People*. Both of them, of course, may be wrong here and there, for they are human beings like all of us. But before one disputes them, one should take special care and show why they are mistaken or wrong.

The main contention of the paper was that, on all available evidence, the presence of *Vedānta* in the first millennium AD is far *less* than that of other schools in Indian philosophy during that period and that it does not enjoy the *same* supremacy as it did in second millennium AD particularly after 1200 AD. This, obviously, is a comparative, quantitative statement and hence, has to be contested on that ground *alone*, all other considerations are irrelevant as far as the contention of the paper concerned.

The simplest way of refuting the contention would have been to show that it is incorrect. Comparatively speaking, the quantitative works which may be considered to be Vedāntic in nature were actually far greater than the other schools of Indian philosophy taken singly, or even collectively. *This has*

not been done. The only exception is G. Mishra who has quoted a statement from *Śrībhāṣyaprakāśikā* of Śrīnivāsācārya which states that 'There existed ninety-six bhāṣyas as on the Brahma-sūtras before Rāmānuja who refuted all those views in his *Śrībhāṣya*.'

If the statement of the author of *Śrībhāṣya-prakāśikā* is correct, then obviously my main contention stands refuted. But there remain many questions still to be answered both by Professor G. Mishra and others who accept the truth of this statement. First, the statement is not of Rāmānuja himself but of a commentator on Rāmānuja's work who is supposed to who is supposed to belong to the 18th or 19th century. (Introduction, *Śūbhāṣya Prakāśika*, Ed. by T. Chandrasekharan, Madras Govt. Oriental manuscript series 48). Secondly, as Śrīnivāsācārya has stated that 'Rāmānuja refuted all these views in composing his *Śrībhāṣya*', it is incumbent on Professor Mishra to find out where exactly these refutations occur and on what grounds they are to be referred to *separate* earlier bhāṣyas on the Brahma-sūtra. This is important as mere refutation of a position does not entail that the view so refuted belongs to a separate independent text, unless the name of the author is specifically mentioned by the person who is refuting the views. Many a time, as Professor Mishra knows very well, the views which are being refuted are imagined as *Pūrvā Pakṣa* by the author himself. Not only this, the same text may contain many *Pūrvā Pakṣas* which are to be refuted by the opponent and hence no one-one co-relation can be established between the *Pūrvā Pakṣas* and the text in which they are supported to have been propounded. It will be interesting to find what exactly were the views which Rāmānuja was refuting and what are the grounds for the conjecture that Śrīnivāsācārya has made in making such a statement in his work.

Besides these, it may be assumed that if Rāmānuja was refuting these views they must be non-viśiṣṭādvaitic in character and as we know that no other non-viśiṣṭādvaitic schools of vedānt existed before Rāmānuja except that of Śaṅkara, they

may be presumed to be advaitic in character. This will mean that all these 96 Bhāṣyas were advaitic in nature and must have been written between Śaṅkara and Rāmānuja, if Śaṅkara's writings do not show any awareness of them. But if they 'really' existed during this period then there must be some evidence of them in the writings of both the advaitins and the other schools of Indian philosophies which flourished during this period. It is unbelievable that Rāmānuja was aware of *all* of them, but none of his predecessors knew about them. And what about the successors? Does Madhva or Vallabha or anyone else show any awareness of them and try to refute them in their writings from the viewpoint of the position held by their own *Sampradāyas*? Surely, Vyāsthūrtha II, the author of *Nyāyāmṛta*, may be expected to know about at least some of them and refute the advaitic arguments in his well-known work on the subject. The same should be true of Vedānta Desika (AD 1330) who belong to the *visistadvaitga* school itself. His famous work is entitled '*Satdusani*' which is a trenchant critique of the advaitic position and has been recently replied to by Pandit Anant Krishan Sastri in his '*Satbhusani*'. To say, or suggest as Professor G. Mishra seems to do that *all* of them were 'lost' is to ask for an 'act of faith' which sounds so improbable that no one can be expected to take it seriously.

The only other text that Professor Mishra refers to is *Śrīvidyārṇava* of *Vidyāranya* which says that 'There were five famous Ācāryas between Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara.' The statement of Vidyāranya [once again, Professor Mishra does not give the date of Vidyāranya who seems to be a different person from the well-known author of *Anubhūtiprakāśikā* (AD 1350) or information about the publication of the work he refers to] does not exactly entail the conclusion which Professor Mishra wants to draw from it for, obviously, the period from Bādarāyaṇa to Śaṅkara includes the period from Gauḍpāda to Śaṅkara in it. Hence, it is not as if the five *ācāryas* who are supposed to have occurred between Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara are in addition to the other five that Potter is supposed to have mentioned

between Bādarāyaṇa and Śaṅkara in his bibliography. Professor Mishra could have easily found the number of persons mentioned by Potter between Bādarāyaṇa and Gauḍapāda and seen how far the total exceeds the number mentioned by us on the basis of Potter's reference.

The only person about whom there can be no dispute that he occurred between Bādarāyaṇa and Gauḍapāda (AD 525) is Bodhāyana (350 AD). All others, in case we accept the current chronology, occur either after Gauḍapāda or may be regarded as his contemporary. The four advaitins whose dates are also given by us occur in the period between Gauḍapāda and Śaṅkara, thus, leaving only one extra advaitin not mentioned by us during the period from Bādarāyaṇa to Śaṅkara so if we accept Vidyāraṇya's statement then the total number of advaitins comes to 6 and not 5 as we had mentioned in our article. The correction is gladly accepted but does it affect the comparative picture we have drawn in any way what-so-ever?

Professor Mishra tries to suggest that one may 'legitimately' explain the non-availability of the bhāṣyas on the Brahma-sūtra before Śaṅkara by postulating the hypothesis that *all* of them were 'lost' due to various reasons. He writes for example that 'Those commentaries might have been lost due to the ravages of time and numerous other factors such as constant quarrels among the scholars nourished by their patrons, kings, which went to the extent of destroying the existing literature of opposing schools' (p. 140). This perhaps, is also meant to apply to all those 96 bhāṣyas which, according to Professor Mishra, must have existed because they have been referred to in Śrībhāṣyapradīpikā of Śrīnivāsācārya. Such a stragging loss of material which was known to Rāmānuja needs to be explained on more substantial grounds than saying that all of them must have been lost due to the attitude of the patron kings which 'went to the extent of *destroying* (emphasis mine) the existing literature of opposing schools.' The destruction of these 96 advaitic bhāṣyas could only have been done by the non-advaitic vedāntins, who at that time, most probably would

have been viśiṣṭādvāitins as the other non-advaitic schools of vedānta had not appeared on the scene. I wonder if the followers of Rāmānuja would like the charge made against them by Professor Mishra which is transparently implicit in what he had said on the subject.

The hypothesis of 'loss' to account for the absence of the advaitic texts before and after Śaṅkara have been resorted to by other persons also who have responded to my article on the subject, but all of them, including Professor Mishra, forget that the hypothesis can equally be applied to the texts of other schools also. After all, the so-called 'ravages of time' do not distinguish between the advaitic and the non-advaitic texts and, as for the patrons, they belong to all schools of Indian philosophy and there is written evidence to show that most of them were hostile to advaita and advaita only. In fact, the charge of deliberate destruction of the texts of other Sampradāyas is a slur on Indian system of patronage which generally supported the scholars of all persuasions and there is little evidence of any large-scale mass destruction of books in this country.

The quantitative counter-evidence given by Professor Mishra, thus, does not seem to support what he is trying to establish. There is, however, another objection which questions the very legitimacy of the quantitative approach that I have adopted in the article concerned. The urge that it is 'quality' and not 'quantity' that matters in all fields, including that of philosophy. I would readily accept this, as I do not believe that quantity *alone* connotes something important except in a marginal manner. Quantitative indices are important in certain contexts and they cannot be ignored. It may be remembered that the comparative context in which the article was written has an essential quantitative aspect and to deny its relevance in that context is, to my mind, utterly meaningless.

But even if we bring in considerations of quality, how shall one ever be able to determine the quality of works that are just not there. And, secondly, who dares to deny the quality of

thinkers like Vasubandhu, Dignāga or Dharmakīrti or Udyotkara or Akalaṅka, to name but a few. The advaitic insight may be qualitatively of the highest order but philosophically it has to be exhibited in concrete works which are to be found in works before Śaṅkara that can reasonably be considered Vedāntic in character. The appeal to the 'quality' of works that are supposed to be lost, is an appeal which no one can take seriously in a cognitive context as literally 'nothing' can be said about it.

A more fundamental objection has been raised by Professor Balasubramanian to my contention that 'The presence of Vedānta in the first millennium AD thus can only be understood in terms of what happens to the *Brahma-sūtras*, and the attention they aroused in the philosophical world of India after they were composed.' (p. 202). According to him, 'The relation between the Upaniṣads and *Brahma-sūtras* is such that it is neither possible nor desirable to separate them.' (p. 141). The same is said, in a sense, by Professor K. Saccidanand Murty when he concedes that *if* vedānta is considered to be that doctrine alone which is propounded in the *Brahma-sūtra* then it will be certainly correct to say that it is not very conspicuously present in the first millennium AD. The obvious implication of Professor Murty's statement is that the situation will drastically change if the Upaniṣads were also to be taken as the legitimate source of what is known by the name of 'Vedānta' in the philosophical tradition.

Professor Balasubramanian's objections to my separation of the *Brahma-sūtra* from the Upaniṣads for the treatment of Vedānta as a '*philosophical*' school appear to be the following. According to him, the Upaniṣads and the *Brahma-sūtra* are related in such a way that two cannot be separated in any meaningful way and that the attempt to do so is 'the fallacy of separating the inseparables.' He has given the examples of gold and bangle, clay and pot and, at a more abstract level, matter and form to explain his contention. The argument reminds one of the well-known contention of the advaitins

where the 'reality', that is, Brahama which itself has no form, *appears* to have form because of the *upādhis* which ultimately hide its reality instead of revealing it. This analogy will be totally unacceptable to any advaitin as he would not like to relegate the *Brahma-sūtra* to the 'illusory' status which the 'world' is given because of the *upādhis* in the advaitic system.

On the other hand, the relation between matter and form to which Professor Balasubramanian takes recourse will not be helpful either. This is so for the simple reason that the same matter can take different forms and that the same form can be exhibited in different materials. This is involved in the very notion of form as it is an abstraction which can be exhibited or exemplified in different materials. As for 'matter' it is ultimately a residual category, something absolutely formless, a pure potentiality—a point that Aristotle emphasized long ago. The mother in the story, which Professor Balasubramanian told to exemplify his view, could easily have satisfied the child by giving her a glass bangle instead of a gold one.

It is bound to be objected that we are taking literally the example given by Professor Balasubramanian and not seeing the essential point which he is making. After all his main contention is that the Upaniṣads and the *Brahma-sūtra* are so integrally and intimately related to each other that the one can neither be separated nor understood without the other. The contention, if taken in its 'strong' sense, could imply not only that the *Brahma-sūtra* cannot be understood without the *upaniṣads* but also that the *upaniṣads* cannot be understood without the *Brahma-sūtra*. Professor Balasubramanian may find this very satisfactory, but it will entail the conclusion that nobody could understand the *upaniṣads* before the *Brahma-sūtra* was composed. This is important as no one will deny that the *Brahma-sūtras* were composed after the *upaniṣads* and are a human creation. Thus, there is a radical difference between the *upaniṣads* and *Brahma-sūtra* especially for those who consider the former as Śruti, as the latter can never achieve that status being the work of a person called Bādarāyaṇa who tried

to understand them according to his own insights. But if this is accepted then the *Brahma-sūtra*, being the work of a human authority, can neither exhaust nor completely unfold the meaning of the Upaniṣads. In fact, alternative 'human' understandings of the Upaniṣads are implicit in the situation and even the earlier analogy of matter and forms demands it as there is no reason why one particular form *alone* should exhibit or embody all the possibilities inherent in the substance to which it is trying to give a form. As a matter of fact, the work itself refers to earlier attempts of understanding the Upaniṣads and gives reasons for disputing their understanding. But if Bādarāyaṇa can do it, so can others and there is no reason why the authority of Bādarāyaṇa should be invoked to preclude this possibility in principle. The idea of there being other *Brahma-sūtras* than the one ascribed to Bādarāyaṇa is not as pre-posterous as it may appear to be at first sight. The *Gītā* itself refers to the *Brahma-sūtra* in 13.4, a fact mentioned by Professor G. Mishra in his comment on my paper. This according to Professor Mishra may point to the '...availability of some other *Brahma-sūtras* which were known to the author of the Bhagvadgītā.' (p. 139). Śaṅkara, according to him thinks otherwise and believes that the reference in the *Gītā* is not to the text known as *Brahma-sūtra* but to *Brahman*. This, of course, seems improbable as such an interpretation of the *śloka* does not make any sense, particularly if the phrase 'हेतुमद्भिः' is taken seriously.

Perhaps, the simple way out of the difficulty would be to assume that the author of the *Gītā* has inadvertently referred to the *Brahma-sūtra* of Bādarāyaṇa and thereby revealed both the human authorship of the work and the relative date when it was composed which, on such an interpretation, will have to be assigned to a time which is later than that of the *Brahma-sūtra*. This, of course, would be anathema to all those who treat the *Gītā* as the word of the Lord himself and assign it to sometime at the end of the *Dwāpara* age when the *Mahā-bhārata* war was supposed to have been fought. These people,

then, would have either to assign the *Brahma-sūtra* to an even earlier date than that of the *Mahābhārata* war or treat the *Upaniṣads*, where *alone* we find a distinctive reference to *Brahman*, as being earlier to the war described in the famous epic.

The problem has a simple solution, but nobody would like to 'accept' it because it will make the *Gītā* a 'human document' written after the composition of the *Brahma-sūtra*, and not the word of the Lord himself who delivered it at the beginning of the battle of the *Mahābhārata*. The *Gītā* also has many *ślokas* which are a verbatim repetition of those given in the *Upaniṣads* and one has the problem of either treating the *Upaniṣads* as having been composed later than the *Gītā* or vice-versa. But, whatever the alternative one chooses, it creates insuperable problems for those who want to treat the *Gītā* as the message of the Lord delivered to Arjun at the battle-field of the Kurukṣetra.

There is another problem in the *Gītā* which has generally not been faced. On the one hand, it claims for itself, or others have tried to claim for it, the status of an *Upaniṣads* which deals with *Brahmavidyā*. A claim which is *not* recognised by anyone in the Indian tradition as it has always, being recognised as a *smṛti* and not as a *śruti* in it. The other well-known statement that 'The *Gītā* gives the essence of all the *Upaniṣads*' makes it rival of the *Brahma-sūtra* which attempts to do the same thing and thus, suggests that the author of the *Gītā* was not satisfied with what the *Brahma-sūtra* had done or conversely the author of the *Brahma-sūtra* was not satisfied with what the author of the *Gītā* had done.

The relations between the *Upaniṣads*, the *Brahma-sūtra* and the *Gītā* are, thus, very complex and can not be treated in the simplistic way as has been done by Professor R. Balasubramanian and Professor G. Mishra. There are other problems which have not been seen by them or anybody else. If the *Upaniṣads* and the *Brahma-sūtra* are 'inseparable' as Professor Balasubramanian has asserted, then the simple question as to which of the *Upaniṣads* are related in this 'inseparable'

way to the *Brahma-sūtra*, will have to be faced by him and all those who accept what he had said in this connection. There would have been no problem if there was only one *Upaniṣad* or only a limited number of the *Upaniṣads* written before the *Brahma-sūtra*, the essence of all of which was given in the *Brahma-sūtra*. But as this does not happen to be the case, as the texts known as the *Upaniṣads* continued to be written long after the *Brahma-sūtra* and even after Śaṅkara, the problem is almost insoluble in nature. The *Brahma-sūtras*, according to analysis of Nakamura, refer only the following *Upaniṣads*—Bṛhadāraṇyaka Chhāndogya, Aitareya, Kauṣītakī, Taittirīya, Īśa, Kāṭhaka, Muṇḍaka, Praśna, Śvetāśāvara and Mahānārāyaṇa.¹

As will be evident from this, the *Brahma-sūtra* does not refer to two important *Upaniṣads*, the *Māṇḍukya* and the *Maitrāyaṇi*, thus creating the problem that its author perhaps did not consider them to be of sufficient importance to be referred to in his work. On the other hand, Śaṅkara is supposed to have written independent commentaries on a number of *Upaniṣads* and also written a *Bhāṣya* on the *Brahma-sūtra* in which he has referred to the various *Upaniṣads* which he must have considered authoritative. However, recently, doubts have been raised regarding the authenticity of ascription of some of these works to Śaṅkara, mainly because of the critical textual works on these by Paul Hacker and Mayada. Professor Potter has summarized the position in his discussion on the subject in his volume entitled 'Advaita Vedānta up to Śaṅkara and his pupils' in the *Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies* edited by him (Motilal Banarsidas, 1981). He writes, 'The upshot of the most careful scholarship to date of the works of Śaṅkara, therefore, is that the following may without question be accepted as the work of the author of the *Brahma-sūtra bhāṣya*. The Bṛhadāraṇyakopaniṣad bhāṣya, the Taittiriyopaniṣadbhāṣya, and the Updeśāsāhasrī. There seems no real reason to question the inclusion of the Aitareyopaniṣadbhāṣya, the

1. See page 466–7, *A History of Early Vedānta Philosophy*.

Chhândogyopaniṣadbhāṣya, the Mundakopaniṣadbhāṣya and the Praśnopaniṣadbhāṣya in this list. Beyond this point, however, is only speculation.' Thus, it seems that both the author of the Brahma-sūtra and Śaṅkara accepts only the authority of certain Upaniṣads and not of others even if they existed *before* the Brahma-sūtra was composed. There seems, thus, to have been a '*selective attitude*' adopted by both in respect of the Upaniṣads that they chose to regard as *Śruti* for their purposes. This raises some fundamental questions regarding the so-called 'integral' and indissoluble relationship between the Upaniṣads and the *Brahma-sūtra* for which Professor Balasubramaniam has contended. The 'relation' has already been separated at least in relation to certain Upaniṣads by the author of the Brahma-sūtra itself. In case we accept that those Upaniṣads existed *prior* to the times when the Brahma-sūtra was composed. The selection, in fact, exists even in respect of the *upaniṣads* which are referred to in the *Brahma-sūtra* as some are openly being treated as major sources for what is being said and others treated only as minor (See Nakamura, pp. 466-7).

This, of course, would not have mattered if the *Upaniṣads* were not being treated as *Śruti*, because if some text or texts are considered in that way, all of its or their parts will have to be treated as having *equal* importance. If something is a *Śruti*, then one can not regard some parts of it as having greater authority than others.

The relation of the Brahma-sūtra to the Upaniṣads that existed before it, is thus not only selective but also 'imposes' on them a structure which they themselves did not have. This structural organization consisting of *adhyāya*, *pāda* and *adhikaraṇa* undoubtedly 'manifest', as Professor Balasubramanian has pointed out, what was implicit in the Upaniṣads. However, it does not and cannot entail the conclusion that this is the *only* structure that is there, or that no alternative structural organization is implicit in the text or texts concerned. The structural organization of the Brahma-sūtra

not only constrains us to see the Upaniṣads in a certain way but also creates the illusory impression that there is, and can be, no other way or ways of seeing the text/texts.

There is a close parallel between what the Brahma-sūtra has done in the context of the Upaniṣads and what the other sūtra-texts have done in the case not only of other schools of Indian philosophy but also of all the other cognitive disciplines in the Indian tradition. After all, everyone admits that there was a lot of discussion regarding the problems which the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra or the Nyāya Sūtra or the Vaiśeṣika Sūtra or the Yoga Sūtra deal with before they gave a systematic organization and presentation to what had gone before in their works. But once they were written, a *Śāstric* form was given to the disorganized, scattered heterogeneous thinking regarding them which had occurred earlier. And, this was the reason why they became the points of departure for all subsequent thinking on the tradition by replacing completely whatever was written earlier on the subject. A *Śāstra* gives a systematic structural organization to what had been thought earlier and, in that process, selects and highlights only those issues which it considers important, rejecting the others or neglecting them all together. The clearest example of such a phenomena occurs in *Paṇḍinī's Aṣṭādhyāyī* in the Indian tradition. Everyone knows that after *Paṇḍinī* there was introduced a radical distinction among the ways Sanskrit was spoken or written, a distinction which can be seen even today amongst the traditional scholars of the language when they point out to each other that such a *prayoga* is *apāṇinīya* or *non-pāṇinīya*.

The same thing happens after the composition of the various *Śāstric* texts in different fields of knowledge, as they not only superseded the earlier scattered pieces of knowledge relating to the subject, but also provided a model for what was to be regarded as 'Knowledge', in the strict sense of the term, in that domain. The same may be presumed to have occurred in the case of the *Brahmasūtra* as they, after the composition, became the standard 'reference point' for what was to be

regarded, as the *Śāstric* form of knowledge. The Upaniṣads, of course, continued to have an independent existence and be a source of inspiration for all those who were interested in what was contained in them. But this was not 'knowledge' in the *Śāstric* form, a point which is ignored by those who argue, like Professor Balasubramanian for their co-ordinate authority with the Brahma-sūtras. This 'independence' of the Upaniṣads from the Brahma-sūtras can easily be recognized by the fact that many people read the Upaniṣads without recourse to the *Brahmasūtras* and that the latter are *only* important for those who care for the *Śāstric* form of knowledge of what has come to be called *Vedānta* in the Indian philosophical tradition.

The same, in fact, is the case with the *Gītā* which, though included in the so-called *Prasthāna trayī* by many of the vedāntins, as an independent status of its own and does not even have a 'Śāstric' form of organization of the material. The simple point is that the Brahma-sūtras, because of the *Śāstric* form of their structural organization, cannot be treated on par with either the Upaniṣads or the *Gītā* which have a totally different form from that of the Brahma-sūtras.

There is, thus, a strict sense of the term philosophy which, if taken seriously, would include only the text known as Brahma-sūtras under it. In a loose sense, however, the term may be applied to the Upaniṣads as they also treat many of the subjects which are treated in the Brahma-sūtra. But, as pointed out earlier, there is the insoluble problem of what Upaniṣads to include and what to exclude. Śaṅkara, for example, is supposed to have referred to Paingī and Jabāla (p 46, Nakamura) Upaniṣads which find no place in the Brahma-sūtras. Not only this, he writes an independent Bhāṣya on Māṇḍūkya Upaniṣads, which has not been referred to in the Brahma-sūtras, according to Nakamura. As for Rāmānuja, he is said to have quoted 'Garbha Cūlikā, Mahā and Subāla Philosophy'¹ which finds no place either in Śaṅkara or in Brahma-sūtra.

1. Page 47, *A History of Early Vedānta Philosophy*, Nakamura.

This, obviously, creates another difficulty for the thesis that the Brahma-sūtra are so inseparably related with the Upaniṣads that they cannot be considered independently of each other. There is, however, another fact to which little attention has been paid by all those who argued for the 'inseparable' relation between the Upaniṣads and the Brahma-sūtra. This concerns the status of the *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā* in the Advaita tradition. Normally it is supposed to be almost of equal importance to the Brahma-sūtra, particularly in view of the fact that Śaṅkara himself is said to have been influenced by it in the interpretation of the Brahma-sūtra because his own teacher Govinda Bhagvatpāda belong to the tradition deriving from that work. But the *Māṇḍūkya Kārikā* is, *prima facie*, a work on *Māṇḍūkyop-niṣada* which finds no place in the Brahma-sūtra itself. Thus, the tradition of Advaita may be said to derive from two sources; the one from the Brahma-sūtra and the other from *Māṇḍākyakārikā*. The situation becomes a little clearer if we remember that Śaṅkara himself wrote an independent *Bhāṣya* on the *Māṇḍūkyopaniṣada* even though, if Nakamura's analysis is to be believed, he does not refer to it in the *Bhāṣya* on the Brahma-sūtra. In any case, as there are so many Upaniṣads and most of the thinkers adopt a selective function in respect of them, nothing definitive can be said regarding all of them in their totality or of their relation to the Brahma-sūtra or what has come to be called 'Vedānta' in the Indian philosophical tradition. The situation is further complicated by the fact that the texts known as Upaniṣads continued to be written not only long after the Brahma-sūtra was composed but even after Śaṅkara had written his *Bhāṣyas* on some of the most important in them. There is another aspect relating to this whole issue which has not been paid attention to even though I had brought it to the notice of the scholarly world in my article entitled 'The Upaniṣads—what are they?' Many of the important Upaniṣads are a 'selection' from earlier texts and the selection, as pointed out in my article, is arbitrary as it does not sometimes include those portions in the original which

explicitly proclaim themselves to be Upaniṣads. As for the term 'vedānta', there are so many problems in respect of it as pointed out in an even earlier article of mine entitled 'Vedānta—Does it really mean anything at all?' which as far as I know, have not been squarely faced by scholars who concern themselves with such issues.

But, whatever may be the problem or problems concerning the relation of the Upaniṣads and the Brahma-sūtras, little difference is likely to be made even if we accept what Professor Balasubramanian has said on the subject. For a moment let us ignore all the objections raised above and accept his contention that the Upaniṣads and Brahma-sūtra are so integrally related to each other that any attempt to separate them will be 'to separate the inseparables'. This would only amount to accepting the Upaniṣads as an integral part of the Vedāntic tradition along with the Brahma-sūtras. But does this 'acceptance' change in any way the situation prevailing in the first millennium AD in respect of what has come to be called the Vedānta in Indian tradition? There are, as far as we know, no independent Bhāṣyas on the Upaniṣads during this period. There is, of course, an isolated reference to a work of Tanka (AD 500) on Chhāndogya Upaniṣada in the *New catalogues catagorum* as mentioned in Potter's Bibliography. There might be a few others, but would their inclusion change the 'comparative' picture of the presence of the Vedānta in the first millennium AD in any way whatsoever? The 'inclusion' will certainly highlight the presence of the awareness of the Upaniṣadic stream in Indian philosophy during the millennium but it will not establish its dominant status there in any way, particularly, if it is compared with those of other schools of Indian philosophy. The term '*auṣṇidic*' certainly occurs and as pointed out by Nakamura, it refers to a school of thinking which is associated with the idea that the reality is one and hence non-dual in character (Nakamura, page 252). This certainly is closed to the advaitic position but the 'school', though known, hardly exercised any influence on dominant philosophical trends in the millennium before

Śaṅkara appeared on the scene. In fact there are no independent works on either the Upaniṣads or the Brahma-sūtra during this pre-Śaṅkara period and though one may postulate innumerable 'lost' bhāṣyas, Vārtikas, tikās, etc. on them, this can change the situation only for those who want to believe in something which is against all evidence and arguments in this context.

The situation certainly changes after Śaṅkara, but as we pointed out in our article, it does not affect in any substantive way the 'comparative' strength of the so-called Vedānta *vis-à-vis* other philosophical schools which flourished during that period. It is true that there is a substantial change in the awareness of Vedānta and the concern with it after Śaṅkara, but this in no way affects the truth of the contention that we had made in our article regarding the comparative status of Vedānta in the first millennium AD.

Professor Balasubramanian had objected to my use of the word *adhyāsa* as according to him '*Adhyāsa* is *perceptual* error, which is different from errors in reasoning as well as errors in interpretation' (page 137). Professor Balasubramanian is an eminent authority on the subject but I would like to suggest that even if he is correct, there can be 'extended' use of the term, especially if the 'extension' preserves the essential character of that in the context of which the original usages were adopted. Ultimately *adhyāsa* is a term for erroneous cognition and there is no reason to confine it to the realm of perception alone.

However, there is a problem in the traditional usage of the term in Advaita Vedānta itself to which I would like to draw his attention as well as of the other specialists in Advaita Vedānta who share his views regarding this issue. Śaṅkara himself raises the question at the very beginning of his bhāṣya and had given the reply to the objection that how could there be *adhyāsa* between the *ātman* and the object when the *ātman* is not an object of perception. The reply is at two levels. The first is to show that *ātman* is an object of perception because it is an object of the 'Asmadpratyaya'. Now this implies that '*Prayakṣa*'

can *only* be that which is a *viṣaya* of some *pratyaya* or other. But the moment such a definition of perception is accepted there can be no realm in principle which can be excluded from being an object of perception except the *Nirvikalpaka pratyakṣa* which by definition is supposed to be the content of no concept what-so-ever.

However, it is his reply at the second level which interests us more in the context of our discussion and it leads in a direction which may shake the very formulation of advaitic thought as it has been developed up till now. Śaṅkara observes that there is no such rule that the *adhyāsa* shall occur only in relation to an object which is present before our consciousness. It is not easy to give the exact translation of what is meant by the original text in this connection which reads as follows: 'न चायमस्ति नियमः पुरोऽवस्थित एव विषये विषयान्तरमध्यसिततद्व्ययमिति।' He does not just say this but gives a concrete example to illustrate his point. The example chosen is that of 'Ākāśa' which, according to him appears to be 'malīna' and also have a 'tala' in it, even though it is not an object of perception. The exact wordings are as follows—'अप्रत्यक्षस्यपि ह्याकाशे बालास्तलमलिनताद्यध्यस्यन्ति।' The statement obviously suggests that it is only the 'ignorant' who 'erroneously ascribe' (अध्यस्यन्ति) 'Tala' or 'malintā' to ākāśa which cannot, in principle, possess this property as it is not an object of perception. The statement raises enormous problems, but we are not interested here in persuing them. The point we want to emphasize is that, according to Śaṅkara, *adhyāsa* can occur even in respect of an object that is not an object of perception and that, hence, the objection that both the objects have necessarily to be perceptual in nature for *adhyāsa* to occur is untenable. In the example that he gives, only one of the objects is non-perceptual in character, while the quality that is ascribed to it happens to be perceptual in character. But the restriction is not necessary, even if Śaṅkara's example may be said to imply it. A non-perceptual object may also have non-perceptual qualities ascribed to it which, on reflection, are discovered to have been erroneously attributed to it. Śaṅkara

does not seem to have considered the problem of *adhyāsa* in the context of properties that are essentially relational in character, the relation being different from ‘*Samvāya*’ that is said to be obtained between properties and objects in the Nyāya tradition. But whatever may be the complexities produced by the introduction of these issues, there can be little doubt that Śaṅkara does not seem to subscribe to the position of Professor Balasubramanian in this connection. Śaṅkara may have change his position later, or the advaitins may have adopted a non-Śaṅkarite position on this subject later but, as far as these statements are concerned, they do not seem to support Professor Balasubramanian’s contention. Ultimately, the problem relates to erroneous cognition in general and not to that which occurs in the context of perception alone. If the term *adhyāsa* is to be restricted to the perceptual field alone then we’ll have to coin another term for erroneous cognition that occurs in other fields. But what would be given by it, only Professor Balasubramanian can tell.

Professor Suresh Chandra has disputed the claim that the so-called Digvijay of Śaṅkara during his own times and even later is hardly attested to by the facts as they are known today. He asks, ‘Was there any other scholar of Śaṅkara’s time whose work excelled that of Śaṅkara both in quality and quantity? Was there ... vedānta philosophy?’ (page 127) Surely, Professor Chandra could have found the facts for himself had he taken the trouble to do so? The dates and period of Śaṅkara’s time are not so well established as he seems to assume, but most scholars who have written on the subject agreed that there were outstanding contemporaries, both senior and junior, who are said to have belonged to the same time as Śaṅkara and who were outstanding philosophers by any standards. Kumārila is a well-known example, and so are many others. In fact, he has not even taken the trouble to find that the so-called account of Śaṅkara’s Digvijaya is based on a work that was written much later than Śaṅkara’s time. Professor G.C. Pande in his recent work on Śaṅkarācārya has examined in

detail the whole question and concluded that 'It (Śaṅkara Digvijaya) could belong to a fairly extensive time bracket, viz. from the 14th to the 17th centuries' (G.C. Pande, page 12).¹ But even if we accept the earliest date, it would still have been written at least six hundred years after Śaṅkara. It can, thus, hardly be cited as a reliable evidence as a contemporary observer of the scene. As for the so-called 'failure' of the 'academic empire' of Śaṅkara, Professor Suresh Chandra does not seem to know the stature of a Padmapāda or a Sureśwara in the tradition of Advaita Vedānta, not to talk of Maṇḍana Mīśra, in case he is supposed to be different from Sureśwara. The tradition of Advaita after Śaṅkara and his immediate disciples is fairly strong, as we find at least three persons before Vācaspati Mīśra I, who supposed to have lived around AD 960 and wrote his famous commentary on the Brahma-sūtra Bhāṣya of Śaṅkara. As the date of Sureśwara is given as AD 740, this will mean a time-lag of about 200 years during which, if Potter's bibliographical information is accepted, we have three persons known as 'advaitins' who have written on the subject. One of them, that is, Gyānottama, is said to have written on the Brahma-sūtra Bhāṣya, while the other two, that is, Gyānaghana (AD 900) and Vimuktātman (AD 950) are said to have written 'Tattva (pari) Śuddhi', and 'Iṣṭisiddhi' respectively. Of these three, the work of Gyānottama, that is Vidyāśrī, has not been published, even though it is supposed to be a work on the Brahma-sūtra Bhāṣya on Śaṅkara and might provide an interesting link between the works of Padmapāda, Sureśwara, and Maṇḍana Mīśra on one hand and Vācaspati Mīśra I on the other. The real impact, however, appears in the works of non-advaitic, and even anti-advaitic, thinkers such as Jayanta and Udayana, a fact already mentioned in our article. Yet, all these are significant pointers to the spreading influence of Śaṅkara. They, in no way, mitigate the fact that all these thinkers taken together do not stand anywhere near the quantity and quality of

1. Page 12, *Life and Thought of Śaṅkaracārya* by G.C. Pande.

work produced by others. The most surprising fact in this connection is that even Vācaspati Miśra I, whose outstanding stature amongst the post-Sureśwara advaitins is acknowledged by everyone, also wrote on both Nyāya and Sāṃkhya with 'equal' authority.

Professor Suresh Chandra, thus, does not seem to have made slightest effort to find out the facts by himself, which he could have easily done if he seriously wanted to know what he was writing about. The 'free-association', the 'free-wheeling' method adopted by him, can hardly help matters. What, for example, can one say about the way he has dismissed the evidence of Haribhadra Sūri in this regard, who occurred just after Śaṅkara and must have been a contemporary of both Padamapāda and Sureśwara if the chronological dates of Potter are accepted. He writes in this connection that, 'Haribhadra's work cannot be considered as the "general survey" of the schools of philosophy existing at his time. It was simply a survey of the philosophical system of his choice' (page 129). Suresh Chandra should have known that a 'survey' is generally made by a person as objectively as possible and not determined by any subjective, personal whim on one's part. After all why should one write a survey? And Haribhadra Sūri was not an ordinary name in Jain tradition. What is even more surprising is to find Suresh Chandra writing, 'The best way to reject a philosopher is to ignore him. *But motives should not be imputed.*' (page 129). He conveniently has forgotten that Haribhadra Suri was not writing about individual philosopher but generally accepted schools of Indian philosophy in his times. And, who is imputing motives, if not Suresh Chandra himself as he just writes after this that the survey he had written was not objective but only a result of his 'choice'. If this is not imputing motives than what it is?

Professor Suresh Chandra has made another distinction which he thinks is of crucial importance in the context of the article I had written. This is the distinction between the 'common-practitioner' and one, 'who knows Vedānta by

philosophical arguments concerning the identity of 'I' with 'Brahman', or, in other words, the distinction between the 'lay-man' and the 'professional philosopher' who specializes in Vedānta as a school of philosophy with ratiocinative, argumentative expository sense of the term. He draws this distinction in the very beginning of his article, but forgets that it is totally irrelevant in the context of the contention that I had made in my article on the subject. After all, I was concerned only with the latter and not the former and, in fact, it could not have been otherwise as the question of the comparative presence of Vedanta in the first millennium AD cannot be decided by any appeal to empirical facts concerning the 'common-practitioners' about whom Professor Chandra is talking and whose beliefs he is worried about. He has not asked himself even the simple question as to how such an empirical investigation can ever be carried out in respect of persons who are dead and gone and about whose beliefs no record had been left, as far as I know. Perhaps Suresh Chandra knows about these records and, if so, he will enlighten us by his empirical investigation on the subject soon. But I hope that even he will accept the distinction which is obtained at all levels and in all fields between what may be called, to use an Indian term, the '*Śāstric*' tradition of knowledge and the common beliefs of the people who generally do not entertain one set of beliefs only, but have an amalgam of them, little caring for the consistencies in them. The question, then, was how to find the presence of '*Śāstric*' tradition of Vedānta in the first millennium AD and I will suggest that not only Suresh Chandra, but also all the others who have commented on my paper undertake this work and come to a conclusion on their own on the basis of evidence that is available to them. I look forward to their investigations and conclusions and I will be happy to revise my own judgement in the light of the conclusions they reach. I may make it clear that I am neither a 'Vedāntin' nor 'anti-Vedāntin' and that I myself had shared the view prevalent in this regard as I had read the same books which my colleagues

had read. They can not imagine the surprise and the shock received when I accidently stumbled on the evidence which, at least to my mind, lead to a different conclusion and 'demanded' to be brought to the attention of the scholarly world so that they may deal with it as honestly as possible. I would like to add that in all intellectual matters one has to have what I have called 'Niḥsaṅga buddhi' which is analogous to what the Lord had called 'Niṣkāma Karma' in the Gītā. And, I may add one thing more, that for a 'real' advaitin, it should not be difficult, for his consciousness ultimately is not 'attached' to any specific *nāma*, *rūpa* or doctrine what-so-ever.

DAYA KRISHNA

3

What are the Different Forms of *Advaita* and How are They to be Distinguished from Each Other?

DAYA KRISHNA

Different Forms of *Advaita*: What Do They Mean?

What is the exact difference between the following: *Advaita*, *dvaitādvaita*, *acintyabhedābheda*, *anubhevādvaita*, *Kāsmīra*, *Śaivism*, *Śaiva Siddhānta*, *Vīra Śaivism*, and *Viśiṣṭaśaivādvaita* and *Śaiva Vedānta*.

Different Forms of Advaitism; What Do They Mean?: A Reply N.S. DRAVID

Under the above heading Professor Daya Krishna has asked for an explanation of the distinction amongst different forms of Advaitism like Advaita, Dvaitādvaita, Śaivism, etc., that are in vogue in Indian philosophy. Since each of these Advaitisms represents a full-fledged school of philosophy only a brief

account of the basic tenets of each of these schools can be given in this note. It may be mentioned first that some of the schools listed by Daya Krishna like Kāśmīr Śaivism or Vīra Śaivism are not traditionally characterized as Advaitism although they have some of its distinctive features. We start the explanation with the 'Advaitism' of Śaṅkara which is in a sense the forerunner of all other Advaitisms which are of the nature of diverse philosophical reactions to the former and are propounded by the great ācāryas like Rāmānuja, Vallabha, Chaitanya, Jivagoswami, etc. It may be mentioned here that 'anubhavādvaita' referred to by Daya Krishna is not the name of any well-known school of Advaitic philosophy, although the word happens to be used by Udayana, and perhaps some other authors too, to describe the Vijñānavāda or the idealistic standpoint of the Yogācāra Buddhists. The word has been used in some contexts in other senses too. Such is also the case with Viśiṣṭaśaivasiddhānta, listed as a kind of Advaitism by Daya Krishna. According to Śaṅkara, the first propounder of Advaitism, reality is absolute, nondual, infinite and it excludes all differences there being nothing other than it which is similar or dissimilar to it. Even within it there are no differences of part and whole, qualified and qualifier, etc. All differences are mere appearances of the absolute and they are the projections of *māyā*, the cosmic illusion. The possibility of such a projection is illustrated by our dream reality experiences in which we, the dreamers, project our own selves as all kinds of things other than ourselves and experience them as such. The apparent and ad hoc reality of the dream-objects is not intrinsic to them as it is our own reality appearing as belonging to them. Even we ourselves are the projections of the basic absolute reality. This apparent reality is inexplicable as it is not absolutely affirmable or totally deniable. The realization of the absolute nature of the ultimate reality dissipates all this illusion leaving behind nothing but the absolute reality. So we can even say that the world is the illusory content of the dream being consciously dreamt by Brahman, this being the basic

difference between our dreams and the dream of Brahman, which as absolute consciousness may be likened to bright light containing all the different spectra of colours within it.

‘Dvaitādvaita’ is—as the very etymology of the word suggests—a kind of Advaitism which does not militate against Dvaitism. It admits their co-existence which in a way is supported by common experience. We commonly distinguish for example a thing and its qualities and yet we so often refer to them as identical with each other. We say that ‘the clay-pot is a material object’ and that ‘red is the colour quality of this object’. This does not prevent us from expressing their identity by making a true statement like ‘The clay-pot is red’. The pluralist philosophers take the word red, in its indirect sense, namely, ‘That which has redness’ instead of its literal sense. But there is no need to take recourse to such uncommonsensual interpretation of a common word only to maintain the nonexistent radical opposition between duality and non-duality. In a certain respect, two or more things can be identical and in some other respect can be different too from each other. So God, the self and the world are related with each other according to Dvaitādvaita both through identity and diversity. The various details concerning such a view—like God’s powers of controlling, enjoying, etc. are not of much philosophical significance. In relation to Advaitism what needs to be noted is the basic principle that identity does not exclude diversity for Bhaṭṭa Bhaṣkara and others who uphold the Dvaitādvaita doctrine.

The Acintyabhedābheda variety of Advaitism owes its origin to Jīvaśvāmī’s (of sixteenth century AD) writings has much affinity to Dvaitādvaita but the difference-cum-non-difference relation holding between God, the soul and the world is considered by this school as non-conceptualizable. These three basic entities being of quite different intrinsic natures, the relation between them cannot be adequately formulated. Unlike Rāmānuja who regards the sentient self and the insentient matter as the infinite attributes of God, the above school treats these latter as just manifestations of God’s energy. The

insentient matter or Prakṛti and the God-dependent self cannot actually characterize God's infinite and infinitely sentient being as this would delimit God's nature. Rāmānuja foreseeing this difficulty has invested even God's attributes with infinity. In this respect the qualified non-dualism of Rāmānuja comes very close to Spinoza's substance attribute philosophy, the only significant difference between these two being that according to Rāmānuja divine attributes are infinitely benevolent while Spinoza does not say anything like this about mind and matter which are the two infinite attributes of the infinite substance in his view.

Śaiva Siddhānta, a creed very popular mainly in South India and having followers and scholars devoted to its study almost all over the world to-day has not much in common with what is known as Kāśmīr Śaivism otherwise known as the Pratyabhiñā school. The main doctrines of this school are these: God Śīva, who is beginningless, omniscient and omnipotent is the supreme reality. He is described as Saccidānanda which is taken to imply that He possesses the attributes of self-existence, essential purity, intrinsic wisdom, infinite intelligence, freedom from all bonds, infinite grace, and infinite bliss. Śīva, though possessing all these attributes, is not the sole creator of the world which is real and devoid of consciousness. Śīva with the cooperation of His Śakti creates the world. The principle of Karuṇā which determines the empirical and spiritual career of each self, is also the instrument of God's operation. Śakti is the link between Śīva, the pure consciousness and the unconscious world. About the nature of the relationship between God, the soul and the world, nothing very original has been said by Śaiva Siddhānta which the other Vedāntic schools have not said. It will be more appropriate to treat this school as theology, rather than philosophy.

Vīra Śaivism is out and out theology. Not much theorizing of philosophical significance is traceable in the writings of this school. It may be called a kind of Advaitism only by courtesy (Śīva being the supreme reality according to it).

Kāśmīr Śaivism is, however, an important form of Advaitism. Śiva, the infinite consciousness which is absolutely unrestricted and independent, is the sole reality of the world. The world exists within the infinite consciousness as an *independent* existent. Unlike in other Advaitic schools, the existence of an instrumental cause like *māyā* or *prakṛti* for the creation of the world is not admitted by this school. God creates everything (absolutely everything) by the force of his will or energy, God makes the world which has its being within Him to appear as if it is outside Him and other than Him. By His own power God manifests Himself as the innumerable selves enjoying the world. It is obvious from this brief account that the God of this school is not much different from the Brahman of Advaita Vedānta, which maintains that Brahman is both the efficient and the material cause of the world. But unlike in Advaita the energy of God is supposed to be endowed with aspects like intelligence, *ānanda* or bliss, will and *kriyā*.

The above is just a bare account of the various Advaitisms unsupported by any reason adduced by their respective advocates.

Is Udayana a *Pracchanna Advaitin*?

DAYA KRISHNA

Udayana, by common consent, is usually regarded as the last of the Naiyāyikas of the old school before Gaṅgeśa started what is called the Navya Nyāya or the new school of Nyāya which replaced older Nyāya completely. Yet, Udayana, in his *Ātmatattvaviveka*, gives six stages of realization of the self in ascending order out of which the third and the fifth are described by him as advaitic positions and the fifth is considered only one step lower than that of the Nyāya which occupies the highest position in his system. As the difference between the two is only marginal, that is, whether the self when completely established in itself without any relation to any object whatsoever can still be regarded as conscious in any relevant sense of the term. Not only this, he closes the book with the recommendation to meditate on the self and suggests the gradual stages of realization which would occur during the course of meditation. In the light of all this, would it not be more proper to treat him as almost an advaitin who is concerned with the realization of the self and believes that it can only be so realized through the usual meditational practices associated with the advaita Vedāntins who deny the awareness of any object

including the self in such a realization? Where is the Naiyāyika in all this? And, should not we, therefore, call him almost an advaitin, a *pracchanna advaitin*?

‘Is Udayana a *Pracchanna Advaitin*?’:

A Reply

Daya Krishna has raised the question whether Udayana, the author of *Ātmatattvaviveka* and other works on Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosophy is a disguised Advaitin. The grounds for raising such a question are, as stated by Daya Krishna, certain remarks made towards the end of *Ātmatattvaviveka* by Udayana. In these remarks Udayana seeks to highlight the distinction between the ultimate philosophical positions of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika and Advaita. Elsewhere in *Ātmatattvaviveka* and in *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* as also in his commentaries Udayana has either criticized the Advaitic position or cast aspersions on it by making slightly disparaging remarks about it. In the aforementioned remarks, Udayana goes one step further in his denunciation of Advaita by maintaining that the quintessence of Advaita is to be found only in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika doctrine of the absolute self and not in the doctrine of self-conscious Brahman as upheld by the so-called Advaita of Śaṅkara. The ātman or self as understood by Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika becomes totally devoid of all its special qualities, even including knowledge in the state of release. The Advaita of Śaṅkara, despite its claim to Advaitism, does not subscribe to such a view of absoluteness of self or Brahman which is nothing but pure consciousness. In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view the knowledge that leads to the release of self from bondage is dissipated of itself in the state of release leaving the self by itself. In the Advaita of Śaṅkara however the last *vrīti jñāna* which brings about self’s release is, of course, dissipated in release but with this dissipation the conscious being of the self stands revealed. There is, thus, no real

absolutism in the Advaita of Śaṅkara. The real absolutism or Advaitism is that of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika only in Udayana's considered view.

N.S. DRAVID

*Ślokārdhena Pravakṣyāmi Yad Uktam
Granthakoṭibhiḥ, Brahmasatyam Jaganmithyā
Brahmajīvaiva Nāparaḥ*

SANGHAMITRA DASGUPTA

*Ślokārdhena pravakṣyāmi yad uktam granthakoṭibhiḥ,
Brahmasatyam Jaganmithyā Brahmajīvaiva nāparaḥ*

Who said this and in which Book?

Reply to the Query Raised by
Sanghamitra Dasgupta

The off-quoted verse, attributed to Ādi Śaṅkara, occurs in *Brahma Jñānāvāṇīmālā*, verse 20. Professor S. Sankaranarayanan quotes a part of this verse in his *Śri Śaṅkara* (The Adayar Library and Research Centre, Chennai, 1955), p. 156. Another reading of this verse is:

*Brahma satyam jaganmithyā jīvo brahmaiva nāparaḥ I
anena vedyam sacchāstram iti vedāntaṇḍīmah II*

See 'Brahmajñānāvalīmāla', V. 20, *Vedānta-sandarbhā* (*Advaita Grantha Ratna Manjusha-32*, Mahesh Research Institute, Varanasi, 1989), p. 378. Yet another reading of this verse occurs in *Vedāntaḍḍimāḥ* V. 66 in *Vedānta-sandarbhā*. It is as follows:

Brahma satyam jagannithyā jīvo brahmaiva nāparah I
jīvanmuktastu tadvidvān iti vedāntaḍḍimāḥ II

R. BALASUBRAMANIAN

Part II

Mīmāṃsā

1

Dravya-Tyāga: Staal's View—Editor's Note and Letter

DAYA KRISHNA

Editor's Note

Professor J.F. Staal is well-known for his work in the field of Indian philosophy. His work on the Vedic *Yajña* entitled *Agni*, along with the film that he had made on it, has made him justly famous for what he has done. Yet, in the course of what he has written on the subject, he has made highly questionable statements which have been accepted as true, on his authority, by other experts in the field. One such statement refers to the formula which is uttered along with the offering of oblations in the fire. His interpretation of the sacrificial offering has been accepted uncritically by many on his authority. Wendy Doniger O'Flaherty, for example, quotes Staal without giving any inkling to the reader that there is another side to the story and that, according to Staal himself, there is a contradiction in the situation. As she does not give the exact page number from where the quotation is taken, it is difficult for the reader to check on the original quotation and the discussion around it, even if he or she wishes to do so [see Wendy Doniger

O'Flaherty (ed.), *Karma and Rebirth in Classical Indian Traditions* (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1983), p. 12].

Professor Staal knows a lot of traditional scholars in the field of *Mīmāṃsā*. In fact, the volume on *Agni* itself is supposed to have been produced in collaboration with Shri C.V. Somayajipad and Shri M. Itti Ravi Nambudri. But one wonders if Professor Staal ever talked to these persons about his theory of sacrificial offering in the Vedic *Yajña*. Or, if he did so, what their opinion about it was.

In any case, here is the opinion of some of the most outstanding *Mīmāṃsā* scholars in India about what Professor Staal has written in his book *Agni: The Vedic Ritual of the Fire Altar* (Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 1984) on the subject. The scholars, of course, were not told whose view it was that they were being requested to comment upon. A Sanskrit translation of Professor Staal's original piece in English was sent to them along with a covering letter, both of which are published here together with the replies received in response to our request. A copy of each of the comments has been sent to Professor Staal for his reply, and as soon as it is received, it will be published in the pages of the *JICPR*.

A dialogue between current scholarship and classical learning has generally not been possible up till now, and the two have lived in worlds apart with hardly any interchange between them. The *JICPR* will try to break this isolation, and build a bridge which may provide a two-way traffic between them. This is the first step in that direction. Let us hope there will be many more such attempts in the pages of the *JICPR* in future.

Letter from the Editor Addressed to Mīmāṃsā Scholars

I am sure you must be aware that a lot of Western scholars have written a great deal regarding the Vedas and interpreted

it in different ways. But, as most of it is written in a language other than Sanskrit, it does not usually come to the notice of traditional Sanskrit scholars in our country. In order to overcome this difficulty, we are planning to bring some of the important contributions of outstanding Western scholars, not merely in the field of the Vedas but also regarding other branches of knowledge, to the notice of our traditional pandits through getting them translated into Sanskrit and asking them what they think about the interpretation.

As a beginning in this direction, I am enclosing herewith an interpretation of *Dravya-Tyāga* in the Vedic *Yajña* given by a very well-known Western scholar who has worked in this field for a long time. May I request you to please consider his interpretation and send me your considered response regarding it for publication in the *Journal of the Indian Council of Philosophical Research*. We would send your response to the original writer for his reply and the same, when received, will be sent to you and also be published in our Journal.

(a) Staal's Interpretation of *Dravya-Tyāga*
by Daya Krishna

The Śrauta Sūtras of the late Vedic period offer several definitions of ritual. One that is often quoted characterizes it as comprising three things: *dravya*, 'the substance (used in oblations)'; *devatā*, 'the deity (to which oblations are offered)'; and *tyāga*, 'renunciation (of the fruits of the ritual acts)'. The *tyāga* is a formula pronounced by the yajamāna or patron at the culmination of each act of oblation. When the officiating priest, on behalf of the yajamāna, makes the oblation into the fire for one of the gods, for example Agni, the Yajamāna says:

This is for Agni, not for me (*agnaye idam na mama*).

At this point a contradiction begins to appear, which becomes increasingly explicit in the ritualistic philosophy of the *Mīmāṃsā*. The reason for performing a specific ritual is stated to be the desire for a particular fruit or effect. The stock example of the *Mīmāṃsā* is:

He who desires heaven shall sacrifice with the Agniṣṭoma ritual (*agniṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta*).

But this fruit is renounced whenever the yajamāna utters his tyāga formula of renunciation. The effect, therefore, is not obtained.

The resulting picture is further complicated by another apparent contradiction. The rites are subdivided into two classes, 'obligatory' (*nitya*) and 'optional' (*kāmya*). Unlike the Agnicayana, which is *kāmya*, the Agniṣṭoma is a *nitya* rite: every brahman has the duty to perform it. So here is a ritual that appears to be optional, since it is confined to those who desire heaven (nobody's duty), but that is also not optional because it is a prescribed duty, and that does not bear any fruit because its fruits are ultimately abandoned. The texts reflect such contradictions. The *Mīmāṃsā Sūtra*, basic manual of the ritual philosophy of the *Mīmāṃsā*, lays down that the rites lead to happiness, but the subcommentary 'Straight Spotless' (*Ṛjuvimalā*) observes that this does not apply to obligatory acts.

(b) Comments by Pandit Paṭṭābhirāma Śāstrī

There is a maxim which says: 'It is easy to please one who is ignorant and easier still to please one who knows the subject well, but even Brahmā (the god of knowledge) cannot please a man complacent in the little that he knows'. I feel, to begin with, a little ashamed in replying to antagonistic opinions expressed by a man who has no connection at all with any

part of the Vedas nor with the performance of activities, whether *śrauta* or *smārta* (that is, enjoined directly by the Vedas or through the Smṛtis) related to the Vedas.

All *śrauta* activities (enjoined in the Vedas), whether of *yajña*, *dāna* (giving) or *homa* (offering libation), have two elements: *devatā* (a god) and *dravya* (things). Both these are known through injunctions. *Vidhi* (Vedic injunction) is expressed through *padas* with a *taddhita*-ending, such as, 'āgneyo' *ṣṭākāpālah*', 'sauryaṃ carum', 'vaiśvadevyāmikṣā' and the like. These indicate both the *devatā* and the *dravya*. Sometimes a *vidhi* is expressed through the fourth case-ending (*caturthi vibhakti*); for example, 'yadagnaye ca prajāpataye ca sāyam juhoti'. This indicates only the god (*devatā*). The *dravya* to be used is indicated by a separate injunction such as 'payasā juhoti' (offers a libation of milk), 'dadhnā juhoti' (offers a libation of yoghurt).

In some cases there are also examples where the *devatā* is to be known through the syllables contained in the Vedic mantra (*mantravarṇena*) and the *dravya* is indicated through a sentence expressive of use or application (*vinīyogavākya*). Thus there is more than one way of expressing a *vidhi*.

Having known the *devatā* and the *dravya*, the activities [which are part of a sacrifice) are performed according to prescriptions given in the Kalpasūtra. These activities are threefold; namely, *yajña*, *dāna* and *homa*. The *yajña* to be performed is enjoined through the verb, 'yajati', *dāna* is indicated through 'dadāti' and *homa* through, 'juhoti'. A *yajña* is defined as: giving up *dravya* for a *devatā* (*devatoddēśena dravyatyāgaḥ*). *Dāna* is the relinquishment of ownership that one has over a thing (*dravya*) in such a manner that it passes on to another who then becomes its owner. *Homa* is putting (*prakṣepa*) the thing to be offered in the enjoined place. The giving up of something in a *yajña* consists only in relinquishing one's ownership of the thing without its passing to another. In *dāna* the process is completed only when the ownership is passed on to

another person. In *yajña* the process of relinquishment is an internal mental process, but in *dāna* it also has a physical counterpart, the act of giving being accompanied with the words, 'I give this to you, O *brāhmaṇa*, it is not mine'. In *yajña* the giving is accompanied with the words, 'this is for Agni, not mine' (*agnaye idaṁ na mama*), the process of relinquishment being purely mental with no physical counterpart. This is the distinction between *yajña* and *dāna*. The distinction is indicated by a difference in the use of words: [in giving to the *brāhmaṇa*], the address is, 'to you' (*tubhyam*), but in giving to Agni it is, 'for Agni' (*agnaye*). *Homa* is an act of placement and is purely physical. The act is, however, a necessary part of *yajña* which cannot be accomplished without it, since the thing (*dravya*) given up for the sake of a god has to be deposited somewhere. This is also known as *pratipatti-karma* (the consummation of completion of an action). The place where the deposit has to be made is enjoined as *agni* (fire), the *agni* known as the *āhavanīya*. The etymology of the word '*agni*' is as follows: '*etya dagdhvā nayatītyagniḥ*' (that which having received something carries that further). Agni is a god, and not merely physical fire. It is that god who after burning carries away the *dravya* given away by the *yajamāna* and placed in it by the *adhvaryu* priest. A distinction must be made here between *agni* in which something is physically deposited and the *agni* to which it is offered. The *agni* to which something is 'given' is a god, but the *agni* in which things are placed for the purpose is a physical object, a fire lit for the purpose and known by such names as *āhavanīya*, *gārhapatya*, etc. In sentences that express injunctions, *agni* as god is articulated through the use of a *pada* ending in a *taddhita*: '*āgneyaḥ*', this is the *agni* to whom an offering is made. The other physical (*laukika*) *agni* on which the offering is merely placed is articulated through the use of the seventh case-ending (*saptamī vibhakti*): '*āhavanīye*'. From the foregoing it is to be understood that the *yajamāna*, having purified the *dravya* to be offered through

processes such as *avadāna*, relinquishes it for the sake of a specified god [with the words], 'it is for Agni, not mine' or 'it is for Indra, not mine' and the like. The *dravya*, thus relinquished, has to be placed in the *āhavanīya* fire. Consequently, what is placed in the fire is *dravya* which has already been given up. In this entire process the part which consists of the act of giving up or relinquishing is the *yajña*; the other part, namely, the placement of the *dravya* in the fire is *homa*. Now, where, may I ask, during this whole process is one giving up the fruit of one's action?

Let me give more details of the order in which things are done. In *yajñas*, where the *dravya* to be offered is *purodāśa*, the injunctions are, '*yavairyajeta*' (one should perform the *yajña* with barley); '*vr̥hibhiryajeta*' (one should perform the *yajña* with paddy). Having learnt from this that paddy is to be used in the *yajña*, a sufficient quantity is poured out for the purpose; it is then threshed and cleansed. Rice is separated from winnowed grains, powdered and roasted. The roasted rice flour is formed into a ball of tortoise shape with the help of hot water kept for the purpose. The ball is then roasted in pots (sherds (*kapāla*)); a piece of it equal to the size of half a thumb, measured from the tip is cut away from its head and placed in the sacrificial wooden ladle. This is tossed into the *āhavanīya* fire by the *adhvaryu* priest when the *hotṛ* priest intones the *vaṣatkāra*. At that very moment the *yajamāna* performs the act of giving up his ownership of the offered *dravya*. The three acts of intoning the *vaṣatkāra*, tossing the *dravya* into the fire and its giving up by the *yajamāna* occur at the same time. I do not see how another act of giving up the fruit, which is yet to materialize of the action, can take a jump and intrude into the process? Perhaps the Western pandit will be able to tell us!

Vedic injunctions (*vidhis*) are of various kinds: *utpatti-vidhi* (which enjoins nothing more than the *yajña* to be performed), *viniyoga-vidhi* (which enjoins the acts to be performed), *prayoga-vidhi*—the manner in which these actions are to be performed (their order) and *adhikāra-vidhi* (which tells as to who is

entitled to undertake the performancé of the sacrifice). These are given in the Brahmaṇa texts—Āpastamba, Āśvalāyana and other authors of the Śrauta-sūtras, have given their expositions as to how a *yajña* should be performed. The *sūtra*-writers do not give the *lakṣaṇa* (definition) of *yajñas*. Such a *lakṣaṇa* can be given in a single *sūtra*; it is not necessary to write a lengthy treatise for the purpose. When the Western pandit says that the Śrauta-sūtras are works which formulate a definition of *yajña* (that is, offer a *lakṣaṇa* of *yajña*), he is only parading his ignorance. Such is the true state of affairs.

Now, what the Western pandit does is to separate a sentence from the context as a whole: the sentence which accompanies the act of giving up on the part of the *yajamāna*, namely, ‘*agnaye idam na mama*’, and formulates an opposing view of his own with the intention of exhibiting an inconsistency in the Mīmāṃsā understanding of *yajña*. He is greatly deluded in this. The chief subject of the Mīmāṃsā discourse is *dharma*. As the sole source for the knowledge of godhood (*bhagavattattva*), the Veda is also the sole source for the knowledge of *dharma* (*dharmatattva*). The Mīmāṃsā is an enterprise to arrive at the truth of *dharma* (*dharmatattvanirṇaya*) through a rational interpretation (*vicāradvārā*) of the Vedic texts. It is for this reason that Mīmāṃsā is also known as Dharmasāstra and *Vākyaśāstra* (a discipline concerned with the meaning of texts, literally, ‘sentences’). Certain maxims or rules of interpretation (*nyāyas*) are necessary for the task Mīmāṃsā has set for itself. Consequently, every section (*adhikaraṇa*) of Mīmāṃsā has its own distinct *nyāya*. It is for this reason that the Mīmāṃsā is also described as a system of thought characterized by the use of *nyāyas* (*nyāyanibandhanātmakam*). How then can Mīmāṃsā be described as a system devoted with *yajñas* (*yajñiyadarśanam*) as the Western pandit asserts? It is a system of thought which considers categories such as substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), actions (*karma*) and universals (*sāmānya*) as *dharmas*. It is not confined to the purpose of propounding *yajña* alone as *dharma*.

Moreover, while pointing out inconsistencies in the Mīmāṃsā, the Western pandit quotes a sentence [from the Veda]: ‘*agniṣṭomena svargakāmo yajeta*’. But no sentence with such a string of syllables is to be found there. And even supposing it does exist, it should then contain the word ‘*jyotiṣā*’: ‘*agniṣṭomena jyotiṣā ...*’. The meaning being: ‘one, desiring heaven, should perform the *jyotiṣṭoma yajña* modelled on the *agniṣṭoma (agniṣṭomasamsthānena)*. The *jyotiṣṭoma yajña* has seven forms (*samsthās*). The first of these is indicated by the word ‘*agniṣṭoma*’. All this seems to have been beyond the understanding of the Western pandit.

The phrase, ‘*agniṣṭomena*’ contains the word, ‘*agni*’. From this the Western deduced that what it means is that a *tyāga* (giving up) to *agni* has to be carried out. But what we have here is an ‘*adhikāra-vākya*’ which speaks of who shall acquire the fruit of the action spoken of in another sentence. The fruit of an action is the purpose for which it is performed. The sentence, ‘*agniṣṭomena svargakāmo...*’, lays down the name of the *yajña* to be performed by a person who is desirous of heaven: he will attain the desired fruit by means of the prescribed *yajña*. There is no question here of giving up the fruit of one’s action. In fact, it is only someone who is desirous of a certain fruit who performs a *yajña* so that it will lead to the fulfilment of his desire. The *yajña* is not performed in order to give up the fruit. Indeed, if there is an inconsistency, it is in the position taken by the Western scholar who thinks that one needs to perform an action in order to give up its fruit and that in order to give up the fruit of an action one must perform the action.

There is another inconsistency in what the Western pandit has to say resulting from the fact that he has been unable to understand the distinction between actions which are ‘*nitya*’ (obligatory) and those which are ‘*kāmya*’ (optional). Actions are of three kinds: *nitya*, *naimittika* and *kāmya*. Actions with a fixed *nimitta* (occasion) are *nitya*; those for which the occasion of performance is not known in advance are *naimittika*. Non-performance of these two kinds of action can lead to harm

and obstruction. *Kāmya* action is an action which, though enjoined by the Veda, is yet optional, to be performed only for the fulfilment of certain desires. Its non-performance cannot lead to any harm. If one does perform it, one has to take another birth in order to avail of its fruits. A person who wants to be free of future births should not perform *kāmya* actions. This being so, where is the inconsistency? [Govinda] Bhagavatpāda has said: Study the Vedas constantly, carefully perform the actions it enjoins in the spirit of worshipping the Lord and give up the thought of performing *kāmya yajñas*.

The Western pandit is so far advanced into the dizzy heights of delusion that he has been able to 'see' yet another inconsistency in Mīmāṃsā.

In order to get the matter clear the following should first be borne in mind. The sentence through which the *nitya jyotiṣṭoma* is enjoined is: '*vasante vasante jyotiṣā yajeta*' (one should perform the *jyotiṣṭoma* during every spring). But the sentence which enjoins the *kāmya jyotiṣṭoma* is different and reads: '*jyotiṣṭomena yajeta svargakāmahī*' (one desirous of heaven should perform the *jyotiṣṭoma*). The *yajña* (or, in other words, the *karma*) remains the same in both cases, the difference is one of purpose and motivation (*prayoga*). Had the *karma* been different, this would have been shown by different indicators, one being a difference in the words forming the injunction. Of the actions enjoined some are *kratvartha*: their goal is the proper performance of the *yajña*, while others are *puruṣārtha* enjoined towards the attainment of specified fruits. If a *yajamāna* desires the fruits of only the *nitya karmas*, then he need not perform any actions other than those enjoined as *puruṣārtha*. Fruits are generated only by '*aṅgas*' (parts of a *karma*) and not the '*pradhāna*' (the *karma* as a whole). Take the *nitya agnihotra* where it is enjoined: '*dadhñendriyakāmasya juhuyāt*' (offer yoghurt desiring [powerful] sense organs). Here the fruit, namely, powerful sense organs are acquired by the use of yoghurt and not the *agnihotra* as a whole which functions merely as an overall context (within which the special use of yoghurt is

made). Similarly, take the *nitya darśapūrṇamāsa*, where water is carried in the *camasa* vessel (*apām praṇayanasādhanam camasaḥ*). If the *yajamāna* is desirous of cattle, then the injunction is: '*godohanena paśukāmasya praṇayet*' (for one desirous of cattle the water should be carried in the milking vessel, instead of *camasa*). Now, if the act is done in the enjoined manner it will result in the desired fruit, the cause of which will be the milking vessel and not the *yajña* as a whole. The milking vessel is here to be taken as the fruit-producer and not the others which are obligatory. The maxim to be followed is: a *kāmya* action takes over the *nitya* (*kāmyam nityasya bādhakam*). The use of milking vessel is a special act in this case; it aids the fetching of the water which remains constant. It is therefore the milking vessel which produces the desired fruit. Such is the state of affairs.

Now let us look at the inconsistency that has been pointed out. The injunction says: '*ya evam vidvānagnim cinute*'. This is the Vedic sentence that enjoins the laying of the fire-place. The sentence, '*iṣṭakābhiragnim cinute*', then prescribes that the act should be done with bricks. In both these sentences the *agni* meant is the secular fire and not the god. After the fire-place has been duly prepared with bricks and the fire is lit, the prescription is: then the *yajña* should be performed in the fire with *agniṣṭoma* and *ukthya* ... for as many as eleven nights '*athato*' *gnimagniṣṭomenānuyajanti, tamukthyena, tam ṣoḍaśinā tamatirātreṇa, tam dvirātreṇa, tam trirātreṇa*'. Here the words '*agniṣṭomena, ukthyena*' ... which have the third case ending and denote the hymns (*stotras*) to be used. By implication, they also denote the [seven] modifications of the *agniṣṭoma* (the seven *saṁsthās*) which bear their name; these are to be performed after this particular *yajña* has been completed. Sometimes, however, the *yajña* to be performed is actually named and not just implied, as in, '*trivṛdagniṣṭutagniṣṭomaḥ*'; what is meant is the *yajña* called '*agniṣṭu*' of the *agniṣṭoma saṁsthā*. In the case we are discussing, however, the words, '*agniṣṭoma*', '*ukthya*' etc. refer to the [seven] *saṁsthās* of the

jyotiṣṭoma. In the *jyotiṣṭoma yajña*, a bamboo-shed (*prāgvamśasālā*) is put up to begin with. This is followed by rites such as the *dīkṣā* (initiation) and other performances which last for three days. On the fourth day, the platform called the *uttaravedī* is constructed where the rites of the fourth and the fifth days are consecrated. Such is the performance of the ‘*nitya*’ (obligatory) *jyotiṣṭoma*. But the *jyotiṣṭoma* containing the *agnicayana* is different. When the *yajña* is performed in this form, then the building of the brick-made fire-altar, a subsidiary act, is said to become the fruit-bearing part of the *yajña*, just as the milking vessel was, as discussed earlier, the producer of the desired fruit. The building of the altar is not really a *yajña* but a rite for the purification of the fire (*agnisamskāra*). Such a purified fire is to be made use of in the *yajñas* of the seven *samsthās* such as the *agniṣṭoma*. Where is the inconsistency in all this is for the Western Pandit to point out.

In speaking of giving up the fruit of actions (*phalatyāga*), what the teacher of the *Gītā* meant is that one should not perform an action with the desire for its fruit in mind and nothing more. The giving up meant here has no relevance to the performance of a *yajña*. The giving up during a *yajña* is the giving up of *dravya* (sacrificial material) and not of the fruit of the action. This is why [Govinda] Bhagavatpāda has said: ‘give up the thought of performing *kāmya yajñas*’.

(c) Comments by Pandit Remella Sūryaprakāsa Śāstrī

In truth there is no inconsistency. One inconsistency relates to the desire for fruit on the part of the *yajamaña* in performing the *yajña*: the *yajamāna*, it is pointed out, gives up the fruit of his action in pronouncing the *mantra*, ‘this is for Agni, not mine’ (*agnaye idaṁ na mama*): revealing that the impetus for performing a *yajña* is *tyāga* (an attitude of giving up), rather than any desire for fruit on the part of the *yajamāna*. From this it is inferred that the *yajña* yields no fruits (it is *niṣphala*).

Such an inference is mistaken. For, *yajña* is defined as the giving up of things for a god (*devatoddeśena dravyatyāgo yāga iti*). Here, in this context, the giving up of things is an inner 'mental' giving up. The *yajamāna* gives up certain things for the sake of a god. The priest known as the *adhvaryu* then offers these things to the fire. The *yajamāna* utters the *mantra*, '*agnaye idam na mama*' (this is for agni, not mine), thus giving up through words what he had already given up mentally. This giving up is the giving up of things, not of the fruit resulting from the action.

However, there is something that must be stressed here. It is not true that the impetus for performing a *yajña* is in every case the desire for a fruit. *Nitya karmas* (obligatory actions) are not performed out of any desire for fruit. Such actions are quite unconnected with any desire whatsoever. The fact of being a living agent is itself the reason for undertaking such actions which have been prescribed as a duty in the Vedas. The Veda decrees that one should perform the *agnihotra* sacrifice as long as one lives (*yāvajjivam agnihotram juhoti*); also, one should perform the *darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifice as long as one lives (*yāvajjivam darśapūrṇamāsābhyām yajeta*). One might ask: do such actions which have been prescribed for an agent as long as he lives, have any fruit? The fruits of such actions, according to the Mīmāṃsakas is the destruction of sin and not the attainment of heaven (*svarga*) or other results (which ensue from sacrifices performed out of desire). That is why the sentences which prescribe such actions are different, being 'one should perform *agnihotra* as long as one lives' and 'one should perform the *darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifices as long as one lives'. Actions (that is, sacrifices) performed out of a desire for heaven or other things are termed *kāmya* ('desired') actions. For them the prescription is (suitably worded as): 'he who desires heaven should perform the *agnihotra* sacrifice' and 'he who desires heaven should perform the *darśapūrṇamāsa* sacrifices' etc. We see that there is a distinction between the '*nitya*' *agnihotra* (one which is obligatory) as well as the '*nitya*' *darśapūrṇamāsa* and the

'*kāmya*' *agnihotra* and the '*kāmya*' *darśapūrṇamāsa*. The distinction lies not in the actual performance of these sacrifices which remains the same, but in the words which prescribe them towards different ends. This results in a difference in the resolve (*saṃkalpa*) with which the same action is performed. In the case of the '*nitya*' *agnihotra* the *saṃkalpa* takes the following form: 'I shall perform it in the morning.' After the *saṃkalpa* there is a sense of joy: this action of mine will please the Lord. Similar is the case with other '*nitya*' *yajñas* such as the *darśapūrṇamāsa* and the *jyotiṣṭoma*. But the *saṃkalpa* to perform a '*kāmya*' *agnihotra* or another '*kāmya*' *yajña* is accompanied by quite another feeling: namely, that 'this will result in the attainment of heaven'. In this manner it is to be understood that a difference in the prescriptive sentence and the *saṃkalpa* results in a distinction between a '*nitya*' and a '*kāmya*' action.

The point I am trying to make is that a *nitya yajña* is not performed for the sake of any fruit whatsoever; the reason for its performance is that its performer is a living agent, though such a performance leads to the destruction of sin.

This is the answer to the first inconsistency. Now about the second inconsistency:

The *agniṣṭoma* is a *nitya* sacrifice; the *cayana* is *kāmya*. Some sacrifices are *vaikalpika* (they can be one or two or more and the performer can choose to perform any one of them). Others are entirely optional. A *nitya* sacrifice is obligatory. But a '*kāmya*' sacrifice is performed only by those who might desire to attain heaven. This seems to lead to a serious objection: the same sacrifice can, as we have seen, become both obligatory and optional. But it cannot be optional, if it is enjoined. Neither can one give up the fruit of sacrifices performed for their fruit, for that would make the sacrifice fruitless, a fact which is absurd. I have, however, shown how the same *yajña* can be both optional and obligatory, depending on the words of the prescriptive sentence and the nature of the *saṃkalpa* which leads to its performance. In such cases there is inconsistency between being optional and being obligatory.

There are many more things that can be said on this subject if an occasion is created for discourse on these matters, wherein it can be shown how all inconsistencies between different Vedic injunctions is only a seeming one. It is not difficult to establish harmony between all Vedic sentences.

(d) Comments by Professor Rāmānuja Tatācārya

The Problem: A *yajña* is the giving up of things for the sake of a god (*devatoddeśena dravyatyāgaḥ yāgaḥ*). When a priest offers things on behalf of a *yajamāna* to the fire then the *yajamāna* proclaims: This is for Agni, it is not mine (*agnaye idam na mama*). But if a *yajña* is performed for attaining a certain fruit, how then can the *yajamāna* say 'it is not mine' and thus give up the fruit of his action? How can this inconsistency be resolved? One is indeed led to a position where one can see no distinction between the doctrine of *niṣkāma karma* (acting without the desire of attaining any fruit of one's action) propounded in the *Gītā* and the *Mīmāmsā* notion of actions performed out of a desire for fruit. Both these notions agree after all in speaking of *tyāga* (a giving up). Also, one cannot see how *Mīmāmsā* can maintain a distinction between *nitya* actions (to be performed necessarily out of a sense of duty) and those which are *kāmya* (optional).

Resolution of the problem: In performing *niṣkāma karma* as propounded in the *Gītā*, the giving up of the fruit of action can be of three kinds. One: giving up the desire for the fruit, such as heaven, of an action. Two: giving up the sense of ownership, expressed in words such as, 'this action belongs to me', when performing an action. And three: giving up the sense of being the agent of an action, expressed in words like, 'I am doing this action'. These three kinds of giving up are characterized as (1) the giving up of fruit (*phala*), (2) of attachment (*saṅga*) and (3) of agency (*kartrtva*).

Consequently, *niṣkāma karma* is characterized by three *tyāgas*: giving up the desire for fruit, as well as the sense of being the 'owner' of an action and the sense of agency. Resultantly, an action done with no sense of being its owner, no sense of agency and no desire for its fruit, is called *niṣkāma karma*.

The Mīmāṃsākas, however, do not believe in the notion of the giving up of the fruits of *yajñas* (*karma*). Every *yajña* whether *nitya* or *kāmya* has a fruit assigned to it and it is performed for its fruits. The giving up accompanied with the words, 'this is for Agni, it is not mine (*agnaye idaṃ na mama*), is a giving up (not of the fruit of the *yajña*) but of the ownership of the substance that is offered as libation. The *yajamāna* gives up the ownership of what he offers as libation to a god who then becomes its owner. All three (quite unlike *niṣkāma karma*) are present in the action of a *yajamāna*: (1) the sense of being the agent of the action, for the *yajamāna* feels that he is performing it; (2) the desire for its fruit; and (3) the sense of being the owner of the action. Since the *yajamāna* feels that the action is his, all that he gives up is the ownership of the libation that he offers.

There is thus an insuperable difference between the notion of giving up as held in the Gītā and that of the Mīmāṃsākas.*

(Translated from Sanskrit by DR MUKUND LATH)

*The original Sanskrit versions of these three comments on Staal's interpretation of *Dravya-Tyāga* in the Vedic *yajña* are being published in the *Sarasvati Suśamā*, a journal of the Sampurnanand Sanskrit Viśvavidyālaya, Varanasi. Anyone desirous of getting the original Sanskrit versions may write to the Editor, JICPR in this connection.

(e) The Concept of Tyāga in Purvamīmāṃsā
and in Bhagavadgītā by K.T. Pandurangi*A Response to Staal's Observations in the General
Introduction to his Work 'Agni'*

In the rituals described in the *Śrauta-sūtras* and discussed in Purvamīmāṃsā, the expression *tyāga* is used in connection with the offering of *homa dravya* in the sacred fire. While offering the same a formula is recited: 'Agnaye idam ŋa mama'. The actual offering is called *prakṣepa*, i.e., putting in the sacred fire, while the thought in the mind represented by the above formula, is called *tyāga*. The thought conveyed by this formula is withdrawal of one's ownership (*Sva svatva nivṛitti*). The *homa dravya* so far belonged to the *yajamāna*, i.e., the sacrificer, now he withdraws his ownership while offering the same to the *agni*. This is *tyāga*. By this *tyāga*, the *yajamān* does not renounce the *phala* to be realized by performing the ritual but renounces only his ownership of *homa dravya*. That is why this formula is recited while offering *homa dravya* both in *Nityakarma* and *Kāmyakarma*. If it were to mean the renunciation of *phala*, then, there would be no need to recite this in *Nityakarma* where there is no *phala*. Further, *tyāga* is *arād upakāraka* while *prakṣepa* is *sannipatyā upakāraka*. Those items that do not contribute to the structure of the sacrifice are *arād upakāraka* while those that contribute to it directly or through some other item are *sannipatyā upakāraka*. *Prakṣepa* as a *saṃskāra* of *homa dravya* contributes to the structure of the sacrifice while *tyāga*, i.e., withdrawal of the ownership of *homa dravya* on the part of *yajamāna* is neither a *saṃskāra* nor an *aṅga*. It does not form a part of the structure of the sacrifice. It is *dravya* and *devatā* that are the primary constituents of *tyāga*. *Tyāga* is a mental act on the part of *yajamāna* which is conveyed by this formula. The concept of *tyāga* in *Bhagavadgītā* is quite different. The phrase '*Mā karma phala hetuh bhūh*' in

the Gītā gives a correct picture of the concept of tyāga. 'Karmaphalam hetuh yasya sah mā bhūh'. Let not the result, i.e. expected gain of the action, be the motive for undertaking the action. According to this guideline, the habit of making the result, i.e. expected gain of an action, the motive to undertake that action has to be renounced. An activity undertaken with this approach is *niṣkāmakarma* in the Gītā. It is the renunciation of making the result the motive of action that is the tyāga of Bhagavadgītā.

A clear understanding of this distinction enables us to get rid of a confusion in respect of the Mīmāṃsā position regarding *kāmyakarma* and *tyāga*. The confusion is as follows:

1. Kāmyakarmas of Purvamīmāṃsā are aimed at obtaining the desired result. The tyāga represented by the formula 'Agnaye idam na mama' announces the renunciation of phala. This leads to a contradictory position on the part of Mīmāṃsākas.

This complaint is not justified, because, the Pūrvamīmāṃsā concept of tyāga is not *phalatyāga* as shown above. It is *svatvatyāga*. Therefore this complaint of a contradiction is based on misinformation.

2. Incidentally, we may refer to another complaint that some of the Mīmāṃsā rituals are declared as *nitya*, i.e. obligatory, but these are also stated as *kāmya*. This is a contradictory position.

For instance, *agnihotra* is declared both as *nitya* and *kāmya*. This is a contradiction. This objection is again due to misinformation about the Mīmāṃsā position in this respect. As per the *Samyogaprithaktva nyāya* of Purvamīmāṃsā, a *nitya* ritual can also be performed as *kāmya*. This does not involve *karmabheda* but only elicits *prayogabheda*. 'A' can perform it as *nitya* while 'B' can perform it as *kāmya*. 'A' is not interested in any result. He is content with *pratyavāya parihāra*. Therefore, he performs it as *nitya*. But 'B' is interested in the result recommended by 'Dadhnaṅ indrikāmasya juhuyāt'. Therefore, he performs

it as a *kāmya*. Now, a ticklish question arises, viz. has he not abandoned *nitya*, and consequently, does he not have to face *pratyavāya*? No, his performance of *agnihotra* as *kāmya* has also simultaneously resulted in the performance of *nitya* by the technique of *prasaṅga-siddhi*. *Prasaṅga* means one performance serving the purpose of the other also. Such a *Prasaṅga* is worked out in respect of *pradhāna*, *aṅga*, and both *aṅga* and *pradhāna*. It is also worked out in respect of *prakṛti*, *vikṛti* and *prakṛti-vikṛti*. The present instance of *kāmya* performance of *agnihotra* serving the purpose of *nitya* is also an instance of *prasaṅga* in respect of *pradhāna*. This is also called *rupasiddhi* *prasaṅga*. Therefore, there is no contradiction in the *Mīmāṃsā* position in respect of treating one and the same *yāga* both as *nitya* and *kāmya*. The *yāga* is one but the *prayogas* are different, the *adhikārins* are different and the *saṃkalp* is different. But the most important point is, one who performs as *kāmya* has not abandoned it as *nitya*. This is explained by the technique of *prasaṅga-siddhi*.

3. Another observation in respect of the *Mīmāṃsā* position is, that the mantras do not convey the meaning, or rather the meaning of the mantras is neither comprehended or taken into account by the priests.

To say that the present generation of priests do not comprehend the meaning is one thing, and to say the very conveying of meaning and the comprehension of it is dispensed with is quite another. *Mīmāṃsā* specifically states that mantras are to be recited to bring the *devatā*, *dravya*, etc., items connected with the *yāga*, to the mind of the *yajamāna* and other participants. '*Prayoga samaveta artha-smāraakatva*' is stated to be the purpose of reciting mantras. Therefore, mantras are meaningful and convey the meaning. To compare the Vedic mantras to tantric chants of meaningless syllables is not fair. The ignorance of meaning on the part of modern priests or a few generations of priests cannot be the ground on which to say

that Mīmāṃsakas did not attach any importance to the meaning of mantras. The statement '*Parokṣa priya hi Devaḥ*' has no relevance here.

There are a few other observations that are also based on similar misinformation. The purpose of this article is only to provide information, and if the information given here is also misinformation, then, I solicit more authentic information or more authentic presentation from better-equipped scholars.

Tradition and Modernity

We are publishing below the reply of Professor Frits Staal to the comments made by Pt. P.N. Paṭṭābhirāma Śāstrī, Pt. Sūryaprakāśa Śāstrī, Professor K.T. Pandurangi and Professor Rāmānuja Tattācārya, on his interpretation of *Dravya-Tyāga* published in *JICPR*, Vol. VIII, No. 3.

I am honoured by the attention that traditional scholars have paid to the three paragraphs from pages 4 and 5 of my book *Agni*¹ that Professor Daya Krishna made available to them in Sanskrit translation.² In the following pages, I formulate reactions to this attention but I am afraid I must disappoint those who might have been looking forward to an entertaining fight. For the chief criticism made by all these scholars is entirely valid: I made a mistake and I apologize for misleading my readers. I was wrong in asserting that the *tyāga* formula of the Yajamāna expresses his renunciation from the *fruits* of the ritual. The truth is that he simply abandons, by that formula, the ownership of the substance of his oblation. My mistake was caused by the popularity of the doctrine of *karma-phala-tyāga* advocated by the Bhagavad Gītā in which the same term *tyāga* is used to abandon the *fruits* of an action. I am not remarking this because I imagine that pointing out that my mistake had a cause is a valid excuse. I am adding it because

I agree with Professor Rāmānuja Tatācārya's final conclusion: 'There is thus an insuperable difference between the notion of giving up as held in the Gītā and that of the Mīmāṃsakas' (p. 126).

The mistake I made has nothing to do with the difference between Western and Indian, or traditional and modern scholars. This is demonstrated by the fact that it was pointed out or hinted at long ago by Harolo Arnold and J.C. Heesterman. More recently, attention was drawn to it in a publication by Helmut Scharfe.³

As for the contradictions that developed between *nitya* 'obligatory' and *kāmya* 'optional' rites, I don't think I made a mistake. This is illustrated by the lack of agreement between the traditional scholars themselves. Pandit Remella Sūryaprakāśa Śāstrī writes (p. 123): '*Nitya karmas* are not performed out of any desire for a fruit.' Professor Rāmānuja Tatācārya writes (p. 125): 'Every *yajña* whether *nitya* or *kāmya* has a fruit assigned to it and it is performed for its fruits.' Pandit Paṭṭābhirāma Śāstri twice invokes (Govinda) Bhagavatpāda according to whom one should 'give up the thought of performing *kāmya yajñas*' (pp. 121 and 123). But if an act is optional, one may or may not perform it and there should be no strings attached; if one is encouraged not to perform it, it is not truly optional.

Some other criticisms especially in the article by Pandit Paṭṭābhirāma Śāstrī need not be taken seriously because they are quibbles about words attributed to me that are taken out of context or misunderstood. Pandit Paṭṭābhirāma Śāstri writes that according to me '*Śrauta Sūtras* are works which formulate a definition of *yajña*,' when all I did is quote a well known definition from *Kātyāyana Śrauta Sūtra*. If the Pandit could have taken a single look at my book (which he could not, since he was not told whose paragraphs he was asked to comment on), he would have noticed that I not only refer frequently to the *Śrauta Sūtras*, but that the second volume of *Agni* contains almost 200 pages from the *Baudhāyana Śrauta*

Sūtra which do not contain a single definition of *yajña*. He also says that I quote a sentence from the Veda which is not found there (p. 120)—but I did not say or think it did; that the seven *saṁsthā* are beyond my understanding (p. 121)—but I describe them in my book (Vol. I, pp. 40 sq., 598 sq.); that the *tyāga* formula is uttered at the same time as the *vaṣaṭkāra* and tossing of the *dravya* into the fire—an event to which I refer throughout; and that there are numerous other things I have missed—but I mention all the relevant ones in my book though not on the one page that was singled out for discussion.

There are also misunderstandings simply due to the translation of my English into Sanskrit. For example, my innocent reference to Mīmāṃsā as a ‘ritualistic philosophy,’ translated *yajñīyadarśanam*, led the Pandit to hold forth on Mīmāṃsā as a system of thought ‘which considers categories such as substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), actions (*karma*) and universals (*sāmānya*) as *dharma*s. It is not confined to the purpose of propounding *yajña* alone as *dharma*’ (p. 120). The term *dharma*, however, is used here in two different senses. Jaimini himself, for example in Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 3.1.12, when he uses the terms *dravya* and *guṇa*, does not refer to them by means of the *dharma* concept ‘proper to Mīmāṃsā’ as Ganganatha Jha described it.⁴ Pandit Paṭṭābhīrāma Sāstrī acknowledges this himself by reminding us of the fact that Mīmāṃsā is known as *Dharmaśāstra* (p. 120) where *dharma* is not understood in the general sense of a *padārtha* category but as *codanālakṣaṇo* ‘*rthah*, ‘that which is indicated by the Vedas as conducive to the highest good’ (Mīmāṃsā Sūtra 1.1.2).

Traditional (Indian) and modern (Indian or Western) scholars can learn much from each other provided they do not depend too heavily on the basic difference that distinguishes them from each other: to most traditional scholars, the Vedas are *apauruṣeya*, ‘not of human origin’; to modern scholars, they are *pauruṣeya*, ‘of human origin’. Modern scholars conceive of the Vedas as compositions by human beings who may be called *ṛṣis* but who were members of the semi-nomadic

communities that entered India during the second millennium BC from the North West, probably over an extended period of time and in several waves. There are other distinctions between traditional and modern scholars but most of them can be derived from this basic difference.

One corollary is that, according to modern scholars, the Vedas, like other human compositions, are not inherently devoid of contradictions. This conflicts with the *samanvaya* or harmony between all Vedic statements that has had a long and venerable history in Indian thought. It is the corner-stone of the two Mīmāṃsā systems which interpret it differently (for the Uttara Mīmāṃsā, see Vedānta Sūtra 1.1.4: *tat tu samanvayāt* with its commentaries). It is difficult to agree with Pandit Remella Sūryaprakāśa Śāstrī that 'it is not difficult to establish harmony between all Vedic sentences' (p. 125) because there are numerous at least *apparent* contradictions and it would have to be shown, in each case, that they are apparent only and not *real*.

That there are *apparent* contradictions is accepted by the Mīmāṃsā Sūtra because it refers to Kautsa according to whom these contradictions are *real*. (1.2.34–38, especially 36: *arthavipratishedhāt* 'because there is contradiction in the meaning'). Kautsa gives several examples, e.g. *aśatrur indra jajñīse*, 'Indra, you are born without enemy!' (*R̥g-Veda* 10.133.2; *Atharva-Veda* 20.95.3; *Sāma-Veda* 2.1152) and *śataṃ senā ajayat śakam indrah*, 'Indra conquered a hundred armies at once' (*R̥g-Veda* 10.103.1; *Atharva-Veda* 19.13.2; *Śāma-Veda* 2.1199; *Vājasaneyi Saṃhitā* 17.33; *Taittirīya Saṃhitā* 4.6.4.1; *Maitrāyaṇī Saṃhitā* 2.10.4; 135.10; *Kāthaka Saṃhitā* 18.5). The Mīmāṃsā, the Nirukta and Sāyaṇa all rejected Kautsa's view, but from the point of view of the modern scholar, Kautsa was right; in fact, he demonstrates that critical scholarship of the modern type existed in ancient India also—a fact already apparent from other Vedāṅgas and Śāstras.

I have noted that modern scholars are not only Western, and would like to end this part of the discussion with a quotation from V.S. Ghate, who examined the *R̥g-Veda* itself in

order to find out whether any precursors of the later idea of *apauruṣeyatya*m can already be found in it. After quoting a variety of passages he concluded:

How are we to reconcile all these various ideas present in the *Ṛg-Veda*? It is clear that some of the ancient *ṛsis* entertained a belief, though, no doubt, indistinct and hesitating, in their own inspiration. This belief was not then suffered to die out in the minds of the later generations. On the contrary it grew up by degrees into a fixed persuasion that all the literary productions of these early sages had not only resulted from a supernatural impulse but were infallible, divine and even eternal.⁵

I think this is a balanced view and one may go on from there. Returning to the *Mīmāṃsā*, it is clear that it tries to reconcile the contradictions that are found in the Vedas and other differences that have crept in over time. I have no problem with Pandit Paṭṭābhirāma Śāstrī's assertion that *Mīmāṃsā* is 'an enterprise to arrive at the truth of *dharma* through a rational interpretation of the Vedic texts' (p. 120). It should be added, however, that in other civilizations than the Indian we come across similar developments and ideas. The Old Testament, the New Testament, and the Koran are accepted as *apauruṣeya* by Jews, Christians, and Muslims, respectively. They all evolved theologies, in some respects not unlike the *Mīmāṃsā*, designed to prove it. To modern scholars, these books are *pauruṣeya* like the Vedas, and all attempts to remove contradictions from them have been in vain.

Everyone must agree with Pandit Remella Sūryaprakāśa Śāstrī's first sentence: 'In truth there is no inconsistency.' We can go one step further if we are willing to accept Śāṅkara's expression of a principle familiar to logicians all over the world: if different and mutually contradictory opinions are expressed, at most 'only one of them is right, the others are erroneous' (*teṣāṃ ekam abhrāntaṃ bhrāntānītarāṇi: Brahmasūtrabhāṣya* 3.3.1). I would go one step further still, based not only on logic but on plausibility:

if so many mutually contradictory views are claimed to be *apauruṣeya*, it must be a human tendency to make such extraordinary claims and if that is the case, it seems likely that *all* of them are false. To which I like to add a *practical* corollary inspired by past and present events: if we reject all such claims, the world would be a better and safer place to live in.

I have already referred to the contrast between the one page that was singled out for discussion and the remaining pages of *Agni*: in Volume I, there are 715 and in Volume II, 832, partly written by other contributors. Since not everyone has access to these volumes or time to go through them, I would like to explain briefly what I attempted to do there. First of all, the book is not about Mīmāṃsā. It is obvious that I am not a Mīmāṃsaka but I also do not claim to be an authority on that *darśana* though there are connections between it and what I am interested in. I accordingly invited such an authority, Paṇḍitarāja K. Bālasubrahmaṇya Śāstrī, to contribute to Volume II. He wrote, in Sanskrit, a contribution that was translated into English, edited by Professor James A. Santucci, and published under the title 'Agnicayana in the Mīmāṃsā (pp. 178–192). Pandit Bālasubrahmaṇya Śāstrī explains in detail many of the things that are explained by Pandit Paṭṭābhirāma Śāstrī, for example, that building of the *uttaravedi* (which is obligatory) in the form of *cayana* is optional, that other constituent rites (e.g., the sixth layer, the offering of twelve cakes to Vaiśvānara, the *agnicid-vratas*, etc.) are *naimittika*, etc.

In regard to Mīmāṃsā, the Editor of our discussion, Professor Daya Krishna, expressed wonder in his introductory note:

Professor Staal knows a lot of traditional scholars in the field of Mīmāṃsā. In fact, the volume on *Agni* itself is supposed to have been produced in collaboration with Shri C.V. Somayajipad and Shri M. Itti Ravi Nambudiri. But one wonders if Professor Staal ever talked to these persons about his theory of sacrificial offering in the Vedic *yajña*.

Or, if he did so, what their opinion was (p. 115).

It is true, as the title page of Volume I of our publication says, that it was written 'in collaboration with C.V. Somayajipad and M. Itti Ravi Nambudiri.' Pages xxiii–xxiv of the *Preface* describes this collaboration in greater detail:

The 1975 performance was organized by Cherumukku Vaidikan and Itti Ravi Nambudiri. Their responsibilities and roles will become apparent in the course of this work. Our collaboration at the writing stage is easily described. The description of the performance in Part II of the present volume was written in drafts that were separately submitted to C.V. and Itti Ravi for their scrutiny. They then sent me their corrections and additions. Many of these exchanges took place through correspondence, but fortunately I have been able to sit at their feet again in the course of this work, and after the manuscript had begun to take shape. These sessions were not confined to the correction of what I had written. They induced me to reorganize the material so as to express its structure more clearly, and to incorporate new facts and insights. For example, ... (etc.).

The page submitted for discussion to the three Pandits occurs in the 'General Introduction' (pp. 1–23), not in Part I ('The Agnicayana Ritual', pp. 27–189) or in Part II ('The 1975 Performance', pp. 193–697), the part to which C.V. and Itti Ravi contributed and which is the chief part of the entire publication. These two Nambudiri brahmins, however, were not Mīmāṃsakas; they were not even Pandits in any strict sense of the term although C.V. had studied Sanskrit from his family teacher and from a retired lecturer. *What they were first and foremost is practising ritualists.* Their knowledge of the ritual was not based upon the Mīmāṃsā or upon any of the Śrauta Sūtras familiar to scholars through their published editions. Certainly, there are Nambudiri Mīmāṃsakas and other great scholars in that community. Certainly, C.V. and Itti Ravi followed Baudhāyana Śāṅkhāyana and Jaiminiya. But C.V. learned the rituals from his father and Itti Ravi from his father and

grandfather's brother; they practised the rites as part of their tradition which is almost entirely oral. In case of conflict between that tradition and the published texts of Baudhāyana, Śāṅkhāyana or Jaiminīya Śrauta Sūtras, with which they were not on the whole familiar, they follow the former and not the latter. In publishing a book written with the fortunate assistance of these two living embodiments of tradition I attempted to demonstrate that there is such a living tradition and make it more widely accessible. The bulk of the book, therefore, is a description of the actual performance that took place in 1975 and not of the ritual as described in texts.

For the benefit of those who are interested in the texts, it may be added that the differences of the living Nambudiri tradition with Baudhāyana's and Śāṅkhāyana's texts as we know them are mostly minor; in the area of the Sāmaveda, the differences with the Jaiminīya Śrauta Sūtra are somewhat more extensive. In order to enable scholars to study these differences in precise detail, the second volume of *Agni* provides Caland's text and a translation by Yasuke Ikari and Harold Arnold of Chapter X of the Baudhāyana Śrauta Sūtra as well as summaries and articles by E.R. Sreekrishna Sarma on the Kauṣītaki Brāhmaṇa (with numerous notes on the Śāṅkhāyana Śrauta Sūtra) and by Asko Parpola on the Jaiminīya Śrauta Sūtra. On the significance, if any, of all of this I have commented in *Agni* and other publications and there is no need to repeat it here.

In conclusion, I would like to thank and applaud Professor Daya Krishna for his attempt to build a bridge and initiate a dialogue between 'current scholarship and classical learning' in the pages of the *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*.

Notes and References

1. Frits Staal, *Agni. The Vedic Ritual of the Fire Altar*, I-II, Berkeley, 1983; Delhi, 1984.

2. *JICPR*, Volume II, Number 3 (1991), pp. 115–26.
3. Helmut Scharfe, 'The Great Rituals—were they really meaningless?' *Sanskrit and Related Studies*, 89–98, edited by B.K. Matilal and P. Bilimoria, Poona, 1990.
4. Ganganatha Jha, *Pūrva-Mīmāṃsā in its Sources*, Benares, 1942, Chapter XIX.
5. V.S. Sukthankar (ed.), *Ghate's Lectures on the R̥g-Veda*, Poona, 1926, 116.

FRITS STAAL

Does *Mīmāṃsā* Treat the Theory of *Karma* as *Pūrvā Pakṣa*?

DAYA KRISHNA

Notes and Queries

The *Sūtra* 3.7.18 raises the issue whether all such sacrifices which are done for the sake of heaven should be performed entirely by the 'sacrificer' himself, or need he do only the act of dedication, that is *atsarga*, and the rest may be done either by himself or others, or only others who have been hired for the purpose. The reason given for the first *pūrvā pakṣa*, that it is the sacrificer alone who should do everything, is, 'because, as a matter of fact, *the result of an action accrues to a person only when he performs the act of himself*. This, obviously is a fair formulation of the theory of *karma* and is given as the reason why the sacrifice should be *performed* by the sacrificer himself. The problem is again raised in the *Mīmāṃsā-sūtras* 3.8.25, 3.8.26, 3.8.28 and 3.8.29. The issue in the *sūtras* relates to the question 'whether reward that is asked for accrues to the priest or to the sacrificer'. The issue is resolved in diverse ways in *sūtras* 26, 28 and 29 respectively. *Sūtra* 3.8.28 resolves it in favour of the sacrificer as it is for his sake that the action is performed. *Sūtra* 3.8.28 argues, according to Śābara, that 'in some cases, the

result spoken of accrues to the priest—i.e. in those cases where the result in question is helpful in the performance...'. *Sūtra* 3.8.29 argues that in case 'there is a direct assertion to that effect, the result is to be taken as accruing to the priests.'

Thus Jaimini does not seem to accept the objection raised by the *pūrvā pakṣa* which is so obviously grounded in the theory of *karma* understood in a certain way. Does, then, Jaimini have a different theory of *karma* than the one propounded in *Sūtra* 3.7.18? Or, does he have no theory at all in the matter?

[In *JICPR*, Vol. XI, No. 2, a query was raised entitled 'Does Mīmāṃsā Treat the Theory of *Karma* as *Pūrvā Pakṣa*?'. Replies were received in Sanskrit from Dr N.S.R. Tatacharyaswami, Shri Surya Prakash Shastri, Shri E.S. Varadacharya, Shri L. Laxminarayan Murti Sharma, Shri N.K. Ramanuja Tatacharya and Shri N.S. Ramanuja Tatacharya. The English translation of these appeared in *JICPR*, Vol. XII, No. 3. The present issue contains the replies in the Sanskrit original—Editor.]

श्री दयाकृष्णमहाभागानां प्रश्नस्य सारः

जैमिनिः कश्चित् कर्म करोति चेदेव फलं प्राप्नोति इति नियमं आश्रित्य पूर्वपक्षं प्रस्तूय यजमानस्य सर्वकर्मांगजातम् कर्तुमशक्तत्वात् परिक्रीतैः ऋत्विग्भिः उत्सर्गदक्षिणादानव्यतिरिक्तकर्मकरणं, उत्सर्गदक्षिणादाने च तत्कर्तव्ये इति सिद्धान्तितवान्।

परन्तु प्रकरणान्तरे स एव उद्दिष्टं आशासनीयं फलं यजमानस्याध्वर्योर्वा भवति इति शंकित्वा यजमानस्यैव फलमाशासनीयम् इति प्रथमेऽधिकरणे सिद्धान्तं कृतगन्। तदुपरि अधिकरणे अध्वर्योः फलमाशासनीयम्, यदि अध्वर्योः फलभागेन कर्मणो भवति उपकारः इति आह। अनन्तराधिकरणे यदि साक्षात् व्यपदेशः तदा अध्वर्योः फलमाशासनीयम् इति जगाद।

इदानीं संशयः—यः कर्म करोति तस्यैव फलमिति नियमः जैमिनिना स्वीकृतो वा न वेति।

डा. एन्. एस्. आर. ताताचार्यस्वामि

यः कर्म करोति तस्यैव फलमिति जैमिनिना स्वीकृतमेव। यजमानस्य सर्वांगकरणाशक्तेः, ऋत्विजः परिक्रीताः तस्य साहाय्यं कुर्वन्ति। प्रधाने यजमानः कर्ता, अंगजाते ऋत्विज इति भेदेऽपि यजमानस्य सर्वस्मिन् कार्ये मुख्यप्रयोजककर्तृत्वयोरन्यतरस्य कर्तृत्वस्य सत्त्वात् तस्यैव फलमित्यत्र न विरोधः।

एवं चेत् प्रकरणान्तरे कथं अध्वर्योः फलं श्रूयते इति चेत् कर्मनिष्पत्त्यौपायिकं अध्वर्युफलं श्रूयते चेत्, अनन्यथासिद्धद्विवचनादिना उभयोः फलं श्रूयते चेत्, तत्राध्वर्योः फलंस्वीक्रियते अन्यत्र कुत्रापि परिक्रीताध्वर्युकृतकर्मणां स्वफलार्थत्वं नास्ति, किन्तु यजमानफलार्थत्वमेवेति ।

श्रीमन्तः सूर्यप्रकाशशास्त्रिणः

ऋत्विग्भिः कर्मकरणे यजमानेन फलभागे च फलभोक्तृत्वसमानाधिकरणतृत्वरूपाधिकारित्वं यजमानस्य न स्यादिति शंकायां उत्सर्गमात्रं कुर्वतापि यजमानेन सर्वकृतं भवतीति भाष्ये उक्तत्वात् न यजमानस्य कर्तृत्वाभाव इति समाधानम् ।

श्रीमन्तः ई. एस्. वरदाचार्याः

योऽयं संशयः—परिक्रीतैः ऋत्विग्भिः यजमानस्य प्रयोजककर्तृत्वात् तस्य फलं भवितुमर्हति चेत्, अग्नाविष्णु मावामवक्रमिषं इत्यादौ अध्वर्युकृतप्रार्थनायाः कथं तदीयफलजनकत्वं स्यात्? अन्येषु अध्वर्युकृतकर्मस्विव यजमानगामिफलजनकत्वं कुतो न स्यात् इति, तत्र समाधानम् कर्मजन्यफलमेव यजमानस्यैव नाध्वर्योः इति कथितम् । एतत्प्रार्थनायाः फलं तु कर्मसंपत्यर्थमसंतापरूपम् इति न विरोधः । किमर्थं यजमानेनोत्सर्गमात्रं कर्तव्यम् अन्यत् सर्वं ऋत्विग्भिरिति नियम इति शंका तु सूत्रकारेणैव समाहिता ३-७-१६, ३-७-२० सूत्राभ्याम् ।

श्रीमन्तः स. लक्ष्मीनारायणमूर्तिशर्माणः

- १ स्वतन्त्रः कर्ता इति वत् तत्प्रयोजको हेतुश्चेति शास्त्रेण प्रयोजकस्यापि कर्तृत्वसिद्धिः ।
- २ न च यजेतेत्यात्मनेपदविरुद्ध्यते इति वाच्यम्, तस्य साक्षात्प्रयोजकसाधारण्येन अकर्तारि फलप्रतिषेधकत्वेन वोपपत्तेः ।
- ३ न च सर्वकर्मसु यजमानस्य साक्षात्कर्तृत्वं संभवि, 'ऋत्विजो वृणीते' इत्युक्त ऋत्विग्वरणस्य दक्षिणादानस्य च श्रौतस्य वैयर्थ्यापत्तेः ।

श्रीमन्तः एन्. एस्. रामानुजताताचार्याः

'तन्नो सह' त्यत्र यत् अध्वर्योः फलं कथितं तत् कथं संगच्छते इति प्रश्नः ।

अत्रेदं समाधानम्—अंगफलकीर्तनस्य तत्त्वेन न तात्पर्यम्, किन्तु अर्थवादत्वमेव, अंगानां स्वातन्त्र्येण फलाभावात् । अत्र अंगेषु ऋत्विक्—द्वारा, प्रधाने तु स्वयमेवेति सांगप्रधानकर्तुः स्वर्गादिफलभोक्तृत्वमिति ।

श्रीमन्तः एन्. एस्. रामानुजताताचार्याः

पूर्वमीमांसायां तृतीयाध्याये सप्तमे पादे सप्तमेऽधिकरणे (यजमानभिन्नकर्त्रन्तर प्रतिपादनपरे) त्रीणि सूत्राणि । तत्र प्रथमं सूत्रं — (३-७-१८)

'शास्त्रफलं प्रयोक्तरि तल्लक्षणत्वात् तस्मात् स्वयं प्रयोगे स्यात्' इति । तत्रैवं संशयः—दर्शपूर्णमासादिकं कर्म किं सांगप्रधानं सर्वं यजमानेन कर्तव्यम्? उत

हविस्त्याग—दक्षिणादानात्मके द्रव्योत्सर्गे यजमानः कर्ता, अन्यत्र यजमानोऽन्यो वेत्यनियमः, किं वा द्रव्योत्सर्गे यजमानः कर्ता, अन्यत्र त्वन्य एवेति नियमः इति । तत्र पूर्वपक्षः—‘स्वर्गकामो यजेत’ इति शास्त्रग्राम्यं फलं प्रयोक्तारि—सांग कर्मकुर्वाणे भवति । कुतः तल्लक्षणत्वात्—फलस्य सांगप्रधानानुष्ठाननिमित्तकत्वात् । ‘स्वर्गकामो यजेत’ इति सांगप्रधानभावनायाः त्र्यंशायाः फले निधानात् । यतश्च सांगप्रधानकर्तुरेव फलमवगतम्, तस्माद्धेतोः स्वयं यजमान एव सांगप्रधानानुष्ठाने कर्ता स्यात् । ‘ऋत्विग्भ्यो दक्षिणां ददाति’ इति दानविधिस्तु ‘आत्रेयाय हिरण्यं ददाति’ इतिवत् अदृष्टार्थतयाप्युपपद्यते । यजमानस्यैव होता अध्वर्युः इत्यादिसमाख्या तत्तत् कर्मनिमित्तका भविष्यति ।

अथ द्वितीयपक्षप्रतिपादकं सूत्रम्—‘उत्सर्गे तु प्रधानत्वात् शेषकारी प्रधानस्य तस्मादन्यः स्वयं वा स्यात्’ यजमानस्य देवतोद्देश्यकद्रव्योत्सर्गात्मके भाग एव कर्तृत्वस्य मुख्यत्वात् प्रधानस्य शेषकारी—अंगानां कर्ता तस्मात्—यजमानात् अन्यः ऋत्विक् स्वयं वा—यजमानो वा स्यात् इत्यनियमः । ऋत्विजां दक्षिणया परिक्रयो हि सहायार्थमन्यापेक्षायां भवति । सहायापेक्षा नाशक्तावेव लोके दृष्टा । ततश्च शक्तौ सत्यां यजमान एव सर्वं सांगप्रधानं करोति । अशक्तौ तु अन्येनांगानि कारयितव्यानि । परिक्रयविधिश्च तन्त्रैव दृष्टार्थो भविष्यति ।

ननु तर्हि अशक्तौ सत्यां द्रव्योत्सर्गेऽप्यन्यस्य कर्तृत्वं स्यादित्यत्राप्येतदेवोत्तरम्—उत्सर्गे तु प्रधानत्वात् इति । उत्सर्गे तु देवतोद्देश्यकद्रव्यत्यागे दक्षिणादाने च यजमान एव कर्ता स्यात् प्रधानत्वात् स्वामित्वात् । न ह्यन्यदीयं द्रव्यमन्यस्मा उत्स्रष्टुं शक्नुयात् ।

अथ सिद्धान्तसूत्रम्—‘अन्यो वा स्यात् परिक्रयाम्नानाद्विप्रतिषेधात् प्रत्यगात्मनि ।’ वाशब्द एवार्थः । सत्यामपि शक्तौ द्रव्योत्सर्ग एव यजमानः कर्ता । अन्यत्र तु अंगजातेऽन्य एव कर्ता । कुतः? परिक्रयाम्नानात् । परिक्रयो नाम द्रव्यदानेन भृत्यस्वीकरणम् । तदर्थं दक्षिणादानविधानादित्यर्थः । तत्र दक्षिणादानं प्रत्यगात्मनि—स्वस्मिन् न संभवति । कुतः? विप्रतिषेधात्—विरोधात् । न हि स्वस्मै स्वयमेव दातुं प्रभवति, दानस्य स्वस्वत्वपरित्यागपूर्वकपरस्वत्वापादनार्थकत्वात् । न च परिक्रयविधिः अशक्तयजमानविषयक इति वक्तुं युक्तम् । लोके प्रत्यक्षादिप्रमाणवशात् अशक्तौ सत्यां अन्यस्य परिक्रयेऽपि मानान्तरागोचरस्य भागस्य नित्यवच्छ्रुतपरिक्रयविधिबलेन नित्यमेव परिक्रीत—पुरुषकर्तृकांगसाध्यत्वावगमात् ।

तथा चैतत् सिद्धं द्रव्योत्सर्गं यजमानस्य मुख्यकर्तृत्वम्, तदितरत्र अंगजाते प्रयोजककर्तृत्वम् । उभयसाधारणकर्तृत्वमेव च स्वर्गकामवाक्यादवगम्यत इति । प्रधाने यजमानः कर्ता, अंगजाते ऋत्विजः कर्तारः इति जैमिनीसिद्धान्तः ।

एतत्सिद्धान्तसिद्धतया जैमिनिः तृतीयाध्यायाष्टमपादे १५ तः २६ पर्यन्तेषु सूत्रेषु किमप्युक्तवानिव दृश्यते इति केचित् आशंकते । तन्निराकरणाय तेषु सूत्रेषूक्तं विषयं प्रथमतः पश्यामः ।

सू. ऋत्विक्फलं करणेष्वर्थवत्त्वात् (जै. सू. ३-८-२५) आध्वर्यमिति समाख्याबलात् ऋत्विक्कर्तृकं यत् समिप्रक्षेपेण आहवनीयाग्निप्रज्वालनरूपमग्न्याधानं तत्करणतया ‘ममाग्ने वर्चो विद्वेष्वस्तु वयं त्वेन्धानास्तुनुवं पुषेमिति पूर्वमग्निं गृह्णाति’ इति वाक्येन विनियुक्तो यो ममाग्ने वर्चः इत्यादिमन्त्रः, तत्प्रकाश्यं वर्चः प्रभृतिफलं ऋत्विजः एव । मन्त्रस्यैव मम इत्यस्मच्छब्देन तस्यैव मुख्यवृत्त्या बाधनात् इति पूर्वपक्षे सिद्धान्तः ।

स्वामिना वा तदर्थत्वात् । (जै.सू. ३-८-२६) इति । वाशब्दोऽवधारणे । मन्त्रप्रयोक्त्रा अध्वर्युणा वर्चः प्रभृति फलं स्वामिनः यजमानस्यैव आशासितव्यम् । तदर्थत्वात्—यजेत इत्यात्मनेपदश्रुत्या सांगप्रधानभावनाविषयांगफलस्यापि यजमानगामित्वावगमात् । तथा च मन्त्रस्थस्य ममेति शब्दस्य मदीयस्य यजमानस्येत्यर्थः । यथा राजनि वर्तमानं जयं अस्माकमिति वदन्ति सैनिकाः तथायं मम देशः ।

वेदसंमतश्चायं न्यायः इत्याह—लिंगदर्शनाच्च (जै.सू. ३-८-२७) वाक्ये शेषादित्यर्थः । 'यां वै कांचन यज्ञे ऋत्विज आशिषमाशासते यजमानस्यैव सा' इति वाक्यशेषो यजमानफलमेव एवं जातीयकेषु सिद्धवत् दर्शयति, वैशब्दस्य प्रसिद्धिद्योतकत्वात् । अतोऽपि याजमानमेव फलमिह विवक्षितम् ।

त्रिसूत्रेणानेनाधिकरणे क्वचित्करणमन्त्रप्रकाशितं फलम् ऋत्विज एव इति स्थापितम् । तथा हि—अस्ति दर्शपूर्णमासयोः दक्षिणातिक्रमणमन्त्रः—'अग्नाविष्णु मा वामवक्रमिषं विजिहायां मा मा संताप्तम्' इति । अग्निः आहवनीयाग्निः । विष्णुर्यज्ञः 'यज्ञो वै विष्णुः' इति श्रुतेः । यज्ञसाधनं वेद्यामासनं हविरिह विवक्षितम् । हे अग्नाविष्ण आहवनीयहविषी । वां—युवाम्, मावक्रमिषं—नाक्रमेयम् । विजिहायां—मयि कोपं त्यजतम् । मा—मां युवयोरन्तरा दक्षिणा अतिक्रमन्तं मा संताप्तम्—न संतापयतमित्यर्थः । अत्रासंतापलक्षणं फलं किमध्वर्युणा यजमानगतमाशासनीयम् उत स्वगतम्? इति संशये पूर्वाधिकरणन्यायेन यजमानगामि फलमेव आशास्यमिति प्राप्ते सिद्धान्तयति—'कर्मार्थं तु फलं तेषां स्वामिनं प्रत्यर्थवत्त्वात्' (सू. ३-८-२८) तुशब्दः वैषम्ये । 'ममाग्ने वर्चः' इत्येवंजातीयकेषु करणमन्त्रेषु याजमानस्यैव फलस्य आशास्यत्वेऽपि 'मा संताप्तम्' इत्येवजातीयकेषु करणमन्त्रेषु तेषां—ऋत्विजामेव संबन्धि असंतापलक्षणं फलमाशास्यं न तु यजमानगामि । कुतः? यतः कर्मार्थम्—असंतापादिलक्षणं हि फलं कर्मसिद्धयौपयिकम् । न हि संतापादिदोषग्रस्ताः कर्म कर्तुं शक्नुवन्ति । ततः सामर्थ्यात् ऋत्विग्भिः स्वात्मन्येवासंतापादिलक्षणं फलम् आशासनीयम् । नन्वेवं सति यजेत इत्यात्मनेपदश्रुतिविरोध इत्यत आह—स्वामिनं प्रत्यर्थवत्त्वात् इति । अर्थ्यते प्रार्थ्यत इत्यर्थः कर्मणि घञ् । प्रार्थनीयत्वात् इत्यर्थः । ऋत्विग्गतस्यैव असंतापादिरूपफलस्य स्वकीयकर्माविधातार्थं स्वामिना यजमानेन प्रार्थनीयत्वात् नात्मनेपदश्रुतिविरोधः ।

अनेन यजमानकर्तृकर्मसिद्धयौपयिकं चेत् ऋत्विग्गतमपि फलं स्वीक्रियत इति सूत्रितम् । अनन्तरसूत्रं—व्यपदेशाच्च (३-८-२६) इति । ज्योतिष्टोमे दक्षिणस्य हविर्धानंशकटस्य अधस्तात् चत्वारः उपरवाख्याः अंटाः । तत्र मिथो हस्तौ निवेश्य अध्वर्युं यजमानः पृच्छति—'अध्वर्यो किमत्र' इति । 'भद्रम्' इत्यध्वर्युः प्रतिवक्ति । ततः 'तन्नौ सह' इति यजमान आह । तत्—पूर्वमन्त्रप्रस्तुतं भद्रं नौ आवयोः अध्वर्युयजमानयोः व्यासक्तं भवतु इत्यर्थः ।

अत्र भद्ररूपफलस्य असंतापादिवत् कर्मद्विचनौपयिकतया अध्वर्युगामित्वेन रूपेण यजमानेन प्रार्थनीयत्वाभावात् यजेत इत्यात्मनेपदानुरोधाच्च यजमानगाम्येव भद्राख्यं फलं विवक्षितम्—नौ इति द्विवचनमेकत्वे लाक्षणिकमिति पूर्वपक्षे प्राप्ते सिद्धान्तयति व्यपदेशाच्च इति ।

चः भिन्नक्रमः । भद्रलक्षणमिदं फलं यजमानस्य अध्वर्योश्चेह विवक्षितम् । कुतः? व्यपदेशात्—नौ इति द्विवचनेन विशिष्य उभयनिर्देशात् । 'ममाग्ने वर्चः' इत्यादौ अजहत्स्वार्थलक्षणतया मम इत्यस्य अस्मदीयस्वामिनः इत्यर्थाश्रयणात् स्वार्थत्यागाभावात् युक्तमात्मनेपदश्रुत्या लिंगबोधनम् ।

इह द्विवचनस्य एकत्वे लक्षणाभ्युपगमे स्वार्थस्य द्वित्वस्य अत्यन्तबाधप्रसंगात् आत्मनेपदश्रुतेरेव द्विवचनं बाधकम्। अतश्च द्विवचनबलात् ऋत्विग्यजमानोभयगाम्येव फलम् आशास्यमिति सिद्धम्।

एवं च उत्सर्गतः यजमानगाम्येव फलम्। कर्मनिष्पत्त्यौपयिकत्वे श्रूयमाणं चेत् ऋत्विग्गतमपि फलमभ्युपगम्यते। यत्र तु अनन्यथासिद्धद्विवचनादिना उभयोः फलं श्रुतं तत् तथैव अंगीक्रियते इति व्यवस्था जैमिनेरभिमता। नात्र कोऽपि पूर्वापरविरोधः।

Notes and Queries

Comments on 'Does *Mīmāṃsā* Treat the Theory of *Karma* as *Pūrva Pakṣa*'

[In *JICPR*, Vol. XI, No. 2, January–April 1994, a query was raised entitled 'Does *Mīmāṃsā* Treat the Theory of *Karma* as *Pūrva Pakṣa*?' The issue raised in the query was summarized in Sanskrit at Tirupati and circulated amongst eminent *Mīmāṃsā* scholars in the tradition. Replies were received from Dr N.S.R. Tatacharyaswami, Shri Surya Prakash Shastri, Shri E.S. Varadacharya, Shri L. Laxminarayan Murti Sharma, Shri N.K. Ramanuja Tatacharya and Shri N.S. Ramanuja Tatacharya. The replies received from them were translated from the original Sanskrit into English by Pt. Kalanath Shastri of Jaipur. The same are published herewith along with the English translation of the summary in Sanskrit sent to these scholars by Professor S.B. Raghunathacharya, the Vice-Chancellor of the Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeetha, Tirupati. The Sanskrit originals will be published in the next issue of *JICPR*, so that concerned scholars may judge for themselves the adequacy of the translation into English and point out the deficiencies, if any—Editor.]

A Gist (Essence) of Professor Daya Krishna's Query

Jaimini establishes the rule that one who does the *karma*, gets its *phala*. Then he raises the question regarding *yajamāna* and *ṛtvikas* and then expounds the theory that since a *yajamāna* is not able to do the whole *karma* other than *utsarga* (Release of

the *dravya* for the gods) and *dakṣiṇādāna* (defraying the fees of *ṛtvika*). The *yajamāna* does these two *karma*—*utsarga* and *dakṣiṇādāna* which are his *karma*.

But in a different section Jaimini raises the question—who will get the desired *phala*? Will the *phala* go to the *yajamāna* or the *adhvaryu*? In the first *adhikarāna* he propounds the theory that the *phala* is to be prayed for the *yajamāna* alone. Elsewhere, in a different section, he says the *phala* is to be prayed for the *adhvaryu* if the apportionment of the *phala* to *adhvaryu* contributes some benefit to the *karma* as such. Again, in a different section he says ‘If there is a specific mention that the *phala* will go to *adhvaryu*—then it is only to be prayed for *adhvaryu*.’

Here the doubt arises whether Jaimini accepts the principle that whoever does the *karma*, its *phala* goes to him only.

Comments

Jaimini accepts the theory that whoever does the *karma* gets the *phala*. Now, if the *yajamāna* is unable to do the whole *karma* himself, he hires the *ṛtvikas* who help him in the *karma*. Thus, in the main *karma*, the *yajamāna* is the doer (*kartā*), in its accessories, the *ṛtvikas*. This difference, of course, exists. But the doership (*kartṛtva*) applies to the *yajamāna* also, although it may be one of the two kinds, the actual (or main: *mukhya*) doership and the causer-doership: *prayojaka kartṛtva*. Therefore, if the *phala* goes to the *yajamāna*, there is no contradiction.

Now, there may be the doubt—why in a different section the *phala* is mentioned for the *adhvaryu*? There we say that if in a *karma* which is auxiliary or accessory—the *phala* is denoted or attributed to *adhvaryu* or alternatively, by a common dual number the *phala* is attributed or apportioned to both—there alone the *phala* is said to go to the *adhvaryu*. Nowhere else does the *phala* go to the hired *adhvaryu*. It goes only to the *yajamāna*. The *karmas* of hired *adhvaryus* reap fruit not to them but to *yajamāna*.

One may raise a doubt that if the *ṛtvikas* do the *karma* but the *phala* goes to the *yajamāna*—how the doership and the reapership exist in two different agents? In that case the *phala* should not go to the *yajamāna*. But this is not the case. The *bhāṣya* clearly says that since the *yajamāna* does the *utsarga*, by that deed he does the whole thing. Therefore, we cannot say that the *yajamāna* is not the doer. There is not *kartṛtva*'s *abhāva* in the *yajamāna*. This is the *samādhāna*.

SURYA PRAKĀŚ ŚĀSTRĪ

The doubt is said to be—when the hired *ṛtvikas* do the different auxiliary partial *karma kalāpās*—but the *yajamāna* who is the causer or sponsor (*prayojaka*) *kartā* gets the *phala*. Applying the same logic we can ask—in a prayer to *Agni* and *Viṣṇu* which is offered by the *adhvaryu* that the *Agni* and *Viṣṇu* should not be furious with him nor should *Agni* burn or scorch him, why its *phala* also not go to the *yajamāna* who is the sponsor? Wherever the *phala* is said to go to *adhvaryu*, why that also should not go to the *yajamāna* since he is the sponsor? The *samādhāna* is that the *phala* of the whole *karma* goes to the *yajamāna* but not of the contributory *karmas* which are auxiliary for the completion of the *karma* itself. Now, the prayer is only regarding not scorching the *adhvaryu* while he is doing the *karma*. Hence, there is no contradiction. As regards the doubt as to why should the *yajamāna* do only the *utsarga* and all the other works are to be done by the *ṛtvikas*, these doubts have been settled by the *sūtrakāra* himself in the two *sūtras*—3-7-19 and 3-7-20.

E.S. VARADACHARYA

1. *Kartā* is defined in two ways by *Śāstras*, '*Svatantra Kartā*' that is the doer *per se* and also *atprayojaka hetuśca*—the cause which gets the doer to do the *karma* can also be called *kartā*. Hence the *kartṛtva* lies in the causer also.

2. Now, the doubt may arise why is there the use of *ātmanepada* in 'yajeta'—(which connotes direct result accruing to the doer). This can be settled by explaining that the doer himself and the causer, both are *kartās*, hence if the *karma phala* is going to either of them or to both, there is no contradiction. It can also be understood in the way that '*phala* should not go to the non-doer'; this was the intention, therefore *ātmanepada* is used.
3. It is obvious that the *yajamāna* cannot be the direct doer in all the *karmas*. '*ṛtvijo vṛaṇīte*' ordains that the *yajamāna* will hire (or select) the *ṛtvikas* and will also present *dakṣiṇā* to them. If the *yajamāna* were to be the only and direct doer of all *karmas*, this ordaining *sūtra* would get infructuous.

LAXMINARAYAN MURTI SHARMA

The point in question is '*tannosaha*' ('the goodwill accrue to both of us together') is spoken by the *yajamāna*. How will one explain this? This can be settled in this way. The *phalas* of auxiliary or accessory (*aṅga*) *karmas* are also mentioned somewhere at times and they also are purported to be the *phalas* (but not therefore the *phalas* of the principal *karma*). This is only *arthavāda*, and does not form the main *vidhi* because the auxiliary *karmas* do not yield any independent result. In the auxiliaries the *ṛtvikas* and in the principal the *kartā* directly gets the *phala* of *swarga-gamana*, etc. This is the distribution in the case of the principal and the auxiliary doers.

N.K. RAMANUJA TATACHARYA

In the third *adhyāya*, 7th *pāda*, 7th *adhikarana* of *Pūrvamīmāṃsā* there are 3 *sūtras* which provide for a '*kartā* other than the *yajamāna*'. The first *sūtra* 93-7-180 reads—'*Śāstra phalam*, etc.' *Śāstra* ordains the *phala* for the performer since that is the

principle—therefore he should do the performance (approximate meaning of the *sūtra*). Here a doubt arises—whether the *yajamāna* himself will do all the works—*karmas* of *darśa* and *pūrṇamāsa yāga*, etc., including the principal *karma* and all auxiliary *karmas*? Or the *yajamāna* should be the *kartā* in *haviṣṭasa* (release of the performance material) and *dakṣiṇādāna* (defraying of fees)—which is called *dravyotsarga* and in other works there should not be a hard and fast rule as to the *kartā*, that is, they may be done either by the *yajamāna* himself or, alternatively, by either the *yajamāna* or by others. Still another alternative is that such a strict rule is intended that in *dravyotsarga* only the *yajamāna* should be the *kartā* and in all other *karmas* only others should be *kartās*. On this a *pūrvapakṣa* is given—the *phala* intended by the *sūtra* ‘*swargakāmo yajeta*’ (*yajña* should be performed by one who wishes to go to *swarga*) goes to the doer who does the total *karma*, that is the principal and its accessory *karmas*. Why? Because it is provided. *Phala* is the result of the total performance which consists of the *pradhāna* (principal *karma*) comprising auxiliaries. *Swargakāmo yajeta* epitomises the triple idea of *aṅga*, *pradhāna* and *phala*. And, since the doer of the total whole (the principal *karma* supported by the accessories) is purported to reap the fruit, the *yajamāna* should be the *kartā* in the whole *karma* comprising the ‘*pradhāna* with the *aṅgabhūta* (auxiliary) *karmas*’. So far as the defraying of fees ordained by the *sūtra* ‘*ṛtvikebhyoḥ dakṣiṇām dadāti*’ is concerned, it can be understood ‘as not required’ by explaining through *adr̥ṣṭakartā* as in ‘*atreyaḥ hiraṇyam dadāti*’. Therefore, the *yajamāna* himself will assume the title of *hotā*, *adhvaryu* etc., as and when he performs these rules. The following *sūtra* supports the second postulate—‘*Utsarge na*’ (as the *utsarga* or the release of money and material is the principal *karma*, therefore for doing the other auxiliary works there may be others (helpers) or he himself may do them. The principal *karma* is the release of material for the gods; therefore, the *yajamāna* is the *kartā* of this principal *karma*. As to the other accessory *karmas* they can be done by the *ṛtvikas* or by

the *yajamāna* himself—there is no specific restriction. Hiring of *ṛtvikas* by giving fees is done only if you require the help of others. Now, help is required in the world only when one is unable to do it oneself. If there is no inability (there is ability), then the *yajamāna* should do everything himself. If there is inability then the auxiliaries should be got done by others. Only in that case the hiring and the fees will apply.

Now, one can argue that if there is inability in the *dravyotsarga* (release of material: the principal *karma*) also, then he can get it done by others. To settle this we shall forward the same answer—*utsargetu pradhānatva*—*utsarga* is the principal *karma* and therefore release of material and defraying of fees is to be done by the *yajamāna* himself. Why? Because he is the *pradhāna*—the owner—therefore he can give his material to others. One cannot give somebody else's property to others. This is provided by the *sūtra*—‘*anyo vā syāta*’ (‘Or there may be another as there is provision of hiring, prohibiting the possibility of direct self’). Here *vā* means *aivam* i.e., ‘or’ means ‘only’—which transpires into saying that others only will be the doers (not he himself). Even if he is able to do everything, and there is no inability, still the *yajamāna* will be *kartā* in *dravyotsarga* only. In all auxiliary works, only others will be *kartās*. Why? Because there is a mention of hiring. Hiring (*parikraya*) is employing of an employee by money. Defraying of fees is done for hiring. Such a hiring or giving of money is not possible for self. Why? Because it would be contradictory. How can one give fees to oneself. Giving requires cessation of ownership of self (the giver) and creation of ownership in the other (taker). Nor can you say that such a giving is prescribed only in case of inability of the *yajamāna*—because it is only in other-worldly affairs that in cases of inability other's help or hiring is required. But in the case of the *yajña* the authority is the *śāstra* which gives clear understanding that the hiring ceremony is necessarily required. Since the *parikraya* (hiring) is ordained as a rule, the auxiliary *karmanas* are to be performed by the hired persons alone.

Thus, it is proved that in *dravyotsarga* only the *yajamāna* is the principal *kartā*; in all other works he is only the causer *kartā*—and the commandment that one who wishes for *swarga* should perform *yajña* contemplates both types of performer-ship—that of direct or principal *kartā* and also that of indirect or causer *kartā*. Therefore, Jaimini's principle is: *Yajamāna* is the *kartā* in the principal *karma*, *ṛtvikas* are *kartās* in auxiliary *karmas*.

Now, some may doubt that Jaimini appears to have said something against this principle in the *sūtras* 25th to 29th of the 8th *Pāda* of the third *adhyāya*. In order to set aside their doubt let us discuss the meanings of these *sūtras*.

'*Ṛtvika phalam ...*' (Jaimini *sūtra* 3-8-25) [*Ṛtvika* gets the *phala* in contributory work if that is so ordained']. There are certain works which are prescribed for the *adhvaryu*. Hence kindling of *āhvaniya* fire and the *mantra* which is chanted at that time '*Mamāgne varcoḥ*' etc., are the *karma* of the *adhvaryu* and the prayer for that *karma*. Now, in this *karma* the *phala* prayed for by the *adhvaryu* should go to the *adhvaryu* himself as there is first person (*mama*) used by *adhvaryu* which means 'I should emerge virtuous'. This is the *pūrvapaksa*. To ward off such interpretations Jaimini gives another *sūtra* '*Svāmīno vā tadarthvratu*'. ['There prayers should yield *phala* for the *swāmī*']. Here '*vā*' means I '*aivam*' i.e., the *phala* prayed for should go to the *swami* 'alone' (not either—or). The *phala* is understood to be going to the *yajamāna* in spite of the fact that *ātmanepada* is used in '*yajeta*'. Therefore, here when *adhvaryu* says '*mama*', he virtually means—'to my *yajamāna*'. Just as the soldiers fight for the king, when they become victorious, the victory belongs to the king but the soldiers also say 'we have become victorious'; in the same way the first person here means the *yajamāna*. And this arrangement is approved by the Vedas also. Therefore, Jaimini says *lingdisichha* (Jaimini *Sūtra* 3-8-27). When prayer is offered by *ṛtvikas* in the *yajña* it is for *yajamāna* only. This interpretation clearly proves that in all such circumstances, the *phala* is purported to belong to the *yajamāna*.

This portion comprising three *sūtras* is devoted to establish that whatever *phalas* other than the principal *karma phalas* are mentioned or prayed, also go to the *yajamāna* in spite of being the *phalas* of auxiliary *karma*.

Now, we find that in a later portion the *phala* acquired by the supporting or auxiliary *mantras* is prescribed to be going to the *ṛtvikas*. For instance in *darśa* and *pūrnāmāsa* there is *dakṣiṇātīkramaṇa mantra* ‘*agnaviṣṇu...*’ etc., which means ‘O Agni and O Viṣṇu (*agni—āhvanīya agni* and *Viṣṇu—yajña*, but here by the word *yajña*—only *havi*, the material of oblation is expressed)—let me not overtake or encroach you. Do not be enraged, and do not scorch me when I pass through the intermediate path which is between you both’. Here the *phala* of the prayer of ‘not scorching’ is required to go to the *yajamāna* or to himself? This is the *śaṅkā*. On this according to the tradition described in the earlier sections, it should be explained as going to the *yajamāna*. This becomes the *pūrvapakṣa*. But it is not so. Therefore, he establishes the final principle—‘*karmāyam nu*’—(*sūtra* 3-8-28]. Here *nu* expresses exception.

He says that in such auxiliary *mantra*—conventionally the *phala* should be explained to be going to the *yajamāna* but looking to the prayer the *phala* should go to the *ṛtvikas* and not to the *yajamāna*. Why? ‘For the performance’. Absence of scorching, etc. is required only for the completion of the performance. If you get scorched, performance will not be completed. Therefore, according to the law of property, the *ṛtvikas* must be praying for the *phala* to themselves. Now, you may question ‘why then is the *ātmanepada* used in *yajet* which indicates that the *phala* should go to the *kartā*.’ To answer this he says that the main *yajamāna*, also prays that the *phala* should go to *ṛtvikas*. Because the *ṛtvikas* are doing the *karma* for *yajamāna*, therefore, the *yajamāna* prays that fire should not scorch his *ṛtvikas*. Hence, there is no contradiction in *ātmanepada*.

This proves that the *phala* prayed for is applied in a performance which is contributory, accessory or auxiliary then the *phala* can be explained as going to *ṛtvikas* also.

Then there is a *sūtra* 'Vyapadeśāstra' (3-8-29).

In *Jyotiṣṭoma* there are four receptacles below the right receptacle for oblation material. In this the *yajamāna* places his hand and asks the *adhvaryu* 'O *Adhvaryu* what do you find here'. *Adhvaryu* replies 'Everything good'. Then the *yajamāna* says 'Let that good go to both of us'.

Here the *phala* should be supposed to go to the *yajamāna* alone because here it is not an auxiliary or accessory performance prayer which should be purported to be going to the *ṛtvika* also. The dual number (both of us) is only formal and it really means singular. This is the *pūrvapakṣa*. But it is not acceptable. Therefore, he propounds the final principle 'Vyapdessauchh'.

Here the 'good' is wished for both the *yajamāna* and the *ṛtvika* and hence it should go to both and not the *yajamāna* alone because there is a specific provision made here by the dual number. In other cases like '*mamgne varchh*', one may take recourse to *lakṣaṇa* but here the *ātmanepada* is expected by *dvivacana* which overrules *ātmanepada*. Therefore because of the dual number the *phala* is explained as going to both.

Thus, finally it can be established that as a rule the *phala* goes to the *yajamāna* alone but as an exception, where the *phala* is only intermediary or required to be effective for the auxiliary performance only—there the *phala* is explained to be going to *ṛtvika* also. And where an unequivocal and clear dual number, etc., clearly prescribe the *phala* for both, there the *phala* is explained as going to both. This is the intention of Jaimini. And, there is no contradiction.

N.S. RAMANUJA TATACHARYA

'Does Mīmāṃsā Treat the Theory of *Karma* as *Pūrvapakṣa*?': Two Responses to the Query

[We publish below two responses received to the issue raised in the 'Notes and Queries' section of *JICPR*, Vol. XI, No. 2, entitled

‘Does Mīmāṃsā Treat the Theory of *Karma* as *Pūrva Pakṣa*?’ Śrī Ram Śarma’s original response was received in Sanskrit. It was translated by Mrs Shyama Bhatnagar of the Department of Sanskrit, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur with some minor corrections and editing by me—Editor.]

Before answering the question, I must explain the word *karma* and the various senses it conveys. *Karma* means (1) an action, a transitory movement, lasting as much time as the action actually taking place and (2) the subtle effect left by such an action, lasting for a longer time—say, up to the moment the effect or reaction is experienced by the doer of the action. This is called *apūrva*; it is of several kinds. It is analogous to *dharma* and *adharmā* or *puṇya* and *pāpa* of other systems. It is a non-matter, which needs a matter as substratum to inhere in. *Ātmā* is the substratum for it, of the doer. ‘Doership’ is of two kinds—direct and indirect. Normally, all such effects produced by actions reside in the *ātmā* of the doer, but in the case of, actions which were *caused* by another, the effects go to the *ātman* of the person who *caused* that action to be done. The actual doer was just an instrument in the hands of the causal agent. He did not perform that action on his own volition. The performer was purchased for the purpose and he did not also desire the resultant effect. *Vedic injunctions* say that specific actions are to be performed by specific persons to obtain one consolidated effect. There are some intermediary effects which go to the actual performer. Here the deciding factor is the injunction.

The third chapter of *Pūrva Mīmāṃsā* with *aṅga karma*—auxiliary rites—most of which are performed by *ṛtviks* for the *yajamāna*. Therefore, the actual affects go to the *yajamāna*, who pays for the services. There are some specific auxiliary rites which not only help the *pradhāna karma*, but also produce intermediary results. These intermediary results are of two kinds—those which go to the *yajamāna* and those which go to the *ṛtvika*. Here too the *Vedic injunction* is the deciding factor

and not logic. Desire for the fruits of the sacrifice is the first requisite for taking up the performance. If *ṛtvika* is entitled to desire a certain fruit of a particular sacrifice, either singly or along with the *yajamāna*, then that *phala* goes to him.

Thus we can see that there are three kinds of *phalas*—*pradhāna karma phala*, *aṅga karma phala*, independent of *pradhāna phala*, which goes to both the *yajamāna* and the *ṛtvika*; and those which go to the *ṛtvika* alone, and those that go to the *yajamāna* alone.

Therefore, no generalization can be made with regard to *phala* in general. They should be particularized and the rules applied accordingly.

Therefore, there is no room to conclude that Jaimini held two views about the *karma* theory. A warrior fights for the king and wins a war, and the king enjoys the kingdom, not the warrior. ‘*Mana eva kāraṇam manuṣyāṅām bandha mokṣayoṅ*’. This clarifies the position. The motive with which one does an action is the deciding factor.

SAMPAT NARAYANA

Comments on Daya Krishna’s Issue About Karma

The question ‘Does Mīmāṃsā Treat the Theory of *Karma* as *pūrvapakṣa*?’ refers to three *adhikaraṇas* in order to show that they involve a contradiction. The *adhikaraṇas* are, first, 3.7.8, *sūtra* 18; second, 3.8.25/26; and third, 3.8.28/29. In 3.7.8 the *bhāṣya* is ‘parts of the action (*aṅgānām*) can be performed by someone else (that is, other than the agent)’; and the *vārtika* asserts, ‘the agent can be other than the *yajamāna*’. In the same way, in 3.8.25/26, the *bhāṣya* says, ‘one should expect for the *swamī-phala* in the *karaṇamantras*. The *vārtika* is, ‘the fruit expressed in the *karaṇamantras* belongs to the *yajamāna*. In 3.8.28/29, ‘the fruit for which the *karma* is undertaken in *karaṇamantra* belongs to *ṛtvija* says the *bhāṣya*; and the *vārtika*

establishes, 'the fruit expressed in the *karaṇamantra*, being instrumental for the action, belongs to *ṛtvija*.'

Now, a doubt arises: 3.7.18 says, 'being the *kartā* in the *yajña* one is to get the fruit; being the *kartā* in the part of process (*sāṅga*) one obtains the fruit; one who works for oneself gets the fruit'. 'Therefore, the *ṛtvija* is entitled to expect the fruit.' 'I shall be powerful', says the *adhvaryu*—'thus he would be zealous.'

In 3.8.28, '*ṛtvija* is entitled to expect fruits', 'sometimes *ṛtvijas* are also entitled to expect fruits.' In 3.8.29, 'Therefore, *adhvaryu* should expect fruit.' In these statements from the *Bhāṣya*, it is stated that the *yajamāna* gets the fruits. At one place it is said that the *ṛtvijas* get the fruit and at another place that 'the agent *yajamāna* alone gets the fruit', this is *karma-siddhānta*.' How can the two go together? Did Jaimini assert this? Is there a tenet of this sort in Mīmāṃsā or not?

In this context it should be understood that in the three *adhikaraṇas* the matter dealt with is different and it is so in this way. In 3.7.8 *adhikaraṇa*, *sūtra* 18, the fruit of the action prescribed by the *śāstra* will be available only to the agent. '*Swargakāmo yajet*', etc., says that one who desires *swarga* has to perform the *yajña* in order to obtain the desired fruit. Thus the principle that one who is the agent is the one who obtains the fruit. If one thinks that there can be only one agent then this is not so. To be an agent is to do the action for oneself or to have it performed by paying for it to a *ṛtvija*. The *vārtikakāra* illustrates this by mentioning *darśapūrṇamāsa*, etc., as example of an action in which the performer is paid for. This is said about the main action. In this, one who is the *kartā* obtains the fruit. This is the principle. Such a doctrine is generally known as *karma-siddhānta*.

In 3.8.25/26 *adhikaraṇa* in the *karaṇamantra*, utters the *adhvaryu*, 'Oh, Agni, may I get the power (*varcaḥ* in *yajña*'. The question is, for whom is the fruit of the power being elicited? Using the word '*mama*', a declension of '*asmad*', suggests that the fruit would go to the *adhvaryu* who utters the

mantra. This, however, is the *pūrvapakṣa*. As the *adhvaryu* is serving against payment, the fruit should go to the *yajamāna*. That proves the same principle. In the *bhāṣya*, an example of a *śruti* is also given in this context. 'The blessings desired by the *ṛtvijas* go to the *yajamāna*.' This *adhikaraṇa* is related with the intermediary fruit which is mentioned in the *karaṇamantras* or the auxiliary *mantras* involved.

In 3.8.28/29 *adhikaraṇa*, in the *karaṇamantras* themselves it is mentioned that the fruit is obtained by both the *adhvaryu* and the *yajamāna*, that is, the *yajamāna* and the *adhvaryu* spread their hands in the centre of their bellies and grasping each other's hands, the *yajamāna* enquires, 'what is there in it, *adhvaryu*'; The *adhvaryu* answers, 'well-being'. Then, first the *yajamāna* declares 'that is for me' and then the *yajamāna* asks a second time, 'what is it here?' and the *adhvaryu* answers, 'well-being'. Then the *yajamāna* says, 'that the well-being is for us together'. Obviously, in situations like these the *śruti* clearly declares the fruit for both. Therefore, the fruit goes to both. This is the principle. However, this example relates to the intermediate fruit only. It is not concerned with the main fruit, such as *swarga*, etc.

Thus, in this connection, there are several *adhikaraṇas* in which, at some places, fruit is mentioned in relation to the *yajamāna* alone, and at other places in relation to both the *yajamāna* and the *ṛtvija*. But this does not lead to any contradiction as they are concerned with different subject-matters. The fundamental points here are as follows:

1. The fruit relating to the main action belongs to the *yajamāna* alone who performs the action. As it is ordained by the Veda that the services of the *ṛtvija* can be purchased, the action can be performed by someone other than the *yajamāna*. But such an action can only be performed by the *ṛtvija*, on payment and by no one else.
2. The fruit of the auxiliary action, even though aspired to by the *ṛtvija*, goes to the *yajamāna* alone.

3. Where, because of the utterance, the fruit of the intermediary action goes to the *ṛtvija* and as even that leads to effectiveness in the action relating to the *yajña*, it too, being a part of the *yajña*, would go to the *yajamāna*.
4. And where the fruit of the auxiliary action is available for both, that is so because it is what the Veda says in the matter. Apart from the effectiveness, etc., that sort of fruit is available to *ṛtvijas* just as it is available to the *yajamāna*.

This does not demolish the *karma siddhānta*. Examples of such behaviour are found in worldly affairs also, as in the tilling of land. The landlord, with the help of money which he pays to the labourers, gets the proper action performed by them appropriate to the expected crop, without himself touching anything and yet is known as a peasant and is also the owner of the fruit. Similarly, if some labourers eat a few mangoes in the garden, they are not called the ones who get the fruit. The *yajamāna* alone owns the fruit.

Another example of this may be seen in textile factories. The workers may get something additional to their usual wages such as bonus but that is not the main fruit. It is not the consumption of the main fruit. Nor does that create a claim on the part of the workers regarding the ownership of the factory. The consumption of the intermediary fruit constitutes no barrier for the *yajamāna* in obtaining and enjoying the main fruit.

Such is the case in respect of *karma* here. In fact, the sanction of *śruti* has permitted the bonus to be paid to the workers. This does not damage the doctrine of *karma*; the fruit goes to the doer.

However, the principle of fruit being enjoyed by the agent alone has some exceptions.

1. For example, 'the father should name the newborn son on the tenth day'. Further, there is this injunction: 'in the *jātyeṣṭī yajña* which is performed on the birth of a son, the fact of naming enables him to be addressed and the *yajña*

promises him a bright future; these fruits here are enjoyed by the son and not by the *yajamāna* who performs the *yajña*.

2. Similarly, the *paitṛka karma* performed for the dead, has for its consequence getting a better place, *uttama loka*, for them and this fruit is enjoyed by the dead and not by the *yajamāna*.

Yet in these cases the Veda commands the *yajamāna* that 'he should do so'. In case he disobeys the command, the *yajamāna* will suffer. Here the reason for performing the action is by itself the fruit, and the fruits consequent on *jātyeṣṭī*, *yajña* and *paitṛka karma* are enjoyed by the son or by the dead father, though the *yajamāna* initiates the *karma* as a *kartā*. This is so because the action is commanded by the Veda for him to be performed. By initiating that action, therefore, the *yajamāna*'s fruit is the achievement of a state or situation which is free from obstacles. The naming and bright future, *abhyudaya*, and the fruit of obtaining a state of well-being, *sadgati*, would go to the newly-born son and the dead person respectively. Except for these two instances, the *kartā* himself is the enjoyer of the main fruit. This is the principle.

It should, however, be clearly understood that there is no independent doctrine of *karma* which may be regarded as the Mīmāṃsā principle. Neither the *bhāṣyakāra* nor the *vārtikakāra*, nor even Jaimini have any doctrine of their own. They only gave a consistent meaning to the various *Veda-vākyas*.

Except the earlier mentioned exceptions, everywhere else this is the Mīmāṃsā principle. The *kartā* alone is the enjoyer of the fruit. Hence, one should never doubt thinking that there is a self-contradiction or mutual opposition in the *adhikaraṇas* or the lack of any principle in the *Mīmāṃsā Śāstra*, for all these together are called *śāstra*. Such a usage is generally accepted in practice also.

Part III

Nyāya

1

Is Nyāya Realist or Idealist?

DAYA KRISHNA

Notes and Queries

Nyāya is usually described as a realist system by most people who write about it in the English language. In fact, many consider it as a realist system *par excellence*, and even identify the one with the other so completely that the two terms seem interchangeable to them. But, is it really so?

Nyāya is supposed to maintain that everything that is real is knowable and nameable. If we keep aside the issue of 'nameability' for the present and confine our attention to 'knowability' alone, then the contention that 'to be real' is 'to be knowable' seems suspiciously close to the idealist contention that '*eesse*' is '*percipi*'. 'To be, is to be perceived' is the well-known Berkeleyan formulation in the western tradition. 'To be perceived' of course means 'to be known' in this context. However, as Berkeley's discussion of the problem is in the context of Locke's distinction between primary and secondary qualities on the one hand, and their inherence in a substance which is, 'known' only as their substrate and is expressly designated as a 'know-not-what' outside this reference to its being the 'support' for the qualities that inhere in it, it may appear

that the 'qualities' about which both Locke and Berkeley are talking are the sort of qualities that can be apprehended through perception, and perception alone. But if there are qualities which need not be known through perception, or which cannot be known through sense perception, then the Berkeleyan formulation is obviously inadequate and the Nyāya formulation in terms of knowledge superior to that of Berkeley.

'To be known', however, is different from 'to be knowable' and the Nyāya position is supposed to be the latter rather than the former. But a reformulation of Berkeley's position in terms of 'the perceivable' rather than 'the perceived' would bring it closer to the Nyāya formulation. The distinction will become even less if we remember that for Berkeley, God's '*percipi*' cannot be 'sense perception' and that his '*percipi*', therefore, has to be understood as 'knowledge' rather than 'perception'. 'To be', thus, would either be 'to be known', or 'to be knowable'. The latter, of course, would be true only for finite minds like those of human beings. In the case of God, the distinction between 'known' and 'knowable' is irrelevant as everything is supposed to be 'known' by Him. It is only in the case of human beings that this distinction may be said to make any sense.

It is not clear whether God plays any such analogous role in Nyāya as it does in Berkeley's system. Perhaps the issue did not engage the attention of the Nyāya thinkers not only because they did not see the problems posed by the distinction between 'knowing' and 'knowability', but also because the issue of the 'independence' of the object of 'knowing' from the 'act of knowing' does not seem to have been focally raised in the tradition, as it was by Locke in the context of 'secondary qualities' in the British empiricist tradition. The notion of '*buddhyāpekṣā*', which comes closest to Locke's distinction, does not appear to have triggered the same set of problems as it did in the western tradition. But if the notion of '*buddhyāpekṣā*' is accepted in respect of some qualities, then at least in respect

of those qualities Nyāya could not be regarded as holding a 'realist' position.

Moreover, even the contention of the essential 'knowability' of 'reality' in the Nyāya context implies that the structure of 'knowing' and the structure of 'reality' be isomorphic in the sense that the *sattā* must be of the nature of *dravya* which is related to *guṇa* and *karma* by *samavāya*. The 'real', thus, has to be 'rational', and as Nyāya does not accept the notion of an 'unknowable thing-in-itself', there is no distinction between 'phenomena' and 'reality' or noumenon, as in Kant's case. If this is not out-and-out 'idealism', what else is it?

The terms 'idealism' and 'realism' had arisen in the context of western philosophizing to describe certain philosophical positions which make sense in the perspective of questions that were being debated in that tradition. In traditions where this sort of questions did not trouble the thinkers, it may not be illuminating to describe their position in those terms. But as the term 'realism' has been used to describe the Nyāya position by almost everybody who has written on it in the English language, it may not be remiss to raise a question about its adequacy in describing the position which is usually ascribed to Nyāya thinkers in the Indian tradition.

The following issues, therefore, need to be clarified before any reasonable answer may be attempted to the question regarding the adequacy of the characterization of the Nyāya tradition of philosophical thought in India as 'realist'.

1. Is it correct to say that Nyāya holds that anything which is 'real' is also 'knowable' and 'nameable'?
2. If so, what exactly is meant by the terms 'knowable' and 'nameable' in this connection?
3. Are the two terms 'knowable' and 'nameable' independent of each other? In other words, can something be 'knowable' without being 'nameable' and *vice-versa*?
4. If all that is 'real' is 'knowable' and 'nameable', then is that which is 'unreal', 'unknowable' and 'unnameable'?

5. Is the relation between that which is 'real' and that which is 'knowable' and 'nameable' symmetrical? In other words, is everything that is 'knowable' and 'nameable' also 'real' by virtue of that very fact?
6. In case there is complete symmetry between them, are they just different words with the same semantic import and thus synonymous with each other except in their pragmatic associations and visual or auditory identities?
7. In case the 'nameability' condition is essential to 'reality' for Nyāya, how will this be compatible with the definition of perceptual knowledge as given in the *Nyāya-Sūtra* 1.1.4, if *avyapadeśya* is understood as that which cannot be 'named'?
8. Is the idea of *avyapadeśya* the same as that of *nirvikalpa pratyakṣa*? If so, what is meant by treating it as 'knowledge'?
9. What exactly is meant by '*buddhyāpekṣā*'? Does Nyāya accept this notion in the context of some qualities, and not of others? What is the ground of the distinctions? And, in case it does accept the notion, does it not affect its so-called 'realist' position in the sense of 'independence' of the object 'known' from the 'act of knowing'?
10. What exactly is meant by this 'independence' on which the usual claim for Nyāya being a 'realist' system is generally based?

These are some of the issues that need to be clarified before we may meaningfully characterize Nyāya as an 'idealist' or 'realist' system.

(a) Is Nyāya Realist?

ARINDAM CHAKRABORTI

We have been happily branding the Nyāya standpoint in metaphysics 'a realist standpoint'. Professor Matilal even called

it 'Naive Realism'—with some reservations, when he began his book *Perception* with the pregnant remark: 'Naive Realism is not all that naive.' Yet, if the hallmark of realism is the thesis that truth is independent of the mind, then Nyāya can be shown to be non-Realist by the following straight forward argument.

- A. Truth or *yāthārthya* is a property of cognitions in Nyāya.
- B. The definition of truth is—'*Tadvati tatprakāratvam*'— (Being true consists in ascribing that qualifier to an object which actually belongs to it).
- C. Now *prakāratā*—which is an essential component of this definition is a kind of *viśayatā*.
- D. A *viśayatā* cannot exist independently of the cognition which confers this objecthood on individuals, characteristics and relations. And of course cognitions cannot exist independently of the self, or some one's self.
- E. Therefore truth *cannot* exist independently of someone's cognition.

Apart from the use of 'truth' as an abstract noun standing for the property of beliefs, (or statements etc.) there is another use of that word in western philosophy; to mean the bearers of truth and falsity, or propositions. The fact that grass *is* green is a truth in this sense. That Nyāya does not and *need not* have any room for mind-independent propositions hanging in a Fregean third realm, I think, has been established beyond doubt (see 'Propositions' by Badrinath Shukla in *Samvāda: A Dialogue between Two Philosophical Traditions*, ed., Daya Krishna *et al.*, ICPR, 1991). So, even in this sense Nyāya does not believe that there is any truth, i.e., any objective content like *that a is f*—waiting to be apprehended by us—but existing independently of our cognition or recognition of them.

Thus, even if Nyāya is not realist regarding truth or propositions, is it not realist regarding concrete particulars and universals and—most importantly—about the tie or relation of exemplification called inherence (*samavāya*)? The answer

seems to be unquestionably affirmative. Just notice, as unmistakable evidence, Udayana's long refutation of Buddhist Idealism in the second part of *Ātma Tattva Viveka*. This part is called: 'Refuting the view that there exists nothing *outside* cognition', hence its conclusion must be: Things *outside* awareness do exist. From the first sentence of this second part of *ATV* it looks as if Nyāya's realism goes to the extreme of claiming that even the self cannot exist unless the external world exists ('As long as the idealist *viññānavādin* is awake, i.e., unvanquished, there is nothing *outside*, so how can there be a self?'). What could be the meaning of 'outside' (*bāhya*) here? The commentaries unanimously say: '*bāhya*' or 'outside' means 'distinct from and not of the nature of awareness' *jñānabhinnam* (Raghunātha) or *jñānanātmakam* (Śaṅkara Mīśra). Even the Nyāya self is not *essentially* conscious or of the nature of awareness. Even the self can exist independently of cognition and that is why if, as the *viññānavādin* insists, nothing can exist independently or outside of cognition then the self's existence is threatened. That the self can exist without consciousness or cognition is shown by the notorious doctrine of classical Nyāya that in the liberated stage the self sheds all awareness. An awareness inheres in the self and makes an external object its intentional target. But neither its seat (the self) nor its structure-giving object (the external object) is made of or dependent upon awareness. They remain outside awareness.

The crucial element of Nyāya realism, as I have already hinted in the previous paragraph, is its insistence on inherence as an objective cognition-independent entity. Although Nyāya does not believe in *facts* as distinct from qualified or property-possessing rich particulars, the cement of the universe for Nyāya is this relation between universals and their exemplifiers, as well as between wholes and their parts etc. Not only do particular things like apples and non-particular things like their fruitness exist outside anybody's awareness, even the cement between the single apple and the universal fruitness exists outside. We are *very* tempted to say that the *fact that this*

is an apple or the *fact that the apple is red* exists independently of the mind. We should resist that temptation because of the Tractarian association with the word 'Fact'. The Nyāya world is very much a totality of *things* rather than facts; but those things include the relation of *being-in*—which exists outside cognition.

Even after this, the general Nyāya dictum that 'Whatever is, is knowable' (*astitva* and *prameyatva* are coextensive) may mislead us to doubt that Nyāya is thing-realist. These two reminders should keep us away from that doubt. First, to be knowable is not to be *known*. Second, even when something is an object of knowledge it retains, according to Nyāya, its independence of and distinctness from knowledge.

It is true that unlike Buddhism and Advaita, Nyāya leaves no room for the distinction between phenomena or empirical transactional reality and noumena or transcendental reality. But why should drawing such a distinction be a necessary condition for being a realist? True, Locke draws such a distinction, establishing thereby a tradition of Scientific Realism which insists upon a sharp distinction between the commonsense 'manifest image' and the 'scientific image' of things as they imperceptibly are in themselves. But drawing this distinction is surely not a *sufficient* predicative awareness are not *two* objects. They are exactly the same—just as the cup which is seen and the cup as it is touched are the *same* cup. So neither *nirvikalpaka* perceptions nor their objects pose any exception to the rule: *whatever is, is nameable*.

In spite of these obvious responses to Professor Daya Krishna's worries—and we did not go into how numbers could be dependent upon counting-cognition and yet be objective qualities—there is one genuine point that emerges out of his searching questions. The canonical western characterization of realism as the thesis that objects exist mind-independently is difficult to apply to Nyāya. The notion of mind-independence involves the notion of *possibility*: An object of awareness is mind-independent if it *can* or *could* exist without awareness

even if it actually is always the object of some awareness (e.g. God's). Nyāya metaphysics cannot make sense of this empty 'can' or 'could', because nowhere in Nyāya do we find any trace of the idea of possible worlds. But Nyāya still would be resolutely realist in the sense that even constant actual *relatedness* to awareness would not make the object *merge* into awareness. Things, even if all of them are actually known, are not of the nature of knowledge. They are distinct. What is central to this realism is the rejection of the Buddhist idealist rule: If two things are always cognized together, then they are identical (*Sahopalambhaniyamād abhedah*).

(b) Is Nyāya Realism or Idealism?

J.N. MOHANTY

The Nyāya puts forward the thesis which predicates that 'existence' (*astitva*), 'knowability' (*jneyatva*) and 'nameability' (*vācyatva*), are co-extensive, meaning that whatever exists is also knowable and nameable. It would also follow that only what exists is knowable. It would also follow—but is it true?—that whatever is nameable exists. What about Pegasus?

The issue raised by Daya is: if existence and knowability are universally co-present, i.e., if whatever exists must be knowable then the attribution of realism to the Nyāya is seriously compromised. There are many other side issues, e.g. with regard to the so-called epistemic entities, *jñānīyapadārthas* such as *viśayatā*. There is no reason why a realistic ontology shall not admit entities that are either purely mental or 'hybrid'.

Let me focus on the *vyāpti* between existence and knowability. Note that for the Nyāya, the *vyāpti* is reversible; whatever is knowable exists. The latter thesis requires that the object of false cognition is also a real entity, that there is no false, non-existent, object. In the thesis 'whatever exists is knowable', 'knowledge' or *jñāna* must be first taken in the broad sense to

include *a-pramā*, but then one can add, legitimately I think, that whatever is an object of *a-pramā* is also a possible object of *pramā*, so that everything that exists (the addition of the phrase 'that exists' is redundant, for there are, in the Nyāya view, no non-existent things) is a possible object of *pramā*.

Another point to note is that the *vyāpti* obtains, not between existence and being-an-object-of-knowledge, *jñānavisayatva*, but rather between existence and knowability. But there is an asymmetry in this thesis, which is hardly noticed. 'Knowability' is a modalized concept, 'existence' is not. It is not being said that whatever is capable of existing, is capable of being known. What is being said is that whatever exists is so capable. There is, as a matter of fact, no equivalent modalized concept with regard to 'existence' in the Nyāya system.

The idealist thesis '*esse est percipi*' asserts the *identity* between 'existing' and 'being perceived'. The Nyāya thesis asserts, not identity, but *invariable co-occurrence* of the two properties: such invariable co-occurrence requires that the two properties be different. However, granted that what we have is a universal co-existence of the two properties, one still has to look closer into the nature of this universality. I will, in this context, draw attention to only two aspects of the thesis. First, *vyāpti*, on the Nyāya view, is an extensional relation. In the celebrated case of smoke and fire, the *vyāpti* is not to be understood intensionally as a necessary relation, but rather extensionally as a relation of mere co-presence. To say that there is *vyāpti* between S(smoke) and F(fire) is *not* to say 'It is impossible that there is a locus of S, in which F is absent', but rather to say 'It is not the case that F is absent in a locus of S'. When the Nyāya holds that whatever exists is capable of being known, what it means to assert is not a logically necessary relation, but a factual relation of co-presence. Whatever exists is knowable, but *not necessarily so*.

Secondly, what is asserted in saying 'whatever exists is knowable' is this: if the causal conditions for knowing an object

exist, then it will be known, i.e. it will be the object of appropriate cognitive state which, however, *need not be perceptual*. As a matter of fact, in many cases it may be inferential. Berkeley spoke of 'being perceived'. Idealism needs this in order to reduce the putative external object to an idea in the mind. That idea must be a mental picture and that is so in the case of perceptual cognition. Nyāya speaks of *jñeyatva*, which does not mean 'capable of being perceived'.

Note that for Nyāya, cognition, even *pramā*, is an occurrence *caused by* various causal conditions, amongst which *its* object is one. The cognition of O is produced, amongst others, by O, then O must be independent of that cognition. But—it may be asked—does not a cognition have a cause even in the Yogācāra Buddhist theory which countenances no mind-independent external object? Amongst the four-fold causes of a cognitive event, on the Yogācāra theory, one is the *ālambanapratyaya*—each of the four being a *pratyaya*: this is an attempt to incorporate the entire causal story into an idealistic framework.

To see, then, the basis of Nyāya realism, one needs to consider not only the causal story, but also the nature of a cognition as the Nyāya understands it. As regards the latter, the decisive point is that on the Nyāya theory, a cognition is *nirākāra*, 'form'-less. I need not go into the arguments in support of this thesis, but let us focus on its consequences: if a cognition is *nirākāra*, then any *ākāra* or form which appears in cognition must fall outside it, and cannot be *in* it (as its immanent content or structure). Add to this the further thesis that a cognition is not self-revealing: what follows, as a consequence, is that what, in the first instance, is presented could not be a form of the cognition but only a form which is other than the cognition, namely the object. These two theses combined constitute the most forceful argument for realism. There are other arguments—e.g. the one deriving from the theory *Pramāṇa samplava*—which I will not expound on this occasion.

The thesis then that everything is a possible object of consciousness, does not lead to a presumption against realism—not as long as by ‘everything’ is meant all that exists, *and* as long as ‘existence’ is construed as a real predicate (which the Yogācāra denies).

The Advaita Vedānta, especially the Vivaraṇa school advances an interesting thesis which resembles the Nyāya thesis, and it would be instructive to compare them. On the Vivaraṇa school view, all things are objects of the witness-consciousness either as known or as unknown (*‘sarvam vastu jñātatayā ajñātatayā vā sākṣicaitanyasya viśaya eva’*). This thesis makes room for things that I do not know of: they are still objects of consciousness but as yet unknown. Those which are objects of consciousness as known, i.e. as manifested by an *antaḥakaraṇa pramāvṛti*, logically have *had* unknown existence. Thus a realism is preserved, but brought under an overarching idealism. The Nyāya does not have these resources and its realism is not provisional but final.

(c) Nyāya is Realist Par Excellence

N.S. DRAVID

That Professor Daya Krishna, a distinguished philosopher, who had been instrumental in establishing effective academic communication between Nyāya scholars and modern Indian philosophers should seriously ask the question, ‘Is Nyāya Realist or Idealist?’¹ is rather puzzling. No indigenously-trained student of Nyāya would ever entertain the slightest doubt about the realistic character of Nyāya. Certain confusions seem to have engendered this doubt in Daya Krishna’s mind. To sustain the doubt a few questions also have been set forth by Daya Krishna. We take up these questions first for discussion.

The first question asks whether in the Nyāya view anything that is real is also ‘knowable’ and ‘nameable’? The answer to

the question is an unqualified 'yes'. The Sanskrit terms standing respectively for the real, the knowable and the nameable (more precisely, 'the denotable'), viz., 'sat', '*prameya*' and '*abhidhēya*' are supposed to have identical denotations, namely 'everything in the universe'. The connotations of these words however differ from each other.

The second question following from the first is, 'what exactly is meant by the terms 'knowable' and 'nameable' to which the answer is as follows:

The knowable or '*preeya*' in Sanskrit is that which can be the object of a true cognition. Even if an object is not already known the possibility of its being known is always there. An unknown object may not be known in its particularity yet as an object belonging to any one of the seven established categories of reals, it can certainly be known. That there are and can be only seven categories or types of reals is determined by means of valid arguments.

The 'nameable' can be defined as 'that which can be the denoted of a word'. If a thing is knowable even as a thing of a certain type, say as a substance or a quality, etc., the word for the substance or the quality, etc. can denote the thing.

The third question asks if knowability and nameability can exclude each other partially? The answer to this question is an emphatic 'No.' Every knowable is a nameable and every nameable is a knowable. The reason for this equivalence is this. To know a thing is to have a determinate cognition of it as 'such and such'. The knower on the basis of such a determinate cognition of the thing can refer to it by using the term denoting it. If the conventional denotative term is not known to the knower of the thing some other term can be used for it by him or her. It is however not necessary that there should be a user of such a term or terms. It is enough that there are such terms having the capacity to denote the things known.

The fourth question is about the unreal. It asks whether the unreal is unknowable and unnameable. Yes, the unreal is neither real nor even knowable or nameable. As the great

Nyāya philosopher Udayana says in his *Ātmatattvaviveka*, 'when some person of perverted intellect discourses about the unreal (hare's horn, barren women's son, etc.) a sober, knowledgeable person cannot but remain silent.'

The fifth question, 'Are the above terms symmetrical?' is materially the same as the third question and so it does not call for a separate reply.

The sixth question is partly answered by the answer to the first question. As stated in the answer, the denotations of the three terms mentioned are exactly the same but their connotations are quite different from each other. Knowability is one kind of property, nameability and reality are quite other kinds of properties and these respectively determine the denotedness pertaining to the terms and characterize everything in the world denoted by them. Daya Krishna refers here to 'the semantic imports' of the terms. Are there non-semantic imports too from which Daya Krishna wants to distinguish imports that are (in his view) only semantic? It is not clear what is meant by this expression.

In the second part of the question it is asked if the above terms are 'synonymous although their pragmatic associations and visual or auditory identities are different?'. The answer to the first part of the question is that in the usual sense of the word 'synonymous' the terms are synonymous (with identical denotation but differing connotations). In the second part of the question it is first asked if the pragmatic associations of the words are different. What does Daya Krishna mean by the pragmatic associations of words? Does he mean 'suggestions of some kinds of action that the utterance of a word in a certain context may make'? For example, if a person utters the word 'door' pointing to a door in the presence of his hearer then the word may be supposed to suggest the word 'shut' or 'open' and through it the activity of shutting or opening the door. But none of these suggestible actions enter the meaning of the word 'door'. All schools of Indian philosophy share the same view on this point. Only the aestheticians hold the view

that even suggested entitles can form part of the meaning of a word, but they too do not regard actions alone as the suggested meanings. Nyāya simply discards such a view. What made Daya Krishna suspect such a thing about Nyāya is beyond comprehension.

But more incomprehensible is the suggested association of the above terms with 'visual and auditory identities'. What are these identities and how can the above terms be supposed to be associated with the identities? Perhaps Daya Krishna is suggesting here that all visual objects are meant by one or more of these terms and all auditory objects are meant by the other term or terms. But such a classification of objects cannot be comprehensive. Supersensible and even some sensible objects would be excluded from this classification. It is extremely surprising how terms recognized by all Indian philosophers to be universal in their denotations and expressly stated to be so by Nyāya are suspected to be of such limited denotation by Daya Krishna.

The next question is an important one and deserves some serious thought. It is asked that if nameability is a universal property residing in every object—perceptual and non-perceptual, then the qualification '*avyapadeśya*' meaning 'that which cannot be named' introduced into the definition of perception in the Nyāya aphorism would be rendered inconsistent. It should be particularly noted here that in the said aphorism we are concerned with the definition of perceptual cognition and not the perceptual object. The above-mentioned qualification is introduced into the definition in order to specify the form under which the perceived object appears in the perceptual cognition. There is the view of the philosophy of grammar expressed in the following verse of Bhartṛhari, the author of *Vākyapadīya*:

न सोऽस्ति प्रत्ययो लोके
 यः शब्दानुगमाद्दते ।
 अनुविद्धभिव ज्ञानं
 सर्वं शब्देन सर्वदा ॥

which says that 'there is no cognition whatever which does not have the word as its (essential) constituent because every cognition is always determined by words.' According to this grammatical view, the determinate perception of a thing must apprehend its object as the bearer of the name by which it is named. The aphorism of Gautama refutes this view by using the above-mentioned qualification to qualify the perceptual object. (Perceptual cognition does not apprehend the name of the object perceived as its identifier or determinant.) The percipient while perceiving the object may recollect its name but the recollected name does not become the object of perception.

From this clarification, it would be obvious that the nameability of all things is not in the least affected by the exclusion of the name from the perceptual cognition. A thing may be endowed by a large number of properties but this does not entail that all these properties or a particular one of these properties should be invariably perceived when the thing is perceived. A man is a rational animal as also a laughing animal. But to perceive or know a certain man is not to perceive or know him as both a rational and a laughing animal.

To the eighth question which asks whether '*avyapadeśya*' is the same as *nirvikalpaka* the answer is an emphatic 'No!' Words aren't involved in either determinate or indeterminate perception according to Nyāya. But the two kinds of perception differ radically from each other. Whether to call or not to call the *Nirvikalpaka* perception as 'knowledge' is a question of terminology. If knowledge is defined as determinate and true cognition then *nirvikalpaka* does not qualify to be called knowledge as it is neither determinate nor true. But if it is not true it is not false either. It is neither true nor false simply because it is a purely referential or discrete cognition of the individual, its genus and the relation joining them. It is a non-judgmental cognition.

In the ninth question it is asked, 'What is *Buddhyapekśa*? is and "If certain qualities are *Buddhyapekśa*" does this not affect

their status as objects independent of knowing?’ To answer these questions it is necessary to clarify the precise meaning of the above Sanskrit word. The correct meaning of the word is ‘dependent upon cognition for its genesis as any effect depends upon its cause for its genesis’. In Nyāya’s view numbers other than unity are the products of the enumerative cognition. If enumeration is not made numbers like two, three, etc., it cannot come into being. The origination of all numbers above unity is caused by enumerative cognitions. In Nyāya’s view, the effect is not the same as the cause despite its dependence upon the cause.

Daya Krishna could have strengthened his case by referring to a different kind of dependence of things upon cognition. It is the dependence of the object of cognition upon the cognition. If the cognition is not there, there is no object of cognition. For example, if I perceive a tree then the tree as the object of my perception will be there. But if I do not perceive the tree it will not cease to be a tree although it will not be a perceptual object during the absence of the perception. This clarification takes care even of the last question posed by Daya Krishna.

Now, we turn to the earlier part of Daya Krishna’s critique of Nyāya realism. Referring to a reformulation of the Berkeleyan principle ‘Esse est percipi’ in terms of the knowability of real, Daya Krishna says ‘... a reformulation of Berkeley’s position in terms of the “perceivable”; ... would bring it closer to the Nyāya formulation’. A serious student of Nyāya would be shocked to read such a statement.

In the Nyāya view things are sometimes known and sometimes not; when they are not known they are *knowable* because the possibility of their being known is not ruled out. Such is not the case with things in Berkeley’s view. According to it, it is not enough for the reality of a thing that there should be a possibility of its being known. According to Berkeley the essence of things consists in their being actually known. Thus, things are totally dependent upon knowing for being real. But for Nyāya *knownness* is an adventitious property of things.

Proceeding further in his comparison of Nyāya with Berkeleyan and Lockean thinking on knowing and knowability Daya Krishna says that ‘... the issue of the “independence” of the object of “knowing” from the “act of knowing” does not seem to have been focally raised in the (Nyāya) tradition as it was by Locke in the context of “secondary qualities”.’

This is another very shocking statement in Daya Krishna’s small note. Even a beginner in Nyāya would know that the object of knowledge is independent of knowledge so far as its being is concerned, simply because an object is not known always. Even things like qualities which are dependent upon substances which are their substrates throughout their existence are not supposed to be dependent upon the latter for their *being*.

The passage coming next to the above is simply mind-boggling. There Daya Krishna says that ‘even the essential “knowability of reality” in the Nyāya context implies that the structure of knowing and the structure of ‘reality be isomorphic in the sense that the “*sattā*” must be of the nature of *dravya* which is related to *guṇa* and *karma* by *samavaya*.’ The ‘real thus has to be “rational” ...’ It has already been explained that things are always knowable but knownness does not constitute their very nature. So, there is no isomorphism between knowing and the structure or nature of reality. One may perhaps say that there is isomorphism (if the use of such a diffuse term in the Nyāya context be permitted) between ‘knowability’ and the ‘nature of reality’. But, even granting per impossible the kind of isomorphism. Daya Krishna speaks of, how can he draw the conclusion that he does from the said isomorphism? Is ‘*sattā*’ the same as *dravya* in Nyāya? If it is so what are *gunas* and *karmas*? Are they other than *sattā*? If all these are *sattā* and not ‘*sat*’ what of the four remaining categories? And how all of a sudden the ‘rational’ creeps in here to determine the nature of *sattā* which is the same as *dravya* for Daya Krishna.

In the end we would like to urge that while discussing the views of Indian philosophy and specially those of Nyāya one

has to be very careful in the use of words—both technical and non-technical. Nyāya lays the greatest stress on this in the interest of arriving at correct conclusions. It is very regrettable that Daya Krishna should take so much liberty with technical words like *sattā*, *buddhyapeksa*, etc. and try to base his arbitrary version of certain Nyāya views on his interpretation of the words.

A few words are called for by way of providing broad definitions of different possible versions of idealism so as to make it clear that Nyāya does not fall under any of the definitions. There is first the Buddhist idealism, according to which consciousness, which is a purely subjective entity, projects itself as objects in the world and assumes different objective forms (or objects are no other than different forms of consciousness). In the idealism of *Advaita* there is no reality outside consciousness. Unlike the Buddhist view this view does not admit consciousness to be endowed with objective forms. Berkeleyan idealism regards the being or the essence of reality to consist in its objectivity or its objective relation to consciousness (or idea). This means that the real is essentially related to consciousness. Then there is Kantian idealism according to which the (empirical) real is a composite of certain ideal forms or categories and non-ideal matter. Hegelian idealism maintains that the real is rational which means that the real is constituted by reason itself in the form of concepts. Nyāya's view of the object does not accord with any of these versions of idealism. When things are cognized they are endowed with the cognitive relation and become cognitive objects. But even as cognitive objects things do not forfeit their cognition-independent nature. In the absence of this relation things remain unknown. But even in the condition of their unknownness the possibility of their being known by a subsequent episode of cognition cannot be ruled out. There is nothing intrinsically obstructive of this possibility. This is why knowability, not knownness is regarded by Nyāya as a universal property of things. If knownness were regarded as such a property then

Daya Krishna would have had some ground to foist idealism on Nyāya.

It may here be asked, 'what can it be in things that makes them knowable except some kind of affinity they may have to knowledge or consciousness?' The answer to the question is that no special property (or relation to consciousness) in a thing need be assumed which may make it knowable. If mere relation of a thing to consciousness is made into a ground to treat it as dependent upon consciousness then on the same ground consciousness too can be treated as dependent upon things. Consciousness cannot be the consciousness of a thing unless it is supposed to depend upon it. But such a dependence is really the dependence of a relational entity upon the relation that gives rise to it.

(d) Nyāya is Realist Par Excellence
(A Supplementary Note)

On reading the short note under the above caption written by me, in reply to a query of Professor Daya Krishna, an inquisitive reader asked me a pertinent question which seemed to be one whose proper answer would throw a great deal of light on the realistic character of Nyāya. Hence this attempt to write this supplement to the earlier note. The question asked is posed thus: As per my elucidation of the nature of knownness of everything, some or other cognition—of any kind—of each and everything is possible. This description covers even those things which remain totally unknown to any human being all through their existence. Such things remain unknown in their individual capacity but by a general cognition, like say of the form. Each and every object in the world is either non-eternal or eternal; even the totally unknown (individually) thing will be included as one of its objects. This being the case there is

not and cannot be anything that is not known by some cognition (in some capacity or other). However, Nyāya would not go as far as the Advaitin does when he says that even an unknown thing is known as 'unknown'. This 'knownness' as unknown is obviously a peculiar kind of knownness—a kind of direct revelation—unmediated by any *vr̥tti* to the *Sākṣin* or the witness-self. Nyāya does not admit the reality of the so-called witness-self or a property like 'unknownness' characterizing anything. The latter is just the hypostatization of sheer absence of a positive property. Now the question posed is that if everything is always known by some cognition or other (and under some aspect or other) according to Nyāya can't this school be dubbed as idealistic although this may appear to be a diluted and slightly peculiar version of idealistic? The answer to this question calls for some classification of the distinction between different kinds of properties of things that Nyāya admits. Broadly speaking, there are five kinds of properties excluding qualities which are not usually treated as properties. The five kinds may be known as generic properties, specific properties, unique (specific) properties, accidental or ad hoc properties, and relational properties. To illustrate: substanceness is the generic property called *jāti* in Sanskrit—of all substances like earth, water, light, etc. Earthness, waterness, etc. are the specific (and also generic) properties of earth, water, etc. respectively. Likewise, potness, clothness, treeness, etc. are the respective specific properties of pot, cloth, tree, etc. More specific and individuating properties which differentiate a particular thing, say a certain specimen of pot from another such specimen are given the names 'This potness' (in Sanskrit *etadghatatva*) and 'That potness' (in Sanskrit *tadghatatva*) respectively. Spaceness, timeness, etc. are instances of unique properties because they characterize singular entities like space, time, etc. Generic and specific properties characterize more than one entity. Accidental or ad hoc properties accrue to things when they enter into some temporary or non-essential relation with each other. For example, a book placed on a

table acquires the conjunctive property of 'being located on the table' because of its conjunctive relation with the table. No sooner the book is displaced its conjunction with the table and the ad hoc property it has given rise to vanish. Such properties may be described even as relational. But the more interesting and important relational properties are the properties of knownness, or knowability, spatiality, temporality, etc. The relations which are at the basis of these properties exist and do not cease to exist so long as both their relata exist. Only if one of the relata goes out of existence, the relations disappear. All the things which are spatial and temporal are related by special relations called '*Densaka*' and '*Kalika*' respectively in Sanskrit to space and time. If the spatio-temporally located things cease to exist, space and time would not cease to exist but the relation between the things and space and time would disappear. The relation of cognition to things is not ad hoc and it is bilateral unlike the spatio-temporal relation which, as described, is unilateral. There is no cognition without an object and no object without there being some or other cognition of it. Cognizedness or knownness is the property that accrues to an object because of its cognitive relation to a cognition. But despite the bilateralness and permanence of the cognitive relation the relational property of cognizedness cannot constitute the nature or being of any object. A pot, for example, is identified as a pot not because it is the object of this or that cognition but because it has a certain structure, certain qualities and serves certain purposes. The cognitive relation is irrelevant to what a thing is in itself. The being of the pot is constituted only by potness which therefore is regarded as the determinant of the structure, causality, etc. pertaining to the pot. It needs to be particularly noted in this connection that Nyāya has given a wide berth to what is called in western philosophy 'the internal relata'. No relation, even including inherence, is an internal relation for Nyāya. Such a relation swallows up the appropriate identity of at least one of its relations. To some inherence called *Samavāya* in Sanskrit may

appear to be the prototype of the internal relation. But this is not true. Inherence—to use the words of Bradley in this context—joins the inherents by keeping them apart.

If the cognitive object were treated as the internal content of its cognition by Nyāya then it could not avoid the idealistic challenge. But Nyāya does not hold such a view of the cognitive object which according to it is neither the content nor the form of its cognition but is an entity wholly external and yet related cognition by a relation which even outlasts it, for, an object is cognizable both when it exists and also when it has ceased to exist. The idealist Buddhists (namely, the Yogācāras) however attach great importance to this (invariable) togetherness of cognition and its objects. As Dharmakīrti says:

the blue (an object) and its cognition are known to go always together and so they are non-different. It is only due to illusory cognition that they are viewed as different from each other as one moon is seen as two by pressing the eyeball. It is almost a tautology that no object is cognized apart from its cognition (where 'apart' means 'unassociated'). But mere invariable association cannot be regarded as the sign of identity. Moreover, it is not the case that an object is associated with the same cognition at all times. Cognitions may come and go but the object remains the same. So, much more intimacy than this is the cognitive relation that is needed to make the object internal to cognition.

(e) Nyāya: Realist or Idealist?

SIBAJIBAN BHATTACHARYA

I have read your query entitled 'Nyāya: Realist or Idealist' with profit. Here are my comments.

(1) Nyāya, specially Navya-Nyāya, admits many eternal, uncreated objects of different categories.

- (a) Substances such as *ākāśa*, space, time, *manas*, *ātmā*, atoms of earth, water, air, fire.
- (b) *Jātis* are all eternal.
- (c) *Samavāya* is eternal.
- (d) *Vīśeṣas* are all eternal.
- (e) *Atyantābhāva* is eternal.

As they are all eternal, uncreated, they are not dependent on anything, least of all on their knowledge.

(2) Knowability, nameability, existence are common properties of all reals—*sādharṇa dharmas Bhāṣāparichedaḥ* (verse 13).

As *dharma* they are dependent upon the reals, not the other way round.

As no human being is omniscient; all reals are *objects* of God's knowledge.

The point that Nyāya is making is that all reals are *objects* of knowledge, and have names.

This theory is in opposition to Śaṅkara's *advaitas* according to which the real, Brahman, is never an object of knowledge, and can have no name.

(3) In liberation, according to Nyāya, there is no consciousness in the liberated self. This self is, even now, an object of inferential knowledge. For, at the stage of liberation, a self being devoid of consciousness does not know itself. In any case no knowledge can know itself according to Nyāya. It can only be an object, if one so desires, of another knowledge. In the case of one's own self, it is *anuvyavasaya*. In the case of perception, according to Nyāya, the object is a *cause of perceptual knowledge*, and hence must exist prior to the production of the knowledge.

(f) Nyāya Realism: Some Reflections

R.K. SHARMA

My aim in this essay is to examine, in some inevitable detail, Professor Daya Krishna's¹ objections to the general view which

regards Nyāya as a 'realist' system in the sense that word is normally understood in the West. I also consider in this connection some of Professor Arindam Chakraborty's² response to Daya Krishna's poser, and for two reasons: one, that it does not head-on address certain issues focalized by Daya Krishna, and two, that in responding to the latter's queries, Chakraborty, even while upholding its basic realistic character, interprets Nyāya's position in a way that at certain points seems questionable.

I

Daya Krishna rightly notes that Nyāya is supposed to maintain that all that is real is knowable and nameable. But then he goes on to attribute to Nyāya the contention that 'to be real' is 'to be knowable' and concludes that if so, the Nyaya standpoint 'seems suspiciously close to the idealist' [that is, Berkeleyan] contention that '*esse*' is '*percepti*' (p. 161) (my emphasis). Further, in order to be in a position to question the common practice of calling Nyāya realist, Daya Krishna tries to bring Nyāya and Berkeley closer by suggesting, obviously implying that there is no harm in doing so, that Berkeley's position can be reformulated in terms of 'the perceivable' (or 'knowable').

I will make two comments on this. In the first place, the Nyāya thesis that whatever is real is knowable does not as such assert the *kind* of equivalence that Daya Krishna attributes to Nyāya. Nyāya does not say that the meaning of 'being real' consists in 'being knowable'; that is Nyāya does not seek to define 'reality' in terms of either 'knowability' (or 'nameability'). Śrīdhara, the author of *Nyāya-kandalī*, when commenting upon Praśastapāda's enumeration of three common characteristics of the six *Padārthas* (categories or classes of reals)—'isness' (*astitva*), 'nameability' (*abhidheyatva*) and 'knowability' (*jñeyatva*)—explains 'isness' (or reality: *astitva*) as the

distinctive character or individuality of a thing: *astitvam svarūpavatvam ... yasya vastuno yat svarūpam tad eva tasyā' stitvam*.³ In other words, according to Śrīdhara the reality of a thing consists in its own distinctive 'isness', its self-identity so to say which is in each case unique to it and so also (in a way) serves to differentiate it from what it is not. In fact, unless the reals have their own-being or individuality they cannot partake of the universal existent-ness' (*sattā-sāmānya*)⁴ which according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika inheres in the three categories of reals—substance (*dravya*), quality (*guṇa*), and motion (*karma*). (After all, for something to have a generic property—even if this property be *sattā-sāmānya*—it must first of all exist.) What Nyāya therefore means (even if it does not always say in so many words) is that its property of knowability or nameability a real thing possesses as a *further* characteristic, and in virtue of the fact that it is real. Reality of a thing cannot therefore be made parasitic upon or relative to its knowability, though it is true that it (that is, reality) becomes one of the necessary conditions for that knowability or even knownness. To put it a little differently, 'to be real' and 'to be knowable' do not in Nyāya *mean* the same thing, though it is the same thing which can be real and knowable at the same time. This proposition, as we know, has quite a few important implications, one of which is that an 'unreal' thing—like, for example, sky flower or square circle—cannot (according to Nyāya) be an object of knowledge. Jayanta, for instance, puts it thus: *yas tu deśāntare'pyartho nā'sti kālāntare'pi vā/na tasya grahaṇam dṛṣṭam gaganendīvarādivat*.⁵ (Roughly: a thing which exists at no time—past, present or future—and in no space has never been found to be known. The example that Jayanta gives of such an unreal thing is of a sky-lotus.) There is a school of thought, specially in the West, which credits even contradictory things (and of course, imaginary things) such as a square circle with some sort of being or existence on the ground that they become objects of thought or philosophic discourse.⁶ Nyāya would have nothing to do with such a view.

In this context someone may intervene and ask whether it is not true that we quite often talk and make judgements about the (so-called) unreal things and thus claim some knowledge about them even if some of these judgements assert nothing more than their unreality. Nyāya's reply would be that it all depends upon what your idea of knowledge is. If by knowledge we mean—and this is what Nyāya's own conception of knowledge, or better, awareness is—awareness of something *as* having certain characteristics, then it is inconceivable, according to Nyāya, that an unreal thing be said to be *known* and thus be (in the process) ascribed characteristics; for, on that logic, Nyāya would say, we might as well find it reasonable to talk and discuss about the kind of fragrance which a sky-lotus may be possessing. Mark, that to Nyāya—and, in my view, even otherwise—this doctrine is of cardinal importance. Indeed, its remarkable relevance (by which I do not necessarily mean its truth) can be gauged when we contrast it with, for example, the Kantian doctrine about what that philosopher calls noumena or things-in-themselves. If Kant is to be believed, it is things-in-themselves alone which are real; and yet it is these which he brackets and puts (perhaps for that very reason) beyond the pale of knowledge. The pretensions of our cognitive capacities do not extend beyond the world (if it be a world) of appearances (or phenomena). And yet (be it noted) Kant *knows* or at least implicitly claims to know that the things-in-themselves are indeed real. To be real, to be known *as* real (and atemporal), and yet to remain unknowable (and not simply unknown)—can there be a greater paradox? And yet Kant asserts all these things of his noumena. And when he further adds that though not knowable as such, they are thinkable as to their existence, does not this whole proposition amount to admitting, however unwittingly, that some knowledge about them is a possibility after all, just as just asserting and without knowing any thing about it beyond that, that God exists, is to know, and know in a definite and non-trivial sense, something about him. The same, however, cannot, according

to Nyāya, apply to things which we think to be unreal. For to deny reality to something is, in Nyāya's view, to affirm nothing about it, let alone say or know something about its nature or character. (It is to be remembered that *astitva* according to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika means being something with regard to which an affirmative awareness [*vidhi-mukha-pratyaya-viśayatva*] as for example Udayana calls it, is possible). That this view of Nyāya raises further problems in its wake is a different matter and beyond the muttons. (One of such problems is the one relate to 'empty' terms—a problem which apart from being epistemological is also logical in nature.)

Professor Daya Krishna then comes out with an alternative suggestion which he thinks undermines the allegedly realistic character of the Nyāya metaphysics. (Recall that the first alternative of Daya Krishna's consisted in construing the Nyāya position—namely, that whatever is real, is knowable—in a certain way so as to bring it close to the Berkeleyan position.) Thus he supposes that a reformulation of Berkeley's thesis, 'To be, is to be *perceived*' as 'To be, is to be *perceivable*' would bring Berkeley's notion 'closer to the Nyāya formulation' (p. 161) so that once again in his view the hitherto common practice of thinking Nyāya to be a realistic system becomes gravely questionable. And so far as I can see there is no doubt that if Professor Krishna's construal of the Nyāya thesis and reformulation of the Berkeleyan position were to be allowed he has half won the battle. But I do not think that Daya Krishna comes anywhere near succeeding. I have already tried to show above how Professor Krishna's representation of the Nyāya view of knowledge is open to objections of a fundamental kind. The same holds, I fear, for his refraining of the Berkeleyan view by substituting 'perceivable' for 'perceived'. Daya Krishna apparently feels that the difference between the two—'the perceived' and 'the perceivable'—though quite obvious, is not so considerable as to be impermissible and that if allowed, affects whatever seems pronouncedly idealistic in Berkeley's doctrine, and so this time brings Berkeley quite close to Nyāya.

Now what is remarkable about Daya Krishna's way of thinking on this issue is that on both the alternatives suggested by him it is Nyāya realism which in his view gets the knocking. That it does on the first alternative (—namely, that 'to be real' means 'to be perceivable'—), assuming for the sake of hypothesis that it is perfectly in order, is clear. But that it should do so even on the second suggestion passes comprehension, for this (that is, the second) alternative (in replacing 'perceived' by 'perceivable') instead of bringing Nyāya near to idealism, gives a clear realistic twist to what is essentially idealistic in Berkeley. In other words, it is Berkeley's idealism which here gets drastically compromised and not Nyāya's (so-called) realism, and consequently if Berkeley and Nyāya are to be thought to have been brought together on a common platform, this platform, I am afraid, is a realistic one rather than an idealistic one.

I have already shown that the first suggestion of Professor Krishna's cannot hold and have also given some reasons. As for his second suggestion referred to above, Daya Krishna apparently feels that while the difference between 'to be perceivable' and 'to be perceived' is only slight (for he does concede a little earlier that 'to be known' is different from 'to be knowable'), the consequence of it is quite considerable so as to bring Berkeley and Nyāya very close to each other. But this precisely is the crux of the matter; for while 'to be perceivable' in one clear sense represents a possible characteristic, 'to be perceived' represents a characteristic (or say ideal) already attained. The difference between the two is, in other words, the difference between possibility and actuality. And that in my view is what makes the whole difference to the issue at hand.

That the difference between the Nyāya position and the Berkeleyan position gets further narrowed if perception is taken, as Daya Krishna suggests, to mean *knowledge* (for perception as sense-perception would necessarily involve, in case of God's knowledge too, his having sense-organs and a body) is a point

whose relevance I am not immediately in a position to estimate in so far as the question of Nyāya's view and Berkeley's view of reality is concerned.

Professor Daya Krishna again betrays less than full appreciation of the Nyāya position when he says that the Naiyāyikas did not quite see the problems posed by the distinction between 'knowing' and 'knowability' or that the issue of the 'independence' of the object of knowing from the 'act of knowing' was not 'focally raised' (p. 162) in the Nyāya (or perhaps the Indian!) tradition just because there was no Locke around to bring to the fore the issue of 'secondary qualities'. My submission, without sounding apologetic at all, on this part of Daya Krishna's contention is that both the things—(a) the distinction between 'knowing' and 'knowability' and (b) the issue of the independence of the object of knowing from the 'act of knowing'—were not only very well understood by the Nyāya thinkers but also given a central place in their ontology and their doctrine of cognition, and that Locke's view about secondary qualities which in Daya Krishna's opinion triggered the concerned twin issues in the British empiricist tradition is something wholly contingent. In Nyāya these issues, I may add, arose in its attempted response to the Vedāntic and some Buddhist schools, specially the idealistic one. In philosophy, as indeed elsewhere, similar issues can arise and similar answers be attempted even if the historical contexts or the thought-traditions themselves happen to be different.

To continue with the question of reality and knowledge as they are conceived in Nyāya, one does not have to quote text after text to show that in Nyāya all that is real, apart from being regarded *for that reason* knowable and nameable, is considered not only as distinct from, but *also* as existing independently of the actual knowing and actual naming of it. Notice that we are here drawing, tentatively though, a distinction between 'being distinct' and 'being independent'. This is because while in Nyāya the reals—and this includes substances (or particulars or things), universals, relations, whether *samyoga*

(contact), or *samavāya* (inherence), and a few other things besides—are both different from and independent of our knowledge (and verbalization) of them, in some schools, specially some of the Buddhistic ones, while an object (*viṣaya*) of knowledge is considered (at whatever level) *distinct* from the concerned act (or state) of knowledge, it is not considered *independent* of that act of knowledge. In other words, according to these schools ‘distinctness’ need not necessarily imply independence too. (‘Independent existence’ of course implies distinctness too.) The word ‘*bāhya-artha*’ used in Nyāya for real objects connotes both distinctness and independence. (That is why, the Naiyāyikas are called by their opponents, *bāhyārtha-vādins*.) The English word ‘externality’ seems to me to capture both these connotations of *bāhyārtha*. It is important to note that in some of Buddhist idealist tradition (Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda, for instance) while provision is made for an object’s distinctness from the particular cognition of it, the object (*viṣaya*) is not considered as capable of existing independently of that cognition and hence is conceived as a *form* or *mode* of it (awareness). (Hence the name *sākāra-jñāna-vāda* for the doctrine.) To the extent the Buddhists entertain the subject-object talk at all they postulate the splitting of consciousness (or cognition) into, firstly, the appearance of itself [as subject] (*svabhāsa*) and secondly, the appearance of the object (*viṣayābhāsa*). Dignāga, for example, attempts to argue for this very thesis in his chapter on *Pratyakṣa* (Perception) in his *Pramāṇasamuccaya*.⁷ And Dharmakīrti and others follow suit. Before them there is Vasubandhu. It is no wonder then that the waking world is often thought of by some of these Buddhist philosophers as being essentially like a dream world where too the objects though perceived as being distinct from their perceptions are not found to exist independently of those perceptions. Of course the reasons why the Buddhist idealists look upon objects of cognition as nothing more than modes or forms of these cognitions are different and call for separate comment. But it would be erroneous to deny that the objects

cognized are thought of as distinct from the act of cognizing to the extent cognition is regarded as *sākāra* (form-*ed*).

I now turn to Daya Krishna's contention that the Nyāya thesis of 'knowability' of 'reality' implies that the structure of 'knowing' and the structure of 'reality' are isomorphic 'in the sense that the *satta* must be of the nature of *dravya* which is related to *guṇa* and *karma* by *samavāya*' (p. 162). Frankly, I am not quite clear what Daya Krishna exactly means by isomorphism of structure here. (In fact, the words within quotes above seem completely dark.) I may however spell out one specific meaning of it which Nyāya seems to accept. This is that 'qualificative cognition' (*savikalpaka* or *viśiṣṭa jñāna*)—and this is the kind of cognition which for all practical purposes matters for Nyāya—consists of such constituent elements which all are, taken separately,—and in the case of true cognitions even in respect of their 'unity'—actual existents and therefore part of the real world. In other words, in Nyāya a cognition is thought capable of knowing an object in a variety of its aspects which are all considered independent existents. Be that as it may, Professor Daya Krishna makes of the alleged structural isomorphism of knowledge and reality in Nyāya the basis of a further conclusion which he states thus: 'The "real", thus, has to be "rational", and as Nyāya does not accept the notion of an "unknowable thing-in-itself", there is no distinction between "phenomena" and "reality" or noumenon, as in Kant's case. If this is not out-and-out "idealism", what else is it?' (p. 162). This passage embodies quite a couple of theses which I shall briefly state and take up one by one. They are:

1. To postulate (as and if Nyāya does) isomorphism of structure between reality and knowledge is to conceive the real as rational.
2. To subscribe to the notion of an unknowable thing-in-itself—as Kant avowedly does and as Nyāya in Daya Krishna's view does not—is to draw a distinction, which Kant draws and which Nyāya does not, between phenomena (or appearances) and reality (or noumena).

3. Nyāya implicitly subscribes, on a certain condition, to (1), explicitly rejects (2), and so ends up by being idealist.

To take up (1), I am not sure whether the isomorphism factor is sufficient in itself to prove the 'rational' nature of reality, as the two terms—'real' and 'rational'—are conceived at least in Hegel's system with whom is associated what is also differently expressed (by him) as the idea of 'being-thought' identity when the two realms are considered holistically. There is no doubt that the eminent Hegelian equation of rationality and reality (or actuality) does presuppose some definite isomorphism between the two, but it should not be forgotten, and I can here do no more than touch upon the topic very cursorily, that the Hegelian conception of rationality goes beyond mere 'cognition' as it is understood in Nyāya (and in some other Indian schools) and involves human reason as the principal arbiter of truth in its inevitably universal and absolute aspect. In Hegel we find the attempt most assiduously carried out—though the process already begins with Descartes so far as modern western philosophy is concerned—to establish the closest possible relation (—and an internal relation at that—) between thought (or logic) and reality so that reason does not remain mere empty form (which it does to an extent even in Kant according to Hegel) and reality does not end up being taken as mere atomic fact or surd, depending upon whether you are on the side of logical analysis or existentialism. When Hegel conceives reality as 'rational' he finds in it an inalienable element of necessity—something which is best illustrated when we consider an apparently moral question. Hegel raises the very important question of whether the world is indeed as it ought to be, and comes to the above conclusion by treating this question as equivalent to the question: Is thought objectively actualized or embedded in the world? To a philosopher like Kant, as indeed to common sense, the two questions may seem to be about different thing, the first about goodness, about whether human beings are morally good and

happy in proportion to their desires and hopes, and the second about intelligibility, about the extent to which phenomena involve thoughts or categories, and about whether or not these thoughts or categories are applicable to things-in-themselves. And since he treats them both as one question, Hegel thinks their solution also to be one and the same. This equation as we come to learn is implicit in the famous Hegelian dictum 'What is rational is actual and what is actual is rational',⁸ 'rationality' here meaning that the world as it is, in that it embodies or instantiates thought-determinations, is rationally intelligible *and* (so) *necessary*, and secondly, that the world is *reasonable* in the sense of being more or less as it ought to be, and so not really to be questioned as regards its ultimate goodness. In the *Encyclopaedia* the key-doctrine that thought is objectively realized in the actual world is construed as implying that it is none of our's or the philosopher's business to suggest that things ought to be different from what they are or to say how they ought to be, if this is viewed as different from the way they are. The point is that Hegel's whole endeavour in mapping the dialectic of reality taken in its widest sense is to establish the most intimate and most intrinsic connection between existence and thought, between content and form, between fact and value, and thereby transcend the bifurcated or sundered world which becomes our inevitable fate when reason goes on holiday so far as its other equally important function of synthesis is concerned. Whether a philosophy like Nyāya, in its conception of reality and knowledge, admits between the two some such relation as envisioned by Hegel is a question which requires a more detailed comment than is possible within the limits of this essay. I will therefore remain content by just pointing out, pertinently in my view, that there is a basic difference between (rational) 'intelligibility' in the sense noted above and 'knowability' as it is normally understood in a system like Nyāya such that even a closest possible correspondence of structure between reality and knowledge, assuming that it is postulated therein, does not really entitle us to regard Nyāya

metaphysics as 'rationalist' or 'idealist'. (I am, however, far from suggesting that 'realism' and 'idealism' are necessarily mutually exclusive categories in themselves.)

As for the thesis (2), it is extremely doubtful whether to draw a distinction between phenomena and reality *is* to subscribe to the doctrine of 'an unknowable thing-in-itself'. (That Kant does so is only a special feature of his philosophy.) Hegel or Advaita Vedānta or philosophers such as Bradley and McTaggart do draw a basic distinction between appearance and reality and yet do not hold (in fact Hegel's critique of the Kantian doctrine is well-known) that there are any such things as *unknowable* things-in-themselves. We find thus that Nyāya philosophy does not become idealistic either on (1) or on (2) or on a combination of them. I may here add, by way of a needed codicil, that though idealism too, like realism, has known many varieties, what is common to them all as a matter of historical fact is that reality is there conceived as being essentially of the nature of spirit. It is in this sense that philosophers, otherwise in many respects as diverse as the Advaita Vedāntins, Leibnitz, Berkeley, Hegel, Bradley and McTaggart, are idealists.

To turn to the phrase '*avyapadeśyam*' in the *Nyāyasūtra* (1.1.4) definition of perception (*pratyakṣa*), which prompts Professor Daya Krishna to make a couple of pertinent (if anxious) queries, it needs to be noted that the adjective does not mean that (knowledge) which cannot be named or verbalized but only, and significantly (as per the explanation given by none other than Vātsyāyana), *that* knowledge which does not owe its existence to any word or name which denotes (or happens to denote) it: *tasmādaśābdamarthajñānamindriyārthasannikarṣotpānam*. It is not that a name cannot produce knowledge of that for which it stands; only, the word naming the object plays *no* role in producing the *perceptual* knowledge of that object. A name only serves the purpose of communication: *tadevamarthajñānakāle sa na samākhyāśabdo vyāpriyate vyavahārakāle tu vyāpriyate*. In other words—as A. Chakraborty

rightly points out by referring to Jayanta Bhaṭṭa's explication of the phrase '*avayapadeśyam*—perceptual knowledge is to be distinguished from the knowledge produced by verbal testimony. There is, therefore, no contradiction between the general thesis that everything real is verbalizable and the view expressed in the (above-mentioned) *Nyāyasūtra* that perceptual cognition is not word-generated (or linguistic) in origin. (In a way, Vātsyāyana's explication of this *sūtra* seems to put a big question mark on the propriety of postulating *nirvikalpaka* awareness as it came to be developed by the subsequent Nyāya philosophers from Vācaspati onwards.) Incidentally, this view of perception as 'non-verbal' has a different fall-out too, and it is that, on Nyāya's account, perceptual knowledge cannot be regarded as necessarily *propositional* knowledge as is commonly supposed in the West, notwithstanding the fact that being *abhidheya*, it can *acquire* a propositional structure (so to say) and so become an objective and public entity when expressed sententially. This point is important, if only because it is often missed in discussions of Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

Professor Daya Krishna then seeks to draw attention to some of the implications of the Nyāya (-Vaiśeṣika) attempt to make certain concepts relative to our conception or view of them, which 'fact' in his opinion compromises Nyāya's alleged realism in respect of at least those concepts.

Since the situation so warrants, I would respond to this suggestion at the basic level and as follows. The relevant aphorism (1.2.3) in Kaṇāda's *Vaiśeṣika-sūtras* where the word '*buddhyapekṣa*' cited by Daya Krishna occurs is this: *sāmānyam viśeṣa iti buddhyapekṣam*. (Genericness and specificity are relative to [the nature of] the viewpoint.) Now the word *buddhyapekṣa*, if not carefully attended to and read along with the rest of the *sūtra*, can easily mislead one, as indeed it does Daya Krishna (if this is the *sūtra* which he has in mind) (and as indeed it has done some other writers), into believing that Kaṇāda here is propounding a conceptualist view of *sāmānya* (genericness) and thus reducing it to something that exists.

(or can exist) in thought alone and so cannot be credited with 'real' objective existence. This interpretation is, however, completely mistaken. What Kaṇāda actually seems to maintain here is that *jātis* or universals are eternal (*nitya*) entities which are (1) as much real as other realities, and so do not merely have (what is called) *logical* existence and which (2) serve *both* to produce as a generic character (*sāmānya*) a cognition of commonness among the members of the *same* class, and to distinguish, as a differentia (or specific character: *viśeṣa*), that class from *other* classes (or universals). Thus *dravyatva* (substancehood), for example, is a generic character or *sāmānya* when it is taken to unify all the existents which are substances, and is a specific character or *viśeṣa* when it is thought to differentiate the whole class of substances (*dravyas*) in which it inheres from such classes (of entities) as qualities (*guṇas*) or actions (*karma*) which are *not* substances. Likewise, the universal 'potness' (*ghaṭatva-sāmānya*) can be conceived as a synthetic principle bringing under itself all individual pots, or as a differentiating principle which, as belonging to pots alone distinguishes them from things which are not pots. Again, as serving the former purpose it ('substancehood' or 'potness' in our examples) is called *kevalasāmānya*, and as serving the latter purpose it is called *viśeṣātma-sāmānya*.⁹ It is this *use* of a *jāti* or *sāmānya* which is dependent upon our viewpoint or understanding and not its *existence*. Our contention is supported by the *Vaiśeṣikasūtra* 1.2.5 (*dravyatvam guṇatvam karmatvam ca sāmānyāni viśeṣās ca*) where it is further made clear that the universals—such as substancehood (*dravyatva*), qualityness (*guṇatva*) and action-ness (*karmatva*)—are also used to differentiate the respective classes they denote from *other* classes and are therefore called *viśeṣas*. It is clear therefore that '*viśeṣa*' here stands for a class-character conceived or understood as a differentia (and so ought to be distinguished from, as would be evident from the remarks that follow, *antya-viśeṣa* which stands for the altogether different category called 'particularity'.) Not only this, Kaṇāda's intention on the score becomes

patently evident from the fact that in the following sūtra (1.2.6) *anyatrāntebhyo viśeṣebhyaḥ*, he uses the expression *antya-viśeṣa* (mark the adjective *antya* added here) to denote the different category (*padārtha*) called *viśeṣas* in order that they are not confused with *sāmānyas* or *jātis* when these latter are viewed as differentia (*viśeṣa*). The *antya-viśeṣas* are meant to represent those *ultimate*, *unique*, *self-differentiated* and *eternal* features which belong to every eternal substance (*nitya dravya*) which could not otherwise—that is, in terms of *guṇa*, *karma* or *sāmānya*—be distinguished from other similar eternal substances. In other words, while everywhere else it is *sāmānya* or *jāti* which assimilates all the members of a certain class under one identical mode of being and *also* further serves, depending upon our intention, as a means to distinguish that class from other classes, in the case of eternal substances which on the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view are *all alike* so far as their *guṇa*, *karma* and *sāmānya* (or *jāti*) are concerned, it is the self-differentiating feature called *viśeṣa* which, on account of its being unique to every such substance (*nitya dravya*), acts as a differentia for that individual substance.

That we are not telling a fairy-tale as regards the two-fold purpose of *sāmānya* we have sought to emphasize by quoting the relevant *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra*, receives unambiguous support from Vātsyāyana's commentary on the *Nyāyasūtra* 2.2.69—*sāmānya-prasavātmikā jātiḥ*—which is concerned with defining *jāti*. Vātsyāyana glosses: 'The class-essence [*jāti*] is that which produces the knowledge of commonness in different objects, *that is*, that by the presence of which the different objects are not mutually differentiated, that is, the entity which is the cause of the continuation of the same knowledge in different objects. That which points to similarity (of something) with some individuals and *at the same time* [my emphasis] differentiates (it) from other individuals is also a class-essence, though of a special (*viśeṣa*) type.'¹⁰ (*yā samānām buddhim prasūte bhinneṣu adhikaraṇeṣu, yayā bahūni itaretarato na vyāvartante, yo 'rtho 'nekatra pratayānuvṛttinimittam tat sāmānyam yat ca keśāṃcid bhedaṃ*

kutaścīd bhedaṃ karoti tat sāmānyaviśeṣo jātiriti.) Notice the last but one phrase *sāmānya-viśeṣa* (in the Sanskrit text) which is comparable to the phrase *sāmānyam-viśeṣa* of the *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* 1.2.3 cited above. To conclude (then) this part of the discussion, there is no real in Nyāya (Vaiśeṣika) which does not exist independently of our knowledge or conception of it. So the Nyāya realism remains unaffected so far as this particular aspect is concerned.

II

I turn now to some of the points contained in Professor Arindam Chakraborty's response to Daya Krishna's Note.

(A) First, I do not understand the point Arindam wishes to make when, while rightly drawing our attention to Udayana's detailed refutation of the 'no external world' theory of the Buddhist idealists, he emphasizes that the self in Nyāya is not only not 'essentially conscious', but also 'can exist independently of cognition' (p. 152), so that both self and object (*as* objects of knowledge) turn out to be entities existing outside (and so without dependence upon) awareness (*bāhyārtha*). My own view is that even if the Nyāya self were essentially conscious or of the nature of awareness that would not by itself compromise its independent existence. Advaita Vedānta, for example, takes this view of the self and yet regards it as objectively and independently existent (*vastu-sat*). And so does for that matter a system like that of Rāmānuja. Second, it is to be noted that whenever the self in Nyāya is *known* as existent it is always as *cognizing* and therefore as *conscious* self (or subject). As those conversant with Nyāya know, the self not being regarded as self-luminous (*sva-prakāśa*) in that philosophy can be known only in a second-order cognition (*anuvyavasāya* or introspective awareness) which makes the first-order or primary awareness (*vyavasāya*, which as such is always of one or another object) its intentional object, the seat or subject of which

primary awareness is precisely the self. In other words, though the self can exist without consciousness it cannot be known as *existent unless it possesses consciousness of some object* (which, for example, it does in a primary cognition). It is this peculiar character of the self which distinguishes it from other entities—which also otherwise exist as independent knowable reals—and which in a way makes Nyāya regard consciousness (or awareness) as a *special* attribute (*sva-dharma*) of the self belonging to it by the relation of inherence. (The only other real which possesses consciousness is God who is called *paramātman* or the universal Self.) It is true that, as Chakraborty says, both self and object ‘remain outside awareness’ and so are not really dependent, as far as their existence is concerned, upon consciousness. But his way of putting the whole proposition is a little awkward and misleading and fails to emphasize (what must be emphasized) that (in Nyāya) it is only a self which is inherently capable, given certain conditions, of being conscious or a knower. Thus, there is a basic difference between the object(s) of knowledge being independent of consciousness and the self being independent of consciousness. Other reals are only knowable and so can never have consciousness while the self, besides being a knowable, is *also* a knower and so is always capable of possessing consciousness. And if the self exists without any consciousness or awareness in the liberated state, this is not because there is no special (even if contingent) relationship between consciousness and the self, but because in that state the self is devoid of any bodily form encased in which alone can it become capable of knowing the outside world via the mind and the senses. My point here is not that the self in Nyāya is not a real independent of cognition, but that even if it were to have consciousness as its intrinsic quality its ontological status would not be affected at all. The same consideration incidentally applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to ‘consciousness’ or ‘cognition’. In Nyāya consciousness too, being a quality (*guṇa*), is considered (like *samyoga*, etc.) among the objective reals and so independent

of its consciousness (which consequently is called *anuvyavasāya* or introspection); and yet, is it not seen (by Nyāya) as possessing the property of being consciousness? Being 'devoid of' or being 'not made of' awareness cannot, therefore, by itself become a decisive criterion for affirming something's independent reality, as Chakraborty seems to think. The one necessary condition for independent existence is that the thing concerned should not be *dependent upon* or *relative to* awareness *of itself*. And this perfectly holds true in case of consciousness in Nyāya, for every cognitive act is there considered as an entity or state numerically different from the act (called *anuvyavasāya*) which cognizes it.

(B) Second, in his anxiety to affirm, rightly of course, that the Nyāya world is a totality of things, Arindam tends to be unfair to facts just because of (a) what he thinks to be the predominantly Tractarian association of the word 'fact' and (b) because of the fear that any admission of independently existing 'facts' would necessarily commit one to upholding either a fact-ontology or to regarding the world as a totality of facts rather than of things—which latter include, as Chakraborty emphasizes, the (real) relation of 'inherence' or *being-in*. Such a fear, however, seems to me unfounded. It is my view that one does not necessarily have to be a fact-ontologist (leaving aside the further question whether the Wittgenstein of *Tractatus* is one or not) as distinct from a thing-ontologist to entertain the idea of facts. It is possible, I think, to say in the same breath that the world consists of things and that these things have *facts* holding about them. What is a fact, after all (to confine ourselves to this elementary level), other than the possession by something of a property or the connection of something with something by a relation. (By 'something' we here mean both particulars and characteristics.) A fact then would exist *depending* on whether or not the thing(s) about which it is a fact exists. The blackness of the crow would then be a fact as distinct from my *cognition* of or belief about it (as black), which (cognition or belief) is an occurrent (attribute)

in my self as a knowing agent. And such judgements can be commonly found in the Nyāya literature.¹¹ Besides, one does not have to be an upholder of the reality of propositions (which, for example, Wittgenstein is) to be an entertainer of facts. One can I think as legitimately talk of correspondence of structure between cognitions and objects (or facts) as between propositions and states of affairs (or facts).

(C) While endorsing the common scholarly opinion that Nyāya upholds metaphysical realism, Professor Chakraborty cites two main reasons which in his view make the Nyāya system a realist one: first, that Nyāya subscribes to the doctrine of *Pramāṇa-samplava* (different means of knowledge grasping the same object) and, second, that Nyāya advocates the doctrine of *nirākāra-jñāna-vāda* (formlessness of awareness). Since Chakraborty leaves unclarified some of the meaning and implications of the two doctrines such that the possibility of misapprehension on this score always looms, I proceed to supplement what he has already said. To take up *nirākāra-jñāna-vāda* first, it must be remembered that this doctrine took the kind of shape (and, of course, the name) it did largely (though not exclusively) by way of a response to the *sākāra-jñāna-vāda* of some of the Buddhist schools, more especially the idealistic ones, who, since they totally denied the ontological reality of the external world (*bāhyārtha*) and since they yet felt impelled, either in the nature of things or by the opponents' attack, to account for the undeniable subject-object distinction as characterizing every cognition (even if in the final analysis this so-called distinction was for them nothing more than an illusion!), took shelter in and formulated the notorious (?) doctrine that every awareness has a form (*sākāra*) which bifurcates itself into two appearances—subject-appearance (*svābhāsa* or *grāhakākāra*) and object-appearance (*viṣayābhāsa* or *grāhyākāra*)—the latter one having then been supposed to represent the objective constituent of an awareness.

As against the *sākāra-jñāna-vādin* Buddhists, the Nyāya realists (as indeed some other Hindu realists and Vaibhāṣika Buddhists) propounded the doctrine of *nirākāra-jñāna* (formless cognition or consciousness) according to which the 'objective' constituent (*viśaya* or *artha*) which serves and enables us to differentiate one state of awareness from another is not provided (as the Buddhist idealists 'mistakenly' thought) by awareness *itself* from *within* but from *outside* this consciousness (which in itself is *nirākāra* or formless), that is, by the exterior world with which the conscious self comes into contact through the mind and the senses. It is always something belonging to the *real external* world which, in so far as it becomes an object of a cognition-episode, constitutes the objective component of a cognitive situation, cognition itself representing the subject-side (*viśayi*) of that situation. Thus while both Nyāya and the Buddhists in question apparently (if unwittingly) agree that it is the object (or 'object-appearance') which distinguishes one awareness from another, this component, while it is in the case of the Buddhists supplied by consciousness internally (or from within and so in fact ultimately reduces to nothing more than an appearance) and thus necessarily renders the latter form-ed (*sākāra*), comes in the case of Nyāya from the actual world outside that cognition and thus underlines the inherently form-less (*nirākāra*) character of consciousness. This doctrine was pithily summed up by Udayana thus: *arthenaiva viśeṣo hi nirākāratayā dhīyām*.¹² (A cognition is distinguished by its object [*artha*] alone, for the cognitions themselves have *no* definite form by which to distinguish them from each other.) Now this particular formulation would seem to lead one to believe that in Nyāya's view consciousness is diaphanous. And in a significant sense it is. (One recalls here G.E. Moore's view of consciousness as enunciated in his essay 'Refutation of Idealism'.)¹³ But though consciousness as thus conceived is diaphanous and formless, it is never contentless (*nirviśayaka*) if only because of the fact that it always is directed towards one or another (real external) object which it grasps

in at least some of its features. And as something with a content, and so a structure,—which incidentally is in Nyāya always in principle expressible in sentential form—it always tends itself to logical analysis. (Its structural content is however revealed only in an introspective or reflective act.)

But how can such an analysis become a possibility in the first instance unless we allow that a cognition must after all have a certain form and so be *sākāra*. Besides, whenever we need to distinguish one primary object-directed cognition from another such cognition we do it only in terms of the contents which have already become *internalized* and immanent (so to say) and so are accessible to introspective (or reflective) awareness whose *raison d'être* consists precisely in making the primary cognition (*saviṣayaka vyavasāya*) its object of reflection. And it is common knowledge that Nyāya brings all such 'immanent' contents under the technical category called *viśayatā* which is said to comprise three further sub-categories—*viśeṣyatā*, *prakāratā* and *saṃsargatā*—into which the constituent contents come to be arranged and their mutual connection analyzed. Indeed, to abstract a little, the sum and substance of the Buddhist idealist's contention is that if there is *no* such *immanent* content which characterizes every state of awareness, if awareness of blue and awareness of red, being therefore formless are wholly alike *internally*, their difference being constituted by the difference between their respective objects existing out there in the world, how can (i) the first awareness be distinguished from the latter (in the so-called introspective awareness) when the objects to which they refer are no longer in sight or are otherwise past, and how can (ii) there exist a one-to-one determinate relation between an awareness and its object? What I am trying to drive at is that the meaning and connotations which we normally assign to the term *sākāra* or *nirākāra* when interpreting or pronouncing on the relative merits of the doctrines concerned is certainly not the whole story and the issues involved are much deeper and greater. I am not at all suggesting that Professor Chakraborty's view of the

doctrine of *nirākāra-jñāna* as one of the pillars of Nyāya realism is without substance. (In fact, I am in agreement with him here.) My only aim in doing the above unavoidably digressive exercise has been to put across to the common reader that the one specific meaning which the term *nirākāra-jñāna* carries in the context of Nyāya (-Vaiśeṣika) is that the (immanent) content which characterizes every primary cognition and therefore makes it necessarily *sakāra* in the sense indicated above, derives its various determinations (in that system) *originally not from within* (hence the significance of the term *nirākāra*) but from the independently *existing* (object-complex in the) outside world. To put it all in one word, the (undeniable) internal content of a cognition is parasitic upon the real transcendent world and the nature or character of this transcendent world is established by *pramāṇas* (*pramāṇāyattā vastusthitih* Jayanta).

(D) In the context of the knowability-talk (*jñeyatva*) in Nyāya, Professor Chakraborty relies exclusively or mainly on the version given by *Siddhāntamuktāvalī* (in commentary on verse 13) and consequently interprets 'Everything that is, is knowable' as 'Everything that is, is actually known by God' (*jñeyatva* having been taken by *Muktāvalī* to mean: knowability is the property of being an object of knowledge: *jñānaviśayatā*), proposing, surely after *Muktāvalī*, that this property of 'knowability' (*jñānaviśayata*) exists everywhere, for everything whatever is *actually* the object of God's (or a *yogi*'s)¹⁴ knowledge. Now this proposition and its acceptance as *the* correct view entails certain consequences. The most important consequence is that if *jñeyata* is to be interpreted as '*actually*' known by God (my emphasis) then the concept *jñeyatva* becomes altogether redundant as a common property of six/seven Vaiśeṣika categories, for the concept of God already implies in Nyāya his omniscience—which property cannot but include knowledge of all that is, and perhaps even that is not. And the same applies, *mutatis mutandis*, to the property of nameability which too is said to belong commonly to all the six/seven categories. Briefly, what I wish to say is that if *jñeyatva* and *abhidheyatva*

only mean that all that exists is *already* the object of God's knowledge and his 'naming' of it, then it would be unnecessary for Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika to enumerate them as additional common properties of the existent. My point, in other words, is that their special mention makes sense only in the context of such thinking beings who, even while not actually possessing knowledge of all that *is*, are deemed inherently capable of acquiring such knowledge.

(E) Finally I turn to a special point made by Chakraborty in his response to some of Daya Krishna's queries. He writes, in obvious approval of a comment of Daya Krishna's: 'The canonical western characterization of realism as the thesis that objects exist mind-independently is *difficult* to apply to Nyāya' (p. 154) (my emphasis). The reason for this, according to Chakraborty, is that the notion of mind-independence involves the notion of *possibility*: 'An object of awareness is mind-independent if it *can* or *could* exist without awareness even if it actually is always the object of some awareness (for example, God's) (p. 154). And Nyāya metaphysics, according to Chakraborty 'cannot make sense of this empty "can" or "could" because nowhere in Nyāya do we find any trace of the idea of possible worlds' (p. 154).

Now frankly I am not quite able to see how exactly is discussion of the question, if Nyāya can appropriately be called a realist philosophy, helped by Chakraborty's introduction of the notion of possibility? In fact, the puzzle only worsens because of Chakraborty's use of 'possibility' and 'possible worlds' as equivalents in the context concerned. What I mean is not that they can never be treated as equivalents, but only that care should be taken to indicate how exactly such equivalence is possible. It can surely not be accepted generally in the context of Nyāya. Thus (to illustrate), while (in Nyāya) it would make perfect sense to say that it may rain today, it is extremely doubtful whether Nyāya would entertain, without any qualification whatever, the notion of a possible *world* which for example, may be devoid of atoms (*paramāṇus*) as its

constitutive cause. Again, in a different context, Nyāya would not hesitate to regard the illusorily perceived snake as a possible object precisely because both the 'snake' and its substrate, rope, are parts of the real world. And to come specifically to the context in which Chakraborty pointedly (if briefly) refers to the issue and goes on to dismiss summarily Nyāya's claim to the title 'realist', on the ground that it shuns any talk of 'possible worlds' which in his view realism as involving belief in mind-independent reality *necessarily* involves, I have only to submit that Chakraborty does nothing to show why 'possibility'—talk in the sense he cares to point out, is not permissible within Nyāya's metaphysical framework. Isn't it plainly the case that to the extent Nyāya's regards the entities (or classes of them) which it postulates *as* real, it thinks them as *capable* of existing independently of being known, whether by finite minds or God's mind, to which latter incidentally they are presumed to be known perennially. If I happen to see a tree and if my perception is valid, isn't this tree (on Nyāya's account of substances) something which, in fact, exists independently of my knowledge of it? And if it so exists now, should not such existence be taken to have been *possible*? Indeed, I would insist that when Nyāya calls an existent thing *jñeya*, it does not mean merely that it is possible to know that thing, but also, significantly, that it is a *potential* object of knowledge. And needless to say, this potentiality (as indeed also the possibility) the object derives from its mind-independent reality. Absence of 'possible worlds'-talk in Nyāya does not one bit change this situation and is besides, as remarked above, an issue standing on a different footing altogether. I have no wish to deny that the history of philosophy bears witness to many versions of realism, but what is common to them all is the thesis that there is a *mind-independent* real world. And I believe that this 'canonical' western characterization of realism does apply to the *essential* Nyāya (-Vaiśeṣika) standpoint on the nature of reality and knowledge (including God's knowledge). In fact, Chakraborty himself seems to concede this when he says:

'Things, even if all of them are actually known, are not of the nature of knowledge. They are distinct' (p. 154). However, his subsequent reduction of Nyāya realism to *just* the rejection of a certain Buddhist idealistic 'rule' (—*sahopalambhaniyamād abhedahḥ nila-taddhiyoh*—) appears to dilute, if not to undermine, not only what is independently and specially typical of Nyāya metaphysics but also its pronouncedly *realistic* character.

Notes and References

1. Daya Krishna, 'Is Nyāya Realist or Idealist?', *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. XII, No. 1, September–December 1994, pp. 161–63. References within parentheses in the first part of the main body of the article are to Daya Krishna's note.
2. Arindam Chakraborty, 'Is Nyāya Realist?', *Journal of Indian Council of Philosophical Research*, Vol. XII, No. 2, January–April 1995, pp. 151–54. References within parentheses in the second part of the main body of the article are to Chakraborty's comment.
3. Śrīdhara, *Nyāya-kandalī* as published with *Praśastapādabhāṣya* (or *Padārthadharmasamgraha*) of Praśastapāda, edited by Durgadhara Jha, Sampurnananda Sanskrit Vishvavidyalaya, Varanasi, 1977, p. 41.
4. 'Na'py astitvam anarthakam niḥsvarūpe sattāyāḥ samavāyābhāvāt', Śrīdhara, *Nyāyakandalī*, op. cit., p. 42.
5. Jayanta Bhaṭṭa, *Nyāya-mañjarī*, Part I, ed. by Gaurinatha Shastri, Varanasi, 1982, *Āhnika* 3, p. 261.
6. Among the moderns, Meinong and F.H. Bradley hold to this view, though the tradition can be traced as far back as Plato's *Theaetatus*.
7. See *Dignāga, on Perception*, trans. and annot. by Masaaki Hattori, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. 1968, Section 1.
8. See *Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, trans. with notes by T.M. Knox (1942: reprint, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1949), Preface (p. 10); cf. also Hegel's *Encyclopaedia*, Introduction.

9. See for example, Desika-Tirumalai Tatacarya, *Vaiśeṣikasūtra-vṛtti*, Ganganatha Jha, Kendriya Sanskrit Vidyapeeth, Allahabad, 1979, p. 16 (on *Vaiśeṣika-sūtra* 1.2.3).
10. Gotama's *Nyāyasūtra* with Vātsyāyana's commentary (*Bhāṣya*), trans. by M.K. Gangopadhyaya, Indian Studies, Kolkata, 1972, p. 168.
11. I would not however be taken to mean that Nyāya does *explicitly* provide for 'facts' within its ontology. I am only suggesting that fact-talk would not strictly be an anathema to Nyāya.
12. Udayana, *Nyāya-kusumāñjali* with four commentaries, ed. with introduction by Mahaprabhulal Goswami, Mithila Research Institute, Darbhanga, 1972, Chapter 4, verse 4.
13. G.E. Moore, 'Refutation of Idealism', *Philosophical Studies*, 1922; reprint, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1958.
14. Note that many translators of the text take '*adi*' in '*īśvarādiññāna-viśayatāyāḥ kevalānvayitvāt*' to include (in addition to God) other knowing beings such as *yogis*.

(g) Can Navya Nyāya Analysis Make a Distinction
between Sense and Reference?

DAYA KRISHNA

Can Navya Nyāya analysis make a distinction between sense and reference? If it cannot, should it not be regarded as idealistic *par excellence*. On the other hand, if it can, how will it do so, particularly when it does not accept the idea of an identical propositional meaning conveyed by different linguistic formulations even when the same 'fact' is supposed to render the two different 'knowledges', 'true'? Or, in other words, can Navya Nyāya analysis ever accept the 'meaning equivalence' of two *differently* formulated linguistic expressions, or in which the *anuyogī* and the *pratiyogī* are different?

(h) Why Nyāya Remains Realist: Second Round

ARINDAM CHAKRABORTY

Let us assume that Navya Nyāya *cannot* make the distinction between sense and reference. Why should that entail (as Daya Krishna provocatively avers in the interrogative, vide May–August 1996 issue of *JICPR*) that it is idealistic *par excellence*?

Russell proudly failed to make that distinction, claiming in *On Denoting* that if you try to preserve the connection between sense and reference, as Frege would understand them, then you cannot stop them becoming the same. And this is not the voice of Russell during his idealistic adolescence. Indeed, it is pretty obvious that Russell thought that *drawing* the sense-reference distinction would go against that ‘robust sense of reality’ which he took to be the hallmark of a realist. If there are no senses of names like ‘Pegasus’ in zoology, then there are none such in reality, he would tell us.

So Daya Krishna’s implicit premise: Whoever is a realist must draw the distinction between sense and reference is simply false. Where could he have got that from? A charitable attempt to speculate turns out to be very uncharitable on Daya Krishna. For, the following argument is a classic case of fallacious reasoning:

Frege was a realist.

Frege drew the sense-reference distinction.

Therefore, every realist must draw the sense-reference distinction.

And, of course, there is a sense in which Navya Nyāya does draw that distinction. What is known or understood when one hears the sentence ‘Gadādhara is Sañkhapaṇi’ is surely different from what you know when you hear ‘Gadādhara is Gadādhara’ because, for one thing, according to Navya Nyāya, you do not know anything when you hear the latter sentence. Yet it is clear that both the sentences speak of the same referent, namely Viṣṇu. Apart from the *vacya*, therefore, Navya

Nyāya includes the reason for application or the limiter of designatumhood (*pravṛttinimitta* or *vācyatāvachchedaka*) within the content of the awareness generated by the use of a word in the context of a sentence.

Whether this notion of a limiter of referentness—that in virtue of which, on a particular occasion, an object is picked out as the intended referent—is quite the same as Frege's notion of *sinn* is a matter of deep and difficult debate. Mohanty's discussion of this point in pp. 65–66 of his *Reason and Tradition* (Oxford, 1992) is the best record of the current state of that debate, apart from the relevant pages of *Samvāda*.

Navya Nyāya and the Russell of 1910 to 1919 (including the famous *Problems of Philosophy*) are very similar in this regard. Both are realist about external objects and universals and both give an account of error or false belief which eschews the positing of false propositions/Fregean thoughts or unobtaining complexes like that-Desdemona-loves-Cassio or that (=rope)-which-is-a-snake. The sophisticated 'multiple relation theory of belief' or '*anyathākhyāti* theory of error' was precisely an answer to the question: How can you be a realist about what is referred to by a false belief or the constituents of an erroneous perceptual judgement without giving ontological status to Fregean senses. The urge to avoid Fregean senses comes actually from a deep commitment to hard realism which fears that once we allow the veil of objective modes of presentation to come between our seeings or graspings from words and the objects and properties seen and grasped, we shall for ever be stuck in a rut of thought-contents. That, to succumb to an old pun, would be as sinful for a Naiyāyika as holding like a Buddhist that 'these words never touch real objects but only capture *vikalpas*.'

It is not clear at all what Daya Krishna is getting at when he links up the sense-reference distinction with accepting the idea that 'the same fact makes two different knowledges true.' If we mean by 'fact' what Frege explicitly meant by that word, that is, true thoughts, then 'Gadādhara saved me' and 'Sankhapani

saved me' would express two different facts. Even Nyāya analysis of those two awarenesses would go *via* invoking different properties '*vācyopasthitiprakāra*'—the manner in which the referent was presented to the knower. And it is by showing sensitivity to this difference between what is meant, in other words, by showing the meaning-non-equivalence of the two formulations, that Navya Nyāya shows that it can do justice to the phenomenon that Frege needed the sense-reference distinction for, without actually drawing that distinction. As to how to honour the realistic intuition that, after all, the same objective circumstance (Viṣṇu saving the speaker) makes both of them true, Nyāya does that by the apparently innocent but extremely farsighted doctrine that *a qualified entity is no distinct from that very entity in its unqualified state* (*śuddha-padārtho viśiṣṭapadārthāt na atiricyate*: the man with the stick is no other than man). The real hallmarks of Nyāya realism are the following apparently distinct doctrines:

1. The relation of inherence is mind-independently real.
2. The object of very unlike kinds of knowing, for example, seeing and touching, perceiving and inferring, perceiving judgements and perceiving indeterminately, can be exactly the same object or object complex.
3. Awareness is not self-aware.
4. Universals are mind-independently real and can be directly and indeterminately perceived.
5. No awareness is self-certified to be true and false awarenesses do not require any non-existent or intentional entities in order to be accounted for.
6. Apart from a man with the stick, who is identical with the man, there is no fact or true thought that the man has a stick anywhere in any sector of reality.

How Frege could be a realist while dropping 2 and 6 is at most as interesting a question as how Prābhākara could be a realist while dropping 3 and 5. But just as you do not become an idealist if you believe that awarenesses are sometimes

unwittingly false, you do not become an idealist if you do not draw the distinction between sense and reference in the way that Frege would.

(i) Nyāya: Realist or Idealist: Is the Debate Ended, the Argument Concluded?

Nyāya, by common consent is regarded as a realist system *par excellence* by everybody. Infact, it is contended that if any philosophical system can be described as 'realist' at all, then Nyāya is one. The queries raised by me under the above heading in two parts in *JICPR* volumes [(i) Nyāya: realist or Idealist? (XII-1, pp. 161–163) (ii) Can Navya-Nyāya make distinction between sense and reference? (XII-3, p. 157)] do not seem to have disturbed the self-evident, axiomatic belief in the characterization of Nyāya as mentioned above. Normally, when five such knowledgeable persons reject the very possibility of doubting such a characterization, one should accept that the grounds of one's 'doubting' had no foundation at all.

Yet, there seems to have been some slight shakings of the foundation of the belief in the responses of all these Naiyāyikas, though expressed in different ways. Professor Chakraborty, for example, concedes, 'The canonical western characterization of realism as the thesis that objects exist mind-independently is difficult to apply to Nyāya' (*JICPR*, XII-2, p. 154). And, Professor N.S. Dravid explicitly admits that the question raised about the compatibility of the requirement of '*abhidheyatva*' with the definition of perception as *avyapadeśyam* given in N.S. 1.1.4. is 'an important one and deserves some serious thought.' Both these admissions are, surprisingly, questioned, the former by Dr. Ramesh Kumar Sharma and the latter by Arindam Chakraborty. But, though there seems to be a difference of opinion amongst the Naiyāyikas on the issue of the relevance, significance and importance of the questions raised, the

'difference' itself is indicative of the fact that it is not easy to determine what exactly is the Nyāya position in respect of the issue concerned.

The different and divergent points raised in the responses to the simple question raised by me suggests that the House of Nyāya is divided in itself, and that the ideas of a unique, unambiguous position of Nyāya is a myth, sustained only by the fact that scholars and students have unquestioningly accepted what is purveyed in the name of Nyāya in the text books on the subject. Nyāya is not, and cannot be, a monolith system as is suggested by all those who write on it, including the 'five-experts' who have chosen to respond to the questions raised by me. To give a few examples from the comments of these well-known 'authorities' on Nyāya, Professor Mohanty is firmly of the view that Nyāya subscribes to the 'extensionality of the relation' that obtains between 'existence' and 'knowability' (*JICPR*, XIII-1, p. 167). Prof. Dravid, on the other hand, believes that at least as far as '*Sat, Prameya and Abhidheya*' are concerned, they are supposed to have identical denotations, though the connotations of these words differ from each other' (*JICPR*, XIII-1, p. 169).

These two positions seem, at least *prima facie*, to be radically opposed to each other. It is not clear whether Mohanty subscribes to the generalized position that Nyāya does not and cannot in principle, accept 'intensional relations' in its system and that all relations have to be necessarily extensional. There is the related problem whether a system which admits only extensional relations can ever have any 'intensional relation' in it.

The problem, however, is not confined to relations alone. The deeper question relates to the issue whether Nyāya admits extensional definitions alone or it also admits definitions that are 'intensional' in nature. Professor Dravid in his discussion of the issue has explicitly brought in the concepts of 'connotation' and 'denotation' and suggested that while '*Sat*',

'*Prameya*' and '*Abhidheya*' have different connotations, they have the same denotation. But once the idea of 'connotation' is accepted in any system, it cannot have pure 'extensional' relations or definitions in it. And, if the extensional relations and definitions are rejected in a system, it is difficult to see how it can be realist in character.

Nyāya, as is well-known, is pre-eminently concerned with considerations of determining the exact *lakṣaṇa* of anything and if it is so then one cannot understand how it can be regarded as realist in the sense in which the postulation of extensional relations or definitions would entail it. All attempts at the correct establishment of the *lakṣaṇa* of anything suffer from either an *ativyāpti doṣa* or *avyāpti doṣa* and it is extremely difficult to avoid either of these and reach a 'definition' which will capture the true nature of the object concerned. Professor Mohanty has argued that there is a *vyāpti* 'between existence and knowability' and that this '*vyāpti*' is 'extensional' in character. Not only this he has explicitly stated that 'In the celebrated case of smoke and fire, the *vyāpti* is not to be understood intensionally as a necessary relation, but rather extensionally as a relation of mere co-presence' (p. 167). This, if correct, will raise serious problems regarding the long discussion about the exact definition of *vyāpti* in the Nyāya tradition. Mohanty knows, as well as everybody else, that successive definitions of *vyāpti* given before Gaṅgeśa were found to be inadequate and the issue regarding the formulation of the exact nature of the *vyāpti* was not closed even after him. If *vyāpti* were merely co-presence, then it will be difficult to understand how these definitions of *vyāpti* were found to be inadequate, and that the dispute about the correct definition of *vyāpti* continued in the Nyāya tradition.

It may be said that the inadequacy of the definitions were primarily because of their inapplicability in those cases where the object concerned was either *Kevalānvaṃyī* or *Kevalāvyatireki*, that is, where it was always present or always absent. But, these

are exceptional situations and normally the relation of *vyāpti* is established on the basis of what Mill calls 'the joint method of agreement and difference'.

Mohanty has suggested that there is an extensional *vyāpti* relation between knowability and existence. But how is this *vyāpti* established? By assertion only or, by an examination of the cases where *anvaya vyatireka sambandha* is found among them. For the latter, one will have to have an independent *lakṣaṇa* or criterion of what existence is and a *separate* one for what knowability is. But, as far as I know, such a *Lakṣaṇa* has not been provided by the Nyāya thinkers and, even if it were to be provided, it will be difficult to see how one can find 'existence' and 'knowability' both present and absent in order to establish a *vyāpti* relation between them. Not only this, 'knowability' is a strange characteristic as it can only be defined in terms of a possibility, and not a actuality. If this is accepted then it will be difficult to see how could one determine its absence any where. If something is 'known' then it certainly must have been 'knowable' but if it is not known then one can only say that it is 'knowable' on grounds of faith alone.

It is, of course, known that it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to establish *vyāpti* between objects or entities which are *Kevalānvayi* or *Kevalvyatireki*. As both 'existence' and 'knowability' are *kevalānvayi*, at least on the usual understanding of the Nyāya position in this context, only Mohanty will know how to establish *vyāpti* relation between them. The solution, of course, is easy. The relation between 'existence' and 'knowability' can be established by treating them as being analytically involved or implied by each other. This, however, will destroy the 'extentionality' of the relationship between them and make it 'intensional' or even 'definitional' which will not probably be acceptable to Naiyāyika, including Mohanty.

The term existence itself is extremely ambiguous, especially in the context of the discussion about Nyāya. Does it mean *Sattā* and, if so, then it will be confined only to the first three

padārthas in the Vaiśeṣika list, or does it mean *padārtha*? And, if so, it will apply to all the six *padārthas* originally mentioned in the Vaiśeṣika Sūtras. However, even in this case, there will always be a problem whether it covers only the specific *dravyas*, *guṇas*, *karmas* etc. which were mentioned by Kaṇāda in his Vaiśeṣika Sūtras or it can be taken to include even those which were added to the list later by subsequent thinkers. Praśastapāda's addition to the list of *guṇas* is well-known, but there are others who have done the same in respect of other *padārthas*. *Sāmānya*, for example, is supposed to give rise to *jāti* but, as everyone knows, Udayana feels the necessity of formulating criteria for deciding between genuine universals and pseudo-universals. There are, thus, *sāmānyas* which do not, and cannot give rise to *jāti* as they suffer from what he called *jātibādhaka* characteristics. The addition of *abhāva* as a *padārtha* presumably by Śivāditya around the 10th century adds problems of its own, as formerly, *padārthas* were supposed to be either *sattā-rūpa* or *bhāva-rūpa* only. But when *abhāva* was accepted as a *padārtha*, it could not be treated either as *sattā* or as a *bhāva*.

Besides these, the case of Raghunātha Śiromaṇi is well-known. We need not elaborate the point. In case the term 'existence' refers to those *padārthas* which have *sattā* and *sattā* alone in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika framework then they alone shall be knowable. In case the term covers or refers to all the *padārthas* then the dispute about the *padārthas* will also be a dispute about that which is knowable. Once this is accepted, the so-called *vyāpti* relation postulated between existence and knowability will also become flexible and shifting in character. Not only this, as the number and types of *padārthas* will increase or decrease, that which was supposed to be knowable will cease to be 'knowable' or that which was not knowable, become 'knowable' by virtue of the very fact that it has now become a *padārtha* and hence accepted as existent in the system. The term 'existence' is also generally contrasted with the term 'real' and it is not clear whether Mohanty accepts this

distinction or not. For, in case he does, he will not probably accept the *vyāpti* between the real and knowable as all that is real does not exist in the usual sense in which the term 'existence' is generally understood.

The term 'knowable' is even stranger than 'existence' as it connotes, or rather denotes (to remain within the extensionalist framework of Mohanty's thought). Something that is a possibility, a 'dispositional' property, which may or may not be actualized. 'Possibilities' or even 'dispositional-properties', as Mohanty very well knows, are strange 'properties'. They are not like the usual properties such as 'red' or 'blue' and give rise to the paradoxes of counter-factual conditionals. In the present context, however, the problem is a different one and relates to the question as to how one may establish a *vyāpti* relation between something that is 'actual' and something else which is 'possible' only, assuming that existence is something actual.

The establishment of a *vyāpti* relation between the 'actual' and the 'possible' may be left to the Naiyāyikas. Who, I am sure, will be able to solve the problem with all the ingenuity which they have developed over the century. But, in the context of the question relating to the issue whether Nyāya is 'realist' or 'idealist', the distinction between 'known' and 'knowable' has assumed a central importance which is of a different kind. Dr. Ramesh Kumar Sharma in one of the most clear presentation of the subject, has questioned the transition from the perceived to the perceivable in the classical Berkeleyan formulation and from the perceivable to knowable to bring it closer to Nyāya formulation. From 'to be is to be perceivable' to 'to be is to be perceived', and from that to 'to be is to be knowable is the subtle, transpositional trick or deception that I am supposed to be guilty of. But, surprisingly, his own conclusion is that this amalgamation of bringing together the position of Berkley and Nyāya makes Berkley a realist rather than Nyāya 'idealist'. He writes '... if Berkeley and Nyāya are thought to have been brought together on a common

platform, this platform, I am afraid, is a realistic one rather than an idealistic one' (*JICPR*, XIV-2, p. 141). But, the main point is that both Berkeley and Nyāya can be brought together on a common platform by the inner logic of their positions and, I hope, Dr. Ramesh Kumar Sharma will admit that there is little point in giving any particular name to that position. If he wishes to call Berkeley a 'realist', I have no objection. But similarly I hope, he will have no objection to my calling Nyāya 'idealist' in the sense in which Berkeley's position is designated as 'Idealism' in the western philosophical tradition.

Unfortunately, the distinctions between the 'perceived' and 'perceivable' and the 'known' and 'knowable' which seems so crucial to Dr. Sharma disappear both in Berkeley and Nyāya when God appears on the scene. To God everything is 'known' and if we use Berkeley's phrase 'everything is perceived'. This has been roundly asserted by almost all those who have responded to my innocent query in the pages of the *JICPR*. But strangely, none of them appears to have seen that such an admission destroys the very foundation of the contention that Nyāya is, in essentials, out-and-out realist, unless the so-called 'knowness' by God is itself treated as completely contingent in character. The crucial problem for the Nyāya theorist as well as for Berkeley is whether for God also things may be knowable and perceivable respectively but not known or perceived. In Berkeley this move is impossible as he argues for the reality of God on the ground that if something 'is', it has to be the object of some consciousness or other. And, as it is not so in the case of many objects as per as finite minds are concerned, one has to postulate an infinite consciousness to which they are eternally objects of its awareness. In Nyāya, on the other hand, God or *Īśwara* is brought in on cosmological grounds, that is, in the context of understanding the creation of the world. As far as the question of 'knowness' of the world is concerned it is, at least *prima facie*, contingent whether it is known by someone or not. The 'someone' may be the finite

mind of the Naiyayika or anybody else, or the infinite mind of the creator who is termed as *Īśwara* in the Nyāya system. In Nyāya *Īśwara*, of course, cannot have a 'mind' in the strict Nyāya sense of the term and, if it were to have it, then it will know only one thing at a time and hence will not be able to know simultaneously all the things that are there as they cannot be co-present to his consciousness at the same time. There is the added problem of things or objects or events that have not yet taken place and hence cannot be known in the same way as those that have occurred or are in the present.

The straight way to realism would be to accept that there are, or may be, things which are not known or which need not necessarily be known by any finite or infinite mind. But this simple way does not seem acceptable to Nyāya and it tries to wriggle out of the difficulty by maintaining that things may not be known but that they are certainly 'knowable' in principle. It not only fights shy of but actively rejects the possibility that something may be 'unknowable' in fact or in principle as it does not want to subscribe to this hard core contention of realism in the strictly epistemological sense of the term. For it, 'to be existent' or 'real' is to be *necessarily* knowable in principle. But what exactly is meant by saying that something is 'knowable' is never explained clearly.

To be 'knowable' in the Nyāya framework is to be a *Prameya*, that is 'to be known by a *pramāṇa*' or, in other words, it is to be an object either of *pratyakṣa* (perception), *anumāna* (inference), *upamāna* (analogy) or *śabda* (testimony). But amongst all these, *pratyakṣa* or perception or being object of the five human senses is primary and foundational in the sense that neither *anumāna*, nor *upamāna* nor *śabda* can even be conceived of without reference to it. There may be some dispute or doubt about the relationship of *śabda* to *pratyakṣa*, but there can be little doubt that *śabda* has, at least, to be heard or 'read' in order to be the means for the knowledge of that which it is supposed to convey authoritatively. There is, of course, the added problem if Gautama's definition of *Śabda* is

to be accepted that one has to *independently* know the character of the person whose *śabda* is to be authoritatively accepted (आप्तोपदेशः शब्दः). And, if the *gloss* of Gautama on this *sūtra* is to be taken seriously then the very 'authoritativeness' of this *pramāṇa* will be compromised at least in the sense in which it has generally been understood in the context of the acceptance of the authority of the *veda* in the Indian tradition. Gautama, as is well-known, gives the example of *Āyurveda* to illustrate the authoritativeness of the *śabda pramāṇa* subsumed under this special category. The authoritativeness of *Āyurveda**, however, is radically different from the way in which the *vedas* or even the *uṇiṣads* have been regarded in the tradition. *Āyurveda* is essentially fallible and the knowledge it contents continue to grow in time, the two characteristics which are completely absent from the authority of the *śruti* which is regarded as both infallible and complete by everyone who accepts it.

The 'knowability', then, in terms of *pratyakṣa* or perception basically depends on the assumption that all 'existent' or 'real' has such a structure that it is graspable by the five human senses. In other words, the limits of human sensibility is the limit of the 'existent' or the 'real' word. To put it differently, such a construal of Nyāya position implies that the existent or the real world is intrinsically and essentially of such a nature that it not only is, but has to be, graspable or apprehensible by the human senses. Its structure, therefore, has to be of such a nature as to correspond with the structure of the human senses in order that it may be graspable by it. One 'knows' that human senses apprehend colour or sound *only* within a limited range and that beyond it they cannot perceive or apprehend whatever is, or may be there.

These entities, which are intrinsically inapprehensible by the human senses, may be said to be the subject of inferential knowledge, but what then is the nature of this 'inferential

*Nyāya Sūtra 2.1.68 (मन्त्रायुर्वेदप्रामाण्यवच्च तत्प्रामाण्यमाप्तप्रामाण्यात्) ।

knowledge' which gives us knowledge of entities or 'things' which are intrinsically ungraspable by the senses and therefore are incapable of being known by *pratyakṣa*. Such a knowledge may be said to be a 'knowledge' that can be known only by *anumāna* and never by *pratyakṣa* and though this may create some problems for Nyāya which believes in *Pramāṇa Samplava* on the one hand and the grounding of *vyāpti* on the basis of *anvaya* and *vyatireka* in terms of sensuously apprehensible experience, it will have to grant some sort of isomorphism between the structure of reason, that is *anumāna*, and the structure of that which can be known only through inferential knowledge and hence is regarded as 'existent' or 'real' in nature.

Dr. Ramesh Kumar Sharma has questioned the postulation of this isomorphism by suggesting that Hegel's famous formulation 'The real is rational and the rational is real' should be understood not only in terms of cognitive rationality but also in terms of what may be called 'the moral intelligibility of the universe'. In other words, according to him the term 'rational' in Hegel's formulation includes both the exiological and the epistemological aspects the term 'Reason' has both these aspects simultaneously included or involved in it. This may or may not be correct and Nyāya may or may not subscribe to it. But, there can hardly be any doubt that in the purely cognitive aspect, there has to be an isomorphism of structure between reason and that which is 'known', if the essential 'knowability' of the real in terms of reason is to be asserted. Dr. Sharma himself accepts this when he writes, 'There is no doubt that the eminent Hegelian equation of rationality and reality (or actuality) does presuppose some definite isomorphism between the two' (*JICPR*, XIV-2, p. 144). But, according to him, Nyāya subscribes only to the half-contention of Hegel; it is silent about the other half, that is about the isomorphism of the valuation aspect of reason and the valuation aspect of reality. According to him, reason in the Hegelian sense involves both 'truth' and 'value' and Nyāya cannot, therefore, be said to

subscribe to the Hegelian dictum 'Rational is real and Real is rati^on'. But this, according to him, will only be to deny the full blown characteristic of Hegelian idealism to Nyāya. It will still have to accept Nyāya as half-idealist in the Hegelian sense of the term and if we take the term 'Idealism' only in the epistemological sense of the term, Nyāya may have to be regarded as out-and-out Idealist on his own analysis.

But what is the 'structure' of *Buddhi* or reason in *Nyāya* which 'determines' the structure of that which is supposed to be 'knowable', as 'to be known' is, in *Nyaya*, to be known in the specific *Nyāya* way alone. Knowledge or *jñāna*, at least at the *savikalpaka* level, has to be linguistic in character. This, according to some, is what is meant by the term *abhidheyatva* in *Nyāya*. Now the structure of linguistic knowledge in *Nyāya* is said to be constituted by *anuyogi*, *pratiyogi* and the relation between them which is termed as *samsargatā*. The complex unit formed by these three together is said to have a characteristic called *viṣayatā* which probably is an emergent property arising, from the unique combination of these three elements. Strangely, the *Nyāya* has to postulate a *viṣayitā* to which the *viṣayatā* appears as an 'object' of cognition. But while *viṣayatā* is an emergent characteristic of the three elements mentioned above, it is not clear to which substantive entity *viṣayitā* belongs as a property, or whether it itself is a reflexively emergent property necessitated by the occurrence of *viṣayatā* which makes the knowledge complex at the first level into an 'object' giving it epistemic objectivity.

The problems here are far more complex than those which have been usually considered by *Nyāya* theorists who have written on this issue. Some of these will become apparent the moment we consider the case of *anuvyavasāya* or introspective reflexion where the first order knowledge-complex consisting of *viṣayitā* and *viṣayatā* becomes an object of cognition and thus, where the complex formed by *viṣayitā* and *viṣayatā* itself becomes an 'object' of cognition giving it a new *viṣayatā* necessitating the postulation of another *viṣayitā* to which it becomes

the object of knowledge. Some of these problems we have dealt with in our comment entitled '*Have the neo-naiyāyikas been leading us up the gardenpath*' (JICPR, XV-2, pp. 121–41). But in the present context, the more important question is as to how the postulation of these entities affects the contention that Nyāya is a realist system *par excellence*.

Professor Mohanty has roundly settled the issue by saying, 'There is no reason why a realistic ontology shall not admit entities that are either purely mental or "hybrid"' (JICPR, XIII-1, p. 167). This is an important declaration from the Nyāya camp and as Mohanty speaks with authority we may, for a moment, accept what Nyāya says in this regard. But what is a 'mental entity' and what exactly is a 'hybrid entity', which presumably is a *mixture* of something 'mental' and 'non-mental' in it? Normally the term 'mental' is taken to mean something that is not independent of consciousness or the *act* of knowing which apprehends it. It is in this sense that Locke regarded the secondary qualities as 'dependent' on mind and hence as not been there, independently of it, in the physical world. The very notion of a 'mental entity', thus, involves that it will not have been there if there had been no 'mind' in the universe. Realism, at least in the sense in which it has been used in the western philosophical tradition, refers to those entities which will be there even if there were no 'mind' in the universe. The contention was that certain kinds of entities come into being just because of the fact that there was 'mind' in the universe and these were regarded as 'subjective' in character. The realist epistemology was in search of those objects of knowledge which were completely independent and objective in the sense that they would be there even if there were no mind and hence will have no admixture of anything 'subjective' in them. The term 'mind' in this context means the same as 'consciousness' and the latter term can be substituted for the former without making any difference to the contention.

The term 'mental', thus, is systematically ambiguous in this context. It may mean (and perhaps Mohanty wishes to mean

in this sense) that there are 'entities' which cannot be characterized as 'physical' in character and yet, which are objects of consciousness and which have their own nature demanding to be known in the same sense as the so-called physical objects do. It may be, parenthetically, pointed out that the term 'mental', as used in the English language, cannot literally convey what is meant by '*manas*' in Nyāya. In fact, it will be interesting to find the exact corresponding term in the Nyāya system which conveys the same meaning as is conveyed by the term 'mind' in the English language.

But, assuming that the term 'mental' refers to what is usually conveyed in the English language, three distinct points arise in respect of the entities that are considered to be purely 'mental'. First, what is their 'ontological' status in the scheme of Nyāya metaphysics and is that status same as the one that is accorded to objects which are considered to be 'non-mental' or physical in character. Second, what is the status of these objects when they are not object of cognition? In other words, do they continue to have 'existence' in the same way as ordinary objects of sense-perception are supposed to have? Third, do they possess an intersubjectively 'objective' character or they are 'objects' to an individual personal mind alone whose so-called 'existent' and objective character is not available to any other mind?

In case the mental entities are accorded a different ontological status than the ones given to non-mental objects, Nyāya would have to accept a radical dualism of the Cartesian type and face the well-known problem caused thereby. As for the second question, the mental entities cannot be regarded to have 'existence' in the same way as is accorded to physical objects and hence, in case they are considered to 'exist' even after they have ceased to be the objects of apprehension by some mind, they will have to be given a 'subsistent' status on the lines which Russell at one time argued for in the case of such entities. This, of course, would save Nyāya realism, but obviously do so in a pickwickean manner. And, in case one

grants them 'objectivity' only in relation to the individual personal mind which apprehends them, the situation will become even more hilariously pickwickean in character as now it will be the individual mind which will be populated by these 'subsistent' entities which will not be accessible to anyone else unless one accepts telepathic cognition to save the situation. One will have to accept 'unfelt' pains and pleasures, hopes and fears as they are mental entities *par excellence*.

Professor Mohanty, however, has not only talked of mental entities but also epistemic ones which, according to him, enjoy the same 'realistic' status in Nyāya as any other entities. The mental is not and cannot be regarded as epistemic if 'Psychologism' is to be avoided. And, if so the 'existence' of a unique class of entities which are neither mental nor physical will have to be admitted having ontological status of their own and an epistemological status different from the ones that is usually accorded to other existent entities such as those that are physical or mental in character. *Viśayatā* for example is one such characteristic and so also will be *viśesyatā*, *prakāratā* *saṁsargatā* and *viśayitā*. Nyāya abounds in such epistemic entities and in fact, they have proliferated as Navya Nyāya analysis developed over a period of time. These are entities created by Navya Nyāya analysis itself and their postulation was necessitated by the mode of analysis adopted by Nyāya. The history of this proliferation is interesting in itself as it shows that however innocent the first step may be taken in philosophical thinking it leads with logical inevitability to consequences which are difficult to accept even by those who are involved in that exercise. To give a few examples of such epistemic objects which the Nyāya analysis has brought into being we may turn to Professor Prahlada Char's article on the *Krodhpatras* published in *JICPR*, Vol. XIV, No. 3. Here are a few samples randomly selected which, I am sure, will test the understanding of even devoted Naiyāyikas unless they happen to be specialist student of the subject: *sva-samānādhikaraṇa*, *sva-āśrayatva*, *sva-tādātmya*, *sua-abhinnatva*, *sua-nirūpitātva*,

sva-vrittitva, avacchedakattva, nirūpakatā avacchedakatva, sambandhitva sambandha, avacchedakatā vrttitva etc.

The problem in respect of these epistemic objects which have gained 'existence' because of the Navya-Nyāya mode of analysis, has troubled the Naiyāyikas themselves. Shall they or shall they not be accorded the status of a *padārtha* in the usual sense of the term? The Nyāya 'realist' does not know how to deal with the situation. Professor V.N. Jha, for example, makes a radical distinction between the usual *padārthas* which are subsumed under the given categories of the vaiśeṣika and others such as *pratiyogitā* etc. which according to him cannot be granted the same status of *padārtha*-hood as is accorded to *ghaṭa* etc. He writes, 'A *Ghaṭa* after it comes into existence remains *ghaṭa* throughout its existence and continues to be designated as *ghaṭa* throughout its existence, but a *ghaṭa* does not always possess *pratiyogitā*' (p. XXIII, *Viśayatāvāda of Harirāma Tarkālamkāra* translated by V.N. Jha, University of Poona, 1987). He calls these 'acquired properties' to distinguish them from those which he designates as 'inherent properties'. The phrase recalls the term used by Locke in connection with his discussion of secondary qualities such as colour, sound, etc. which according to Professor Jha, would be regarded as inherent properties in the Navya-Nyāya mode of analysis. The important point is not how the property 'red' is designated in the Lockean and the Nyāya framework but that each, in its own way, feels the necessity of positing a distinction between properties which set them radically apart from each other. And, this distinction is based on 'dependence' on something because of which they do not belong to the object in the same inherent fashion as the other ones do. In a sense many relational properties have this character, though it is not clear if Nyāya has paid attention to them.

The so-called 'acquired' properties in Nyāya, go on proliferating and the Naiyāyika does not find it easy to decide what to do with them. To give but one example, one may look into the discussion on *āpādyatā* in Harirāma Tarkālamkāra's

Viśayatāvāda. Āpādyeta is a very strange relation and the discussion about it is so subtle and sophisticated as not to be clear even to good Naiyāyikas. It arises in the context of the postulation of the absence of a *pratibāndhaka* in respect of any knowledge whatsoever, and when, strangely, this is extended to the cognition of an imagined object where again one will have to posit the absence of *pratibāndhaka* in order that the 'imagined object' may be imagined (For detailed discussion see page XXXIX, *ibid.*).

The problem of the *acceptance* of such entities is well-known in the Nyāya tradition and many a time, the dispute is sought to be settled by invoking the criteria of *gaurava* and *lāghava* in the situation and arguing that only that alternative should be chosen which necessitate the postulation of the lesser number of such entities. This is *occam's razor* without the awareness of the epistemological and ontological implications of its acceptance by the philosopher concerned. One interesting example of such a discussion in Nyāya relates to the dispute between Gadādhara and Jagdish regarding the construal of the meaning of an expression in terms of *prakāratā* and *sāmsargatā*. Baccā Jhā in his well-known discussion of the subject is said to have concluded that Jagdish's position on the issue is preferable to that of Gadādhara as it requires the postulation of only 720 *pratibāndhakatās* as against Gadādhara's position which require a far greater number of *Pratibāndhakatās*¹ if *Prakarata* view is accepted.

This is a strange way of solving the problem in case such entities are supposed to be existent in character, for who would decide about the population of animals in forest on such a basis. The existence of 'Existent' entities is not, and cannot, be decided in such a manner. They enjoy an independence of all such consideration and if Nyāya is deemed to be a 'realist' then it cannot be allowed to indulge in arbitrary abolition of

1. See page 139. 'शास्तमूर्ति धर्मदत्त (बच्चा) झा इमः वैदुष्य एवं व्यक्तित्व' by Kishore Nath Jha in 'UNMILAN', July 1999.

such 'existent' realities which are independent of both of the Nyāya and Naiyāyikas.

The issue, however, is not confined to those epistemic properties only which have been termed as acquired properties by V.N. Jha. It affects one of the basic *padārthas* in *vaiśeṣika* system which according to everybody has an independent existent character, entailed by a realist epistemology. This is the *padārtha* called *sāmānya* and as everybody knows, the *Naiyāyikas* are fond of establishing the reality of their 'realism' by pointing out to it. But, as every *Naiyāyika* knows, or should know, there was a problem with such an acceptance and that consisted in the question whether every *sāmānya* should be given an independent existent reality or some criterion or criteria formulated to distinguish between genuine *sāmānyas* and *psuedo-sāmānyas*. As pointed out earlier, *Udayana*, formulated such criteria and called them *jāti-bādhaka* to focus attention upon the fact that in case any or all of these criteria did not apply to a *sāmānya*, it could not be treated as giving rise to a genuine class of existent objects. It may be said that we are ignoring the distinction between '*jāti*' and '*sāmānya*', but what could have been the necessity for making this distinction.

The *padārthas*, it may be said, have sub-classes of their own, and hence it should not cause any surprise if '*sāmānya*' has also sub-classes within it. But while this seems to be true of the first three *padārthas* which alone are granted *sattā*, that is, 'existence' within the *Nyāya* system, it is difficult to say whether the same is true of the other *padārthas*, particularly the next three which are given the status of *sattā* but of *bhāva* in the *Nyāya* framework. *Sāmānaya*, obviously, does not have subclasses within it and its not clear whether *viśeṣa* can be said to have any such sub-classes, even though there is the notion of *antya-viśeṣa* or the ultimate particulars which is supposed to be a property only of the atoms in the system (it will be interesting to find in this connection whether the individual souls that is the *ātman* also have this characteristics). As for *abhāva*

whose status as a *padārtha* was accepted much later in the vaiśeṣika system, it is divided into *prāgbhāva*, *dhvansābhāva* and *atyantābhāva* (*anyonyābhāva* is also supposed to be accepted by some as a separate *abhāva*, distinct from the three), but it is not clear if these should be accepted as sub-classes of *abhāva* in the same sense as one accepts those that are mentioned in the case of *dravya*, *guṇa* and *karma*. In any case, the case of *sāmānya* seems to be radically different as it is based on the ground of exemplification in existents and those which not only are not exemplified but cannot be ever exemplified because they are not *sāmānyas* at all and have been regarded as such by misunderstanding on the part of the thinkers concerned.

The epistemic entities, or the *jñānīyapadārthas* will, thus, have to be divided into at least two major classes; the one consisting of the three *padārthas-sāmānya*, *viśeṣa* and *sāmāvaya* and the other consisting of all those which have arisen because of *navya-nyāya* mode of analysis and whose number is, in principle, unending as their 'manufacture' depends on the ingenuity of the Nyāya theoreticians. The status of *abhāva* in this context is ambiguous as one is not sure whether it can be classed as a *jñānīya padārtha* or not. Nor is the relation of these *padārthas* to those which are supposed to arise from *apekṣā buddhi* clear, even though the latter are specifically restricted to arithmetical numbers only. Professor Dravid has suggested that '... numbers other than unity are the products of the *enumerative cognition*' (p. 172), forgetting that it is enumerative activity that may be said to give rise to numbers and not enumerative cognition. The distinction between number 'one' and all other numbers will cease to have any meaning if Professor Dravid's explanation of the reality of numbers is accepted. For, while the 'enumerative cognition' of numbers 2, 3, 4, ... is there then it will only be the 'cognition' of those numbers that will be there and when that cognition will cease, only the 'cognition' of the numbers will cease but the numbers themselves will still be there just as is the case with other objects such as trees etc.

The issue of Nyāya realism, thus, has to address itself to all different kinds of objects that Nyāya postulates because of very different reasons. These 'objects' are not of one type and the contention that this difference between the ontological typology of the objects concerned makes no difference to the epistemological issue of 'realism' in respect of their knowledge, will be strange indeed. The very fact that there is an 'undecidable' dispute about the number and nature of these *padārthas* should be a sufficient reason for doubting the 'objective', 'realistic' character of them. The case of Raghunāth Śīromaṇi is well-known and so also the fact that in spite of his great reputation among Naiyāyikas, hardly anyone accepted his radical suggestions in this regard. It should be remembered in this connection that he not only argued that *new-padārthas* be accepted in the Naiyāyika pantheon but also demolished and rejected the old ones and threw them out with scant regard for the tradition which had 'worshipped' them for so long without feeling any guilt whatsoever.

The two most telling objections against any possible doubt regarding Nyāya being a 'realist' system *par excellence* come from the fact that Nyāya accepts a large number of 'eternal', objects in its ontology and that, in Nyāya view the Self or the *Ātman* in its pure nature is devoid of consciousness. Professor Sibajiban Bhattacharya opens his comment on the issue by enumerating these 'eternal' objects and suggests that, 'As they are all eternal, uncreated, they are not dependent on anything, least of all on their knowledge' (p. 164). But he seems to forget that 'All reals are *objects* of God's knowledge' (p. 164) and, if it is so than to be 'real' is either to be an object of human cognition or of God's cognition, a position that is squarely that of Bishop Berkeley in the western tradition. That 'No human being is omniscient' (p. 164) is accepted by all idealists and no-one, as far as I know, has maintained that to be 'real' is necessarily to be 'an object of some human cognition or other.'

As for the second objection that the *Ātman* or the self does not possess consciousness as its essential property, this does not make Nyāya any more realist than the acceptance of enumerable other such entities, if it is accepted that they are necessarily the 'objects' of some cognition, whether it be that of God or of some other consciousness different from the *Ātman* concerned.

The question whether Nyāya is realist or not can only be answered if one is first able to decide what realism as a philosophical position necessarily involves. The crucial question in this context relates to the notion of 'independence' from consciousness. Thus any discussion of the issue involves a prior acceptance of the notion of consciousness and that something can be dependent or independent of it in the context of cognition. There is the related question of what is meant by 'being an object of' or 'being an object to' consciousness.

There is also the question whether something can be regarded as 'known' if it is merely an object of awareness of some consciousness or other. The term 'known' may be used in the strict sense when to be 'known' is to be known in a judgemental form and even in a more strict form as entailing a cognitive claim which can be 'justified' if one is challenged to do so. Beyond this, 'knowledge' may be said strictly to refer only to those complex conceptual and theoretic structures which form a systematic unity of their own and are usually designated as 'Science' or '*Sāstra*'. A cognitive assertion or denial is said to be a piece of 'knowledge' in this sense if it follows from the theories or laws or principles that form a basic part of that science or *sāstra*.

It is obvious that while in the first sense 'to be an object of awareness' involves a concrete, specific, experiential state of consciousness, while in all the others the 'experiential' and the 'existential' character gets more and more diluted till, in the last stage the idea that an 'object' of knowledge is an object of consciousness can be asserted only in the vaguest form. The related question of the independence of object of

knowledge from the act of being known or as being the object of some awareness or other is, thus, bound to be different in different cases. The notion of 'independence' is itself not clear and hence any formulation of the philosophical issue concerning the 'realism' or 'idealism' of a philosophical position will have to be analyzed and answered in a differentiated manner in order that it may be meaningful and significant.

'Independence' may mean independence in origination or independence in 'existence' or independence in assertibility in respect of the nature and content of that which is asserted. Realism or Idealism thus, may also be of three types in respect of the contention that what I know is independent of the consciousness that 'knows' it. But, as consciousness itself is the vaguest of all entities and it is difficult to specify the exact sense in which it may be said to be 'known', the question of something being 'dependent' or 'independent' of it is still more difficult to answer. Most objects of awareness are independent, in the third sense as, their nature and content is distinct from the consciousness of which they are object. The only exception to this occurs in the case of consciousness when it itself becomes an object of *anuvyavasāya* or self consciousness. In this situation where consciousness itself becomes an object of cognition, the former is not just consciousness but rather consciousness as 'knowing' or as being aware of something else. The complex awareness form by 'self consciousness' thus presents a difficult case for the realistic contention as here what is an object of awareness does not differ radically in nature and content from that which is aware of it except in the sense that there is a content involved in the first level awareness which is not present in the same sense at the second level awareness. And, in case some new property, such as, say *viśayatā* is produced then its 'origination' will have to be ascribed to the act of self consciousness which has given rise to it. It will be difficult to say that such a property will continue to obtain even when the act of self-consciousness which had given rise to it, ceases to exist. *Viśayatā*, for example, can hardly

be said to characterize the judgemental cognition which occurs at the first level of conscious cognition at the human level, just as the whole complex of the judgemental cognition that is *savikalpaka jñāna*, can hardly be said to exist at the *nirakalpaka* level or characterize it in any meaningful way, as any such characterization will destroy its *nirvikalpaka* character. Thus, the successive levels of *nirvikalpaka*, *savikalpaka* and *anuvyavasāya* cognition are characterized by properties which arise because of acts of consciousness and which cannot be said to characterize them when that act of consciousness ceases to exist. Hence, at least in two senses of 'independence', that is in terms of 'origination' and 'existence' these properties cannot be regarded as 'independent' from the act of consciousness which has given rise to them. They may still be recognized as independent in the third sense, that is, in respect of their nature and content, though even in their case there is an element of commonality between the act of consciousness which had given rise to them and the way they themselves are constituted.

There is still a way out for the Nyāya realist to save his position in case he wants to do so at all cost in face of the above evidence to the contrary. He may maintain that what once occurred as an actuality, can always be regarded as existing as a possibility which can always be actualized whenever the appropriate conditions obtain. There is, of course, the problem whether what is possible but has not yet occurred can be regarded as 'real' or 'existent' in any relevant sense of the term. The issue has been debated in Arab philosophy but Nyāya, being an ultra-realist, may not be deterred from giving them a respectable place in its 'realist' pantheon. There will still remain the problem of what are usually regarded as being impossible such as *vandhyā-putra* and Nyāya alone may, to preserve its realism, grant them some sort of independent reality as they are 'knowable' in some sense of the term. Some have argued that at least they are known as 'unknowable' and hence have to be treated as 'known' in a minimal sense, as

otherwise they could not have been characterized even as unknowable or impossible.

This will, of course, introduce modal concepts into Nyāya but, as Arindam Chakraborty asserts, 'Nyāya metaphysics cannot make sense of this empty 'can' or 'could', because nowhere in Nyāya do we find any trace of the idea of possible worlds' (*JICPR*, XII-2). Professor Arindam Chakraborty, however, is not deterred by this and is not shaken in his belief that Nyāya continues to be 'resolutely realist' in spite of this. There could perhaps not be greater example of 'faith' than this as he himself have just asserted 'The notion of mind independence involves the notion of possibility' (*Ibid.*, p. 154). For faith there are no contradictions and all persons who have encountered men of deep religious faith know this. Philosophy, however, is not a matter of faith but of reason and it normally does not count on contradictions unless they are shown to be 'illusory' in nature. Nyāya, we hope, believes in reason and will not like to be saved on grounds which are non-rational or irrational or supra-rational in character.

DAYA KRISHNA

‘Ghaṭo-Ghaṭaḥ’ Has to be Accepted as a Meaningful Sentence in Navya Nyāya

V.N. JHA

It is usually held that the Naiyāyika cannot accept a sentence such as ‘*ghaṭo-ghaṭaḥ*’ as meaningful in a system for, according to him, any sentence to be meaningful must give some new knowledge. However, we have received the following statement from Professor V.N. Jha of Pune University arguing that the Naiyāyika will have to accept the sentence ‘*ghaṭo-ghaṭaḥ*’ as meaningful, if he wants to stick to his definition of *anyonyābhāva* as the latter entails the former:

The Navya Nyāya provides the definition of *anyonyābhāva* or *bheda* as follows:

तादात्म्य-सम्बन्धवच्छिन्न-प्रतियोगिताक-अभावः

‘A mutual absence is that absence the contra-positive of which is delimited by the relation of identity.’

The example may be paraphrased as either

(1) पट प्रतियोगिक भेदवान्-घटः

or (2) घट प्रतियोगिक भेदवान्-पटः

Let us expand either of them:

घट प्रतियोगिक-भेदवान् पटः

= घटनिष्ठ प्रतियोगिता—निरूपक भेदवान् पटः

= तदात्म्य (= अभेद)—

सम्बन्धावाच्छिन्न—घटानिष्ठ प्रति—योगिता—निरूपक—भेदवान् पटः

implies that

घट घटः, घटः न पटः

पटः पटः, पटः न पटः

Unless this is accepted the definition of भेद cannot be justified according to Nyāya. As a matter of fact, the tradition says that घटः अभेदेन घटे अस्ति, अभेदेन् पटे नास्ति

That is what I mean when I said *ghaṭo-ghaṭaḥ* has to be accepted by Navya Nyāya.

(a) A Note on Navya Nyāya View of Tautology N.S. DRAVID

V.N. Jha's contention that Navya Nyāya has to admit tautologies as significant is inadmissible but not for the reason that 'any sentence to be meaningful must give some new knowledge' as stated in the introductory passage of 'Notes and Queries', *JICPR*, Vol. XV, No. 2. A significant sentence repeatedly uttered does not cease to be meaningful even if its several instances do not yield new knowledge. The correct reason for the denial of the meaningfulness of tautology in Navya Nyāya may be explained as under:

It is quite true, as Jha says, that because a pot is not locus of its difference it is pot itself. But this is only a matter of fact. What however we are concerned with here is the problem of the significance of a (tautological) *statement*. Gadādhara, the great Navya Nyāya logician, raises and answers this very problem in his *Vyutpattivāda*, a treatise on Nyāya semantics. A part of the concerned passage is given below:

अभेदान्वयबोधश्च विरूपोपस्तियोरेवेति वयुत्पत्तिः घटो घटः, दण्डवान् दण्डवान्, पाकं पचतीत्यादौ घटत्वदण्डवत्वपाकत्वाद्यवच्छिन्ने तत्रद्रपावच्छिनस्य तथाविधान्वयबोधानुदयात्

अथ तत्प्रयोजकसमानविमर्कित्वादेः सत्त्वात्कथं न तादृशान्वयबोधः? अत्राहुः। ...

घटत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नविशेष्यताकाभेदसंसर्गघटत्वाद्यवच्छिन्नप्रकारकशाब्दबोधस्य क्वचिदप्यनुदयः

The reason for denying the meaningfulness of tautology given here is that the verbal cognition of the denotends of two coordinate terms in a sentence arises only if the connotations of the terms are different from each other. This rule is in conformity with common usage. There is a logical basis also for the rule which may be explained thus: Navya Nyāya which admits many kinds of relations has divided them into two broad classes, viz. the class of location-determining (वृत्तिनियामक) and that of non-location-determining (वृच्चनियामक) relations. Conjunction, inherence, etc. are relations of the former kind as, things that are locus and locatee respectively are related by these relations. Identity and many logical relations are of the latter kind as the entities joined by these relations are not the locus and the locatees in respect of each other. Nothing can be supposed to be located in itself by the identity-relation although everything is self-identical. This is the reason why difference as a kind of negation is distinguished from occurrence-negation—called ‘atyantābhāva’ or ‘saṃsargābhāva’ in the classification of negation in Indian logic. The counter-positive of the occurrence-negation excludes it from its locus while the counterpositive of difference excludes the difference from itself with which it is identical but not located in it by the identity relation.

Further there cannot arise a verbal or even a nonverbal cognition of a thing as both the epistemic qualifier (*Viśeṣaṇa*) and the epistemic qualificand (*viśeṣya*) in the cognition. Unless the epistemic qualifier and the qualificand are different from each other the cognition cannot be determinate or predicative at all. It cannot be indeterminate either as it has a definite subject. It will have to be reckoned only as an instance of imperfect cognition. If however identity involved as relation in the cognition is turned into a property so that the cognition has the form, ‘The pot is self-identical’, then the cognition

can well be determinate but then it will not remain tautological in the strict sense of the word.

It may be argued here that if we can say truly that 'a pot is not different from or the locus of the difference from itself', then we can say truly that 'a pot is a pot'. However the above mentioned distinction between difference and occurrence-negation and the consequent difference in the application of the principle of double negation to the two kinds of negation can very well meet the argument. The negation of the occurrence-negation of a thing is identical with the thing but the negation of the difference from a thing is supposed to be identical not with the thing but with the distinctive property of the thing. So the statement 'a pot is not different from itself' would not imply the statement 'a pot is a pot'. It would imply only the statement 'a pot is endowed with potness'. Tautologies are therefore as senseless and devoid of statementhood as the simple subject term 'a pot' or 'the pot' is.

(b) Reaction on the Expression
Ghaṭo-Ghaṭaḥ by V.N. Jha
D. PRAHLADACHAR

Dr. V.N. Jha's argument is not clear. By drawing our attention to the definition of अन्योन्याभाव, provided by the Naiyayikas, he seems to argue that since पट etc. objects have the difference of घट, घट has to be admitted as having घटतादात्म्य and hence the expression 'घटो घटः' conveying the same, is quite acceptable. But, what I fail to understand, is as to why Dr. Jha takes the trouble to prove the identity of jar in the jar. घटतादात्म्य in घट, is a universally admitted fact and there is no necessity to prove it by referring to the definition of अन्योन्याभाव. Anyway, Gadādhara's discussion in व्युत्पत्तिवाद, aims at finding out the reasons for the absence of the expression—'घटो घटः'. This implies that none has ever doubted the absence of such expressions. But, Dr. Jha seems to hold that since घट has घटतादात्म्य, there must also

be an expression conveying the same and 'घटो घटः' could be such an expression. If this is his view, I think it is not justifiable. For, let alone in Sanskrit, in no other language, are such expressions found. For instance, in English, we come across the expressions such as 'a blue jar', 'a red jar', etc. But we never find the expressions like 'a jar jar'. This shows that whenever two words in the same case affix, which generally denote the objects that stand in the relation of identity, are used then they are such that they denote different properties. The expression 'घटो नीलः' is an example. The two words that are here, denote the objects that are related by the relation of identity and the properties they denote viz. घटत्व and नीलत्व are different from each other. But, in the case of the alleged expression 'घटो घटः' it is not so. For, the two terms denote the same property namely—घटत्व. In short, an expression like 'घटो घटः' cannot convey the identity of jar in the jar, for the properties denoted by the two terms are not different.

Then the question may arise as to how the identity of a jar in the same can be conveyed. The answer is simple. It can be conveyed by the sentences such as 'घटो घटोभिन्नः' or 'घटः घटतादात्म्यवान्' etc. The difference between the alleged expression 'घटो घटः' and the above sentences, is too obvious and needs no explanation.

The Naiyayikas hold this view, mainly with regard to verbal cognitions and a non-verbal cognition wherein both qualifier and qualificand are presented through one and the same property, can occur. Nothing can prevent us to infer 'घटः तादात्म्येन घटवान् घटत्वात्'. The inferential cognition produced by it, would have घट as both qualifier and qualificand, and तादात्म्य as the relation.

(c) A Note on Identity Relation

RAGHUNATH GHOSH

Professor N.S. Dravid, following the line of Gadādhara, has tried to highlight the meaninglessness of the tautology as found

in the case of identical statement. So far, as my understanding goes, the defect of tautology as found in the West is not accepted in Indian Logic. To him nothing can be supposed to be located in itself by the identity-relation although everything is self-identical. To this point I beg to differ, because each and every object becomes *abheda* with itself. The *abheda* means 'the absence of mutual absence' (*bhedābhāva*). If it is possible logically to say that something is different (*bheda*) from something, it is quite natural or there is also a logical possibility of saying that something is *not different* from something. If *bheda* becomes an object of description, why not *abheda*? That an object is non-different from itself is an 'information' in the true sense of the term, because in terms of 'non-difference' an object is known as different from another. In the Nyāya-framework the absence called *anyonyābhāva* (mutual absence) would become 'inconceivable' or 'meaningless' if there were no idea of '*abheda*' i.e. the absence of mutual absence. Any idea of *bheda* presupposes the idea of *abheda*. For this reason *bheda* (*anyonyābhāva*) is defined in terms of *tādātmyasambandhāvachinnapratiyogitākābhāva* (i.e. an absence, the absenteness of which is limited by the relation of identity). Without the acceptance of identity the *anyonyābhāva* (*bheda*) cannot be admitted as a form of *abhāva*. I do not know in such cases how the position of Gadādhara can be defended.

Professor Dravid argues that if the epistemic qualifier (*viśeṣaṇa*) and the epistemic qualificand (*viśeṣya*) are not different from each other, the cognition cannot be determinate at all. If in this context determinate cognition is taken as a *savikalpaka* knowledge then the definition of it may be considered carefully. It runs as follows: '*Viśeṣaṇa-viśeṣya-samsargāvagāhijñānam*' (i.e. a cognition in which qualifier, qualificand and their relation are revealed). In the present case of 'A jar is a jar', the first ('a jar') is to be taken as a jar existing in proximity to our eyes and the second one ('a jar') is taken as a jar seen earlier and in between these two there is a relation (*samsarga*) called *tādātmya*. Though the same word (a jar) is

used at both the places, the first one may be taken as a qualificand and the second one is a qualifier and *tādātmya* (identity) is the relation. Hence it is a case of determinate cognition. In our daily life we generally make such identity-statements in the above-mentioned sense and there is a successful communication with others. Once a friend of mine came to my house on the occasion of *Sarasvatī pūjā* in my childhood. Customarily if some guest comes during this occasion, he is given some *prasāda* (some eatables sacrificed in the name of the goddess). When my friend was given a plate full of *prasāda*, he took a small portion of it. When he was asked the reason for not taking the rest, he answered boldly, ‘*Prasāda is Prasāda*’. I didn’t have any difficulty to understand the import of the sentence though I didn’t read philosophy at that time. He wanted to mean that *Prasāda* does not lose its sanctity and purity if taken in a small portion, because it is virtually a *prasāda* which cannot be compared with other objects. As it is *prasāda*, the quantity of it is irrelevant. Hence, these statements cannot be totally ignored as meaningless.

Lastly, I would like to know from the scholars whether there is any Sanskrit term for expressing ‘*tautology*’. If it is translated as ‘*punarukti*’, then what may be the differentiating factors between *punarukti* and *tādātmya* (identity). It seems to me Professor Dravid did not make a distinction between these two, but in the West there is a distinction between them. However, even if the sentences like ‘*ghaṭo ghaṭaḥ*’ are taken as tautology, they may be taken as virtuous ones, but not vicious. Whatever is stated in the form of a sentence in the Indian Logic is material, but *not* merely a formal one. Hence there is hardly any sentence which is meaningless in the context of Navya Nyāya if it possesses conditions like *akāṅkṣā* etc. Any sentence which is determinate must be ‘relational’, which entails some meaning. The terms like hare’s horn (*śaśaśṅga*) etc. do not convey any meaning as they are absurd entities (*alīka*) which do not come under any category (*padārtha*) accepted by them.

(d) Comments on Ghaṭo–Ghaṭaḥ

‘घटो घटः’ इति वाक्यं न प्रमाणम्

अभेदान्वयबोधश्च विरूपोपस्थितयोरेवेति व्युत्पत्तिः । विरुद्धधर्माभ्यामुपस्थितयोरेव अभेदान्वयबोधो भवतीत्यर्थः । यथा ‘नीलोघटः’ इत्यत्र नीलत्वघटत्वाभ्यां विरुद्धधर्माभ्यामुपस्थितयोः नीलघटयोः अभेदान्वयबोधो भवति । घटत्वघटत्वे न विरुद्धधर्मौ । अतः ‘घटो घट’ इत्यत्र घटत्वावच्छिन्ने घटत्वावच्छिन्नस्य अभेदसम्बन्धेन शब्दबोधो न भवति । विधेयांशेऽधिकावगाहि शब्दबोधस्वीकारात् ‘घटो नीलघटः’ इत्यत्र अभेदान्वयबोधो भवति । तत्र विधेयांशे नीलस्याधिकस्य प्रवेशात् । ‘घटोघटः’ इत्यत्र च उद्देश्यकोटौ विधेयकोटौ च केवलघटस्यैव प्रवेशात् विधेयकोटौ अधिकावगाहित्वाभावेन अभेदान्वयबोधो न जायते ।

तद्धर्मावच्छिन्न भेदसंसर्गावधिउन्न प्रकारतानिरूपित विशेष्यता—वधुदेकतासम्बन्धेन शाब्दबुद्धित्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति तद्धर्मभेदः कारणम् । ‘द्रव्यं घटः’ इत्यत्र घटत्वावधिउन्न भेद सम्बन्धावच्छिन्न प्रकारता—निरूपित विशेष्यतावधुदेकतासम्बन्धेन द्रव्यत्वे जायमान शाब्दबुद्धित्वावच्छिन्नं प्रति द्रव्यत्वे घटत्वभेदः कारणम् । घटाभिन्नं द्रव्यमिति शाब्दबोधो जायते । यत्र विशेष्यतावधुदेक प्रकारतावधुदेकयोः भेदो वर्तते, तत्रैवाभेदान्वयबोधो भवतीति सिद्धम् । ‘द्रव्यं घट’ इत्यत्र द्रव्यत्वं विशेष्यतावधुदेकं, घटत्वं प्रकारतावधुदेकम् । ‘घटो घट’ इत्यत्र तु घटत्वमेव विशेष्यतावधुदेकं प्रकारतावधुदेकञ्चेति विशेष्यतावधुदेकप्रकारतावधुदेकयोः भेदोभावात् अभेदान्वयबोधो न भवति । अयन्च कार्यकारणभावः शब्दबुद्धि प्रति पृथगुक्तः ।

ज्ञानसामान्ये सर्वाणुगतः कार्यकारणभाव—तद्धर्मान्यवृत्ति—विषयतासम्बन्धेन ज्ञानं प्रति तद्धर्मभेदः कारणम् । ज्ञानत्वं व्यापकधर्मः । शाब्दबोधत्वं व्यात्यधर्मः । व्यात्यधर्मावधिउन्ने कार्ये जननीये व्यापकधर्मावच्छिन्नकार्यस्य सामग्री अपेक्षिता । ज्ञानमात्रं घटत्वान्यवृत्तिविषयतासम्बन्धेन घटत्वभिन्ने एव वर्तते । एवन्च व्यापकीभूत ज्ञानत्वावधिउन्नोत्पादक सामग्री घटत्वभेदघटितेति ‘घटोघट’ इत्यत्र घटत्वभेदविरहान्न घटत्वे उक्तज्ञानापत्तिः ।

अतः शाब्दबोधजनकं ‘घटो घट’ इति वाक्यं न प्रमाणम् ।

संशयनिवर्तकं यत् तदेव प्रमाणं भवितुमर्हति । ‘घटोघट’ इति वाक्यन्च न कस्यापि संशयस्य निवर्तकम् । द्रव्ये घटतव घटत्वाभावोभयावगाहि ‘द्रव्यं घटो न वा’ इत्याकारकसंशयनिवर्तकत्वेन ‘द्रव्यं घट’ इति वाक्यं प्रमाणम् । प्रकृते ‘घटो घटो न वा’ इति संशयो नास्ति । तस्य घटे घटत्व—घटत्वाभावोभयावगाहित्वेन आहार्यत्वं वर्तते । बाधकालीध्वजन्यं ज्ञानं आहार्यम् । तच्च न कस्यापि प्रतिबध्यं, प्रतिबन्धकन्च भवति । अतो ‘घटो घट’ इति वाक्यं प्रमाणं भवितुं नार्हति ।

तादात्म्यसम्बन्धावधिउन्न प्रतियोगिताकत्वमन्योन्याभावस्य लक्षणम् । घटतादात्म्यन्च घटे वर्तताम् । परन्तु ‘तादात्म्यसम्बन्धेन घटो घटेऽस्ति’ इति प्रतीतिरापादयितुं न शक्यते । तादात्म्यसम्बन्धस्य वृच्यनियामकत्वात् । “घटतादात्म्यवान् घट” इत्यपि प्रतीतिरापादयितुं न शक्यते । विधेयस्य घटतादात्म्यस्य उद्देश्यतावधुदेकरूपत्वांगीकारे घटतादात्म्यं घटत्वस्वरूपमेव । तदानीमुद्देश्यतावधुदेक विधेययोः ऐक्यात् भेदाभावात् तद्वाक्यं अप्रमाणमेव भवति ।

अपि च शाब्दबोधे आकांक्षापि कारणम् । प्रकृते घटत्ववदुद्देश्यक घटत्वविधेयक शब्दबोधेजनने आकांक्षा नास्ति । आकांक्षाभ्रमात् जायमानः शाब्दबोधः प्रकृते भ्रमात्मकः । अतः तज्जनकं 'घटो घट' इति वाक्यं सर्वथाप्रमाणमेव भवति ।

एवञ्च 'घटो घट' इति वाक्यं नैयायिकैश्वश्यं प्रमाणत्वेन अंगीकर्तव्यमिति नास्ति नियमः, नास्ति सिद्धान्तस्य ।

S. SUBRAHMANYAM

3

How a Neo-Naiyāyika would Analyse a Sentence Like 'Bright Red Rose'

DAYA KRISHNA

What shall be the Navya Nyāya Analysis of the following Sentence?

This is the same bright, red rose whose sweet and subtle fragrance so deeply affected the beautiful princess when she came for an early morning stroll in the private royal garden a few days back that she still talks about it to her friends and says that she would remember the fragrance all her life.

This is a rather long sentence but the Navya Nyāya analysis, as Professor Prahlada Char's article on the *Kroḍapatrās* (JICPR, Vol. XIV, No. 3) showed generally concentrates on such simple sentences as '*atra ghataḥ asti*', that I felt tempted to construct a complex sentence.

The sentence is deliberately constructed to test as to how a neo-Naiyāyika would analyse such a phrase as 'bright, red rose' or 'sweet and subtle fragrance' without questioning the generally accepted presuppositions of Navya Nyāya analysis. Also, the sentence challenges one to find what is the '*mukhya viśeṣyatā*' which is so often talked about in Navya Nyāya

analysis. Basically it is an invitation to *do* Nyāya rather than to talk about it, as most of our Naiyāyikas do.

(a) महावाक्यम् Comments on the Notes and
Query Entitled 'What shall be the Navya Nyāya
Analysis of the Sentence'

N.S.R. TATACHARYA

Introduction

१तदेवेदं भासमानं रक्तपुष्पं वर्तते, २यस्य सूक्ष्ममधुरसुगन्धः तां सुन्दरीं राजपुत्रीं तथा गभीरतया प्रभावितवान्, ३यथा सा रचकीयराजोद्याने प्रारब्धनित्यभ्रमणा अद्यापि तद्विषये स्वसरवीभिः सह अभिभाषते वदति च 'सुगन्धममुं आजीवनं स्मश्यामि' इति। अत्र त्रीणि वाक्यानि सन्ति। यत्तच्छब्दयोगात् त्रीण्यपि मिलित्वा एकं महावाक्यमिति स्वीक्रियते। तत्र यथा सा इत्यादितृतीयवाक्ये तद्विषये इत्यत्र तच्छब्देन द्वितीयवाक्यस्य सुगन्धस्य परामर्शाऽस्ति। द्वितीयवाक्ये यस्येति निर्दिष्टस्य प्रथमवाक्ये तच्छब्देन परामर्शाऽस्ति। अतः द्वितीयं तृतीयेन संगम्य ततः तृतीयं प्रथमेन संगम्य महावाक्यार्थो वर्णितः।

अथवा तृतीयवाक्यस्थयथाशब्दार्थस्य द्वितीयवाक्ये तथाशब्देन परामर्शात् तृतीयं द्वितीयेन संगम्य द्वितीयं प्रथमेन संगम्यापि महावाक्यार्थो वर्णनीयः। पूर्वोत्तरभावमात्रे विशेषः। अन्यत् सर्वं समानम्। 'सुगन्धममुं स्मरिष्यामि' इति तु वाक्यपरम्, न तु वाक्यार्थपरम्।

१'यस्य सूक्ष्ममधुरसुगन्धः तां सुन्दरीं राजपुत्रीं तथा गभीरतया प्रभावितवान्'

यस्येत्यत्र षष्ठ्याः संबन्धोऽर्थः। तस्य सुगन्धेऽन्वयः। सुगन्धशब्दस्य सुरभिगन्धोऽर्थः। तत्र सूक्ष्ममधुरपदार्थयोरभेदसंबन्धेनान्वयः। तच्छब्दार्थस्य सुन्दरीशब्दार्थस्य चाभेदेन राजपुत्र्यामन्वयः। तथा इत्यत्र याल्प्रत्ययस्य प्रकारोऽर्थः तच्छब्दः यथेत्यत्र यच्छब्दनिर्दिष्टमर्थः परामृशति। राजपुत्रीशब्दस्य राजसंबन्धिपुत्रीत्यर्थः। पुत्रीमिति द्वितीयामाः समवेतत्वम् (समवायसंन्धावच्छिन्नमाधेयत्वमर्थः) तत्र निरूपितत्वेन राजपुत्र्याः अन्वयः। समवेतत्वेस्याश्रयतया प्रपूर्वकभांधात्वर्थेऽन्वयः गभीरतया इतीत्यंभूतलक्षणे तृतीया। तस्याः विशिष्टत्वमर्थः। तस्य भांधात्वर्थेऽन्वयः प्रपूर्वकभांधातोः प्रकृष्टज्ञानमर्थः (आसक्तिजनकज्ञानमर्थः)। तदुत्तरणिचः अनुकूलव्यापारोऽर्थः। झवतुप्रत्ययस्य आश्रयोऽर्थः। तस्याभेदसंबन्धेन सुगन्धेऽन्वयः। याल्प्रत्ययार्थप्रकारस्य गिजर्थे व्यापारेऽन्वयः तथा च 'यस्य सूक्ष्म ... इत्यादि ... प्रभावितवान्' इत्यन्तवाक्यान्।

यत्संबन्धी सूक्ष्माभिन्नमधुराभिन्नसुरभिगन्धः तदभिन्नसुन्दर्यभिन्नराजसंब निपुत्रीसमवेततत्प्रकारविशिष्टगभीरत्वविशिष्टप्रकृष्टज्ञानानुकूलव्यापारवदभिन्नः—

इति शाब्दबोधो भवति ।

²'यथा सा स्वकीयराजोद्याने प्रारब्धनित्यभ्रमणा अद्यापि तद्विषये स्वसरवीभिः सह अभिभाषते, वदति च सुगन्धममुं आजीवनं स्मरिष्यामीति ।'

यथा इत्यत्र यच्छब्दोत्तरयालुप्रत्ययस्य प्रकारोऽर्थः । तस्य आश्रयतासंबन्धेन अभिपूर्वकभाषधत्वर्थे अभिभाषणे वदधात्वर्थे कथने यान्वयः । स्वकीयशब्दार्थस्य स्वसंबन्धिनः राजोद्यानशब्दार्थे राजसंबन्ध्युद्याने अभेदसंबन्धेनान्वयः । सप्तम्याः अधिकरणत्वमर्थः । तत्र आधेयतासंबन्धेन राजसंबन्ध्युद्यानस्यान्वयः । अधिकरणत्वस्य निरूपकतासंबन्धेन भ्रमणेऽन्वयः । प्रारब्धशब्दस्य प्रारम्भकर्मत्वर्थः । तस्याभेदसंबन्धेन नित्यभ्रमणशब्दार्थैकदेशे भ्रमणेऽन्वयः । नित्यभ्रमणशब्दस्य सार्वकालिकभ्रमणवती अथवा प्रतिदिनभ्रमणवती इत्यर्थः तस्या अभेदसंबन्धेन तच्छब्दार्थे राजपुत्रयामन्वयः । अद्यशब्दस्य इतच्छिनमर्थः । अपिशब्दस्य पूर्वदिनसमुच्चयोऽर्थः । तस्य आश्रयतासंबन्धेन इतच्छिने न्वयः । इतच्छिनस्य कालिकसंबन्धेन अभिभाषणैन्वयः । स चासौ विषयश्च तद्विषयः । तदभिन्नविषय इत्यर्थः । (तच्छब्दः सुगन्धपरामर्शकः) सप्तम्याः विषयत्वमर्थः । तत्र आधेयतासंबन्धेन तद्विषयस्याऽन्वयः । विषयत्वस्य निरूपकतासंबन्धेन अभिभाषणेऽन्वयः । स्वसरवीशब्दस्य स्वसंबन्धिसखी इत्यर्थः । तृतीयायाः कर्तृत्वमर्थः । तत्र आधेयतासंबन्धेन स्वसखीशब्दार्थस्यान्वयः । तृतीयार्थकर्तृत्वस्य निरूपकतासंबन्धेन सहशब्दार्थैकदेशे अभिभाषणक्रियायामन्वयः । सहशब्दस्य साहित्यमर्थः । तच्च प्रकृते अभिभाषणसमानकालीनाभिभाषणरूपम् । अभिभाषणं नाम ज्ञानजनकशब्दप्रयोगः । सहशब्दार्थान्तर्गतप्रथमाभिभाषणेन्तीयार्थकर्तृत्वस्यान्वयः । द्वितीयाभिभाषणस्य कर्तृत्वसंबन्धेन तच्छब्दार्थराजपुत्रयामन्वयः । अभिभाषते इत्यत्र आख्यातस्य कृतिरर्थः । तत्र घात्वर्थस्यानुकूलतासंबन्धेनान्वयः । कृतेः आश्रयतासंबन्धेन तच्छब्दार्थराजपुत्रयामन्वयः । इतिशब्दस्य 'सुगन्धममुमाजीवनं स्मरिष्यामि' वाक्यगतानुपूर्वीरूपप्रकारोऽर्थः । तस्य आश्रयतासंबन्धेन वदधात्वर्थे ज्ञानजनकशब्देऽन्वयः । वदतीत्यत्र आख्यातस्य कृतिः अर्थः । तत्र घात्वर्थस्यानुकूलतासंबन्धेनान्वयः । कृतेः आश्रयतासंबन्धेन तच्छब्दार्थे राजपुत्रयामन्वयः । चशब्दस्य अभिभाषणसमुच्चयोऽर्थः । तस्याश्रयतासंबन्धेन वदनेऽन्वयः । तथा च 'यथा सा...इत्यादि... स्मरिष्यामीति' इत्यन्तवाक्यात् 'स्वसंबन्ध्यभिन्न राजसंबन्ध्यभिन्नोद्याननिष्ठाधिकरणतानिरूपक-प्रारम्भकर्माभिन्न-सार्वकालिकभ्रमण-वदभिन्न-राजपुत्री स्वसम्बन्धिसरवीनिष्ठकर्तृता-निरूपकाभिभाषणसमान-कालिका भियाषणकर्त्री पूर्वदिनसमुच्चयाश्रयएतद्दिन कालिकतदभिन्नविषयविषयक यत्प्रकारक अभिभाषणानुकूलकृत्याश्रयः 'सुगन्धममुमाजीवनं स्मरिष्यामि' वाक्यनिष्ठानुपूर्वीविशिष्ट 'अभिभाषणसमुच्चयाश्रयज्ञानजनकशब्दानुकूलकृत्याश्रयः (राजपुत्री) इति शब्दबोधः ।

³'तदेवेदं भासमानं रक्तपुण्यं वर्तते'

तच्छब्दः यस्येत्यत्र यच्छब्देन निर्दिष्टमर्थं परामृशति । एवकारस्य अन्यभिन्नमित्यर्थः । तच्छब्दार्थस्य एव-शब्दार्थस्य च रक्तपुण्येऽन्वयः । इदंशब्दस्य पुरोवर्तीत्यर्थः तस्याभेदेन रक्तपुण्येऽन्वयः । भासमानमित्यस्य प्रतीयमानमित्यर्थः (वर्तमानकालिकप्रतीतिविषयः) । तस्याभेदेन रक्तपुण्येऽन्वयः । रक्तपुण्यं रक्ताभिन्नं पुष्पम् । वृत्तधातोः सत्ता अर्थः । तेप्रत्ययस्य आश्रयत्वं वर्तमानकालिकत्वं चार्थः । वर्तमानकालिकत्वस्य सत्तायाम्, आश्रयत्वस्य रक्तपुण्येऽन्वयः । तथा

च—उक्तवाक्यात् 'तदभिन्नतदन्यभिन्न पुरोवर्त्यभिन्न वर्तमान कालिकप्रतीतिविषयाभिन्नरक्ताभिन्नपुष्पं वर्तमानकालिक सत्ताश्रयः इति बोधः।

महावाक्यार्थबोधः

तथा च वाक्यत्रयधटितात् महावाक्यात्

यत्संबन्धी सूक्ष्माभिन्नमधुराभिन्नसुरभिगन्धः तदभिन्नसुन्दर्यभिन्नराजसंबन्धि—पुत्रीसमवेततत्प्रकारविशिष्ट गमीरत्वविशिष्टप्रकृष्टज्ञानानुकूलव्यापारवदभिन्नः,

स्वसंबन्ध्यभिन्नराजसंबन्ध्याभिन्नोद्याननिष्ठाधिकरणतानिरूपक—प्रारम्भकर्माभिन्न सार्वकालिकभ्रमणवदभिन्ना स्वसंबन्धिसखीनिष्ठकर्तृतानिरूपकाभिभाषणसमानकालिकाभिभाषणकर्त्री तादृशसुगन्धरूपविषयक—पूर्वदिनसमुच्चयाश्रयएतद्दिनकालिक त्वप्रकारकाभिभाषणानुकूलकृत्याश्रयः 'सुगन्धममुमाजीवनं स्मरिष्यामि' वाक्यनिष्ठानुपूर्वी विशिष्टाभिभाषणसमुच्चयाश्रयज्ञानजनक—शब्दानुकूलकृत्याश्रयः राजपुत्री, तदभिन्नतदन्यभिन्नपुरोवर्त्यभिन्नवर्तमानकालिक प्रतीतिविषयाभिन्नरक्ताभिन्नपुष्पं वर्तमानकालिकसत्ताश्रय इति शब्दबोधो भवति।

(b) Exercise on the 'Mahāvākya' for Śābdabodha
Response to the Comments on the Mahāvākya
Received from N.S.R. Tatacharya
ACHYUTANANDA DASH

The following is my comment on the *Navya Nyāya* Analysis of the complex sentence (*mahāvākya*) which is published in the *JICPR*, Vol. XV, No. 1. It may be pointed out that my comment consists of four parts and they are about:

- I: The sentence,
- II: The translation (in Sanskrit),
- III: The *śābdabodha* (as has been presented by Professor N.S.R. Tatacharya), and
- IV: The whole exercise.

I. The Sentence

This is the same bright, red rose whose sweet and subtle fragrance so deeply affected the beautiful princess, when she came for an early morning stroll in the private royal garden a

few days back that she still talks about it to her friends and says that she would remember the fragrance all her life.

Before I say anything, I think it is worth recording an interesting comment on the structure and syntax of this sentence by my computer¹:

Your sentences may be too long to be effective and may be hard to follow. For clarity and conciseness, consider rewording your sentence or splitting it into two sentences.

This, I think, is a very precise and accurate comment on this sentence. It is clear that this is not a sentence from any classical/Standard English literature but 'deliberately constructed' to test the *Navya Nyāya* analysis of long and complex sentence structure. The 'deliberateness' as has been suggested by the compiler directed towards analysing the phrases like '*bright, red rose*' or '*sweet and subtle fragrance*' without questioning the conventions of *Navya Nyāya* analysis. It refers to the analysis of the adjectival clauses, when there are two adjectives to one and the same noun. I do not think it is a big problem to handle for the *naiyāyikas*. Then the question is why should one deliberately construct a sentence like this, whose grammaticality is doubtful. Anyway this presents an interesting exercise for *śābdabodha*.

If the meaning aspect of the sentence is taken into account, it can be doubtlessly said that the sentence is ambiguous. I think the ambiguity arises out of the clause '*that she still talks about it*'. The question is 'about what'? Is it about: 'The bright red rose'? 'The sweet and subtle fragrance'? or 'How deeply it *affected* the beautiful princess'? In other words, does it refer to the grammatical subject, or the grammatical object or the grammatical event? In fact, there are two grammatical subjects in the given complex sentence: (i) the rose, and (ii) the fragrance. There are also two grammatical objects. They are: (i) the princess and (ii) her friends. There are several events; at least four may be considered for the sentential analysis point of view. And they are: (i) *deeply affecting* the princess, (ii) her

coming for an early morning stroll to the private royal garden, (iii) her *talking* about it to her friends, and (iv) *remembering* the fragrance all her life. Taking all these factors into account, the question certainly arises whether such complex construction in English itself is granunatically viable/desirable.² The syntax in English is the most difficult area of study and the *meaning analysis* of the complex sentential construction fully depends upon the structure of the sentence. Needless to say that unless we understand the sentence and its grammatical structure in its *source* language, it would certainly be difficult in translating it to the *target* language and analyze it in a different framework accordingly in the target language.

II. The Translation (In Sanskrit)

The sentence in question is translated into Sanskrit as follows (I present it in Roman diacritic for writing conveniently with the help of my computer):

*tad evedam bhāsamānam rakta-ṣuṣṭam varttate yasya sūkṣma-
madhūrasugandhaḥ tāṃ sundarīm rājaputrīm tathā gabhīratayā
prabhāvitavān yathā sā svakīyarājodyāne prārabdha-nitya-bhramaṇā
adyāpi tad-viṣaye sva-sakhībhiḥ saha abhibhāṣate vadati ca
sugandham amum ājīvanam smarīṣyāmīti/*

This is not a very good translation in Sanskrit. There are several English words/phrases not properly translated into Sanskrit that can bear the near-most meaning to express the idea in its original construction. For instance:

1. The word 'bright' is translated into Sanskrit 'bhāsamānam'. Though the verbal base (*dhātu*) *bhās*—means 'to sign', 'to bright', 'to appear', 'occur to the mind' etc., still, the word 'bhāsamāna' is mostly used in *śāstric* works to mean 'pratīyamānam = varttamāna-kālīka-pratīti-*viṣayaḥ*' (complete understanding or clear apprehension), as has been explained by Professor N.S.R. Tatacharya in his *Navya*

Nyāya analysis. This explanation is not congruous with this construction. It is obviously wrong due to the inappropriate translation of the word ‘*bright*’ that leads to an inappropriate explanation in terms of *Navya Nyāya* analysis. Therefore, I think ‘*bhāsamāna*’ not a good Sanskrit rendering of the English word ‘*bright*’. It could have been translated as ‘*ruciram*’ or ‘*bhāsuram*’ which could have been compatible with the sentential meaning analysis.

2. The word ‘red rose’ is translated as ‘*rakta-puṣpam*’ (red flower). Perhaps, we do not have a word in Sanskrit for ‘rose’. V.S. Apte’s Dictionary is helpful to some extent when it defines ‘*japā/javā puṣpam*’ as synonym to ‘rose’. I think there is no harm in accepting this name for ‘rose’. How long we will be bereft of the *name* of a flower that is so dear to all of us these days!
3. The English word ‘*subtle*’ is translated into Sanskrit as ‘*sūkṣma*’. However, this translation does not describe the subtle charm of the sentence. Thus I think it could have been rendered as ‘*anirvacanīyam*’ (or *anyādyśam/asādharmaṇam*) because the *Oxford English Dictionary* (OED) defines the word ‘*subtle*’ as: ‘difficult to perceive or describe because fine and delicate’.
4. The word ‘*deeply*’ is an adverb in English but its translation in Sanskrit as ‘*gabhīratayā*’ is a noun (in instrumental singular ending), which has created problem in the sentential analysis in the *Navya Nyāya* framework. (We shall discuss this later on.) It could have been translated only as ‘*gabhīram*’ in an adverbial form.
5. The word ‘*affected*’ is translated as ‘*prabhāvitavān*’, which is derived from the verbal base *bhā-* with the pre-verb *pra-*³, that means ‘begin to become light, shine, gleam, to appear, seem, to look like, to illuminate, enlighten’ etc. These meanings do not come closer to the meaning of ‘*affect*’: ‘have an influence or impression on, act on’ (OED). It is because of this inappropriate translation, Professor Tatacharya goes on explaining it as ‘*pra-pūrvaka-bhā-dhātōḥ*

prakṛṣṭa-jñānam arthaḥ [āśakti-janaka-jñānam arthaḥ], which neither suits the context nor the sentential analysis. This term could have been translated with the verbal base *abhibhū-* (*abhibhūtavān*) which would have given a meaning that is closer to the meaning of the original construction.

6. The phrase '*prārabdha-nitya-bhramaṇā*' which, anybody will agree, certainly is not the translation of the English clause '*when she came for an early morning stroll*'. It is because of this wrong translation, the whole episode in the semantic exposition in the *Navya Nyāya* analysis is misleading. Moreover, the word '*stroll*' is translated '*bhramaṇa*' which is not a very good rendering in Sanskrit. The Sanskrit word '*vihārah*' would have been a better term in this context.
7. The phrase '*a few days back*' in the original sentence has not been translated into Sanskrit.
8. The clause '*she ... says that she would remember the fragrance all her life*' is an indirect statement, whereas '*vadati ca sugandham amum ājīvanam smarisyāmī*' is a direct statement. Though it is desirable to translate an indirect statement into direct statement sometime, it is not desirable here, because it effects the semantic analysis. Therefore, Professor Tatacharya opines that '*sugandham amum smarisyāmi*' refers to the phrase itself but not to the meaning of the phrase. Thus he does not explain the phrase (*atas tasya pṛthag vākyārtho na varnitah*). The question arises that is it desirable to leave the meaning analysis of an indirect statement in the *Navya Nyāya* framework or not. I, however, do agree with Professor Tatacharya that the direct statement need not be explained and he is perfectly right in this case. It is not the translation that makes a difference.

III. The *Śābdabodha*

(As has been presented by Professor N.S.R. Tatacharya)

The *śābdabodha*, as has been presented by Professor N.S.R. Tatacharya, certainly proves the living tradition of the *Navya*

Nyāya analysis with its astounding glory. This is not a simple task but this exercise has made it clear that present-day's scholarship is in no way diminished from that of the works of the great Gaṅgeśa to Raghunātha, from Tattvacintāmaṇi to Didhiti. Of course, it is true that there are very few outstanding scholars like Professor Tatacharya these days who have command over the *Navya Nyāya* exposition in sentential analysis. I am however not very happy with the sentential analysis or the representation of *śābdabodha* as has been given here. It is solely because of the inappropriate translation of the English sentence. Professor Tatacharya however has done a commendable job.

The sentence in question has a complex structure. Its semantic representation is expected to be obviously more complex than the sentence structure. Professor Tatacharya has analyzed the given translation of the original English sentence with a great acumen of the *Navya Nyāya* conceptual framework of the *śābdabodha*. *Śābdabodha* usually considers representing the cognitive structure of the *expression* as has been received by the listener. It of course takes the cognitive mechanism into account and then relates the micro-sentential representations to construe the macrosentential representation (*mahāvākya*). Before proceeding to represent the *śābdabodha* of a complex sentential structure like this one has to identify the embedded clauses of the main structure.

Professor Tatacharya identifies three such embedded clauses of the sentence in question in the following manner and says due to use of 'yat' and 'tat' they all form a 'mahāvākya' (a complex/long sentence).

1. *tad evedaṃ bhāsamānam rakta-puṣpaṃ varttate,*
2. *yasya sūkṣma-madhūra-sugandhaḥ tāṃ sundarīm rājaputrīm tathā gabhīratayā prabhāvītvān,*
3. *yathā sā svakīya-rājodyāne prārabdha-nitya-bhramaṇā adyāpi tadviṣaye sva-sakhibhiḥ saha abhibhāṣate vadati ca sugandham amum ājīvanam smariṣyāmīti.*

According to Professor Tatacharya, the clause [1] is the main clause of this sentence and therefore the so-called 'rakta-puṣpam' is the chief qualificand (*mukhya-viśeṣya*) in the cognitive representation of the sentence being the subject. The clause [2] is about the 'fragrance' (*sugandhaḥ*) which again is the subject in the second clause. The clause [3] is about the 'princess' (*rāja-putrī*). It may be pointed out here that the subjects in all these three clauses are in nominative singular endings (*prathamānta*) and all of them are suited to the conventional theory of the chief qualificand (*mukhya-viśeṣya*) in the cognitive representation in the system of *Navya Nyāya* analysis. Therefore, Professor Tatacharya has very accurately analysed the clause [2] first and then the clause [3] and thereafter he related the whole cognitive representation to the cognitive representation of the clause [1] upholding 'the rose' as the chief qualificand of the *mahāvākya*. Professor Tatacharya of course has proposed a second way out of the cognitive representation, of the *mahāvākya*. According to his second alternative, the clause [3] may be taken first for the sentential analysis and then the clause [2] and thereafter the whole sum of these two clauses may be added to the cognitive representation of [1] for giving the final shape to the cognitive representation of the *mahāvākya*. He, however, takes the first option and goes on to explain the *śābdabodha* of the sentence.

The *śābdabodha* consists of the *padārthas* (the word meanings) and their mutual 'relations' (*saṃsargas*) represented through the conventional process technically called '*saṃsargamaryādā*'. Literally it may be translated as 'the boundary or limit of relation'.⁴ However, this literal translation seems to be incongruous with the conceptual framework of *śābdabodha*. According to the commentators, the term *saṃsargamaryādā* is *rūḍha* ('has a conventional meaning' as opposed to 'etymological meaning') in the sense '*ākāṅkṣā*' (syntactico-semantic expectancy).⁵ Therefore, we may translate the term *saṃsargamaryādā* as 'the governing principle of syntactico-semantic expectancy'. While representing the *śābdabodha* of a

sentence like this, one has to pay special attention to the meaning of the case ending or the affixes/suffixes (*vibhakti/pratyaya*) first, and thereafter to the nouns or verbs. Because the meanings of the nouns and the verbs are almost fixed in the lexicons (i.e., *koṣa/dhātupāṭha*), whereas that is not the case with the case endings. Therefore it is a common phenomena seen in almost all *śābdabodha* works that the *śāstra-kāras* always try to define (or redefine) the meanings of the case endings first and then try to relate it with the meaning of the substantives or the verbal bases as the case may be. The next crucial thing about the *śābdabodha* is to identify the 'relation' (*saṃsarga*), between two so-called *padārthas* (word meanings strictly represented by *vṛtti*), which functions as connective of the word meanings. Though the 'relation' is to be identified strictly according to the principle of '*saṃsarga-maryādā*' (the boundary or limit of relation) still, I am always confronted with the question: does this so-called relational limitation limitless? Is it flexible enough to give scope to imagine any relation that appears to be appropriate/suitable to the cognitive engineer? In other words, is it to some extent subjective? There is indeed an aspect of thinking on relations to be due to *ātma-niṣṭha-pratyāsatti* (the relation based on self-contact) in contrast to that of *viṣayaniṣṭha-pratyāsatti* (the relation based on object-contact). In other words if the relation is subjective then how scientific is the cognitive structure and the cognitive event? If it is objective what is the role of *saṃsargamaryādā* which is often interpreted as '*ākāṅkṣā*' (desire), a quality of the self? These aspects are yet to be seriously investigated upon. I am interested in raising this question in this connection because this is a plain case of *doing* a serious exercise on *Navya Nyāya*. Though I have no serious objections to *what* and *how* Professor Tatacharya has explained the *śābdabodha* here, still there are places where doubt regarding the relations may be raised as to 'why this relation, why not that'. For instance, let us take the *śābdabodha* into consideration of the clause [1] of the

sentence, namely '*tad evedam bhāsamānam rakta-puṣpam varttate*' as has been presented by Professor Tatacharya.

The *śābdabodha* is given as: '*tad-abhinna-tad-anya-bhinna-purovarttyabhinna-varttamānakālīka-pratīti-ṣayābhinna-raktābhinna-puṣpam varttamāna-kālīka-sattāśrayah*'.

Let us relate the sentence/clause [1] to the *śābdabodha*. For that we have to check the words and their respective meanings first and then the relations between the word meanings subsequently. For the sake of clarity, let us do it like this:

- (a) *tad* = this is a relative pronoun and refers to the same meaning which is referred to by the counter relative pronoun *yat* (in the clause [2]).
- (b) *eva* = this is an indeclinable (*avyaya*) and means (in this context) 'other than something, different from itself' (*anya-bhinna ity arthah*). This is how Professor Tatacharya has explained in the most simple manner possible. A traditional scholar would have explained the same in a more sophisticated manner as '*eva-kārasya itaravyavacchedo rthah*', which almost means the same as above.
- (c) *idam* = 'this'. This refers to 'the thing which is present before someone (that he can indicate pointing out to it by his finger/indicator)'. It is explained in Sanskrit as '*purovartti ity arthah*'.
- (d) *bhāsamānam* = *vartamāna-kālīka-pratīti-ṣayā* (see Section I, No. 1).
- (e) *rakta-puṣpam* = [(e_1) *rakta* + (e_2) *puṣpa*] *raktābhinna-puṣpam* (see Section I, No. 2).
- (f) *varttate* = [(f_1) *vṛt-* + (f_2) *-te*] = *vṛt-* means '*sattā*' (existence) and *-te* means '*āśrayatvam*' and '*vartamānakālīkatvam*' ('substratum' and 'belonging to present time').

The relations between the meanings of the words have been presented by Professor Tatacharya in the following manner:

1. The relation between the meanings of (a) and (b) is *abheda* (identity);

2. The relation between the meanings (c) and (e) is also *abheda*;
3. The same between the meanings of (d) and (e) is also *abheda*;
4. The relation between the meanings of (e₁) and (e₂) is also *abheda*;
5. The relation between the meanings of (f₁) and (f₂) is *janakatā* represented by the primary suffix *ka*.

The relation between the meanings of (d) (*viz. vartamāna-kālika-pratīti-viśaya*) and (e) (*viz. raktābhinnam puṣṣam*) has been given *abheda* (see 3). This is of course true. But I think there is possibility of contemplating different relations in the following manner if we consider the *śābdabodha* of this sub-clause as:

- (a) '*vartamāna-kālika-pratīti-viśyatā-nirūpaka-raktābhinnam puṣṣam*' or
- (b) '*vartamāna-kalika-pratīti-viśaya-niṣṭha-viśyatā nirūpakaraktābhinnam puṣṣam*' or simply
- (c) '*vartamāna-kālika-pratīti-viśyaka-raktābhinnam puṣṣam*'.

Well, what I am doing is trying to expand the simple cognitive structure into more complex cognitive structure. This further can be expanded and this is called *pariṣkāra-prakriyā*. The purpose behind this is to make the cognitive event more explicit, clearer, and more unambiguous. However in essence they do not differ from one another. But the point to be noted is that this expansion is technically possible due to the concept of '*saṃsargamaryādā*' which seems to be flexible in nature, of course within the limit of its conceptual framework. The question, as has already been pointed out, is 'how flexible is it?' To what extent does *saṃsargamaryādā* limit/restrict the application of a relation? For instance, we can say '*pratīti-viśayābhinna-raktapuṣṣam*' represents the same cognitive structure as that of the '*pratīti-viśyatā-nirūpaka-raktapuṣṣam*'. However, can we say '*abheda*' is the same relation which is represented by the primary suffix *ka* to the substantive '*viśaya*'?

The reply will certainly be in the negative. Because, the suffix *ka* (*nirūpaka*) is a *bheda* relation-whereas the other is an *abheda* relation and in that case can it be said that the *abheda* relation is convertible with a *bheda* relation? It is of course evident in the *śāstric* works that they are inter-convertibles, since the term *abheda* is explained as: (a) *bhedatvāvacchinnābhāvaḥ*, (b) *bhedapratiyogikābhāvaḥ*, (c) *bheda* and *abhāva* (being related appropriately). The inter-convertibility of *bheda* and *abheda* leads to the question of their ontological reality and logical compatibility. There are a lot of issues that can be raised in this connection and that invite serious attention.

IV. The Whole Exercise

Now may we think on the merit and demerit of the whole exercise? To my mind even though this is a very interesting exercise, still how useful is it if we just do *Navya Nyāya* without thinking about the questions and issues as has been pointed out above. Moreover, I do not think it is necessary to 'deliberately construct' a complex sentence in English and then try to translate the same into Sanskrit (which often loses its original flavour) and then try to exercise its *śābdabodha*. If this is the aim, then why go for a roundabout way of thinking/constructing a sentence in English and then translating it into Sanskrit and then exercising to give the cognitive structure of the same in *Navya Nyāya* framework? We can do the same picking up any *śloka/vākya* from the vast and marvellous literature in Sanskrit. We should think ourselves fortunate to have a very rich literature both in prose and poetry in Sanskrit. For the sake of *śābdabodha*, can't we find an appropriate (and if required, complex) sentence from it? Have we forgotten the great Mahākāvyas like Kādambarī or Daśakumāracaritam? Well, if we would like to concentrate only on a sentence where a *prathamānta* (nominative singular) is present as the chief qualificand then we have an innumerable number of sentences

in our literature. Therefore, I do not think this type of exercise shows a very healthy intellectual trend. We should instead seriously concentrate upon deliberating on different issues and concepts and their applicability to the modern linguistic and logical concepts. We should also try to reinvestigate the historical development of the conceptual framework for emphasizing the rich tradition of *Navya Nyāya* and we should go for constructing a comparative logic and epistemology.

Notes and References

1. I am using *Microsoft Word* for word processing job.
2. A colleague of mine who is a professor in English says that the sentence in question is certainly grammatically wrong.
3. *Prabhāvitavān* is also derived from the verbal base (*dhātu*) *pra-bhū* (where the *dhātū* is *bhū* with the pre-verb *pra*, which means 'to come forth, spring up, arise or originate from, appear, become visible, happen, occur, etc. However, Professor Tatacharya has taken it to be derived from *pra-bhā* while explaining the sentential analysis.
4. *Encyclopaedia of Indian Philosophies—The Philosophy of Grammar-ians* (1990) translates *samsarga-maryādā* as 'association of word meanings' (p. 10, 98) or 'the power of association' (p. 96). Matilal, B.K. (1968, p. 152) translates it as 'relational seam'.
5. '*samsarga-maryādā-śabda ākāṅkṣāyām rūḍhaḥ*'. See *Tippaṇī* on VV-S, p. 10.

(c) The *Navya Nyāya* Analysis of the *Mahāvākya*: Some Comments. Response to the Comments on the *Mahāvākya* Received from N.S.R. Tatacharya

I

The intention of this paper is to give some comments on the *Navya Nyāya* analysis of *Mahāvākya* (the sentence and its

Sanskrit translation appeared in *JICPR*, Vol. XV, No. 1) given by Professor N.S.R. Tatacharya.

II

In connection with determining the meaning of the large sentence (*Mahāvākyaārtha*) Professor Tatacharya has divided the sentence into three parts, viz., (a) This is the same bright red rose, (b) Whose sweet and subtle fragrance deeply affected the beautiful princess, (c) At the time of her early morning stroll in the private royal garden a few days back, she still talks about it to her friends and says that she would remember the fragrance all her life.

Professor Tatacharya has first explained the second part of the sentence—'*Yasya sūkṣmamadhurasugandhaḥ tām sundarīm rajaputrīm tathā gabhūratayā prabhāvitavān.*' The meaning of the genitive case in *yasya* is the relation which is connected with fragrance. In this context the identical relation prevails in two objects—subtle and sweet. The meaning of the term '*taḥ*' found in '*tām*' is connected with the princess who is identical with the meaning of the term 'beautiful'. The suffix '*thāl*' in the term '*tathā*' gives rise to principal adjective (*prakāra*). The term '*taḥ*' (in *tām*) refers to the meanings expressed through the term '*yaḥ*' found in '*yathā*'. The meaning of the term '*rājaputrī*' (princess) is 'the daughter of the king' (*rājasambandhi*). The second case-ending attached to *putrīm* refers to the superstratumness (*ādheyatvam*) limited by the relation of inherence (*samavāyasambandhāvachinna*), which is again related to *rājaputrī* through the relation of being determined (*nirūpitatva*). The term '*prabhāvitavān*' is derived from root *bhā* if preceded by the prefix *pra*, which means best cognition (*prakṛṣṭajñānam*) or cognition generating desire (*āsaktijanaka-jñānamarthaḥ*). The suffix *ñij* attached to this means favourable action (*anukūlavayāpārah*). The suffix *ktavatu* gives rise to the meanin—the substratum (*āsraya*). It is connected with sweet fragrance through the relation of identity.

If all the terms are combined, it will have the following comprehensive meaning:

The fragrance which is identical with sweetness and subtleness is related to that which is endowed with action favourable to best cognition qualified with depth which is again qualified by the chief qualifier of that inhered in the daughter related to royal race and endowed with full beauty ('*yat sambandhī sūkṣmābhinnamadhurābhinnasurabhigandhaḥ tadabhinnasundary-abhinna-rājasambandhiḥputrīsemaveta-tatprakāravīśiṣṭa-gabhīratva-vīśiṣṭa-prakṛṣṭa-jñānānūkūla-vyāpāravadabhinnah'*).

III

The third part of the sentence runs as follows: '*yathā sāvakīyarājodyāne prārabdhanitya-bhramaṇā adyāpi tadviśaye svasakhībhiḥ saha abhibhāṣate, vadati ca sugandhamamum ājīvanam smarīṣyāmīti*'.

In this part of the sentence the term *yathā* means chief qualifier (*prakāra*) signified by the suffix '*thāl*' adduced to the term *yat*. It is construed with the phenomenon of saying and addressing (*abhibhāṣaṇa*) coming from the meaning of the roots—*vada* and *bhāṣa* prefixed by *abhi* through the relation of substratumness (*āśrayatāsambandha*). The meaning of the term *svakīya* is the royal garden in relation to self (own) and which is identical with garden in relation to king (*rājasambandhyudyaṇa*). The meaning of the locative case-ending is the substratumness (*adhikaraṇatva*). In this context the royal garden is related to the locative case through the relation of superstratumness (*ādheyatāsambandha*) and the substratumness (*adhikaraṇatva*) is related to strolling (*bhramaṇa*) through the relation of determinatoriness (*nirūpakatāsambandha*). The term '*prārabdha*' means *prārabdhakarma* (action) which is connected with 'a part of regular strolling' (*nityabhramaṇaikadeśa*) through the relation of identity. The term '*nityabhramaṇa*'—is either 'woman

strolling at all times' (*sārvakālikabhramaṇavatī*) or woman strolling everyday (*pratidinabhramaṇavatī*). This adjective is construed with the princess, the meaning of the term '*taṭ*', through relation of identity. The term '*adya*' (today) means 'this particular day' (*etaddinam*). The term '*api*' has got a different import which is 'the assemblage of earlier days' (*pūrvadinasamuccayah*), which is connected with 'this day' through the relation of substratumness (*āśrayatāsambandhena*). The relation between 'this day' and 'addressing' is through the temporal relation (*kālikasambandha*). The term '*tadviśayah*' means the identity between '*thāl* in *taṭ* and object (*viśaya*). In this context the term '*taṭ*' is used as a pointer to 'the cognition of sweet smell' (*sugandhaparāmarśaka*). The locative case-ending refers to the 'contentness which is connected with that object' (*tadviśaya*) through the relation of superstratumness (*ādheyatāsambandha*). The contentness is connected with the phenomenon of addressing (*abhibhāṣana*) through the relation of determinatoriness (*nirūpakatā*). The term '*svasakhī*' means 'friends in relation to her own' (*svasambandhisakhī*). The 'third-case-ending' has got the meaning of agentness (*karṭṛtva*) which is connected with 'own friend' (*svasakhī*) through the relation of superstratumness (*ādheyatāsambandha*). The 'agentness' (referred to by third case-ending) is construed with the activity of addressing, a portion of the meaning of the term '*saha*' i.e., 'togetherness' (*sāhityam*). The definition of addressing (*abhibhāṣaṇa*) is 'the usage of words for generating cognition' (*jñānajanakaśabdaprayogaḥ*). The first addressing or saying which is included under the meaning of the term '*saha*' is connected with the 'agentness', the meaning of the third case-ending. The second addressing or saying is construed with the princess, the meaning of the term '*taṭ*' through the relation of agentness. The verbal suffix in *abhibhāṣate* means 'effort' (*kṛtī*). Here the meaning of the verb is connected with this (*kṛtī*) through the relation of favourability (*anukūlatāsambandha*). The 'effort' is connected with 'the princess' through the relation of substratumness. The term '*itī*' refers to the meaning of the

a sub-section of the section—‘I shall remember this fragrance during the whole life’ (*sugandhamamumājīvanam smariṣyāmi*). This is again connected with ‘the usage of the words generating cognition’, the meaning of the root ‘*vada*’ through the relation of substratumness. The meaning of the verb—‘*vadati*’ is volition (*kṛti*) which is connected with the meaning of the root through the relation of favourability (*anukūlatāsambandha*). The ‘volition’ (*kṛti*) is related to princess through the relation of substratumness. The term ‘*ca*’ (and) means ‘collection of *abhībhāṣana*’ (*abhībhāṣaṇasamuccayah*), which is connected with the phenomenon of saying (*kathana*) through relation of substratumness.

This is the analysis of the second part of the *Mahāvākya*.

IV

The analysis of the first part—‘*tadevaṃ bhāsamānaṃ raktapuṣpaṃ vartate*’ is as follows. The term ‘*ta*’ here refers to the particular meaning expressed by the term ‘*ya*’ existing in ‘*yasya*’. The term *eva* is used to give an emphasis on this particular meaning different from other (*anyabhinna*). The meaning of the term ‘*ta*’ and ‘*eva*’ have got connection with red flower (*raktapuṣpa*). The term *idaṃ* is used to refer to an object existing in front, (*purovartī*) which is identical with red-flower. The word ‘*bhāsamāna*’ means appearance (*pratīyamāna*) of something known in the present tense, which is identical with red-flower. The ‘red-flower’, a flower identical with this property—‘*red*’ (*raktābhinna*). The root ‘*vṛ*’ means ‘to exist’ (*sattā*). The suffix ‘*te*’ (in *vartate*) indicates substratumness (*āśrayatva*) and ‘being in present tense’ (*vartamānakālikatva*). The former is construed with the red-flower while the latter with the state of being (*sattā*).

The whole meaning of this part is ascertained as follows. The knowledge of the substratum of being in the present tense of the flower identical with redness which is identical with the

object known in the present tense and identical with an object existing in front, which is again identical with that which is referred earlier (*Tadabhinna-tadanyabhinna-purovartyabhinna-vartamāna-kālika-pratīti-viṣayābhinna-raktābhinnapuṣpaṃ vartatamānakālika-sattāśrayaḥ iti bodhaḥ*).

V. Comments

Following the *Navya Nyāya* analysis of the different parts of the *Mahāvākya* we have an idea about the justification of each and every term, each and every grammatical formation of the terms, each and every prefix and suffix and some *avyayas* used in the sentence. The English rendering of the meaning is given for the better understanding of the non-Sanskritists. I personally agree with the analysis of Professor Tatacharya to some extent. Though it seems to be clumsy to go through the different parts of the sentence, it is necessary for the sake of accurate and precise expression following the *Navya Nyāya* terminology. As for example, the meaning of *rājaputrī* is *rājasambandhiputri* the second case-ending in *putrīm* gives rise to the meaning of the superstratumness limited by relation of inherence (*samavāyasambandhāvacchinna-mādheyatvaṃ*), *raktapuṣpaṃ* means a flower identical with the property 'red' (*raktābhinnam puṣpaṃ*), the *avyayas* like 'eva' 'api' (in *adyāpi*) etc. meaning 'anyabhinna' (different from other), 'pūrvadina-samuccaya' (assemblage of the previous day) etc. These specific meanings can be pointed out if many peculiar relations and technical terms are used.

It is said in connection with the second part of the sentence that 'nityabhramana-śabdasya sārva-kālikabhramaṇavatī athavā pratidinabhramaṇavatī'. In this connection I would like to mention that the original term should be 'nityabhramaṇā' (with feminine suffix *ṭāp*) but not *nityabhramaṇa* as mentioned by Professor Tatacharya. Moreover, the meaning of the term *nitya* as *sārva-kālika* or *pratidina* may be questioned. Is it really the

intention of the speaker that the beautiful princess comes for a stroll 'everyday' (*pratidinam*) or 'always' (*sārvakālīka*)? *I do not think so*. Because from the English sentence it is known that 'the beautiful princess came for an early morning stroll'. Here the term '*nitya*' is redundant, as there is no mention of everyday stroll or stroll covering all times (*sārvakālīka*). If at all the term *nitya* is kept intact, the meaning of it as *sārvakālīka* should seek a justification which is lacking in the present analysis. Moreover, the Sanskrit translation of the term—'an early morning' is not done in the given translation. The term '*nitya*' should have been replaced by the word—'*prātaḥ*', to keep the sanctity of the original English sentence, which is unfortunately not done.

In context of the explanation of the second part of the sentence, Professor Tatacharya has given the different meaning of the actions—*abhibhāṣaṇa* and *kathana*. To him the meaning of the root *bhāṣa* prefixed by *abhi* is *abhibhāṣaṇa* (addressing)—*abhipūrvakabhāṣa-dhātvartha abhibhāṣaṇa* and the meaning of the verb *vada* is 'saying'—*vadadhatvārthe kathane*. Though the difference is shown in the first part, these are not maintained afterwards, but used in the same sense in the second part of his elucidation. The definition of *abhibhāṣa* is given as '*jñānajanakaśabdaprayogaḥ*' (i.e. the application of words giving rise to cognition). Afterwards Professor Tatacharya has taken the meaning of *abhibhāṣaṇa* and '*kathana*' in the same sense, because the former is referred to as *prathamābhibhāṣaṇa* while the latter as *dviṭīyābhibhāṣaṇa*. In fact, there are two verbs—*abhibhāṣaṇa* and *kathana* in two different contexts and hence these two cannot be used in the same sense. The first one is used in the context of general experience and the second one is in the context of specific sentence in the form—'I will remember this sweet fragrance all my life'. These specific meanings are hinted at with the usage of the two verbs, which should have a separate mention in the analysis. However, the given analysis may be taken for granted if the meaning of the term *abhibhāṣaṇa* is taken in a general sense

'*jñānanakaśabdaprayogaḥ*' i.e., the usage of a term for generating some cognition, then both the verbs can be taken in the same sense, which perhaps Professor Tatacharya wants to mean.

Lastly, one may raise a question whether 'sweet fragrance' can really be translated as '*madhuraḥ sugandhaḥ*'. The term '*sugandha*' means '*surabhiḥgandha*' i.e., sweet smell, in one word, fragrance. If it is so, why is the adjunct '*madhuraḥ*' inserted to *sugandha*? Is it not tautologous? I do not know if there is any justification of such usage. Professor Tatacharya also did not highlight this issue, which was essential in the *Navya Nyāya* pattern of analysis accepted to be most precise and accurate in logical thinking. If it is said '*amadhuraḥ sugandhaḥ*', it is contradictory in terms. If something is *amadhuraḥ*, non-sweet or bitter, it is no more *sugandha* or fragrance. Again, the explanation of the concept of subtlety (*sukṣmatva*) is not given by Professor Tatacharya. One can similarly raise a question—Is there any *sugandha* in this world which is of *shūla* (as opposed to *sūkṣma*) type? These probable questions are not replied to in the given *bhāṣya* of the Mahāvākya.

RAGHUNATH GHOSH

The Concept of *Āhārya-Jñāna*: Some Queries

MUKUND LATH

The Concept of *Āhārya-Jñānā*: Some Queries

I have been recently looking into some works by Viśveśvara Pāṇdeya, a thinker of the earlier part of the eighteenth century. Lively and innovative, Viśveśvara has written on a number of subjects. In *vyākaraṇa*, he composed a new commentary on the *Aṣṭādhyayī* of Pāṇini, taking especial note of philosophical issues. The first three chapters of this work have been published. Viśveśvara was also concerned with philosophy more directly and has two works on Nyāya or rather Navya-nyāya: the *Tarka-kutūhala** and *Dīdhiti-prakāśa*; these works, so far as I know, are unpublished.

What interests me here is a work of Viśveśvara on *alaṅkāra*, the *Alaṅkāra-kaustubham*. It seems to be one of the first works of its kind to make detailed and extensive use of the full force of Navya-nyāya methods and terminology in the area of poetics. It defines different *alaṅkāras*, figures of poetic speech, with Navya-nyāya precision, carefully distinguishing one *alaṅkāra* from another through definition and analysis, raising

*The *Tarka-kutūhala* has been published.

questions, presenting counter-examples of *avyāptis* (examples which the definition should include but does not), and *ativyāptis* (examples that should lie outside the definition but do not) and taking up arguments seeking to demolish the definition presented. This is a procedure which, at its best, in seeking to demarcate boundaries with articulate finesse, imparts, interestingly, a richness of conceptual detail and nuance to the area that lies *within* a boundary.

Using Navya-nyāya logic and language, one cannot avoid bringing in Navya-nyāya ontology and epistemology—or so it seems to me. Viśveśvara, indeed, *uses* them deliberately for his own purposes, as my query, I hope, will show.

A distinction—which Viśveśvara makes at length and with great deliberation—is made between two major *alaṅkāras*, *upamā* ('simile', which depends on 'sādṛśya' or 'similarity' between two disparate things) and *rūpaka* ('metaphor', which leans on *abheda* or 'identity'). In Viśveśvara, as in all good Ālaṅkārikas, one is aware of the distinction at two different levels: the intuitive, or rather the aesthetics, and the structural or the linguistic, that is, the different words and expressions through which the two *alaṅkāras* are articulated. Viśveśvara, like other Ālaṅkārikas seeks meaningfully to combine the two levels in his exposition. The main focus is on capturing the unique 'feel', the individual evocative force of an *alaṅkāra*—its *vicchitti-viśeṣa* in Viśveśvara's own words—as different from others. In doing so, Viśveśvara, with his love of Navya-nyāya, devotes great attention to the logical analysis of the language used to express the two *alaṅkāras*. He grants, however, that language in poetry has an evocative power or *vyāñjanā*, not amenable to a straight-forward structural analysis, and that, structurally or grammatically, the same language that expresses a simile is also used to express an inane, quite *vicchitti*-less, similarity. The judgement of the *sahyodaya*, therefore, must be kept in mind. Conceptual finesse lies in the skill with which this judgement itself can be articulated, especially in distinguishing *alaṅkāras* like *upamā* and *rūpaka* which, though distinct, are yet also felt

to be close to each other (Viśveśvara describes 63 distinct *alaṅkāras*). The attempt, to take an example from another field, is like discriminating discursively between different *rāgas*, close in structure to each other.

What I have tried, briefly, to sketch above is to introduce the context of my queries and what Viśveśvara is intent upon, for it is my feeling that few, if any, of my readers even among those who are Naiyāyikas, would have heard of this evidently important thinker, who is better known to Ālaṅkārikas. I do not wish to expound Viśveśvara's thought here which, obviously, needs a lengthier and fuller deliberation.

Let me come now to my queries. They concern a concept used by Viśveśvara in distinguishing *rūpaka* from *upamā*. The concept of *āharya-jñāna*. According to Ālaṅkārikas, what distinguishes *rūpaka* (expressed in the standard example as, *mukhaṁ candraḥ*—'face-moon') from *upamā* (expressed as *candra iva mukhaṁ*—'moon-like face') is an overpowering sense of *abheda* (non-difference or identity). Both *upamā* and *rūpaka*, it is argued, share a sense of *sādṛśya*, similarity, between two disparate things, but in *rūpaka* this *sādṛśya* is pushed to the background and overpowered by *abheda*, the feeling that the two things are one and not separate, and this is what distinguishes *rūpaka* from *upamā*. 'Everyone agrees', Viśveśvara remarks at the end of his discussion of *rūpaka*, 'that the body of the *rūpaka* is formed through a *sādṛśya* (similarity) between two distinct things and is, thus, based on a sense of *bheda* (difference)—*bhedagarbhasādṛśyasya rūpakaśarīratvena sarvasammatatvād...*'. However, its soul, which marks it as *rūpaka* and distinct from *upamā*, lies in *abheda*. Viśveśvara expresses this in his formal 'definition' of *rūpaka*, embodied in a *kārikā*, which initiates his discussion of *rūpaka*. His 'definition' is as follows: '*rūpaka* is the *alaṅkāra* where there is *abheda* (non-difference) between that to which something is compared (this is the *upameya*, the *mukha* in our example), and the thing it is compared to (the *upamāna*, *candra* in our example)—*tadrūpakam tvabhedaḥ syādupamānopameyayoyatra*'. (see pp. 203-14 of the

Alaṅkāra-kaustubham, with Viśveśvara's *Kārikās*, *Vṛtti* and *Vyākhyā*, reprinted by Chaukhamba Sanskrit Pratisthan, Delhi, 1987).

The peculiar feel or *bodha* of *abheda*, lying in a tension between similarity and identity, that marks a metaphor, had posed a kind of theoretical challenge to interested thinkers and many Ālaṅkārikas had tried to characterize the *bodha* through different conceptual moves. Viśveśvara summarises and discusses the more 'modern' of these moves which had by his time already begun to travel the pathways of Navya-nyāya.

The Naiyāyikas (meaning the Navya-naiyāyikas), he says, make use of the concept of *āhārya-jñāna* in this context. *Āhārya-jñāna* may be roughly translated as 'make-belief knowledge'. The dress an actor assumes in becoming someone he is not, is known as *āhārya*; though I am not sure if this association—obvious to me—is also present in the Naiyāyika's mind in using the word '*āhārya*'. It does not seem so.

The Naiyāyika argues: when we utter a sentence such as, *mukhaṁ candraḥ*, identifying the *mukha* with *candra*, there is a *bādha* or rather the knowledge of a *bādha*, a *bādha-jñāna*, an obstructive knowledge, which prevents the two words to be conjoined into a sentence. In *mukhaṁ candraḥ* (very roughly, just to present the words, 'face-moon'), the togetherness of *mukha* and *candra* has a grammatical intent of producing a sense of *abheda* or identity between *mukha* and *candra*. But we know that the two are distinct things and cannot be identical. This *bādha-jñāna* comes in the way of even letting *mukhaṁ candraḥ* become a meaningful sentence. How, then, do we actually take the expression as a *rūpaka*, despite the *bādha-jñāna*? It is here that *āhārya-jñāna* comes into play. It overrides the *bādha-jñāna*. *Āhārya-jñāna* functions through my *icchā*. When I have an *āhārya-jñāna*, I willingly, out of my own *icchā*, overcome *bādha-jñāna* and allow a knowledge to take place which would not have otherwise taken place. The standard example given here is, *vahninā siñcati*—'wets with fire'—an instance where *bādha-jñāna*, for the Naiyāyika, totally obstructs sense, since we know that fire cannot wet. Here, too, Viśveśvara says,

āhārya-jñāna can, according to certain Naiyāyikas, function, allowing *vahninā siñcati* to make sense. This for the Naiyāyika is a really extreme example. Viśveśvara does not, however, specify, what kind of sense *vahninā siñcati* now makes. Is it a figure of speech? He does not say so. From what he says, it appears that *āhārya-jñāna* is granted the force of rendering the (for the Naiyāyika) nonsensical jumble of words that is *vahninā siñcati* into an ordinary meaningful sentence.

In Nyāya thinking it is necessary that a *yogyatā*, a 'fittingness' be there for two words to be related in a certain way in verbal knowledge, and *yogyatā* depends not upon grammar but upon the nature of the things being related. *Vahninā siñcati* lacks *yogyatā*, since fire cannot be instrumentally related to the act of wetting, and hence is absurd; it cannot give rise to any knowledge at all. Nyāya, I should think, can yet allow the possibility of sense here through more than one move, *lakṣaṇā* for example. The Ālaṅkārikas among the *Naiyāyikas* had chosen to bring in the concept of *āhārya-jñāna*. *Āhārya* works through my desire to have the knowledge. I willingly grant *yogyatā* (and so it is called *āhārya-yogyatā*) where it is not otherwise there (allowing fire, in our example, an instrumentality it does not have, and conjoining *mukham* with *candraḥ* with a relation of *abheda*).

This is an interesting move, but to my mind it gives rise to a number of queries.

(1) It appears to me that the concept of *āhārya-jñāna* itself has no conceptual *yogyatā* (if one might use such a term) to be allowed a place in the Nyāya scheme of things. Nyāya has a kind of essentialism which insists that *yogyatā* is given in the very nature of things and their relations; expressions which flout it cannot, in principle, give rise to *śābdabodha* or verbal knowledge. How, I wonder, can the concept of *āhārya-jñāna*, then, be at all accommodated in Nyāya? Also, there is the question of the relation between *icchā* and *jñāna*, a question interesting in itself; but taking the question in regard to Nyāya, I cannot see how *icchā* can be instrumental in *producing*

knowledge, as it is in *āhārya-jñāna*? One can imagine 'desire for knowledge' (*jñāneccha*) in Nyāya but how can one think of 'knowledge produced through desire' (*icchā-janya-jñāna*)? *Lakṣaṇā*, Nyāya allows, and *lakṣaṇā* can get rid of *bādha*. But *lakṣaṇā* has an associative logic of its own and functions as a means for removing quirks in language, arising out of usage. It is not *icchā*-produced, and thus not incongruous in Nyāya. But *lakṣaṇā*, some thought, might straighten out a wayward sentence, translating it into a 'correct' one. It cannot fully explain metaphor.

Viśveśvara reproduces a line of argument concerning the inadequacy of *lakṣaṇā* for *rūpaka*. The argument was that all *lakṣaṇā* can do in a case of metaphor such as *mukhaṁ candraḥ* is to project similarity through association (*mukha* is similar to *candra* for it shares the attributes of beauty, radiance, pleasingness and the like which *candra* has), and thus removing the *bādha* produced by the awareness that *mukha* is not *candra*, conjoin *mukhaṁ* and *candraḥ* into a sentence. But then what we will have is a simile and not a metaphor. Because for metaphor a sense of *abheda* is essential, and it is for this reason that it becomes necessary to bring in *āhārya-jñāna*.

Another thing I remember in this context is that during the *saṁvāda*, which was later recorded in the book *Samvāda: A Dialogue Between Two Philosophical Traditions* (ICPR and Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1991), Professor Sibajiban Bhattacharyya had raised the question: how does the Naiyāyika understand the meaning of the sentence, *śabda nityaḥ*—'sound is eternal'—since for him the sentence is as meaningless as *vahninā siñcatī*? And if the Naiyāyika does not understand the sentence, how does he refute it (*Samvāda*, p. 151, etc.)? In his interesting answer Badrinath Shukla had used some intriguing concepts to explain the Naiyāyika's comprehension of such sentences, but not the concept of *āhārya-jñāna*. The question is, could the concept have been used?

(2) This brings me to another puzzle. *Āhārya-jñāna*, it appears, is believed by Naiyāyikas to be possible only in *pratyakṣa*,

'direct perception'. (This may have been why Badrinathji did not use it). But such a notion seems even more incongruous in the Nyāya scheme than the notion of *āhārya-jñāna* itself. Illusions are another matter; they are not the wilful seeing of one thing as quite another. And illusion disappears when the thing is perceived for what it is. *Āhārya-jñāna*, on the contrary, comes into operation upon seeing things as they are and then moving into a world of imagination. The question, however, is how can *pratyakṣa* in Nyāya accommodate *āhārya*?

It seems, though, from what I have understood from the *Nyāyakośa* of Bhīmācārya Jhalkīkar (see under *āhārya*) that *āhārya* could not only mean a kind of willing perception but it could also be somewhat similar to *bhrama* or illusion. It was seeing something with an attribute the 'opposite', so to say, of what it actually had (*svavirodhi-dharma-dharmitāvācchedaṃ svaprakāraṃ jñānam*). For example, seeing a mountain with fire as without fire. Such 'seeing', or such *āhārya-jñāna*, has not been characterized by Jhalkīkar as a 'willing knowledge', as Viśveśvara clearly characterizes the *āhārya* that he speaks of ('*satyapy ukta bādhanjñāne mukhatvāvācchinnaviśeṣyatāka abhedasamsargaka candratvāvācchinna prakāraaka bodho jāyatāmiti योग्यताज्ञानं sambhavatyeva, icchadhīnajñāne bādhabuddhera-pratibandhakatvāt*', op. cit., *Vyākhyā*, p. 207, where the *Vṛtti*, explained in the *Vyākhyā* here, takes up *āhārya-jñāna*, calling it a Naiyāyika's concept). Jhalkīkar notes other examples of similar *bhrama*-like *āhāryas* which appear to be different kinds of the same species. These are not imbued with the spirit of a conceptual reaching out towards the world of imagination, which Viśveśvara's *āhārya* has, and, moreover, one cannot help wondering why they should not be included under *bhrama*? Why form a new category? The Ālaṅkārikas among the Naiyāyikas, who brought in *āhārya*, had, evidently, felt that they needed a concept which was distinct from *bhrama* if one were to properly comprehend metaphor. Still, one is bound to ask how the concept was made to fit into Nyāya, if at all. Or,

how can a Naiyāyika do so within the system, even though it may not have been done earlier.

(3) Intriguingly, the *bhrama*-like *āhārya* and the *icchā* produced *āhārya* have both been made to share a strange property. They are both limited to *pratyakṣa*. But metaphors are expressed in language, and should be a species of *sābdabodha*, how, then, can an *āhārya* which is confined to *pratyākṣa* be meaningful in explaining them? One would think that *āhārya* belongs to the field of *parokṣa*. It is a concept meant to articulate fiction, and some Naiyāyikas, it appears—though not Viśveśvara—had extended it to *sābdabodha*. On what grounds, I do not know. In *pratyakṣa*, too, one can, I think, imagine instances of *āhārya-jñāna*. Theatre comes immediately to mind. Besides, there are games where one willingly assumes one thing to be another: a chair could be monster ‘who’ will eat you if you sit on it.... Such a thing is done even in explaining layouts: a glass on the table can become a house from which another glass, the house we want to reach, is shown to be lying at such a distance, in such a direction. And so on. But Naiyāyikas, even if they be Ālaṅkārikas, do not seem to have such examples in mind, so far as I know. They do not extend the scope of *āhārya* beyond metaphor into a realm of *āhārya* worlds in general. Is this merely accidental or is there something in the grain of Nyāya which goes against it?

(4) But can *āhārya* not be extended to ‘virtual’ worlds in general, even to theoretical models and theory-making? Can we, in fact, not talk of *āhārya* worlds of different kinds? Let us make some Nyāka-like argumentative moves and probe at possible *vyāptis* and *vyāvṛttis* in order to see how far we can extend the concept of *āhārya*. (Such moves may not be exactly Nyāya-like, where the usual move is the other way round: to intuitively assume a field and define it through *lakṣaṇa*, examining it for *avyāptis* and *ativyāptis*, and modifying it for a better fit, but they are, I think, quite in the same spirit.) Taking metaphor as the basic (*mūrdhanya*) example, the *vyāpti*, I feel, can be extended

'direct perception'. (This may have been why Badrinathji did not use it). But such a notion seems even more incongruous in the Nyāya scheme than the notion of *āhārya-jñāna* itself. Illusions are another matter; they are not the wilful seeing of one thing as quite another. And illusion disappears when the thing is perceived for what it is. *Āhārya-jñāna*, on the contrary, comes into operation upon seeing things as they are and then moving into a world of imagination. The question, however, is how can *pratyakṣa* in Nyāya accommodate *āhārya*?

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or provisional *bādha*, and not an actual one. But then one would have to modify the *lakṣaṇa* or characterization of *āhārya-jñāna* we have set out with, and a good Naiyāyika will do this, if he feels that the objection is well-taken. (The question, of course, can arise that in comprehending metaphor, too, can we really speak of a *bādha*, or is it that the Naiyāyika feels so because he takes a certain sense-perceived world to be given and true? But let us not raise this question here. Yet, supposing we modify our *lakṣaṇa*, we can, may be, move to divide *bādha* itself into two distinct kinds, (1) actual and (2) virtual or possible. The problem, then would be to understand the concept of a possible or virtual *bādha*. Can such a *bādha* really be a *bādha*? But let us make a further move in what we had been saying earlier. A scientific hypothesis is just a step towards a scientific theory. But if the theory, according to a well-known principle, is to be considered essentially falsifiable, then is the *bādha* not built into the very fabric of the scientific conception of truth? Why should we not consider scientific knowledge *āhārya-jñāna*? A scientific theory, one might object, is plainly different from a metaphor. But why should the concept be limited to metaphor and not extended to scientific theories—or the world of theories in general—if this can be done without a proper and valid *bādha*? For if there is a *vyāvṛtti* here, it has to be shown. The concept of *abhyupagama* in Nyāya seems to me to come close to the making, or at least the consideration of hypotheses, why should the knowledge of *abhyupagama* not be *āhārya-jñāna*? *Siddhānta* in Nyāya, however, seems to have been made immune to *āhārya*. But is it really so? For a non-Naiyāyika, for example.

But let me also try and take up what appear to me as some *avyāptis*, which the *lakṣaṇa* of *āhārya* as the knowledge of imaginary worlds should, ideally, include but does not. *Āhārya* assumes the privileged knowledge of a 'real' world, which creates a *bādha* when we wish to enter a world of imagination; and we must willingly suspend or override the *bādha* if we wish to do

so. What about music then, the pure music of *rāgas*, or pure dance, *nr̥tta*, or abstract painting or even pure design? These appear to be worlds created through imagination, yet can we speak of *āhārya-jñāna* here? If so where is the *bādha* projected by the knowledge of a real world? We just slip into these worlds of the imagination, without anything obstructing us. Perhaps we can speak of an *icchā* here, but on what grounds can we speak of a *bādha*? And if there is no *bādha*, can we speak of the knowledge (which is a willing, absorbed awareness) of these worlds as *āhārya*? But why limit ourselves to the arts, granted generally to be realms of imagination. What about some realms of thought: mathematics and logic, for example. Can we not place them in the arena of the *āhārya*? But mathematics, it may be argued, is certainly different from music in the sense that mathematics can apply to reality. But what about those areas of mathematics which have no such application? Would they be *bādhita* and need *āhārya-jñāna* for us to be able to enter them? These pure worlds of the arts and of thought have each a sense of *yogyatā* or appropriateness of their own. Hence we can speak of *bādha* within them. Is this *bādha* in any sense analogous to the *bādha* arising in the Naiyāyika's *āhārya*? If so, can we suspend or override it through an analogous *āhārya*? It does not seem so, and so it would appear that *āhārya* functioning through an *icchā* created *āhārya-yogyatā* is out of bounds here.

What I have said may have strayed and meandered, somewhat frivolously, perhaps, at places, but I feel it has not strayed away from the questioning and argumentative spirit of Navya-nyāya. I hope it will elicit response, making clarifications and perhaps even stringent or dismissive counter-arguments, that will help in making the concept more transparent. Hopefully, there may even be sympathetic responses, carrying the line of thought into more meaningful directions. I found the concept of *āhārya-jñāna* exciting. Hence this note.

(a) *Āhārya* Cognition in Navya-Nyāya

N.S. DRAVID

The question 'whether deliberate falsehood in cognition can have a place in the Navya-Nyāya scheme of things or epistemology', raised by Lath is interesting but not one which has not been raised and answered (affirmatively) by Nyāya authors. Lath need not have been at pains to search out possible instances—from different fields—of *āhāryā* cognitions. Such instances are just at hand. The jaundiced person seeing the conch before him as yellow, knowing fully well that it is nothing but white, is an oft-quoted example of false cognitions known as false by the knower. Another familiar example of such a cognition is 'a man seeing the moon as double by pressing his eye-ball'. Before answering Lath's question I would like to point out that a slightly similar question has been raised by Gaṅgeśa himself about inferential cognition. I quote here Gaṅgeśa's remarks on this point as they occur in the Pakṣatā section of his *Tattvaciṅtāmanī*. The remark is this 'प्रत्यक्ष दृष्टमप्यर्थ अनुमानेन बुभुत्सन्तेतर्कासिको'. This means that, although ordinarily doubt about the presence of the major in the minor is necessary for the inference of the former, yet if there is strong desire to infer the perceived major in the minor, then even the absence of the said doubt does not obstruct the occurrence of the inference of the major. Perceptual certainty about the presence of the major in the minor is certainly preventive of the inference of the major but the desire for the inference tilts the balance in favour of the inference and thus the inference emerges despite perceptual knowledge being already there.

Turning now to metaphorical cognition and other similar cognitions, it may be pointed out that there is nothing unreasonable if it is maintained that a person can have the cognition which he knows to be false. Doesn't a debater seek to defend a view just to defeat his opponent when he is fully aware that

the view being defended is false? Not only this, when a person refutes a certain view, hasn't he to take full cognizance of the view refuted? It is quite natural, for example, for a jaundiced person to assert, 'I see the conch as yellow but I know that it is white'. All deliberate falsehoods are more or less of this type. When the contradictory cognition is present, the contradicted cognition cannot be prevented even from emerging in to being. The contradiction itself involves reference to the contradicted cognition. The only difference in the occurrence of the contradicted cognition from the same uncontradicted cognition is that there is present in the former case introspective awareness of the contradictory character of the contradicted cognition in the mind of the cogniser. The presence of desire for the occurrence of the contradicted cognition tilts the balance in its favour by weakening, so to say, the contradictory force of the contradicting cognition. The causal collocation productive of the contradicted cognition is strengthened by the addition of desire and thus despite contradiction the contradicted cognition does arise. There is nothing unreasonable in this view. Lath has quoted S.J.B.'s query to late B.N. Shukla regarding the possibility of the occurrence of verbal cognition—शब्दबोध—from the incompetent sentence 'he irrigates with fire'. I do not know what answer Shuklaji gave to S.J.B.'s query. The right answer to the query—which is very simple—is that when the sentence is known to lack competence it is not that no verbal cognition is yielded by the sentence. The false cognition arising from the sentence is introspectively cognized (अनु व्यवसाय विषय) as false by the cognizer. Thus the false cognition becomes an epistemic qualificand in the introspective cognition "That he irrigates with fire" is a falsehood'. Of course, the cogniser is inwardly aware of the falsehood but poses as if he does not believe in the falsehood. In all deceptions the introspective awareness that what one is saying or communicating is false is always present in the mind of the deceiver.

A significant question may be asked here. Granted that the deceiver is aware of the falsehood of a cognition does he have

the (original) cognition or not? If he has, what is the status of this (object) cognition? Does the person denying the statement, 'one irrigates with fire', first have the cognition that 'one irrigates with fire' and then deny it? If he has, what is the nature of this cognition? The answer to the question is simple. In the backdrop of a contradictory cognition the emergence of the contradicted contradiction is only in the capacity of an epistemic qualificand of 'falsehood' as inwardly apprehended. Where a person makes the remark—to deceive another—that 'plants are being irrigated with fire' what he intends his listener to understand is that 'his (listener's) cognition that fire irrigates' is true (although he himself knows it to be false). The listener's false cognition of irrigation with fire is presupposed by the deceiver when he makes the deceptive remark.

The *āhārya* cognition is not ordinary illusion. There are illusions and illusions. Nyāya does not enumerate all the different types of false cognitions or illusions. All these are subsumed by Nyāya under the general category विषयय. Vedānta calls it अध्यायस (which is quite different from ordinary illusion).

One question does yet remain to be answered. The question is this: 'How does the imaginative falsehood practised in metaphor yield pleasure or joy when it is known that it is nothing but falsehood?' Nyāya's answer to the question—which is quite different from the poeticians' and also not quite satisfactory—is, that often deliberate self-deception is more pleasurable than other-deception. It is a kind of creative activity by means of which one seeks as it were to defy reality which is felt as restrictive of one's cognitive freedom. Phantasizing is a kind of recreation to which one takes recourse when one is bored with the stark reality of the external world.

The *āhārya* cognition that the face is the moon is not inferential. So the the well-known Nyāya explanation that even perceived objects can be inferentially known if there is a strong desire for inference, cannot be applied straightaway to the

said cognition. The cognition is perceptual and it is supposed to take place in defiance of the contradictory perception that the face is different from the moon. The desire or predisposition to *perceive* the face as identical with the moon is *āhārya* cognition as a result of which the contradictory force of the difference-perception is vitiated. But since the contradictory perception is not dissipated, the *āhārya* cognition that emerges in succession to the latter is of the nature of *mental perception* (मानस प्रत्यक्ष as Nyāya called it). It is therefore almost similar to the internal perception of one's own pleasure, pain, etc. Thus the contradictory perception is visual while the *āhārya* perception is mental. The explanation based on introspective awareness of falsehood applies to other cases of *āhārya* cognitions mentioned above which need to be distinguished from the *rūpaka* cognition. There are different types of *āhārya* cognition having different causes like *vāsanā*, desire, predisposition, disability of sense-organs, strong prejudices, and so on.

The sum and substance of the points discussed above along with a few more points may be put down as follows:

1. The *āhārya* cognition is quite different from the illusory cognition although both are false cognitions. Because of this difference in nature of the *āhārya* cognition Śamkara calls it *adhyāṣa* and illustrates it with the help of the cognition of the double moon that a person may have by pressing his eyeball even while knowing that there is only one moon.
2. The said cognition is sometimes inferential but it is usually perceptual. It is not always caused by the desire to have it for oneself although the desire to deceive or may cause it. If the cognition is meant for oneself it occurs as the qualificand of 'invalidity' and has the form, for example, 'That plants are irrigated with fire is a falsehood.' To mislead a credulous person one may however make the blatantly false statement that 'plants are irrigated with fire'.

3. The reflective or introspective invites future awareness of the *āhārya* cognition as the epistemic qualificand of falsehood that one may have, is mental (called मानस प्रत्यक्ष in Sanskrit) but its character of privacy is unlike the privacy characterizing mental states like pleasure, pain, etc.
4. As stated above the *āhārya* cognition is usually perceptual overriding another perceptual cognition which contradicts it. The presence of passion, obsession, desire, etc. in the causal collocation of the *āhārya* cognition helps it to weaken the causal collocation of the contradicting cognition. But such weakening of the causal collocation of the contradicting cognition (happens in the case of other kinds of cognition too). What happens is that the contradicting cognition is followed in the second moment of its occurrence by the emergence of the contradicted cognition as its causal collocation is reinforced by the induction of *āsanā*, passion, make-believe, etc. Thus, in the case of the *āhārya*-cognition we have one kind of perception prevailing upon or overriding another kind of *perception itself*. If the contradicting perception disappears due to time-lapse the residual impression left behind by it persists till the contradicted cognition comes into being.
5. The admission of *āhārya* cognition raises the question of why the same entity is not cognized again and again by cognitions similar to each other if one desires to have such cognitions. (Novelty is not—according to Nyāya—a characteristic feature of a valid cognition.) However, the possibility of monotonous types of cognition pertaining to the same entity may be called into question even by Nyāya.
6. Another question that the *āhārya* cognition may give rise to is that Nyāya's admission of this cognition may force it to admit tautological cognitions too, provided there is a strong desire to have them. The question may have two answers. One, Nyāya can deny that any sensible person does or will ever have such a desire to know where there is nothing to know in the tautology. Two, the tautology

may be desired to have propositional or even factual character. In a proposition there have to be both a subject and a predicate. The subject must be endowed with subjecthood and the predicate with predicatehood. The predicate cannot be contained into the subject. The subject is the determinandum and the predicate the determinant. How can one and the same thing play both these roles? Of course, a thing can be known or sensed indeterminately but then such a sensing cannot have the form of tautology.

7. The *āhārya* cognition may be viewed even by Nyāya as an emotive content masquerading as determinate cognition. This is why it is sometimes described or called 'wishful thinking' which—as per Nyāya view—means wish assuming the form of thinking. Thus it may be treated as a peculiar type of illusion. Here there are two illusions involved, viz. the illusion of wish parading as thinking and the illusion of the wished object as the object of thought or knowledge.
8. From the above discussion it becomes quite obvious that Nyāya cannot go all the way with poetics in its explanation of Rūpaka. There is however a mode of interpretation of Rūpaka which, without infringing Nyāya doctrines can maintain the validity of *āhārya* cognition. In the stock example of Rūpaka, viz. 'The face is the moon' the word 'moon' may be taken to mean (or suggest) by means of '*lakṣaṇa*' a majority of characteristics of the moon. Then the sentence can bear the interpretation that the face is endowed with almost all the characteristics of the moon. *Sinule* may now be distinguished from Rūpaka quite easily. If only a few characteristics are common to two things then they may be described only as alike and not as identical with each other.

(b) The Concept of Āhārya-jñāna in Navya-Nyāya:
Some Reflections

A few interesting philosophical problems have been raised by Professor Lath in connection with the concept of *āhārya-jñāna* in Navya-Nyāya (*JICPR*, Vol. XIII, No. 1). As the problems are very much cogent, interesting and thought-provoking, an effort has been made to illuminate these logically from the purview of Navya-Nyāya.

A problem of how one can think of 'knowledge produced through desire' (*icchājanya-jñāna*) has been raised (p. 174). A solution to this problem may be offered in the following way. Let us look towards the exact nature of exact nature of *āhārya-jñāna*. The knowledge which is produced out of one's own desire at the time when there is the contradictory knowledge is called *āhārya-jñāna*. (*Virodhijñāna-kālīnecchāprayojya-jñānatvaṃ āhāryajñānatvam* or '*Vādhakālīnecchājanya-jñānam*').¹ The word '*āhārya*' means 'artificial', which is found in the *Bhaṭṭikāvya* where the ladies are described as *āhāryaśobhārahaitaira-māyaiḥ*² (that is, free from artificial beauty). From this, it follows that the word *anāhārya* means 'natural' which is expressed by the term '*amāyaiḥ*'. When we talk of *āhārya*-knowledge, it has to be taken as an artificial knowledge on account of the fact that between two objects an object is *deliberately* thought as otherwise in spite of knowing the distinct character or real nature of these two objects. In these cases one's desire of thinking an object as otherwise acts as an instrument (*icchājanya*). It is to be borne in mind that the Navya Naiyāyikas have given much importance on *vivakṣā* (that is, will to say). Let us put forth some cases where we find a knowledge produced through the instrumentality of desire (*icchājanya-jñāna*). One is allowed to say *sthālī pacati* (he cooks with clay-pot) with the nominative case-ending to the pot instead of the correct expression '*sthālyā pacati*', with the instrumental case-ending with the word *sthālī* if one so desires.

Apart from these there are a few cases where we find knowledge attained through the instrumentality of desire (*icchājanya*) as in the case of *pakṣatā*. If someone bears a strong desire to infer (*siṣādhayiṣā*), he can infer in spite of having *siddhi* ('*siṣādhayiṣāsattve numitirbhavatyeva*'³). It is permissible as the Naiyāyikas believe in the theory of *pramāṇasamplava* (that is, capability of applying various *pramāṇas*) to ascertain an object. According to this theory, 'fire' which is perceived can be inferred if someone so desires. That a cloth is completely different from a jar is completely known from the perception and hence there is not at all any necessity to infer a cloth as distinct from a jar. In spite of this one is found to infer: 'It (that is, a cloth) is endowed with the mutual absence of a jar, as it has got clothness' (*ghaṭānyonyābhāvavān paṭatvāt*). All these cases are supportable as an individual desires to do so and hence the role of *icchājanyatva* in the attainment of knowledge cannot be denied. But it should be clearly borne in mind that all *icchājanya*—inferences or knowledges—are not *āhārya*. The *icchājanya-jñāna* as found in the case of *rūpaka* and *tarka* are the instances of *āhārya-jñāna*. From the abovementioned cases it is proved that desire may act as the instrument of knowledge which is called *icchājanyajñāna*.

Another problem has been raised how the concept of *āhārya-jñāna* can be accommodated in *Nyāya* as the sentence conveying such cognition has no *yogyatā* (p. 176). It may seem strange to us as to why such artificial nature of knowledge is at all essential in the context of *nyāya*. Though there is no direct result of the deliberation of such artificial knowledge due to not having semantic competency (*yogyatā*), it plays a great role in pointing out the exact nature of an object *indirectly*.

The importance of accepting *āhārya-jñāna* can be realized easily if we ponder over the importance of *tarka* as a philosophical method. *Tarka* is nothing but an *āhārya-jñāna*, which is evidenced from the definition given in the *Nīlakanthaparakāśikā* on *Dīpikā* '*Āhāryavyāpyavattābhramajanya āhāryavyāpakavattābhramastarkaḥ*'⁴. That is, *tarka* is an imposed (*āhārya*) erroneous

cognition of the existence of a pervader (*vyāpaka*) which is produced by another imposed erroneous cognition of the existence of a *vyāpya*. If the knowledge in the form—‘There is fire in the lake’ (*hrado vahnimān*) is produced out of one’s desire at the time where there is the awareness of the contradictory knowledge in the form—‘there is the absence of fire in the lake’ (*hrado vahnyabhāvavān*), it is called *āhārya*. In this case erroneous cognition is deliberate which is not found in ordinary illusion.

The main purpose of accepting *āhārya-jñāna* is to ascertain the true nature of an object (*viśayapariśodhaka*) and to remove the doubt of deviation (*vyabhicāraśaṅkānivartaka*). The *āhārya-jñāna* existing in the former type—‘If it has no fire, it has no smoke’ (*Yadyam vahnimān na syāt tadā dhūmavān na syāt*) ascertains the existence of fire in a particular locus. In the same way, the Navya Naiyāyikas have accepted another form of *tarka* which is also *āhārya* in order to eliminate one’s doubt of deviation (*vyabhicāraśaṅkā*). If someone bears a doubt whether smoke and fire have an invariable relation or not, this doubt of deviation (*vyabhicāraśaṅkā*) can be dispelled by demonstrating the *āhārya*-knowledge in the form: ‘If smoke be deviated from fire, it will not be caused by fire’ (*dhūmo yadi vahnivyabhicārī syāt tarhi vahnijanyo na syāt*). From this it is indirectly proved that as smoke is caused by fire, it will not be deviated from fire.⁵

By virtue of being *āhārya* both the parts—the ground (*āpādaka*) and consequent (*āpādya*) are imaginary or hypothetical. If the first part is true, the second part would become automatically true. But it is a well-known fact that the second part is not true in so far as we do not get any smoke which is not caused by fire. So, the doubt as to the deviation of fire with smoke can be removed by applying the *tarka* in the form of *āhārya*. It, being a kind of mental construction, is useful for removing doubt and hence it becomes promoter to *pramāṇas*. This *āhārya* cognition is otherwise called *aniṣṭāpatti* or *aniṣṭaprasaṅga*, that is, introduction of the undesired through

which the desired one is established. This imposition of the undesired is of two types: the rejection of the established fact and the acceptance of the non-established object (*Syādanīṣṭam dvividham smṛtam prāmāṇīkaparityāgastathetaraparigrahaḥ*). If there is an *āhārya-jñāna* in the form—‘water cannot quench thirst’, there would arise an objection—‘If it is so, no thirsty people should drink water’. It is known from our experience that water is capable of quenching thirst, which is denied here and hence it comes under the first type of *anīṣṭa*.

If it is said that water causes burning, there would arise objection in the form—‘If it is so, the drinking of water would cause a burning sensation.’ The burning sensation from water is not an established fact, which is admitted here and hence it belongs to the second type of *anīṣṭa*. We often take recourse to *āhārya-jñāna* even in our day-to-day debate. If an opponent says to a Naiyāyika that self is non-eternal (*anitya*), he may first agree with what the opponent says in the following manner—‘O.K., initially I agree with you that self is non-eternal’. This agreement for the time being is *āhārya* and the next step in the form—‘If self were non-eternal in nature, there would not have been the enjoyment of *karma*, rebirth or liberation due to the destruction of the self’ is also *āhārya* which indirectly points to the eternality of self. In the same way, various expressions like ‘If I were a bird, I would have flown from one place to another’, ‘If you were a firmament, I would have stretched my wings like a crane’ (which reminds me of a Bengali song—*Tumi ākāś yadi hate āmi balākār mato pākhā meltām*) can be included under *āhārya-jñāna*.

The accommodation of *āhārya-jñāna* in Navya-Nyāya is primarily to promote an indirect method through which truth is ascertained. In the indirect proof in symbolic logic the negation of the conclusion is deliberately taken which is also an *āhārya* and from this it is shown that, if this is taken as a conclusion, it will lead to some contradiction or absurdity. If the negation of P which is originally a conclusion is taken as a conclusion of *āhārya*-type and proved it as contradictory or

absurd, it will automatically follow that the original conclusion, that is, P (*anāhārya*) is true. This method is also called the method of proof by *reductio ad absurdum*.⁶

In metaphorical expressions such *āhārya-jñāna* bears a completely different import. *Rūpaka* remains in the representation of the subject of description which is not concealed, as identified with another well known standard (*rūpakam rūpitāropād viṣaye nirapahnave*).⁷ In the famous case of *rūpaka*—*mukhacandra* the *upameya* is 'face' which is identified with 'moon'. In this case, the distinction between these is not concealed in spite of having excessive similarity. Though the difference between them is not concealed yet there is the ascription of the identification between two objects (*atisāmyāt anapahnutabhedayoḥ upamānopameyayoḥ abhedāropah*). In spite of knowing the distinction between *upamāna* and *upameya*, there is the hypothetical ascription of identity deliberately which is also an *āhārya*.⁸

From the above discussions, it is known to us that the accommodation of the *āhārya-jñāna* presupposes some intention of an individual. In the case of metaphor, *āhāryatva* is taken recourse to in order to show the extreme similarities between two objects. In the same way, *āhārya-jñāna* is accepted by the logicians to ascertain the real nature of an object indirectly. Hence *āhārya-jñāna* can be utilized as an accessory to a *pramāṇa* (*pramāṇānugrāhakarūpeṇa*). Though the semantic competency (*yogyatā*), the criterion of the meaningfulness of a sentence, is not found in the sentences conveying *āhārya-jñāna*, meaning of such sentences is easily understood by others. Had these been not understood at all, the absence of *yogyatā* cannot also be known. Moreover, as there is semantic incompetency, a search for either indirect or secondary meaning is permissible. As there is the absence of *yogyatā* in the expressions like *mukhacandra* and 'If I were a bird, I would have flown', etc., a thorough search for indirect meanings like extreme similarity (*atisāmya*) between face and moon, the absurdity of describing a man as bird, etc. have to be ascertained. It is to be kept in

mind that the semantic competency is essential only in the case of direct meaning (*śakyārtha*) but not in implicative or suggestive meaning (*lakṣyārtha* or *vyañgyārtha*). In fact, an implicative or suggestive meaning is looked for if there is the incompetency among the words (*mukhyārthavādhe*). Hence the semantic incompetency paves way to the indirect meaning as found in the expressions like 'I am building castles in the air', etc. Following the same line it can be said that *āhārya-jñāna* can communicate something to us indirectly in spite of not having the said competency.

Professor Lath further adds: can we speak of *āhārya-jñāna* existing in the pure music of *rāgas*, pure dance or abstract paintings that are new worlds created through imagination? In response to this, the following suggestions can be made. Though *āhārya-jñāna* is a product of imagination, all imaginations cannot be taken as *āhārya-jñāna*. The imaginary ideas as found in the fanciful stories or fairy tales, etc., are not *āhārya*. Some imagination is created out of one's own will (*icchāprayojya*) at the time when one is conscious of the contradictory knowledge (*virodhijñānakālina*). In spite of being conscious of the fact that fire cannot stay in the lake, we imagine that the lake has fire out of our strong will. It is the case of *āhārya* as already mentioned. In the case of pure music, dance and abstract paintings, we are not aware of the contradictory knowledge (*virodhijñāna*) through which the imaginary states are sublated (*vādhitā*). Though these are the cases of imagination having the characteristic of *icchāprayojyatva*, or *icchājanyatva*, they are not *āhāryajñāna* due to the lack of the other characteristic, that is, *virodhijñānakālinatva* or *vādhakālinatva*. In the case of *āhārya-jñāna* both the characteristic should be taken as adjuncts of imaginations. An imaginary cognition associated with *icchāprayojyatva* or *icchājanyatva* and *virodhijñānakālinatva* is called *āhārya*. Due to the absence of the second characteristic the charge of *avyāpti* of the definition of *āhārya-jñāna* to the pure music, etc., does not stand on logic.

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RAGHUNATH GHOSH

On the *Kroḍapatras*—A New Genre of Philosophical Writing in India

D. PRAHLADA CHAR

Among the large numbers of works of Nyāya, written during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, we come across two types of works which have made a unique contribution in the development of Nyāya school. They are *Vādas* and *Kroḍapatras*. Between the two, the *Vādas* are generally small treatises which aim at upholding a Nyāya view of a concept through a thorough discussion of the same. In fact, the genesis of these *Vāda* works can be traced during the eighteenth century itself. It seems that it is Raghunātha Śiromaṇi who started writing such *vādagranthas*. *Ākhyatavāda*, *Nañvāda*, *Kṛtisādhyatānumānavāda*, *Vājapeyavāda*, etc. are a few *Vādas* written by him. As their very title indicates they were written to discuss thoroughly certain topics. Later, Harirāma Tarkavāgīśa, Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya and others continued to write such treatises. Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya's *Vyutpattivāda*, *Viśayatavāda*, *Prāmāṇyavāda*, etc. are of that type. During the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries innumerable such *Vādas* were written. A list of these *Vādas*, based on the *Darśana-Mañjarī* of Śrī R. Taṅgaswāmī, is given separately here.

The *Kroḍapatras* are slightly different from the *Vādas*. They are not as lengthy as the *Vādas*. Though these *Kroḍapatras* are written to explain certain sentences that occur in the original text they cannot be considered as commentaries because they do not continue to explain each and every sentence of the text. They pick up only certain points made in the original text and discuss them thoroughly. Thus, they deserve to be treated as independent works of the author, because except at the starting point, the author nowhere explains or comments on any part of the text; he never takes the trouble of summarizing the points made in the text, which a commentator generally does. He keeps himself off the text and concentrates on a particular point. He starts by raising an objection on it. Further, he goes on rejecting any modification or clarification by pointing out the loopholes in it. When it thus reaches a certain stage beyond which no further objection is possible, he comes out with his own solution, normally by suggesting an *anugama*, a technical device discovered by the Navya Naiyāyikās, by which the point under discussion is ultimately vindicated by plugging all the loopholes. The ingenuity with which the author of a *Kroḍapatra* imagines peculiar instances which nobody can ever think of and points out the untenability of the arguments defending the point under discussion, is indeed something remarkable. He can be compared to a very shrewd chess-player who while practicing the game, plays the role of two players, one strongly defending a position and the other savagely attacking the same.

The very title '*Kroḍapatra*' suggests the purpose and scope of the small treatises that are called *Kroḍapatras*. '*Kroḍa*' means '*Madhya*' or middle. The term '*patra*' which in common parlance means a letter, also means an article, analytical in nature. Thus, a *Kroḍapatra* is an article or a collection of articles with a critical perspective that aims at discussing a point which occurs in the middle of a topic being discussed in the original text. Another explanation given to the term is that *Kroḍapatra* is a paper kept in between the pages. While copying the manuscripts,

sometimes the copyist may miss some sentences and in such cases, it becomes necessary to offer some explanation for that portion. Sometimes some scholar may write something to express his own views on a certain point discussed in the text. *Kroḍapatra*, as per this explanation is an article written with either of the intentions mentioned above and kept in the middle of the pages. But, as we see the *Kroḍapatras*, it is seldom found that the author is trying to fill in the gaps that were created by the person who copied the manuscript. As a matter of fact, generally the authors of the *Kroḍapatras* commence their discussion on the point which the original writer has stated as final. Here, I shall try to give an example to show the contribution of the *Kroḍapatras* for the development of the Navya-Nyāya tradition. The example that I have chosen is from the two *Kroḍapatras*—*Kālīsaṅkarīya* and *Candranārāyaṇīya* named after the authors Kālīsaṅkara Bhaṭṭācārya and Candranārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭācārya who flourished during the eighteenth century AD. These two *Kroḍapatras* are held in high esteem in the Nyāya circle and even today they are studied as a part of the advanced study of Nyāya. These two *Kroḍapatras* are on the *Hetvābhāṣasāmānyanirukti* of Gadādhara Bhaṭṭācārya, which in its turn is a commentary on Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's *Didhiti* on the *Hetvābhāṣa* portion of Gaṅgeśa's *Tattvacintāmaṇi*.

Gaṅgeśa in the *Hetvābhāṣapraकरणा* of his *Tattvacintāmaṇi* suggests, one after the other, three definitions of fallacies of reason. The second definition is:

॥ यद्विषयकत्वेन ज्ञानस्यानुमितिप्रतिबन्धकत्वं तत्त्वम् ॥

It means that a fallacy of reason is that by comprehending which a cognition prevents an inferential cognition. *Vanhyabhāvavadhrada* is an instance of this definition. It is called the fallacy of *bādha*, while the inference is '*hrado vanhimān dhūmāt*'. The definition is applicable here because, the cognition of this fallacy, which arises in the form '*hrado Vanhyabhāvavān*' prevents the inferential cognition '*hrado vanhimān*'.

Commenting on this definition, Raghunātha Śiromaṇi suggests a slight modification by replacing *yadvīṣayakatvena* into *yādṛṣaviśiṣṭaviṣayakatvena*. Suppose this modification is not made, the definition would not be applicable to any fallacy. For, since 'mere *hrada*' is identical with the '*hrada* qualified by *vanhyabhāva*' the cognition of 'mere *hrada*' also is the cognition *vanhyabhāvavadhrada*. But, the cognition of 'mere *hrada*' does not prevent the inferential cognition '*hrado vanhimān*'. Therefore the cognition of *Vanhyabhāvavadhrada* cannot be said as preventive of the inferential cognition. Thus, the definition suffers from the defect of *asambhava*. If the term '*yadvīṣayakatvena*', is replaced by the term '*yādṛṣaviśiṣṭaviṣayakatvena*', this effect can be avoided. Apparently, this modification suggested by Śiromaṇi is meaningless. For, since a qualified object is identical with the 'mere object', the *hrada* qualified with '*vanhyabhāva*' is the same as the 'mere *hrada*' and hence the cognition of 'mere *hrada*' is also the cognition of the *viśiṣṭa*—the *hrada* qualified with *vanhyabhāva*. But, as Gadādhara suggests here, the term '*Yādṛṣaviśiṣṭaviṣayakatvena*', should be taken in the sense of '*Yadrūpāvacchinnavīṣayakatvena*'. Now the definition is:

यद्रूपावच्छिन्नविषयकत्वेन ज्ञानस्य अनुमितिप्रतिबन्धकत्वं तद्रूपावच्छिन्नत्वम् ।

It means 'a fallacy of reason is the possessing of that property, by comprehending the thing possessed of which property, a cognition prevents the inferential cognition'.

In case of the instance, '*hrado vanhimān dhūmāi*' Gadādhara seems to hold the view that the property, the cognition of the thing possessed of which is the preventor of the above inference, is '*vanhyabhāvavadgratvā*' or 'lakeness qualified with the absence of fire'. However, he does not specifically spell it out and moves to the next topic. From this point, the *Kroḍapatras* commence their analysis.

Kālīśaṅkara Bhaṭṭācārya raises the question—*atha yadrūpapadena kim dhartavyam?*—What is signified by the term '*yadrūpa*' (which property) in the definition? The ready

answer would be '*vanhyabhāvavadhradatvam*' in case of the fallacious inference—'*hrado vanhimān dhūmā'*. But, Kālīśankara continues to question—*vanhyabhāvavadhradatva* means the property called lakeness qualified with *vanhyabhāva* and what is this relation with which *hradatva* is said to be qualified with *vanhyabhāva*? Of course, the relation cannot be the relation of *svarūpa* by which an absence is normally expected to be present wherever its counterpositive does not exist. For, since fire, the counterpositive in the above case, can never even be imagined to exist in '*hradatva*', its absence naturally always exists in it and the cognition '*the lake has lakeness that has no fire*' cannot prevent the inferential cognition '*hrado vanhimān*'. Therefore, the possible relation with *vanhyabhāva* here should be the relation of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* or co-existence. It may be held that one, who knows *hradatva* and *vanhyabhāva* existing together cannot have the cognition '*hrado vanhimān*' and hence the cognition that 'the lake has the property lakeness which is qualified with *vanhyabhāva* by the relation of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* will definitely prevent the inferential cognition—'*hrado vanhimān*'. Kālīśankara points out that this view is not tenable, because there are some such cognitions which cannot prevent the inferential cognition but comprehend a thing which is possessed of the said property. For instance, the cognition—'*sāmānādhikaraṇyasambandhēna vanhyabhāvavadhradatvavān*'. The peculiarity of this cognition is that it has *hrada* as its qualificandum and *hradatva* qualified with *vanhyabhāva* by the relation of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* as its qualifier. But it does not comprehend any limiter of the qualificandumness. For the same reason it cannot prevent the inferential cognition '*hrado vanhimān*', which has a limiter of qualificandumness, namely, *hradatva*. Since these two cognitions mentioned above do not have the same limiter of qualificandumness, they cannot be held as *pratibadhya*—*pratibandhaka*. But, this cognition also comprehends *hradatva* as qualified with *vanhyabhāva* by the relation of *sāmānādhikaraṇya*. Therefore, '*sāmānādhikaraṇya*

sambandhena vanhyabhāvavadhradatva cannot be the property signified by the term '*yadrūpa*' in the definition.

The other alternative is to hold that *vanhyabhāva* and *hradatva*—the two properties as denoted by the term '*yadrūpa*'. But, as in the case of the first alternative, here also it can be shown that even a cognition, which is a non-preventor of the inferential cognition '*hrado vanhimān*', has as its content the thing possessed of the two properties—*vanhyabhāva* and *hradatva*. For instance, the cognition '*vanhyabhāvavadhradatvavān*' which comprehends both *vanhyabhāva* and *hradatva* together in *hrada*. As in the earlier case, even this cognition does not have *hradatva* as the limiter of the qualificandumness, and hence cannot be the preventor of the inferential cognition '*hrado vanhimān*' which has *hradatva* as the limiter of the qualificandumness. Thus, Kālīsaṅkara points out that it is not possible to specifically state as to what could be the denotation of the term '*yadrūpa*'.

Kālīsaṅkara Bhaṭṭācārya then refers to several attempts made to solve the problem, including that of the 'Navyas' who could be his contemporary Naiyāyikas. He finds fault in some of them. He also refers to the other views without criticizing them, thereby indicating that they are acceptable. Only with one view, he first, finds fault with it and on the suggestion of an amendment, he gives his assent to it. I shall try to explain here only that view which he concedes as admissible with an amendment. The following are his words:

केचित्तु—वह्निधर्मितावच्छेदकतापत्राभावत्वावच्छिन्नधर्मितावच्छेदकतापत्रहृदत्वमेव यद्रूपपदेन धर्तव्यमित्यपि वदन्ति। तत्र। तथासति वह्निधर्मितावच्छेदकतापत्राभावत्वा। वच्छिन्न—धर्मितावच्छेदकतापत्रपर्वतत्वमादाय भ्रमविषयेऽतिव्याप्तेः। यदि च तादृश—धर्मितावच्छेदकतापत्रं यद् वह्न्यभाववद्हृदत्ववादिं तदेव यद्रूपपदनोच्यते तदा न दोष इति ध्येयम्।

The solution suggested by *kēcit* (some) is this—in case of the fallacious inference—'*hrado vanhimān dhūmāt*', the term *yadrūpa* denotes the property *hradatva* which has the limitorness in respect to the qualificandumness determined by an *abhāva*,

the property—*abhāvatva* of which has the limitorness in respect to the qualificandumness determined by *vanhi*. The above solution will be easy to understand if we analyse the structure of the cognition—‘*hrado vanhyabhāvavān*’. Here *abhāva* is comprehended as qualified with *vanhi*. Thus with reference to *vanhi*, *abhāva* is the qualificandum and the *abhāvatva*, residing in it, is the limiter of the qualificandumness that resides in the *abhāva*. Hence it can be said that *abhāvatva* has the limitorness in respect to the qualificandumness residing in the *abhāva* and this qualificandumness is determined by the *vanhi*. Similarly with reference to the *abhāva*, *hrada* has the qualificandumness and *hradatva* is its limiter.

In short, the term ‘*yadrūpa*’ in the definition, refers to that *hradatva* which has the limitorness in respect to the qualificandumness determined by the *abhāva*; *abhāvatva*, the property of which also has the limitorness in respect to the qualificandumness determined by *vanhi*. Only by comprehending a thing possessed of such a *hradatva*, the cognition ‘*hrado vanhyabhāvavān*’ could prevent the inferential cognition ‘*hradovanhimān*’. Since the other cognitions such as ‘*sāmānadhikāraṇyasambandhena vanhyabhāvavaviśiṣṭahradatvavān*’, ‘*vanhyabhāvahradatvōbhayavān*’ etc., do not comprehend such a *hradatva*, they cannot prevent the inferential cognition *hrado vanhimān*.

The fault that Kālīśaṅkara Bhaṭṭācārya finds with this second explanation is that if such a property as shown above is denoted by the term ‘*yadrūpa*’, then the definition of *hētuvābhāsa* will become too wide. For, the inference ‘*parvato vanhimān dhūmāt*’ which is a valid inference can also be shown as having a fallacy. The point that is being made by him is this—just as the cognition ‘*hrado vanhyabhāvavān*’ prevents the inferential cognition ‘*hrado vanhimān*’, the cognition ‘*parvato vanhyabhāvavān*’ also actually prevents the inferential cognition ‘*parvato vanhyabhāvavān*’. The only difference is that while the cognition ‘*hrado vanhyabhāvavān*’ is a valid cognition, the cognition ‘*parvato vanhyabhāvavān*’ is an erroneous one.

Anyway, when it occurs, it prevents the inferential cognition 'parvato vanhimān'. Now, just as the cognition 'hrado vanhyabhāvavān' comprehends that which is possessed of *hradatva* which has *dharmitāvachhedakatā* determined by the *abhāva*, *abhāvatva* the property of which also has *dharmitāvachhedakatā* determined by *vanhi*, the cognition 'parvato vanhyabhāvavān' also comprehends that which is possessed of *parvatatva* which has *dharmitāvachedapatā* determined by the *adhāva*, *abhāvatva* the property of which has *dharmitāvachhedakatā* determined by *vanhi*. Therefore, if the inference 'hrado vanhimān dhūmāt' is fallacious, similarly, the inference, 'parvato vanhimān dhūmāt' also will have to be considered as fallacious.

Kālīśaṅkara himself shows the way to overcome the above problem. He suggests that in addition to all that is said it must also be said that the *hradatva* qualified with *vanhyabhāva*, is denoted by the term 'yadrūpa'. Since *hradatva* is naturally qualified with *vanhyabhāva* by the relation of *sāmānādhikarānya* such a *hradatva* which also has *dharmitāvachhedakatā* as explained earlier, can be taken as the meaning of the term 'yadrūpa'. But in the case of *parvatatva* it is not so. *Parvatatva* might be having *dharmitāvachhedakatā* as shown earlier. But, it is not qualified with *vanhyabhāva* as the smoky hill has no *vanhyabhāva*. In other words, since such a *parvatatva* does not exist, it cannot be the meaning of the term 'yadrūpa' and it is also not possible to claim that the inference 'parvato vanhimān dhūmāt' will have to be considered as fallacious.

This is the amendment that Kālīśaṅkara suggests here and he is of the view that with this modification the explanation of the meaning of the term 'yadrūpa' given by 'kecit' is acceptable. We do not know who are these 'kecit' Naiyāyikās. There is also a custom among the *śāstric* writers to float their own views by the name of others. Kālīśaṅkara too might have followed that custom here.

Candranārāyaṇa Bhaṭṭācāryā's work, which also is a *Kroḍapatra* on the same text of *Gadādhara*, discusses more

elaborately than the Kālīsaṅkariya does, the meaning of the term 'yadrūpa'. In addition to the two possible alternatives that Kālīsaṅkara referred to in the beginning of his analysis, Candranārāyaṇā refers to one more possible meaning of the term 'yadrūpa' and thoroughly explains all the three alternatives. It is interesting to note that Candranārāyaṇā also, without offering his own solution to the problems, just criticizes the explanations offered by the others. While examining the third explanation of the term 'yadrūpa' and also the explanation offered by some, what ultimately he points out is that if these explanations along with the amendments suggested are accepted, then certain *viśeṣaṇas* later included in the definition by Gadādhara would become redundant. Thus he is candid enough to show the inadequacies in the process of analyzing the things connected with the definition of *hetvābhāsa* by Gadādhara who first, blindly introduced the term 'yadrūpa' in the definition, without bothering to analyse its significance and later included some more *viśeṣaṇas* which would become redundant if the denotation of the term is properly analyzed.

Here I shall try to highlight briefly some of the interesting observations that Candranārāyaṇā makes while discussing the significance of the term 'yadrūpa'.

The first possible explanation of the term 'yadrūpa' that Candranārāyaṇā refers to is '*sāmānādhikaraṇyasambandhena vanhyabhāvaviśiṣṭahradatva*'. Kālīsaṅkara also refers to this explanation. The fault that Candranārāyaṇā finds here is this that if this is the 'yadrūpa' then it should have been comprehended by the cognition *hrado vanhyabhāvavān* which actually prevents the inferential cognition '*hrado vanhīmān*'. But it is obvious that the cognition '*hrado vanhyabhāvavān*' does not comprehend *vanhyabhāva* in *hradatva* by the relation of *sāmānādhikaraṇya*. It may be argued that since, in the said cognition, *hradatva* is the limiter of the qualificandumness through the qualificandum that is *hrada*, *vanhyabhāva* is comprehended by the relation of *sāmānādhikaraṇya* in *hradatva*. But, Candranārāyaṇā draws our attention to the subtle but

significant point that though thus the cognition is comprehending *vanhyabhāva* in *hradatva* by the *sāmānādhikarāṇya* relation, it cannot be said that the cognition is comprehending *yadrūpāvacchinna*. To be more precise, what is meant by comprehending the *yadrūpāvacchinna*, is that the cognition must be the determinant of the qualificandumness which has the *yadrūpa* as its limiter (*yadrūpāvacchinnaviśeṣyatākatva*). But, while *vahnyabhāva* is, by an indirect relation *sāmānādhikarāṇya* grasped in *hradatva*, the objecthood that is the *viśayatā* in *hradatva*, is not the limitorness determined by the qualificandumness (*viśeṣyatāvachchedakatā*). Hence the cognition *hrado vahnyabhāvavān* cannot be said as *yadrūpāvacchhinnaviśayaka* in the sense of '*yadrūpaniṣṭhāvacchedakatāka-viśeṣyatāka*'.

Candranārāyaṇa also rejects the second explanation according to which *vanhyabhāva* and *hradatva*—these two are meant by the term *yadrūpa*. In that case, the cognition '*hrado vahnyabhāvavān*' which prevents the inferential cognition '*hrado vahnyimān*', will have to be regarded as *yadrūpāvacchhinnaviśayaka* which means *yadrūpa* has the limitorness (*avachchedakatā*) determined by the objecthood of the cognition. It further indicates that *yadrūpa*, that is, *vahnyabhāva-hradatva* together have a limitorness determined by the objecthood of the cognition. But, if we analyze the structure of the cognition '*hrado vahnyabhāvavān*' it becomes clear that it is not so. In this cognition, *vahnyabhāva* is the mode and its modeness is limited by the property *vahnyabhāvavān* and also by the relation called *viśeṣanataviśeṣa*. But, though *hradatva* also is a content of this cognition it is not a mode. It is the limiter of the qualificandumness residing in the *hrada*. Thus the *hradatva* has the limitorness, which though is limited by the relation of *samavāya*, is not limited by any property. Hence it is clear that the objecthood residing in the *vahnyabhāva* is of the nature of modeness, whereas the objecthood residing in *hradatva* is of the nature of the limitorness and thus are absolutely different. This being the case, it is not correct to say that *vahnyabhāva*

and *hradatva* are the *yadrūpa* and that both have the same limitorness determined by qualificandumness of the cognition 'hrado vahnyabhāvavān'. Thus the second explanation also does not hold good.

As per the third explanation, mere 'vahnyabhāva' with the relation of *viśeṣaṇatā* qualified with *hradatvāvachchinnānu-yogitākatva* is the *yadrūpa*. This explanation and also the explanation offered by some according to which *hradatva*—*vahnyabhāva*—these two only are the *yadrūpa*, are rejected by Candranārāyaṇa, pointing out that if these explanations with all the amendments that will be suggested are admitted, then the *viśeṣaṇas* which Gadādhara will include later in the definition would become redundant. I do not propose here to discuss these two explanations and Candranārāyaṇa's criticism thereon. I would only like to point out the frankness and the unbiased attitude of the authors of the *Kroḍapatras*, who after a thorough examination of a problem, are prepared even to reject the stand considered as final by the earlier Naiyāyikās.

Among the large number of *Kroḍapatras* that are known to us, only a few are published and are rarely studied. Some of them were secretly guarded by some scholars. *Tritalāvachchedak-atāvāda* published by the Mithila Institute of Darbhanga is an example of it. It is said that for generations, this *Kroḍapatra* was secretly guarded by a tradition which would make use of the arguments and *pariṣkārās* contained in the *Kroḍapatra*, in the debates just to baffle the opponents. During the last century, and also the earlier part of this century, the *Naiyāyikās* got used to the study of the *Kroḍapatras* with much enthusiasm and consequently criticism and justification of the *Kroḍapatras* was also going on. Mysore Rāmā Śāstry's *Śatakoti Kroḍapatras* on the *satpratipakṣa* of Gadādhara is an example of it. This, which contains one hundred arguments, thoroughly examines the definition of the fallacy—*satpratipakṣa*, offered by Gadādhara. Two Naiyāyikās, namely Anantalvār and Kriṣṇatātācārya wrote *Kroḍapatras* called *śatakotikhandana* and attacked the arguments contained in the *śatakoti*. Later,

another Naiyāyika authored a *Kroḍapatra* called *śatakotikhandanamandana* to justify Rāmā Śāstry's *Kroḍapatra*. Thus, till the earlier part of this century the *Kroḍapatra* tradition was a living force and now the tradition is no more alive.

This article on the *Kroḍapatras*, will be incomplete if the structure of *anugamas* which are frequently made use of in the *Kroḍapatras* is not explained. Hence, an attempt is made here to explain the technique of *anugama*.

The *anugamas* that are suggested as a final solution to a problem are of a wonderful structure. In the beginning they appear to be of a very simple nature. But, soon they will develop into a complex and complicated structure with the peculiar and the multiple relations involved. The structure of an *anugama* thus created is so complex that an ordinary student will find it impossible to penetrate into this fort containing innumerable inner circles.

Here an attempt is made to illustrate an *anugama* with its background:

Anugama

While discussing the meaning of singular case suffix (*ekavacanapratyaya*), the Naiyāyikas reject the contention that the number—being one, is the meaning of the suffix. For, such a number is universally present and hence even when there are several jars on the ground, the sentence '*atra ghaṭostī*'—'there is one jar on the ground'—will have to be considered as valid. Therefore, they define *ekatva*—the meaning of the regular suffix in a different manner. Accordingly, *ekatva* means '*sajātīyadvītiyarahitatva*' that is, being devoid of a second which is similar. Now, when several jars are on the ground, the sentence '*atra ghaṭostī*' becomes incorrect, because there is another jar similar to it. Here the similarity consists in possessing the attribute:

स्वसमभिव्याहृतपदार्थसंसारिगताविशिष्टप्रकृत्यर्थतावच्छेदकधर्म

that is the limiter of being the meaning of the nominal base (*prakṛtyarthatāvachcheddaka*) that co-exists with the relation of the locus conveyed by a word used in the same sentence. In the sentence—‘*atra ghaṭosti*’ the nominal base of the singular number is the word—‘*ghaṭa*’. The limiter of being the meaning of this word, is jarness. This jarness, co-existing with the relation of the locus conveyed by the word ‘*atra*’ used in the same sentence, is to be regarded here as the similarity and it is the absence of a similar object of that kind that is the *ekatva*—the meaning of a singular case suffix. When there are several jars on the ground, each jar has a jar similar to it. For, the other jar has not only the *prakṛtyarthatāvachcheddaka* or jarness, but also ‘the relation of the locus conveyed by the word *atra* of the sentence. That is why in a situation when there are several jars on the ground, the sentence—‘*atra ghaṭosti*’ becomes invalid.

Now an objection is raised against this explanation. Suppose there are two jars on the ground, one is black and the other is yellow—the sentence ‘*atra nilagḥṭosti*’ cannot be said to be incorrect, because actually there is only one black jar on the ground. But, as per the above explanation of the meaning of the singular case suffix, even such sentences will have to be rejected as incorrect as in the given situation, the black jar has a similar jar with it. In other words, the yellow jar is similar to the black jar, because it has both the *prakṛtyarthatāvachcheddaka*—jarness and also the ‘relation of the locus’ conveyed by the term ‘*atra*’. Thus, as the black jar has another similar jar with it, and, if the singular case suffix conveys the meaning as is described above, then the sentence when there is a *pītaghoṭa* also, will have to be rejected as incorrect.

The untenability of the explanation of the meaning of the singular case suffix, is shown by another instance also.

The sentence ‘*brāhmaṇo brāhmaṇāya gām dadāti*’—‘one Brahmin gives away a cow to another Brahmin’, conveys *ekatva* of

two Brahmins, of whom one is the giver and other is the receiver. The singular case suffix added to the two 'brāhmaṇa' words here, conveys *ekatva* of both of them. But, if the meaning of the singular case suffix is as above then that cannot be explained in either case. For, as per the explanation, each of them, should be *svasajātīyadvitīyarahita*, that is, must have been having the absence of the second similar to it. And the similarity as explained earlier consists in having the *prakṛtyarthatāvachhedaka* and also *samabhivyahṛta samsarga*. Here the nominal base for the *ekavacana* is the word 'brāhmaṇa' and hence 'Brahminhood' is the *prakṛtyarthatāvachhedaka*. This is present in both the giver and the receiver here. Again both of them possess *samabhivyahṛtasamsarga*—the relation of the object conveyed by a word used in the sentence. Here, such an object is the action 'giving away' or '*sampradānakriyā*' conveyed by the word '*dadāti*'. It is obvious that the relation of this object is present in both the giver and the receiver. Thus, both the Brahmins denoted by the two 'Brāhmaṇa' terms of the sentence have the *samabhivyāhṛtasamsarga*. Therefore each of the two Brāhmaṇas here, has a *sajātīya*, a second person similar to him. Hence none of them can be said as having the *ekatva* denoted by the singular case suffix here.

In order to avoid the above objections the following *anugama* is suggested:

एकवचनविशिष्टम् एकत्वम् एकवचनार्थः ।

This simply means that a singular case suffix means the *ekatva*, that is, 'being one' which is related with an *ekavacana*—singular case suffix. Thus in the instance '*atra ghaṭostī*' the singular suffix that is added to the term '*ghaṭa*', means the *ekatva* that is related with the *ekavacana* (the singular case suffix).

Now, naturally, the question arises as to what is the relation of *ekavacana* in *ekatva*. In reply, the following relation is suggested:

स्वप्रकृत्यर्थतावच्छेदकत्वम्—स्वविशिष्टसंसर्गतानिरूपकत्वोभयसंबन्धेन यत्स्वाधिकरणं तन्निष्ठभेदप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकत्वम्

In the second relation mentioned above, certain *samsargatā* is to be related with the *ekavacana* which is referred to by the term 'sva'. The following is the relation of 'sva' in the *samsargatā*:

स्वप्रयोज्यशाब्दबोधविषयत्वसामानाधिकरण्य—स्वसमानाधिकरणप्रयोज्यशाब्द—
बोधकिवषयतासामानाधिकरण्यान्यतरसंबन्धेन ।

The understanding of the above relations demands the familiarity with various technicalities, used by the Navya-Nyāya school. I take it for granted that the reader is sufficiently, familiar with those technicalities and will try to explain the above relations as simply as possible.

Let me take an instance and try to explain it. Let us suppose that there is only one jar on the ground. Only in such a situation the *ekatva*—'oneness' the number residing in the *ghaṭa* becomes related with the *ekavacana* that is added to the nominal base 'ghaṭa'. This *ekatva* which is in the *ghaṭa* is related with the *ekavacana* by a relation which involves in it two relations such as *svaprakṛtyarthatāvacchedakavatva* and *svaviśiṣṭasamsargatānirūpakatva*. Since this is the relation of *ekavacana*, here 'sva' refers to the *ekavacana*. Its *prakṛti* (the nominal base), is the word 'ghaṭa'. The *prakṛtyarthatāvacchedaka*, that is the limiter of 'being the meaning' of the *prakṛti* is *ghaṭatva*. As a matter of fact, this *ghaṭatva* is present even in a jar kept somewhere else. But, that jar does not have the second relation of the *ekavacana*, namely, *svaviśiṣṭasamsargatānirūpakatva*. Here the term *samsargatā* refers only to that *samsargatā* which resides in the *samsarga*—the relation between the ground and the jar that are before us. That relation is the *ādheyatā* residing in the jar before and is determined by the ground. At present, we have to assume that only this *samsargatā* is related with the *sva* and not any other *samsargatā*. This point will become clear when we try to analyze the relation of *sva* in the *samsargatā*. The relation is:

स्वप्रयोज्यशाब्दबोधविषयत्वसामानाधिकरण्य—

स्वसमानाधिकरणप्रत्ययप्रयोज्यतादृशविषयतासामानाधिकरण्य—एतदन्यतरसंबन्ध ।

The above relation, actually, contains two relations and the *samsargatā* is intended to be related with *sva* by either of the two relations. The two relations are:

1. स्वप्रयोज्यशाब्दबोधविषयत्वसामानाधिकरण्य and
2. स्वसमानाधिकरणप्रत्ययप्रयोज्यतादृशविषयतासामानाधिकरण्य ।

In the case of the instance '*atra ghaṭaḥ asti*', '*sva*', as already said, refers to the *ekavacana* suffix added to the word '*ghaṭa*'. The '*ghaṭa*', mentioned here in this sentence, is the *ghaṭa* which is on the ground before us (*atra*). That *ghaṭa* has the *samsarga*, namely *etaddeśanīrūpitā ādhēyata*. This *ādhēyata* being a *samsarga* has a *samsargatā*. This *samsargitā* is *svaviśiṣṭa* is related with the *ekavacana* by the second relation of the two mentioned above. This can be explained as follows:

The relation is स्वसमानाधिकरणप्रत्ययप्रयोज्यशाब्दबोधविषयत्व

sva is the *ekavacana* that we hear after the word '*ghaṭa*'. *Svasamānādhikaraṇapratyaya* means the suffix that co-exists with the *ekavacana*. In the sentence '*atra ghaṭaḥ asti*' both the *ekavacana* and the suffix *tral* which is a part of the word *atra*, are present. Hence the *tral* suffix can be said as *svasamānādhikaraṇapratyaya*. The meaning of the *tral* is *ādheyatā*. By conveying that meaning the *tral* makes it possible for this *ādheyatva* to become an object of the verbal cognition produced by the sentence '*atra ghaṭaḥ asti*'. Therefore the *ādheyatā* has the objectness. This objectness, that is, *viśayatā* resides here as *svasamānādhikaraṇapratyayaprayojyaśabdabodhaviśyatā*. Since this *viśayatā* resides in the *samsarga*—*etaddeśanīrūpitādhēyatā*, it is now clear that the *samsargatā* of this *samsarga*, has the coexistence of the above *viśayatā*. Thus the *samsargatā* which is in the *ādhēyatā*, has *svasamānādhikaraṇa-pratyayaprayojyaśabdabodhaviśyatā*—*sāmānādhikaraṇya*. In other words, the *samsargatā* is related with the *sva*, that is, *svaviśiṣṭa* by the above relation. Since this *samsargatā* is determined by the *ghaṭa* which actually has the *samsarga*, that is, *ādhēyatā*, it is now

clear that *ghaṭa* is *svaviśiṣṭa-samsargatānirūpaka*. Thus, by the two relations, namely, *svaprakṛtyartha-tāvachedakavatva* and *svaviśiṣṭasamsargatā-nirūpakatva*, *sva* is related to the *ghaṭa* or, in other words by these two relations, the locus of the *sva* is the *ghaṭa* before us. The *ekatva* with which we are concerned now and which has to be shown by us as being related with the *ekavacana* of the word 'ghaṭaḥ', also belongs to the same *ghaṭa*. The difference which may be said to be present in the *svādhikaraṇa ghaṭa*, is the difference of some other *ghaṭa*, and is never that of the same *ghaṭa*. Hence, the counterpositive (*pratiyogī*) of the difference is another jar and the *ekatva* residing in that *ghaṭa* can be said as being the limiter of the counterpositiveness. But the *ekatva* residing in the same *ghaṭa* cannot be the limiter of the counterpositiveness. Hence, when there is only one jar on the ground then only the sentence 'atra ghaṭaḥ asti' becomes valid. For, as already explained above, the jar which is there alone on the ground can be the possessor of the meaning of the singular case suffix, the meaning being 'ekavacanaviśiṣṭam ekatvam'.

Suppose there are two jars on the ground, then the sentence 'atra ghaṭaḥ asti' becomes incorrect, because none of the two jars, has the meaning of the singular case suffix. This can be briefly explained as follows:

The meaning of the singular case suffix is 'ekavacanaviśiṣṭam ekatvam'. The *vaiśiṣṭya* or the relation of *ekavacana* in the *ekatva* is:

svaprakṛtyarthatāvachedakavattva—svaviśiṣṭasamsargatānirūpakatvobhaya sambandhen yat svādhikaraṇam tanniṣṭhabheda-pratiyogitānavachedakatva. Since both the jars are present on the same ground, both of them become *svādhikaraṇa*, that is the locus of *ekavacana* by the two relations, namely—*svaprakṛtyarthatāvachedakavattva* and *svaviśiṣṭasamsargatānirūpakatva*. Since the *ekatva* that is oneness of each jar can be the *pratiyogitvacchedaka* of the *bheda* residing in the other, none of the jars does possess the *ekatva* which is not the limiter of the counterpositiveness of the difference.

Similarly, when there are two jars on the ground—one being *nīla* and the other *pīta*—the sentence ‘*atra nīlaghataḥ asti*’ can be justified.

Here the singular case suffix, added to the word *ghata*, can be said to be related with only the *nīla*-jar and not with the *pīta*-jar for the following reasons. Between the two relations, namely, *svaprakṛtyarthatāvachchedakavattva* and *svaviśiṣṭa-samsargatānirūpakatva*, the *pītaghata*, as a matter of fact, is related with the *ekavacana* in the word ‘*ghataḥ*’ by the first relation, because the *prakṛtyarthatāvachchedaka*—the limiter of being the meaning of the nominal base ‘*ghataḥ*’, that is, ‘*ghatatva*’ is very much present in the *pītaghata* also. But, the *pītaghata* is not related with the singular case suffix, by the relation—*svaviśiṣṭasamsargatānirūpakatva*, for, the *samsargatā* which is *svaviśiṣṭa*, that is, related with the *ekavacana* here, is the *samsargatā* residing in the *ādheyatā* that belongs to *nīlaghata* alone. This is because that *samsargatā* alone has the relation of *sva*, namely *svasāmānādhikaraṇa-pratyayaprayojyaśābdabodha-viśayatā-sāmānādhikaraṇya*. A brief explanation of this is as follows: *Sva* is the singular case suffix. The *pratyaya* co-existing with *sva*, is the *tral* in the word ‘*atra*’. The *viśayatā*-objectness determined by the verbal cognition, resides in the *ādheyatā* of *nīlaghata* only. Since the *pītaghata* is not an object of the verbal cognition produced by the sentence ‘*atra nīlaghataḥ asti*’, the question of its *ādheyatā* having the objectness belonging to *pītaghata* and that too being caused by the *tral*, does not arise. In short, the *pītaghata* though exists on the same ground on which the *nīlaghata* exists, is not related with the *ekavacana* by the second of the two relations. What actually is thus related with the *ekavacana* here, is *nīlaghata*. Since *nīlaghata* has the *bheda* of *pītaghata*, the *ekatva* of *pītaghata* becomes the *bhedapratyogitāvachchedaka*. On the other hand, since *nīlaghata*, cannot have the *bheda* of itself, the *ekatva* of it, becomes the *bhedapratyogitānavachchedaka*. The meaning of the *ekavacana* suffix, as pointed out earlier, is the *ekavacanaviśiṣṭa-ekatva*. Such an *ekatva* is actually present in the *nīlaghata*, in spite of the fact

that *pītaghaṭa* also is present on the same ground. Thus, the sentence '*atra nīlaghaṭaḥ asti*'—when there are *nīlaghaṭa* and *pītaghaṭa* on the ground, can be justified.

The origin of this complicated structure of *ekatva* can be traced in the simple statement '*sajātīyadvīṭīyarahitatvam ekatvam*' made by Gadādhara in his *Vyutpattivāda*, while discussing the meaning of *ekavacana*. To make the concept more clear, Gadādhara himself elaborated it as *svasajātīyaniṣṭhabhedapratīyogīānavacchedakaikatva* and further clarified by stating the *sājātya*, that is, similarity, contained in it, as—*sājātyam ca svasamabhivṛyāhṛtapadarthasamsargitva—viśiṣṭapraṅkṛtyarthatāvachchedakavatvarūpeṇa*. The above *anugama* suggested by Pt. Bacchā Jhā, is clear now that it is based only on these certain statements made by Gadādhara.

As a matter of fact, the *anugama* now shown is a simple one compared to the still complicated structure which Pt. Bacchā Jhā suggested later in order to avoid certain objections raised against the above *anugama*. I do not propose here either to discuss or elaborately explain the objections raised and the structure of *anugama* suggested to avoid the objections. But, just to show the mind-boggling complicatedness of it, which is the result of the various relations that are involved in it, I shall merely demonstrate the *anugama* with all the relations contained in it.

एकवचनविशिष्टं एकत्वम् एकवचनार्थः

This just means that the meaning of a singular case suffix is the *ekatva* which is related with the singular case suffix. Thus, in the sentence '*atra nīlaghaṭaḥ asti*', the singular case suffix added to the word '*nīlaghaṭa*' means the *ekatva* of *nīlaghaṭa*, denoted by the term '*nīlaghaṭa*'. The following is the relation of the singular case suffix in the *ekatva*:

स्वप्रकृतिप्रयोज्यविषयताविशिष्टनिरूपकताधिकरणतात्वावच्छिन्नानुयोगिताकपर्याप्तिक-
संख्यावच्छिन्नवद्वृत्तिभेदप्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकत्वम् । (Here, '*sva*' refers to the
ekavacana.)

In the above relation, 'nirūpakatā' is stated as related with 'svaprakṛtiprayojyaviṣayatā'. The relation of the viṣayatā in the nirūpakatā is one of the following four relations:

निरूपकतायां वैशिष्ट्यं च—

1. स्वाभिन्नमुख्यविशेष्यतावत्त्व
2. स्वाभिन्नमुख्यप्रकारतावच्छेदकतावत्त्व
3. स्वाभिन्नमुख्यप्रकारतावत्त्व
4. स्वाभिन्नतादृशविशेष्यतावच्छेदकतावत्त्व—अन्यतरमसंबन्धेन ।

There are four possible, different instances in which a singular case suffix can be found. They are:

1. Where the singular case suffix is added to a word that denotes the main qualificandum (*mukhyaviśeṣya*) for example, 'atra ghaṭaḥ asti'. Here the word 'ghaṭa' denotes the main qualificandum. The singular case suffix added to this is taken care of by the first of the above four relations.
2. The second type of singular case suffix is that which is added to the word that denotes the 'limitor of the qualificierness' (*prakāratāvacchedaka*). For example 'puruṣoyam rājñah'—'This is a king's servant'. Here the *ṣaṣṭhi*—*ekavacana* added to the word 'rājan' is being covered. In the cognition produced by this sentence, 'servant' is the qualifier and the king is the limitor of the qualificierness. To explain the meaning of this *ekavacana* the second of the above four relations, is mentioned.
3. Among the above four relations, the third one, namely 'svābhinnamukhyaprakāratāvatva' is included to cover the instance—'Rāmadārāḥ Jānakī'. Here the word 'Rāmadārā' denotes the qualificandum and the word 'Jānakī' refers to the qualifier. Since the word Rāmadāra is in plural number, that suffix cannot convey the *ekatva* of 'Rāmadāra'—consort of Rāma. As a matter of fact, the suffix is considered here as meaningless, but added just for the sake of grammatical correctness of the word. Hence

the *ekatva* of Rāmadāra, will have to be conveyed by the singular case suffix which we hear after the word 'Jānakī'. As told above, this instance is covered by the third relation.

4. The fourth of the four relations being explained now, is *svābhinnamukhyaviśeṣyatā-vacchedakatāvattva*. This is included here to cover the instance '*rājñāḥ puruṣah atrāsti*'. Here there are two terms ending with a singular case suffix. One is the term '*rājñāḥ*' which is in *ṣaṣṭhī—ēkavacana*. Again, the main qualificandum of the cognition produced by this sentence is '*puruṣa*'. The *ekatva* of him is conveyed by the singular case affix added to the word '*puruṣa*'. But, if the *ekatva* of the '*rājan*' also is intended in the given sentence, to cover it, this fourth relation becomes necessary.

Before we continue further with this *anugama*, it will be helpful, if we briefly repeat what we have explained so far:

The meaning of a singular case affix is:

स्वप्रकृतिप्रयोज्यविषयता

↓

विशिष्ट

↓

निरूपकताधिकरणतात्वावच्छिन्नानुयोगिताकपर्याप्तिकसंख्याच्छिन्नदृष्टिभेद-
प्रतियोगितानवच्छेदकमेकत्वम् ।

The *nirūpakatā* underlined above is related with one of the four relations, mentioned below:

1. स्वाभिन्नमुख्यविशेष्यतावत्त्व ।
2. स्वाभिन्नमुख्यप्रकारतावच्छेदकतावत्त्व ।
3. स्वाभिन्नमुख्यप्रकारतावत्त्वं ।
4. स्वाभिन्नमुख्यविशेष्यतावच्छेदकतावत्त्व ।

In all the above four relations, '*sva*' refers to '*svaprakṛtiprayojyaviśayatā*' in which '*sva*' refers to the singular case suffix, the meaning of which is being discussed now. It

may be noticed here that each of the above relations, involves relations. Thus the first relation involves relations of *svābhinnamukhyaviśeṣyatā* in the *nirūpakatā*. The relations of the *mukhyaviśeṣyatā* in the *nirūpakatā* is either of the following two relations:

1. स्वसाक्षान्निरूपकतावच्छेदकतावत्त्व,
2. स्वनिरूपितमुख्यप्रकारतावत्त्व ।

It is obvious that both the above relations which are the relations of *svābhinnamukhyaviśeṣyatā* in *nirūpakatā*, involve relations. The relations of *svasākṣānnirūpakatāvachchedakatāvattva* in the *nirūpakatā*, are four. They are:

1. स्वसामानाधिकरण्य
2. स्वावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नत्व
3. स्वावच्छेदकानवच्छिन्नत्व
4. स्ववृत्तित्व

So far we have explained the first relation of *svābhinnamukhyaviśeṣyatā*. The second relation of *svābhinnamukhyaviśeṣyatā* in the *nirūpakatā* is *svanirūpitamukhyaparakāratā-vattva*. *mukhyaparakāratāvattva* means 'being replaced with the *mukhyaparakāratā*'. The relations of the *mukhyaparakāratā* in the *nirūpakatā*, are two. They are:

1. स्वावच्छेदकतात्वावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकर्षापत्यनुपयोगितावच्छेदकरूपवृत्तित्व
2. स्वावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नत्व ।

Here ends the chain of the relations with which *svaprakṛtiprayojyaviśayatā* is connected with the first of the four relations, namely, *svābhinnamukhyaviśeṣyatāvattva*.

The second relation of *svaprakṛtiprayojyaviśayatā* in the *nirūpakatā*, is *svābhinnamukhyaparakāratāvachchedakatāvattva*. Since this is a relation of *svaprakṛtiprayojyaviśayatā*, as before, here also 'sva' refers to *svaprakṛtiprayojyaviśayatā*.

The relation *svābhinnamukhyaparakāratāvachchedakatāvattva* means 'being related with *svābhinnamukhyaparakāratāvachchedakatā*'. Now, we have to show as to how this *mukhyaparakāratāvachchedakatā* has the relation in *nirūpakatā*. Either of

the following, is the relation of *mukhyaparakāratāvachedakatā* in the *nirūpakatā*,

1. स्वविशिष्टावच्छेदकतावत्त्व
2. स्वाश्रयत्व ।

The first of the above two relations, viz., *svaviśiṣṭāvacchedakatāvattva* involves two relations. One is the relation of 'sva', that is, *svābhinnamukhyaparakāratāvachedakatā*, in a certain *avachedakatā*. We call this as 'certain *avachedakāā*' as we are not, at this stage, familiar with this *avachedakatā* which is briefly stated as '*svaviśiṣṭāvacchedakatā*'. The other is the relation of this *avachédakatā* in the *nirūpakatā*. The following two are the relations of *mukhyaparakāratāvachedakatā* in the particular *avachedakatā*:

1. स्वसाक्षान्निरूपकता
2. स्वावच्छेद्यप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यत्वानवच्छिन्नत्व

The relations of the particular *avachedakatā* in the *nirūpakatā* are the following four:

1. स्वसामानाधिकरण्य
2. स्वावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नत्व
3. स्वानवच्छेदकानवच्छिन्नत्व
4. स्ववृत्तित्व ।

So far we have explained the first chain of the relations of *mukhyaparakāratāvachedakatā* with the *nirūpakatā*. Now, we have to explain the second relation, namely *svāśrayatva*. Here 'sva' is *mukhyaparakāratāvachedakatā*. The *nirūpakatā* is said to be the locus of *mukhyaparakāratāvachedakatā* with the three relations. They are:

1. स्वावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नसंबन्धित्वसंबन्धावच्छिन्नत्व
2. स्वावच्छेद्यप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यत्वावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नत्व
3. स्वविशिष्टविषयतात्वव्यापकत्व

The last of the above relations again involves two more relations. One is the relation of 'sva' in the *viśayatā* and the other

is the relation with which *vyāpakatva*, that is pervasiveness of the *nirūpakatā*, is limited. The relations of the 'sva' in the *viṣayatā*, are the following:

1. स्वावच्छेद्यविषयतानिरूपितविषयत्वावच्छिन्नत्व
2. स्वनिरूपितत्व

The *vyāpakatāvacchedakasambandha*, that is, the relation which is the limiter of *vyāpakatvā* is:

स्वनिरूपितावच्छेदकतावृत्तित्व

As per the above relation, the *nirūpakatā* is pervasive of *viṣayatā* as it resides in all the instances of *viṣayatā* by the relation of *svanirūpitāvacchedakatāvṛttitva*. This relation holds good when the *nirūpakatā* resides in the *svanirūpitāvacchedakatā*. The relation with which the *nirūpakatā* is required to be present in the *svanirūpitāvacchedakatā*, is actually not one, but two. They are:

1. स्वावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नत्व
2. स्वविशिष्टविशेष्यतानिरूपितप्रकारतावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नत्व

In the second of the relations, certain *viśeṣyatā* is required to be *svaviśiṣṭa*—related with *sva*. The relations of *sva* in the *viśeṣyatā*, are three. They are:

1. स्वाश्रयत्व
2. स्वानवच्छेदकानवच्छिन्नत्व
3. स्ववृत्तित्व

Of the above three, as per the first, *viśeṣyatā* is supposed to be the locus of *sva*. Here the relation is either of the following two:

1. स्वतादात्म्य
2. स्वावच्छेद्यत्व ।

So far, of the two relations with which *nirūpakatā* is required to be present in the *nirūpakatāvacchedakatva*, the second, namely *svaviśiṣṭaviśeṣyatanirūpita*, etc. is explained. The other, that is, the first relation is *svāvacchēdakāvacchinna*. This is described

as *svābhāvavadavacchedakatvānirūpitatva*. Here, *svābhāva* means the absence of *sva*, the *pratiyogitāvacchedakasambandha* of this absence, that is the relation with which the *sva* is negated, is either of the following two:

1. स्वनिरूपितावच्छेदकतावत्त्व
2. स्वावच्छेदप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यतावत्त्व

Of the above two relations, the first one refers to the possession of *avacchedakatā* and the second one to the possession of *viśeṣyatā*. The following are the relations with which the possession of *avacchedakatā* and *viśeṣyatā*, is intended.

1. स्वसामानाधिकरण्य
2. स्वावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नत्व
3. स्वानवच्छेदकानवच्छिन्नत्व
4. स्ववृत्तित्व

Here ends the chain of relations connected with the second relation referred to in the original definition of *ekatva*, that is, *svaprakṛtiprayojyaviśayatāvīṣṭānirūpakatākādhikaraṇatātāvāvacchinna*, etc. The third relation with which *svaprakṛtiprayojyaviśavatā* is related with the *nirūpakatā*, is—*svābhinnamukhyaparakāratāvattva*. The relation of *mukhyaparakāratā* in the *nirūpakatā*, is either of the following two:

1. स्वनिरूपितावच्छेदकतावत्त्व
2. स्वाश्रयत्व ।

The second relation *svāśrayatva* means being the locus of *sva*, namely, the *mukhyaparakāratā*. The following two are the relations with which *nirūpakatā* is intended to be the locus of *mukhyaparakāratā*:

1. स्वावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नसंबन्धित्वसंबन्धावच्छिन्नत्व
2. स्वनिरूपितविशेष्यतावत्त्व

Viśeṣyatāvatta in the second relation here means 'possessing *viśeṣyatā*'. Similarly, in the first relation of the two mentioned a bit earlier as the relations of *mukhyaparakāratā* in the *nirūpakatā*,

avacchedakatāvattva is included, *avvacchedakatāvattva* means 'possessing the *avacchedakatā*'. The relations with which *nirūpakatā* is intended to be possessed of this *avacchedakatā* and also the relations of *viśeṣyatā* which is mentioned above, are:

1. स्वसामानाधिकरण्य
2. स्वावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नत्व
3. स्वानवच्छेदकानवच्छिन्नत्व
4. स्ववृत्तित्व

Here ends the chain of the relations of *mukhyaprakāratā* in the *nirūpakatā*. The fourth and the final relation of *svaprakṛtiprayojyaviśavayatā* in the *nirūpakatā* of the original definition of *ekatva*, is *svābhinnamukhyaviśeṣyatāvvacchedakatāvattva*. Either of the following is the relation of *mukhyaviśeṣyatāvvacchedakatā* in *nirūpakatā*:

1. स्वविशिष्टावच्छेदकतावत्त्व
2. स्वाश्रयात्त्व

The first of the above two relations, involves the relation of *sva* in the *avacchedakatā* and also the relation of *avacchedakatā* in the *nirūpakatā*. Those relations are the following:

1. स्वसामानाधिकरण्य
2. स्वावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नत्व
3. स्वानवच्छेदकानवच्छिन्नत्व

The second relation, *svāśrayatva*, means that the *nirūpakatā* is the locus of *viśeṣyatāvvacchedakatā*. The following are the relations with which the *nirūpakatā* is intended to be the locus:

1. स्वावच्छेदकसंबन्धावच्छिन्नसंबन्धित्वसंबन्धावच्छिन्नत्व
2. स्वनिरूपितस्वावच्छेदप्रकारतानिरूपितविशेष्यत्वावच्छेद्यविषयतावच्छेदकावच्छिन्नत्व
3. स्वनिरूपिततुमुख्यप्रकारतावदवच्छेदकतात्त्व
4. स्वविशिष्टविषयतात्वव्यापकत्व

The last relation here involves the relations of *sva* in a *viśayatā* and also *vyāpakatva*, that is, pervasiveness. The relations of *sva* in the *viśayatā* are the following:

1. स्वनिरूपितत्व
2. स्वावच्छेद्यविशेष्यतानिरूपितविषयताभिन्नत्व
3. स्वनिरूपितमुख्यप्रकारतावदन्यत्व

The *vyāpakatā* mentioned earlier, is intended with either of the following relations:

1. स्ववृत्तित्व
2. स्वनिरूपितावच्छेदकतावृत्तित्व

Though this chain of relations can be developed further, we may stop here and can say that this explanation of *ekatva*, can cover all the instances of *ekatva*. For a layman, why, even for a scholar who is able to follow the Navya-Nyāya terminology only up to an extent, all this exercise may seem to be absolutely meaningless. It is also impossible to convince a layman the necessity of conceiving innumerable relations, each of which involves many other relations and are mostly unintelligible. But when one notices the use of the singular case in different contexts, it becomes clear that a simple explanation cannot cover all the cases. For instance, take the sentence ‘*puruṣoḥyam rājñah*’. Here singular case suffix is used more than once. The singular case that we hear after the term ‘*puruṣa*’ denotes the *ekatva* that belongs to the qualificandum, whereas the singular case suffix heard after the word ‘*rājan*’ denotes the *ekatva* that is related to the qualifier, because as per the Sanskrit linguistic rules—*puruṣa* is the qualificandum and *rājan* is the qualifier here. Any explanation of *ekatva* will have to cover all these instances. There are also some peculiar instances wherein the use of singular case affix poses a problem. Bacchā Jhā refers to many such instances. When a servant is carrying some money which actually belongs to two kings, the use of a sentence—*rājñah dhanam gṛhītva jigamiṣati rājño dāsaḥ*—‘The servant of the king desires to go, taking the money of the king’ is not valid if the *ekatva* of the *rājan* is intended in both cases—‘*rājñah dhanam*’ and ‘*rājñah dāsaḥ*.’ In one case, that is, ‘*rājñah dāsaḥ*’ the use of *ekavacana* is quite valid because the person is a servant of only one king, but the same cannot be said in the

case of 'rājñāḥ dhanam', because the money, actually does not belong to only one king. The various relations involved in this *anugama* take care of this instance also, the validity of which, otherwise cannot be established.

Similarly, there are sentences like 'Rāmadārāḥ Jānaki'. Here, as per the desire of the speaker, either the term 'Rāmadārāḥ' can be taken as the term denoting the qualificandum (*viśeṣya*) or the term 'Jānakī'. In either case, the plural number used after the word Rāmadārāḥ is not intended. Since the word *dāra*, as per the Sanskrit linguistic rules, for the sake of grammatical correctness has to be used in plural number, it is so used. But, the singular number after the word Jānakī, denotes the *ekatva*. Certain relations introduced in the *anugama* are intended to cover instances such as these also. Therefore, though it is very difficult even to make an attempt to explain the utility of the seemingly meaningless relations included in an *anugama*, it can only be said that an *anugama* is employed as a last weapon by the Naiyāyikās through which they can avoid many inconvenient questions and achieve precision to a maximum extent. The *anugama* mentioned above, which satisfactorily explains the *ekatva* that the singular case suffixes used in different situations denote, was designed by the great Naiyāyikas of this century, Bacchā Jhā, in his *Gūḍharthatattvaloka*, a commentary on the *Vyutpattivāda* of Gadādhara. Though Gadādhara discusses the meaning of singular case suffix in his *Vyutpattivāda* and offers an explanation of *ekatva* which is, by and large, acceptable to all, Bacchā Jhā continues the discussion further, pointing out the problems that cannot be solved by the explanation of *ekatva* offered by Gadādhara. The objections that he raises and the solutions, including the above *anugama*, are entirely his own. This is only a small instance of the amazing ingenuity for which Bacchā Jhā is recognized as a legendary Naiyāyika of this century.

[According to Professor V.N. Jha, the well-known scholar of Nyāya to whom these comments were sent to find if there was anything

wrong with them, 'They are far from the tradition. It appears that nobody has made the fundamentals of Navya-Nyāya clear to you. Naturally your comments are without foundation.' However, as he has not indicated as to what exactly is the misunderstanding, I am still tempted to publish them so the misunderstandings if any, may be clarified and we may move nearer to understanding what exactly the neo-Naiyāyika is doing and whether he has really achieved the precision which is usually ascribed to him. Professor V.N. Jha had said that 'It is not possible for me and also it is not a rewarding exercise to write my own comments on each and every comment of yours, because that will take double the pages you have used for your comments.' However, I hope that he, as well as other Naiyāyikas would point out the 'misunderstandings' so that the issue may be clarified to the extent it is possible. Navya-Nyāya ultimately is a mode of analysis and I see no reason why it cannot be used by anyone for purposes other than the traditional ones for which the neo-Naiyāyikas have used them in the past. I am also giving at the end the response that Professor D. Prahlada Char had made on my comments so that the reader may see the difference between the two responses, one by Professor V.N. Jha and the other by Professor Prahlada Char.]

(a) Have the Neo-Naiyāyikas been Leading Us Up
the Garden Path? A Comment on the *Kroḍapatras*
by D. Prahlada Char

DAYA KRISHNA

Professor Prahlada Char's article on the *Kroḍapatras* published in the *JICPR*, Vol. XIV, No. 3, is perhaps the first detailed study of this new genre of philosophical writing which occurred in India some time in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth century. The *Kroḍapatras* are supposed to be different from the *Vādagranthas* and are primarily written to explain certain sentences which occur in the classical texts and which have some difficulty with respect to their formulation. The *Kroḍapatras* that he considers for detailed examination are those

by Kālīsaṅkara Bhaṭṭācārya (AD 1810) and Candranārāyana Bhaṭṭācārya (AD 1790). These two *kroḍapatras* are supposed to be concerned with the *hetvābhāṣa sāmānyanirukti* Gadādhara which treats the issue of fallacies and which itself is a commentary on Raghunātha Śīromaṇi's treatment of fallacies as given by Gaṅgeśa in his *Tattvacintāmaṇi*. Gaṅgeśa's definition runs somewhat as follows, 'The fallacy of reason is that by comprehending which a cognition prevents an inferential cognition'. What perhaps is meant is that the moment one recognizes something as a fallacy one feels constrained to forego the deduction of a conclusion from premises from which earlier one had supposed it to follow. However, Gaṅgeśa's definition, though obviously plausible, does not take into account the distinction between the one who gives the argument and the one who only receives it or hears it or learns about it in any other way. The distinction is important for the awareness of a fallacy normally would function differently in the two contexts. The person who is actively thinking and arguing, after becoming aware that there is a fallacy involved in the argument would normally think of finding some other premises or grounds from which the conclusion can be derived without involving the fallacy concerned as he is convinced that the conclusion itself is valid and hence needs to be established on non-fallacious grounds. Basically, the point is that the attitude of the thinker to the awareness of a fallacy in his argument is not 'passive', particularly as there are very few conclusions which follow only from one set of premises and from no others. Normally, we do not have 'Q', if and only, if 'P'. In other words, the 'active' mind searches for alternative premises from which to derive the conclusion concerned in the face of its awareness that there is a fallacy involved in the argument that one has given. On the other hand, the passive recipient of the argument or the one who purely contemplates it as an object, feels only that as there is a fallacy, the conclusion does not follow from the premises that have been provided for it. Gaṅgeśa definition therefore while essentially correct, is

inadequate as it does not take into account the distinction between *swārthānumāna* and *parārthānumāna* which the Nyāya thinker generally accepts. It is of course true that this distinction is not normally drawn in the way we are trying to understand it, but if the whole context of an argument which is usually designated as '*prayojana*' and which is so heavily emphasized by the Nyāya thinker is kept in mind, then one will see the relevance of the point that we are trying to make.

The *Kroḍapatras*, however, are not concerned with this issue but rather with something else. They are concerned rather with the modification that Raghunātha Śīromaṇi suggested in the definition of Gaṅgeśa. However, it does not discuss the generalized issue at all, thus pointing to a strange limitation of the traditional format of the discussion on the subject. Somehow, the tradition seems to accept that the inference 'there is fire on the mountain, because there is smoke' as valid while 'there is fire on the lake because there is smoke' is invalid, without critically examining why the first is valid and the second invalid. In fact, the Sanskrit formulations are ambiguous in the extreme, for the Sanskrit phrase '*parvato vanhimān dhūmāt*' means the mountain is fiery or to make it closer to English usage that the mountain is characterized by the presence of fire because there is smoke. The term '*dhūmāt*' only means that the ground of this inference is the perception of smoke but not directly the perception of the fire itself. The hidden ground for this inference is the adage 'where there is smoke, there is fire'. But even this formulation of the ground is faulty, for the terms 'where' and 'there' are ambiguous. One obviously does not mean that the fire is exactly at the same place where there is smoke but only that in case smoke is perceived, or even smelt, it is a sign that there is fire somewhere. Where exactly the fire is, the smoke can never tell. On the other hand, the counter-example on which the whole discussion in the *Kroḍapatra* is based which alleges that the second definition of fallacious reasoning given by Gaṅgeśa would not be able to distinguish between the statement 'the

mountain is fiery because there is smoke' and the statement 'the lake is fiery because there is smoke' even though the latter is obviously fallacious while the former is not. The reason why the second is supposed to be fallacious is because there seems to be *a priori* knowledge that water, by its very nature, cannot have the characteristic of having fire in it. But it is never discussed in the tradition as to how one obtains this knowledge and how one is certain' about it. For, in a sense, even a mountain can never have a fire on it unless there is a forest cover on it to catch the fire. A mountain totally bereft of a forest cover, that is, which does not have any dry grass or trees can obviously never be characterized as fiery, as stones normally are not supposed to catch fire. They can of course become very hot, but so can water. Water cannot only get very hot but also boil and burn and if heat is the chief characteristic of fire then surely it can have an element of fire in it and obviously it cannot be held that its intrinsic nature is such as not to allow any element of heat within it. Of course, we pour it on fire to extinguish it but there are some kinds of fire in which water is not supposed to be used to extinguish them. Also, in the tradition itself, there is supposed to be a fire which is held to be intrinsic to water itself and this has been called '*baḍavānala*'. In fact, if one believes in the usual mythology, then Rama is supposed to have burnt the ocean or threatened to burn it, if it refused to hear his request to provide access for his troops to cross over to Laṅkā. If water could never burn, then surely Rāma would not even have threatened to do so, and if this was as impossible as the Nyāya logicians treat it, then the author of the Rāmāyaṇa would never have written it.

The issue is not of mythology or of what people believe in. It relates to a question of empirical fact and hence the objection to a definition should not normally be entertained where the example given is itself subject to doubt. In fact, the traditional Nyāya logician seems never to have carefully distinguished between the logical and the empirical and this perhaps is the reason why he is continuously faced with problems

arising from the absence of such a distinction. Of course, the distinction raises problems of its own as has been pointed out by Quine in his famous article entitled 'Two Dogmas of Empiricism'. But the Indian logician does not seem to have even faced the problem of the essential contingency of most empirical statements as they are always based on limited experience which future experience may subvert.

In any case, it appears that Raghunātha Śiromaṇi in his commentary on Gaṅgeśa found a slight defect in the formulation of the definition and added the word '*viśiṣṭa*' in order to obviate this defect. Perhaps, by adding this term he wanted to restrict the definition of fallacious reasoning given by Gaṅgeśa to the specific nature of the objects in which the relation of *vyāpti* was supposed to be the ground of inference. The correction by Raghunātha however seems to have given rise to further difficulties as the term '*viśiṣṭa*' which he added does not seem to have conveyed precisely the nature of the property in the cognition of fallacious reasoning which prevents the inferential process from taking place. Gadādhara made a further addition in the modification suggested by Raghunātha to the definition given by Gaṅgeśa, creating further problems for subsequent thinkers, though the writers of the *Kroḍapatras* seem to have dealt with them.

It appears that Gadādhara added the word '*yadrūpa*' to specify what exactly the word '*viśiṣṭa*' meant when Raghunātha Śiromaṇi's used this term to convey the specificity of the property conceived. But it seems that the added precision was not precise enough for subsequent Nyāya thinkers and Kālīśaṅkara Bhaṭṭācārya starts his *Kroḍapatras* by asking what exactly was meant by '*yadrūpa*', which Gadādhara had added to the modification already proposed by Raghunātha, or in other words, what exactly was the property whose apprehension obstructed the process of inferring the conclusion from the premises. The obvious answer in the context of the Nyāya example is that it should be the absence of the *vyāpti* relation between the *hetu* and the *sādhyā*. However, instead of discussing at this

general level, which perhaps would have been more rational, the Nyāya discussion, as developed by the authors of the *Krodāpatras*, takes a different turn and confines itself only to the specific example of the fallacious inference that the lake is on fire because there is smoke. This suggests that the apprehension of the property which obstructs the inference is obviously the fact that the lake which is full of water cannot be on fire as water is characterized by the absence of fire. Or, to put the same thing in Nyāya terminology, as water itself is characterized by 'wateriness' and fire by 'fireness', it is the absence of the 'fireness' in 'wateriness' which obstructs the process of inference. The Nyāyāyika however does not raise the question as to how one accounts for this absence or how one validates such an assertion. Kālīśaṅkara Bhaṭṭācārya, on the other hand, in his *Krodāpatras* raises the question as to the exact nature of the relation between the absence of 'fireness' in the 'wateriness' which is supposed to be an essential characteristic of something being a lake. Kālīśaṅkara forgets that there can be such a thing as a 'dry lake' and that such a lake where there is no water is not a contradiction-in-terms, that is, it is not like *vandhyāpauṭra*. However, forgetting this objection for the moment and attending only to the turn that Kālīśaṅkara's thought takes in the discussion of the subject, the issue that he raises is that the relation between the absence of 'fireness' in what he calls 'lakeness' cannot be a *swarūpa sambandha* as, in the case of the absence of a pot on the ground and the ground itself, which is related by what the Nyāya calls a *swarūpa sambandha*. The relation of the absence will have to be more positive in character. Perhaps, what is meant is that the relation of 'fireness' in the 'lakeness' will have to be more positive in order to obstruct the inference. Kālīśaṅkara's move to provide this positive character to the presence of the negation is to suggest that the relation should be conceived as *samānādhikarānya*, that is, as 'co-present' in the same locus and not as *swarūpa*. This however is no solution at all as the basic question is whether the co-presence of

absence is accidental or necessary, an issue to which Kālīśaṅkara does not address himself for the simple reason that Nyāya thought does not come to grips with the problem. But basically Kālīśaṅkara is not very serious about this suggestion as he himself rejects it. Yet, the very fact that he does entertain the possibility shows, firstly, that the distinction between necessary and accidental qualities has not been given much attention in Nyāya and, secondly, the very notion of *samānādhikaraṇya* and what it implies has not been analysed as it is not clear what exactly is meant by saying that the same object is the locus of different properties or, putting it differently, the same subject can be characterized by different predicates. This obviously presupposes the notion of a substance or a thing which endures in time and hence may even have incompatible properties in case they occur at different moments of time. However, even if one accepts the notion of *samānādhikaraṇa*, one will have to further discuss the criteria on the basis of which some properties or certain kinds of properties cannot in principle have the same *samānādhikaraṇa*. Nyāya thinkers have not discussed this question. The objection of Kālīśaṅkara to the acceptance of the *samānādhikaraṇa* of 'lakeness' and the 'absence of fire' seems to be on the ground that sufficient precision has not been articulated with respect to the 'absence of fire in the lake' as one has to realize that the lake is characterized by 'lakeness' and fire by 'fireness' and that 'absence' is itself characterized both by what may be called 'absenceness' on the one hand and that it is the 'absence of fire', and hence an 'absenceness' qualified by fire, which itself is qualified by 'fireness' and which characterizes the 'lakeness' which is characterizing the lake. Thus, to put this simple thing in a very complicated way, the lake is characterized by 'lakeness' which itself is characterized by the 'absence of fire' which in turn is characterized by 'absenceness' and 'fireness' which together are further characterized by an 'absenceness of fireness'. This 'absenceness characterized by fireness' itself characterizes 'lakeness' which characterizes the lake. This complicated

analysis seems to be a roundabout way to the assertion which, in the western philosophical tradition, has been described in terms of the necessary exclusion of one set of qualities from another set of qualities on one set of predicates from another set. As a predicate is always analysed as a particular characterized by a universal and as the exclusion is supposed to be necessary because of the very nature of the predicate, the awareness of such an exclusion prevents or forbids such an inference from occurring. However, the Western tradition of philosophizing has never been able to completely explicate as to what exactly is meant by a 'necessary' exclusion just as the Indian analysis does not seem to come to grips with the question as to the grounds on which such exclusion is justified. The situation is however further complicated by the fact that Nyāya does not treat sentences as conveying some specific state of affairs or 'facts', but rather as producing states of 'knowing' in the person who reads or hears them and hence treats sentences which convey the same fact as essentially different depending on the way it is expressed in a sentence, or through a sentential construction. Thus a sentence like 'Daśaratha is the father of Rāma' will be treated as essentially different from the sentence 'Rāma is the son of Daśaratha' even though they may denote the same fact, especially for a person who is familiar with Indian mythology and hence knows that the name 'Rāma' denotes a male person. The western analysis of such sentences postulates either the notion of a proposition or a fact which is conveyed by seemingly diverse kinds of sentences which, for all cognitive purposes, are supposed to say the same thing. As Nyāya does not accept this position, it is not quite clear how it will tackle the question of the translatability of one set of sentences into another while preserving the identity of meaning. It is not quite clear whether the prolonged discussion of *śābdabodha* or linguistic meaning in the Indian tradition has addressed itself to this issue. In the recent western discussion on the subject Professor Quine has questioned the notion of translatability in terms of the preservation of the sameness

of meaning understood in terms of *salva veritate*, but one does not know whether there is a comparable Indian discussion on the subject and if it has taken the Quinean turn or some other direction.

Kālīsaṅkara, however, seems to raise an objection even to this complicated formulation mentioned above. His objection appears to suggest that the formulation would also prohibit the inference of the presence of fire in the mountain if for some reason someone were to think that the absence of fire was as much a characteristic of a mountain as it is of a lake. It is strange to find Kālīsaṅkara raising such an objection as the crux of the matter was that there is a radical difference between lake and mountain in this regard and while the first can never be characterized by the presence of fire the other possibly could and there is nothing in the nature of things which prevents a mountain being characterized by the presence of fire though a mountain can certainly have a lake within it. But normally one would not deny the possibility of a mountain catching fire on the ground that there was a lake there. Kālīsaṅkara may have been grouping for a purely formal notion of inferential validity/invalidity which does not clearly exist in the Nyāya framework. It is of course true that in case one 'accepts' the premise that wherever there is 'mountainness' there is absence of 'fireness', then one cannot infer that there is fire on the mountain, just as if one accepts' that wherever there is 'lakeness' there is an absence of 'fireness', one cannot infer that there is fire in the lake. All of this, of course, is correct as it depends on the acceptance of the premise preceded by it and Kālīsaṅkara's understandable confusion arises simply from the fact that he has not grasped the notion of the formal validity of an inference as distinct from its empirical truth.

As Kālīsaṅkara wrote in 1810 or so, it is quite possible that he had not had any interaction with the western tradition of philosophizing. As both the Sanskrit College and Hindu College were established by the British in Kolkata in 1823 and

1828, respectively, it would be interesting to know in this regard if persons writing later showed any awareness of this commonplace distinction in the western tradition.

Kālīśaṅkara's further explanation as to why the term '*yadrūpa*' in Gadādhara cannot apply to 'mountainness' when it can apply to 'lakeness' is as unsatisfactory as his earlier discussion because he does not seem to have grasped the essential point of the discussion. Surely a mountain can be characterized by the absence of fire as there is nothing in the nature of a mountain to make it impossible for fire to be absent there. On the other hand, the very nature of water as such seems to exclude the possible presence of fire in it and hence the absence of fire is not contingent or accidental as in the case of a mountain but necessary as the very nature of water is supposed to require that it is such. The absence of fire in the mountain and the absence of fire in the water in the lake are thus of two different orders and unless this is realized, no satisfactory analysis of the term '*yadrūpa*' as given by Gadādhara can be done.

The discussion on what exactly is meant by the term '*yadrūpa*' in Gadādhara is carried forward in another *kroḍapatra* by Candranārāyana Bhaṭṭācārya who makes an interesting point that the bringing in of the notion of *samānādhikaraṇya* does not explain the 'fireness' in the 'lakeness' as the relation between two such universals cannot be said to have any *samānādhikaraṇya* which the 'absence of fire' and the lake may be supposed to have. The issue in fact is a larger one and it is doubtful if Candranārāyana has seen it in this manner, even if what he has written appears to imply that he did. The issue might be formulated in the form of a question. Can universals in their universality have *samānādhikaraṇya* which only particular properties are supposed to have when they characterize the same object?

There is a subtle point raised by Candranārāyana as to why the indirect *samānādhikaraṇatva* of absence of fire in the lake, cannot be regarded as sufficient ground for the acceptance of

the absence of 'fireness' in 'lakeness'. According to him it cannot be the meaning of the term '*yadrūpa*' in Gadādhara which would prevent the inferential cognition as required by Gaṅgeśa's definition.

Candranārāyana raises another interesting issue in his discussion as to why the term '*yadrūpa*' cannot be understood as lake characterized by the absence of fire. The main point of his objection seems to be that the term 'lake' and the complex term characterized by the 'absence of fire' have two totally different modalities and hence cannot jointly be combined as being referred to by the term '*yadrūpa*', for the property of 'being characterized by the absence of fire', according to him, does not have the same *avacchedaka* which the term 'lake' has. The lake obviously has the *avacchedaka* 'lakeness' which resides in it according to Nyāya analysis by the relation of *samavāya*. On the other hand, 'characterized by the absence of fire' as an *avacchedaka*, namely the 'absence of fireness' which is related to the lake by the relation of *viśeṣanata* or what may be called an adjectival relation. Even if one accepts Candranārāyana's analysis it does not follow as to why the term '*yadrūpa*' would not convey a complex awareness whose different parts or elements are characterized by different *avacchedakas* and even different relations. He seems to be assuming that the term '*yadrūpa*' can only refer to a unitary awareness of a simple kind, or at least the different elements of which have the same *avacchedakas*. But he has given no reasons to justify this assumption.

One reason that Candranārāyana gives as to why the absence of fire cannot be regarded as an adjective of the lake and the whole considered as the meaning of the term '*yadrūpa*' used by Gadādhara is that if this were to be accepted, then many of the adjectives later on used by Gadādhara himself would be inapplicable and that the two set of adjectives would contradict each other.

The discussion about a faultless definition of fallacy seems to have been a favourite topic of the authors of the *Kroḍapatras*

as we hear of one *Kroḍapatra* written by Mysore Rāma Śastrī (1850) entitled 'Śatakoti *Kroḍapatra*' which seems to get its name from the hundred arguments against the definition given by Gadādhara in his work *Satpratīpakṣa*. The work of Rāma Śastrī had aroused great controversy as it was replied to by Anantalvas and Kṛṣṇatātācārya who wrote a *kroḍapatra* entitled *Śatakoti Khaṇḍana*. Another Naiyayika seems to have come to the defence of Rāma Śastrī by writing a work entitled *Śatkoṭi Khaṇḍana Maṇḍana*. In any case, as no one seems to have examined the arguments and counter-arguments, one is not in a position to assess it for the quality of arguments or their validity. But it certainly is evidence of the lively philosophical debate through the medium of the *Kroḍapatras* which occurred until the beginning of the twentieth century, after which for some reason the interest in writing *Kroḍapatras* declined and ultimately ceased altogether.

II

Leaving the issue relating to the adequate definition of fallacy as discussed in the *Kroḍapatras*, Professor Prahlada Char attempts to explicate the notion of an *anugama* which however is not very clear. Perhaps the idea of an *anugama* is to show that a seemingly simple situation is full of infinite complexity and appears to be simple only because it has not been adequately analysed. He takes the example relating to the issue as to how the singularity of an object is denoted and shows why the simple answer that it is easily conveyed by the singular number of the *vibhakti* concerned, cannot be accepted. The Sanskrit language, as is well known, has singular, dual and plural numbers and thus conveys by the grammatical suffix whether one is talking of a single object, two objects or many objects. Professor Prahlada Char tries to show that such an easy explanation will not do and takes the example of a simple sentence: 'Atra ghaṭah asti' (Here there is a jar). Such a

statement, according to him, would be mistaken if supposing there were more than one jar at the place concerned and hence either the suffix pointing to the singleness of the object would be wrong or the singularity would have to be conveyed in some other way. The analysis seems to have been vitiated from the very beginning by paying too much attention to how language conveys singularities. The problem obviously is not with 'ghaṭa', but with 'atṛā'. What exactly is meant by 'atṛā'? Normally we tend to assume that one object can only occupy one space or that, conversely, the same space cannot be occupied by more than one object. This however is not quite clear for one can show that the same space, for example the space enclosed by the four walls of a room, is occupied by a plurality or multiplicity of objects. Yet, this counter-example would be held by most people to be mistaken as it would be said that the space occupied by each object in the room is different from that occupied by other objects in the room. On the other hand if one gave the example of Chinese boxes where each box is inside the other, it could be objected that, after all, the space occupied by one box is not the same as the space occupied by the other boxes. But if one asks the question as to what is meant by the 'same space' or by something occupying 'that space' then it will be clear that ultimately the idea of space and something occupying that space are being treated in such a way that they are completely identical and that the singularity of the object is the same as the singularity of the space and that one does not quite know what exactly is meant by either the singularity of the object or the singularity of the space, for if the space was infinitely divisible there would be no singularity of space and as for the singularity of objects, none of the objects that we commonly talk of would be regarded as singular under this mode of analysis.

The problem has been discussed in contemporary philosophy in the context of what has come to be known as the theory of definite description, but it is interesting to see how the same issue has been discussed by Indian thinkers in a

totally different way in a different context where the uniqueness of reference seems to have been approached and caught in a different way.

The problem posed by the Indian analyst appears to arise from an imagined situation where there are a number of jars on the ground and where someone uses the sentence 'here there is a jar', the 'is' of the English language conveying the oneness or singularity of the object referred to by the sentence. The question is whether the use of such a sentence as 'here is a jar' is correct and whether it really refers to the oneness of the object that is being referred to. One of the suggested modifications in the condition of the reference of a singular suffix ending for purposes of ensuring singularity of reference, namely that there should be no other object of the same kind in order that the singularity of references is unambiguously indicated does not obtain in this case as there is another jar which obviously is of the same kind. There is thus an obvious necessity of formulating the conditions of singular reference in such a way that this kind of situation is adequately taken care of along with many others which the ingenious mind of the Naiyāyika can imagine.

Unfortunately, the Nyāya discussion on the subject does not seem to distinguish between '*ekatva*' and '*viśiṣṭatva*', that is, between the numerical oneness of the object conveyed by the suffix in the Sanskrit language and the uniqueness of the object which is the subject of the second discussion around the notion of definite descriptions and proper names in the western tradition primarily associated with the names of Russell, Quine and Davidson.

The example of the two jars on the ground which seems to invalidate the condition that there should be nothing else of the same kind is further complicated by the assumption that the two jars are of different colours—one, yellow and the other, blue. In such a situation, the addition of the word relating to colour would provide the distinguishing reference, even though another object of the same kind still continues to be there.

There has therefore to be some further condition to the absence of another thing of the same kind to ensure the correctness of 'oneness' of reference by the suffix in the Sanskrit language. In fact, the discussion brings in another notion regarding the natural meaning of a word or '*prakṛtyārtha*' which itself needs further clarification. The example of two jars with different colours can be taken care of by specifying the colour of the jar that is referred to, ensuring its '*ekatva*' being correctly conveyed by the suffix in '*atra neelghaṭaḥ asti*'. However the Nyāya imagination conceives of another instance where the sentence refers to a situation where one brāhmaṇa gives a cow to another brāhmaṇa. Here both are brāhmaṇas and belong to the same caste and yet each of them is referred to by a suffix which conveys the '*ekatva*' of each and does not group them together to convey that they are two of a kind. The sentence seems correct and yet if the condition were to be accepted, the reference of '*ekatva*' will be wrong. The analysis does not seem to take into account the fact that the distinction between the two brāhmaṇas is not in their brāhmaṇhood but that they are related by a relation in which one is a receiver and the other a giver. The western tradition would have treated this as an asymmetrical or non-symmetrical relation and perhaps chosen a clearer example such as 'A is greater than B'. However, in the context in which it is given, it is interesting as the suffix indicating both the brāhmaṇas ensures their 'oneness' even though they are both present together at the same place and time and hence violate the condition of the absence of another of one's kind which was given to ensure the oneness of reference by the Sanskrit suffix.

The solution suggested to these difficulties is to completely drop the condition of the absence of another of the same kind and just hold that the oneness or '*ekatva*' of the object concerned is denoted by the singular case ending of the suffix. But this is to go back to the earlier definition and is almost a tautology for that is what the *eka vacana* singular suffix is

supposed to denote. The apparently simple situation is complicated by the raising of the question as to what exactly is the relation between the *eka vacana* suffix of the language and the *ekatva* or the numerical oneness denoted by it, a question which no one would ordinarily think of asking at all as it is the function of language to denote or to refer. Moreover, it is not clear as to whether the question refers only to the specificity of the relation between 'eka vacana' and the 'ekatva' or the generalized question regarding the relation of language to reality or of language to that which it refers, or even to what it means. The trouble with much of the Nyāya discussion in the *Kroḍapatras* seems to be that it is too tied to the particular instances it is discussing and does not deal with the general issues which are involved in it and of which, at least on a *prima facie* view, it appears to be only an instance. The Nyāya explication of the relation between the *ekavacana* of the suffix in the Sanskrit language and the *ekatva* or numerical oneness of the object referred to is that there are at least two relations involved here, the first being the relation of natural meaningfulness which inheres in the *ekavacana* in the language and by which it is essentially characterized or limited. The second relation, on the other hand, is being characterized by 'samsargatā' which is specifically peculiar to it, 'it' referring to the suffix itself. The suffix then is supposed to be characterized by two relations, the one being its natural meaning and the second being that *viśiṣṭa samsargatā* by which it characterizes the object to which the suffix is added. The second relation probably refers to the relation which the suffix has to the term to which it is added. After all, the suffix denoting *ekavacana* can be added to anything such as a jar or a brāhmaṇa. The *ekavacananess* of the suffix remains the same, but as the suffix can never be used by itself and will have to be added to some term or the other, this term to which the suffix is added will have *svaviśiṣṭasamsarga-tānirūpakatva*. However, as this term is a word and hence will produce knowledge, that is, *śābdabodha* and as the word will always be used by someone to produce

this *śābdabodha*, a number of other relations also enter into the situation besides *svaprakṛtyārtha avacchedakatva* and *svaviśiṣṭa saṃsargatā nirūpakatva*.

However, Professor Prahlada Char's presentation of the analysis turns the discussion in another direction. It focuses on the term 'atra' in the sentence '*atra ghaṭaḥ asti*', that is, 'Here there is a jar'. The term 'here' according to him, denotes the numerical singularity of the space which is being occupied by the jar and hence which is functioning as a support or '*ādihāra*' of the jar which is related to it by the relation, known in Nyāya as '*ādihāra ādheya*'. Hence, the jar has the *ādheyatā* and the space has the *ādiharatā* in it and the *ekavacana* of the *ghaṭaḥ* refers both to the *ekatva* of the jar and also indirectly to the *ekatva* of the space in which the jar exists and which is being denoted by the term 'atra'. This double relation of the suffix denoting the *ekavacana* in the term *ghaṭa*, both in the jar and the space in which the jar exists is being described by saying that the 'sva', that is, the suffix is a joint locus or *samānādhikaraṇa* of the *ekatva* residing both in the jar and the space in which the jar exists and which is conveyed as a *viśaya* by the cognition of the two words, 'atra' and 'ghaṭa' in the sentence '*atra ghaṭaḥ asti*'. It is not quite clear what exactly is the difference between *pratyaya* and *śābdabodha* used by Professor Prahlada Char in his description of the analysis given in the *anugama* on this issue. The discussion in fact is vitiated by the lack of a distinction between the *ekatva* which is denoted by the *ekadeśīyatā* of the 'atra' and the *ekatva* of the jar which is conveyed by the suffix which is added to the word *ghaṭa* in the Sanskrit language. The former, interestingly, is immediately transmitted to the jar which occupies the space and thus the *ādheyatā* relation with it. The two 'onenesses' derive from two radically different considerations some of which have been pointed out earlier. It is only material objects whose essential characteristic is supposed to be their spatiality or their extentionality or the fact that they occupy space which leads to this dual characterization of 'oneness', one of which derives

from the oneness which is intrinsic to them and the other because of the fact that one object can occupy only one space at a time. This duality of derivation of the characteristic of oneness on their part becomes clear in the case of those objects which do not occupy space and yet are regarded as numerically one as distinguished from others of their own kind.

Much of the discussion on this issue seems also to be further limited by the fact that the thinkers who have engaged in it seem to be unaware that it is only the peculiarity of the Sanskrit language where numerical oneness is to be conveyed by addition of a suffix which has created the problem. In English, for example, this is not the case and no suffix is to be added to convey that we are talking of one object and only one. It is only when more than one object is under consideration that suffixes are added.

The situation of linguistic analysis in Sanskrit, particularly in the Nyāya perspective, is further complicated by the fact that for Nyāya, a specific property called '*viṣayatā*', arises in the object when it is cognized, that is, the epistemological status of being an object which is conferred on it by the fact of its being known and hence every object of knowledge gains this additional property which it did not have before it was known. Furthermore, if this cognition happens to be linguistic in character, then the linguistic meaning apprehended by consciousness gains what may be called '*Sābdabodha viṣayatā*' or the objectness generated by the cognition of a linguistic element in the meaning itself. The numerical oneness conveyed by a suffix because of its *prakṛtyārthā* or natural meaning and the relationship of '*sāmsargatā*' that it has with the specific object to which it is related by the relation of *sāmsargata* is complicated by the other *sāmsargatā* relations which also obtain, according to Navya-Nyāya analysis, in this situation. There is, for example, the *sāmsargatā* relation introduced by the *ekadesīyatā* denoted by '*atra*' which, in turn, transmits this to the jar which is related to it by *ādheyatā*. This relation of *ādheyatā* which the jar gets because it is located in the space which is

denoted by the term *atra* is supposed to be related to it by the relation of *samvāya*. This however does not close the story as the whole cognition is further characterized by the relation of *viṣayatā* or epistemological objectness which arises because of the multiple *samsargatā* relations between the words denoting all these together in the sentence ‘*atra ghaṭaḥ astī*’.

It is not quite clear how many *viṣayatās* Nyāya will have to postulate and how many *samsargatās* in the complex act of linguistic cognition, and in case it has to postulate more than one, how it will establish the interrelationship between them. The recourse to *samānādhikaraṇa* will not help, as while in the case of an objective situation *samānādhikaraṇa* may help, in the case of *śabdabodha* it will not do so, particularly when a very large number of sentences convey a unified meaning. Even in the case of complex situations there may arise the same problem as, for example, in the case of large scale historical events. There is the added question as to whether Nyāya postulates different kinds of *viṣayatās* for different kinds of cognition. Perceptual knowledge, for instance, is supposed to be non-linguistic and its *viṣayatā* will have to be different from the *viṣayatā* of linguistic cognition. On the other hand, even when *śabdabodha* is necessarily involved as, say, in *anumāna* one will have to distinguish between the ‘*viṣayatā*’ of the inferential cognition and that of linguistic meaning in which it is embedded. In any case, the complications brought into the analysis by its introduction of *viṣayatā* as an emergent property both in the object and the linguistic meaning seems fairly clear. But, Professor Prahlada Char’s discussion seems to restrict itself only to the *viṣayatā* of the *ādheyatā* of the jar on the ground denoted by the term ‘*atra*’ and does not extend to the *viṣayatā* of the *samsargatā* between the suffix and the word ‘*ghaṭā*’. There seems no reason why he should have restricted himself only to one type of *viṣayatā* and not considered the others involved in the cognition resulting from the sentence ‘*atra ghaṭaḥ astī*’.

However, it seems that none of these strategies takes care of the situation where there is more than one jar on the ground

unless the so-called *ādheyatā* itself is related as qualified by the space to which the jar has that relation and thus treated as a *viśiṣṭādheyatā* which occurs only in the first jar and not in the second jar. In other words, the numerical singularity at least of an object occupying space will have to be determined by the space it occupies.

Professor Prahlada Char's analysis does not seem to take this direction for solving the problem. On the other hand, he complicates the example by postulating jars of two different colours forgetting that the singularity in such a situation will not be denoted so much by the *ekavacana* suffix as by the distinguishing attribute which will separate one jar from the other. The trouble with the discussion seems to be that it does not address itself directly to the question as to what makes an object 'one' and how this 'oneness' is unambiguously referred to by language. There is of course the larger problem of how language tries to mitigate or avoid the intrinsic ambiguity which is involved in it and which is concerned not only with the numerical singularity of the object but with the specificity of all reference whatever where one wants to distinguish clearly what one wants to refer to from everything else.

The discussion on pages 17–18 with respect to the '*neelghaṭa*' and its presumed distinction from the '*pītaghaṭa*' seems to be vitiated by the fact that Professor Prahlada Char is assuming that the *ādheyatā* of the *neelghaṭa* is distinct from that of the *pītaghaṭa* because of the fact that one is blue and the other is yellow. That is not the case because the *ādheyatā* has nothing to do with the colour but relates rather to the space which the jar occupies. And hence the *viśiṣṭādheyatā* of the *neelghaṭa* has nothing to do with its blueness and would be there even if the jars were of the same colour. It is of course true that the *viśayatā* produced by the *śābdabodha* in the sentence which has *neelghaṭa* is different from that which is produced by the sentence which has *pītaghaṭa* in it but this distinction in the *viśayatā* in the *śābdabodha* has nothing to do with the *ādheyatā* of the two jars unless the *ādheyatā* of the jar is itself considered to be

related to their colour. But normally the colour is supposed to be related to the jar by *samavāya sambandha*, and I am not sure if the *ādharā-ādheya sambandha* can be discussed relevantly in this context. It is also not clear whether the *viṣayatā* of the *śābdabodha* can itself be considered in terms of the *ādharā ādheya* relation where the *śābdabodha* is the *ādharā* of the *viṣayatā* which then is treated as *ādheya*. However, whatever the twists and turns that the Nyāya analysis may take, it cannot get rid of the fundamental fact that the distinction between the two jars is because of reference to their colours and not to the space to which they are related by *ādheyatā* because of the simple reason that the term *atra* occurs in both the sentences with no sign that it is being used to denote two different spaces in the sentences concerned.

The complications further introduced by Baccā Jhā in his attempt at clarification through a detailed specification of all the relations involved in the simple statement derived from the Navya-Nyāya analysis of the *śābdabodha* conveyed by the sentence '*atra ghaṭaḥ asti*' are discussed by Professor Prahlada Char. But in order to understand what Baccā Jhā is doing we ourselves have to understand the conceptual apparatus involved in Nyāya analysis of the act of cognition. The first thing to understand is that for Nyāya a knowledge is always a relation, and therefore the analysis has to state the technical names of the terms between which the relation is supposed to hold along with the name of the relation itself. The names of the terms are *anuyogī* and *pratiyogī*. However as the Naiyāyikas are fond of making a property out of everything as well as the universal of which the property is an instance, the *anuyogī* and the *pratiyogī* will have to have the property of *anuyogitā* and *pratiyogitā* in them. This however will not suffice as the property of *anuyogitā* is merely an instance of the universal characteristic of being *anuyogitā* and hence is supposed to possess *anuyogitātva* or *anuyogīness*. The same of course will be true of *pratiyogitā* which will be seen as an instance of *pratiyogitātva*. The story cannot end here, for it is the specific terms of the relation that

have these properties. If it is a 'jar', for example, which has the property 'red', then it will be the 'jar' and the 'red' which have these properties of *anuyogitā* and *pratiyogitā* which themselves are characterized by *anuyogitātva* and *pratiyogitātva*. Thus the Nyāya analyst has to state further that in the statement 'the jar is red' the *anuyogitā* relation is confined to 'jar' only and not to anything else. In the same way, the *pratiyogitā* is confined to red alone in the sentence. Thus the Nyāya analyst has to use another technical term to indicate this specific restriction and he uses the word *avacchedaka* to indicate it. The jar has to be characterized by *anuyogitā* which is treated as the *avacchedaka* to denote that only the jar is the *anuyogī* in the relation and nothing else. The same of course has to be done with respect to the term 'red' whose being a *pratiyogī* is limited to it alone. However, as everything particular has to have a universal, one will have to have *avacchedakatā* which is a property and *avacchedakatva*, which is a universal. Now in Nyāya analysis a universal has to be related to a particular by a relation and this relation is called *samavāya*. Thus we have to have not only *anuyogitātva*, *pratiyogitātva* and *avacchedakatva* but each of these relations related to the property of *anuyogitā*, *pratiyogitā* and *avacchedaktā* respectively, which in turn belong to *anuyogī*, *pratiyogī* and *avacchedaka* which in their own turn will characterize the specific objects in the sentence concerned. Further, each of these universals will have to be related to their property by a *samavāya sambandha* which itself will have to be related to the object by another *samavāya sambandha*. On the other hand, as the concept of the *avacchedaka* is brought in to clearly denote the specific limitation under which properties and relations are functioning, it will have to be mentioned all the time and if one is particular, one will have to talk of an *avacchedaka* characterizing *avacchedakatva* of the *avacchedaktā* of the property or the relation separately each time. All this may sound very complicated but in fact it is really very simple. To give an example, take such a sentence as 'the rose is red'. In the Nyāya analysis 'rose' is the *anuyogi* and 'red' is the

pratiyogī. And the relation is that of inherence between the red and the rose. But the rose has 'roseness' and red has 'redness' and the 'roseness' belongs to the rose by a relation of *samavāya* and 'redness' belongs to red by the relation of *samavāya*. But though there are three relations of *samavāya*, one being the relation of 'roseness' and the 'rose', the second being the relation between the 'redness' and the 'red' and the third between the red and the rose, one will have to have the relevant *avacchedakas* to capture the distinction between the three *samavāyas*. Besides these, as the rose is the *anuyogī* and the red is the *pratiyogī* in the relation of the red to the rose, this will further lead to the specification of the property of *anuyogitā* in the rose and of *pratiyogitā* in the red. Thus rose does not have only the property red in it but also the property of *anuyogitā*, and similarly red has not merely redness in it but also the property of *pratiyogitā*, and as the Naiyāyika wants no confusion at all, that is, no misunderstanding that the rose is a *pratiyogī* and red is an *anuyogī*, he has to use an *avacchedaka* to characterize the *anuyogitā* of the rose and the *pratiyogitā* of the red. However, this *avacchedaktā* will have to be distinguished from the three *avacchedaktās* which were brought in to distinguish the *samavāya sambandhas* mentioned earlier. Another *avacchedaka* will have to be added, for it should be remembered that the *anuyogitā* of the rose is related to it by the *samavāya sambandha*, just as the *pratiyogitā* of the red is related to it by a *samavāya sambandha*. The story will have to go on, for one has also to remember that *anuyogitā* has its *anuyogitātva* and the *pratiyogitā* has its *pratiyogitātva* which are related to them by a *samavāya sambandha* respectively, just as the *pratiyogitā* is related to *anuyogitā* by another *samavāya sambandha*.

All these relations have to be related to the rose on the one hand and the red on the other. So Nyāya has to postulate the notion of a *samānādhikaraṇa* which gives unity to all these diverse relations by being the common locus of all of them. The *samānādhikaraṇa*, it should be noted, will have to be three-fold in this specific instance; the first in the rose and the second

in the red, and the third one also in the rose as it will also have the red within it, being the *samānādhikaraṇa* of all the relations which the property red has in it. The rose, then, is a *samānādhikaraṇa* of all the properties and relations which belong to it by virtue of its being a rose as well as those which belong to red by virtue of its being red along with the special property which it gets as an *anuyogī* because of having this relationship with red, though excluding the property of *pratiyogī* which the red has because of its relation to the rose. The strange world of Nyāya does not end with this as one might think, for the knowledge that the rose is red has a property called *viśayatā* which arises in it when it becomes an object of cognition. This property is independent of all the properties that we have talked about until now, and belongs to the complex object of cognition that the rose is red and if one is to be faithful to the Nyāya mode of analysis this will in turn have *viśayatātva* to which *viśayatā* would have to be related by *samavāya sambandha* and which will belong to the object of cognition and yet which itself will have to be distinguished from the *viśayatā* of all other objects of cognition by bringing in a new *avacchedaka* specifying this. In fact, as *viśayatā* is itself a correlate of *viśayitā*, that is, the subject to which the object is an object, the relation between *viśayitā* and *viśayatā* will again have to be analysed in terms of *anuyogī* and *pratiyogī* and all the other attendant *avacchedakas* which have already been pointed out.

This is, however, a direction which fortunately for the reader, Baccā Jhā, does not take, but which he should have taken if he were to be true to the spirit of the Nyāya mode of analysis. He, in fact, takes another turn and emphasizes two notions of Nyāya analysis to which we have paid no attention until now, *viśeṣyatā* and *prakāratā*, that is, that which is qualified, and of which the property is said to be a property. *Prakāratā*, on the other hand, is that which qualifies or which is a property. He makes a further distinction between the *mukhya viśeṣyatā* and the *mukhya prakāratā*, particularly in the context of complex

sentences where there are a number of *viśeṣyatās* and *prakāratās*. And as each one of them can be treated as a universal, the same process will have to be repeated regarding their specific characterization along with their proper relation and the *avacchedaka* involved. Baccā Jhā's complications thus can easily be understood once one understands the principle behind them. For example, in the first formulation that he gives, the *anuyogitā* is given as *anuyogitātva* and the *pratiyogitā* is given as *pratiyogitātva*.

Analyzing these further, Professor Prahlada Char tries to clarify the possible ways in which the *viśiṣṭa nirūpaktā* is related. It is not quite clear whether *nirupkta* is only another name of *prakāratā* or it is something different from it. As all these relations have to be in a common locus, the first thing that has to be mentioned is *sva-samānādhikaraṇa*. Also as everything has to be related, ultimately to one object, there has to be a *sva-avacchedaka sambandha-vacchinatva*, what Professor Prahlada Char calls *sva-vṛttitva*. However, the number 3 that he has given on page 113 is not quite intelligible as it seems to be just the opposite of number 2. However, as the opposite correlation of the *nirūpaktā* is *nirūpyatā* which obviously would be the *viśeṣyatā*, the same analysis would have to be done in respect to the *nirūpyatā*, that is, the *viśeṣyatā*. The relations of the *mukhya prakāratā* in the *nirūpaktā* are again given on page 114. However, the interesting point here seems to be that as every relation will have to have an *anuyogī* and a *pratiyogī* and if *prakāratā* which is itself a *pratiyogī* has to have a relation, then it will have to be treated as an *anuyogī* in that context. The point perhaps is that those two terms are relative to each other and if the *pratiyogī* itself becomes the subject of a relation, then it will have to become an *anuyogī* with respect to that relation; in case it becomes an *anuyogī* to that relation, its *pratiyogī* will have to be specified further. However, it is not clear as to why when an *anuyogī* is itself related to something else by some other relation, it should not be treated as a *pratiyogī* to that relation. Some of the subtleties introduced by Baccā

Jhā derive from the fact that the Sanskrit language has some peculiarities of its own which have to be accommodated to explain how numerical singularity is conveyed through the language. The two examples discussed by Professor Prahlada Char which have to be accommodated in the definition are 'rājñah puruṣah' and 'rāmadārā Jānakī'. The former necessitates the distinction between *mukhya viśeṣyatā* and that which is not so. The second, on the other hand, addresses the problem that even though ostensibly the linguistic indication is that of a plural number, as the word 'dārā' in Sanskrit can only be used in the plural, it nevertheless conveys a numerical singularity as here it qualifies *Jānakī* who herself is numerically one rather than many. It is not quite clear whether the plurality of 'dārā' in Sanskrit is rendered singular by the fact that Rāma had only one wife or by the fact that it is qualifying *Sītā* who happens to be 'one'. The point is important because if it is the latter which is the singularity of reference, then the term 'dārā' in Sanskrit would always qualify a singular object unless the plurality itself is indicated by a specific mention of the names of most of the wives that one has.

If one closely analyzes the analysis given on page 114, one finds that the terms *viśeṣyatva*, *nirūpita*, *prakāratā* and *avacchedaka* are used both before *prakāratā* and after *viśeṣyatva*. Thus we have two *avacchedaks* in the situation and *viśeṣyatā* itself turns into a universal by making it *viśeṣyatva*. The further analysis that Professor Prahlada Char gives to explain the *avacchedakatā* in the *nirūpakatā* are *sva-sāmānyadhikarānya*, meaning thereby that all the relations are located in the same locus including one's relation to oneself. The second relation is supposed to be that this self-relatedness has itself to be seen as of a very specific kind and hence seen as a limiter or as an *avacchedaka* of itself. However, it is not quite clear what exactly is gained by this point. The third relation mentioned is again not quite clear as it is the exact opposite of what has been said for the second relation, unless it is a negative way of saying what has been said earlier as it uses a double negation with respect to

avacchedaka. The fourth relation mentioned again seems to relate a thing to itself and it is not quite clear how it is different from one and two though the word *ṛtti* seems to suggest something different from what was mentioned in one and two. However, a universal is again made of *ṛtti* and it is mentioned as *ṛttitva*. These four relations are supposed to explicate the *avacchedakatā* relating to the *mukhya prakāratā* and its relation to *nirūpakatā*. The second explanation which is being given is supposed to be of the relation of being the 'āśraya' or the support of oneself, or being one's own *ādhāra*, that is, the unity of the relation of *ādhāra* and *ādheya* in one's own self. It is not quite clear how this is different from the relation of either *sva-ṛttitva* or *svasamānādhikaraṇtā*.

In any case, the explications of how *nirūpakatā* is the locus of *mukhya prakāratā avacchedakatā* through the three relations mentioned do not seem to help to see matters clearly. Take for example, the first relation. It seems to talk about the relation of *avacchedakā* itself and tries to show how the relationship of *avacchedakatā* is itself related to the objects concerned. Firstly, *sambandha* or relation itself has been universalized and the term used is 'sambandhitva' and to talk of being *avacchina* or limited by the *sambandhitva* and to talk of being *avacchina* or limited by the *sambandhitva sambandha* or the relation of relatedness only illustrates the tendency of the Nyāya analyst to make a universal of everything and then relate that which is a universal to that from which the universal was generated by a generalization and then to mention it again in terms of an *avacchedakatā*, in terms of which the game can be repeated again as the *avacchedaka* itself has a universal. However as *avacchedakatava* is a universal, it will itself have to be specified further by being limited to that to which it is being applied. It is surprising why Baccā Jhā or Professor Prahlada Char has not mentioned the specific relation of *sambandhitva sambandha* and the *avacchedaka*.

Similarly, the second relation only specifies further the *prakāratā nirūpitā viśeṣyatā* along with the *avacchedakas* concerned. The third brings in the notion of *viśayatā* and

interestingly again makes a universal of it by writing *viṣayatātva* and brings in another notion of *vyāpaka* and *vyāpyatva*. However, it is not quite clear as to why Baccā Jhā only mentions *vyāpakatva* without mentioning *vyāpyatva*. Still, it is to be noted that here the *viṣayatātva* is itself being related to *vyāpakatva* without mentioning the relation between them. Professor Prahlada Char of course admits that the third relation has another two relations in it, one being of 'sva' to 'viṣayatā' and the second between 'vyāpakatva' and 'nirūpakatā'. But besides these there has to be a relation of *viśiṣṭa* to *viṣayatā*, though perhaps that is included in the relation 'sva' to *viṣayatā* and the relation between *viṣayatātva* and *vyāpakatva*. The two relations are further explicated on page 113. However it is not clear how the second relation of *sva nirūpitātva* is different from what was earlier been called *svavṛttitva*. He tries to explicate further the relation which is the limiter of *vyāpakata* and again brings the notion of *avacchedakatā vṛttitva*, suggesting thereby that *vṛttitva* can be added to anything. However, he does not clarify what the distinction is between *avacchedakatva* and *avacchedakatāvṛttitva*. Once the notion of *vyāpakatā* is brought in then obviously it will have to be mentioned in all analyses, for all relations in Nyāya analysis have a *vyāpya-vyāpaka sambandha* and it will have to be explained as to why, in the earlier analysis, it was not used.

Interestingly, Professor Prahlada Char brings another notion into his analysis on page 115 and that is the notion of *tādātmya*. He suggests that as *viśeṣyatā* is supposed to be the locus of *sva*, this has to be by the relation of *tādātmya* and also *avacchedyatva*. It is not quite clear whether this *avacchedyatva* is the same as *avacchedakatva* or different from it. In any case, if these are to be considered as distinct relations different from all others mentioned until now, then they will have to be inevitably mentioned in the context of all other relations for we have to state whether the relation is related by *tādātmya* and *avacchedyatva* or not. In fact, the story of the proliferation of relations appears to go on unendingly as on the same page he

raises the question as to how *nirūpakatā* is related to or present in *nirūpakatā avacchedakatva*. And as this *nirūpakatā* is supposed to belong to *viśeṣyatā* which itself is *viśiṣṭa* and which is related to *sva*, we can understand the complications that this search for relations introduces in Nyāya analysis. If *avacchinayatva* has also to be related to *avacchedaka* and if the latter has to be related to *sva*, one can see how one can indefinitely multiply relations in this manner. In fact, if one brings the notion of *abhāva* into the picture, as he does at the end of page 115, and if one also sees that one may, in the Nyāya analysis, also mention that there is an *abhāva* of *abhāva*; in case there is no *abhāva*, one can imagine the further complications that one can introduce into one's analysis which is in search of a complete precision of statement.

In fact, if *avacchedakatā* itself has to be related to every other thing in the analysis and if *avacchedakatā* also has a universal, that is *avacchedakatva* and if the term *anuyogī* and *pratīyogī* are also to be brought into this relation, and if each of these is also to be seen in terms of its *viśayatā* which is related to *viśayitā*, then one can imagine the infinite complexity. Baccā Jhā can introduce in the name of the search for seeking precision and unambiguity in Navya-Nyāya analysis of the simplest of statements, such as, say '*atra ghaṭaḥ asti*'. In the further analysis on pages 116 and 117, while there is generally a repetition of the points made earlier, a new relation is mentioned there on page 117 called '*abhinnatva*'. It is not quite clear if this is different from *tādātmya*. In case this is so, then we will have to mention it also. Similarly, there is the relation of *āśrayatva* mentioned on the same page, but is *āśrayatva* different from *samānādhikaraṇa* mentioned earlier? In case this is so, one will have to mention *sva-samānādhikaraṇa*, *sva-āśrayatva*, *sva-tādātmya*, *sva-abhinnatva*. In fact we further have the mention of such a relation as *svanīrupitatva* and in case this is different from *sva-vṛttitva*, it will have to be mentioned all the time also. Professor Prahlada Char has of course mentioned

on page 118 that this chain of relations could be developed further but that he would stop there.

The basic issues are two. What is the principle behind the development of this unending chain of relations and whether it can be ever stopped and if so what shall be the possible ground for believing that no further relation can be generated by the inherent logic of the generation of relations in the Nyāya perspective? Secondly, why should one generate this chain of relations and what does one get out of it? Thirdly, the problem of the infinite generation of relations or of classes has been encountered in other philosophical traditions and some *ad hoc* principle has been adopted to stop this chain as, say, in Russell's theory of types. Has any such principle ever been formulated by Nyāya theorists?

(b) Reply to Daya Krishna's Comment on the
Kroḍapatras
D. PRAHLADA CHAR

My article on 'Kroḍapatras' aims at giving a picture of the *Kroḍapatras* as to what they are and highlighting their contribution to the development of Navya-Nyāya tradition. For this purpose, I have selected a few points that are discussed in some of the *Kroḍapatras* and have tried to explain them. I do not know how far I have been successful in my endeavour. Your commentary, though makes an honest attempt to evaluate the contribution made by the *Kroḍapatras*, on the basis of the discussion of some of the highly technical points which I have selected from the *Kroḍapatras* as examples, I am afraid, the observations made, miss to recognize the philosophical points that emerge from the discussion and to evaluate them. This, I feel, is quite natural. For, the issues that are chosen to be explained in the article are highly technical involving a very complicated Navya-Nyāya terminology. Regarding some of the comments you have made about the factual correctness of

some of the instances like 'mountain is fiery, because of smoke', and 'the lake is fiery', etc. that are frequently made use of, by the Naiyāyikas, I would only wish to point out that Naiyāyikas, like any of their counterparts in the East or the West, are purely philosophical in their approach and not much bothered about the factuality of the contents of the instance. Therefore, I feel these observations do not help much to assess the merit of the discussion made in the *Kroḍapatras*. But, the questions you have raised at the end of the commentary are very much relevant and they should be answered.

(c) 'Have the Neo-Naiyāyikas been Leading Us Up the Garden Path'

Professor Prahlada Char has, in his essay entitled 'On the *Kroḍapatras*', brought to the notice of modern logicians an unique type polemical literature in Indian logic in which certain logical and other concepts discussed in Nyāya texts and commentaries are analytically elaborated with utmost precision so that they can be treated as foolproof. In Neo-Indian logic Kāliśankar, Candranārāyaṇa, Neelkaṇṭha, Ramśastry, etc. are quite well known as authors of *Kroḍapatras* (the etymological meaning of the word is 'marginal notes' and these do not deal with *sentences as Daya Krishna writes*). Prahlada Char has instanced a few concepts (logical and epistemic) or properties which these authors have ingeniously elaborated so as to make them invulnerable to any logical drawback. Since Prahlada Char's explanation of the logical elaborations (called *anugamas*, the etymological meaning of the word being 'generalized logical formulations') is somewhat technical. We are giving below a simple elucidation of a few of these elaborations. It is not possible to deal with all the different elaborations here; the main purpose of the elucidations being to highlight the extraordinary logical acumen of the great Nyāya scholars. After the elucidations we give extracts from Daya Krishna's

comments on the elaborations to show how wide off the mark, distorting (of the nature of the elaborations) and even erroneous these comments are. Since the comments are very lengthy and uniformly of the same character from beginning to end, only the first few pages of them are critically considered here. Students of Nyāya are sure to be dumbfounded to read these comments.

Professor Prahlada Char starts with Gaṅgeśa's definition of the fallacies of reason in his account. As per this definition a fallacy of reason is one whose cognition is preventive of the inferential cognition in which the reason plays the part of the middle term. For example the false inference, 'The lake is afire because there arises smoke from it' is opposed by the true cognition, 'the lake is devoid of fire'. In this definition the term 'whose cognition' calls for precisification because, the lake and the lake devoid of fire being identical even the cognition of the *mere lake* can be treated as the cognition of the *lake as devoid of fire*. But the cognition of the mere lake is not preventive of the said inference. Raghunātha Śīromaṇī, the great commentator of *Tattvacintāmaṇī*, anticipates this objection and tries to meet it by elaborating the term 'whose cognition' as 'the cognition of a qualificand as determined by its qualifier'. The cognition of the 'mere lake' is not such and so it is excluded from the purview of the definition of fallacy. Gadādhara, the eminent sub-commentator of Raghunāth's commentary has sought a further elaboration in the meaning of the term 'whose cognition' on the above ground itself. The mere lake is the same as the lake as qualified by the absence of fire. So the cognition of the mere lake may also be regarded as the cognition of the qualified lake. To exclude this cognition the meaning of the above term has to be modified to read as 'the cognition whose preventive nature is determined (*avaccheda*) by the cognitive relation having the specific property of the determinate cognition as its limiter (*avacchīdaka*). The preventive nature of the cognition of the lake as devoid of fire is delimited by the property 'Lakeness qualified by the

absence of fire'. Here the qualificatory relation between lakeness and the absence of fire is coexistence as the lake is the locus of both lakeness and the absence. The relation is not '*swarūpa*' as Daya Krishna suggests because the absence is always present in lakeness by this relation. So there would be no point in mentioning the qualification of lakeness by the absence by the *swarūpa* relation. Kālīśankar, the famous author of a *Kroḍapatra* has raised an important question here. He asks, 'What exactly is the property that is supposed to delimit the preventive nature of the fallacy-cognition'? Evidently the property as suggested above would be the property lakeness as coexistent with the absence of fire. Now taking objection to the foregoing elaboration, Kālīśankar says that even a cognition like 'Something is endowed with lakeness as coexistent with the absence of fire' is tailor-made to the above description of the preventive cognition. But it does not prevent the inference of the form 'the lake is on fire' because 'the lake as lake' is not the qualificandum in the cognition. Here one may enter a caveat against the further elaboration of the foregoing term that Kālīśankar suggests. Kālīśankar's relevant *Kroḍapatra* is not before the present writer. So he has to depend upon what Professor Prahlada Char has given as Kālīśankar's answer to the above objection. The caveat is to the effect that the modification in the composition of the *qualifier* cannot meet the objection. It is the nature of the qualificandum that needs to be precisely specified to ward off the objection. In the above example, the qualificandum remains undelimited by any property which renders the said cognition ineffective as preventer.

From all this explanation it will be clear that all these eminent logicians are concerned with precisifying the exact logical structure of the determinate cognition that can prevent another determinate cognition. Professor Prahlada Char has referred to and explained some other concepts also which are elaborated by Kālīśankar and Candranārāyaṇa. But this much elucidation coupled with an account of what Daya Krishna says regarding it in his comments will suffice to show how

irrelevant, distorting and even erroneous the statements in Daya Krishna's comments are.

1. Daya Krishna's first objection is that Gaṅgeśa's definition does not take into account the distinction between the one who gives the arguments (the word is used for inference) and the one who only receives it. Gaṅgeśa's definition is inadequate as he does not take into account the distinction between *svārthānumāna* and *parārthanumāna*. One is stunned to read this. Does the cognition 'the lake is devoid of fire' cease to contradict the inferential cognition 'the lake is a fire' if the inference is for oneself or for others? The psychological processes involved in the two kinds of inferences may be different from each other but they do not affect the contradictory natures of the two cognitions.
2. Daya Krishna's second objection goes like this: 'the term *dhumāt* in the stock example only means that the ground of this inference is the perception of smoke *but not directly the perception of fire itself*. *The hidden ground of this inference is the adage* 'where there is smoke there is fire' but even this ground of the formulation is faulty, for the terms 'where' and 'there' are ambiguous (italics mine). From this excerpt from the comments it is obvious that according to Daya Krishna it is *the direct perception of fire* that is the ground of *the inference of fire*. What is one to say of such a perverse statement? Further, how can the concomitance of smoke and fire be regarded as the *hidden ground* of the inference of fire and in what sense can the statement of the concomitance be called *an adage*? Moreover the meanings of the adverbs 'where' and 'there' are quite obvious even to school-going children. If a logical formulation of the meaning is needed it is given by Nyāya in terms of what is called *vyāpya-vyāpakabhāva* even in elementary texts of Nyāya.
3. The third objection trotted out by Daya Krishna is, in his own words this: 'the second definition of fallacy given by Gaṅgeśa would not be able to distinguish between the statements' 'the mountain is fiery because there is smoke'

and the statement 'the lake is fiery because there is smoke in it'. Even though the latter is obviously fallacious while the former is not. The reason why the second statement is supposed to be fallacious is that 'there seems to be a *priori knowledge* that water, by its very nature cannot have the characteristic of having fire in it. But it is never discussed in the tradition how one obtains this knowledge about it.'

A grosser misinterpretation of the criticized passage printed on page 101 (of the said elaboration) can rarely be imagined यद्विषयकत्वेन. Raghunātha Śīromaṇi suggests a slight modification by replacing यद्विषयकत्वेन by यद्गपावाच्छिन्न विषयकत्वेन. Suppose this modification is not made, then the definition would not be applicable to any fallacy for, since mere 'hrada' is identical with 'hrada qualified by *vahnnyabhāva*' but the cognition of mere 'hrada' does not prevent the inferential cognition 'hrado *vahniman*'.

Evidently the absurd statements of Daya Krishna are the result of a gross misunderstanding of the simple fact stated here that the qualified lake and the mere lake being identical, the cognition of the mere lake is not preventive of inference and thus the definition cannot apply to the fallacy of the *bādha*, which the cognition of the lake devoid of fire represents. In view of this simple fact the aforementioned remarks that there seems to be a *priori knowledge* that water cannot have fire in it, that it is never discussed in the tradition how one obtains this knowledge, that even a mountain can never have fire unless there is a forest cover on it, that water cannot only get very hot but also boil and burn, that Rama is supposed to have burnt the ocean or threatened to burn it and so on and on, which follow the foregoing remark leave the reader simply *aghast*. Does all this aberration have any place in any strictly logical discussion of the nature of the fallacies of reason?

4. The above fantastic objections are sought to be justified by Daya Krishna on the ground that 'the traditional Nyāya logician seems never to have carefully distinguished between the logical and the empirical ... and (so) he is continuously faced with problems arising from the absence of such a distinction'. This means that those who accept this distinction do not have to worry 'whether mountains have fire or not or whether some lakes will always be devoid of water or not!' One wonders what the said distinction has to do with the definition of fallacy.
5. Regarding the modifications introduced into the definition of fallacy referred to earlier, Daya Krishna says nonchallantly that 'these definitions have to do with the absence of *the vyāpti relation* of the *hetu* and *sādhya*'. On the basis of this utterly erroneous suggestion Daya Krishna goes on to reprimand the authors of the *Kroḍapatras* 'for confining their discussion to the specific example of the fallacious inference that the lake is on fire because there is smoke in it.' How appropriate is this admonition that the discussion of the fallacy should deal with the *vyāpti* of *hetu* and the *sādhya* instead of the fallacious inference prevented by the fallacy of cognition!
6. A more perverse misrepresentation faces the reader just two sentences ahead of this where it is said that 'to put the same thing in Nyāya terminology ... it is the absence of the *fireness in waterness which obstructs the process of inference*'. What has this absence to do with the inference that 'there is fire in lake?' First, it is absence-cognition not absence which obstructs the said inference. Secondly the preventer absence-cognition concerns the absence of *fire in water, not of fireness in waterness*.
7. Daya Krishna attributes to Kālīśankar forgetfulness concerning the fact 'that there can be such a thing as a dry lake and such a lake where there is no water is not a contradiction in terms'. One becomes tongue-tied in face of such shocking remarks.

8. The relation of *sāmanādhikaraṇya* or coexistence connecting the absence of fire with lakeness referred to at the beginning invites similarly ridiculous objections in the comment. There the fantastic remark is made (p. 125) that 'this is no solution at all as the basic question is whether the absence of fire is accidental or necessary'. There is absolutely no occasion here to discuss this. The issue being discussed by Kālīśankar is that *vahnyabhāvavalhrdatva* being the property limiting the preventive nature of the cognition of the form *vahnyabhāvavan hrdatva* what relation connects *vahnyabhāva* and *hrdatva*. As this cannot but be coexistence as the lake is the colocus of fire-absence and lakeness. *Swarūpa*, of course, is the connecting relation between fire-absence and the lake.

One may thus go on and on pointing out all kinds of solecisms in the comments without coming across a single point that is either relevant to the discussion in the *Kroḍapatra* or is in itself logically sustainable either from the Western or the Indian viewpoint. This is why Professor Prahlada Char reacting to the comments says with tongue in the cheek that the 'observations made (by Daya Krishna) miss to recognise the philosophical points that emerge from the discussions and to evaluate them'. V.N. Jha, to whom the comments were referred, is more explicit when he says that 'it appears that nobody has made the fundamentals of *navyanyāya* clear to you (Daya Krishna)'.

If the present writer were to voice his honest reaction to the comments he would be forced to say that the whole thing is a tremendous joke which has unwittingly perhaps botched the penetrating logical insights (of geniuses like Kālīśankar, Candranārāyaṇa, etc.) which would have done honour even to the greatest contemporary logicians of the West.

6

Mohanta's Queries About *Pramā*

D.K. MOHANTA

1. Can *pramā* of the Nyāya school be treated as 'justified true belief'.
2. Can *pramā* of the Nyāya school be treated as a piece of knowledge which is 'justified, true and nondubious'?
3. Is there any substitute word in Saṃskṛta of the word '*belief*' as it is used by the epistemologists in the West?

D.K. MOHANTA

Answers to D.K. Mohanta's Queries*

1. *Pramā* as Nyāya understands it is 'justified true belief' if the word 'justified' is used to mean 'that for which justification is available or can be provided if asked for'. In this sense every true belief is a 'justified true belief' and therefore the qualification 'justified' used in the phrase is redundant. If however the word is taken in the sense of 'that whose justification is known to the holder of the belief' then not every true belief may be said to be justified. Even if a true

**JICPR*, XV, 1, pp. 132-8.

belief is held on wrong grounds it cannot be said to be justified in this sense of the word. But in both these senses the belief will not forfeit its intrinsic character of truth.

2. Pramā is certainly a piece of knowledge but it need not be 'justified' in the second possible sense of the word given above. As to 'nondubiety,' it cannot be ensured for every true belief. In the Nyāya view nondubiety or veridicity of true beliefs needs to be inferentially established.
3. The word 'belief' is used both in the dispositional and the episodic sense in western epistemology. The technical Sanskrit equivalent of the word in the first sense is संस्कार and in the second sense it is ज्ञान.

The Sanskrit translation of the sentence is as given below. For identifying the 'mukhya viśēśya' in the sentence the complexity of the sentence does not offer much difficulty. 'The beautiful princess' is the *mukhya viśēśya* as the term having this meaning is in the nominative case and its meaning does not act as the qualifier of any other meaning in the sentence. The phrases 'bright red rose' and 'sweet subtle fragrance' appear to denote qualities of qualities but they need not be so taken as redness and fragrance are qualities no doubt but brightness and subtlety may be regarded as certain *upādhis* or analysable properties. Sweetness is nothing but the property of causing pleasure.

The words '*anuyogi*' and '*pratiyogi*' are rarely used in the analysis of sentences. They occur mainly in the analyses of cognition. In a cognition the epistemic qualificandum is the *anuyogi* while the epistemic qualifier is the *pratiyogi*. In the first four sentences given, obviously the first term is *pratiyogi* as it is in the locative case. In the remaining two there is no *pratiyogi* or *anuyogi*.

The Sankrit rendering of the complex English sentence is:

इंद तदेव जपापुष्पं भास्वदरक्तं, यस्य सूक्ष्म-मधुर-आमोदेन इपत् अभिभूता अत्र पूर्वं राजोद्याने प्रातः भ्रमणाय समागता सुन्दरी राजकुमारी यत् सा स्वसख्यः तत् पुष्पं अनुलक्ष्य भणति यत् अद्यं न कद्यपि तत् आमोदं विस्मरिष्यामि इति।