

Nyāyasiddhāñjana

of Vedānta Deśika

An Annotated Translation

Toshihiro MIKAMI

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0. Introduction (1,1–40,1)

0.0. Maṅgala (2,1–3,2)

I, [named] ‘a lord of [Mount] Veṅkatha,’ being abundant in prosperity (śrīmat), whose knowledge attains the purport of the top of śrutis, [namely, Upanishads], and whose purpose is acquired through [Ātraya-]Rāmānuja-ācārya,¹ who was devoted to the venerable Varadārya,² will write [a book] (or prescribe [medicine]) [named] “The Magical Ointment (siddhāñjana) of Valid Logic” so as to decide the true reality (tattva) for beginners whose knowledge (or sight) (dr̥ś) is sunk because of the connection with the multitude (paṭala) of endless delusions (or with [eye disease named] paṭala causing endless delusions). // 1 //

This [book] begins in order to purify the reality hidden by dancers of various opinions who are different in the subject: [what is] real and [what is] unreal. // 2 // **[3]**

I have already shown ‘prameya’ briefly at the end of my Nyāyapariśuddhi³; here it will be explained again in detail. // 3 //

0.1. What is prameya? (3,3–5,1)

¹ (Ātreya) Rāmānuja (1220–1310), alias Vādihaṃsāmbuda, is the maternal uncle and the guru of Vedānta Deśika. [Raghavan 19; Singh 130f.; Dasgupta 118f.].

² Varadācārya (1165–1275) [Singh 127f.]. Dasgupta 119, esp. fn.

³ Chap.5 [ed. Viraraghavachari, pp.305ff.].

Brahman, which has all spiritual and non-spiritual beings as Its mode (prakāra) [or body], is the sole reality.

Though there is complete difference between the modes and One which has mode or between the modes mutually, [4] [scriptures] speak of the identity and deny what is other than it with the intention of speaking that [Brahman] qualified [by various modes] is one etc.⁴ Because, otherwise, all means of valid knowledge [which clearly show the difference] would be violated. [5]

And this very [Brahman, which is qualified by various modes] in this way, is called ‘prameya’ because, in general, it is the object of valid knowledge (pramāviśaya) and, in particular, it is the prominent object of knowledge (prakarṣeṇa meyam).⁵ [7]

0.2. Division between dravya and adravya (7,1–16,1)

0.2.1. Definition of dravya and adravya (7,1–2)

Everything included in It is classified into substance (dravya) and non-substance (adravya). Substance is material (upādāna); material is that which is the substratum of some conditions (avasthā).⁶ Non-substance is what is not so.⁷

0.2.2. The distinction between dharma and dharmin (7,2–16,1)

0.2.2.1. Proof based on pratyakṣa (7,2–11,2)

This distinction between substance [or dharmin, i.e. the substratum of conditions] and non-substance [or dharma] is proved by force of the perception [in the form “a pot

⁴ “Etc.” means, according to **R**(anṅgarāmānuja's commentary), its importance etc.; according to **K**(ṛṣṇatātārya's commentary), it means the non-absence of another reality which is devoid of being qualifier (viśeṣaṇatā) not established separately (aprthaksiddha) from Brahman.

⁵ Here prameya is derived in two different ways: (1) (pra+ mā)+yaT; (2) pra+(mā+yaT); cf. “pūravam dhātu upasargeṇa yujyate paścāt pratyayena. pūravam dhātu pratyayena yujyate paścād upasargeṇa” quoted in R (the same passage is found in Nāgeśabhaṭṭa's Paribhāshenduśekhara). In this regard, the commentators quote the passage of the Nyāyapariśudhi (=NyP), chap. on prameya, the second day lesson: “Here according to the derivation that prameya is the object of valid knowledge, all that is not superimposed is called ‘prameya’ because it is of non-superimposed form; still, what is [really] intended here is that prameya is the excellent object of knowledge as being inherent subsidiary of superior happiness for one who desirous of it” (atra yady api pramāviśayaḥ prameyam iti vyupattya "ropitākārvyavacchedārthatayā 'nāropitarūpaṃ sarvaṃ prameyaṃ tathāpi niḥśreyasāntaramgatayā tadarthibhiḥ prakarṣeṇa meyaṃ prameyam iha vivakṣitam) [318,2–4, ed. Viraraghavachari]. According to this, the second interpretation is his favorite one. The Yatīndramatadīpikā (ed. Adidevananda: abbr. to **YMD**) adopts this interpretation [IV. 1].

⁶ See 357,5ff.

⁷ In the chapter on adravya, it is technically defined as saṃyogarahitam [443,1].

has color” and the like] [8].

It is impossible to deny either of the two by means of the logic of Buddhists etc.⁸
The reasons are—

There is the practical usage (vyavahāra) of the distinction between color (rūpa) and the colored (rūpin) etc., which is not sublated (abādhita) and cannot be explained in other way (anayathāsiddha); [accordingly, this distinction cannot be delusion].

Seeing and touching, whose faculties are restricted to color and touch respectively, identify⁹ (pratisandhāna) one and the same thing as being the substratum of [the two in the form “I am touching what I saw¹⁰”]; [this identification could not be explained without the one entity which has both color and touch].¹¹ Even if grasped [dharma]s coexist, grasping [faculty] does not violate the restriction concerning its own object: [seeing perceives only color and touching perceives only touch]; [accordingly, the substratum of the dharmas, which is recognized by both seeing and touching, cannot be denied].

Further, another [positive entity being] limiting adjunct¹² (upādhi) [which brings

⁸ Buddhists deny substance (or dharmin) for the reason that there is no substratum of [dharmas] such as color (rūpāder āśrayābhāvāt); The Advaitins deny non-substance (or dharma) for the reason that only one [dharma, namely Brahman], which is falsely imagined as [dharmas] such as color, is really existence (rūpādītayā vikalpyamānasyaikasyaiva vā sattvāt). See Sarvārthasiddhi (Mysore ed.: abbr. to **SAS**) I. 8: 24,2f.

⁹ pratisandhānam apy ātmagocaram pratyabhijñāviśeṣa eva; “yo 'ham adrākṣaṃ sa eva spr̥śāmi” ityevamādirūpatvāt [NyP 296,11f.].

¹⁰ Cf. “Between the [two doctrine], firstly the [Buddhist doctrine] that there is no substratum [of dharmas] is refuted by means of particular recognition. That is, there is the knowledge concerning [one] object grasped by two [different] sense organs in the form: I am touching what I have seen” (tatra nirādhāratvaṃ tāvat pratisandhānaviśeṣeṇa nirasyati / asti hi dr̥ṣṭam eva spr̥śāmi dvīndriyagrāhyavastuvishayā dhīḥ) [SAS I. 8: 25,6f.]. Though pointing out the direct perception “I touch what I see” is enough to prove the distinction between dharma and dharmin, the recognition is pointed out with the intention refuting kṣaṇabhāṅga also [SAS I. 8: 26,4f.].

¹¹ “The object of such [recognition by both seeing and touching] is not mere color. Because [color] cannot be the object of touching; otherwise, even a blind person could grasp color by touching. Nor is [it] mere touch. Because [touch] also cannot be the object of seeing; if it were so, we could grasp the touch of a thing, even if it is not touched, through seeing. Nor is [it] both [color and touch]. Because the two are the objects of seeing and touching separately. Therefore, this recognition proves the existent, [i.e. dharmin], which is other than [dharma] such as color and is the substratum of them; it has color and touch” (seyaṃ na rūpamātragocarā; tasya sparśanavishayavābhāvāt, anyathāndhasyāpi sparśanena rūpopalambhaprasaṅgāt / na ca sparśamātragocarā; tasyāpi dr̥gvishayavābhāvāt, tathātve cāspr̥śato 'pi dr̥śā sparśadhīprasāṅgāt / na cobhayavishayā; darśanasparśayoḥ pratyekavishayavād eva / ataḥ iyaṃ pratyabhijñā rūpādyatirīkṭam tadāśrayabhūtam vastu prakāśayati, idaṃ rūpasparśavat) [SAS I. 8: 27,2–28,3].

¹² Non-essential factor adjoined to the pure form of an entity which is thereby

about] the coexistence is not established. [9] You cannot accept position or time as such [limiting adjunct].¹³ Even if you should accept the coexistence through the identity in [position or time], there would be over-application [to things which are in the same position but are different in time, things which are in the same time but in different positions, or things which happen to be in the same position and the same time]. Nor having one and the same cause or effect can be established [to be the limiting adjunct; because color and touch have different cause and effect]. If it were established, you can hardly avoid over-application [to things which have the same cause and effect but in different positions etc.].¹⁴ [10]

Regarding one and the same [dharmin], there are clear and obscure understanding in accordance with its proximity and remoteness¹⁵ etc.¹⁶ These two [understanding] would be impossible [to explain] without evidencing that the understood dharmas are delimited and conditioned [van Buitenen: VAS, p.184 fn.10]; e.g. a pot to ether.

¹³ According to Buddhist, time is not an independent positive entity. As for position, Buddhist regards ether as mere non-obstruction (*ākāśam anāvṛttiḥ*) [Abhidharmakośa I. 5d; cf. Nakamura: Early Vedānta, pp.462f.]; accordingly, it cannot be the upādhi. Even if positive entity such as the earth were the position where dharmas coexist, there would be endless regression because the earth etc. are also brought about through coexistence of dharmas.

¹⁴ Cf. “[The opinion] that the coexistence is nothing but the identity in position is rejected by means of the above-mentioned logic: [if the position were same as combined color and touch, color and touch would be perceived separately and the recognition would be impossible; if it were different, you would practically accept dharmin]. Because things in the same space, even if they are in past, present and future, would be combined together. [Buddhists:] The position is also different from time to time [because of its momentariness]. [Answer:] Not so, because the momentariness will be refuted (TMK I. 25ff.). And the position cannot be ether; because you hold that it is mere non-absence of obstruction. Nor is it material cause, because it is accepted that touch, color etc. have respectively different moment as material cause. If they have the same material cause, that is substance. If the coexistence were brought about through the identity in position such as the earth, this coexistent would also need another coexistent and, consequently, there would be endless regression; or, there would be mutual dependence” (etena deśaikyam eva saṃghāta ity apāstam; ekadeśānvayināṃ traikālikānām ekasaṃghāta-prasaṃgāt / deśo 'pi tadātadā bhinna eveiti cen na; kṣaṇabhaṃgasya niraśishyamāṇatvāt / na ca te deśa ākāśādirūpaḥ; tasya yushmābhir āvaraṇābhāvamātravajñāpanāt / na copādānarūpaḥ; sparśarūpādīnāṃ bhinnabhinnakṣaṇopādānatvābhyupagamāt / ekopādānatve tu tad eva dravyam / pṛthivyādideśaikyāt saṃghātatve tu tatsaṃghātasyāpi saṃghātāntarāpekshāyām anavsthā, anyonyāśrayo vā) [SAS I. 8: 34,2–35,4].

¹⁵ TMK (I. 8c: ekasmin dūrātāder aviśadaviśadapratyabhijñādi tadvat) refers to the fact that a man who saw a thing closely recognizes the same thing obscurely when he sees it remotely and that a man who saw a thing remotely recognizes the same thing clearly when he sees it closely (SAS 43,6f.: āsannadeśe dṛṣṭvā dūraṃ gatasyāviśadā pratyabhijñā, dūre dṛṣṭvā samīpaṃ gatasya tu viśadā).

¹⁶ ‘Etc.’ denotes the condition of lightening etc. Cf. evaṃ kramād bahalaviralālokādivaśād apy ubhayathā [= vishadam avishadam ca] grāhyā [SAS I. 8: 43,8f.].

more or less¹⁷ [because the dharmin is one and same].

Concerning one and the same [continuous dharmin such as clay], appearing and destroyed conditions [or dharmas such as being a lump, being a pot, being a broken piece] are established [in order] by means of perception (adhyaksha).

Even in a moment, many dharmas such as being black and being young are seen in one and the same [person].¹⁸

In delusion¹⁹ (bhrama) in the form that a white shell appears yellow and the like, [the dharmin] such as a shell is identified [with the apparent dharma such as yellowness], even though [the existent dharma such as] whiteness is not perceived. [Buddhists may say that a yellow shell arises anew at the moment of the perception because everything is momentary; but it is untrue. Because] at the same time another [normal] persons perceive the same thing as white, [and because] the momentary destruction (kṣaṇabhāṅga) will be rejected later.²⁰ [11]

In every delusion, it is inevitable that [some] peculiarities (viśeṣa) [or dharmas] are not grasped even though the [dharmin], which is the substratum [of the qualifiers], itself is grasped. And it is accepted that the delusion is rubbed off when these [peculiarities] are grasped.²¹

For this reason, [Advaita] theory that Brahman, without any peculiarity, is the substratum of every delusion has no ground.²²

0.2.2.2. Criticism on sahopalambhniyama (11,3–13,2)

[Obj.] [Dharmas such as] ‘blue’ and their substratum [or dharmin] are not different

¹⁷ Cf. alpadharmaviśiṣṭatayā grahaṇam aviśadagrahaṇam, bhūyodharmaviśiṣṭatayā tu viśadagrahaṇam [SAS I. 8: 43,9ff.]

¹⁸ If dharmin were same as dharma, there would be the undesirable conclusion: a person ṁ being black, a person ṁ being young, \ being black ṁ being young (K).

¹⁹ Delusion (bhrama or viparyaya [Nyāyabodhinī §64]) is defined as: anyasyānyathādhyavasāyaḥ or dharmisphuraṇe saty apratipannatadvirodhaviśeṣhādhyavasāyaḥ. It is classified into many types and the delusion ‘a shell is yellow’ is an example of ekaviśeṣhasphuraṇa [NyP I. ii: 56,4ff.]. Cf. Vedavalli 1984: 22.

²⁰ 16,3ff.

²¹ Cf. SAS I. 8: saṁśayaviparyayau adhishṭhānagrahe viśeṣhāgrahāt samānadharmagrahāc ca bhavataḥ / tathādṛṣṭīniyamaś ca nānyathyitum śakyah [45,5ff.].

²² Cf. SAS I. 8: [Were it not for dharma], there would be no delusion whether the substratum is completely grasped or not. Why is it possible that there is the distinction between understood form and non-understood form in [Brahman] which has no dharma? (adhishṭhānasya kārtsyena bhāna 'bhāne ca na bhramaḥ / bhātābhātākṛtibhidā katham nirdharmake bhavet //) [46,2f.].

because of the invariable rule that they are simultaneously cognized (sahopalambhaniyama).²³

[Ans.] It is not true. Because this [simultaneousness] can be brought about due to the fact that they are cognized under the same sufficient condition²⁴ (sāmagrī) [i.e., they are always cognized by the eyes].²⁵ Again the simultaneousness and the invariable rule on it establish the very difference,²⁶ [because nobody describes the simultaneousness regarding one and the same thing]; accordingly, [the reason you pose] is contradicted²⁷ (viruddha). Moreover, if the invariable rule that they are simultaneously cognized means that [the ranges of the two cognition] are same (sama),²⁸ it is not established in the case of a shell and [its] whiteness [when the former is cognized by a handicapped person as yellow²⁹] **[12]**. Even [if the rule means that the ranges of the two] are not same (asama),³⁰ [it is not established] in the case of [the earth and] smell [when smell blowing in the wind is cognized a person who do not see the earth]. And [the reason] is straying (anekānta) in view of shining color [of light] and non-shining color [of a pot and the like], [which are simultaneously cognized but are different].³¹

[Advaitin—] Due to the difference among grasping [sense-organs], grasped [object] appears to be different.³²

²³ Here Vaibhāshika Buddhist utilizes sahopalambhaniyama to reject the existence of dharmin. Cf. “sahopalambhaniyamād abhedo nilataddhiyoḥ,” which is quoted in many works as the verse of the Pramānaviniścaya by Dharmakīrti [See Mesquita, Erkenntnis, S.35 Anm.28; Samvitsiddhi, S.162 Anm.281]. This theory of Yogācāra Buddhist is criticized in 410,1f. and TMK IV. 20 also.

²⁴ sāmagrī: full collection of causes except for what is related to the effect by no means (kāryāyogavyavacchinnaḥ kāraṇasamudāyaḥ) [Nyāyakośa].

²⁵ Cf. sahopalambhaniyamaḥ ekasāmagrīvedyatvaprayuktaḥ [Tātparyadīpikā on VAS (Tirupati ed.) 150,9].

²⁶ Cf. ŚrīBh II. ii. 27: sāhityasyārthabhedahetukatvāt [303,6f.].

²⁷ sādhyābhāvavyāpto hetur viruddhaḥ [TarS §54; YMD II. 36].

²⁸ I.e. A ṁ B.

²⁹ Cf. SAS I. 8: na ca rūpāder dharmiṇaś ca sahopalambhaniyamaḥ, pītaśamkhādibhrame rūpam antareṇa rūpiṇaḥ tam antareṇa tasya copalabdheḥ [38,4f.].

³⁰ I.e. A ... B or B ... A.

³¹ See 322,1–2.

³² Cf. SAS I. 8d: Let it be that a certain entity grasped by two sense-organs exists by force of the identification. But we agree neither that it is composed of [dharmas] such as color and taste nor that it is their substratum, because these [dharmas] do not exist. [The fact is]: regarding one and the same entity, various dharmas are known in accordance with the difference in grasping [organ]; for example, in accordance with the

[Ans.] Not so. Because there is mutual dependence: the difference among [grasping organs] such as the eye and the ear has the difference among grasped objects such as color for its limiting adjunct³³; [that is, the former difference could not be established without the latter³⁴]. **[13]** And we have already shown the example of the cognition in which, though grasping [organs] are different, grasped object is one and same: ["I am touching what I saw"]. [On the other hand], though grasping [organ such as eye] is one and same, the difference is seen in grasped [color] such as blue and yellow. And such is common to the other [sense-organs].

For the same reason [that the difference between dharma and dharmin is actually grasped], the opinion [of some Buddhists] that four atoms beginning with wind [respectively] have one, two, three and four [dharmas] beginning with touch as their essential nature³⁵ (svabhāva) is rejected.³⁶ **[14]**

0.2.2.3. Criticism of the opponent's tarka (14,1–16,1)

And in the same manner, it is proved that the relatedness (vaiśiṣṭya) [between dharma and dharmin] is really existent³⁷ and that determinate [perception³⁸] (vikalpa) is difference in reflector such as a jewel, a sword and a mirror, [the same reflected object] such as face is known as small, big, dirty, clean etc., and the reverse of left and right happens (nanv astu pratisandhānalād dvīndriyagrāhyaṃ kiṃcit; tat tu rūparasādyātmakam iti vā tadāsraya iti vā na mṛshyāmahe; teshāṃ evābhāvāt / ekasminn eva grāhakabhedāt tattaddharmadhīḥ, yathā maṇikṛpāṇadarpaṇādīvyāṅjakabhedān mukhāder aṇutvapṛthutvamaṇinatvavimalatvādīdīḥ savyadakṣiṇāvipyāsaś ceti) [50,4ff.].

³³ Here upādhi means jñāpaka (K).

³⁴ Cf. SAS I. 8: "The difference among [sense-organs] such as eye is assumed through the difference among grasped forms. If [the latter] has not been established, how is the difference among [sense-organs] grasping [the forms] assumed? If there has not been this [assumption], how is the difference among the grasped forms from it assumed?" (cakshurādivaijātyaṃ hi grāhyākārabhedāt kalpyate; tadasiddhau katham tadgrāhakabhedakṛptiḥ? tadabhāve ca katham tata eva grāhyākārabhedakṛptiḥ?) [50,1 ff.].

³⁵ That is, "Earthy atom has color, taste, touch and smell as its nature. Watery [atom] has color, taste and touch as its nature. Fiery [atom] has color and touch as its nature. Windy [atom] has touch as its nature" [ŚrīBh II. ii. 17: 296,1–3]. According to Dr Shokei Matsumoto, this description reminds us the theory of Vaiśeṣhika (Vaiśeṣikasūtra II. i. 1–4) rather than that of Vaiśeṣhika (Abhidharmakośa II. 22) [Rāmānuja no Kenkyū (in Japanese), p.235 n.1]. See also Vedāntaparibhāṣā V. 22. The same theory is mentioned in SAS I. 8 [36,6ff.] also and the Ānandadāyini thereof quotes the verse of the Tattvamātrapañcikā [?]: vāyavīvyavahāro bhavati sparśādīlakṣaṇair eva / dvitrisvabhāvabhāgbhiḥ ekasmādd hrasvatādīva [37,10f.].

³⁶ Here it is suggested that one entity cannot have plural entities as its nature (R). Cf. SAS I. 8: ekasyānekasvabhāvavāyogāt, tadabhyupagame jainamatāvātārāt [37,1].

³⁷ This statement presupposes the following objection— "How is it possible that this [dharma] exists in what is devoid of it? On the other hand, if this [dharma] exists in

non-sublated means of valid knowledge. And the silly talk that the relation is untenable and so on are rejected for the reason that any one of the five members of the *reductio ad absurdum*³⁹ (*tarka*) is cast away⁴⁰ and the like. [15]

what is qualified by it, there would be the undesirable conclusion that this [dharma] abides in itself. Therefore, there is neither dharma nor dharmin. (*tacchūnye tasya vṛtīḥ katham iva ghaṭate, tadviśiṣṭe tu vṛttau svādhāratvapasamgas tata iha na guṇau nāpi dharmī*)” [TMK I. 10]; “Where does what is accepted as attribute, say, color, exist? In what is devoid of itself? Or, in what is qualified by itself? Not the former because it is contradicted. ... Not the latter because it would bring about mutual dependence. What is qualified is nothing but the qualifier, the substantive of the qualifier (*viśeshya*) and the relation between the [two]. Because there is no proof on such [a qualified thing as is other than these three]. And any one of the above-mentioned three cannot be [qualified thing] because there is neither knowledge on a qualified thing nor usage [of ‘qualified’] regarding it only, [that is, both are possible only when there is the unit of the three]. Therefore, the word ‘qualified’ can mean both of the related, [namely, the qualifier and the qualified]. Thus, attribute existing in what is qualified by itself abides not only in the substantive of [the qualifier] but also in [the qualifier] itself. What is undesirable? [This suggests] A is different from A. (*yo 'yaṃ rūpādiḥ dravyasya guṇatayeshṭaḥ sa kiṃ svasūnye vartate svaviśiṣṭe vā? nādyah, vyāghātāt / ... na dvitīyah / ātmāśrayāpātāt / viśiṣṭaṃ viśeṣaṇa-viśeshya-tatsambandha-atiriktam na kiṃcit / tasmin pramāṇābhāvāt / na cokteshu trishv anyatamamātram, tāvati viśiṣṭadhivyavahārayor abhāvāt / ataḥ sambandhyubhayaṃ viśiṣṭaśabdārtha iti syāt / tathā ca svaviśiṣṭe vartamāno guṇaḥ svaviśeshyam iva svātmānam api svādhārikuryāt / kim atrāniṣṭam? svasya svasmād anyatvam*)” [SAS I. 10: 77,6–81,5]. This discussion is found in the *Khaṇ ana* and the *Samkṣepaśārīraka*; see *Bhāvaprakāśikā*.

³⁸ For the Buddhist negation of *savikalpaka pratyaksha*, see Dr Yuichi Kajiyama's English translation of the *Tarkabhāshā* of Mokshākaragupta §5 (pp.40ff.) [reprinted in his *Studies in Buddhist Philosophy*, Kyoto, 1989]. Deśika criticizes it in *NyP* 77ff., *TMK* IV. 32.

³⁹ *Tarka* is defined as: “*vyāpyāṃgikāre 'niṣṭavyāpakaprasaṅjanam*” [SAS IV. 60: 590,6; *NyP* 214,18; *YMD* II. 43], namely, leading to an undesirable pervader through accepting a pervaded hypothetically. Mostly it is used as counter-argument (*pratikūlatarka*) to refute the opinion of an opponent through leading to an unacceptable conclusion; that is why I translate the term with *reductio ad absurdum*. (Cf. *Tarkabhāshā*, ed. KSS, p. 242, where the term is defined as *aniṣṭaprasaṅgaḥ*).

Opposing to the *Naiyāyika*, who do not accept *tarka* as valid knowledge [see *NySū* I. i. 40 and the commentaries thereof, *TarS* §64], Deśika accept it as included in inference [*NyP* 214ff.]; for the detail of his discussion, see *VEDAVALLI* 1984: 108-13, *SINGH* 1958: 241–46.

It is composed of five members:

- (1) *prasaṅjakasya prasaṅjanīyena vyāptiḥ*,
 - (2) *pratitarkena 'pratighātaḥ*,
 - (3) *prasaṅjanīyaviparyaye paryavasānam*,
 - (4) *prasaṅjitasya 'niṣṭatvam*,
 - (5) *parapakshasādhakatvam* [*NyP* 222,2f.].
- (Cf. *Tārkikarakshā*, v. 72: (1) *vyāptiḥ*, (2) *tarkāpratihatīḥ*, (3) *avasānam viparyaye* / (4) *aniṣṭa-* (5) *ananukūlatvam iti tarkāṃgapañcakam* // [summarized by POTTER in *EIPH* II: 637], cited in *MMU*, *anumāna*, §15).

The following example makes the point clear. When someone (A) infers ‘The mountain has fire because it has smoke,’ another (B) says ‘There might not be fire.’ The statement of B is rejected by the following *tarka* which shows that the non-existence of

Moreover,

(4) Even after hundreds of objection by disputants, we should depend upon the force of perception. Why doesn't this [force] grasp the [relation between dharma and dharmin]?

(5) If either of this-ness (or dharmin) and thus-ness (or dharma) were denied by means of a certain [reasoning], the statement 'there is not this [relation between dharma and dharmin] would be also denied because either of ['this' and 'is not'] would be denied.

(6) In order to prove that [all determinate knowledge] is disagreeing (visaṃvāda) [with experience],⁴¹ [Buddhists pose] the reason that it is determinate. But such reason to such probandum (sādhyā) is spoiled in view of the alternative whether the subject (paksha), the reason etc. are sublated (bādha) or not.⁴² [16]

Thus, this existent distinction between substance and non-substance is established.

0.3. Substances are continuous — Criticism on kṣaṇabhaṅga – (16,3–37,3)

And such substances are continuous (sthira). For there is no proof (pramāṇa) on [Buddhis doctrine that] everything is momentary (kṣaṇabhaṅga).

fire brings about the non-existence of smoke. First, (1) the non-existence of fire (= prasañjaka) is pervaded by the non-existence of smoke (= prasañjanīya). And (2) assuming, on the other hand, the existence of fire does not bring about any undesirable conclusion, with which this [pervasion] could be rejected by means of [the pratitarka] (na ca sāgnitve 'py atra kaścīd anisṭhāprasaṅgaḥ, yena tataḥ pratihanyeta). Moreover, (3) the fact contrary to the non-existence of smoke, [which is to be brought about through the pervasion] (= prasañjanīyaviparyaya), that the mountain actually has smoke, is concluded by means of perception. Accordingly (4) the non-existence of smoke, which is to be brought about through the pervasion, is not acceptable. Thus (5) [the opinion of the other] that the mountain has fire is established [NyP 222,2-8] (Cf. TMK VI. 60 and Srinivasa Chari 1987: 93).

⁴⁰ The opponent's tarka is: if dharma exists in what is devoid of it, there would be contradiction; if dharma exists in what is qualified by it, dharma would exist in itself. But neither is true, because dharma exists in [dharmin] which is the substantive qualified by it (tadvṛttir dharmimātre [TMK I. 10]; vastutaḥ tadviśiṣṭe viśeṣhye [SAS 82,8f.]). Accordingly, tarka is: if dharma exists in the substantive qualified by it, it exists in itself. In this tarka, its fourth member is established because the conclusion is not acceptable, but its first member is not established (K).

⁴¹ Cf. Pramāṇavārttika II. 1: pramāṇam avisaṃvādi jñānam; Nyāyabindu III. 5: avisaṃvādakaṃ jñānaṃ samyagjñānam.

⁴² If the knowledge of the reason etc. were with reference to what is sublated, there would be the defect that the sublation is not established and the like. If they were with reference to what is not sublated, the reason would be straying (vyabhicāra), because the very subject, which is determinate in the form of the knowledge of the reason etc., does not have the probandum, being disagreeing (R). The same reason of Buddhists is refuted in TMK IV. 33 also.

From which [can we understand] this [doctrine], perception (pratyaksha) or inference (anumāna)?

0.3.1. Proof based on pratyabhijñā (16,4–27,1)

Not the former, because perception is of nature contradictory [to the momentariness] : that is, the perception in the form of recognition⁴³ [or identification] (pratyabhijñā) [such as ‘The present pot is the very pot which I saw in the past (so ‘yam ghaṭaḥ)’] proves the very continuity [of the pot in the present and that in the past].

[Obj.] This [recognition] is delusion (bhrānti).

[Ans.] Not so; for that which has neither defects in its causes, [i.e. sense-organs], nor the cognition sublating it (bādhakapratyaya), cannot be [delusion].

[Obj.] The defect, too, is inferred by the sublation based on reasoning⁴⁴ (yukti).

[Ans.] What is your reasoning?

0.3.1.1 On contrary attributes (17,1–22,1)

[Obj.] **[17]** [Our reasoning] is composed of the contingency (prasaṅga) that two contradictory (viruddha) attributes (dharma) — namely, the capability (sāmārthya) [of sprouting a bud] and the incapability (asāmārthya) [of sprouting a bud], which are based on the fact that [a seed in a field] makes an effect [i.e. a bud]⁴⁵ (karaṇa) and that [a seed in a granary] does not make the effect (akaraṇa) — might be superimposed⁴⁶ (adhyāsa) [in one seed, if a seed in a field and a seed in a granary, as you hold, were one and the same]. Or rather, [our reasoning] is composed of the contingency that even what cannot make [an effect], [i.e., a seed in a granary], might make the effect; because what has the capability could make the effect [without fail].

[Ans.] It is incorrect. Because the word ‘capability’ means having the innate nature (svabhāva) of being able to make [the effect] when the assistant causes (sahakārin), [e.g. water and the sunlight], are present. In other words, it means having the non-existence of the effect resulting from the non-existence of the assistant causes **[18]**. Therefore, the

⁴³ “pratyabhijñānaṃ hi nāma atītavartamānakālavarthyekavastuvishayam ekaṃ pratyakshajñānam / tasya kāladvayasambandhaviśiṣṭam eva vastu vishayaḥ” [VDīpa II. ii. 24: 61,10-11].

There were some different views as to whether it is included in pratyaksha alone or not [NyP 295,2–296,10; Vedavalli 1984: 181–83]. According to Rāmānuja, Viśṇucitta and YMD (I. 21), it is included in perception.

⁴⁴ Here yukti means tarka.

⁴⁵ K = phalopadhānam.

⁴⁶ adhyāsa. K = sambandha. Because pratyabhijñā is of bhrānti, Buddhists use this word. Cf. the usage of adhyavasāya in Tattvasaṃgraha vv.447 & 450.

capability itself [can] enter one and the same [seed], because whether making the effect or not results from whether the assistant causes are present or not.

[Obj.] It is hardly possible that one and the same entity has both [the presence of the assistant causes and the non-presence of them].

[Ans.] Not so. It is possible because the time [of the presence and that of the non-presence] are severally fixed by connection⁴⁷ (santāna) with each sufficient condition (sāmagrī) of these [two] **[19]**.

[Obj.] The problem [how one and the same entity has] both the relation with particular sufficient condition of [the presence] and the non-relation with it, still remains.

[Ans.] Not so; [this problem] is avoided for the very reason that each particular sufficient condition belongs to different time. When a seed-moment⁴⁸ (bījakshaṇa) of the same kind as [a seed in a granary] becomes a seed capable [of sprouting a bud] **[20]**, you also cannot avoid this [fact that the presence of the assistant causes causes to begin the effect].

[Obj.] [Only] the innate nature (svabhāva) of the moment immediately before [the seed capable of sprouting a bud] causes [to begin the effect].

[Ans.] Because of the very [fact that it can make the effect only in the presence of the assistant causes], this question has been already answered. Otherwise, there would be the contingency of the complication (gaurava) of assuming innumerable moments and their innate natures, though not perceptible.

If the assistant causes, though based on the affirmative and negative consequence⁴⁹ (anvayavyatireka), were not the causes,⁵⁰ **[21]** even the fact that the material (upādāna)

⁴⁷ The commentators shows three interpretations: paramparā (R1, K1), sambandha (R3, K2), paushkalya (completeness) (R2).

⁴⁸ bījakshaṇaḥ = bījarūpaḥ kshaṇaḥ (R). According to Buddhists, time is not positive reality. So it must be called by the name of some entities existing in it.

⁴⁹ If there are the assistant causes, there is the cause; if not the assistant causes, there is not the cause.

⁵⁰ R: “Then, your statement ‘the dominant [or sense-organs such as the eye], the auxiliary [such as light], the dependent [or the object] and the immediate [or the moment immediately before] are the fourfold causes of the birth of knowledge (adhipati-sahakāri-ālambana-samanantapratyayāś catvāro 'pi jñānotpattihetavaḥ [= ŚrīBh II. ii. 21: 298, 13f.]’ would be contradicted.”

While the orthodox texts of the Vaibhāshika, e.g. the Abhidharmakośabhāshya II. 61, mention to hetupratyaya for sahakāri°, the same list are also found in many texts; e.g. Bhāmatī ad II. ii. 21 (nīlābhāsasya hi cittasya nīlād ālambanapratyayān nīlākārātā, samanantapratyayāt pūrvavijñānād bodharūpatā, cakshusho 'dhipatipratyayād rūpa-grahaṇapratīnyamah, ālokāt sahakāripratyayād hetoḥ spashṭārthatā), SDS II. 275ff. Cf. Matsumoto 235, n.5.

[such as a seed] is the cause could not be satisfactorily explained (durnirvaha).

And further, if those which are divided into two by the difference of time — that is, making the effect (karaṇa) and not making the effect (akaraṇa), or the presence of the assistant causes and the non-presence of them — should divide the one entity (vastu) [into two moments], those which are divided by the difference in position [of a seed] — that is, making the effect and not making the effect, the capability and the incapability, or the presence of the assistant causes and the non-presence of them — could divide these two [moments]. Thus, even one moment would be divided into many parts. Then the one [entity] could not be established anywhere because the differences [in time and position] are countless. Consequently, [your standpoint] might be the theory of voidness (śūnyavāda). **[22]**

[Obj.] As to the difference in position, the presence and the non-presence in this [position] make it possible that [a sprout is seen only in a particular position of a seed].

[Ans.] It is incorrect; because contradictory [attributes] such as [the presence] and [the non-presence] ought to make difference, as in that case [of the difference in time]. **[23]**

0.3.1.2 One thing can be connected with another time (23,1–26,2)

[Obj.] It is hardly possible that one and the same [entity] is connected with the prior time and the posterior time, which are mutually contradictory.

[Ans.] Not so; because it is unattainable to be prior or posterior with reference to its own self. That is, we never assert that one entity is connected with the time delimited (avacchinna) by its own antecedent non-existence (prāgabhāva) and the time delimited by its own annihilative non-existence (pradhvaṃsa). You have to admit that there is no contradiction, even regarding one moment, if the time prior to A and posterior to C is its own time for B. For example, the intermediate position which is prior to atom (pramāṇu) Y and posterior to atom C is its own position for another atom B; accordingly, there is no contradiction in that [one entity] is connected with [this position]. Otherwise, even one moment would be divided as in the previous case. **[24]**

[Obj.] Nevertheless, it is hardly possible that the prior time and the posterior time or limiting adjuncts⁵¹ (upādhi) of these [two], which are contradictory each other like light and darkness, enter one [entity]. If they were not contradictory, [the two] would be simultaneous (yaugapadya) [or connected with the same moment].

[Ans.] Not so. It is true that they would be contradictory each other if they were

⁵¹ This is a reply to those who do not admit the inherent distinction of time (R).

simultaneous, but they are no [contradictory] if they enter one and the same entity. Otherwise, [two objects] would be contradictory each other only because they are connected with one knowledge and, consequently, recognition (pratyabhijñā) [such as ‘The present pot is the very pot which I saw (so ‘yaṃ ghaṭaḥ)’] itself could not arise at all.

[Obj.] What we intend to say is that it would be contradictory if [the prior] time and [the posterior] time are identified (tādātmya) because [the two] are different in nature.

[Ans.] Yet the connection with one entity will not be denied, as in the case of color and taste, [which are not identified but can be connected with one entity]. **[25]**

[Obj.] One entity is not connected with many anywhere.

[Ans.] You cannot say so. For you admit that an atom, momentary and without any attribute (nirdharmaka) [according to your opinion], also have many [attributes] such as being-without-space⁵² (nairantarya) when they are combined together.

[Obj.] The momentary destruction is proved by the notion of presentness (vartmānatva).⁵³

[Ans.] This argument is rejected for the same reason [that one entity can be connected with both the prior time and the posterior time]: this [notion] makes neither grasp nor suggest (ākshipyate) the non-existence of the connection with both the prior time and the posterior time. For it denies the mere non-presentness contradictory to that [presentness].⁵⁴ And this [notion of presentness], denying the antecedent non-existence (prāgabhāva) and the annihilative non-existence (pradhvaṃsābhāva) [regarding only] at that time, is not contradictory to the connection with both the prior time and the posterior time. **[26]**

[Obj.] Perception grasps only one moment connected with the sense-organ. Then, another moment regarding this [entity grasped by perception] is hardly established.

[Ans.] Not so; because we already explained recognition (pratyabhijñā) and that it is not sublated.⁵⁵

⁵² Buddhists do not accept saṃyoga. Cf. 475,7ff.

⁵³ The similar objection is found in the Kusumāñjali [Viraraghavachari's Bhūmikā 25].

⁵⁴ Cf. ŚrīBh II. ii. 24: pratyakshagamyā vartamānasyāvartamānād vyāvṛttir na vartamānasya vastvantaratvam avagamayati, api tu vartamānakālayogitāmātram / na ca tāvatā vastvantaratvaṃ siddhyati, tasyaiva kālāntarayogisaṃbhavāt [300,13ff.].

⁵⁵ “pratyabhijñāpratyaksheṇa sthiratvasyaiva siddheḥ” [16,4].

0.3.1.2 Recognition cannot be denied by inference (26,2–27,1)

[Obj.] [We shall pose the following inference—] All recognitions are delusions; because of being recognition, [born from both reminiscent impressions (saṃskāra) and a contact with a sense-organ]; like the recognition of flame⁵⁶ [where a succession of flames uninterruptedly produced anew is mistaken for one continuous flame].

[Ans.] [This is not correct]; because in view of [the defect in its causes (i.e. the sense-organs) or the cognition sublating it], which has been mentioned before [as causing to be delusion],⁵⁷ [this inference] has an vicious condition⁵⁸ (upādhi). If [recognition] were sublating merely by this inference, [you could infer] that all cognitions (pratyaya) are delusions only because of being cognition. Thus, you cannot avoid the doctrine of the Mādhyamika [27] rising.

0.3.2. kṣaṇabhaṅga cannot be proved by inference (27,2–34,1)

0.3.2.1. Inference itself is impossible (27,2–3)

According to those who admit the momentary destruction, not only recognition, which is of the nature of delusion for them, but also remembrance (smṛti) is not possible, as we will consider in [the section of] the self.⁵⁹ And for the reason [that remembrance is not possible], the recollection (pratisaṃdhāna) of invariable concomitance (vyāpti) is not possible; accordingly inference itself proves to be baseless.⁶⁰ Then in what manner do you infer the momentary destruction?

0.3.2.2. Criticism on the hetu “sat” (27,3–31,2)

0.3.2.2.1. anvayavyāpti is impossible (27,3–29,2)

[Obj.] [Our inference is:] Whatever is existent (sat) is momentary (kṣaṇika),

⁵⁶ Cf. ŚrīBh II. ii. 24: jvalādishv iva sādṛśyanibandhano 'yam ekatvavyāmohaḥ [300,4].

⁵⁷ “kāraṇadosha-bādhakapratyaya” [16,5].

⁵⁸ “sādhanaṅvyāpakatve sati sādhyasamavyāptaḥ sādhanadharmavyatirikto dharmā upādhiḥ” [NyP 96,8–97,1]. Cf. ĀTV 863,13: sādhanāvyāpakatve sati sādhyavyāpakatvam; “sādhyavyāpakatve sati sādhanāvyāpaka upādhiḥ” [TarS §56]. Due to the presence of upādhi, the inference becomes vyāpyatvāsiddha [ibid., YMD II. 35]. Here kāraṇadosha or bādhakapratyaya pervades the sādhyā (: bhrānti), but does not pervade the hetu (: pratyabhijñā). For further details of upādhi in Viśiṣṭādvaita-Vedānta, see Vedavalli 86–88.

⁵⁹ Chap.2, jīva-pariccheda: “bhrāntirūpaṃ vā ātmapratisandhānam, viśayapratyabhijñānam, smṛtimātram ca saṃskārādhāraṃ sthiraṃ ātmānam antareṇa kathamcid api na ghaṭate” [187,2–188,2].

⁶⁰ Cf. ŚrīBh II. i. 24: pramāṭṛpremeyayoḥ kṣaṇikatvam vadadbhirvyāptyavadhāraṇatatsmaraṇapūrvakānumānbhyupagame 'pi duḥśakāḥ [301,3f.].

like a pot; and these entities⁶¹ (bhāva) are existent.⁶²

[Ans.] Even [this inference] is not [logically correct].

If the word “entity (bhāva)” denoted everything (viśva) as the subject (paksha), the distinction between the subject (paksha), the reason (hetu), and the instance (dṛṣṭānta) were not established⁶³ [28].

Even if the subject meant things other than a pot, a pot cannot be the instance because a pot are not well-known to be momentary. And the superimposition of contradictory attributes [such as capability and incapability, through which you intend to prove momentariness], has been already refused.⁶⁴

[Obj.] Flames of a lamp can be the instance.

[Ans.] This instance is also rejected by the above-mentioned reason [that there is no agreement about its momentariness], because even [flames] are accepted to be continuous (sthira) for three or four moments.

[Obj.] Let the limiting adjunct of a moment⁶⁵ (kṣaṇa-upādhi) be the instance, then. Indeed it is not continuous; if so, it could not delimit (avacchedaka) a moment.

[Ans.] Not so; because a thing A whose beginning is delimited by the end of a thing B and B whose end is delimited by A's beginning, though both [A and B] are continuous, can delimit [a moment].⁶⁶ And the mutual delimitation [between A and B] is

⁶¹ bhāva =vastu (R).

⁶² [udāharāṇa]: yat sat tat kṣaṇikam, yathā ghataḥ; [upanaya]: santaś cāmī bhāvāḥ. Here the reason is sat and the probandum (sādhyā) is kṣaṇika. Cf. ŚrīBh II. i. 24: arthakriyākāritvāt sattvād vā gṛhādiḥ kṣaṇikaḥ, yad akṣaṇikaḥ śaśavishāṇādi tad anarthakriyākārya asac ca [300,10–12]. (Note that according to Buddhist philosophers after Dharmakīrti, sattva is nothing but arthakriyāsāmarthyatva. See, for instance, Nyāyabindu I. 15: arthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇatvād vastunaḥ; Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvalī 1,9: sattā śaktir ihārthakarmani [= SDS II. 118].)

This reason sattva to prove kṣaṇabhāṅga is first introduced by Dharmakīrti in his Pramānaviniścaya [the second chapter (ed. E. Steinkellner) 28,24ff.]. See E. Steinkellner: ‘Die Entwicklung des Kṣaṇikatvānumāna bei Dharmakīrti,’ WZKSO 12-13, 1968/69, 361–77; Katsumi Mimaki: ‘Setsunametsu-ronshō’ (in Japanese) in: A. Hirakawa, Y. Kajiyama and J. Takasaki (eds.), Kōza Daijō Bukkyō vol.9: Ninshiki-ron to Ronri-gaku, Tokyo 1984, pp.217–54, esp.224f.

⁶³ “sandigdhasādhyasya pakshasya, niścitasādhyasya sapakshasya ca, pakshanishṭhasya ca hetor bhedāvaśyambhāvāt”(R). Cf. TarS §49, 50, 44.

⁶⁴ NySi 17,2–25,5.

⁶⁵ “kṣaṇapadavācyatāvachedaka”(K), that is, all reason that cause to use the word a moment.

⁶⁶ For instance, in the case “I saw a snake and ran away,” the moment I stopped to see it and begin to run is delimited by seeing whose end is delimited by the beginning of running and by running whose beginning is delimited by the end of seeing.

established by being the object of the qualified knowledge, “simultaneously.” [29] As two extended measuring-rods whose directions are contradictory but which are conjoined a little in the middle are, though they are long, capable of delimiting a minimum (alpatara) space by the part delimited by their mutual conjunction; so in time. Hence there is no defect.

0.3.2.2.1. vyatirekavyāpti is impossible (29,3–31,2)

[Obj.] Affirmative [concomitance] (anvaya) must not be [in the inference]. Negative [concomitance] (vyatireka) should be: whatever is non-momentary (akṣaṇika) is non-existent (asat), like a rabbit's horn.⁶⁷

[Ans.] Not so. Because it cannot be mentioned that non-momentariness [i.e. non-existence of momentariness⁶⁸] is the pervaded (vyāpya). For momentariness accepted by you by you has not been established; accordingly, non-momentariness expressed (nirūpya) by it is not established.⁶⁹

[Obj.] [The word “akṣaṇika”] means [not the non-existence of momentariness but] being continuous for long time (cirakālasthāyitva) [30].

[Ans.] Then, it cannot be applied to a rabbit's horn, which does not have its own innate nature (niḥsvabhāva).

[Obj.] Let the non-existence of a rabbit's horn be the instance.

[Ans.] Then it is nothing but existent (sann eva)⁷⁰; because it is [31] based on the means of valid knowledge (prāmāṇika).

[Obj.] ‘Non-existent (asattva)’ is defined as “being different from entity (bhāvetratva).”

[Ans.] [Still non-existence of a rabbit's horn] cannot be [the instance]. The reasons are as follows. According to the opinion that non-existence is another kind of positive existence (bhāvāntara) [opposite to its counter-correlative (pratiyogin)],⁷¹ even [‘non-existent’] cannot be established [in the non-existence of a rabbit's horn]. Even if [non-

⁶⁷ Cf. ŚrīBh II. i. 24: 300,10–12, cited above. A rabbit's horn is an example of absolute non-existent. Cf. Sureśvara's BṛhUp-Bhāshyavārttika v. : esha vandhyāsuto yāti śaśaṣṛṅgadhanur dharaḥ / mṛgatṛṣṇāmbhasi snātaḥ khapushpakṛtaśekharaḥ // (cited in SAS IV. 18: 511,2f.).

⁶⁸ In vyatireka, sādhyābhāva is vyāpya.

⁶⁹ “abhāvapratyaye pratiyogitāvacchedakaviśiṣṭapratiyogijñānasya 'pekshitatvāt’”(K).

⁷⁰ “kālasambaddhitvasyaiva sattvarūpatvāt’”(R).

⁷¹ K 31,17–19. This doctrine is accepted by the Viśiṣṭādvaitins: “abhāvas tv asmanmate bhāvāntarātmā” [NyP 300,12]; cf. YMD I. 21, IV. 4.

existence were] not [another kind of existence but negative category other than positive categories (bhāvātirikta)], it would be easy to say (suvaca) that an existent is also [continuous] as a non-existent is, [in your opinion, continuous].⁷² And there is no difference [whether ‘non-existent’ is other than non-existence or is other than existence] regarding reversed supposition (kusṛṭi⁷³) so as to avoid the obstructions to perceptibility (pratyakshatva).⁷⁴

On the other hand, some [Buddhists], thinking that the reason “existent (sat)” is sublated by Scriptures because Buddha taught a certain eternal reality (tattva) [i.e. voidness or sūnya], [32] regard “take place inevitably (dhruvabhāvitva)” as the reason.⁷⁵ That is to say:

[Obj.] Whatever takes place inevitably needs no cause (hetu); otherwise taking place inevitably would be contradicted, [because whatever has a cause could be non-existent in view of the non-existence of the cause, consequently it could not inevitably take place]. For this reason, it is proved that the annihilative non-existence (pradhvaṃsa) of effects, which take place inevitably, needs no cause (ahetuka); accordingly the delay (vilamba) [of the destruction] is not possible. Therefore entity rising up now will be destroyed by it [without any delay].⁷⁶

[Ans.] Here which is meant by the word “take place inevitably”,

⁷² anyatrāpy abhāvasyeva bhāvasyāpi suvacatvāt. This sentence is too simple to decide the meaning. Here I follow the interpretation of K: “bhāvetaratvam evāsattvam ity aṃgīkṛtya tadvataḥ sthīratvasvīkāre, abhāvetaratvam eva sattvam ity aṃgīkṛtya tadvato bhāvasyāpi sthīratvena vaktuṃ śakyatvāt” [31,21–22]. R interprets differently: “as non-existence has technical non-beingness defined by to be other than existence, non-existence has technical non-beingness defined by to be other than non-existence (abhāve bhāvabhinnatvalakṣaṇapāribhāshikāsattvavat abhāvabhinnatvalakṣaṇapāribhāshikāsattvasyābhāve 'pi suvacatvāt)” [31,6–7].

⁷³ viparītakalpanā (N).

⁷⁴ When a pot does not exist, if non-being (asattva) were other than non-existence (abhāvabhinnatva), perceptibility of the pot would be obstructed because it is non-being; on the other hand, if non-being (asattva) were other than existence (bhāvabhinnatva), perceptibility of the pot's non-existence would be obstructed. Therefore both of us should accept that being means “to be connected with the time” [R 31,8–10; K 31,23–26].

⁷⁵ E.g. Tattvasaṃgraha v.353. see Mimaki 1984.

⁷⁶ This inference can be written as follows:

udiyamānasya vastunaḥ (or dhruvabhāvīnaḥ kāryāṇām) pradhvaṃso 'hetukaḥ,
dhruvabhāvitvāt,
[anyāpohavat].

The sādhyā is ahētukatva, the hetu is dhruvabhāvitva, and the pakṣa is pradhvaṃsa(-abhāva) whose pratīyogin is vastu (or kārya).

- (1) to exist as long as [its counter-correlative (pratiyogin)] (tatsamakālabhāvitva⁷⁷),
 (2) to take place immediately before [its counter-correlative] without any exception (tadanantarabhāvitvaniyama⁷⁸),
 (3) to be born from [its counter-correlative] alone (tanmātrajanyatva),
 (4) to be born from the sufficient condition of [its counter-correlative] alone (tadeka-sāmagrījanyatva⁷⁹),
 (5) without any cause (ahetukatva⁸⁰), or others⁸¹?

(1) would be unestablished (asiddhi⁸²) [because non-existence and its counter-correlative cannot coexist⁸³]. (2) would be unestablished⁸⁴ too. (3) and (4) would be contradictory (vyāghāta⁸⁵) [to not having any cause⁸⁶]. And (5) would be the same as the probandum (sādhyā).⁸⁷ Because of these logical defects (dosha), **[33]** only “to take place in future without any exception (eshyattvaniyama⁸⁸)” remains [as faultless]. Yet you also admit this [reason] to be inconstant (anaikāntika⁸⁹) in the case of [the first] potsherd-

⁷⁷ = tatksanaṭva, the third alternative in TMK I. 28. SAS: sa eva kṣaṇo yasya sa tatksanaṭ tasya bhāvas tatksanaṭvaṃ tadā dhruvabhāvi sahabhāvīty arthaḥ.

⁷⁸ = anukṣaṇatva, the fourth alternative in TMK I. 28. SAS: anukṣaṇa-śabdopacāritas tu hetur anantarakṣṇavartitvam.

⁷⁹ (3) and (4) = tajjanyatā, the sixth alternative in TMK I. 28.

⁸⁰ = jananaividhuratā, the second alternative in TMK I. 28.

⁸¹ K refers to the fifth alternative in TMK I. 28: tattva (=pratiyogirūpatva). The answer to this in SAS: pañcame tv asiddhir vyāghātaś ca.

⁸² svarūpāsiddhi (K). NyBo §56: svarūpāsiddhir nāma pakshe hetvabhāvaḥ. Cf. YMD II. 33.

⁸³ SAS: ayam api hetur asiddha eva / na ca pradhvaṃsapratiyoginor yaugapadya-sambhavaḥ, sambhave vā bhāvaḥ paścād api kiṃ na syāt [SAS^v 140,15–16].

⁸⁴ K: sādhyāviśeshāparaparyāyā samdigdhāsiddhiḥ / vastusthirapakshet tat-[=niyama-(N)] sampratipattyabhāvāt. SAS: tatrāpi bhāvotpattyapekshayā "nantaryavivakshāyām asiddhiḥ / bhāvasvarūpāpekshayā tv ānantaryaniyame bhāva eva hetuḥ syād iti katham hetunairapekshyam / tadatiriktanairapekshyam vivakshitam iti cen na, tadvad eva sahakāriṇām apy avarjanīyatvād iti [SAS^v 140,17–19].

⁸⁵ = viruddha: sādhyābhāvavyāpto hetuḥ [TarS §54, YMD II.36].

⁸⁶ SAS: tajjanyatve hetau pratijñāvirodhaḥ / tajjanyatvaṃ hi taddhetukatvam, tena katham hetunairapekshyasādhanam / hetvantaranairapekshyam api ca durvacam ity uktam [SAS^v 140, 27–28].

⁸⁷ SAS has a long discussion on this alternative [SAS^v 139,33–140,13].

⁸⁸ eshyattva is the the first alternative in TMK I. 28. It is interpreted as “avaśyambhāvitvamātra” [Ānandadāyin¶141,8–9].

⁸⁹ = asādhāraṇa: sādhyābhāvavadvṛttitvam [NyBo §53, YMD II.38].

moment (kapāla-kshaṇa) causing to begin dissimilar successions (visabhāgasantāna⁹⁰), the artificial destruction (pratisaṃkhyānirodha⁹¹) inseparable from it, and so forth; [because they take place in future without any exception but has causes such as hitting by a hammer]. If [whatever takes place in future without any exception did] not [have any cause], exactly at the first moment every moment would spring up and at the same time everything would vanish, for there is no distinction among all future moments in taking place in future. **[34]**

[Obj.] In order to remove an attachment (āsthā) the momentariness should be taught.

[Ans.] What a pity! This big injustice may cling to a very righteous man who speaks no false. And [only] a man of minute knowledge could remove his attachment in this [instruction]. And only if you teach the non-eternality, [an attachment] can be [removed]. Otherwise you could not help teaching the śūnya.

And counter-inferences are as follow:

(1) Recognition, the subject of our discussion, is valid knowledge (pramā) in so far as its own object;

Because it is non-sublated cognition (abādhitabuddhi);

Like knowledge of own specific characteristic (svalakṣhaṇa). **[36]**

Not only for us but also for the Vaibhāshika, [knowledge of own specific characteristic] is valid knowledge in so far as its own object.

(2) Whatever is being (sat) is not momentary, like **[37]** the eternal entity accepted [in Buddha's teachings];

And these existents (bhāva) are being.

(3) [Although we do not admit that a rabbit's horn is cognizable], it would be concluded even by your practical usage (vyavahāra)⁹² that:

Whatever is cognized (yat pratīyate) is non-momentary, like a rabbit's horn.

(4) Destruction has the cause (sahetuka);

⁹⁰ = visadr̥śasantāna, whose antonym is sadr̥śasantāna.

⁹¹ Its antonym is apratisaṃkhyānirodha (natural destruction). The two terms are explained in ŚrīBh II. ii. 21: kṣhaṇikavādibhir mudgarābhīghātādyanantarabhāvitayopalabdhiyogyaḥ sadr̥śasantānāvasānarūpaḥ sthūlo yaḥ, sadr̥śasantāne pratikṣhaṇabhāvī copalabdhyanarhaḥ sūkṣhmaś ca yo niranvayo vināśaḥ pratisaṃkhyānirodha-apratisaṃkhyānirodha-śabdābhyām abhidhīyate [298,19–299,1]. This explanation is criticized by Dr. Nakamura because it is far from that of Abhidharma Buddhism [Nakamura 1983: 462f.]. According to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya,

⁹² “tanmatasiddhāṃ śaśaśṛṃgapratītim abhyupagamyā tasya dr̥śhātātvenopanyāsaḥ” (K).

Because it has the previous limit (pūrvāvadhi⁹³);

Like a pot.

And the others are understood by themselves.

Thus the continuity of substance is proved.

0. 4. Classification of substances (37,3–40,1)

And these

7) substances are classified into two as material (ja a) and immaterial (aja a) or inwards (pratyak) and the other [i.e. outwards (parāk)],

Or into six as (1) that which have three components (triguṇa⁹⁴), (2) time (anehas⁹⁵), (3) individual soul (jīva), (4) God (īśvara), (5) manifestation of enjoyment (bhogavibhūti⁹⁶), and (6) [attributive] knowledge (mati⁹⁷) // 7 // **[38]**

8) Not referring to knowledge (dhī), time and the manifestation of enjoyment, for the reason that they are attributes and so on,⁹⁸

Some classify the reality (tattva) into three [as spiritual (cit), non-spiritual (acit) and God (īśvara)] in order to distinguish between bodies, souls and God // 8 //

“Material (ja a)” means manifesting only from others.⁹⁹ “Immaterial (aja a)” means not so.¹⁰⁰ “Inwards (pratyak)” is manifesting for oneself.¹⁰¹ And “outwards (parāk)” means manifesting for others¹⁰² **[39]**. Thus is our practical usage. Accordingly it is established that [attributive] knowledge is, though immaterial, outwards.

⁹³ pūrvādhimattva = prāgabhāvapratyogitva (K).

⁹⁴ = prakṛti and its vikāras.

⁹⁵ = kāla.

⁹⁶ = nityavibhūti.

⁹⁷ = dharmabhūtajñāna.

⁹⁸ “Dharmabhūtajñāna is clearly an attribute of knower. Nityavibhūti is an attribute of God in the form of His body and so on. And time is an attribute of enjoyed prakṛti because it is the cause of the enjoyed evolution beginning with mahat” [R 38,7–8].

⁹⁹ parata eva bhāsamānam = svanirūpitavishayatāsūnyatve [= nirūpakatva-āśrayatva-ubhaya sambandhena vishayatāviśiṣṭānyatve] sati svetarānirūpitavishayatāvattvam (K). In YMD ja a is defined as “amiśrasattvarahitam” [IV. 6].

¹⁰⁰ tadanyat = nirūpakatva-āśrayatva-ubhaya sambandhena vishayatāviśiṣṭam (K). In YMD aja a is defined as “svayamprakāśatvam” [VI. 1].

¹⁰¹ svasmai bhāsamānam = svakartṛkavyavahāraprayojakavishayatāvat (K).

¹⁰² parasmai bhāsamānam = svabhinnakartṛkavyavahāraprayojakavishayatāvat (K).

Nārāyaṇārya,¹⁰³ however, said like this in the Nītimālā:¹⁰⁴

* Knowledge has just the non-existence of outwardness, but [it does] not [have] inwardness. [Nītimālā]

Still we should think that it is because he accepted [knowledge has] non-existence of that-ness (idaṃtva)¹⁰⁵ established only for the reason that it is the object of [another knowledge such as] seeing,¹⁰⁶ as asserted by the prima facie view (pūrvapaksha).¹⁰⁷ That is, the prima facie view to this passage is as follows:

* And [knowledge] is inwards because of the non-existence of outwardness, for it does not manifest as “that” like “blue” and so on [40]. [Nītimālā]

In [the above-mentioned classification], the definition of triguṇa is having an element called rajas, or having an element called tamas, or being able to become conditions (avasthā) such as the great (mahat) and so on.¹⁰⁸ It is established in various conditions respectively by perception and so on. And it is infinite in the lower and other directions but is limited by manifestation of enjoyment (bhogavibhūti) in the upper direction; because Scriptures (śruti) mention that eternal manifestation (nityavibhūti) is beyond tamas¹⁰⁹ and triguṇa is mentioned like this:

* It is infinite and its extent cannot be enumerated. [ViP II. vii. 26] [41]

And it is also called “māyā (mysterious power)” because it is the instrument of the wonderful (vicitra¹¹⁰) creation, “prakṛti” because it generates (prakaroti) modifications, and “avidyā (ignorance)” and so on for the reason that it is opposite to knowledge (vidyā) and others.

¹⁰³ Fl. in the first half of thirteenth century [Raghavan 21; Singh 130].

¹⁰⁴ Published as Annamalai Univ. Philosophy Ser. 2, 1940. This is his only work that remains completely.

¹⁰⁵ In short, idantva is the same as ja atva. See the definition of ja atva and the footnote to it.

¹⁰⁶ dr̥gviśhayatvamātrādhīnasiddhikatvarūpa° = jñānāntarādhīnasiddhikatvamātra- (R) or svabhinnajñānaviśhayatvamātrādhīnasamśayaviśhayatvabhāvarūpa (K).

¹⁰⁷ That is, here parāktva means ja atva called idaṃtva (R); consequently Nārāyaṇārya's view is not contradictory to Vedānta Deśika's.

¹⁰⁸ “sattvagūṇakatva” is not mentioned here for fear of ativyāpti to śuddhasattva [i.e. nityavibhūti (see YMD VI. 1)].

¹⁰⁹ “ādītyavarṇaṃ tamasaḥ parastāt” [ŚveUp III. 8 (= BhG VIII. 9)]. Here tamas means “ṛṣṭ” [ŚrīBh et passim].

¹¹⁰ The reason for using the word “māyā” is to denote the idea “vicitra” [R 41,3–4 = K].

And [it] begins a series of modifications (vikāra) characterized by similarity or dissimilarity in accordance with the difference in time and place (bhāga).¹¹¹ [42]

And it is without any separation even if it transforms itself into [four] gross elements (bhūta) [except ether (ākāśa)] or organs (indriya), which are able to move. That is why it pervades all its effects. Or rather, there is no contradiction that the two crush each other (pratighatva) because one of the two has no touch. For example, four gross elements beginning with wind, which has touch, are pervaded by ether, which has no touch. And the very triguṇa, according to the difference in its conditions (avasthā), which suppress (upamardaka) their each preceding condition, becomes twenty-four principles (tattva), namely, the primordial cause (prakṛti), the great (mahat), the I-ness (ahaṃkāra), eleven organs (indriya), five subtle elements (tanmātra), and five gross elements (bhūta).

[Objection:] Why can the one entity transform itself (pariṇāma) into the all, which consists of plural conditions (anekadhāvasthita)?

You may answer that as one lump of clay transforms itself into a pot, a dish and so on. But it is not right; because such transformation is impossible in the case of a thing which has no part (niravayava). Or, if it had parts (sāvayava), you could not but conclude that plural entities transform themselves into plural things; accordingly, the theory of the one and only material cause (upadāna) would be given up.

You may say that the one and only existent (sat), composed of many parts and called avyakta (non-manifested), is the material cause. But it is not true; because it cannot bear the following alternative question (vikalpa): that is, which do you want to say,

- (1) that unity (ekatva) and plurality (anekatva) has one substratum (āśraya),
- (2) that there is unity in the whole (aṃśin) and plurality in parts (aṃśa), or
- (3) that like a council, a forest, or an army, plural existents has unity caused by the connection with one limiting adjunct (upādhi)?

Not (1), because it is contradicted. Otherwise why can you get angry with the

¹¹¹ “The difference in time means the time of creation and the time of dissolution. The difference in place means [the place] connected with unequalness of guṇa and one not connected with it. The similarity of evolution means not to be able to denote the distinction between names and forms. The dissimilarity means to be able to denote the distinction between names and forms. Accordingly, it begins dissimilar evolution in a place connected to unequalness of guṇa, but it begins similar evolution in another place; because prakṛti itself engages in eternal evolution. On the other hand, in the time of dissolution, evolutions become equal everywhere” [R 41,12–16].

theory that the difference and the non-difference [exist in one and the same entity] (bhedābheda)? Neither (2); because in this case you should accept the whole (avayavin). Even if you accepted it, the world never arise from the only one [whole], because not the whole but its parts independently transform themselves in various ways. Compared to this, it is better to accept [plural] atoms (paramāṇu), unrelated (anārū ha) to the one meaningless substance [i.e. the whole], begin the world. For the same reason, (3) is not true; because it is meaningless to show a group if each one separately begins [the world], and real unity is impossible even in the case of a forest and so on. And further, in teaching unity based on limiting adjunct, your opinion has no difference from the theory admitted by the Vaiśeṣika-school and others that endless atoms are the material causes [of the world]. **[43]** Therefore the assumption (kalpanā) that the one entity transforms itself into the plural things is only a previous stage of the theory of false appearance (vivarta-vāda).¹¹²

To this objection, we answer:

9) Like something atomic (aṇu) or something omnipresent (vibhu) can be the substratum of a partial conjunction (prādeśika-saṃyoga),

It is possible even for that which has no part (niravayava) to evolve partially // 9 //

At first, not every non-substance (adravya) pervades its own substratum; because some [qualities] such as conjunction (saṃyoga) [or sound (śabda) in omnipresent ether (ākāśa)] are not observed so. And not every [non-substance] exists only in one part of its own substratum; because some attributes (dharma) deprived of the coexistence (sāmānādhikaraṇya) with its non-existence¹¹³ are observed.

10) That is why partial qualities (guṇa) are grasped in something atomic and something omnipresent.

So do accept the Vaiśeṣika and other schools // 10 // **[44]**

[Obj.] As to this point, we¹¹⁴ accept that in the case of something omnipresent [e.g. ether], another quality [e.g. sound] arises in the part delimited (avacchinna) by the conjunction with their efficient cause (nimitta), an embodied (mūrta) substances [e.g. air (vāyu)].

[Ans.] Then, how do you prove that the conjunction with an embodied substance

¹¹² To solve these problems, either unity or plurality should be denied. And because unity is supported by Scriptures teaching the creation [e.g. ChUp VI], plurality is false notion. Therefore we reach the vivarta-vāda [R, K].

¹¹³ svābhāvasāmānādhikaraṇyarahitadharmā. Cf. pūrvapakṣa-lakṣhaṇa of vyāpti: sādhyābhāvasavṛttitva [NyBo 44].

¹¹⁴ The Nyāya-school (K).

is partial? For you do not accept inherent (svābhāvika) partial difference (bheda) in something omnipresent. And a conjunction never arises in the part having a conjunction as its limiting adjunct; for the two would be mutually dependent (parasparāśraya): it is by a certain conjunction that a partial difference is established and it is in the thus-established [part] that a partial conjunction arises.

[Obj.] Something embodied such as a pot can partially delimitate something omnipresent in accordance with its size.

[Ans.] It is also rejected for the above-mentioned reason [that the two would be mutually dependent]. And [such delimitation] is impossible in a conjunction of two atoms, [which have the same size and have no part; because their conjunction would be overall].

Therefore a conjunction which arises from the particular sufficient condition (sāmagrī), [45] enjoys (anu bhū) the coexistence (sāmānādhikarāṇya) with its own non-existence in an atomic or maximum entity, which has no part; and moreover, in the same entity, it produces the notion of various parts, separately fixed according to the comprehension by the connection with itself, namely, the non-existence of its own non-existence. Thus should be admitted from valid knowledge.

Similarly, even in the case of triguṇa without any part, the differences in transformation (pariṇāma), whose substrata are divided and whose parts are separately fixed, arise by the differences in sufficient condition (sāmagrī) determined by the particular wish of Supreme God [46]. Why is it impossible that [such triguṇa's] cutting, splitting, moving and so on are also established when it partially transforms itself into something characterized by touch (sparśa) and so on? Even for the parts of the substrata which has the differences (bheda) such as moving and touch, it is these specific attributes [such as moving and touch] that differentiate them each other (bheda). As in the theory of ether without splitting, for its parts, it is peculiar conjunctions [with a drum and so on] or attributes such as very acute sound that differentiate them each other (bheda); so is in this case.

[Obj.] Even if [the differences characterized by transformation of conditions such as the great were admitted in triguṇa without any difference], you could not escape from the snare that the difference and the non-difference [exist in one and the same entity] (bhedābheda).

[Ans.] No, because this kind of [blame for] the contingency (prasamga) of the difference and the non-difference is common to the theory of [momentary] destructions (vaināśika), [which blamed us for the contingency of the capability (sāmārthya) and the

incapability (asāmārthya)¹¹⁵. And there is no contradiction [owing to the difference in time, as taught in the refutation of the theory of momentariness¹¹⁶]. Only in the theory that one entity is another [at the same time without any delimitating factor (avacchedaka) such as the difference in time] do we point out its contradiction; **[47]** not in the transformation that what have one condition [i.e., one] comes to have another condition [i.e., many], because unity and plurality as conditions are avoided by the difference in time. And the [Śrī-]Bhāshya supports this view:

* In the same way as the condition of being a jar results from its abandoning the condition of being a half-pot or a lump of clay, plurality results from abandoning the condition of unity, and unity from abandoning the condition of plurality; accordingly there is no contradiction. [ŚrīBh II. i. 15; 253, 11–12]

[Obj.] Let unity as condition not be contradictory to plurality in past or future. But there would be contradiction in case the substantial identity of these substances.

[Ans.] No. True, there would be contradiction if one substance in itself substantially became another. But there is no [contradiction] in case the very existent (sat) [substance] attains plurality by the limiting adjunct, namely, the connection with many attributes (dharma). And in a smṛti, the Venerable Parāśara says:

* Identity¹¹⁷ of [individual] self with Supreme Self is admitted as real existent (paramārtha), but it is false; for one substance cannot become another. [ViP II. xiv. 26] **[48]**

Or rather¹¹⁸, let the unmanifested (avyakta) have parts in nature (svataḥ sāmśatva). Even then there is no contingency that [we admit] the difference and the non-difference or the whole (avayavin).

[Obj.] If each part respectively produces its own effect in this way, we need not assume the condition being one.

[Ans.] Yes. If we assumed it as the followers of Kapila do, we should be blamed so. The condition of unity, however, understood by the Scriptures teaching the cause [of the world], cannot be the target of the question as to complication (gaurava) of assumption (kalpanā) **[49]**. And it is not meaningless; because in order to refuse those which sublate

¹¹⁵ 17,1–2 et passim. And, as pointed out by commentators, the Buddhist also should have admitted a partial conjunction named nairantarya [25,1–2].

¹¹⁶ 18,1ff.

¹¹⁷ yoga. = tādātmaya or aikya [Viśnucittya ad loc.], abheda [R, K].

¹¹⁸ For fear that vivarta-vāda should be accepted, the author says so [R 48,4–5]. Cf. K 48,12–23.

the Scriptures we can assume its meaning.

[Obj.] Unity is not real existent (vāstavika) because it is based on limiting adjunct (upādhi).

[Ans.] No; because [the assumption that] plural [parts] forming a mass produce unity (ekatva), is simpler (laughava) than [the assumption that] they produce the one [entity] (eka).¹¹⁹ And we will establish it when we refuse the whole (avayava) [other than its parts].¹²⁰

[Obj.] Then, it is mere congregation of atoms admitted by others.

[Ans.] You cannot doubt so. For [triguṇa], which is established by the Scriptures and so on as deprived of smell and taste and touch and other [qualities], not crushing each other, the substratum of three elements (guṇa) called sattva and rajas and tamas, blended each other, and forming subtle substance like five gross elements, has only the non-existence of any nature (svabhāva) of atoms admitted by others; therefore it proves to be an entity completely different [from atoms].

[Obj.] Referring to those who hold the theory of the difference and the difference by limiting adjunct (aupādhika-bhedābhedavāda), the [Śrī-]Bhāshya states that Brahman cannot be cut and so on even though it is connected with limiting adjunct.¹²¹

[Ans.] This statement depends upon the power of the description that Brahman in itself has no part and cannot be cut and so on [50]. Otherwise Brahman in itself would have modifications (vikāra); accordingly there would be no room for the Scriptures which describe Brahman has no modification. Moreover in this case, the contingency that Brahman recollects all happiness and misery belonging to His parts, could not be avoided; because He is omniscient. In the case of [triguṇa], however, there is not mixture of the natures in each modifications fixed according to the partial differences.

By the above-mentioned discussions, the theory that atoms (paramāṇu) are the causes [of the world] is also rejected. For there is no proof of the assumption of an imperceptible atom, other than a floating mote (trasareṇu) shone by a sunbeam through the window.¹²² [On the other hand,] the very [floating motes] are called, according to the difference in size, an atom (paramāṇu), a dyad (dvyaṇuka) or a triad (tryaṇuka) and so

¹¹⁹ “dharmikalpanāto varam dharmakalpanā” [R 49,9].

¹²⁰ 150,7–158,4; esp. .

¹²¹ ŚrīBh I. i. 4 ?.

¹²² It is the smallest perceptible thing or the smallest thing that has largeness (mahattva), and is also called tryaṇuka, an aggregate of three dyads (dvyaṇuka) in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas.

on in the books which can be sources of valid knowledge (pramāṇa). True some regards an atom as imperceptible, but it is not contradictory [to our opinion]; because [floating motes] can be invisible and so on when their color and other [qualities] are not appeared (anudbhava), like subtle substance, that substratum of grasped smell which is led by [the wind] conveying the smell [51]. And subtle substance led by the wind is not accepted even by you as an atom, because you do not admit that an atom can be the substratum of perceptible qualities (guṇa). Therefore neither from perception nor from the Scriptures¹²³ can an atom accepted by you be proved.

[Obj.] But we think the inference as follows: The degree of minute size [or the increase of smallness] (aṅuparimāṇatāratamya¹²⁴) culminates (viśrānti) somewhere [i.e., at an atom (paramāṇu)]; because it is of the degree of size; [52] like the degree of big size [or the increase of bigness, which culminates at something omnipresent (vibhu)].

[Ans.] It is not correct. For only if you say “because it is of degree” [as the reason], this inference has no inconstancy¹²⁵ (vyabhicāra¹²⁶); accordingly the qualifying attribute (viśeṣhaṇa), “in size” has no meaning. [And what is meant by the subject of the inference (paksha)?] (1) If the word “minute (aṅu)” is used in the sense of “atomic size (pārimāṇ alya¹²⁷),” mutual dependence (anyonyāśraya) occurs [because the inference functions only after the subject is established but the subject is established by the very inference]. (2) [If the subject means] “the degree of decrease (apakarsha) of largeness (mahattva),” you admit that it culminates [not at an atom but] at a floating mote. (3) Even if [the subject] is used in the sense of “the degree of decrease of size” in general, its culmination is also possible only at a visible thing¹²⁸ [i.e., a floating mote or triad].

[You may pose another inference: the degree of decrease of (the number of) parts (avayavāpakarshatāratamya) culminates somewhere i.e., at an atom (paramāṇu);

¹²³ E.g. “nityaṃ vibhuṃ sarvagataṃ susūkshmaṃ” [Mu[^]ḍUp I. i. 6] (R).

¹²⁴ aṅuparimāṇapāramya or aṅutvotkarsha (R); aṅutvanishṭho 'pakarshasamānādhikaraṇotkarsha (K).

¹²⁵ For example, jñānaśaktitāratamya terminates somewhere (K).

¹²⁶ It is of two kinds according to the Viśiṣṭādvaita or of three kinds according to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. (1) sādharmaṇa: sādhyābhāvavadvṛttiḥ [TarS §53], pakshasapakshavipakshavṛttiḥ [YMD II. 38]; (2) asādharmaṇa: pakshamātravṛttiḥ [TarS], vipakshasapakshavyāvṛttaḥ [YMD]; (3) anupasaṃhārī: anvayavyatirekadṛṣṭāntarahitaḥ [TarS].

¹²⁷ See VaiSū [Potter 1977: 218 §66], 『十句義論』 [Potter 1977: 276 §4], PDhS [Potter 1977: 291 §86]. “pārimāṇ alyam aṅuparimāṇam” [NySMuk ad v.15].

¹²⁸ Here it is illegible.

because it is degree. But it is not true; because] the culmination of the degree of decrease of parts is also [possible only at a visible thing]. Or rather, let it have no culmination [of the number of parts].

[Obj.] Then, the size of a mountain would be same as that of a mustard and so on, [because everything would be composed of (ārabdha) infinite parts].¹²⁹

[Ans.] Such contingency is avoided by the superiority and the inferiority established by means of valid knowledge [53]. And you also accept the superiority and the inferiority between [the numbers of] that which has higher genus (jāti) and that which has lower, or [the numbers of] a moment, a day, a half-month, a month, a year, four yugas, kalpa and so on, which are not different as to [being composed of] infinite parts.¹³⁰

[Obj.] [Another inference is possible:] for example, [a floating mote (trasareṇu)], which is under the discussion (vipratipanna), is a product of substances being effects [i.e., three dyads (dvyaṅka), composed of two atoms (paramāṅu)] (kāryadravyārabdha¹³¹); because it has bigness (mahattva) and visibility (cākshushatva), or because it has visibility and is substance (cākshushadravyatva).

[Ans.] Such inferences cannot achieve their aim (aprayojaka) [i.e., proving an atom], because they have no sublating (bādhaka) in their counter-example (vipaksha) [i.e., what is not a product of substances being effects].

[Obj.] The superiority as to the visibility of substance¹³² is found in proportion to the superiority as to its bigness¹³³ or the number of its parts: the former superiority is caused by one of the latter two superiority. Therefore without [the bigness or the parts], the visibility cannot exist. [That means there is negative concomitance (vyatirekavyāpti) between the probandum (sādhya) “being composed of parts” or “being a product” and the non-existence of the reason (hetu) “visibility”].

[Ans.] No; [54] because the possibility (yogyatā) [for visibility] is accepted [as caused by only having a visible color (udbhūtarūpatvamātra)] according to our ordinal

¹²⁹ See Kiraṇāvalī [Potter 1977: 592]

¹³⁰ “parajāti means sattā, and aparajāti means dravyatva etc. [The number of] existents, substances, pots etc. are equally infinite; but infinity of substance is superior to that of a pot, infinity of existent is superior to that of substance. In the same way, in a moment and so on, infinity of each preceding one is superior to that of each following one” (R).

¹³¹ = kāryadravyajanya (K).

¹³² dravyacākshushatāprakarsha = dravyaviśayakacākshushajñānanishṭhāvaiśadyātīśaya (K).

¹³³ mahattva is only a dṛshṭānta (R, K).

apprehension (upalambha). If not so, “being a product of big parts (mahāvayavārabdhātva)” also could enter your invariable concomitance (vyāpti); [then, even a dyad would have bigness]. And our opinion is simpler (laughava) [because we accept only having a visible color as the cause of the possibility for visibility and do not assume an invisible dyad etc.].

And [your inference is] merely proving what has already proved (siddhasādhana) by our opinion, because we think even each floating mote and the like, aerial (vāyaviya), fiery (taijasa), watery (āpya), and earthy (pārthiva), is “a product of substances being an effect” in the form of each former element.¹³⁴

[Obj.] I want to prove “the whole (avayavin) [inherent (samaveta)] in effects.”

[Ans.] Even then, you cannot avoid inconstancy (vyabhicāra) by time, which we regard as visible¹³⁵ [but not as the whole]. And for those who accept [a floating mote (trasareṇu)], which is actually seen (paridṛśyamāna), as a minimum entity (paramāṇu), the qualifying attribute (viśeṣhaṇa) “being big (mahattva)” [in the reason (hetu)] is not established [in the subject (paksha) “a minimum floating mote”]; accordingly, the inference is unestablished in respect of itself (svarūpāsiddhi)].

[Obj.] Mere “having visibility and being substance (cākshushadravyatva)” can prove “being big.”

[Ans.] This inference also should be denied in the previous way, [that is, having a visible color (udbhūtarūpatvamātra) alone is admitted as the cause of the possibility (yogyatā) for visibility].

[Obj.] [An atom can be proved as follows:] earthiness (pṛthivītvā) exists in something inherent in an eternal thing [i.e., an earthy atom] (nityasamavetavṛtti); because it is genus (jāti) of [both] a pot and a cloth; like existence (sattā). **[55]**

[Ans.] Wise scholars (nirūpaka) do not count this kind of winding inference among valid inferences. The reasons are as follows:

(1) like the previous one, it has no sublatting (bādhaka) in its counter-example (vipaksha);

(2) due to the lack of something restricting its scope, [the reason] can be excessively applied (atiprasaṃ) [to wrong inference such as:

Earthiness exists in water,

Because it is genus (jāti) of [both] a pot and a cloth,

¹³⁴ The order is: tāmasāhaṃkāra Æ śabda-tamātra Æ ākāśa Æ sparśa-t° Æ vāyu Æ rūpa-t° Æ tejas Æ rasa-t° Æ ap Æ gandha-t° Æ pṛthivī [YMD IV. 31–47].

¹³⁵ YMD V. 9: sha indriyavedyaḥ kāla ity ācāryāḥ.

Like existence (sattā)];

(3) it can be obstructed by the following counter-inference and the like:

Earthiness does not exist in an eternal thing,

Because it is genus (jāti) of earth alone,

Like pot-ness;

(4) what brings to an end (paryavasāna) in the particular intended thing [i.e., an atom], is not established; [accordingly, it can prove anything eternal].

And this inference is merely proving what has already proved (siddhasādhana); because [we] accept that all entities such as pot are resorting to (āśrita) God (īśvara), and [in this case, we] do not accept any other relation [such as] inherence (samavāya).¹³⁶ Even if you want to prove [only] “to exist in eternal things (nityavṛtti),” the same defect [i.e., proving what has already proved (siddhasādhana)] results; since [we] admit that substance having three components (triguṇadravya) is eternal by nature, even if it transforms itself into a pot and so on.

In the same way, whosoever blames the atomic theory makes the objection by the alternative question whether the conjunction (saṃyoga) between atoms producing (ārambhaka) [gross things] is entire (kṛtsna) or partial (pradeśa); [in the former case] they could not produce substance of the size superior to them, [in the latter] they would have divisions (vibhāga) [56].¹³⁷ And the author of the [Śrī-]Bhāshya makes the same objection in the section including the following sūtra:

* And, in the same way as the big and long [triad] from the short [dyad] and the minimum [atom], [other doctrines of the Vaiśeṣika are unsound].¹³⁸ [BrSū II. ii. 10]

It is possible only for the Mādhyāmika [to make this objection], but not [possible] for the other [schools of Buddhism¹³⁹]. That is, the Vaibhāshika and other [namely, the

¹³⁶ Strictly speaking, the second reason is not for siddhasādhana but for sādhyāprasiddha, as K asserts. Noticing this, R explains that samavetatva here means nothing but āśritatva because samavāya is apramāṇika.

¹³⁷ E.g. Potter p.541, summary of Ātmatattvaviveka (by V. Varadachari) §61.

¹³⁸ mahaddīrghavad vā hrasvaparimaṇ alābhyām. “asaṃjasam (sūt.9) iti vartate / vā-śabdaś ca-arthe / hrasvaparimaṇ alābhyām = dvyaṇuka-pramāṇubhy mahaddīrghavat = tryaṇukotpattivādavat, anyac ca tadabhimataṃ sarvam asaṃjasam” [ŚrīBh II. ii. 10; 289,4–290,1].

¹³⁹ “te [saugtāḥ] caturvidhāḥ— kecit [= Vaibhāshikāḥ] pārthivāpyataijasavāyaviyaparamāṇusamghātarūpān bhūtabhautikān bāhyān, cittacaittarūpāṃś cābhyantarān arthān pratyakshānumānasiddhān abhyupayanti / anye [= Sautrāntikāḥ] tu bāhyān arthān sarvān pṛthivyādīn vijñānānumeyān vadanti / apare [= Yogācārāḥ] tu, arthaśūnyam vijñānam eva paramārthasat, bāhyārthās tu svāpnārthakalpāḥ ity āhuḥ / trayo 'py ete svābhyupagataṃ vastu kṣaṇikam ācakshate; uktabhūtabhautikacittacaittavatiriktam ātmākāśādikam svarūpeṇaiva nānumanvate / anye

Sautrāntika], though not admitting the conjunction (saṃyoga) [other than close proximity (nairantarya)] between atoms in gathering together (puñja), should accept whether one atom is covered (āvṛta) by another or not (anāvṛta) depends upon the difference in the delimitations of space (digavacchedabheda) [57].

For those who assert only knowledge [is real] (jñānamātravādin) [i.e., the Yogācāra], the alternative question whether the connection (sambandha) between one knowledge and the form known by it (jñeyākāra) is entire or partial is of the same condition (tadavastha): [that is, if knowledge connected with its object entirely, we could not grasp another object; and if partially, knowledge would have divisions].¹⁴⁰

[Obj.] It is avoidable, because something known is unreal (mithyā).

[Ans.] No, because even as to unreal things an imaginative description (ullekha¹⁴¹) is inevitable.

[Obj.] We accept subtle (sūkshma) perceptible substance [a floating mote (trasareṇu)] as lacking any division (nirvibhāga), [thereby the problem of conjunction is eligible].

[Ans.] Then, the same objection is established as to the conjunction between [a floating mote] and something omnipresent (vibhu) without any division.¹⁴²

[Obj.] But we do not accept omnipresent substance.

[Ans.] Then, [the same objection is established as to the connection] between [two individuals (vyakti)] and genus (sāmānya). Even if you do not accept [genus], [the same objection is established] when conjunction (saṃyoga) or inherence (samavāya) exists in many entities. For there is no rule that this objection relates to substance alone.

[Obj.] Only substance has the fitness for having divisions.

[Ans.] If you admit so, you would rather say [only] substance except something atomic or omnipresent does.

[Obj.] True. Then, how [do you interpret the passage of] the [Śrī-]Bhāshya [58] ?

[Ans.] It intends to deny the assumption of something other than things actually seen. Whosoever assume [a floating mote (trasareṇu)], which is perceived lacking any division (nirvibhāga), has parts (sāvayava), should accept the following invariable rule [=Mādhyāmikāḥ] tu sarvaśūnyatvam eva saṃgirante” [ŚrīBh II. ii. 17; 295,4–9].

¹⁴⁰ Cf. Potter p.542, summary of Ātmatattvaviveka (by V. Varadachari) §62.

¹⁴¹ = jñānasya tadvishayakatva (K).

¹⁴² “uktasūkshmadravyaṇām vibhusaṃyogānabhyupagame sarvamūrtadravysaṃyogitvarūpavibhutvānupapattiprasaṃgena tatsaṃyogasyā"vaśyakatayā” (K R).

(vyāpti): every substance producing [another] substance¹⁴³ [always] produces after making a conjunction dependent on its part (avayavataḥ),¹⁴⁴ and the difference in the delimitations of space (digavacchedabheda) is also [always] dependent on the parts.¹⁴⁵ Consequently the atom admitted and settled by other [schools] cannot be proved. This fact is approved about something atomic, God and so on, which are established by perception and the Scriptures, according to means of valid knowledge [59]. For the same reason, in order to reject the sūtra

*There would be the contingency that the entire [Brahman becomes all the effects]; otherwise the śruti teaching its being without any part, would be stultified,¹⁴⁶ [BrSū II. i. 26]

there is sūtras beginning with

*No, because śrutis say so; for [Brahman] is founded upon the holy word [only].¹⁴⁷ [BrSū II. i. 27]

[Obj.] Then, let it be that only subtle substances as established by perception produce the world.

[Ans.] Not so. For if you admit independent production, it is opposite to the sacred texts (śāstra). If you admit production dependent upon [God], prakṛti is also admitted according to the Scripture¹⁴⁸ (āgama). And there is contradiction in your theory that the phenomenal world [characterized by space (ākāśa)], which must exist earlier

¹⁴³ sarvaṃ dravyaṃ dravyārambhakam... Viraraghavachari's ed. omits dravyaṃ, which remains in K.

¹⁴⁴ dravyārambhakadravyatvaṃ yatra yatra, tatra tatra svāśrayāvachchinnasamyogavattvam iti vā; dravyārambhakasamyogavattvaṃ yatra yatra, tatra tatra svāśrayāvachchinnatvam iti vā vyāptiḥ (K).

¹⁴⁵ yatra yatra vibhinnadiksambandhatvaṃ tatra tatra sāvayavatvam iti vyāptiḥ (K).

¹⁴⁶ kṛtsnaprasaktir niravayavatvaśabdakopo vā. “param brahma kṛtsnam kārya- tvenopayuktam ity abhyupagantavyam / atha cidamśaḥ kṣetrajañnavibhāgavibhaktāḥ, acidamśaś cā "kāśādivibhāgavibhaktā ity ucyate; tadā ... kāraṇabhūtasya brahmaṇo niravayavatvavādināḥ śabdāḥ kupyeyuḥ = bādhitā bhaveyuḥ” [ŚrīBh II. i. 26; (II) 268,1–4].

¹⁴⁷ śrutes tu śabdāmūlatvāt. “tu-śabda uktadoshaṃ vyāvartayati / naivam asañjasam / kutaḥ? śruteḥ — śrutis tāvan niravayavatvaṃ brahmaṇas tato vicitrasargaṃ cā"ha / sraute 'rthe yathāśruti pratipattavyam ity arthaḥ / ... śabdāmūlatvād iti / śabdaikapramāṇakatvena sakaletaravastuvisajātīyatvād asyā'rthasya vicitraśaktiyogo na virudhyate” [ŚrīBh II. i. 27; (II) 268,9–13].

¹⁴⁸ E.g. “avyaktaṃ kāraṇaṃ yat tat pradhānam ṛshisattamaiḥ / procyate prakṛtiḥ sūkshmā nityaṃ sadasadātmakam” (VishPu I. ii. 19), “gaur anādy antavati sā janitī bhūtabhāvinī” (CūlikāUp 5) [Jacob: gaur anādavati sā tu...], “avyaktaṃ kāraṇaṃ yat tan nityaṃ sadasadātmakam” (?).

than four elements [other than space], is produced by them.

[Obj.] The part of four gross elements are called space or sound.

[Ans.] It is abandoned [because even a child can distinguish space from four elements]. **[60]** And the way (prakriyā) of the process of creation that one element becomes material (upādāna) or product (upādeya) mutually, is contradictory to [the Scriptures¹⁴⁹].

[Obj.] There is nothing but four elements.

[Ans.] No, because it is contradictory to the Scriptures.¹⁵⁰

[Obj.] Let it be that floating motes (trasareṇu) themselves have the condition (avasthā) devoid of smell and so on.

[Ans.] If you admit so, in the same way, their turning into [the condition] devoid of any division (avibhāgāpatti¹⁵¹) is also admitted; this is proved to be mūlaprakṛti (primordial cause).

This mūlaprakṛti is that which has each three components equally (samatraiguṇya). According to the slight difference (mātrayā bheda¹⁵²), as [triguṇa is called in other names¹⁵³], four conditions of [mūlaprakṛti], namely, avyakta, akshara, vibhakta[tamas] and avibhaktatamas, are mentioned in the holy texts (āmananti).¹⁵⁴ **[61]** In this regard, Varadanārāyaṇa-bhaṭṭāraka¹⁵⁵ says in the Nyāyasūdarśana¹⁵⁶:

*The authors of smṛtis are of two kinds: some assert avyakta is the cause [of the world], others assert tamas is the cause. The opinion of those who decide on (pary-ava- sō) avyakta, is that varieties of avyakta with a slight difference in their condition are akshara and tamas, and the difference is not noteworthy. [The opinion] of those who

¹⁴⁹ E.g. “ākāśād vāyuh, vāyor agniḥ” (TaittUp II. i. 1).

¹⁵⁰ E.g. “khaṃ vāyur jyotir āpaḥ pṛthivī viśvasya dhāriṇī” (Muṇ Up II. i. 3).

¹⁵¹ = ekatvāvasthāpatti (R).

¹⁵² = alpabheda (K).

¹⁵³ See 41,1–2.

¹⁵⁴ E.g. avyaktam akshare liyate, aksharam tamasi liyate, tamah pare deve ekibhavati [SubālaUp 2]. Sudarśanasūri's Subālopanishadvyākhyāna (not available now and this quotation is the only passage ever known [Singh 129]) illustrates the difference as follows: “(1) avibhakta-tamas is like a seed hidden in a granary, (2) vibhakta-tamas is like a seed sown in mud, (3) akshara is same as a seed which is partially wet and loose connected with water and (4) avyakta is same as a swollen seed” [R 61, 11–13], which is supported by Vyāsārya (?) [K 61, 18–20].

¹⁵⁵ fl. in the last decade of the 12th century [Singh 127].

¹⁵⁶ An exposition of ŚrīBh, published up to the end of I. i. 3. [Biblio 298–301].

decide on *tamas*, is based on the fact that they think much (*urarīkṛtya*) of such [slight] difference. Therefore there is no contradiction between them. [Nyāyasudarśana]

[Obj.] But in the [Śrī-]bhāshya and so on, it is illustrated as to many passages [such as ‘avyaktam akshare liyate’ (SubālaUp 2)] that the word “akshara” read along with “avyakta” denotes a spiritual being (*cetana*).¹⁵⁷

[Ans.] There is not any contradiction in view of the following grounds¹⁵⁸: **[62]**

(1) The author follows the way of the interpretation of others.¹⁵⁹

(2) Even if it undergoes spiritual modifications, the individual self (*jīva*), lacking of modifications by nature, can be denoted by the word “akshara (non-delaying)” because it is said to be created; like this, we can assume the potentiality (*śakti*) of the word “akshara” whose object is other than Brahman to denote the particular condition of non-spiritual entity. In order to teach it, [Rāmānuja says so].

(3) [He says so] with the intention that in this case only the implication that does not abandon [its own meaning] (*ajahallakṣhaṇā*¹⁶⁰) is proper. The reasons are: (a) Though in some [passages] the word “akshara (non-decaying)” denotes a particular [condition of] *prakṛti*, which is decaying (*kshara*), this usage cannot be primary (*mukhya*). (b) There is not the purpose in the implication (*lakṣhaṇā*) by the connection with the decaying (*kshara*) named Brahman. (c) It is proper to teach a particular absorption (*laya*) and so on by the connection with the individual soul, and the absorption of both is described in the passage such as

*These two are absorbed in the highest soul [ViP IV. iv. 39].

1.3 mahat (62,8–66,1)

The mahat (great) is the *triguṇa* qualified by the condition immediately after the condition called *avyakta* and the condition immediately before the condition called *aḥamkāra*. **[63]** Or its definition is being denoted by the word [mahat]. **[65]** As to *aḥamkāra* and other [evolutions], such [definition] is possible.

According to the Sāṃkhya school, mahat is the mental faculty (*vṛtti*) of

¹⁵⁷ The commentators quotes the passage of the ŚrīBh: “‘avyaktam akshare liyate’ (SubālaUp 2) ‘yasyāvyaktaṃ śarīraṃ ... yasyāksharaṃ śarīraṃ’ (ibid. 7) ‘ksharaḥ sarvāṇi bhūtāni kūṭastho ‘ksharaḥ’ (BhG XV. 16) ityādishu pratyagātmany apy aksharaśabdaprayogadarśanāt” [ŚrīBh I. iii. 10; (II) 23,2–4]. Cf. “aksharaśabdanirdiṣṭa kūṭastho ‘citsaṃsargaviyuktaḥ svaṇa rūpeṇāvasthito muktātmā” [GBh XV. 16].

¹⁵⁸ According to the commentator, the latter, the better.

¹⁵⁹ The above-mentined passage of the ŚrīBh is the opinion of the pūrvapakshin.

¹⁶⁰ E.g. “chatriṇo yānti (Men with umbrellas and men without it go).” See TarD §59, NySMuk ad 82ab.

determination (adhyavasāya), that is to say:

*Buddhi [=mahat] is determination. [SK 23]

But it is not true, because determination is the attribute (dharma) of ātman (the self).

[Obj.] [The definition¹⁶¹] of mahat is being the efficient cause (nimitta) of determination in general (°mātra); and only by this fact (tāvataiva) it can be the object of the word “buddhi,” “adhyavasāya,” etc.

[Ans.] Even if you conclude so (yadi param¹⁶²), being the efficient cause of [determination] in general can not be the definition; because [this definition] has so wide that it is applicable (ativyāpti) [even to time or adṛṣṭa], and because any secondary (avāntara) special character (viśeṣa¹⁶³) [that can distinguish mahat from following principles] is not ascertained. For those who ascertain them, however, it also could be the definition.

For the same reason, the definitions “being the cause of the merit (dharma) and the demerit (adharma)” and the like are refuted. [66]

[Mahat] is of three kinds: sāttvika, rājasa and tāmasa. Here each designation is based on the difference in part by the preponderance (unmesha) of each component (guṇa).

1.4 ahaṃkāra (65,3–68,2)

Ahaṃkāra (I-ness) is the triḡuṇa qualified by the condition immediately before indriyas. Here also the definition by the Sāṃkhya school, that is,

*ahaṃkāra is abhimāna (ego) [SK 24],

can be denied as in the previous case [for the reason that it is the attribute of ātman]. Moreover, it is denoted by the word “ahaṃkāra” only because it is the cause to make (karaṇa) the notion (bhāva¹⁶⁴) that one's body, which is not ātman, is “I (aham),” but not because it is the principle called “I” (ahamartha¹⁶⁵).¹⁶⁶ For the inward (pratyac) self is

¹⁶¹ According to K, some MSS add “lakṣhaṇam.”

¹⁶² “yadi param” is often used by Yāmuna (N) and means “yadi nirvahaṇīyam..., tarhi...” (Vīraraghavachari's footnote 2).

¹⁶³ The reading of U “vishaya” is apparently misprint.

¹⁶⁴ ahambhāva = ahambuddhi (R, K).

¹⁶⁵ “na jñaptimātram ātmā, api tu jñātaivā'hamarthaḥ” [ŚrīBh I. i. 1; (1) 146], “aham ity eva pratyagātmano svarūpam” [ib. (1) 172,8f.]. See also NySi 204. [ViśKośa q.v.].

¹⁶⁶ In this respect, the commentators quote the passage of the ŚrīBh: “sa tv

[the principle called “I”]. And it is not contradictory to the description that [ahaṃkāra] is to be abandoned,¹⁶⁷ because ahaṃkāra in the sense of “abhimāna,” synonymous with arrogance (garva) which causes to slight superior persons, is described so¹⁶⁸ [67].

As in the previous case, [ahaṃkāra] is also of three kinds: [sāttvika, rājasa and tāmasa]. Among them, from sāttvika-[ahaṃkāra] indriyas are generated; from tāmasa-[ahaṃkāra] subtle elements (tanmātra) of sound (śabda); rājasa-[ahaṃkāra] assists both [generation]. Even in the case of tāmasa-[ahaṃkāra] and rājasa-[ahaṃkāra], [the above-mentioned definition] is not of too narrow application (avyāpti), because, [though either are not the cause of indriyas], to be immediately before indriyas in general (°mātra) is accepted in both. Each mode¹⁶⁹ of the relationship of the cause and the effect in three [ahaṃkāra]¹⁷⁰ is also the definition of the three respectively.

The king Bhoja,¹⁷¹ however, says:

*This ahaṃkāra is of three kinds: living (jīvana), activity (saṃrambha) and arrogance (garva). Because of the mixture of this being [ahaṃkāra], object gets to be used practically (vyavahāratām eti).

According to the difference among sāttvika, rājasa and tāmasa, further three kinds are born. And it breathes (sam-ud-śvas) by the name of tajjasa, vaikārika and bhūtādi.¹⁷²

Among them, from the tajjasa manas is generated; from the vaikārika eyes are generated; from the bhūtādi subtle elements (tanmātra) [are generated]. That is the creation of them from it. [Tattvaparakāśikā¹⁷³]

[68] In this respect, the parts contradictory to [our opinion]¹⁷⁴ should not be respected anātmani dehe 'hambhāvakaraṇaheturvenā'haṃkāra ity ucyate / asyāhaṃkāraśabdasya, abhūtatadbhāve Cvi-pratyayam utpādyā vyutpattir drasṭavyā” [ŚrīBh I. i. 1; (1) 173,1–2].

¹⁶⁷ E.g. “ahaṃkāraṃ balaṃ darpaṃ kāmaṃ krodhaṃ parigrahaṃ / vimucya nirmamaḥ śānto brahmabhūyāya kalpate” [BhG XVIII. 53].

¹⁶⁸ Cf. “āyam eva tv ahaṃkāra utkṛṣṭajanāvamānahetur garvāparanāmā śāstreshu bahuśaḥ heyatayā pratipādyate” [ŚrīBh I. i. 1; (1) 173,3].

¹⁶⁹ That is, sāttvika-ahaṃkāra = indriyakāraṇatva, tāmasa-a° = tanmātrakāraṇatva, rājasa-a° = ubhayānugrahakāraṇatva.

¹⁷⁰ ...kāryakāraṇaprakāram (Bv.) would be the better reading, N said.

¹⁷¹ Probably the same person as the author of the Rājāvarttika on the Yogasūtra, fl. in the 11th century [Dasgupta HIPh V 159].

¹⁷² Cf. “vaikārikas tajjaso bhūtādir iti trividho 'haṃkāraḥ / sa ca kramāt sāttviko rājasas tāmasas ca” [VAS §57; 104,14f.].

¹⁷³ The work is referred to by Mādhava in his Sarvadarśanasamgraha, chap. 7: Śaiva-darśana. Dasgupta shows its contents in his HIPh V 159–72.

¹⁷⁴ That is, (1) the classification based upon jīvana etc., (2) that manas and other indriyas have respectively each own cause, (3) that tanmātra is the product of bhūtādi.

because it is based on the heterodox (bāhya) scriptures of the Śaiva sect. In the same way, depending upon the [Vishṇu-]Purāṇa and so on by the Venerable Parāśara and others, which are the most authoritative¹⁷⁵ (pramāṇatama), the descriptions of other Purāṇas should be justified (nirvāhya). And the extreme contradictions should be ignored.

1.5 indriya (68,3–87,4)

1.5.1 The definition of indriya (68,4–69,2)

Indriya (faculty) is that which is other than prāṇa and other [vital air] and is competent for each particular effect as the operation (vyāpāra) delimited (avacchinna) by the particular part of a body such as a heart, ears and eyes.

*The substance which is not a body but held by the vital air and supports the self (purusha), is indriya, [?]

says Varadavishṇu-miśra. The definition of the Sāṃkhya and other schools that indriya has sātत्वika-ahaṃkāra as its material cause (upādāna)¹⁷⁶ is not correct because it is too narrow to be applicable (avyāpti) to indriya which is not derived from prakṛti (aprākṛta) [69]. And the [definitions] asserted by the Vaiśeṣhika and other schools such as

[Indriya] is that which is the means (sādhana) of direct knowledge (sākshātpramiti) only if it is united with a body but which is not perceptible, [or] that which the means of direct experience (sākshātkāra) [Tārkikarakshā v. 28¹⁷⁷]

are untenable for the reason that it is too narrow to be applicable (avyāpti) to karma-indriyas (the faculties of actions) and so on. And it will be explained that speech (vāc) and the like are indriyas.

1.5.2 The divisions of indriyas (69,4–70,4)

Indriya is of two kinds: prākṛta (derived from prakṛti or material) and aprākṛta (not derived from prakṛti or immaterial). This distinction depends on whether it has pure sattva (śuddhasattva) or not (śuddhasattva). According to some teachers,¹⁷⁸ there is the distinction between prākṛta and aprākṛta even in avyakta, mahat and ahaṃkāra [70].

The definition of prākṛta-indriya (indriya derived from prakṛti) is being produced

¹⁷⁵ The commentators refer to the Śrutaparakāśikā.

¹⁷⁶ The translator has not traced the exact source. Cf. SK 25: sātत्वika ekādaśakaḥ [indriyagaṇaḥ] pravartate vaikṛtād ahaṃkārat [= sātत्वika-ahaṃkārat].

¹⁷⁷ According to the quotation in Nyāyakośa, q.v. [142,15]. The work is written by Bharadarāja (12c), and summarized in Potter 629ff, esp. 636.

¹⁷⁸ Some hold that there are the twenty-four principles including mahat and other intermediate principles even in the nityavibhūti; see chap.4, 389,3.

along with subtle elements of sound (śabda-tanmātra), having sāttvika-ahaṃkāra as its material cause (upādāna) and so on.

And further, indriya is of two kinds: the faculty of knowledge (jñānendriya) and the faculty of action (karmendriya).

1.5.3 jñāna-indriyas (70,5–81,1)

1.5.3.1 jñāna-indriyas are six including manas (70,5–71,1)

The faculty of knowledge (jñānendriya) is the indriya being capable of spreading (prasaraṇa) knowledge. It is of six kinds according to the difference among manas (mental faculty), the faculty of hearing (śrotra) and the like. And such distinction has explained by Bhaṭṭa-Parāśara-pāda in his Tattvaratnākara beginning with

*And it is of six kinds,
and ending with

*Manas is internal. [Tattvaratnākara]

The Sāṃkhya and other schools assert that manas is included in the faculties of action because all activities presuppose the manas.¹⁷⁹ That is to say:

*The faculties of perception (buddhīndriya) are said to be sight (cakshus), hearing (śrotra), smell (ghrāṇa), taste (rasanā) and touch (tvac). They say the faculties of action are speech (vāc), prehension (pāṇi), walking (pāda), excretion (pāyu) and generation (upastha).¹⁸⁰

Manas belongs to both. [SK 26–27a]

It is not right, because only through knowledge [manas] can be the cause of activities. Moreover, if something were [the faculty of action] only because [activities presuppose it], even eyes and the like would be so. True in some cases¹⁸¹ there is practical usage that [manas is] the faculty of action, but it is only figurative (aupacārika). Actions (karma) are classified into mental (mānasa), lingual (vācika) and physical (kāyika); but it is because the word is used for the knowledge in the form of pure and impure will. Therefore the faculties of knowledge are but six.

Among them, the varieties of the prākṛta are as follows.

1.5.3.2 manas (71,2–72,1)

¹⁷⁹ “cakshurādīnām vāgādīnām ca monodhishṭhānām eva svasvavishayeshu pravṛtteḥ” [Tattvakaumudī on SK 27].

¹⁸⁰ Vācaspati reads 26cd: vākpāṇipādapāyūpasthāni karmendriyāṇy āhuḥ (underlined reading = U's reading in parenthesis).

¹⁸¹ K quotes the passage of Yājñavalkyasmṛti.

The definition of *prākṛta-manas* is, not being pure *sattva*, being *indriya* common to five kinds of objects, being *indriya* which is the instrument (*karaṇa*) of memory (*smaraṇa*) and so on.

And it is located only in the part of a heart. Even for other *indriyas*, the place of the root (*kanda*) is the part of a heart, but they respectively exist even in other places. Generally the [individual] self also exists in [the part of a heart], as is explained in the [Śrī-]Bhāshya :

*[The individual soul] exists in a particular place which is the root of all *indriyas*; accordingly, it cannot settle (*ava- sthā*) in the eye. [ŚrīBh I. ii. 18; 314,4–5]

Manas is the one and only internal organ. Only through its operation (*vyāpāra*), will (*saṃkalpa*), determination (*adhyavasāya*) and others are generated; hence they are not other kinds of internal organ, as is explained in the [Śrī-]Bhāshya :

**Manas* itself is designated by the words *buddhi*, *ahaṃkāra* and *citta* according to the difference in function, namely, *adhyavasāya* (determination), *abhimāna* (ego) and *cintā* (thinking). [ŚrīBh II. iv. 5; 391,18–392,1]

And further, the author of the [Brahma-]sūtra has illustrated this point as the example as to *prāṇa*:

* [The *prāṇa*] is designated as having five-fold function like the *manas*. [BrSū II. iv. 11]

Therefore, what is asserted by the Sāṃkhya and other schools¹⁸²:

*The internal organ is of three kinds: [*buddhi*, *ahaṃkāra* and *manas*] [SK 33] and the like are refuted [72].

1.5.3.3 śrotra

(72,2–74,3)

The *prākṛta-śrotra* (the faculty of hearing derive from *prakṛti*) is the *indriya* capable of grasping only sound out of five [kinds of object] such as sound.

It exists, in the case of men and the like, in the [part] delimited by the orifice (*śashkulī*) of the ear. In the case of a snake (*dvijihva*), however, it exists in the eye, as [Nāthamuni] has explained in the eighth section (*adhikaraṇa*) of the chapter on organs (*karaṇa-pāda*) in his *Nyāyatattva* :

*There is the restricted that the eye of snakes is the faculty of hearing (*śravaṇa*). [Nyāyatattva] and so on.

¹⁸² That is, the Advaita-Vedānta School, according to N. See, however, *Vedāntaparibhāṣā* I. 58: “*vṛttibhedena ekam api antaḥkaraṇam mana iti buddhir iti ahaṃkāra iti cittam iti ca "khyāyate."*”

[Obj.] But [Parāśara-bhaṭṭa] has said in his Tattvaratnākara:

*The substratum of these [indriyas] are the orifice of the ear, the body, the eyeball (nayanagolaka), the tongue and the nose [respectively]. [Tattvaratnākara].

[Ans.] It should be regard as mostly the case (prāyika).

[Obj.] [Some texts] assert that [the faculty of hearing] is born from ether (nābhṣa)¹⁸³ or that its material is direction (dik).¹⁸⁴

[Ans.] It can be justified (nirvāhya) by [the fact] that [gross elements] nourish (āpyāyanatva¹⁸⁵) [the indriyas],¹⁸⁶ because there is the statement which cannot be explained otherwise (ananyathāsiddha) that [the faculty of hearing] is born from ahaṃkāra¹⁸⁷ [73].

[Obj.] In the fifth section (adhikaraṇa) of the chapter on organs (karaṇa-pāda) [in the Nyāyatattva], however, it is said that the faculty (śakti) of sight (netra) and the faculty of hearing (śrotra) and so on are composed of [fire (tejas), whose attribute (dharma) is] light (āloka), and of [ether (ākāśa), whose attribute is] sound (śabda). And in the seventh section, the passage beginning with

*The indriya is the subtle evolution of the food (anna),¹⁸⁸ [Tattvaratnākara] and the passage beginning with

*because the faculties of action are the evolutions of the food [Tattvaratnākara] make us understand that the indriyas are made of gross elements (bhūta).

[Ans.] It also can be justified (nirvāhya) with the intention that [these elements] nourish (āpyāyana) [the indriyas]. For in the Vedārthasaṃgraha the statement of the

¹⁸³ E.g. “śabdaḥ śrotraṃ tathā khādi trayam ākāśasambhavam...” (Mahābhārata [Mokshadharma] XII.).

¹⁸⁴ E.g. “...diśaḥ śrotraṃ bhūtvā karṇau prāviśan” (AitareyaUp I. ii. 4).

¹⁸⁵ The reading is supported by R. Varanasi ed. and Madras (1934) ed. read āpyāyitatva, which is supported by K.

¹⁸⁶ Cf. VAS §57 quoted afterwards.: “indriyāṇām āhaṃkārikāṇām bhūtais cāpyāyanam Mahābhārata ucyate” (105,3f.).

¹⁸⁷ E.g. “tajasānindriyāṇy āhur devā vaikārikā daśa / ekādaśaṃ manas cātra devā vaikārikāḥ smṛtāḥ” (VishP I. ii. 47). According to Rāmānuja's commentary on this passage in VAS §57 [104,14–105,3] and the Vishṇucittiya [7a, 6ff.], the translation is as follows: Some say that the indriyas are [born from] the rājasa-ahaṃkāra (=tājasa); [others say that] the ten indriyas (=deva) and the eleventh manas are [born from] the sāttvika-ahaṃkāra (=vaikārika). On this point [our opinion is that] the indriyas (=deva) are said to be [born from] the sāttvika-ahaṃkāra (=vaikārika). The last portion (atra devāḥ...) is the proof for the ananyathāsiddhatva according to R and K. However the interpretation of this passage is not ananyathāsiddha at all; see van Buitenen's translation of VAS p.224 n.248.

¹⁸⁸ Here anna means bhūta. Cf. ŚrīBh I. ii. 23 (comm. on Muṇ akaUp I. i. 8): adyata ity annam; viśvasya bhokṣṭvargasya bhogyabhūtaṃ bhūtasūkshmam avyākṣtam... [329,7–8].

smṛti [i.e., ViP I. ii. 47] is also interpreted in the same way. That is, from:

*Those who know the Veda says the eleven indriyas are from the sāttvika (vaikārika°) ahaṃkāra ...[VAS §57; 104,10f.]

up to:

The Mahābhārata¹⁸⁹ says the indriyas, being from ahaṃkāra,¹⁹⁰ is nourished by the elements (bhūta). [VAS §57; 105,3f.]

[Obj.] [The following inferences prove that the indriyas are made of the elements:]
 (a) The faculty of hearing (śrotra) is made of the elements (bhautika), because it is an external organ (bāhyendriya), [like the faculty of sight (cakshus)];
 (b) Ether (ākāśa) produces the indriya [i.e., śrotra], because it is an element, [like earth];
 (c) Sound is grasped by the indriya which has the same quality (guṇa) as it, because it is the quality causing the regularity (vyavasthā) of external organs, [like color (rūpa)];
 (d) The faculty of hearing (śrotra) has the same quality as the quality grasped by it, because it is an external organ, [like the faculty of sight]; and the like [74].

[Ans.] To this objection, the following refutations can be said: [the instance (dṛshṭānta) in the inference (a)] is deprived of the probandum (sādhyā) because the faculty of sight will be explained as not to be made of the elements (abhautika),¹⁹¹ they are sublated by the śrutis, and so on.

(11) Sound is the attribute (dharma) of the element [i.e., ether]; and [the faculty of] hearing (śruti) is from the sāttvika-ahaṃkāra (vaikārika). Accordingly, the proper (yogya) [sound], whose substratum is [ether] conjunct with [the faculty of hearing] (saṃyuktanilaya), is apprehended by [the faculty of hearing]¹⁹² // 11 //

We will put down (śam) some controversies (vivāda) concerning sound whether it is dravya or adravya, whether the faculty of hearing goes or sound comes and the like in [the chapter on] adravya.

¹⁸⁹ Sudarśanasūri's Tātparyadīpikā [118,15ff.] has not mentioned which passage of the Mahābhārata is indicated here; it is maybe the same one as quoted in R and K, the dialogue between Bhṛgu and Bharadvāja from the Mokshadharmā [Cr. ed. XII. 176–80]: “āpyāyyante ca te nityaṃ dhātavas tais tu pañcabhiḥ.” Van Buitenen refers to XII. 194. 5ff. without mentioning the source [1956: 224 n.250].

¹⁹⁰ āhaṃkārikāṇām indriyāṇām. Van Buitenen's ed. of VAS reads indriyāṇām āhaṃkārikāṇām.

¹⁹¹ 76,10–80,1.

¹⁹² “āhāṃkārikaśrotrasaṃyuktākāśādinisṭho yogya-śabdaḥ (=saḥ) saṃyuktāśritatvarūpapratyāsattiyā śrotrendriyeṇa (=tena) gr̥hyata itīty arthaḥ” (R K). Varanasi ed. reads yogaḥ for yogyaḥ in a parenthesis. In this case, the translation of pāda cd could be: the connection (yoga = saṃbandha) is saṃyuktāśraya (saṃyuktanilaya); [sound] is apprehended by it.

1.5.3.4 tvac etc.

(74,4–76,9)

If you substitute the word (a) ‘only touch (sparśa)’ and so on, [i.e., (b) ‘only color (rūpa),’ (c) ‘only taste (rasa)’ and (d) ‘only smell (gandha)’], respectively for the word ‘only sound’ in the above-mentioned definition of the faculty of hearing (śrotra), [“the indriya capable of grasping only sound out of five kinds of object such as sound”], you can get the definitions of (a) the faculty of touch (tvac) and the others, [i.e., (b) the faculty of sight (cakshus), (c) the faculty of taste (rasana) and (d) the faculty of smell (ghrāṇa)] [75].

Among them, the substratum of the faculty of touch is the whole body. It is said in the eighth section (adhikaraṇa) of the chapter on organs (karaṇa-pāda) [in the Nyāyatattva]:

*The degree of the grasping touch [varies] according to the difference in the part [of the body]; and in the part of nails, teeth, hair and so on, touch is not grasped because of the very low degree of the prāṇa.¹⁹³ [Nyāyatattva]

[The faculty of touch] properly (yathāyogyam) grasp the four elements such as air (vāyu) [other than ether] by the conjunction (saṃyogena). [The adravya] such as touch [are grasped] as existing in [the dravya] conjunct with [the faculty of touch] (saṃyuktanishṭhatayā).

The substrata of the faculty of sight (cakshus) and other [faculties, i.e., the faculty of taste (rasana) and the faculty of smell (ghrāṇa)] are respectively the eyeball (nayanagolaka), the palate (tālu) and the nose (nāsa). In this respect, it is said that the nose of an elephant is [one of] its hands, accordingly the substratum of the faculty of hearing is same as that of the faculty of prehension (pāṇi). It is explained [in the chapter on organs (karaṇa-pāda) of the Nyāyatattva¹⁹⁴]:

*Only an elephant can grasp smell by the hand [Nyāyatattva] and so on. The above-mentioned regulation as to the part of each indriya is mostly the case (prāyaśaḥ) only in moving animals.

The faculty of sight grasp the four elements other than air (vāyu),¹⁹⁵ as [in the case of the faculty of touch, by the conjunction]. Color and so on also, as in the case of touch, [are grasped as existing in the dravya conjunct with the faculty of sight]

¹⁹³ Nevertheless the prāṇa exists in them. See “na ca keśanakhādishu prāṇavyāptir nāstīti śaṃkhyam; Nyāyatattva-śāstre prāṇavyāpteh pratipāditatvāt” [R 75,12f K].

¹⁹⁴ According to the pramāṇa-akāra of U.

¹⁹⁵ Even ākāśa can be grasped by the cakshus. See 94,6ff.

(saṃyuktanishṭhatayā). In grasping something far away, the connection (sambandha) [between the faculty of sight and its object] is established in view of the travel (prasaraṇa) of the ocular beam (mahas); it is explained in detail (prapañcita) in the second section (adhikaraṇa) of the chapter on organs (karaṇa-pāda) [in the Nyāyatattva]. And in grasping a reflected image (pratibimba), [the connection is] based on that the ocular beam reflected by the bright (svaccha) substance travels in the contrary direction, as is said the prima facie view in the section (adhikaraṇa) on delusion [in the chapter on organs (karaṇa-pāda) (?) of the Nyāyatattva¹⁹⁶] [76]. Our experience (darśana) prove that glass (sphatika) and the like have the structure (saṃsthāna) fit for the penetration of light such as the ocular beam; that is why everyone can grasp something screened off (vyavahita) by glass. The faculty of sight anointed with a magic eyewash (añjana) can grasp a jewel and so on [concealed in the earth], because the ocular beam purified by it can penetrate the earth and so on.

Now the faculty of taste (rasana) and the faculty of smell (ghrāṇa) grasp taste and smell respectively as existing in [the dravya] conjunct with [it]. And it is said in the Tattvaratnākara [of Parāśara-bhaṭṭa] that the connection [between an indriya and its object] is of two kinds:

*In this respect, the elders had known that a contact [between an indriya and its object] (sannikarshaṇa) is [of two kinds only, that is,] conjunction (saṃyoga) and existing in something conjunct [with the indriya] (saṃyuktāśrayaṇa). Let observe respectively in this way.¹⁹⁷ [Tattvaratnākara]

In this way, the manas, the faculty of touch (sparśa) and the faculty of sight (āloka) can grasp both dravya and adravya; the faculty of hearing, the faculty of taste and the faculty of smell can only adravya. Or rather, all indriyas can grasp both dravya and adravya, because they grasp the entity (vastu) qualified by the present time, as is said by Śrī-Vishṇucitta-ārya in his Prameyasamgraha in refuting [the theory] that [only] pure existence (sanmātra) is perceptible:

*Time is included in all the cognitions (pratīti) because it is the attribute of [all] entities; accordingly, it cannot have any independent form (pṛthagrūpavat¹⁹⁸). [Prameyasamgraha]

¹⁹⁶ Mesquita points out the similarity of this content and the passage of ŚrīBh I. i. 1: (2) 36,2f. See Erkenntnis, S.252.

¹⁹⁷ Also cited in NyP 74,6. Cf. YMD I. 15.

¹⁹⁸ When the same passage is cited again [96,1f.], the reading is: °rūpavattva. The comments here are: svātantryeṇa kālo na pratīta ity arthaḥ (R), pratyakśanirūpitamukhyaviśeshyatvaṃ nety arthaḥ (K). Cf. the comments there.

1.5.3.5 Composition of indriyas

(76,10–80,1)

By the way, the Vaiśeṣhika and other schools assert:

Indriyas such as (a) the faculty of touch, [(b) the faculty of sight, (c) the faculty of taste and (d) the faculty of smell] are composed of elements such as (a) air, [(b) fire, (c) water and (d) earth] respectively;

Because they respectively manifest (abhivyañjaka) only (a) touch, (b) color, (c) taste and (d) smell out of [five kinds of object] such as sound;

(a) Like the wind, which manifests the coolness of sweat, (b) Like the light of a lamp, (c) Like water in teeth, [which manifests the taste of something entering through the teeth], (d) ghee, which manifest the smell of saffron [77].

[Ans.] In these [inferences], which is meant by “manifest,” (1) to be the means par excellence (karaṇa¹⁹⁹) for the manifestation, (2) to be the auxiliary (anugrahika) to [the means par excellence],²⁰⁰ (3) to be a cause in general or (4) to be the indriya for it?

(1) and (2) are incorrect. For, in the case of (1), if you intend [the probandum (sādhyā)] whose counter-correlatives (pratiyogin) are all the causes other than itself is the means par excellence, the instance would be deprived of the reason (sādhnavikara) [because it cannot be the means par excellence then]; or, if you intend [the instance (dṛṣhānta)] is the means par excellence, [the probandum] would be unestablished in respect of itself (svārūpāsiddhi). [In the case of (2), if the probandum is the auxiliary to the means par excellence, the instance is the means par excellence; accordingly the instance would be deprived of the reason. And if the instance is the auxiliary to the means par excellence, the probandum is the means par excellence; accordingly, the probandum would be unestablished in respect of itself].

(3) is also incorrect, because [the inference] would be inconstancy (anaikāntika) in view of the substratum of the indriya or something to purify it, [which is one of the cause of the sight but is not composed of fire].

(4) is incorrect too, because [the instance is] deprived of the reason.

And all alternatives are sublated by the Scriptures, [which teach indriyas are derived from ahaṃkāra]. This sublation (bādha) is also sublation by what make itself understood (dharmigrāhaka). That is to say, without the Scriptures indriyas, which is something different from the eyeball, could not be established. Even being dependent

¹⁹⁹ = sākshātkāranirūpitasādhakatamatvam (K). See Pāṇini I. iv. 42: sādhatamam karaṇam.

²⁰⁰ = karaṇanishṭhasāmarthyasampādakatvam (K).

on a certain instrumental cause (karaṇa) can prove only an instrumental cause in general, but not [indriyas, which is something] different from [the eyeball] **[78]**.

[Obj.] [A blind man], even though the eyeball etc. have no defect, is deprived of the effect [i.e., seeing]; thereby [indriyas, which is something] different from [the eyeball], is assumed.

[Ans.] No; because a very small defect [in the eyeball exists but] is hardly seen as [the defect of] a seed smelt by a rabbit.²⁰¹

[Obj.: The eyeball is not what is effective only when reached (prāpyakāri), but indriya is so; accordingly indriya named cakshus is assumed].

[Ans.] Particular parts of the earthy (pārthiva) eyeball could spread out and connect with the object as in the case of spreading fragrance; therefore there is no contradiction to its effectiveness only when reached.

Therefore when the subject of an inference is that which is proved by the affirmation and negation (anvaya-vyatireka²⁰²) [i.e., the eyeball which is known as earthy] or that which is proved by the Scriptures [i.e., indriya known as derived from ahaṃkāra], it is inevitable that [the probandum, i.e., to be composed of fire,] sublated by the means of valid knowledge which makes [indriya] itself understood (grāhaka-pramāṇa) .

[Obj.] [The indriya other than the earthy eyeball is proved by following inference:] Perception (sākshātkāra) of color which is born when light does not exist [i.e., perception of color in darkness], has the instrumental cause named fire;

Because it is perception of color;

Like perception of color born when light does exist.

[Ans.] This inference is also incorrect; because it proves what has been already proved (siddhasādhana) in view of fire [in our opinion], which is [the cause of perception] as what nourishes (āpyāyaka) [visual organ]. Even if fire were the cause [of the perception], there would be no restriction that it is the faculty of sight (cakshus); because not only indriya but also a certain external fire whose color and touch is not manifested (anudbhūta), for example, hotness in summer, is also possible.

[Obj.] Then what we want to prove is [fire] whose color is manifested.

[Ans.] In this case, indriya accepted by you also would have manifested color; thereby, darkness itself could not exist. **[79]** And [the inference] is inconstancy (anaikāntya) in view of the knowledge of God, [which has the perception of color but which does not have the cause because it is eternal].

²⁰¹ A seed smelt by a rabbit cannot sprout anymore (K).

²⁰² golakasattve cākshushajñānam, tadabhāve cākshushajñānābhāvaḥ (K).

[Obj.] Then we add a qualifying attribute (viśeṣhaṇa) “non-eternal” [to the reason].

[Ans.] It is still inconstancy in view of the perception in deep sleep or the perception of yogin.

[Obj.] Then we add “being other than all grounds for inconstancy.”

[Ans.] How skilful in logic you are!

In the same way, defects in other inferences can be guessed respectively [80].

1.5.3.6 aprākṛta

(80,1–81,1)

Regarding [aprākṛta-indriyas] such as aprākṛta-śrotra, the restriction that one organ assists only its own object is not persisting; because the liberated and God, though they do not expand their knowledge through the instrumental causes, are embodied according to their free will. Their definitions are [denoted] by a particular part which is their own substratum.²⁰³

The Buddhists, however, assert that the Enlightened (buddha) knows everything through his eyes. It is not true; because there is not any means of valid knowledge to show such omniscience (sārvajñya) as accepted by you.

[Buddhist] [We have an inference as follows:]

The degree of the excellence (prakarśa) in eyes culminates (viśrānti) somewhere [i.e., in the eyes of the Buddha];

Because it is of the degree of excellence.

[Ans.] Such an inference is also [incorrect]. For all the excellence of eyes is possible only in the range of the objects grasped by them; accordingly, eyes cannot have the culmination as to taste, which violates the range [81].

1.5.4 karma-indriya

(81,1–87,4)

Now the faculty of action (karmendriya) [are explained].

Its definition is being the cause of any one action (kriyā) out of pronunciation and so on. It is of five kinds: the faculty of speech and so on.

(1) The faculty of speech (vāk) is the indriya being the means of pronouncing (uccāraṇa) syllables (varṇa). And it exists in eight parts of the body: the heart, the throat, the root of the tongue, the palate, the lip, the nose and the head.²⁰⁴ Birds other

²⁰³ “karṇaśashkulyadhishṭhānatvaṃ śrotrendriyasya lakṣhaṇam / nayanagolakādhishṭhānatvaṃ cakshurindriyasya, ityādikam drashtavyam” (R K).

²⁰⁴ Cf. “ashtau sthānāni varṇānām uraḥ kaṇṭhaḥ śiras tathā / jihvāmūlaṃ ca dantāś ca nāsika-ushṭhau ca tālu ca //” (Pāṇini-śikshā quoted in R and K).

than a parrot have no ability of pronouncing syllables, because the configuration (saṁsthāna) of their each unseen power (adr̥ṣṭa) does not assist it. Even for parrots, their pronunciations are various in view of the variety of their [unseen power].

(2) The faculty of prehension (pāṇi) is the indriya being the means of manual work (śilpa). And it exists in the hands and so on in the case of human being and the like. In the case of an elephant, it exists in the nose.

[Obj.] It should be admitted to exist in the palate or the foot, because it is seen that even the palate or the foot can do a manual work such as tying a pearl or writing (lipikaraṇa) in view of the hard training (abhyāsapāṭava).

[Ans.] True, it exists a little in both of them; because there is no contradiction in view of the difference in part²⁰⁵ and because the faculty of sight or the faculty of touch is seen abiding the part pervaded by another indriya, [for example, the eyeball has not only cakshus but also tvak].

(3) The faculty of movement (pāda) is the indriya being the means of walking (saṁcaraṇa). And it exists in the feet and so on in the case of human being and the like. In the case of snakes and birds, however, it exists in the side of the chest and so on. It is explained in the eighth section (adhikaraṇa) of the chapter on organs (karaṇa-pāda) [in Nāthamuni's Nyāyatattva]:

*Snakes do not have the faculty of action (karmendriya) named pāda and go with the chest. Their ability to move is on the chest. That is why they are called “that which goes with the chest (uraga²⁰⁶)” or “that which does not go with the feet (pannaga²⁰⁷).” [Nyāyatattva]

Here “the faculty of action named pāda” a metaphor to denote a particular part, [i.e., the feet] [82]. For the indriya itself cannot be negated because every living beings have eleven indriyas. And the various configurations [i.e., limbs of the body] help the [faculty of movement] become the cause of moving in the earth, water, the sky and so on, because the affirmation and negation (anvaya-vyatireka) is seen in the case of [a yogin's] entrance into other's body such as birds', [that is, if he enters birds' body he can fly, but if he does not he cannot].

(4) The faculty of excretion (pāyu) is the indriya being the means of abandoning

²⁰⁵ virodhābhābhāvād deśabhedena. According to R, some MSS reads deśabhede, which means pradeśaviśeṣa. Anyway, the word is connected with the previous virodhābhāva.

²⁰⁶ urasā gacchantīti ura-gāḥ.

²⁰⁷ padbhyāṁ na gacchantīti pan-na-gāḥ (K).

dung and the like (malādityāga). And it exists in various parts of the body. In the case of a particular bird, it exists in the mouth. It is also explained in the eighth section (adhikaraṇa) of the same [chapter on organs (karaṇa-pāda) in the Nyāyatattva]:

*For example, a bat excretes its ordure and urine through the mouth. [Nyāyatattva]

(5) The faculty of generation (upastha) is the indriya being the means of particular enjoyment (ānandaviśeṣa). And it exists in the penis and so on.

1.5.5 Some aspects of indriyas (82,6–86,11)

1.5.5.1 The number of indriyas (82,6–83,1)

By the way, those who do not accept the karmendriyas cannot accept the jñānendriyas, because the reason (tarka) and the Scriptures [to prove them] are same in the both cases. That is, as in the case of the faculty of sight and the eyeball,²⁰⁸ even the defects of the feet and so on, a certain particular subtle defect prevents from walking and so on. In the conclusion of the section which determine the number of [indriyas],²⁰⁹ the [Śrī-]Bhāshya says:

*The number [eleven] proved by these śrutis and smṛtis²¹⁰ is confirmed. The statements regarding more number are to denote the different functions (vṛtti) of the manas [such as buddhi, ahaṃkāra and citta].²¹¹ The references to less number are connected with special effects such as accompanying (gamana) [the self] and the like which are intended in several contexts. **[83]** [ŚrīBh II. iv. 5; 392,3–5]

1.5.5.2 Their size (83,1–6)

And that they are minute (aṇu) means only that they are not to be perceptible and limited in size.²¹² It is said in the [Brahma-]sūtra:

*And [they are] minute [BrSū II. iv. 6],

as is clearly explained in the [Śrī-]Bhāshya.²¹³ And the śruti passage:

²⁰⁸ See 78,1–2.

²⁰⁹ I.e. saptagatyadhikaraṇa, BrSū II. iv. adhi°2, sū°4–5.

²¹⁰ E.g. “indriyāṇi daśaikam ca pañca cendriyagocarāḥ” (BhG XIII. 5), “tājasānīndriyāṇy āhur devā vaikārikā daśa / ekādaśam manaś cātra” (Viṣṇu I. ii. 47) [see note on 72,5ff.] and so on.

²¹¹ See ŚrīBh II. iv. 5 (391,18–392,1) quoted in 71, 6f.

²¹² Cf. “aṇutvaṃ nāma paricchinnatve saty upalabdhyarhasthūlatārāhityam... aṇutvaṃ paricchinatve sati atisvacchatvaṃ [or sparśavattvaṃ or asparśavattvaṃ (vls. in the Bhāvaprakāśikā)]” [Śrutaprakāśikā ad ŚrīBh II. iv. 6; 393,22–24].

²¹³ “utkrātyādiśravaṇāt parimitatve siddhe sati pārśvasthair anupalabhyamānatvād aṇavaś ca prāṇāḥ” [ŚrīBh II. iv. 6; 393,4–5].

*They are all equal (sama) and are infinite (ananta)²¹⁴ [BṛhUp I. v. 13] means [not that their sizes are equal but] that they equally assist [perception],²¹⁵ and means the abundance (bāhulya) of the effects which is an attribute of the prāṇa enjoined (vihita) to worship (upa- ̄ās) in the passage:

*Those who worship them as infinite [BṛhUp I. v. 13].²¹⁶

For the same reason, it is established that their sizes are limited and various. And their size varies in the various bodies such as of a mosquito and an elephant, because they can be modified. In [the section on] knowledge,²¹⁷ we will justify that the size varies depending on the difference in time.

1.5.5.3 The indriyas are lasting (83,6–87,4)

And for all these [indriyas], only the defect in their own substratum is the defect: [in fact, they do not have any defect in themselves].²¹⁸ Even in the condition of an inert matter (sthāvara), an unseen power (adṛṣṭa) and the like causes the degree (tāratamya) of the obstruction of the function (vṛtti²¹⁹) of each [indriya] as in the condition of deep sleep. With the cooperation (sahakāra) by their powerful unseen power, the indriyas of Gandharva, yogins and so on can perceive a microscopic (sūkshma) object or a concealed one (vyavahita).

App.I Case of yogins (83,8–84,6)

When [a yogin] enters into somebody's living (jīvavat) body,²²⁰ though [indriyas] are specified (vyavahita) in each person by his own unseen power from the time of his origination (utpatti), the indriyas [of the latter] assist the former (para) like [the latter's] body due to another special unseen power [of the yogin, which make it possible to enter

²¹⁴ ete sarva eva samāḥ sarva evānantāḥ (In Up, the second eva is omitted).

²¹⁵ The word “sama” is not commented in the ŚrīBh II. iv. 6. Sudarśanasūri says: samaśrutiḥ kāryakaratvavishayā [Śrutaparakāśikā ad ŚrīBh II. iv. 6; 393,27].

²¹⁶ This explanation is equal to that of the ŚrīBh II. iv. 6 (393,5f.): ānantaśrutis tu ‘atha yo haitān anantān upāste’ ity upāsanaśravaṇād upāsyaprāṇaviśeṣaṇabhūtakāryabāhulyābhiprāyā. Raṅgarāmānuja's commentary on BṛhUp, however, suggests another interpretation: ānantaḥ ca”kalpasthāyitvāt manaādīvyasṭībhedaḥ ca (ad I. v. 13).

²¹⁷ See buddhi-pariccheda .

²¹⁸ That is why a blind can see if he gets another body.

²¹⁹ =pravṛtti (R).

²²⁰ U reads jīvavat parakāyapraveśe, but jīvavatparakāya°, which is contrastive with mṛtakāya, is correct.

other's body]. Or rather, [a yogin] enters into every [body] with his own indriyas; therefore, it is [his own indriyas] that assist him everywhere. For when he enters into a dead body, only his own indriyas can do so. The same answer (samādhi) is proper when [he] enters into a living body **[84]**. And smṛti says:

*Whatever body the ruler [of indriyas] attains and from whatever body he departs, he goes on his way, grasping them, as the wind [carrying] perfumes from their palace. [BhG XV. 8]

And the practical usage (vyavahāra) of “somebody's body” as to a dead body is based on figurative expression.²²¹ Of [a dead body] which is entered [by the self of the yogin] with some parts of the body creating anew (ārambhaka) a “somebody's body” such as a bone and so on, [that is, subtle elements led by him], a new combination (saṃghāta) which meets the definition of “body” begins. And at that time, [the yogin's] own body are dead. [He] enters [into his own body] again [begin a new “body”] as he enters into somebody's dead body. Those who can control many bodies [at once], however, can [control two bodies or abandon one of them] at will (yatheshṭham). And when a body vanishes, the indriyas slightly (mātrayā) lose [five elements] nourishing (āpyāyaka) it. When another body [is gained], the [indriyas] are nourished [by five elements] again.

It should be understood that [indriyas] abandoned by released men, which are hold by others or not, remain till the universal dissolution (pralaya), and so on.

App.II Criticism on the theory that karmendriyas are produced and destroyed with the body (84,8–86,11)

[Obj.] Isn't it that the karmendriyas are produced and destroyed with each body and that they will not enter another body again? That is, the [Vedānta-]Sāra says:

*Hands and so on are also the indriyas, because there is no distinction as to assisting the self when the self abides (sthite) in the body²²² [VSāra II. iv. 5; 226,2] **[85]**.

And also the [Śrī-]Bhāshya asserts:

*The indriyas are not seven, but eleven; because hands so on are also, when the soul abides in the body, assist his enjoyment; and because they have distinct effects. That is, it is seen that not only [the jñānendriyas] such as the faculty of hearing but also [the karmendriyas] such as the hand have distinct effects, for example, grasping, etc.

²²¹ For the definiton of śarīra is not applicable to it. The definition of śarīra is: yasya cetanasya yad drvyam sarvātmanā niyantum dhārayitum ca śakyam taccheśataikasvarūpam ca tat tasya śarīram [ŚrīBh II. ii. 9; 222,11–223,1]. For the futher detail, see NySi 158ff.

²²² °antaravashita. Adyar ed. reads antaḥsthita.

[ŚrīBh II. iv. 5; 391,11–12]

And further,

*The references to less number are connected with special effects such as accompanying (gamana) [the self] and the like which are intended in several contexts. [ŚrīBh II. iv. 5; 392,4–5]

And the [Vedānta-]dīpa clearly states:

*Among them, the faculty of hearing and the like follow the self when he enters another body. However, the karmendriyas such as the faculty of speech and the faculty of prehension (hasta), which are produced with the body and destroyed with the self, assist the self in the living (sthite) body [VDīpa II. iv. 5; 77,14–16], and so on. Therefore the author of the [Śrī-]Bhāṣya, as Yādavaprakāśa, thinks that karmendriyas are produced and destroyed in accordance with each body.

[Ans.] It is not so; because to the sūtra,

*And because the prāṇas move [BrSū III. i. 3],

[Rāmānuja] quotes the śruti passage:

*Following the departing [self], the [chief] prāṇa departs [from the body]; and following the departing [chief] prāṇa, all the prāṇas depart [from the body] [BṛhUp IV. iv. 2]

and the like²²³ [in his all commentaries]; and because in the section²²⁴ [beginning with]

*[Indriyas are] seven, because of the movement [BrSū II. iv. 4],

he stands the prima facie view that

*But as to those which are other than [the above-mentioned seven prāṇas], [understood] as grasping [some objects], ... their denotation as prāṇa is figurative [ŚrīBh II. iv. 4; 391,10–13],

and after that, he explains that they are also prāṇas in [the sūtra],

*But the hand and others exists because of [their being the assistants] (ataḥ) to [the self] abiding (sthite)²²⁵ [in the body]; therefore (ataḥ), it is not so²²⁶ [BrSū II. iv. 5].

Immediately after the sūtra,

*And because the prāṇas move [BrSū III. i. 3], **[86]**

the sūtra,

²²³ E.g. BhG XV. 7–8.

²²⁴ I.e. saptagatyadhikaraṇa, BrSū II. iv. adhi^o2, sū^o4–5.

²²⁵ The translation of ‘sthite’ is here based on the interpretation of ŚrīBh and VSāra.

²²⁶ Here “ataḥ” is taken as used twice and first ‘ataḥ’ means ‘bhogopakarāṇatvāt’; see Śrutaprakāśikā.

*If it be said [that it is not so] because of the Scriptures as to going to Agni etc.; no, because of the figurative nature [BrSū III. i. 4],

is commented as follows:

*[Obj.] By the Scriptures beginning with: “Where the dead man's speech (vāk) enters into fire (agni), [his chief] prāṇa into air, [his] eyes into the sun” [BṛhUp III. ii. 13], it is heard that at the time of the death of the self, his prāṇas enter into fire and so on; accordingly, they cannot move with the self. Hence the Scriptures as to their movement has to be interpreted in another way. [Ans.] Not so; because the Scriptures teaching the movement etc. is figurative [ŚrīBh III. i. 4; 408,17–409,1]

and so on. Therefore, it is apprehended that he accepts here that the karmendriya, the faculty of speech, also moves. And it is same in other [indriyas]. The [Vedānta-]Sāra states:

*It is because the seven [prāṇas] are prominent that the scriptures state the movement of the seven and they are qualified [by the word ‘jñāna’²²⁷] [VSāra II. iv. 5; 226,5],

and so on. The [Vedānta-]dīpa also says:

*It is because the jñānendriyas including manas and buddhi in the form of its function are prominent that the Scriptures state only the seven go [with the soul] [at the time of his death²²⁸] and they are qualified [by the word ‘jñāna’] at the time of his meditation²²⁹ [VDīpa II. iv. 4; 77,9–10]

and so on. And those who assert that the indriyas are from ahaṁkāra cannot accept they are produced and destroyed with each body.²³⁰ The substrata of these indriyas, however, are not indriyas; accordingly they can be produced and destroyed with the body.

[Obj.] Then, how is the passage beginning with

*The faculty of hearing and the like... [VDīpa II. iv. 5; 77,14], interpreted?

[Ans.] The answer is as follows. [The author of the Vedāntadīpa] thought that even if we accept [the faculty of speech and the like] are produced and destroyed with

²²⁷ See “yadā pañcāvatiṣṭhante jñānāni manasā saha” (KaṭhaUp II. iii. 10) quoted in the commentaries on ‘viśeshitatvāt’ in BrSū II. iv. 4 (R, K).

²²⁸ Vedānta Deśika omits “prāyaṇakāle” before “gatiśravaṇam.”

²²⁹ Here Vedānta Deśika regards “prādhānyāt” as the reason for both “gatiśravaṇam” and “viśeṣhaṇam,” following the description of the VSāra. As far as I know, however, all the texts of the VDīpa regards “vāgādīnām jīvena saha gamanābhāvāt,” which is omitted by him on purpose, as the reason for “gatiśravaṇam.”

²³⁰ śabdatanmātrasamakālotpattilayakatvād indriyāṇām (R, K).

each body as others, we can prove that they are indriyas; and to the sūtra

*But the hand and others exists because of [their being the assistants] (ataḥ) [to the self] in the living (sthite) [body];²³¹ therefore (ataḥ), it is not so [BrSū II. iv. 5], he said so with the intention of another grammatical construction (yojanā).²³² Therefore we understand that the author of the [Śrī-]Bhāshya thought all eleven indriyas continue.

1.5.5.4 Criticism on the opinion on indriya by other schools (86,12–87,4)

In this way, the Scriptures prove only these [indriyas, jñānendriyas and karmendriyas,] (eshām eva) as such, [not excluding karmendriyas] (etāvatām eva), having the above-mentioned nature. Buddhists, the Vaiśeshikas, the Cārvākas and so on, talk other [doctrines on indriyas]: (1) [Buddhist] assume female indriya, male indriya and so on; (2) [the Vaiśeshikas] reject karmendriya; (3) [the Cārvākas] assert indriyas is one only [and the difference in its function based on that in the part of the body], among them (a) some accept the skin is the indriya, (b) some [accept] the body itself is the indriya;²³³ (4) [Yādavaprakāśa holds] karmendriyas are produced and destroyed with the body; (5) (a) [some²³⁴ holds] manas is omnipresent (vibhu), (b) [some holds thereby] it is eternal, [some holds] it is from fire, [but some holds] it does not exist, and so on;²³⁵ (6) [Bhojarāja²³⁶ states] indriyas are form rājasāhaṃkāra; (7) [some assert] they are made of elements. These [doctrines] and the like should be neglected because of the proof by the Scriptures. And the sublation by logic can be led respectively.

1.6 tanmātra and bhūta (87,5–126,3)

1.6.1 General Definition (87,5–88,6)

Now the creations of tanmātras and so on [are explained].

Tanmātra (a subtle element) is the substance qualified by the subtle condition (avasthā) which immediately [precedes] gross elements (bhūta). As milk changing into (pariṇāma) curd has a intermediate condition, a substance changing into a gross element

²³¹ Here the translation is based on the interpretation of VDīpa.

²³² “Bhāshya-Sārayoḥ ‘sthite’ ity etat jīvaviśeṣhaṇatayā vyākhyātam, Dīpe tu śarīraviśeṣhaṇatayā iti bhāvaḥ” (R).

²³³ Cf. TMK I. 38

²³⁴ Mīmāṃsaka, see Mānameyodaya, dravya §124ff.

²³⁵ Cf. TMK I. 39.

²³⁶ See Tattvaprakāśika quoted in 67,5ff.

has a certain condition preceding it; This condition is tanmātra. A substance qualified by this condition is also called tanmātra. And the very [substance] is the cause of a gross element; hence, not only from qualities (guṇa) such as sound are gross elements created.

A gross element (bhūta) is the substratum of the object such as sound which has some specific characters (viśiṣṭa²³⁷) and the like. It is classified into a material (prākṛta) and an immaterial (aprākṛta) like the previous one [i.e., indriya].

Tanmātras and bhūtas are of five kinds according to the differences among a subtle element of sound (śabdatanmātra) and others or the differences among ether (ākāśa) and others.

1.6.2 śabdatanmātra

(88,4–92,3)

Among them, śabda-tanmātra is the substance qualified by the intermediate condition between tāmasāhaṃkāra and ether.

In the same way, the definition of each subsequent tanmātra [e.g. sparśa-tanmātra] can be understood as to be qualified by the intermediate condition between each two elements [e.g. to be qualified by the intermediate condition between ether and air (vāyu)], to be the substratum of each quality which has no specific character (aviśiṣṭa) [e.g. to be the substratum of touch (sparśa) which has no specific character], or to be the material of each element [e.g. to be the material of air]. [89]

App. Criticism on the order of evolution in the Sāṃkhya (89,1–92,1)

The Sāṃkhya school, however, asserts: Five tanmātras are directly born from the tāmasa-ahaṃkāra. Among them, from śabdatanmātra ether is born. And other tanmātras produce each subsequent element with the assistance of each previous tanmātras, [that is, sparśa-tanmātra with śabda-tanmātra produces air, rūpa-tanmātra with sparśa-tanmātra and śabda-tanmātra produces fire, and so on].²³⁸

It is not true. For [some śruti passage], such as

*From ether air [arose] [TaiUp II. i. 1],

describe a specific order of materials which does not allow any other interpretation

²³⁷ viśiṣṭa means having some viśeṣhaṇa such as śāntatva, ghoratva and mūrdhatva. Cf. SK 38: tanmātrāṇy aviśeṣhāḥ ... bhūtāni ... te smṛtā viśeṣhāḥ ...; Tattvakaumudī ad SK 38d: ākāśādīshu sthūleṣhu sattvapradhānatayā kecīt śāntāḥ sukhāḥ prakāśāḥ labhavaḥ, kecid rajahpradhānatayā ghorāḥ duḥkhāḥ anavasthitāḥ, kecid tamaḥ pradhānatayā mū hāḥ vishaṇṇāḥ guravaḥ [229,1–3].

²³⁸ Cf. Tattvakaumudī ad SK 38b: tebhyaḥ tanmātrebhyo yathāsāṃkhyam eka-dvi-tri-catuh-pañcabhyo bhūtāny ākāśa-anilāḥ [=vāyu] -anala [=tejas] -salila [=ap] -avani [=pṛthivī] rūpāṇi pañca pañcabhyaḥ tanmātrebhyaḥ [228,2–3].

(anayathāsiddha); and [the same order] is explained by Parāśara²³⁹ and others²⁴⁰ [90].

And the śruti passage,

*Tanmātras [merge into] bhūtādi [SubālaUp 2],

does not mean that [all tanmātras] directly merge into [tāmasa-ahaṃkāra] at the same time; because it is contradictory to the previous passage beginning with

*earth merges into water²⁴¹ [SubālaUp 2],

and it is contradictory to the passage,

*From ether air [arose] [TaiUp II. i. 1]. [91]

For, if it were so, the śruti should first describe the order that “earth merges into gandha-tanmātra, water merges into rasa-tanmātra” etc., and subsequently say “Tanmātras [merge into] bhūtādi.” And this śruti does not intend to fix the complete order; because the special order that

*Ether [merges into] indryas. Indriyas [merge into] tanmātras [SubālaUp 2],

which even you cannot admit, is understood at the first sight (āpāta). In the same way, the śruti passage,

*There are sixteen originating principles (prakṛti) and eight effected ones (vikṛti)²⁴²

[GarbhaUp 3] [92],

can be also somehow interpreted.²⁴³

Therefore, the above-mentioned definition of śābada-tanmātra is not applicable even to [other tanmātras] (ativyāpti). If [we] should [admit your opinion that] all [tanmātras] are produced at once [from ahaṃkāra], it means only simultaneousness, but sparśatanmātra and so on are not of the nature of the intermediate condition between ether and ahaṃkāra. Thereby [the definition] is not of too wide application.

1.6.3 ākāśa

(92,5–100,3)

²³⁹ VishP I. ii. 37, 38cd–39ab, 40ab quoted in R and K.

²⁴⁰ R and K quote Bhagavatśāstra (Pāñcarātrāgama?).

²⁴¹ The order of the mergence in SubālaUp 2 is: pṛthivī Æ ap Æ tejas Æ vāyu Æ ākāśa Æ indriya Æ tanmātra Æ bhūtādi Æ mahat Æ avyakta Æ akshara Æ tamas Æ parāḥ devāḥ.

²⁴² This passage is quoted in ŚrīBh I. iv. 8 [114,6]. Cf. SK 3: mūlaprakṛtir avikṛtiḥ, mahadādayāḥ [= mahad, ahaṃkāra, 5tanmātras] prakṛtīvikṛtayaḥ sapta / sho haśakas [= 5bhūtas, 1 indriyas] tu vikāraḥ, na prakṛtir na vikṛtiḥ puruṣaḥ.

²⁴³ According to K, the eight (avyakta, mahat, ahaṃkāra and 5bhūtas) are prakṛti because they produce a body, and the sixteen (5vishayas and 11indriyas) are vikṛti because they abide in a body. Such classification is seen in the dialogue between Janaka and Yājñavalkya in the Mokshadharma (K) and the Yamasmṛti (R, K).

1.6.3.1 Its definition

(92,5–93,2)

The definition of ether (ākāśa) is to be the substratum of qualified sound without possessing touch (asparśatve sati viśiṣṭaśabdāśrayatvam), and to nourish the faculty of hearing (śrotrāpyāyakatvam). And it is admitted that [ether] helps by providing space (avakāśa) because it is established in the Scriptures [93]. Even in the part of prakṛti which does not change into ether [e.g. Vaiṣṇava], space exists; because otherwise, the motion of those who has touch [e.g. liberated men with subtle elements (bhūtasūkṣma)] would be obstructed.

1.6.3.2 It is not eternal

(93,2–94,4)

[The Vaiśeṣikas] prove that ether is eternal, because it is substance which does not have any part, [like the self]; and others [i.e., the Mīmāṃsakas] prove [the manas is omnipresent, because it is substance which does not have touch, like ether²⁴⁴].

These [inferences], however, must be vitiated; because they are sublated by the Scriptures, [which teach both are produced]; because [if the reason of the Vaiśeṣikas means ‘not to have any part with inherent relation (avayavāsamavetatva),’] it is inconstancy from [our] viewpoint (anyatarānaikāntya) in view of mahat and so on, [which are substances having some parts but are not eternal, even though both of us do not accept them²⁴⁵]; and because [if the reason of the Vaiśeṣikas means ‘deprived of material (upādānarāhitya),’ it is unestablished for us, who accept ether has material]. Moreover, which does the ‘eternal’ mean, ‘deprived of entering into any condition’ or ‘existence of substance forever’? [94] Not the former, because it is inconstancy in view of earthy atom and the like, [which are eternal according to your opinion but have conditions (avasthā) such as conjunction (saṃyoga) producing a dyad (dvyaṅka), color born from baking (pākaja) and so on]. And you accept that the subject (pakṣa) [i.e., ether] has the difference of conditions such as having sound or not; thereby, [the reason] would be sublation (bādha²⁴⁶) and contradictory to your position (apasiddhānta). Nor the latter, because it proves what has been already proved (siddhasādhana) [in our opinion].

[Obj.] The destruction characterized by the separation of parts is denied here.

²⁴⁴ See K's commentary on three ādi: ākāśāder nityatvādisādhanaṇi niravayavadravatvādi.

²⁴⁵ “mahādāder ubhayasampratipannatvābhāve 'pi siddhāntisampratipannatayā tanmatarītyā tatrānaikāntikatvam asty evety abhiprāyeṇa anyatarānaikāntika-tvety uktam” (K).

²⁴⁶ The definition of bādhitā in TarS §57 is: yasya sādhyābhāvaḥ pramāṇāntareṇa niścitaḥ [kālātyayāpadishṭa in YMD II. 40]. But in this case the better definition is: sādhyābhāvavātpakṣako hetuḥ [NyKośa, (KA) from the Tarkakamudī].

[Ans.] It is not true. [Which does it mean, (a) non-existence of the destruction characterized by the separation in the previous condition, (b) in the sequent condition, or (c) in the present condition?] In view of (a) what attains the state of ahaṃkāra and so on, it proves what has been already proved. Concerning (b) what attains the state of air (vāyutva) or (c) what undergoes the quintuplication²⁴⁷ (pañcīkaraṇa) and so on, the distinction of the conditions are wholly probable, as has already explained.²⁴⁸

1.6.3.3 It is perceptible

(94,6–97,4)

And this ether is perceptible. For when you open the eyes, without any delay²⁴⁹ (tadaiva) you cognize “This is ether.”

[Obj.] Why can something without any color be perceptible?

[Ans.] You cannot say so **[95]**, because you should be asked why something with some color can be perceptible, then.

[Obj.] [Perceptibility] is based on the possibility (yogyatā) [for visibility] established by our cognition.

[Ans.] [The perceptibility of ether] is also [based on it]. For otherwise, [i.e., if you accepted only having manifested color (udbhūtarūpavattva) as the reason for the perceptibility of a pot, pot-ness and the like could not be perceptible, and] it would be untenable to assume the secondary (avāntara) distinction [of the perceptible entities such as] color, the colored [substance] (rūpin), and the [qualities such as number, extension etc.] which inhere in the entity together with the color (rūpaikārthasamavāya).²⁵⁰

[96]

Or rather, the color of a independent entity (vyashṭi) [such as ether] is established by the quintuplication (pañcīkaraṇa), as is said in the [Śrī-]Bhāshya.²⁵¹ And it is explained

²⁴⁷ “ekaikam eva bhūtaṃ dvidhākṛtya dvayor bhāgayoḥ svabhāgam ekam nidhāya bhāgāntaram caturdhākṛtya tāṃś caturbhāgān bhūtāntareshu caturshu yojayati” [YMD IV. 50]. For the details, see 149,4ff.

²⁴⁸ “tatra sparśādīlakṣaṇaprādeśikapariṇātidaśāyāṃ chedanabhedanaparispanḍanādīnām api siddhiḥ” (46,1–2).

²⁴⁹ It means without any time for consideration of vyāpti etc.

²⁵⁰ See ŚrīBh I. i. 1 quoted below and the śloka in the Āgamaprāmānya: rūparūpitadaikārthasamavāyishu cākshuṣaḥ, etc. [4,18]. Professor Narasimhachari's note on this passage is: rūpe, tadvati ghaṭe, tathā rūpeṇa saha ekasminn arthe ghaṭe samavāyasambandhena vidyamāneshu samkhyāparimāṇādishu....

²⁵¹ “aṅ āntarvarttinaś cākāśasya trivṛtkaraṇopadarśitapañcīkaraṇena rūpavatvāt cākshuṣatve 'py avirodhaḥ” [ŚrīBh II. ii. 23; 299,25f.].

in the Prameyasamgraha [of Viṣṇucitta], for example²⁵²:

*Time is included in all the cognitions (pratīti) because it is the attribute of [all] entities; accordingly, it cannot have any independent form (pṛthagrūpavattva²⁵³). Ether and directions have color due to the tripartition (trivṛtkaraṇa) [Prameyasamgraha], and so on.

[Obj.] But the [Śrī-]Bhāshya says:

*And mere existence (sanmātra) cannot be perceived by the eye, because it grasps the entities (padārtha) such as color, the colored [substance] (rūpin), and the [qualities] which inhere in the substance together with the color (rūpaikārthasamaveta), [ŚrīBh I. i. 1; (i) 125,6f.]

[and it does not mention the thing mingled with colored entity by the quintuplication].

[Ans.] It means that the object of perception is a qualified entity but not that the relation called being mingled with colored [entity] (rūpavanmiśratva) is denied. That is why the Prameyasamgraha says:

*It is established that only what is associated with color, the colored [substance] (rūpin), the [qualities] which inhere in the substance together with the color (rūpaikārthasanniveśa) and so on, [i.e., entities mingled with colored entity], are perceptible. [Prameyasamgraha]

Hence it is grasped due to our cognition that even color which inheres in a conjunct thing (samyuktasamaveta) makes the effect [97].

[Obj.] Then even God and so on, [which are conjunct with all the colored things, would be perceptible].

[Ans.] No, because [He cannot be perceptible] as in the case of weight (gurutva). As to air (vāyu), even though it has color due to the quintuplication (pañcīkaraṇa), it is not perceptible because its color is not manifested. Although the Prameyasamgraha says:

*Even [keen] eyes of a baby cannot grasp air, which has no color (arūpa) [Prameyasamgraha],

It means the non-existence of manifested color.

Thus ether has color; accordingly, we cognize “Ether is blue (śyāma).”

²⁵² Hindi ed. includes yathā in the quotation, but Viraraghvachari [fn.1] suggests it may be excluded referring to the same passage quoted before [76,8f.].

²⁵³ When the same passage is cited before [76,8f.], the reading is: °rūpatva. The comments here are: apakshitam iti śeṣaḥ / rūpaikārthasamavāyītayā pratīyamāne samkhyādipratyakshe pṛthagrūpānapekshāvad iti bhāvaḥ (R), āśrayatāsambandhena rūpavattvam ity arthaḥ / apekshitam iti śeṣaḥ (K). Cf. the comments there. The same reading and interpretation are right, said Viraraghavachari [fn. 1].

1.6.3.4 It is not the non-existence of delimitations (97,4–99,2)

And for this very reason, this cognition is not what is based on the non-existence of a delimitation (āvaraṇābhāva) [as Buddhists²⁵⁴ and the Cārvākas assert²⁵⁵]. For [this cognition] is a positive statement (vidhi). From the viewpoint of those who assert non-existence is another kind of [positive] existence, there is nothing wrong [in that positive ether is the non-existence of delimitation]. From the viewpoint of those who maintain [non-existence] is [negative category] different from [other positive categories], however, the question if [ether] is the prior non-existence (prāg-abhāva) [of a delimitation] and the like, [i.e., if it is the annihilative non-existence (pradhvaṃsa-a°), or if it is the absolute non-existence (atyanta-a°)], cannot stand²⁵⁶ [98]; because the negation whose counter-correlate (pratiyogin) is everything cannot be established. Even if a delimitation [exists], the non-existence of identity (tādātmya) is of the nature of the negation of being in the same substratum (sāmānādhikaraṇya), [that is to say, the mutual non-existence (anyonya-a°) of a delimitation is of the non-existence of delimitation-ness (āvaraṇatva)]; then, you could not cognize that ether is on the ground, because the negation of delimitation-ness is not possible in the earth as a delimitation²⁵⁷ [99]. Moreover, relative non-existence (saṃsarga-a°) would not be possible without the cognition of something related, [i.e., its substratum]; and it is concluded that this very [substratum] is ether.

[Obj.] [The cognition that there is no delimitation] is the negation whose substratum is assumed.

[Ans.] Not so, because [an assumed thing] could not be unsublated.

1.6.3.5 It is not light and darkness (99,3–4)

[Obj.] [Ether] is based on light and darkness.

[Ans.] It is also untrue; because in reference to them, cognition of ether and practical usage as such are impossible.²⁵⁸ [You may say that in the expression that ether

²⁵⁴ Abhidharmakośa I. 5d.

²⁵⁵ “atra kecit cārvākāḥ saugatās ca...” [SAS I. 46; 169,1].

²⁵⁶ The same vikalpas are seen in ŚrīBh II. ii. 23.

²⁵⁷ This is based on the first interpretation of R: āvaraṇatvanishedhasyāvaraṇabhūte pṛthivyādāv asambhavād bhūtala ākāśa iti pratītir na syāt. His second interpretation is: anyonyābhāvasya sāmānādhikāṇyanishedhatvenāvaraṇatvanishedhatvābhāvād āvaraṇanirodhitvaṃ na syāt. The interpretation of K is: āvaraṇatvy api pradeśa āvaraṇatvābhāvasambhavād ākāśapratītiprasaṅgaḥ.

²⁵⁸ “ākāśe ālokaḥ, ākāśe tamaḥ ity ālokādyadhikaraṇatayā pratiyamānasya ākāśasya ālokādipratītivishayatvayogāt” (R K).

is blue ether is superimposed (āropita) like a silver on a shell; but it is not true], because even superimposition (āropa) is preceded by the cognition.

1.6.3.6 It is not inferred

(99,4–100,3)

Moreover, if [ether] were not perceptible, it would be baseless that [ether] is within the scope of ignorant man's practical usage preceded by pointing out with the finger. For the inference based on the consideration what [element] remains (pariśeṣha) as the substratum of sound, [that is, sound has something as its substratum, because it is quality; and only ether can be its substratum], and the like are not for ignorant people. And such inference is not possible: there is not any logical defect in case sound were the attribute of parts of a drum as smell [of a flower which is far away from here but brought by wind] or sound were the attribute of air, which is accepted as causing (kāraṅka) sound or manifesting (vyañjaka) it²⁵⁹ [100]. And [if it were the attribute of air or earth] it could not be grasped by touch or [vision], because we see that smell, taste, color or so which is the quality of one and only element, is grasped by each organ (akṣha). In the same manner, other sublations are also rejected. And the complication (gaurava) [due to the assumption of something other than four perceptible elements] would be subalation for you. However we accept sound as being in ether because of the Scriptures. [101]

1.6.4 vāyu

(101,1–107,2)

1.6.4.1 Its definition

(101,1–2)

From ether, a subtle element of touch (śabdatanmātra) [is produced].

From the latter, air (vāyu) [is produced].

Its definition is: (1) having qualified touch and being devoid of color (viśiṣṭasparśavatve sati rūpaśūnyatvam);²⁶⁰ (2) being the substance grasped only by the faculty of touch of us and the like [who are not liberated] (asmadādisparśanaikendriyagrāhyatvam);²⁶¹ (3) being qualified by touch which is neither cold nor hot and not having smell (anushṇāśītasparśaviśiṣṭatve sati gandhaśūnyatvam),²⁶² and so on.

²⁵⁹ “śabdānityapakṣhe utpādatatayā tannityapakṣhe vyañjakatayā” (R, K).

²⁶⁰ viśiṣṭa prevents ativyāpti to śabdatanmātra; ...sati prevents ativyāpti to ākāśa; rūpaśūnya prevents ativyāpti to pṛthivī etc.

²⁶¹ asmadādi excludes mukta-indriya; eka prevents ativyāpti to pṛthivī etc.; dravya prevents ativyāpti to sparśa.

²⁶² ...sati prevents ativyāpti to jala etc.; gandhaśūnya prevents ativyāpti to pṛthivī.

1.6.4.2 It is perceived by the faculty of touch (101,2–102,5)

[The Vaiśeṣikas] It is unfit for the faculty of touch, imperceptible etc.; because it is uncolored substance etc.

[Ans.] These reasons are rejected for the reason that they are contradictory to our experience (upalambha), and that they are inconstancy (anaikāntya) [in view of time and the self²⁶³] and so on²⁶⁴ **[102]**. For it is not having color but having touch that causes being grasped by the faculty of touch. And the [Śrī-]Bhāṣhya also²⁶⁵ supports it.²⁶⁶ Following it, the author of the Vivaraṇa²⁶⁷ says:

*Even tactual sense (sparśana) does not have pure existence as the object; because its objects are touch and an entity having touch. [Vivaraṇa on ŚrīBh].

And the Prameyasamgraha says:

*Even the faculty of touch has the capacity to grasp an entity having touch [Prameyasamgraha].

If air were [not perceived but] inferred through touch, even earth, water and fire would not be perceived by touch; for even in these cases we could say they are inferred through it, because the experience [that we touch a pot and so on] is same.

1.6.4.3 Its character (its movement and touch) (102,6–104,1)

And this air has inherent horizontal (tiryak) movement due to its own nature or God's will in the form of unseen power (adṛṣṭa). Due to the obstruction by substance such as earthy one or other air, [it has] circular (bhramana) movement, vertical (ūrdhva) one etc. And for one who stands far away these [movements of air] are inferred through the circular one, vertical movement or so of a grass, dusts and so on. For one who stands there, however, they are grasped by his tactual sense. Thereupon the variety of air is also proved. And it stops when it is obstructed in all sides by earthy or watery [substance].

When it is conjunct with water, heat, a flower and so on, coolness, hotness,

²⁶³ The latter is only for the imperceptibility.

²⁶⁴ ādi = aprayojaka.

²⁶⁵ H omits the second ca. According to Viraraghavachari, it means that not only the Nyāya's Bhāṣhya but ours supports it [102, fn. 1].

²⁶⁶ “nāpi tvacā sparśavadvastuvishayatvāt” [ŚrīBh I. i. 1; 125,7].

²⁶⁷ The Vivaraṇa on ŚrīBh is not available now. The author is Śrī-Rāmamiśra (II) or Somāśiyān ān (Somayāji Ān an), b.1094, who was said to be the brother of Parāśara-bhaṭṭa and the son of Śrī Vātsāmka-miśra [Singh 118; Raghavan 17].

fragrance and so on are imposed [on it]; because²⁶⁸ there is such affirmative and negative relation (anvayavyatireka).

For this reason, the thought of the followers of the Āyurveda, who assert that air is cool because of the maxim that:

*For everything, increase [is caused] by things of the same kind, and the contrary [is caused] by things of the contrary kind [Vaidikaśāstra?],

are rejected [103]. True there is the general instruction that [air is] cool because it increases a cool thing and decreases a cool thing, but there is no restriction that increase is caused by a thing of the same kind and that decrease is caused by a thing of a contrary kind. For we observe that an earthy thing, [which is neither cool nor hot], and so on irregularly increase or decrease diseases.

[Obj.] In the case [of earthy things], it is possible due to the power of a natural watery part and so on in these various earthy things.

[Ans.] Then, what is the contradiction if [air] is so? For in their independent condition, air and the causes of its increase or decrease are composed of five elements [by quintuplication (pañcīkaraṇa)]. And because the śṛiti passage,

*Vital air is composed of water [ChUp VI. v. 4, vi. 6, vii. 1, 2], proves that vital air is nourished by water, it is possible [for air] to increase a cool things. In various contexts, [the followers of the Āyurveda] explain the nature and the effect of an entity based on its unimaginable capacity as [big] sound [caused by] a [small] drum. This [capacity] can applied here also; accordingly there is not any difficulty. [104]

And air assists through nourishing the faculty of touch and as vital air, a body or an object.

1.6.4.4 On the prāṇa(s)

(104,1–107,1)

Among them, what is called vital air (prāṇa) is specific air causing the maintenance of a body and so on. It is neither mere air nor an action of air. It is said in the [Brahma-]sūtra:

*[Vital air] is neither mere air nor its action; because it is stated separately [BrSū II. iv. 8].

This vital air is said to be of five kinds or ten kinds according to the variety of its functions. The [Brahma-]sūtra says:

*[Vital air] is described as having five functions like the manas [BrSū II. iv. 11].

²⁶⁸ co hetau (K).

[105]

It is of five kinds according to the difference between prāṇa, apāna, vyāna, udāna and samāna. It is of ten kinds in view of the difference between nāga, kūrma, kṛkara, devadatta and dhanañjana.²⁶⁹ The word ‘prāṇa’ is explained generally [as meaning every kind of vital air] or specifically [as meaning prāṇa among the five kinds], as the word ‘vāda’ [generally means a talk and specifically means a dispute].

It supports the body and the indriyas, as is established in śrīti passages such as:

*On whose departing, this body looks like worst... [ChUp V. i. 7];

*All [other prāṇa] became the form, [i.e., those which controlled], of it [i.e., the chief prāṇa]. [?] **[106]**

And the [Śrī-]Bhāshya says:

*The prāṇa, however, supports the body and the indriyas [ŚrīBh II. iv. 16; 399,12].

This meaning is explained in detail in the topic on the meditation of the prāṇa.²⁷⁰

In this manner, it exists not only in a body of movable animals but also in a body of unmovable plants, because we accept earthy particles (dhātu) [of a tree] which have a desire at budding time (dohada) for water sprinkled on its root. In this respect also, the [Śrī-]Bhāshya says:

*For though prāṇa can exist in a unmovable plant, it does not exist in five different way to support its body [ŚrīBh II. i. 9; 222,9].

And to the [Brahma-]sūtra,

*For this reason, the prāṇa [is para brahman] [BrSū I. i. 24],

the [Vedānta-]dīpa says:

*Regarding [non-sentient things] such as a stone, a wood, their existence is not based on the prāṇa [VDīpa I. i. 24; 13,12–13].

It is explained in the eighth section (adhikaraṇa) of the chapter on organs (karaṇa-pāda) in the Nyāyatattva that even nails, teeth, hair, a scar and so on, are the substrate very low the prāṇa.

To control it in the form of emitting (recaka), inhaling (pūraka) and suspending (kumbhaka) is the fourth division of the eightfold yoga, [namely, prāṇāyama²⁷¹]. The further explanation on it is seen in the Āyurveda and the instruction of yoga **[107]**.

²⁶⁹ Their functions are explained in the Ānandadāyini ad TMK I. 53 [105 fn.1]. I cannot trace the source (Purāṇa?) quoted in R and K.

²⁷⁰ ChUp V. i.

²⁷¹ See the Yogasūtra II. 50, the Yogabhāshya and Tattvavaiśārādī on it.

1.6.4.5 Its variations (107,1–2)

The air which is the material of a body is utterly different from the air which is called the prāṇa. Having air as the material is clear in the bodies filled with air of tempest, etc.

[Air] is object in hot wind, wind of a fan etc.

1.6.5 tejas (107,3–115,2)

1.6.5.1 Vāyu is its material cause (107,3–109,6)

From air, a subtle element of color (rūpatanmātra) [is produced].

From the latter, a fiery element (tejas) [is produced].

The word ‘agni’ in the passage,

*From air, fire (agni) [is produced] [TaiUp II. i. 1],

denotes a fiery element in general. **[108]**

[Obj.] If the passage,

*From air, fire (agni) [is produced] [TaiUp II. i. 1],

means [air] is the material cause of [fire], it is contradictory to our perception. For only a leaf, grass, wood and so on can change into ashes, smoke, fire (dhūmadhvaja), and a leaf and so on are earthy. You may suppose that even in these cases imperceptible fiery particles [in a grass etc.] led by unseen power (adṛṣṭa) produce flames (jvālā), but this assumption is complicated (guru). And various product [different from an original] is actually seen in the case of ashes, smoke, charcoal and so on; accordingly, the fact is not avoidable [and does not lead to complication]. The peculiar touch, [hotness], is possible [in a thing whose material is earth, neither hot nor cool], as the specific smell belonging to smoke, [which does not exist in grass], [or] as the specific touch [causing itch] belonging to Alhagi Maurorum (durālabhā). Thus, as water transforms itself into foam, wave, or bubble according to the difference in its assistants, it is proved that earth partially transforms itself into fire (hutavaha). If so, [the passage] beginning with,

*From air, fire (agni) [is produced] [TaiUp II. i. 1],

can be explained as meaning that [air] is the efficient cause (nimittakāraṇa) [of fire].

[Ans.] It is not true, because it is contradictory to the process (prakriyā) of the orders of the creation²⁷² and the dissolution²⁷³ [of the universe] read in the context regarding a material cause which cannot be explained in other ways (ananyathāsiddha).

²⁷² See TaiUp II. i. 1: ātmana ākāśaḥ sambhūtaḥ, ākāśād vāyuḥ, vāyor agniḥ...

²⁷³ See SubālaUp II: pṛthivy apsu praliyate, āpas tejasi liyate, tejo vāyau liyate...

And we will explain that a leaf and so on are also of five elements [by the quintuplication (pañcīkaraṇa)]. For this reason, we accept the origination [of fire] from their [fiery] part [109]. It is proper that [the fiery part of a leaf etc. is not perceived] before the origination of [flames], as soon after putting off flames, the [fiery] part of them is, [though it exists], not perceived; in this case, there is not the complication [in the assumption of another external fiery element led by unseen power]. And concerning submarine fire (abindhana), you cannot imagine that it is the transformation of earth; the assumption of irregular material [in each case] is complicated. Thus we perceive that fire hidden in various things appears by force of a specific assistant and the conjunction with homogenous parts brought by unseen power. And the usages of great sages also support it:

*As fire lies in wood [?],

*As fire resides in wood and oil in a sesame, so that purusha... [VishP II. vii. 28], and so on. Therefore, it is proper in the stage of aggregate creation (samashtīṣṛṣṭī) that fire is produced from air as its material, but in the stage of individual creation (vyashtīṣṛṣṭī) a gross fiery element appears from a subtle fiery element.

1.6.5.2 Its definition etc.

(109,6–110,3)

The definitions of a fiery element are having hot touch, having brilliant color, and so on.

And it nourishes the faculty of speech (vāc) and the faculty of sight (cakshus), as is explained in the following śrutis:

*Speech is composed of fire [ChUp VI. v. 4, vi. 1, vii. 6],

*The sun, becoming sight, entered the eyes [AitareyaUp I. ii. 4],

*Through his rays, the [man in the sun] entered it [BṛhUp V. v. 1],

and so on. For eyes without a specific ointment (añjana), except for the case of an owl (dinābhīta), [a fiery element] whose color appears and which is other than what nourishes them is unavoidable and necessary to produce the knowledge of objects other than darkness (timira) and the like [110].

As the digestive fire (vaiśvānara) [it] assists [the self]. The digestive fire is a specific fire abiding in the body which becomes the cause of digestion of eaten or drunken food through the conjunction with the prāṇa etc.²⁷⁴

That a fiery element is the body is clear in the case of the bodies filled with fire of fire god (dahana²⁷⁵), the sun (tapana) etc.

²⁷⁴ See BhG XV. 14.

²⁷⁵ dikpālāgnidevatā (R, K).

That [it is the object] is [clear] in the case of sunshine, lightning, ordinary fire (hutavaha) and so on.

1.6.5.3 Flames are momentary and have the cause for their destruction (110,3–112,1)

Among them, ordinary fire composed of flames is proved to be momentary (kshaṇika) in the sense that it destroys very quickly, because (a) it is seen to be extinct when the burnt object is extinct; (b) [flames are successively produced] when complete causes, [namely, the conjunctions of another parts containing oil], successively approach; (c) you cannot see many light at once [111]. And the recognition (pratyabhijñā) [of momentary flames in the form that this is the very fire which was seen before] can be explained in other way, [namely, it can be explained as wrong notion based on their similarity], as [a man wrongly recognizes] light which was once blown out and is lightened (āropita) again [during his absence].²⁷⁶ The difference between flames is perceptible, as is explained in the Nyāyatattva:

*By close observation, flicker of fire can be seen as stream of water. [Nyāyatattva]

“The destruction of flames takes place without any cause,” say someone who are influenced by Buddhism. But it is not true, because momentary destruction would be resulted [due to the absence of the cause for its delay] and because unseen power (adr̥ṣṭa), God etc. are inevitably the causes. And it is possible for speed (vega) and so on, which is inseparable [from flames], to make another condition, [i.e., non-existence of flames²⁷⁷]. In the same way, those who assert that last sound, last impression (saṃskāra) [immediately before liberation] and so on also destroy in themselves are rejected. Holding

²⁷⁶ pratyabhijñā tu nishkrāntapraṣiṣṭavadasambhavān nirvāpitāropitadīpādīshv ivānyathāsiddhā. My translation follows the interpretation of K: nishkrāntapraṣiṣṭe devadattādāv iva yāthāthyāsambhavāt ... nirvāpitāropitadīpādīshu nirvāpanāropane ajānato jāyamānā “so 'yaṃ dīpaḥ” iti pratyabhijñā sādr̥śyadoshamūlakatayā yathā bhrāntirūpā, tathā “sayam dīpajvalā” iti pratyabhijñā'pi bhrāntirūpā. According to K, the interpretation of R is on the variant reading as follows: pratyabhijñā tu nishkrāntapraṣiṣṭasya sambhavān nirvāpitāropitadīpādīshv ivānyathāsiddhā (the recognition [of momentary flames in the form that this is the very fire which was seen before] can be explained in other way as in the case of [wrong recognition of] lamp which was once blown out and is lightened again, which is possible for those who once departed and enters again). The third reading in K is: pratyabhijñā tu nishkrāntapraṣiṣṭasya nishkrānadaśānirvāpitāropitadīpādīshv ivānyathāsiddhā (the recognition [of momentary flames in the form that this is the very fire which was seen before] can be explained in other way, as those who once departed and enters again [wrongly recognize] lamp which was once blown out and is lightened during his absence).

²⁷⁷ nāśasya abhāvarūpatve [=bhāvātiriktatve] hy ahetukaśaṃkā'pi; asmanmate [=bhāvāntarābhāvapakṣhe] tu nāśo nāma bhāvarūpāvasthāntaram eva, na tasyāhetukatvam (R K).

in mind all this, the Vedārthasaṃgraha says [112]:

*A forest fire etc. also inevitably have a series of modifications which are contrary to their earlier condition. [VAS §47; 100,7]

Concerning it, the classification into terrestrial (bhauma) one, celestial (divya) and so on,²⁷⁸ totality of causes and effects of each of them, whether it is momentary or not, and so on are presumed according to the possibility (yathāyogyam).

1.6.5.4 prabhā and prabhāvat

(112,2–114,4)

Fire is generally of two kinds: effulgence (prabhā) and effulgent one (prabhāvat).

Effulgence is a kind of fire which expands or contracts depending upon the existence or the non-existence of concealment, and stretches out beyond its locus according to its speed and capacity. And it is produced with the effulgent one and vanishes with it.

And it is not a portion of light broken into pieces. For it is complicated to assume that [these portion], which naturally go upwards [like fire], simultaneously spread out in every direction provided obstruction by wind etc. is not seen [113]; whereas effulgence is accepted so according to our experience. Moreover, if it were so, firmer things such as a jewel or the sun would be broken into pieces. If it should be accepted, they would be destroyed like light and the like. And it is too complicated to assume even in this case that they are produced [again and again] in every moment [like flames]. For particular totality of causes as is seen in the case of oil [poured one by one into a lamp and causing each flame], is not seen [in this case]. And recognition (pratyabhijñā) of a jewel and the like is not erroneous knowledge (bhrānti) [like recognition of flames] because of mutual dependence: it can be proved to be erroneous only if [a jewel etc.] are proved to be broken into pieces, and they can be proved to be so only if [the recognition] is proved to be wrong.

[Obj.] If they are partly broken into pieces, as in the case of a Campaka flower which is the substratum of broken perfume, the [erroneous] recognition [is possible].

[Ans.] Not so; because concerning recognition, the answer is already given [by pointing out the mutual dependence]. And if you accept another substance based on our experience, there is no room for the assumption that [the recognition] is erroneous. And the similarity between effulgence [and the flowers] is cast off because the perception of perfume inevitably follows a particular course of wind and because it is seen that even if the substratum such as a Campaka disappears its perfume persists. In summer night and

²⁷⁸ According to YMD IV. 39, tejas is classified into bhauma, divya, audarya (gastric) and ākaraja (mineral). The explanation on them is seen in YMD IV. 40.

the like, though hotness, [whose substratum is a broken part of fire (tejas)], is experienced, effulgence (prabhā) itself does not exist; [accordingly, effulgence cannot be a part of fire].²⁷⁹ [114] And the fact that [effulgence] is thick in its root and is thin in its end is grasped depending on our experience; [hence, it has parts].

[Obj.] But Varadavishṇu-miśra gave effulgence as the instance of expansion and contraction of the knowledge of the self, which does not have any part, and said:

*Effulgence has no part, because its part is not cognized [?].

[Ans.] It must be understood as based on the intention that [effulgence] is deprived of a part which is capable of being split (chedana) or cut (bhedana).

And [effulgence] is not independent, because it is cognized as not being established separately from a lamp and the like.

Effulgent one (prabhāvat) is light which is qualified by effulgence. And it is of many forms such as a jewel and the sun.

1.6.5.5 Its characters

(114,4–115,2)

Due to the difference of its own nature depending upon particular totality of causes, fire has the distinction in causing removal of grief [in the case of the sun], removal of joy and high tide (vṛddhi) [in the case of the moon], cooking [in the case of ordinary fire], illuminating [in the case of a lamp] and so on. Flames burning up are also due to [the difference of its nature] or unseen power.

Though it has red and brilliant color as its one and only nature, its variety of color is perceived due to the difference in its conjunction with water and so on. It is proved by the śruti:

*Whatever red color fire has, [it is the color of fire] [ChUp VI. iv. 1], and so on.

[Obj.: (1) Fieriness exists in a white thing, because it is genus (jāti) directly pervaded by the substance-ness which exists in a colored thing, like wateriness; (2) fire is white, because it is different from earth though it has color, like water].

[Ans.] Such affirmative and negative relations (anvavyatireka²⁸⁰) used by the

²⁷⁹ This is based on the second interpretation of R. The first one (K) is: nanu prabhāśrayāvinābhūtatvaṃ prabhāyā nāsti, astamite 'pi sūrye aushṇyādyānapagamadarśanena tadāśrayaprabhāyā apy avasthiter ity āśaṃkhyā, upalabhyamānaushṇyāśrayasya prabhādravyātirikatvān na dosha ity āha.

²⁸⁰ The commentators interpreted it in three ways: (1) there are affirmative syllogism [a] and negative one [b]; (2) if fire increases whiteness increase, and if fire decreases whiteness decrease; (3) syllogism [a] has anvavyatirekavyāpti. The second one is seen only in R.

Vaiśeṣhika and so on in order to prove [fire] is white are sublated by the [above-mentioned] śruti and can be explained in another way²⁸¹ **[115]**. Concerning cognition that a disc (maṇḍala) of the midday sun is white, it is also possible that it is based on a watery part supporting the disc whose touch, [i.e. coolness], is not manifested but whose color, [i.e., white], is manifested. And whether qualities are manifested or not is not fixed as is admitted in other cases.

1.6.6 ap (115,3–7)

From fire, a subtle element of taste (rasatanmātra) [is produced].

From the latter, water (ap) [is produced].

Its definition is: having cool touch, not having smell but having specific taste, and so on. Though it has white [color], sweet [taste] and cool [touch] as its one and only nature, the variety of color, taste and touch is superimposed due to the difference in the conjunction with its substratum and so on. Distinction in qualities of fire, water and food is discussed in detail when we explain non-substance.²⁸² Inherently it has fluidity (dravatva). Hail and the like, though they are composed of water, have solidness due to coagulation (upashṭhambha).

[Water] assists through nourishing vital breath (rasana) and the taste. That it is a body is clear in bodies in the case of the world of Varuṇa filled with water. That [it is] an object [is clear] in river and ocean.

1.6.7 pṛthivī (115,8–117,2)

From water, a subtle element of smell (gandhatanmātra) [is produced].

From the latter, earth (pṛthivī) [is produced].

Its definition is: having peculiar touch; having taste and having specific touch, and so on **[116]**.

First it is born as having fragrant [smell], sweet [taste], black [color] and touch neither hot nor cold. Therefore being neither hot nor cool is always consistent. It is conditioned on the copresence or the coabsence (anvayavyatireka) of the limiting adjunct (upādhi) by fire or water that [earth] is perceived as having hotness or coolness. Its blackness is self-evident, as is proved by the śruti.²⁸³ Due to the difference in baking, it is born as having the variety of color. That it has fragrance as its own nature is also

²⁸¹ anyathāsiddha = aprayojaka, vipakṣhe bādhakābhāvāt (K).

²⁸² Chap. 5 adravya-sara: .

²⁸³ See ChUp VI. iv. 1: yat kṛṣṇaṃ tad annasya.

established by the maxim of general rule (autsargika). And continuity of sweetness in water, which is its [material] cause, is grasped [also in earth] so long as there is no sublation. Though it has solidity, in some cases its fluidity is perceived due to the association with water, heat and so on.

And its assistance is through nourishing the mind and the faculty of smell.

That it is a body is clear in human being, animals, plants (sthāvara) and the like.

That it is an object [is clear] in clay, stones, food, herbs (aushadhi), darkness and the like.

It is true that all that are referred to as an object and so on will be said as a body regarding God or regarding the soul qualified by each object, we classify [them into an object and a body] from the viewpoint of the difference in degree of usefulness for the usage of ordinary people and practically use [these two words] [117]. The Vaiśeṣhika also referred to even what is accepted as a body as an object:

*An object is characterized by clay, stones and plants.²⁸⁴ [Prašastapādabhāshya, on pṛthivī]

For they explain for themselves that plants are bodies.

1.6.8 tamas (117,4–126,3)

1.6.8.1 It is substance and included in earth (117,4–123,1)

Darkness (tamas) is substance and is composed of earth; because it is object of unsublated cognition that it is blue [like a blue pot²⁸⁵] and [moving].²⁸⁶

[Obj.] Because of [the general rule that] there is not visibility if there is no light [and there is visibility if there is light], [the cognition of darkness, which is generated in the absence of light], is sublated.

[Ans.] Not so, because there is inconstancy (vyabhicāra) in view of light, [which is visible without another light].

[Obj.] Excepting [the knowledge of light], [the above-mentioned rule holds good].

[Ans.] Still it is not right; because even if there is not [light], darkness, accepted by you [as the non-existence of light], is visible.

²⁸⁴ vishayas tu dvyaṇukādikramenārabdhas trividho mṛtpāshāṇasthāvaralakṣhaṇaḥ (GOS ed. [with Nyāyakandalī], §52 p.106). The italic portion is omitted here.

²⁸⁵ Some MSS mentioned in K add ghaṭavat after °vishayatvāt. According to K, it means ‘like a blue pot’; but U makes this reading (with a parenthesis) contain the next sentence.

²⁸⁶ ādi refers to moving (K).

[Obj.] In order to establish the [assistant] capability ([sahakāri-]yogyatā) [for visibility of darkness], whose definition is totality of causes other than [the essential capability (svarūpayogyatā) such as being other than heaviness (gurutva)], and in order to avoid the contradiction [that darkness can be seen with light], we should approve that [light is not the cause for the visual knowledge of darkness]²⁸⁷ **[119]**.

[Ans.] Even in this case, you must know [that darkness is positive entity] for fear that you deny its form perceived [as blue and moving]. For what needs the other in some cases does not always need it: touch needs wind to grasp coolness of sweat and the like, but touch does not need wind to grasp hotness.

Some holds that [darkness is] non-existence of light,²⁸⁸ non-existence of particular cognition, [that is, absence of cognition of color],²⁸⁹ or pure notion of blueness.²⁹⁰ These opinions are, however, rejected [respectively²⁹¹] for the reason that [darkness] is perceived as [not negative but] positive **[120]**, that [the opinion] would be contradictory to our ordinary experience [that darkness has blue color], and that [darkness] appears as that which has qualities (dharmin), that is, it is something blue. It is true that [the words] dissolution (pralaya), destruction (vināśa), termination (avasāna) and the like are used in positive sense, but they permit a room for the theory that [they are] non-existent; because [in these cases] we do not perceive other entity clearly [while in the case of darkness we clearly perceive other entity possessing dark color and motion], and because all notion of them is established as “... of something” **[121]**. Critics says that touch [in darkness] is not perceived, [though all colored things have touch]; it can be explained as in the case of light of a blue diamond.

Scriptures support the fact that darkness is substance etc., because they describe its creation as in the case of other entities:

²⁸⁷ “If light were also included in causes for the perception of darkness, the capability for its visibility would be lost because the absence of light [=darkness, according to the opponent], cannot coexist with light. On the contrary, the object [=darkness] itself would be non-existent due to this contradiction” (R). K, however, interprets as follows: if darkness is substance, light would be included in causes for its visibility as in the case of a pot; in order to avoid this contradiction, if darkness is non-existence of light, we can accept that darkness is visible without light.

²⁸⁸ This is the opinion of the major Vaiśeshikas. See Vaiśeshika Sūtra V. ii. 21f. (the number in the commentary of Candrānanda), Kiraṇāvalī 83–112 (Bibliotheca Indica ed.), etc.

²⁸⁹ This is the opinion of Śrī Rāmamiśra. See R on the Śa arthasaṃkṣhepa quoted below: rūpapatītyabhāva eva tama iti bhāvaḥ [121,15].

²⁹⁰ This is the opinion of Śrīdhara. See Nyāyakandalī §18 [on dravya in general, §4 in VizSS] pp.32–35 (GOS ed.).

²⁹¹ pakshatrayam api krameṇa pratikshipati (R K).

*Bhagavat created darkness [?],

and because they mention its dissolution with other effects and light:

*There is not darkness, nor light, nor other [?].

If [darkness] were [mere] non-existence of light, it would be contradictory to the fact that they mention the dissolutions of both darkness and light [separately]. Moreover the Brāhmaṇa of Inner Controller describes not only light but also darkness as [His] body:

*Whose body is darkness [BṛhUp III. vii. 13].

And the [Śrī-]Bhāshya comments on it:

*In the same way, concerning water, fire, sky, air, the sun, regions (dik), the moon, stars, ether, darkness and light [ŚrīBh I. ii. 19; 316,7] and so on.

[Obj.] But the Śa arthasaṃkṣhepa²⁹² says in refuting the inference of the non-knowledge (ajñāna) as positive entity:

*Darkness is not substance, as it appears even if we close the eyes. A blind man, however, cannot grasp [darkness] in the eyes. And our practical usage supports it. [Śa arthasaṃkṣhepa]

[Ans.] It is said [as prima facie view] by other schools or only by one sect [of our school], because it is contradictory to śrutis, smṛtis and the [Śrī-]Bhāshya.²⁹³ Appearing even when we close the eyes is also similar to the case that eyes injured by bile (pitta) grasp some bile. [You may say a blind man could not use the word darkness because it is impossible for him even to see something in the eyes], but a congenital blind man does not practically use [the word darkness] as substance [122]; even an acquired blind man, though the substratum of his sense faculty has some problems, can grasp something in the eyes without contradiction, because capacity of the faculty remains to some extent.

[Obj.] Darkness is not substance; because it is grasped when light is not existent; like non-existence of light.

[Ans.] It is not valid [inference]. For the Prabhākara school, [who denies non-existence as separate category], there are neither the reason nor the instance. For the followers of Udayana, [who assert darkness is non-existence of light], there is no distinction

²⁹² It is written by Śrī Rāmamiśra (b. 1074), a pupil of Rāmānuja [Raghavan 1979: 17; Singh 118].

²⁹³ ŚrīBh, in the pūrvapakṣa of the Advaita, deals with tamas in reference to an inference to prove bhāvarūpa-avidyā, and concludes that tamas is substance [I. i. 1: (2) 11,2–12,1]; this view is not denied afterwards (Cf. ŚP (2) 12,21: tamo dravyam ity eva Bhāshyakāra-matam, siddhānte tasyādūshitatvāt).

between the subject and the instance. For those who assert darkness is mere [blue] color, there is inconstancy (vyabhicāra) in view of something seen by an owl and the like. Even if you add an attribute “by human eyes” [to the reason], [still there is inconstancy] in view of something seen by yogins. Even if you add an attribute “[by human eyes] excepting those of yogins,” [still there is inconstancy] in view of something grasped by eyes anointed with magic ointment (añjana). Even if you add an attribute “[by human eyes] without excellent unseen power, magic ointment and the like,” you can hardly avoid sublation or contradiction: for example, darkness is different from blue color (nīlīma) because it is the object of unsublated cognition that it is the substratum of blueness.

Varada-guru says in his Tattvasāra:

*We know what is called darkness, which is thin and thick, blue and moving, as substance. No sublation has not been seen by anybody anywhere [123]. Accordingly, [to the objection that darkness is non-existence because it pervades the inside of big room as soon as light is put out], we can assume the reason [that it is like light pervades the inside of big room soon after the ignition],²⁹⁴ and right knowledge based on Scriptures conquers [the objection]. Indeed our experience shows that eyes manifest it without light. [Tattvasāra v. 28; on the antaryāmi-adhikaraṇa]

[Obj.] Thus let our established theory (siddhānta) be that darkness is substance. But the statement of the author of the [Śrī-]Bhāṣya does prove that it is composed of earth.²⁹⁵

[Ans.] Not so, because it is concluded by the principle of remainder (pariśeṣha) due to the statement that [darkness] is made of prakṛti and that it is blue. That is, [entities] made of prakṛti up to air have no quality of color; water and light have no black color, as is said by the śruti:

*Whatever red color fire has..., [ChUp VI. iv. 1]

and so on.²⁹⁶

²⁹⁴ These objection and answer are based on R and K. The Ratnasāriṇī [published as MGOS vol. 74], a commentary on the Tattvasāra by Vīrarāghava (fl. 18 c. [Raghavan 64]), explains in another way. This verse is cited in ŚP (2) 12,19f. without specific explanation.

²⁹⁵ E.g. ŚP (2) 12,22f.: svacchadravyatvād ākāśakāryaṃ tamaḥ; rūpavatvaṃ pañcīkaraṇād upapadyate/ yadvā, tejaḥkāryaṃ tmaḥ; rūpavatvāt; sparśānupalambhaḥ svacchadravyatvāt.

²⁹⁶ yad agne rohitaṃ rūpaṃ tejasas tad rūpam, yac chuklaṃ tad apām, yat kṛṣṇaṃ tad annasya.

1.6.8.2 On the description of the Tattvaratnākara (123,2–126,3)

[Obj.] It is said in the Tattvaratnākara that darkness (tamas) is nothing but mūlaprakṛti (primordial cause):

*Bowling to Hari, tamas is explained; it²⁹⁷ bounds people if they slight Him, and it set them free if they resort to Him.

Accordingly, the examination on it should not be neglected as that on teeth of a crow, because we try to remove it only after we understand it bounds us.

Wise men have different opinions about what makes us grasp its nature and origin and so on. That is why questions arise. Now we will explain [to remove them].

1) According to the Vaiśeshika, tamas is non-existence of light. 2) According to the followers of Prabhākara, tamas does not exist; the cause for the practical usage of tamas is nothing but the absence of memory²⁹⁸ concerning blue color²⁹⁹ **[124]**. 3) According to the followers of Kumārila, it is assumed as another substance. 4) According to those who know the truth, tamas is entity called pradhāna. [Tattvaratnākara]

And putting down the third opinion after the criticism of both the first and the second, it says:

*On this point, those who know the truth assert that divine māyā composed of guṇas³⁰⁰ is thought to be external or internal tamas being in gross or subtle condition. [Tattvaratnākara]

Therefore, the principle of remainder cannot prove it is of earth.

[Ans.] It is not correct. First, [darkness] cannot be mūlaprakṛti, because its creation and dissolution are described with that of [mūlaprakṛti's] modifications. And the Brāhmaṇa of Inner Controller mentions tamas as opposed to light and is other than the primordial tamas separately as [His] body through [God's] entrance into a group of effects.³⁰¹ And tamas as the primordial cause cannot be grasped by perception. And there is the following verse in smṛti:

*There was neither day nor night, nor sky nor earth, nor darkness (tamas) nor

²⁹⁷ According to K, the subject is tamas.

²⁹⁸ smṛtipramośa means memory deprived of the substratum or the substratum-ness (R, K).

²⁹⁹ nilabhāvarūpa. R and K suggest a better reading omitting bhāva.

³⁰⁰ Cf. daivī hy eshā guṇamayī mama māyā (BhG VII. 14).

³⁰¹ R and K refer to the following passage: yasyāvyaktaṃ śārīraṃ... yasyākshāraṃ śārīraṃ... yasya tamaḥ śārīraṃ... But BṛhUp III. vii does not mention avyakta and akshara, and SubālaUp 7 does not mention tamas.

light, nor any other. Only one primordial cause³⁰² which is not grasped by sense organs such as ears, Brahman and the self (pums) were there at that time. [ViP I. ii. 23]

[Obj.] All the [fact that tamas is perceptible or it is separately His body] is possible if [tamas as the primordial cause] is the substratum of other condition.

[Ans.] True, that is what we would like to say.

[Obj.] But “other condition” is different from the condition of earth.

[Ans.] Not so, [it is nothing but the condition of earth] due to the above-mentioned principle of remainder.

[Obj.] Then, why are its creation and so on described as different from those of earth?

[Ans.] You should interpret as in the case of the heaven or the sky.³⁰³

[Obj.] Why is the usage of the word “tamas” common [to the primordial cause and darkness]? **[125]**

[Ans.] The common usage can be explained in another way because it has many meanings; for example, the word “prakāśa” is common to knowledge and light. Or rather, based on dominant tamas as guṇa, our practical usage [of the word “tamas”] to both is possible.

[Obj.] How [do you explain] the passage of the Tattvaratnākara, then?

[Ans.] As a matter of fact, we also have doubt. For this work had not been written up to the conclusion of the opening declaration (pratijñā), by which we could decide the meaning. That is, this book is interrupted till the end of the śloka,

*On this point, those who know the truth assert...

As far as the part written down, however, it is not contradictory to what we have said; because something composed of earth is also included in the entity called primordial cause, for we do not hold the theory that an effect is not existent in its cause (asatkāryavāda). And if the author intended to start the examination on prakṛti and all its effects, the passage beginning with

*It bounds people if they slight Him...

is justified. Concerning the śloka,

*On this point, those who know the truth assert... **[126]**,

we find the same intention because it classifies [tamas] into

*being in gross or subtle condition.

³⁰² prādhānya: svārthe ṭhaK-pratyayaḥ [Vishṇucittīya].

³⁰³ See R̥gveda X. 90. (purushasūkta) 14ab: n bhyā āsīd antārikshaṃ śīrshṇó dyáuḥ sám avartata.

Or rather, there is a certain other condition of prakṛti called darkness which is like dark color of new and dense cloud and is devoid of smell, touch and taste. Even in this case, it is not proved to be another substance.

1.7 The number of principles

1.7.1 The number of principles are twenty-four (126,4–6)

Thus twenty-four principles (tattva) was examined. The statement on creation of less [principles] such as:

*From ātman, ether was produced [TaiUp II. ii. 1],

*It created light [ChUp VI. ii. 3],

are not to deny the creations of other principles; because, equally based on the authority, they cannot be neglected. And people say:

*[Those who describe fully] say that from milk this³⁰⁴ is produced, from this that, and from that yoghurt; [those who describe briefly] say that from milk yoghurt is produced: what is the deference between two? [?]

1.7.2 On the categorization of the Śaiva (126,7–130,9)

For this reason, those who assert thirty-six principles are also rejected. They assert as follows. On summary of the principles:

*In the scripture of the Śaiva, [what should be known] first is threefold: the lord (pati), cattle (paśu) and bandages (pāśā) in order [127]. Among them, the lord is said to be Śiva, cattle are the selves (aṇu³⁰⁵), and bandages are five entities [Tattvaprakāśa].

On classification of the bandages:

*The five entities are impurity (mala), karma, māyā, all the world produced from māyā, concealing capacity (tirodhānakārī śaktiḥ) [Tattvaprakāśa].

On clarification of eternal principles being the abode of the creation and the dissolution:

*At the big dissolution of things, māyā, the self and Śiva remain. At the creation, it starts again in the previous way [Tattvaprakāśa].

On enumeration of the principles:

*In the beginning and the end [of the world], five pure principles are reported: Śiva, [128] capacity (śakti), the eternal Śiva (sadāśiva), God (īśvara) and knowledge (vidyā).

³⁰⁴ kalila etc. (R, K).

³⁰⁵ In the Śaiva, jīva is called aṇu, but it is thought to be vibhu.

From māyā, in order to help the self to be knower and doer, five principles is produced: time (kāla), controlling power (niyati), kalā, knowledge (vidyā) and passion (rāga).

From māyā, the principle endowed with [three] qualities, namely avyakta, is produced. Following that, the principles, buddhi, ahaṁkāra, manas (cetas), faculties of knowledge and action and tanmātras, are produced. [Tattvaprakāśa].

In this doctrine, we have no objection on the classification into spiritual, non-spiritual and God, their eternality and so on. [In our doctrine], however, God is different from well-known Śiva, but is Nārāyaṇa described by the word “eternal auspicious (śāsvataśiva).” And He is one who possesses the body (śarīrin) for spiritual and non-spiritual in all conditions. These difference between [the Śaiva and] those who hold Upanishads and the like will be explained in [the chapter on] God.

As to their enumeration of the principles, we do not have objection too much on the five pure principles; because, strictly speaking, they are included in one principle and they are said only by them. That is, they say so by themselves:

*Among these [pure] principles, there is not order, because they are devoid of time, [which is produced later]. Depending upon the functions, assumption of them are fixed in our scriptures.

In fact, there is only one principle which is called Śiva and possesses various capacities [129]. The variety of it is assumed depending upon the difference among the capacities. [Tattvaprakāśa]

Passion (rāga) defined by them as

*Passion is composed of attachment [Tattvaprakāśa],

which is nothing but one of the qualities of the self, is not another product of prakṛti. In so far as the contact with prakṛti produce passion of the self, we accept their opinion.

[Obj.] Through the effect called passion, we assume its cause as another principle.

[Ans.] No, because it can be produced only through the knowledge that it causes happiness and the like. Otherwise, we should assume another principle concerning effects such as hate.

Knowledge (vidyā) is also described as follows:

*The principle knowledge in the form of light, which causes to present an object for the self whose capacity of doer is manifested [by kalā] is produced due to its peculiarity as an instrument [Tattvaprakāśa].

On this point, however, multitude of instruments for right knowledge such as mind alone is enough to present an object; accordingly, we do not accept another instruments.

And kalā is described as follows:

*From māyā, kalā [is produced] following [niyati]. It conceals impurity (mala) of the self on one side, and manifests his capacity of doer. That is why it is called kalā³⁰⁶ here.

With time and niyati, which always possess subordination (upasarjanatā), it brings about its own function up to earth. [Tattvaprakāśa]. **[130]**

On this point, however, we accept one condition of prakṛti which causes condition of avyakta and is called by the word akshara. Let it be that you use the word kalā or another word in this meaning. Still that it manifests capacity of doer is not accepted; because only knowledge (jñāna), desire, good and bad act and the like manifest it, and knowledge and so on depend on the organs (indriya) and the like.

The technical interpretation [on the niyati] is as follows:

*The niyati is in the form of control (niyamana). It also is produced from māyā afterwards. All is controlled by it; accordingly, it is called that which controls (niyati). [Tattvaprakāśa].

If the word “control” here means the capacity of a controller, the niyati is nothing but the will of God and the like. If [the word] means that fixed fruits necessarily come out, the niyati is in the form of virtue, sin and so on. If [the word] means producing various effects, the niyati is fixed capacity of various entities. Thus it is not another material principle. It is true that some [texts] of the Pañcarātra and the like, which are authority [for us], describe the creation of niyati, but it should be thought, based on the import of each [text], as counting down of a specific accepted principle and its capacity separately. [Your] logical argument is always rejected, but the scripture is not.

1.7.3 Especially on time (130,10–141,8)

1.7.3.1 Time is eternal and all-pervasive (130,10–132,1)

That time is produced from māyā is sublated by [scriptures] such as,

*Time as God is without beginning and its end is not known, a man of twice-born. [ViP I. ii. 26].

And the reductio ad absurdum (tarka) is as follows:

(12) If there were no time after one point of time or before it, before-ness or after-ness in your statement would not be established.

(13) [You may say that there is no time in the past spatial position or the future spatial position, but it is not true]. As for another spatial position (deśa), practical usage

³⁰⁶ < kalA (X 64) kshepe.

that it is in present, it was in past, it will be in future and so on, is possible as far as it is based on time. Therefore [another spatial position] would not be also established if there were no [time].

Although time is not the cause [of modification] in the eternal manifestation (nityavibhūti), it is not non-existent due to the expressions such as,

*He cooks time; no time is there [in His eternal manifestation], there is the Lord alone³⁰⁷ [MBh XII. 25. 9],

*Of which manifestation, time, composed of kalā, muhūrta and so on,³⁰⁸ is not the cause of modification (pariṇāma) [ViP IV. i. 84].

Otherwise, **[131]** it would be contradictory to the statement,

*Sages always see... [NṛsiṃhapūrvatāpinīUp V. 10],

and the like.

And it is proved to be the efficient cause of various effects properly by means of the examination of coexistence and coabsence³⁰⁹ (anvayavyatireka) and the scripture [quoted above]. And that [it is the efficient cause] is due to some limiting adjuncts (upādhi) [such as movement of the sun].³¹⁰ But according to the opinion that [time] has transformation (savikāra), time is only the material cause concerning its modifications (vikāra) [such as kshaṇa, muhūrta etc.]; because there is not another form as the efficient cause. **[132]**

(14) Because only by one moment (kshaṇa) it can be the attribute of all this [world], not only time but also [every] moments of it are all-pervasive (vyāpin) // 14 //

1.7.3.2 Time is changing

(132,2–136,8)

And [time] has transformation, which is said in the śrutis such as,

³⁰⁷ Cited in VAS §42 also.

³⁰⁸ According to ViP I. iii. 8–9, 15 nimeshas = 1 kāshṭhā (3.2 sec.); 30 kāshṭhās = 1 kalā (1.6 min.); 30 kālās = 1 muhūrta (48 min.); 30 muhūrtas = a day. But different computation is found in the Manusmṛti [I. 64] etc. See Wilson's translation of ViP ad loc., fn.

³⁰⁹ When it is spring, there are a mango-fruit and a kusuma-flower; when it is not, there are not (R, K).

³¹⁰ Concerning partite (akhaṇ a) time, anvayavyatireka is impossible; concerning impartite (khaṇ a) time, it is possible (R). The Viśiṣṭādvaitin holds that it does not matter if time is khaṇ a or akhaṇ a. See Vucci's Vedāntakālikāvali, kālanirūpaṇa 1cd–4ab: akhaṇ akhaṇ abhedena sa kālo dvividho mataḥ //1// ādyo vibhur bhūtabhāvivatmānatvadhikaraḥ / nimeshādiprabhedena bahubhedas tv asau mataḥ //2// akhaṇ akāla evāyaṃ nitya ity avagamyate / kālāḥ svakāryaṃ prati tu syād upādānakāraṇam //3// kāryarūpas tato naiva nitya ity avadhāryatām /; YMD V. 7. In this regard, see also van Buitenen 1956: 213, n.188.

*From the shining person, all nimeshas, kalās, muhūrtas, kāshṭhās, days, half-months, months and seasons were born [MahānārāyaṇaUp I. 8];

and smṛtis such as,

*He [modifies] time [MBh XII]

*[Time], composed of (maya³¹¹) kalā, muhūrta and so on [ViP IV. i. 84].

[Obj.] This [śruti] can be explained as the description of production of god or limiting adjunct.

[Ans.] You should not suspect so, because there is no sublation on its natural meaning.

App. Causation in eternal and all-pervasive entities (132,4–136,4)

[Obj.] The sublation is that an all-pervasive thing (vibhu) cannot be transformed.

[133]

[Ans.] Not so, because we do not accept the transformation characterized by decrease and [increase] of parts, and [the transformation characterized by] mere becoming another condition is not contradictory to [all-pervasiveness]. Otherwise, an all-pervasive thing itself could not be established. For all-pervasiveness is [defined as] having conjunctions with all limited things (mūrta)³¹²; accordingly, you cannot help admitting [transformation] in the form of conjunction at last. You might think that no [substance including God] is all-pervasive for the reason that [every substance is transformed though] the transformation [of all-pervasive thing] is inappropriate; if it were so, the all-pervasiveness of time would be denied because it is transformed. Nevertheless, its transformation would not [be denied] for the reason that it is all-pervasive [because its transformation is proved by the above-mentioned scriptures].³¹³

Moreover, why does being transformed sublate all-pervasiveness?

[Obj.] Because there is no proof on being the cause. **[134]**

[Ans.] First, it is not general statement. That is,

(15) Whether [the statement] that there is no relation between the cause and the effect is said with the intention of understanding or not, your statement is rejected: in the first

³¹¹ Here mayaṭ means vikāra (K). See Pāṇini IV. iii. 134 & 143.

³¹² Cf. Tarkadīpikā §14: sarvamūrtadravyasamyogitvaṃ vibhutvaṃ, mūrtatvaṃ paricchinnaparimāṇavattvaṃ kriyāvattvaṃ vā.

³¹³ According to R and the comment of K on it: Śrīmad-Raṃgarāmānujamunibhis tu dravyeshu sarvatra vikāritvasya pramāṇasiddhatayā tadanupapattyā vibhudravyam eva na svīkriyata iti mate 'pi, kālasya vibhutvābhāve 'pi vikāritvaṃ nishpratyūham ity abhprāyakatayā vyākhyātaḥ. According to K's own interpretation, the translation would be somehow different.

case [you should accept the usage of words] makes an effect, [therefore, it is contradictory to your statement]; in the second case [the usage of words] do not make any effect, [therefore, your statement is meaningless].

(16) As for [an effect] which has a limit, the previous limit is its cause and the last one is its end. Without any limit, an effect would be eternal or non-existent at all.

[Obj.] We hardly grasp that an eternal and all-pervasive thing is a cause, because it has no negative relation (vyatireka) in time and space, though it has positive relation (anvaya).³¹⁴

[Ans.] Not so. **[135]** For, even if there are not both [relation], that [an eternal and all-pervasive thing such as ether is the cause of quality such as sound] is proved by [inferences³¹⁵ or scriptures] which make grasp something qualified (dharmin). And in general the positive relation and the negative relation [between quality and its cause or substratum] can be shown. It is the principle of remainder (pāriśeshya) and the like that proves something proved in general [as the substratum of the quality] is all-pervasive and [eternal].

[Obj.] There is the invariable concomitance that something transformed is not all-pervasive.

[Ans.] Not so, because there is inconstancy in view of God and His knowledge **[136]:** if the two were also included in the subject, [the inference] would be sublated by śrutis.

[Obj.] There is no defect because God is not transformed.

[Ans.] No, because His transformation in the form of conjunction, desire of the creation and so on should be inevitably accepted.

The impossibilities of alternative that the [transformation] is entire or partial and the like, however, would bring the theory that [everything] is void, because they are valid not only in the case of all-pervasive substance but also in the case of something other than all-pervasive substance [such as genus (jāti), conjunction, knowledge, sound, atom]. And applying God, they are refuted by the author of the [Brahma-]Sūtra, as follows:

*[Obj.] Entire [Brahman] would enter [the effect], [or the sacred word on His being devoid of parts would be contradicted] [BrSū II. i. 26].

*[Ans.] On account of scriptures, however, [it is not so]; because [His power] is

³¹⁴ The same objection and answer are seen in Udayana's Nyāyakusumāñjali I. 19 (Vīraraghavachari's note).

³¹⁵ For example: śabdādīḥ kiṃcidāśrito guṇatvād rūpādivat (R).

founded [only] by the sacred word [BrSū II. i. 27].

And the Vedārthasaṃgraha states that kalā and so on are things transformed:

*His great appearance, which is infinite and not touched by the transformation caused by time whose proper form has countless division beginning with nimesha, kāshṭhā, kalā, muhūrta³¹⁶ and up to parārdha³¹⁷ and which is the efficient cause of the all transformation such as origination, maintenance and resorption of the world... [VAS §42; 95,6f.]

And in the Nītimālā Nārāyaṇa-ārya says:

*Time is without beginning and end; it has divisions such as muhūrta, day and night being transformed in every moment; it the cause of the transformation and movement. [Nītimālā] [137]

1.7.3.3 Time is perceptible and cannot be proved by mere inference

(137,1–141,8)

And [time] is perceptible. That is to say,

(17) In perception every entity appears as being in present. This [presentness] is not [the entity] itself, because there is difference in the knowledge: [the former is perceived as the qualifier; the latter as the qualified]. Nor is it [caused by] limiting adjunct (upādhi) [such as movement of the sun]; because [the movement needs another limiting adjunct to bring about its presentness, thus] endless regression would be resulted.

(18) [Obj.] This [limiting adjunct] can bring about [presentness] not only of other [entities] but also of itself; [accordingly, another limiting adjunct is not necessary].

[Ans.] If it were so, why isn't it so in the previous one, [namely, the entity itself]?

[Obj.] Let it be so: [the entity itself can bring about its presentness; we do not have to assume time as another principle].

[Ans.] To those who say so, scriptures are powerful enough [to prove the existence of time in the form of presentness]. [138]

(19) It is proved by our experience that something proved by [the scriptures, time], is perceptible.

[Obj.: Our experience cannot deny the possibility that the object of present knowledge is the previous non-existence (prāgabhāva) of various entities].

³¹⁶ See the note on ViP IV. i. 84 quoted in 130,16.

³¹⁷ A half existence of Brahmā. Cf. ViP I. iii. 27.

[Ans.] It is preferable that present knowledge has [time] as its object, because it is simpler.

(20) And this [present] knowledge is not based on some indicating marks (laiṃgika), [i.e., it is not inference]; because there is not consideration (vimarśa) on indicating marks and the like.³¹⁸

[You may assert that time can be inferred, because] there is consideration on indicating marks, [namely, temporary remoteness (paratva) belonging to an older thing and temporary nearness (aparatva) belonging to a younger thing. And the former is based on the larger number of connections with movement of the sun; the latter is based on the smaller number of them. Movement of the sun, however, cannot directly connect with a thing. Therefore we should assume something bringing about the connection. It is only time that can be the link].³¹⁹

Nevertheless it can be explained in other ways and we do not grasp logical argument [to reject the explanations]. **[139]**

(21) For limited [entities] mutually connected [with movement of the sun and a thing] or all-pervasive [entities] directly conjunct with the [two], e.g. ether, which are accepted by both of us, **[140]**

(22) causing the larger number of connections with movement of the sun and the smaller number of them, establish temporary remoteness and temporary nearness and the like; [therefore we do not have to assume the other principles, time]. Otherwise, it would be complicated.

(23) Even if an entity established [by both of us] is assumed as something causing that much, the world is not mixed, as in the case of the other [entity, namely time, assumed by you].

(24) If you accept temporary remoteness and [temporary nearness] as the connection with time, you have to approve that time is perceptible because the indicating mark is established. **[141]**

(25) Therefore mere inference cannot prove the existence of the other [entity called] time.

Moreover, if it were proved only by scriptures, ordinary people could not use the word.

Believing that it is hard to accomplish time by mere logical argument, the

³¹⁸ Here liṃga means liṃgatva or vyāpti, and ādi indicates pakshadhrmatā (K).

³¹⁹ In this regards, R refers to the Nyāyalīlāvati 290,3–292,1 (ChSS ed.). See also Kiraṇāvalī 348–58 (Bibliotheca Indica ed.). Nyāyakandalī is of other opinin [

Nyāyatattva says in the chapter (adhikaraṇa) on conjunction:

*Time is the number belonging to [action such as twinkling characterized by] conjunction and disjunction [of an eyelash] [Nyāyatattva], and so on. And in the section on knower (pramāṭṛ-pāda), occasionally referring to time, what is properly said³²⁰ is concluded:

*Therefore time is the number of action depending upon the same substratum, [namely the sun] [Nyāyatattva].

And in the same [section], it is explained that [time] is perceptible, as follows:

*All knowledge is experienced as connected with time. And memory, born as qualified by space and space in the form of ‘that...,’ also proves the experience of the previous time [Nyāyatattva].

And the [Śrī-]Bhāshya says in the criticism of the Jaina:

*Because time is known as mere attribute of entities, its independent existence or non-existence etc. cannot be said, nor can be rejected.³²¹ The practical usage “time exists” or “time does not exist” is same as the practical usage “genus (jāti) exists” or “genus does not exist” for users of the words [ŚrīBh II. ii. 31; 309,15–17].

And that is the reason why time is not separately counted down.

1.7.4 The number including God etc.

(141,9–142,8)

Thus in the context of the creation starting from avyakta, mahat, ahaṃkāra, [eleven] indriyas, [five] subtle elements and [five] gross elements, the individual self and the Supreme [self] are [respectively] the twenty-fifth and the twenty-sixth. Counting akshara and tamas separately or starting from either of the two and counting time separately, [the individual self and the Supreme self] are imagined respectively to be the twenty-sixth, the twenty-seventh, the twenty-eighth and so on [142]. And scriptures say:

*Some hold the [individual self] is twenty-sixth; some the twenty-seventh [MantrikāUp].

Those who assert larger number by counting sattva, rajas and tamas are rejected because we will criticize the opinion that they are substances. The explanation of those who intend to deny the number larger than twenty-five is shown in the Mokshadharma by Bhagavat Vyāsa:

*Oh king, the one is the Supreme and the other is the twenty-fifth. Sages see that

³²⁰ sūkta. svokta suggested in U seems better.

³²¹ It is stated in order to reject the Jaina theory of saptabhaṅgīnaya.

they are same because [He] abides in it [as the inner-controller]. [MBh XII.]
And the [Brahma-]Sūtra says:

*Because [Brahman] abides in [the individual self], says Kāśakṛtsna³²² [BrSū I. iv. 22].

And the [Śrī-]Bhāshya etc.³²³ explained this meaning in detail in the explanation of the grammatical coordination (sāmānādhikarāṇya).³²⁴

[Obj.] Nevertheless, it is impossible to fix the number of principles, because each gross element has following various conditions such as sunstone [of earth], snow and hail [of water], lightening and digestive fire [of fire].

[Ans.] Not so, because the [number of principles] is fixed as far as aggregate (samashṭi) condition is concerned. As for particular individual (vyashṭi) conditions after the quintuplication (pañcīkaraṇa), however, the number is not countable because they are infinite.

1.8 The creation (142,8–158,4)

1.8.1 Change is partial (142,8–143,5)

And from the part of these principles, each following [principle] is produced. For it is mentioned in śrutis³²⁵ that each previous [principle] covers each following one and remains in the effects in its own form. Otherwise, [that is, previous principle completely changed into following principle], only earth would remain **[143]**; but previous elements are established by our experience.

Concerning [five] subtle elements, some hold they are completely transformed for the reason that their covering and the like are not admitted; others hold they are also partially transformed for the reason that a body and so on are said to be composed of twenty-four principles.³²⁶ According to the first opinion, a body and so on are said to be composed of twenty-four principles including five qualities as the effects of [five] subtle elements or they are said so only to teach they are composed of all non-spiritual

³²² Fl. 350–250 B.C. [Nakamura 1983: 376].

³²³ See ŚrīBh I. i. 1, esp. vol. I (2) pp.57–62; ibid. I. i. 13; VAS §§75–76.

³²⁴ “bhinnapravṛttinimitānām śabdānām ekasminn arthe vṛttiḥ sāmānādhikarāṇyam” [VAS §26: 86,8–9; ŚrīBh I. i. 1: (1) 191,7]. Cf. Kaiyaṭa's definition (comm. on Mahābhāshya I. ii. 42) [ŚrīBh (R-Ai) 85]. See Oxford etc....

³²⁵ See “pradhānatattvam udbhūtaṃ mahāntaṃ tat samāvṛṇot [34ab] / yathā pradhānena mahān mahatā sa tathāvṛtaḥ [36cd] / ākāśhaṃ śabdamaṭraṃ tu sparsamaṭraṃ samāviśat [39ab]” [ViP I. ii] (R, K).

³²⁶ Rāmānuja seems to hold the second opinion; see GBh XIII. 5–6, quoted in 150,1ff.

principles. According to the second opinion, covering and the like [of subtle elements] are not mentioned without any intention as in the case of some [Upanishads] not mentioning the creation of some [principles].³²⁷

1.8.2 The order of the creation (143,6–146,2)

Each principle is first created at His will by God, who has the each previous principle preceding it as His body.³²⁸ Then He wishes to manifest individual names and forms³²⁹; and because these separated principles are not capable of individual creation,³³⁰ He wishes to mix them mutually. Thus having made the quintuplication with [a half of] each element and one-eighth of other four elements in the order described in the texts such as,

*A half of ether is fourfold: wind, fire, water and earth³³¹ [?] [144],

He makes a group of the individual self, entered by Himself, enter into them, and from these principles He produces the cosmic egg (brahmāṇ a) composed of elements attaining to the change called gold, enclosed by the seven covers, [namely water, fire, air, ether, ahaṃkāra, mahat and prakṛti], each following one of which is ten times thicker than the previous.³³² And after that, out of His grace (prasāda) He creates four-faced [Brahmā], whose form is filled with all spiritual entities dwelling inside of this egg,³³³ in any one of

³²⁷ For example, the ChUp does not mention the creation of ākāśa, mahat etc.; the TaiUp does not mention the creation of mahat etc. (R, K).

³²⁸ Cf. “tad aikshata bahu syāṃ prajāyeyeti / tat tejo 'srjata / tat teja aikshata bahu syāṃ prajāyeyeti / tad apo 'srjata /...// tā [sā in U] āpa aikshanta bahvaḥ syāma prajāyemahiit / tā annam asrjanta” [ChUp VI. ii. 3–4]; “tadabhidhyānād eva tu talliṅgāt saḥ (But He is [the cause of the world] because of marks indicating Him, His will)” [BrSū II. iii. 14].

³²⁹ Cf. “hantāham imās tisro devatā anena jīvenānupraviśya nāmarūpe vyākaravāṇi” [ChUp VI. iii. 2]; “nāmarūpe vyākaravāṇi devādivicitrasṣṣṭiṃ tannāmadheyāni ca karavāṇi” [ŚrīBh II. iv. 17; 402,23].

³³⁰ Cf. “tāsāṃ trivṛtaṃ trivṛtam ekaikāṃ karavāṇi” [ChUp VI. iii. 3]; “nānāvīryā” etc. [ViP I. ii. 52ff.], quoted in 149,7ff.

³³¹ The previous verse is: “evaṃ jāteshu bhūtāni pratyekaṃ syur dvidhā tataḥ / caturdhā bhinnam ekaikam ardham arshaṃ tathā sthitam” (R, K).

³³² daśaguṇitottara. Cf. “(1) vāli- (2) vahny- (3) anila- (4) ākāśais tato (5) bhūtādinā bahiḥ / vṛtaṃ daśaguṇair aṇ aṃ bhūtādir (6) mahatā tathā // (7) avyaktenā"vṛto brahmaṃs taiḥ sarvaḥ sahito mahān / ebhir āvaraṇaia aṇ aṃ saptabhiḥ prakṛtair vṛtam //” [ViP I. ii. 59–60]; “daśaguṇaiḥ daśaguṇottaraḥ” [Vishṇucittiya], that is, gold, composed of earth, is covered by the ten times larger watery cover, and the fiery cover is ten times larger than the watery cover, etc.

³³³ “cetanabharitavigrahaṃ iti / baddhātmasamasṭhibhūtaṃ ity arthaḥ / samasṭhitvaṃ karmavaśyajīvanāṃ taccharīrānupraviśṭatvam” (R K).

seven places, [namely His mind, His eye, His mouth, His ear, His nose, His testis and] a lotus in His navel³³⁴; out of His anger He creates Rudra, [Śiva]. In this regards, a śruti says [145]:

*Nārāyaṇa alone was; neither Brahmā nor the controller, [Rudra]. [MahāUp 1]

...

*There four-faced Brahmā was born; a person with three eyes, having a trident in his hand, was born. [MahāUp 2],

and so on. And also another śruti says:

*From Nārāyaṇa, Brahmā was born; From Nārāyaṇa, Rudra was born [NārāyaṇaUp 1],

and so on. It is stated in the Mahābhārata:

*Brahmā, [Rudra], having the dark-throat, and other gods are mentioned. Awakened do not serve them, because the fruit is limited.

These two, wise and best, are said to be born from [His] grace and anger and follow the ways making the creation and the dissolution shown by Him [MBh XII. 350. 36f.?].

And immediately God, being the inner-controller of Brahmā created by Himself, causes Brahmā, who is magnified by knowledge and power as to wonderful creation which He offers through understanding initiated in Vedas composed by Himself,³³⁵ and the various dangers to whom such as Madhu and Kaiṭabha are removed by Him,³³⁶ to form the fourteen worlds³³⁷ in the cosmic egg and to create individual names and forms abiding in these [worlds], wonderful and various, such as gods, animals, human beings, plants and a particular direction (dik) [146]; and so does He for Himself, having [Brahmā] as His body. And it is stated in the [Brahma-]Sūtra:

³³⁴ Cf. “ahaṃ prasādajas tubhyaṃ lokadhāmne svayambhuve / tvatto me mānasam janma prathamam dvijapūjitam // cākshusham vai dvitīyam me āsij janma purātanam / tvaprasādāc ca me janma tṛtīyam vācakaṃ mahat // tvatto me śrāvaṇam cāpi caturtham janma me vibho / nāsikyam caiva me janma tvattaḥ pañcamam ucyaṭe // aṇ aṇam cāpi me janma tvattaḥ shashtham vinirmitam / idaṃ ca saptamam janma padmajam me 'mitaprabha //” [Hayaśiraḥ' teaching in MBh].

³³⁵ svaprahita. Cf. “yo vai vedāṃś ca prahiṇoti tasmai” [ŚvetUp VI. 18]; “nāma rūpaṃ ca bhūtānāṃ kṛtyānāṃ ca prapañcanam / vedaśabdebhya evā'sau [āḍau?] vedādīnāṃ cakāra saḥ //” [ViP I. v. 63]; “śabda iti cen nātaḥ prabhavāt pratyakshānumānābhyām” [BrSū I. iii. 27].

³³⁶ Both demons, born from Viṣṇu, were killed by Viṣṇu when they were about to kill Brahmā. See the authority quoted in R and K.

³³⁷ Upper worlds: bhūrloka, bhuvārloka, svarloka, mahārloka, janaloka, tapoloka, satyaloka; lower worlds: atala, vitala, sutala, rasātala, talātala, mahātala, pātāla [YMD IV. 69–70].

*But the creation of names and forms belongs to [Him], who makes the triplication (trivṛtkurvāt), because of the teachings [BrSū II. iv. 17].

He causes [Hari] to take back [the worlds]; and so does He for Himself, having Hari as His body.

App. Direction (146,3–149,3)

[Obj.] Why can direction, eternal and all-pervasive, be an effect³³⁸?

[Ans.] The question is not right, because direction is not proved as an eternal and all-pervasive substance. For the statement referring to west, east, far, near and so on [147] can be explained according to the circumstances as based on various [all-pervasive] substances accepted by both of us such as ether which bring about the connection (upahita³³⁹) with various limiting adjuncts, or based on particular limiting adjuncts which are thought to explain the difference [in direction], east etc., and are connected indirectly by conjunction with something conjunct with other limited entity. You may say that direction should be assumed as another new [substance] by giving up well-known [all-pervasive substance] such as ether in order to avoid the excessive application (atiprasaṅga) that everything is endowed with every quality, but it is same as avoiding Gaṅgā and run to mirage for fear that the former might perish not only sin but also merit.

(26) Comparing to the assumption of another new [substance] as something having the nature to bring about that much, you had better assume it is a substance (dharmin) already established that brings about that much. [148]

[Obj.] Let it be that direction is other than ether because the śrutis mention its separate creation and dissolution, for example:

*From His two feet earth [was born]; from His ear direction [was born] [RgVeda X. 90. 14],

*Directions [into] the ear [?].

[Ans.] No, because it can be explained as the creation of the presiding deity (abhimānidevatā³⁴⁰) or the limiting adjunct as in the case of the creation and [the dissolution] referring to inner-space, the heaven and so on in these same sections³⁴¹; otherwise you

³³⁸ The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas hold that direction or space (dik) is another substance and is proved in the same way as in the case of time.

³³⁹ upahita = upanāyaka = sambandhasampādaka (K).

³⁴⁰ Cf. van Buitenen's note to his translation of VAS, p.194 fn.97.

³⁴¹ See Rgveda X. 90. 14: n bhyā āsīd antārikṣhaṃ śīrshṇó dyáuḥ sám avartata / padbhy m bh mir díśaḥ śrótrāt táthā lok akalpayan //

should accept they are also separate entities. And the author of the [Brahma-]Sūtra says in the section beginning with

*[Vital air (prāṇa)] is neither mere air (vāyu) nor its action; because it is stated separately [BrSū II. iv. 8],

that vital air, though its separate creation etc. are mentioned,³⁴² is an aspect of air; in the same way, [those] of direction etc. should be thought as only to show an example.

Moreover, if a certain principle named direction were an effect, before its creation and after its dissolution there would be no regulation (vyavasthā) with regard to the relation of covering and being covered³⁴³ or being far and near between the principles such as prakṛti and mahat; for according to the śrutis, direction is created in the stage of individualization (vyasṭi). Or, if [direction] were limited because of its being an effect of prakṛti, there would be no regulation with regard to being upwards or downwards etc. between pure sattva, triguṇa and so on. If it were explained in these cases as based on particular limiting adjuncts or based on various [entities] which bring about the connection with [various limiting adjuncts], the situation is same even in [our ordinary experience]. Therefore, direction is not another new principle.

What the Prameyasamgraha [of Viśṇucitta] says:

*Ether and directions have color due to the triplication (trivṛtkaraṇa)³⁴⁴; and for this reason, everything visible is grasped as having some particularity (viśeṣa) [Prameyasamgraha],

also makes us understand that [direction] is produced from elements made by the quintuplication, but not that it is another principle other than twenty-four [principles] fixed in number.

Varadaviṣṇu-miśra, however, counts down the substance named direction separately in the passage beginning with,

*And substance is of twenty-six kinds: ... sattva, rajas, tamas... [?].³⁴⁵

And its visibility is shown:

*Ether, time and direction are [perceived] by the faculty of sight [?]. **[149]**

And it is proved:

*[Their visibility] is understood by the inference: direction and time are visible,

³⁴² See “etasmāṅ jāyate prāṇo manaḥ sarvedriyāṇi ca, khaṁ vāyuḥ...” [MuUp II. i. 3].

³⁴³ See 142,7ff.

³⁴⁴ Here the Advaitic view that perception grasps pure existence is refuted. The same portion is quoted in 76,8f. & 96,2.

³⁴⁵ Quoted again in 446,6.

because they are the substratum of conjunction being the cause of perceptible remoteness (paratva) and nearness (aparatva), like a pot, and so on [?].

Here its separateness should be thought as having another intention like the enumeration of sattva and so on as [separate] substance, which is contradictory to the [Śrī-]Bhāshya.

1.8.3 Pañcīkaraṇa (149,4–150,7)

In this manner, the whole [universe] starting from the cosmic egg up to grass is composed of the five elements, because the quintuplication (pañcīkaraṇa) and the like are stated. [The statement of the triplication (tṛvitkaraṇa)],

*Let me make each one of three threefold [ChUp IV. iii. 4], is mere indication, as is concluded by the [other Upanishad's passages] in the same context³⁴⁶ and supporting statement. [You may say that if it were so, the practical usage that this is earth, which is composed of all elements, would be impossible]; but the practical usage of ordinary people, scholars, and scriptures is based on predominance [of each element]. It is mentioned in the [Brahma-]Sūtra:

*Because they are greater, however, there is this designation, this designation³⁴⁷ [BrSū II. iv. 17];

*But on account of its consisting of the three elements, on account of predominance [BrSū III. i. 2].

In the same manner, the quintuplication is also nothing but indication [because of the octuplication including mahat etc.], as the Venerable Parāśara says:

*These [principles], possessing various powers and being separated, are without mixture; accordingly they, not having combine together, could not create living beings.

Having got mutual conjunction, they depend upon one another; and having merged into complete oneness, they have one composite unit as their result.³⁴⁸

[...] they, from mahat to a particular, create the cosmic egg [ViP I. ii. 52–53, 54cd]. **[150]**

It is stated in the Śrīmat-Gītābhāshya:

³⁴⁶ See TaiUp II. i. 1 etc., which mentions five elements such as ether.

³⁴⁷ The last word is repeated because this is the last sūtra of the adhyāya.

³⁴⁸ ekasaṃghātalakshāḥ. ekasaṃghātāḥ aṇ aṃ lakshaṃ sādhyam yeshāṃ te (R K). The Vishṇucittīya reads ekasaṃghātavikshāḥ or °lakshyāḥ and comments as follows: ekasaṃghātavikshāḥ caturvidhānantaprajānirantarāṇ oṭpādanatparāḥ; pāṭhāntare ekaḥ saṃghātāḥ aṇ aṃ lakshyam sādhyam yeshāṃ te ekasaṃghātalakshyāḥ, yadvā ekasaṃghātalakshyā ekaḥ saṃghātāḥ iti dṛshyāḥ.

*‘[Five] gross elements, ahaṃkāra [or bhūtādi], buddhi [or mahat] and avyakta [or mūlaprakṛti]’ [BhG XIII. 5] are substances producing the body (kshetra) [GBh XIII. 5–6; 427,7].

...

It is produced by substances from prakṛti to earth; it is the substratum of the indriyas; it has the modifications of the nature of desire, hatred, pleasure and pain, and its form is combination of the elements; it serves as the basis of the experience of pleasure and pain by spiritual beings: this is what is called the body. [GBh XIII. 5–6; 430,1–3]

In this way, bodies have eight substances as their material cause. As for indriyas, they are another substances abiding in the body; because they are distinguished [from the body]:

*‘Ten and one indriyas and the five object of indriyas’ [BhG XIII. 5] are principles abiding the body [GBh XIII. 5–6; 425,9–426,1]

and because the conclusion is:

*[The body] is the substratum of the indriyas [GBh XIII. 5–6; 430,2].

This seems to suggest that the above-mentioned view that tanmātras are completely transformed is accepted.

[Obj.] If one [substance] had many substances as its material causes, admixture of [various] genera (jātiṣaṃkara) would happen [in the whole composed of many elements, each of which has own genus].

[Ans.] It would not happen, because we do not accept the whole (avayavin) [as distinguished from its components (avayava)]. **[151]** The difference [between the whole and its components] in understanding, word, number, size, place, time, effect and so on, [through which you prove the whole],³⁴⁹ is explained only with the help of another

³⁴⁹ In this regard, R quotes the pūrvapaksha by the Vaiśeshika (kāṇādāḥ) in the ārambhaṇādhikaraṇa of the Śrībhāshya [II. i. 15; 234,1–8]: “It is not possible that the effect is non-different from the cause, because [the two] are known by different understandings. As you know, understanding of the cause such as a thread and a lump of clay and that of the effect such as cloth and a pot are not same at all. And there is difference in word: threads are not called cloth, or cloth [is not called] threads. And there is difference in effect: water cannot be brought with a lump of clay, or a wall cannot be made from a pot. And there is difference in time: the cause is prior in time and the effect is posterior in time. And there is difference in form: the cause has the form of a lump and the effect is the form of a belly with a broad base. Thus a pot is said to be destroyed even though a lump of clay exists. And the difference in number is seen: threads are many and cloth is one. (And the difference in size is seen [added in R; the example in K: there are threads in cotton and cloth in threads]). Moreover, the activity of producing agent (kāraḥ) would be useless: if the effect were nothing but the

condition which you accept as producing the whole, [namely, a particular conjunction which you accept as the non-inherent cause (asamavāyikāraṇa)³⁵⁰ of the whole; that is, the assumption of the whole as distinct from the components is not necessary because, for example, all the practical usage concerning cloth is possible so far as it is regarded as threads qualified by a particular conjunction].³⁵¹ **[152]** Otherwise, a heap [of grains, forest, an army] etc. also should be assumed as another substance. **[153]**

Moreover, [if the effect were completely different from the cause], you would take the trouble such as that of explaining the fact that the weight [of the cause] and so on are not seen in the effect, [which has its own weight].³⁵² For the weight of the components is not hindered, because we observe a separate edge [of cloth] (daśā)³⁵³ [also] falls down.³⁵⁴ On the other hand, if the weight of the whole were hindered, every [composition] including a dyad (dvyaṇuka) would not fall down. Even if every fall were caused by the weight of [composite] atoms (paramāṇu), their weight could not be the non-inherent cause of the fall of a pot and so on,³⁵⁵ which are not directly produced from atoms.³⁵⁶ **[154]**

cause, what could be accomplished by the producing agent? If the activity of the producing agent, even though the effect is [already] existent [in the cause], were necessary as the assistant for the effect, the activity of the producing agent could never stop [sarvadā omitted in R].”

³⁵⁰ kāryeṇa kāraṇena vā sahaikasminn arthe samavetaṃ sat kāraṇam asamavāyikāraṇam; yathā tantusaṃyogaḥ paṭasya, tanturūpaṃ paṭarūpasya [TarS §40]; kāraṇa here means samavāyikāraṇa [NBo §40].

³⁵¹ Cf. TMK I. 21a: na ca naḥ kalpanāguravaṃ syāt; SAS: atra hi parair apy asamavāyikāraṇatayābhimatā dṛṣṭā ca saṃyuktāvasthā svīkṛteti nāsmākam iha kāci kalpanā; kutas tad guravaṃ saṃbhavet [229,4–6].

³⁵² See TMK I. 20a: kāryopādānabhede na katham adhikatā guravādeḥ. This problem is already discussed in the Nyāyavārttika II. i. 34 [Potter 1977: 323]; see also Bhāvaprakāśa on SAS, p.217.

³⁵³ According to R, daśā here means avayava.

³⁵⁴ See SAS I. 20; 218,4–219,2 (Mysore ed.): kim ayaṃ pratibandho 'vayavigurutvasya, utāvayavagurutvasya? ... na dvitīyaḥ, kadācin nishkampe 'vayavini śākhāphalahastādīlambhanābhāvaprasaṃgāt.

³⁵⁵ The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika defines gurutvam as ādyapatanāsamavāyikāraṇam [TarS §30].

³⁵⁶ For atoms are connected (pratyāsanna) with neither the samavāyikāraṇas of a pot's fall, i.e. the pot, nor its components (R). Cf. yatsamavetaṃ kāryam utpadyate tat samavāyikāraṇam; yathā tantavaḥ paṭasya, paṭas ca svagatarūpādeḥ [TarS §40]. In SAS, however, the problem here is that atoms have no weight: kim ayaṃ pratibandho 'vayavigurutvasya, utāvayavagurutvasya? nādyāḥ, paramāṇugurutvasyaiva patanahetutva-prasaṃgāt / tathā sati gurutvāt patanaṃ dravatvāt syandanam iti tattatkriyāvannishṭhagurutvādikalpanābhaṃgāpātanāc ca / ato 'tra varam avayavini gurutvānupapattikalpanam / tatra cokto doshaḥ [218,4–8]; na tāvad avayavini gurutvam

Furthermore, as to those which are made by combination of one long thread, the practical usage of a word other than a thread would be denied, because there is not [the non-inherent cause of a cloth, namely] the conjunction [of two threads].³⁵⁷ And there is no distinction between the notion of a cloth [in the course of weaving] which is made out of threads including the second one up to the last but one³⁵⁸ and the notion of a [torn] cloth of threads other than threads taken away.³⁵⁹ You may hold that [each added thread] produces [new] product, [namely another new cloth]; if it were so, you could not accept the condition of a substance having two threads and so on if the first and the second thread are removed.³⁶⁰ **[155]**

na jāyate; paramāṇugurutvaparīśeshaprasaṅgāt, tathā ca tvayānabhyupagamāt / ayuktes ca, kāryagurutvād eva hy aṇugurutvaṃ kalpayasi [217,3–218,3].

³⁵⁷ In SAS, the same rejection is seen as the view of the opponent and rejected. TMK I. 21b: vastre dīrghaikatantubhramaṇaviracite vastudhīr nāpi bādhyā. SAS: nanu tantava eva vyatishamgaviśeshaviśiṣṭāḥ paṭa iti bhavatāṃ rāddhāntaḥ “paṭavac ca” [BrSū II. i. 19] iti sūtre darśitaḥ; tathā satī dīrghaikatantuparivartanaviśeshanishpaādite 'vayavini katham paṭabiddhiḥ syāt? anekatantusaṃghātāsiddher ity atrāha: vastre iti / na hi vyaṃ tantugatam ekatvaṃ dvitvabahutvādikam vā paṭadhīnibandhanam niyacchāmaḥ; yathādṛṣṭi (sarva-) sambhavāt / tvaṃ tu svapakshadoṣam asmaṭpakshastham manyase [230,8–231,8].

³⁵⁸ The same objection is seen in the Kiraṇāvalī [Bhāvaprakāśā p.228 n.1].

³⁵⁹ “In the procedure of making a big cloth, are new clothes such as that having two threads successively produced each time a new thread such as the second one is added, or not? In the first alternative, thousands of clothes would be cognized [in the one big cloth]. It can not be said that the cloth with two threads is destroyed when the cloth with three threads is produced, because there is not any destroyer and destruction without any reason is not appropriate. Therefore a series of clothes would be seen. In the second alternative, knowledge of clothes which are born before the conjunction of the last thread would be false. And there would not be a resulting of what is desired (iṣṭāpatti): knowledge of a cloth born in removing one thread or two also would be false. And then there would not be a resulting of what is desired: those who hold that a whole is produced would also accept knowledge of a torn cloth is true because they accept it is newly born” (R K). Cf. SAS I. 21a: pṛthutarapaṭanirmānakrame dvitantukādīpaṭapamktir utpadyate, na vā? na cet, buddhiśabdāntarādir avasthābhedād eveti siddham syāt / utpadyate cet; tritantukādyārambhadaśāyāṃ pūrvapūrvam tishṭhati, na vā? pūrvatra tadanārambhaḥ; ārabdhakāryais tadānīm avayavyantarānārambhāt / na ca dvitantukādis tantvantarasahitas tritantukādyāmbhaka iti yuktam, iha tantushu paṭa ityādisvābhimatavyavahāravirodhāt / pūrvasiddhapaṭais sārđham tantubhiḥ paṭasambhave / paṭapamktiḥ samikshyeta kramād ādhikyaśālinī // prāksiddhānām paṭādīnām uttarottarajanmani / ahetuko vināśaś ca sthirapakṣhe na yujyate // na cet; upalambhaviruddhanāśasantatikalpanāprasamgaḥ / evam ekadvitryādītantvapakarshaṇadaśāyāṃ api khaṇ apamparotpattināśapamparākṛptiḥ kṣhṭatārā [227,7–228,7].

³⁶⁰ “[Obj.]: A product is produced in the manner that a cloth having two threads with another [third] thread produces a cloth having three threads, and so on. In this theory, when some threads are removed, though clothes produced from each of the threads are destroyed, the existence of another cloth not produced from them is not obstructed. Therefore, the knowledge of a cloth would not be false. ... [Ans.]: If the first and the second threads are removed, the cloth having two threads which was produced

Concerning a pot and the like, we do not perceive a producing division [in a lump of clay like a threads in a cloth]; hence, a division that you want is impossible. And it is sublated by our experience³⁶¹ and the śrutis³⁶².

Thus the whole is not accepted; accordingly, there is not the admixture of [various] genera.

Even though it should be accepted, it could be explained [without the admixture] as an image composed of fixed parts such as gold and silver, Gaṇeśa, [whose head is of human beings but whose body is of elephant], and so on. According to our theory, however, each element is fixed [as the substratum of its own genus] in a kind of multitude. Even for those who accept the whole, many elements inevitably enter into one multitude as the material cause and the efficient cause respectively [156]; and mutual admixture of genera or identity is not born in this case. Then, there is no difference between two of us.

Besides, admixture of genera is not a defect like admixture of limiting adjuncts. There is no regulating rule, without your prejudice, that entrance into one entity of two limiting adjuncts which are mutually excluded in some things qualified (dharmin),³⁶³ such as being made and being limited, does not bring about over-application³⁶⁴ but so does [that] of two genera.

[Obj.] We always observe that two genera, excepting those which are in the relation that the one is pervaded by the other (parāparabhāva),³⁶⁵ cannot coexist: this is the regulating rule.

[Ans.] Not so; because it is also possible for two limiting adjuncts such as being blue and being yellow. It is seen in some cases, so is it in some kinds of genus. For example, we see that being golden and being an earring, existing separately in a golden first should be destroyed; when it is destroyed, another cloth [having three threads, which was] produced from it, should be also destroyed; when it is destroyed, [another cloth having four threads, which was] produced from it, should be also destroyed. In this manner, till the destruction of the clothes, the knowledge of a cloth would be false” (K). Cf. SAS I. 21a: na ca dvitantukādis tantvantarasahitas tritantukādyāmbhaka iti yuktam, iha tantushu paṭa ityādisvābhimatavyavahāravirodhāt [227,11f.].

³⁶¹ “That which was a lump of clay the other day becomes a pot and so on” (R K).

³⁶² “vācārambhaṇaṃ vikāro nāmadheyam mṛttikety eva satyam” [ChUp VI. i. 4]. The meaning of this passage is explained in detail in ŚBh II. i. 15 [252,1–10].

³⁶³ Literally, two limiting adjuncts which exist by giving up the dharmi each other.

³⁶⁴ For example, mūrtatva exists in manas by giving up kāryatva, kāryatva exists in color and the like by giving up mūrtatva; but both coexist in a pot and the like (R

bracelet and a silver earring, coexist in a golden earring; [157] and that being ga-sound and being in high pitch, [existing separately in high kha-sound and low ga-sound], coexist in high ga-sound. Still they are accepted as genus.

[Obj.] Then, any one of the two is denied to be genus. Or, two [independent] genera, [e.g. being a golden-earring and being a silver-earring], which are manifested by a similar shape, [e.g. that of a earring], are assumed.

[Ans.] Such opinion is nothing but an attachment to the baby named your conclusion. And such an attachment wants to eat [your conclusion], as a [hungry] cat eats own kitten. For, if identical things were also recognized without sublation as being of one and the same kind [based on the similarity of their shapes], genus itself would be denied.³⁶⁶

Thus, it is proved that all individuals starting from the cosmic egg are composed of many principles.

For the detail of innumerableness of such cosmic eggs, configuration of particular worlds in them, their size, the difference in habitation of the protectors of the worlds, time of their duration and so on, see astronomical texts, Purāṇas and so on.

The uneven creation of low and high beings from Brahmā up to a grass in accordance with the degree of their experience of the fruits in the form of fixed time and place is based on the degree of karma, flowing without beginning, of the multitude of the individual selves, who are beginningless by nature [158]; therefore, there would not be acquisition of what has not been done, the loss of what has been done,³⁶⁷ His unevenness and cruelty³⁶⁸ and so on. Such defects, however, burst in the theory that the individual selves [are not eternal but] remain till the dissolution and so on. Thus, according to the degree of their merit and sin, some have superior body, indriyas, knowledge, power and so on in the heaven and the like; some have inferior body and so on in the hell and the like due to the cause of miserable pain; some with mixed karma have mixed moderate happiness and so on in the earth and the like.

1.9 On the body (158,5–180,4)

1.9.1 Its definition (158,5–174,5)

K).

³⁶⁵ vyāpyavyāpakabhāva (R K), such as the relation of ghaṭatva and pṛthivīva.

³⁶⁶ ghaṭādāv apy anugatavyavahārasya samsthānasādṛśyād evopapattyā jātyasiddhir eva syād iti, vṛddhim icchato mūlahāniḥ syāt (R, K).

³⁶⁷ Cf. VAS §71 and the note on it by van Buitenen.

1.9.1.1 The definition in the Śrībhāshya

(158,5–159,4)

In this occasion, common definition of the body is shown. The [Śrī-]Bhāshya says:

*For a spiritual being, that substance which is capable of being completely [1] controlled and [2] supported for its own purpose, and which is [3] subordinate to it by nature, is the body of that spiritual being (yasya cetanasya yad dravyam sarvātmanā svārthe [1] niyantum [2] dhārayitum ca śakyam [3] taccheshataikasvarūpaṃ ca tat tasya śarīram) [ŚrīBh II. i. 9; 222.11–223,1].

The intention of the author of the [Śrī-]Bhāshya is: The word ‘body,’ whose denoting function (vṛtti) is, as that of words such as ‘cow,’ ‘pot,’ not fixed by the configuration and so on, cannot be fixed to some particular things; therefore, this very definition in agreement of all the usages is what is established in the śrutis³⁶⁹ and inclusive one.³⁷⁰

Some³⁷¹ interpreted this definition as one single unit; others as three [independent] definitions: [(1) being controlled, (2) being supported and (3) being subordinate]. In the opinion that it is one single unit, what is excluded (vyavacchedya) is not acquired, [because each definition based on any one of the three is of the same scope³⁷²]. Still some hold that what is excluded is not settled in this definition [of the body], if it is one single unite, as well as in the definition of Brahman that it is the cause of three, namely the birth, [the preservation and the dissolution of the world] [159]; but that, [if only one of the three is shown as the definition], the same questions may arise [in both cases, that is, “Are there any other things that bring about the rest two³⁷³?”]. Such explanation, however, is unfit for a logical text; accordingly the opinion that it is three is primary (mukhya). The venerable Bhaṭṭa-Parāśara also indicates the same opinion in the

³⁶⁸ See BrSū II. i. 34: vaishamyairghṛṇye na sāpekshatvāt tathā hi darśayati.

³⁶⁹ “yaḥ pṛthivyām tishṭhan ... yasya pṛthivī śarīram ...” [BṛhUp III. vii. 3–23] etc.

³⁷⁰ In this regard, R and K refer to the passage of the Śrībhāshya: “[Not only in sacred texts but] also in ordinary world, the word ‘body’ has not obtained, like words such as ‘pot’, the function to denote substance of the same form, but is seen used in non-secondary meaning (mukhya) to denote substances of completely different forms, such as worms, insects, moths, snakes, human beings and animals. Therefore, we should fix the cause of usage (pravṛttinimitta) of the word in agreement with all usages” [II. i. 9; 222,1–3].

³⁷¹ See the Nayadyumaṇi of Meghanādārisūri (12 cent.), (MGOS 141, 1956). See Hindi commentary in Varanasi ed., pp.194ff. fn.54.; Bhūmikā by Viraraghavachari p.28.

³⁷² According to the Hindi commentary, ????

³⁷³ See īśvara: 273,1–2.

commentary on the two section concerning the Highest Self³⁷⁴:

*Spiritual beings and non-spiritual beings are equally His body, because there is no difference among them in being pervaded by God, who controls them at His free will. This is why a physical body is a body [Adhyātmakhaṇ advayavivaraṇa]. In this way, only one [constituent, namely being controlled], is shown as the definition.

1.9.1.2 The first definition

(160,1–162,5)

Thus, the three definitions are clear now.

The first definition is: For a spiritual being, that substance found in a certain condition which, so long as it exists, unable not to be associated with the spiritual being, and which, within its capacity, is to be controlled by nature is, in this condition, the body of the spiritual being (yasya cetanasya yadavasthaṁ dravyaṁ yāvatsattam asambandhānarhaṁ svaśakye niyantavyasvabhāvaṁ tadavasthaṁ tasya śarīram).

Here ‘spiritual being (cetana)’ means that which is qualified by spirituality (caitanya). Thereby spirituality is excluded from the body of its substratum.³⁷⁵

‘Found in a certain condition’ is for the purpose of avoiding the partial inapplicability of the definition (avyāpti), because the same thing in another condition, [for example, the body in the condition of ashes], is separated from [the spiritual being].³⁷⁶

‘Substance’ excludes action and so on.³⁷⁷

‘So long as it exists’ and so on excludes [what is associated with a individual self for a time] such as bodies of the others, the vital air, the organs and an axe from the body of the individual self [161]. For vital air and so on, which are created separately, exist before the formation of the body and is continuous even after its liberation till the dissolution.

³⁷⁴ The work is quoted again named Adhyātmakhaṇ advayavyākhyā [258,10f.]. Oberhammer [1979: 217ff.] guesses that it is the commentary on the Śubāla Upanishad. But his discussion is not strong enough.

³⁷⁵ Accordingly, the dharmabhūtajñāna cannot be the body of its substratum, the jīva, but is the body of God; the knowledge of God is nobody's body (R). Cf. ŚP on cetanasya.

³⁷⁶ Cf. ŚrīBh II. i. 9: “The dead body, beginning to collapse at the moment of the separation from the individual being, the next moment has collapsed. The reason why it is called ‘body’ is that it is in the same position where once the configuration assumed as [the body] exists (mṛtaśarīraṁ ca cetanaviyogasamaya eva viśirtum ārabdhaṁ kṣaṇāntare viśiryate / pūrvam śarīratayā parikṣtasamghātaikadeśatvena ca tatra śarīratvavyavahārah).” [223,3–4] (K).

³⁷⁷ ādi denotes samyoga (K).

‘Within its capacity’ is for the purpose of avoiding the total inapplicability of the definition (asambhava). That is to say, the body of a man, an animal, a snake and the like is not capable of flying in the sky, which can be done by the body of birds, but we cannot say they do not have the body only for this reason. Each capacity of these [bodies] can be judged from the consideration of coexistence and coabsence (anvayavyatireka) respectively.

[Obj.] The definition is inapplicable to a stone, a wood, a pot and the like even if they become the bodies of individual selves³⁷⁸ because these former is not dependent upon these latter.

[Ans.] This objection is set aside for that reason. For we ordinary men cannot grasp a kind of very subtle controlling power [of them] as that of plants. It is true that opening and closing the eyes are observed in some plants, but it is not universal. And the smṛti mentions that there is a little spirituality even in a stone, a wood and the like:

*There is very subtle [power called knowing the body (kshetrajñasamjñitā śaktih)] in non-livings; there is more [power] in plants [ViP VI. vii. 64].

According to the fourth definition mentioned later, however, there is no room for such objection.

And it does not mean controlling all time what is ‘within its capacity,’ because on occasion we cannot [control] even [what is within its capacity] if we do not want to, [162] and because the effect cannot happen only due to the assistant not coming. For example, it cannot be said that a group of seeds which are destroyed before sprouting has not the capacity for sprouting.

‘To be controlled’ etc. excludes sickness and the like, which cannot be controlled. For sickness and the like belong to a substance because they are composed of it and are active within its capacity; [accordingly, without the word the definition would be applicable to them]. So are a body of the son, [which, so long as it exists as a body of the son, cannot help but being associated with the father's soul, and is active within its capacity but is not always controlled], and the like.

The word ‘by nature’ prevents the partial inapplicability of the definition. For a human body and the like, though they are not controlled during sickness and so on, are bodies; we should know that being incapable of controlling at that time is due to some limiting adjuncts.

³⁷⁸ For example, Ahalyā, who had an affair with Indra, became a stone by the curse of his husband, Gotama. (According to Rāmāyana I. 48–49, she became invisible). The problem of the body in such case is discussed in ŚrīBh II. i. 9 [222,10]

1.9.1.3 The second definition (162,6–163,1)

The second definition is: For a spiritual being, that substance found in a certain condition which, so long as it exists, is to be supported is, in this condition, the body of the spiritual being (yasya cetanasya yadavasthaṃ dravyaṃ yāvatsattaṃ dhāryaṃ tadavasthaṃ tasya śarīram). [163]

Bodies of the son and the like are excluded because they are not supported [by the father] so long as they exist. The rest [should be taken] as in the previous one.

1.9.1.4 The third definition (163,1–165,1)

The third definition is: To a spiritual being, that substance found in a certain condition which, so long as it exists, cannot be non-subordinate is, in this condition, the body of the spiritual being (yasya cetanasya yadavasthaṃ dravyaṃ yāvatsattaṃ aśeṣatānarhaṃ tadavasthaṃ tasya śarīram) [164].

As in the previous ones, ‘cannot be non-subordinate’ excludes the son and so on; because they can stop being subordinate to [the father] by a donation and the like, but his body, even when he falls into a slave [165] and is subordinate to another person, being subordinate to himself by birth cannot be stopped.

1.9.1.5 The fourth definition (165,1–166,4)

Here the fourth definition, which is resulted from these three definitions and is intended by the author of the [Śrī-]Bhāṣya, is also mentioned: Of a spiritual being, that substance found in a certain condition which is an inseparable attribute is the body of it (yasya cetanasya yadavasthaṃ aprthaksiddhaviśeṣaṇaṃ dravyaṃ tat tasya śarīram).

‘Inseparable’ means to be unable not to be associated, so long as one exists, with [the spiritual being]. Being supported, being controlled and being subordinate are intended here as secondary varieties of being inseparable. What is excluded is clear enough.

Thereby, the following [objection] is also rejected. [166]

[Obj.] Is the criterion of the word³⁷⁹ (pravṛttinimitta) ‘body’ one of the three, or all the three respectively, or the composite of the three? It is not the first, because it is contradicted to the passage of the [Śrī-]Bhāṣya:

³⁷⁹ The cause of using the word. “tasya bhāvas tva-taLau / śabdasya pravṛttinimittam bhāvaśabdenocyate” [Kāśikā ad Pāṇini V. i. 119]. “pravṛttinimittalakṣaṇam iti / pravṛttinimittam samudāyaśaktinimittam vācyabhūtam / tac ca lakṣaṇam / tena vyutpattinimittabhūtasypalakṣaṇabhūtasya lakṣaṇasya ca vyāvṛttiḥ / gośabdasya gamI-dhātvartho vyutpattinimittam / pṛthivīśabadavācyasya pṛthivītvasyopalakṣaṇabhūtam gandhavattvam / tadubhayam api na pravṛttinimittam” [Śrutaprakāśikā ad ŚrīBh I. ii. 9; 222,19–22].

*Being supported, being controlled and being subordinate are the criterions of the word ‘body’ [ŚrīBh I. ii. 2; 292,5–6].

Nor the second; because it is complicated, and the word would be polysemic. Nor the third, because it is complicated. And there is unnaturalness in the opinion that the [three are] independent definitions, [because the [Śrī-]Bhāshya does not use ‘or’].

[Ans.] There is no defect, because being inseparable from a spiritual being, which is indicated by the three, is the criterion of the word.

1.9.1.6 The accidental definition

(166,5–168,1)

Or the accidental definition³⁸⁰ (taṭasthalakṣhaṇa) is: A body is a substance other than God and His knowledge (īśvaratajjñānavyatiriktaṃ dravyaṃ śarīram).

In order to indicate that being a body is accompanied with the counter-relative like being a father [167], and in order to indicate that secondary varieties such as being a god, being a human being and having two legs are useless, the [Śrī-]Bhāshya shows “For a spiritual being, that substance which” etc. In definition without showing the counter-relative, a particular counter-relative is fixed according to means of valid knowledge; as, speaking of the definitions of the Vaiśeshika school, in the definitions of relative [categories] such as quality, generality, particularity, inherence and non-existence without showing the relative, for example:

*Quality is, being other than action, what is the substratum of genus alone.³⁸¹

*Generality is what is one, eternal and inherent to many³⁸² [168].

*Particularity is, not being genus, what exists in one.³⁸³

*Inherence is what is related forever.³⁸⁴ [169]

1.9.1.7 The definitions of the Nyāyasūtra criticized

(169,1–174,2)

³⁸⁰ Definition is classified into essential one (svarūpalakṣhaṇa) and accidental one (taṭasthala°). For example, ‘satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma’ is the former definition of braham; the latter is ‘yato vā imāni’ etc. [NKOśa q.v.]. “taṭasthalakṣhaṇam iti / śarīraśabdapravṛttinimittatvaśūnyaḥ śarīravavyavahāravishayatajñāpakāḥ śarīrāsādhāraṇadharmā ity arthaḥ” (K).

³⁸¹ karmānyatve sati jātimātrāśrayo guṇaḥ. Cf. Tarkadīpikā §4: dravyakarmabhinnatve sati sāmānyavān guṇaḥ.

³⁸² nityam ekam anekasamavāyi sāmānyam. Cf. Tarkasamgraha §77: nityam ekam anekānugataṃ sāmānyam (= Tarkabhāshā); Tārkikarakshā v. 53: sāmānyam nityam ekam syād anekasamavāyi ca.

³⁸³ ajātir ekavṛttir viśeṣaḥ. Cf. Tārkikarakshā v. 53: ajātir ekavṛttiś ca viśeṣa iti śiṣhyate.

³⁸⁴ nityasambaddhaḥ samavāyaḥ = Tarkasamgraha §79.

Another school, however, says in their sūtra:

*Body is the substratum of activity, sense organs, and enjoyment [Nyāyasūtra I. i. 10].

Here the first definition is: body is, [qualified by] being a final whole (antyāvayavain),³⁸⁵ the substratum of activity. The [rest] two are: body is, qualified by that, the substratum of sense organs and the locus of enjoyment [respectively].

Among them, if the word ‘activity (ceshtā)’ means movement (kriyā) in general, the over-applicability [to a pot and so on] is apparent. If it means movement the non-inherent cause of which is conjunction with the self possessing volition (prayatna), the definition is over-applicable to the earth, a mountain and so on, though you do not accept them as His bodies, which are the substratum of movement [such as earthquake] the non-inherent cause of which is conjunction with God possessing volition. If the attribute “the individual self possessing volition” is added, still the definition is over-applicable to the vital air and the like. Even if the attribute “conscious (buddhipūrvaka) volition” is added, the definition is still over-applicable to the same when one consciously exhales or inhales.

[Obj.] Air and so on are not a final whole.

[Ans.] What is so then?

[Obj.] A pot and so on.

[Ans.] They cannot be so in making a wall out of many pots, a garment out of many clothes and so on.

[Obj.] In these cases, there is not production of them.

[Ans.] Even in other cases, there is not [170]. That is true.

[Obj.] Let it be that a pot and so on are a middle whole then.

[Ans.] It is not true. Because anything could be so, the concept of a final whole becomes [unreal] like a bud in ether. Accordingly, the definition qualified by it is very nice!

[Concerning the second definition], being the substratum of sense organs should mean being inherent to them or being conjunct with them. But it is not the former, because it is not accepted and parts of sense organs, according to your theory, would be bodies. Nor the latter, because it is possible even in a pot and so on [when one sees them].

[Obj.] Conjunction as long as it exists is meant.

[Ans.] It is also untrue. For there is over-application to a bubble and the like

³⁸⁵ dravyānārambhakatve sati kāryadravyatvam [Nyāyakośa].

being born and destroyed while a person observes them without winking; and, according to the theory that the mind is eternal, there is over-application to the self; moreover, they accept a dead body as a body.

[Obj.] That all parts of which are conjunct with sense organs is a body.

[Ans.] It is not true, because you also should accept that there is no conjunction in all parts between the two limited things, namely, a body and a sense organ due to the contradiction by crashing each other [171], and because it is established by means of valid knowledge that there are particular parts without any sense organ inside a body.

[Obj.] A place where many sense organs exists simultaneously is a body.

[Ans.] Not so; because, if ‘exist’ means conjunction in general, [all-pervading substances such as] ether and also God would be our body, and because, if it means inseparable relation, God would be [our] body according to our theory. If it means ‘enlarge their power (upashtambhaka³⁸⁶)’, the definition would be over-applicable to vital air.

[Obj.] Body is that which cannot be non-conjunct with sense organs so far as it exists [172].

[Ans.] The answer to it also has already been given [that a dead body is not so]. And it is unavoidable that the definition would be over-applicable to God and [the mind according to your theory].

[Obj.] Body is that which is other than a sense organ [and] has activity, cessation etc. based on the function of vital air.

[Ans.] No, because the self and the impurity and the like would be so.

[Obj.] That means being dependent on [vital air] in all activities [173].

[Ans.] It is not right, because the definition would be totally inapplicable (asambhava). That is, activity of a body carried away by wind is not dependent on the vital air.

[As for the third definition] also, if ‘the locus of enjoyment’ means the place of enjoyment in general, the definition would be over-applicable to a house and so on.

[Obj.] ‘The locus of enjoyment’ means that depending upon which the self experiences enjoyment.

[Ans.] Not so, because the definition would be totally inapplicable according to our theory. That is, it is accepted that a liberated person, though without the body, has

³⁸⁶ indriyāṇām svasvakāryajananasāmarthyāpādakatvam indriya-upashtambhakatvam (R). This is based on the passage of the Nyāyabhāṣya I. i. 10: yasyānugraheṇānugrhitāny upaghāte copahatāni sādhasādhusu pravartante, sa indriyāśrayaḥ (Viraraghavachari fn. 1).

particular enjoyment.

[Obj.] Enjoyment composed of misery is intended here.

[Ans.] Still the definition would be over-applicable to the sense organs. And the definition would be partially inapplicable to a body gained by God or a liberated person and the like at will.

[Obj.] [A body is] the substratum of enjoyment caused by the mistake, [namely, that which are misunderstood as the substratum of enjoyment].

[Ans.] It is not also true [174]; because the definition would be over-applicable to sense organs, mind and vital air, which are thought [by mistake] as the self by various schools, and because it would be partially inapplicable to a body of God or a liberated person and the like.

1.9.1.8 The other definitions criticized

(174,2–5)

[Obj.] A body is that which is composed of the head, the hand, the leg and so on.

[Ans.] It is possible even in the case of a sculpture.

[Obj.] [Let us add] ‘having vital air and the like’ [to the definition].

[Ans.] Still it is not right, because the definition would be partially inapplicable to a dead body and the like.

[Obj.] It means only being associated with vital air and the like at times.

[Ans.] Still the definition would be partially inapplicable to the body of a plant and the like, because they, though having vital air and the like, do not have the configuration of the hands, the legs and so on.

In the same way, other definitions also can be rejected. Only what has been mentioned in accordance with śrutis and other [scriptures] is the definition of it.

1.9.2 Classification of the body

(174,6–178,1)

That very body is of two kinds: eternal one and non-eternal one. Of these, the eternal is the body of God composed of substance made up of three guṇas, time, the individual self, auspicious locus³⁸⁷ [or His figure as Vāsudeva] and so on. And eternal [sages³⁸⁸] have the natural forms of Garu a, Śesha and so on. The non-eternal is of two kinds: that which is not made by karma and that which is made by karma [175]. The former is of God in the forms of mahat and so on. So are the forms of Ananta, Garu a etc. and those who are liberated, which are made at will. That which is made by karma

³⁸⁷ śubhāśraya. See ViP VI. vii. 70f. and 76, quoted in R and K.

³⁸⁸ nityasūriṇām in YMD IV. 55.

is also of two kinds: that which is made by karma with the help of one's own will and that which is made purely by karma. The former is of great [sages] such as Saubhari, [who controlled many bodies at once]; the latter is of other insignificant beings.

Again, the body is of two kinds in general: movable one and immovable one.

A wood etc. and a stone etc. are immovable ones; for example, those of a tree, a shrub, a creeper (latā), a spreading creeper (vīrudh) and a grass, which are called tamas, moha, mahāmoha, tāmīśra, and dhatāmīśra [176] [respectively].³⁸⁹ It is established by the śrutis which refer to the case of Ahalyā that there are individual selves having even stone and the like as the bodies. Furthermore, the Vedārthasaṃgraha says:

*Therefore, all words which are known as having denoting power due to the connection of the stem and an affix, e.g. god, man, yaksha, rākshasa, ..., bird, tree, creeper, wood, stone, grass, pot, cloth etc., denote, through the entities having their own configurations which are commonly known as denoted by the words, the individual selves presiding them and the Supreme Self, who is the inner-controller of them, finally [VAS §17; 87,3–6].

And it is said based on the authority of the śrutis mentioning that all names and forms after the individualization are entered by the individual selves. Moreover, on [the verse]:

*Those who are characterized by tamas, abiding in the activities of the worst guṇa, go downwards [BhG XIV. 18],

the Śrīmat-Gītābhāṣya comments as follows:

*Those who are characterized by tamas, however, abiding in the activities of the worst guṇa — abiding in the activities of the guṇa called tamas, which become increasingly worse, go downwards — attain the lowest state [of human beings], then the state of animals, then birth as worms, insects and the like, then the state of plants (sthāvara), then the state of shrubs and creepers, and finally the state of stones, wood, clod, grass³⁹⁰ etc. [GBh XIV. 18; 468,1–4]

It should be known that the word sthāvara here denotes [not plant in general including a shrub etc. but], as in the case of go (cattle in general or cow) and valīvardha (bull), a particular [plant] called sthāvara such as a tree.

The movable one is of four kinds: god, human being, animal and hellish being (nārayika). Asuras, yakshas, rākshasas and the like are also sprung from gods. Brāhmaṇas, Kshatriyas, Vaiśyas, Śūdras and so on living in the bhūloka are sprung from human

³⁸⁹ See ViP I. v. 5–6. Tamas etc. are mentioned in the Sāṃkhyakārikā 48 as the five variations of vaiparyaya.

³⁹⁰ ṛṇa is omitted in the Nyāyasiddhāñjana (U adds it in parenthesis).

beings. By the way, they are subject to the injunctions and the prohibitions mentioned in the śrutis and the smṛtis; so are gods and the like, because their expiration, sacrifice, penance, observance, knowledge of Brahman and so on are stated in the śrutis. Beasts, birds, reptiles and so on are sprung from animals. Hellish beings have bodies in which misery alone exists and which are hard to abandon in Raurava³⁹¹ and other [hells].

Again the movable one is of two kinds: viviparous (yonija) and non-viviparous. This [classification] is possible in all the three [movable ones] beginning with gods. For being born from sweat and so on are seen in Prajāpati, [born from the lotus of God's navel], Madhu and Kaiyaṭa, [born at God's will only], Dhṛṣṭadyumna, [born from fire], Airāvata, [born from milky ocean]. In the two, only the viviparous one needs the fifth offering, [namely, the sexual intercourse].³⁹² Before reaching the womb, he is merely conjunct with others' bodies, namely, ether, wind, smoke, mist, cloud, rain, rice and that of one who discharges the semen.³⁹³ [177] Among them, before reaching rice and the like, he can quickly exit them. After that, it takes long time to exit.³⁹⁴ Concerning one who is offered to the fifth fire called woman, following the sky, rain, the earth and man,³⁹⁵ his particular changes fixed in each time and so on are clearly determined in the texts of the Āyurveda or yoga.³⁹⁶ It is in them that the mode of the production of seven constituent elements (dhātu) [of the body] from semen and [menstrual] blood,³⁹⁷ the detail of windy humor, bile, phlegm and so on, which are fixed in accordance with the state of the original and the variation, [178] particular tubes and other [organs] and their change etc. are determined.

Similarly the distinction between womb-born, egg-born, sprouting-born and sweat-born also can be understood.

³⁹¹ One of the twenty-one hells. See YMD IV. 28.

³⁹² See ChUp V. iii. 3, ix. 1 and BrSū III. i. 1.

³⁹³ See ChUp V. x. 5–6 and BrSū III. i. 22, 24, 26.

³⁹⁴ See ChUp V. x. 6 and BrSū III. i. 23. The word durnishprapatara used here is a vedic form: durnishprapataram iti chāndasaḥ taśabdalopaḥ; durnishprapataram, duḥkhanishkramaṇataram ity arthaḥ [ŚrīBh III. i. 23; 422,6–7].

³⁹⁵ According to the pañcāgnividyā, the soul of a dead person first reaches loka (dyu in NySi), then parjanya, then pṛthivī, then puruṣa, then yoshā, and gets rebirth. See ChUp V. iv–viii.

³⁹⁶ On this point, R and K quote GarbhaUp 2–3.

³⁹⁷ According to GarbhaUp 2, (quoted in R), the order is: from chyle (rasa) blood (śoṇita) is produced, from blood flesh (māsa), from flesh fat (medas), from fat bones (asthi), from bones marrow (majjā), from marrow semen (śukla), and from the combination of the blood and the semen, an embryo.

1.9.3 The body-relation as to the non-spiritual and God (178,2–179,9)

According to one tradition, it is directly and indirectly that the bodies of the individual selves after the individualization become the bodies of God. Only indirectly, according to the other.

The first opinion has been suggested by the usages³⁹⁸ of the author of the [Śrī-]Bhāṣya repeatedly. And also in the Tattvaratnākara, the same [opinion] is supported, because [the author] says as follows:

*Spiritual beings and non-spiritual beings are equally His body [Tattvaratnākara], and so on.³⁹⁹

The second opinion, however, are accepted by the author of the Vivaraṇa [ad the Śrībhāṣya]. That is, in the Śa arthasaṃkṣhepa [of the same author], he brings forth the following question — Because non-spiritual being is the body of [both] the individual self and God, the knowledge born from the word denoting it terminates in both; and because both are independently manifest, there would be double manifestation. And he answers:

*Not so, because non-spiritual being becomes the body of Brahman [only] through the individual self [Śa arthasaṃkṣhepa].

Also in the Vivaraṇa, the same import is detailed.

This controversy is relative to bodies after the individualization such as those of gods or human beings, because for His divine and auspicious body and the like, though non-spiritual, the indirectness is impossible. For even the Vivaraṇa states, in order to avoid the contradiction that tamas and so on are also said to be His body,⁴⁰⁰ that the entities in the general creation are directly bodies of the Supreme as follows:

*In the primitive creation, however, [Vivaraṇa] and so on. It is only in the distinction of names and forms such as god and human being immediately following the creation of fire, water and earth that there is the indirectness based on the śruti passage:

*By means of this individual self [ChUp VI. iii. 2]

and so on [179].

³⁹⁸ “jīvadvarā paramātmani paryavasyanti” and “cidacitoḥ paramātmaśarīratvāt” (R, K). Cf. ŚrīBh I. i. 1, p. 235 [Melkote ed.].

³⁹⁹ The same passage was quoted in 159,3f. as of the Adhyātmakhaṇ advayavivaraṇa.

⁴⁰⁰ I.e. yasya tamaḥ śarīram [BṛhUp III. vii. 13]; yasyāksharam śarīram [SubālaUp 7].

Even after that, being His body directly and being His body indirectly [at the same time] are not contradictory at all. That [the knowledge born from the word denoting a non-spiritual being] terminates in both is also avoided, because the distinction of the application is fixed based on the speciality [that the individual self is manifest not as an independent entity but as an inseparable attribute of God]. For that reason, there is not double manifestation. Moreover, it is not improper that one is the body of many at the same time; because it is proper in applying the definition [of body], like being subordinate to many etc. And substance composed of the three guṇas, being [His] body by itself as the individual self is, does not lose its being the body of God just because it is in the state of a particular combination entered by the individual self. And it does not become another substance; because substance is not different, and because God is the inner-controller for separated elements and [indriyas] such as touch.⁴⁰¹ And for this reason, they are mentioned as body of God [directly] in the śrutis. And in the [unconscious] condition such as deep sleep and a faint, it is observed that a body and one who possesses the body are controlled by God only, which is inherent for them. Accordingly, this direct control would not be possible according to the [second] opinion. And mere existence of the individual self does not bring about the control of the body; because it, devoid of knowledge and will at that condition, is same as ether. Therefore, all substances in every condition are by themselves the bodies of God only; their being the bodies of the individual selves is caused by their karma. Thus, this way, [namely, the first opinion], proves to be better. **[180]**

1.10 Postscript

(180,1–7)

(17) May I know the figure named non-knowledge, spotted with black, red and white,⁴⁰² [namely, substance composed of sattva, rajas and tamas], belonging to Viṣṇu accompanied with Śrī; which is a veil covering the self, the locus of His sports at will, His companion at night without any activity, [i.e., the dissolution], sleep of the non-sleeping Self, and His peacock weather in arranging the net of the great Indra, [i.e. His trick], from Brahmā up to plants.

Here ends the first section on substance in the Nyāyasiddhāñjana composed by Śrīmat-Veṃkaṭanātha or Vedāntācārya, who is the lion among poets and logicians

⁴⁰¹ yaḥ sarveshu bhūteshu tishṭhan ... [BṛhUp III. vii. 15]; yas tvaci tishṭhan ... [21].

⁴⁰² See ŚveUp IV. 5: ajām ekāṃ lohitaśuklakṛshṇām ...

and who masters all branches of arts.

The Chapter 2 The Self

2.1 Its definition (181,2)

Now the individual self [is explained].

The definition is: It is, while being of minute size, a knower (jñātṛ); it is, while being subordinate to [God], a knower, etc.

2.2 The self is different from the body etc.

2.2.1 The self is not the body (181,3–184,3)

First,⁴⁰³ such [individual self as spiritual being] is not the body. For we can assume that the spirituality exists neither in each part [of the body], nor in their combination, nor [in the whole distinct from its components]. [The first alternative] would bring about the undesirable conclusion that [different parts] have different intensions as in the case of different bodies.⁴⁰⁴ **[182]** Moreover, we have the notion of the difference [between ‘I’ and the body or each of its parts], i.e. “[this is not I but] mine”; [accordingly all the alternatives are rejected].⁴⁰⁵ [The second alternative would bring about the undesirable conclusion that the individual self is non-spiritual like a pot] for the reason that it is a combination, [that it has color or that it is grasped by an external organ].⁴⁰⁶ [The third alternative is also incorrect] because the whole has been already rejected.⁴⁰⁷ Even if it should be established, its quality would be accordant with the quality of its causes⁴⁰⁸, [namely, its components; accordingly, the above-mentioned defects as to the first

⁴⁰³ Deśika follows the order of Yāmūnācārya's Ātmasiddhi: dehendriyamaṇaḥ-prāṇadhībhyo 'nya 'nanyasādhanāḥ [v. 3; 10,4].

⁴⁰⁴ Cf. ĀS 11,8f.: pratyekaṃ paramāṇuṣhu caitanyānupalabdheḥ tadabbhyupagame caikaśarīra evānekaśahasracetanāpātāt.

⁴⁰⁵ Cf. ĀS 12,17–13,3.

⁴⁰⁶ Cf. ĀS 16,16.

⁴⁰⁷ See 150,7–155,2. According to K, “it is rejected even by you (the Cārvāka)”; see ĀS 11,13ff.

⁴⁰⁸ Cf. ĀS 11,9: akāraṇaguṇapūrvakasya kāryadravyavartino viśeshaguṇasāmbhavāt; 15,9f.

alternative could not be avoidable] **[183]**. Even if a special change, [namely, an accidental quality of spirituality], like a baked-born (pākaja) attribute,⁴⁰⁹ should be admitted [in the whole], it would be impossible to avoid the undesirable conclusion that each component part has [its own] spirituality, [as a new color of a baked pot is seen in its parts]. For the same reason, the incoherent speech [of the Cārvāka school],

*From those [four elements combined together to form the body], the spirituality [is produced], as intoxicating power [is produced] from a Kiṇva seed⁴¹⁰ and so on [mixed together to make an alcoholic drink]⁴¹¹ [Cārvākasūtra], is rejected, because in the combination each part [inevitably] has the intoxicating power as well as a particular taste [of the drink].⁴¹²

[Obj.] Then, let it be that a particular part of elements, quickly moving [around whole the body] or staying [in a certain place of the body], becomes the knower **[184]**.

[Ans.] If you say so, our opinion based on the Vedic authority [that the self exists and is different from the body] is admitted in a different way. For, once something other than a mass called body is admitted, it is effortless to avoid the theory that it is non-eternal and so on.

Some hold that its difference from the body can be proved only through the scriptures, as is said in the Ātmasiddhi:

*Those who follow the śrutis do not have confidence even in inferential proof of the self but accept that based on the śrutis⁴¹³ only [ĀS 53,15]. **[186]**

⁴⁰⁹ This supposes the following objectin: according to the pīlupāka-theory, the baked-born quality of the whole is always follows the quality of its cause, an atom; according to the piṭharapāka-theory, however, it is newly born without any relation to its parts. See Tarkadīpikā §23: paramāṇushv eva pākah, na dvyaṇukādaḥ; āmapākanikshipte ghaṭe paramānushu rūpāntarotpattau śyāmaghaṭanāśe punar dvyaṇukādikrameṇa raktaghaṭotpattiḥ ... iti pīlupākavādino vaiśeshikāḥ / pūrvaghaṭasya vināśaṃ vināivā'vayaviny avayavesu paramāṇuparyanteshu ca yugapad rūpāntarotpattiḥ iti piṭharapākavādino naiyāyikāḥ.

⁴¹⁰ kiṇvam aṃkuraḥ surābījaḥ [fn. 4 ad ĀS p.12].

⁴¹¹ See Bārhaspatyasūtra quoted in Ātmasiddhi 12,14f. and 15,12f.: 'pṛthivy āpas tejo vāyur iti tattvāni, tebhyaś caitanyam kiṇvādibhyo madaśaktivat.' Cf. Sarvadarśanasamgraha on the cārvāka : pṛthivyādīni bhūtāni catvāri tattvāni / tebhya eva dehākārapariṇatebhyaḥ kiṇvādibhyaḥ madaśaktivac caitanyam upajāyate [Cowell's ed. p.3].

⁴¹² The translation follows the interpretation of **K.** ĀS 15,12ff. shows another reason to refute this opinion of the Cārvāka.

⁴¹³ In this regard, Yāmunācārya quotes BṛhUp III. ix. 26 etc. (neti neti), ĪśaUp 8,

2.2.2 The self is not the external organs (186,1–6)

Nor is it the external organs; for their mutual agreement cannot be fixed because they are many, and that recollection of the object mutually perceived, [e.g., “What I touch now is what I saw the other day”], would be impossible because each scope of them is limited⁴¹⁴ etc. Nor one of them, because nothing decides it. Nor the combination of them, because there is not the notion “I am a combination,” and because finally we should conclude that [each] combined [organ has spirituality]. And the fact that those who sleep and whose external organs are ceased see themselves the form of a tiger etc. [in their dream] also clearly shows that the self is different from the external organs and the body. Accordingly, the knowledge, when the organs are perfect or imperfect, “I am perfect” or “I am imperfect” is caused by our delusion. Or this knowledge means being qualified by [such organs].

2.2.3 The self is not the mind (186,6–187,1)

Nor is it the mind. For it is established by the śrutis⁴¹⁵ and the inference⁴¹⁶ as merely an instrument of the self, which is doer. And it is said to be produced from ahaṃkāra by the śrutis⁴¹⁷ [187].

2.2.4 The self is not the vital air (187,1)

Nor is it the vital airs, because the [above-mentioned] reductio ad absurdum (yukti) as to [the theory that] body [is the self] is equally applicable to them.

2.2.5 The self is not the pure knowledge (187,2–194,2)

2.2.5.1 The self is not the mere knowledge but the knower (187,2–188,2)

Nor is it the knowledge (dhī). For, if it were so, the recollection “I, [enjoying happiness now], am that [who was in pain the other day]” would be impossible because KaṭhaUp V. 7, BhG II. 20, ChUp VI. xi. 3, VIII. xii. 1 [54,2ff.].

⁴¹⁴ Cf. ĀS 17,8–11: kiṃ pratyekam indriyāṇi cetanāni, saṃbhūya vā? yadi pratyekam, indriyāntarasṣṭasyendriyāntareṇa pratisandhānaṃ na syāt; asti ca tat: yam aham adrākshaṃ tam ahaṃ sprśāmīti / ata eva na sambhūyāpi cetanatvam; na hi pañcabhir indriyaiḥ saṃbhūyaikaṃ vastv anubhūyate, anusandhīyate vā.

⁴¹⁵ E.g. manasā hy eva paśyati [MaitrāyaṇiUp VI. 30].

⁴¹⁶ sukhādipratītiḥ sakaraṇikā kriyātvāt (R).

⁴¹⁷ E.g. ekādaśa manas cātra devā vaikārikā smṛtāḥ [ViP I. ii. 47cd].

[the knowledge] appears to be the quality of the knower and perishable. And such recollection is not delusion because nothing can sublimate it. The reasons [maintained by the Buddhists] in order to prove the momentary destruction (kṣaṇabhāṅga) has been already rejected.⁴¹⁸ Without the eternal self as the substratum of the latent impression (saṃskāra), the recollection as to the self, even if it were delusion, [188] recognition of one object and, moreover, mere memory would not be possible at all. For the same reason, the means [for the liberation], the experience of its fruits and the like also would be hardly brought about.

2.2.5.2 Yogācāra theory criticized

(188,3–190,3)

Some [Buddhists] assert:

*In whatever series (saṅgā) the latent impression (vāsanā) of one's karma is put, its fruit bears only in the same [series], as the redness in cotton [is caused by latent impression in its seed]⁴¹⁹ [189];

but this is also incorrect. For some imperishable parts which support the latent impression [in the seed] endure in this [cotton]. Concerning all momentary existents (kṣaṇa)⁴²⁰ in the world, which are destroyed absolutely⁴²¹ [in every moment], it cannot be said that the series is same or different. For whatever momentary existent born [in a certain series] is, without distinction, subsequent to all destroyed momentary existents [including those which are thought as belonging to another series]. [You may say that a momentary existent in a certain position can give its latent impression only to the next momentary existent in the same position, but] the identity of the position cannot be established because a particular position is also momentary. For the same reason, the difference in a series of the mind-consciousness (cittavijñāna) and the store-consciousness

⁴¹⁸ 16,3–37,3.

⁴¹⁹ This verse is quoted in Prajñākaramati's Pañjikā ad Śāntideva's Bodhicaryāvatāra IX. 73cd (Bauddha Bharati Ser. 21, Varanasi, 1988, p.340). In SDS III, 18ff., it is followed by the verse that: kusume bijapūrāder yal lākṣhādy avasicyate / śaktir ādhīyate tatra kācit tām kiṃ na paśyasi //. See below 506,7f. See also ŚD XVII (90,5), where this verse is criticized by the Advaitins who maintain that dṛgdrśyasambandha is impossible.

⁴²⁰ bauddhamate vastutaḥ kālasyābhāvāt, ghaṭāder eva udyataḥ svarasabhaṅgurataḥ kṣaṇakalpanānimittatayā, kṣaṇyate hiṃsyate iti vyutapattayā ca ghaṭāder eva tanmate kṣaṇatvena vyapadeśaḥ (R K).

⁴²¹ niranvayavināśa: destruction of the dharmin itself as well as the dharmas.

(ālayavijñāna)⁴²² [190] is also rejected. Therefore, what they say:

*Though the knowledge itself has no division, those who have inverted perception observe as if it had the difference: the knowing subject, the known object and the knowledge⁴²³ [Pramāṇavārttika III (pratyaksha). 354], decides that they themselves have inverted perception.

2.2.5.3 Advaita theory criticized: The self is the knower (190,4–191,3)

In this way, the established opinion of the pseudo-Buddhist Vedānta school, [namely the Advaita school], is also overcome. For⁴²⁴ the mere consciousness (jñapti), [not the knower and not eternal], cannot be the object of the I-notion; even if it is admitted to be permanent, the conscious agent (anubhavitṛ) is postulated for the recollection and the like, if they were of delusion⁴²⁵; if being the knower were brought about by another delusion, there would be infinite regress.

[Obj.] The infinite regress as to causes is not defect [like a seed and a sprout].

[Ans.] Not so. For, [if infinite regress were not defect at all], you should abandon your theory that ignorance is beginnings and that its substratum is real, [which you maintain in order to avoid the infinite regress in case the former had beginning and the latter were unreal], because defect and its substratum as such would be possible in any case.

⁴²² The commentators quotes the following verse: tat syād ālayavijñānaṃ yad bhaved ahamāspadam / tat syādd hi cittavijñānaṃ yan nīlādikam ullikhet // The same verse is quoted in Sarvadarśanasamgraha chap. 2 (on the Buddhism), Cowell's ed. 38 (with some variants: pravṛttivijñāna for citta°).

⁴²³ avibhāgo 'pi buddhyātmā viparyāsitarśanaḥ / grāhyagrāhakaśamvittibhedavān iva lakshyate // [= *Pramāṇavārttika* I. 45; Miyasaka's critical edition of the *Pramāṇavārttika* (Acta Indologica 2, 1971-72) reads: buddhyātmaviparyāsita°]. This verse is quoted in Ātmasiddhi 25,3f., and also in many works; cf. Nakamura: WZKSO 12-13 (1968), 242.

⁴²⁴ The following translation is based on the second interpretation of **R**. According to the first interpretation, the translation is: “the mere consciousness, even if it is admitted to be permanent, cannot be the object of the I-notion [because it is not the substratum of an object]; the conscious agent (anubhavitṛ) [as the substratum] is postulated for the recollection and the like, even if they were of delusion [and were not a real object]” etc.

⁴²⁵ In this regard, **R** quotes the passage of ŚBh: “If the consciousness were admitted to be the self, though it is permanent, there would be the same impossibility of recollection; because recollection proves the conscious agent continuous from the earlier time to the later time, but not mere consciousness (anibhūter ātmatvābhyupagame tasyā nityatve 'pi pratisaṃdhānāsambhavas tadavasthaḥ; pratisaṃdhānaṃ hi pūrvāparakāla-

2.2.5.4 The reflection-theory criticized

(191,3–194,2)

Nevertheless the same [Advaita school] **[192]**, joined with the Sāṃkhya school, states as follows⁴²⁶:

As (a) a mirror [reflecting] a face [appears to be the substratum of the face], (b) an iron ball [associated with fire appears to be the substratum of the] hotness or (c) the palm [manifesting the sunbeam through a small hole in a dark room appears to be the substratum of] the solar ray, so (a) reflection of (or on) the consciousness (cicchāyāpatti), (b) association with it or (c) manifestation of it causes the delusion that [the internal organ is] the substratum of it; accordingly, the internal organ [appears to] be the knower.

[Ans.] [Concerning (a)], if the literal meaning is intended, how is the reflection possible between the invisible reflected object, [the consciousness], and the invisible substratum of it, [the internal organ]⁴²⁷?

[Obj.] This is secondary usage meaning mere superimposition.

[Ans.] Where and of what? [That is, which is meant by ‘cicchāyāpatti,’ the reflection of the consciousness or the reflection on it?]

[Obj.] The consciousness is [superimposed] on the internal organ.

[Ans.] If it were so, the consciousness itself would be unreal, because it is superimposed; {even if non-superimposed consciousness itself existed}, the consciousness not resting on [the internal organ] would be like fragrance of a sky-flower [because all knowledge is based on the I-notion].

[Obj.] The internal organ [is superimposed] in the consciousness, then.

[Ans.] If it were the case, there would be the delusion that the knowledge is the substratum of the internal organ, **[193]** but not the delusion that the internal organ is the knower; such delusion can never be seen.

Moreover, [as to (b)], if there were the association [between the consciousness sthāyinam anubhavitāram upasthāpayati, nānubhūtimātram]” [I. i. 1; I (1) 146,2f.] (ĀS 32,11f.).

⁴²⁶ Cf. ĀS 34f. and ŚBh I. i. 1, (1) 161f.

⁴²⁷ Cf. nīrūpe binbitatvaṃ kva nu bhavti katham rūpaśūnyasya tat syāt [TMK II.

and the internal organ], how do you, who do not accept the knower-ness as really existing in the two like the hotness [existing in both the iron and fire], explain the superimposition of it?

[Obj.] As we see in ordinary life that being dharma and being dharmin [are superimposed in a pot and its color etc.], such superimposition in [the consciousness and the internal organ] causes the delusion as to being knower.

[Ans.] Because there is no criterion to decide in which being dharma is imposed and in which being dharmin is imposed, the situation would be reversible: [not only apprehension “I know (or I am the substratum of the knowledge)” but also apprehension “The knowledge is the substratum of I-notion” would be possible].

[Obj.] In one [of the two, i.e. the internal organ], we cannot grasp the distinction from the dharmin; in the other, [i.e. the consciousness], we cannot grasp the distinction from the dharma. These facts are the criterions.

[Ans.] Not so. For you cannot accept that the knowledge (jñapti), which illuminates itself, has ungrasped distinctions other than itself; or if you should accept the distinctions, you could not avoid the undesirable conclusion that [the knowledge or the self, which has no speciality according to you], has some dharmas.

The opinion that (c) [the consciousness] is manifested by the internal organ (ahaṅkāra) is also rejected for the very reason that [the knowledge, illuminating itself], cannot grasp no distinction, as is said by the Venerable Yāmuna-muni:

*That the internal organ (ahaṅkāra), which is insentient in nature, manifests the self, which illuminates itself, is as illogical as that a spent coal [manifests] the sun.⁴²⁸ [ĀS 35,13–14] **[194]**

*And mutual manifesting and being manifested [between the internal organ and the self] is impossible because they are opposite in nature. If the self were manifested, it would lose its consciousness like a pot [ĀS 36,1–2].⁴²⁹

Therefore it is proved that the self is the knower and is the object of the I-notion.

71a].

⁴²⁸ This is to reject the opinion of Sureśvara, the Naishkarmyasiddhi II. 32.

2.3 The self is the object of ‘I’ (194,2–197,3)

2.3.1 The proof by means of perception (194,2–195,2)

Furthermore,

(28) The self is the object of ‘I’ and is permanent. For it is inward [or it illuminates for itself⁴³⁰]; it is experienced [that “I am the knower”]; desire for the liberation is in the form “there will be my happiness”; passages of Vedas⁴³¹ mentioning [‘I’] regarding liberated one⁴³², Brahman⁴³³ and one who intends to be liberated⁴³⁴; [as to a deep sleep] there is the usage “I slept,” [which would be impossible if the internal organ were the object of ‘I’ because its function stops at that time]; **[195]** [the usage] “I did not know me [during a deep sleep]” is also merely based on the fact that there is not the knowledge regarding one's own body [at that time]; and one remembers what he did before the sleep.

2.3.2 Advaitin's counter-inferences criticized (195,2–196,3)

[Obj.] The self is not within the scope of the I-notion; because it is the self, because it is immaterial, because it has no change, etc.

[Ans.] These [reasons] are rejected by force of our perception and the scriptures [we have pointed out immediately before]. And they are uncommon straying reasons (asādhāraṇa-anaikāntika) [because they are present only in the subject but not in any similar example such as a pot]. [The same reasons] used to deny that the self is the knower or that it is the doer can be dealt with in the same way.

⁴²⁹ These two verses are also quoted in ŚBh [I. i. 1; (1) 162,3 & 7f.].

⁴³⁰ See the definition of pratyak [38,3].

⁴³¹ According to the first interpretation of **R**, this compound means “due to the passages regarding liberated one, Brahman, one who intends to be liberated and the Veda.” In this case the passage regarding the Veda are: “aham evādhastād ... ahaṃ purastāt” [ChUp VII. xxv. 1], “tad ātmānam evāhaṃ veda” [?], “ahaṃ brahmāsmi” [BṛhUp I. iv. 10] etc.

⁴³² E.g. “aham annam” [TaiUp III. x. 6]; “aham maṇuḥ” [RV IV. xxvi. 1], quoted in BṛhUp I. iv. 10 (cf. ŚBh I. i. 1: “brahmātmabhāvāparokshyanirdhūtaniravaśeshāvidyānām api vāmadevādīnām aham ity evātmanubhavadarśanāc ca” [(1) 171,7]) etc.

⁴³³ E.g. “hantāham imās tisro devatāḥ” [ChUp VI. iii. 2] etc.

⁴³⁴ E.g. “ahaṃ vai tvam asi bhagavo devate” [VarāhaUp 2. 34], “ahaṃ ekaḥ prathamam āsam” [AtharvaśirasUp 1], “mumukshur vai śaraṇam ahaṃ prapadye” [ŚveUp

[Obj.] **[196]** The knowership, the doership or [being within the scope of the I-notion] is not the attribute of the self; because it is an attribute, because it can be seen or [because it is an accidental attribute].

[Ans.] These [inferences] are not established because it is sublated [by our experience] and because nothing sublates [these reasons] in counter-examples. That is, when the syllogism that [the knowership etc.] are not the attributes of the internal organ (ahaṃkāra) [because they are attributes etc.] is asserted, what is the logic [to refute it] of [you] loved by gods?

[Obj.] [We do approve this syllogism too, because these attributes are merely fancied]by ignorance.

[Ans.] True, [your answer proves] only [your] ignorance⁴³⁵. For, [according to your opinion, real] doership not rooted in ignorance cannot be accepted in any case. If you should deny even [doership] rooted in ignorance, it is contradictory to injunctions concerning [doership such as “one who wants the heaven should sacrifice”]. **[197]**

2.3.3 The proof by means of scriptures (197,1–3)

And that the knowership is the inherent nature of [the self] is explained by means of śrutis in the section [beginning with the Brahmasūtra]

*For the same reason, [namely because of scriptures], [the self is not mere knowledge but] the knower [BrSū II. iii. 19].

That the doership, which is the cause of being enjoyer, belongs to the self, the enjoyer, and that it is generally caused by the Supreme Person are explained in detail in the section [beginning with the sūtra]:

*[The self, being the enjoyer, is] the doer because scriptures have a purport [only in that case] [BrSū II. iii. 33]

and that [beginning with the sūtra]:

*But [the doership of the individual self] is from the Supreme [Brahman] because śrutis mention of it [BrSū II. iii. 40].

2.4 The self is self-luminous (197,3–207,2) VI. 8] etc.

It is proved by means of śrutis and logical appropriateness that [the self] is self-luminous, eternal, various, minute and so on [198].

2.4.1 Its self-luminous aspect and illuminated aspect etc. (198,1–201,3)

And it is self-luminous [only] for itself; for others, however, it [is not self-luminous but] known [indirectly] as the object of their knowledge. One's own [self] also can be the object of his own knowledge in the form qualified by being minute, being subordinate, being controlled, being eternal and so on, which are determined [only] by other means of knowledge, [namely inference and scriptures]. [199] But it is always self-luminous as what is qualified by being inward and being one in the form of 'I'. During yogic meditation, however, [it] is directly known by yogic perception as what is qualified by [all] true qualities which cannot [be directly perceived] before [the meditation].⁴³⁶ The above-mentioned is stated in the Ātmasiddhi [201] :

*So the self, being self-established, is known clearly by means of scriptures, inference and perception resulting from yogic practice. [ĀS vs.43; 86,9–10]

Thus the self exists as the agent of knowledge (mātr), the object of knowledge (meya) and the knowledge (māna) accordant to the difference in being knower and so on. Varadanārāyaṇa-bhaṭṭāraka⁴³⁷ says in the Prajñāparitrāṇa:

*The self can be the agent of knowledge, the object of knowledge and the knowledge (pramāṇa). The [attributive] consciousness (dhī) is the knowledge and the object of knowledge. A pot and the like are merely the objects of knowledge. [Prajñāparitrāṇa] [202]

2.4.2 The proof by means of scriptures (202,1–203,2)

The śrutis regarding [its] self-luminousness are well-known. It is true that [the word 'jñāna'] in

*[Brahman is] truth, jñānam [TaiUp II. i. 1] should be accepted as meaning [not knowledge but] knowing agent because there is udātta accent in the last syllable⁴³⁸; that [the word]

⁴³⁵ Accordin to the first interpretation of **K**.

⁴³⁶ yathāvasthitāpūrvākāra°. **K** suggests thereading yathāvasthitasarvākāra°.

⁴³⁷ Fl. in the last of the 12th century [Singh 127].

⁴³⁸ The text with accent marks reads jñānām. If a taddhita-affix aC [in P 5. 2. 127, meaning “belonging to this or existing in this (asyāsty asmin)”) is added to the

*vijñānaghanah [BṛhUp II. iv. 12]

means ‘pervaded by knowledge’ because, judging from the [following] example ‘rasaghana’ [II. v. 13], it is natural; and that in the passage

*Knowledge (vijñānam) performs sacrifice [TaiUp II. v. 1],

*[The self] is denoted by the [word ‘vijñāna’] because [the self] has that quality as its essence, as the Intelligent (prājña) [namely, Brahman], [is denoted by the word ‘bliss (ānanda)’] [BrSū II. iii. 29].

Nevertheless, in the passage

*Indeed he is seer,⁴³⁹ hearer, smeller, taster, thinker (manṭr), knower (boddhṛ), doer, vijñānātman, and the [individual] self [PrašnaUp V. 9],

it is established that [the self is] ‘knowledge itself (jñānasvarūpa),’ because this meaning is naturally understood from the word ‘vijñānātman’, and because there is no use mentioning again that he is knower, which is already explained particularly [by the words ‘seer’ etc.] and generally [by the words ‘knower’] [203].

In the same way, the self-luminousness [of the self] should be admitted to be naturally established by means of the following passages:

*Then the self becomes self-luminous (svayamjyotis) [BṛhUp IV. iii. 9],

*Which is the self? The person who among vital air is composed of knowledge and who is the illumination (jyotis) in the heart [BṛhUp IV. iii. 7],

and so on.

2.4.3 The logical proof considered (203,3–207,2)

—Attributive knowledge and substantive knowledge

Śrī-Vishṇucitta says:

*This is the inference: The self is self-luminous, because it is knowledge [in general], like attributive knowledge (dharmabhūtajñāna).

Illuminating without being the object of other knowledge, being the relative of word jñāna-, the udātta-accent in the first syllable (6. 1. 193) is shifted to the last syllable (6. 1. 163). In other cases, the last syllable of jñānam has svarita-accent (6. 1. 107 & 8. 4. 66). Accordingly, this jñānām, having udātta-accent in the last syllable, means not ‘knowledge’ itself but ‘the substratum of knowledge.’ See ĀS 47,12ff.: ‘satyaṃ jñānām’ ity atrāpi brahmalakṣaṇanirdeśe jñānaśabdo na jñānamātravacanaḥ, api tu tadvadvacanaḥ / tadvacanatve ‘L-ṛi’ [P 6. 1. 193] ity ādyudāttatvaprakṛteḥ / antodāttaś cāyaṃ jñānaśabdah / matvarthīya-aC-pratyayāntatve tathātvaṃ ghaṭate, nānyathā. Cf. Narasimhachari 1971: 162f. and van Buitenen: Rāmānuja's VAS, p.62, n.173a.

the relation between the knowledge and the self⁴⁴⁰ and so on,⁴⁴¹ intended by Viṣṇu-miśra [in this inference as common qualities of knowledge in general], are sublated by no means.

[If the self or substantive knowledge (dharmijñāna) were also knowledge, you may claim, it would illuminate others as well as itself like attributive knowledge — Against this objection, we reply:]

(29) As a lump illuminates only itself but its light [illuminates] others as well as itself, so is the difference between substantive knowledge and attributive knowledge, though both are same [in being knowledge]. **[204]**

(30) The [consideration⁴⁴²] that ‘I slept happily’ and the like establish the inferential knowledge as far as the [relation with the past] time and [the sleep] are concerned, provided the self is always declared to be inward, self-luminous and happy.⁴⁴³

(31) Even in this case, the happiness appears as belonging to that time, like sweetness and so on in the case ‘I sung sweetly’, ‘I walked slowly’ etc. **[206]**

[Obj.⁴⁴⁴] [The word] ‘knowledge,’ [presented as the reason (hetu) in your inference], is a relative term (sambandhiśabda) [and is always used in the form “A’s knowledge on B”]; accordingly, mere ‘knowledge’ is just figurative].

[Ans.] Your view shows mere derivation of the word. The real criterion of the word (pravṛttinimitta), however, is being an independent cause to make something fit for verbal reference (vyavahāra) **[207]**. And [an independent cause to make something fit for verbal reference] described concerning one’s own [verbal reference] is ‘self-luminous,’ [presented as the probandum (sādhyā) in our inference]. Hence, [the reason] is not same as the probandum. Being qualified by the substratum of the object is always found in attributive knowledge, [but substantive knowledge is devoid of it]. Nevertheless,

⁴³⁹ sprashṭā after drashṭā is omitted.

⁴⁴⁰ jñānātmasambandhapratisambandhitva. “being the describer of the relation between the knowledge and the self (jñānātamanor yaḥ sambandhaḥ tannirūpakatvam)” **(R)**, “having the relation existing in the self which has the knowledge as its adjunct (jñānapratyogikātmanishṭhasambandhavattva)” **(K)**; “it exists only in knowledge and the self, accordingly [the reason] is not vyabhicāra at all” **(R)**.

⁴⁴¹ jñānātmanāyataratva **(R)**, jñānaśabdavācyaiva **(K)**.

⁴⁴² parāmarśa. “vyāptiviśiṣṭapakshadharmatājñānam” **[TarS §44]**.

⁴⁴³ The commentators quote the passage of the Śrutaparakāśikā 168,13–16.

[according to our opinion], substantive knowledge is also qualified [by eternity etc.]; thus [our opinion] is not same as that of the other school, [namely, the Advaitin who maintains pure knowledge without any quality]. **[208]**

2.5 The self is eternal (208,1–2)

The reasons to prove that the self is imperishable are mentioned in the passages⁴⁴⁵ of the Bhagavadgītā beginning with

*Know, however, that to be imperishable by which all this is pervaded [BhG II. 17].

And they are explained in detail in [Rāmānuja's] commentary on it. Moreover, if [the self] were non-eternal, it would bring about the undesirable conclusion that [the self] acquires [the result of] what he has not done and loses [that of] what he has done.

2.6 The self is atomic in size (208,3–213,17)

2.6.1 The proof (208,3)

And [the individual self] is atomic in size (aṇu). Because the śrutis⁴⁴⁶ describe so, and because, [logically speaking], it is natural conclusion from the fact that we know the self-luminous [self] to be limited in the [subtle] space inside the heart; [if it were all-pervasive, it would be known everywhere]. **[209]**

2.6.2 The Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika view criticized (209,1–4)

[Obj.] [The self] must be all-pervasive so as to establish the fact that its effects through the unseen force (adr̥shṭa), [the substratum of which is the self], are seen at the same time in all directions.⁴⁴⁷

⁴⁴⁴ The opinion of the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika.

⁴⁴⁵ **R** quotes BhG II. 17–20.

⁴⁴⁶ E.g. “esho 'ṇur ātmā cetasā veditavyaḥ” [MuUp III. i. 9]; “ārāgramātro hy avaro 'pi dr̥shṭaḥ” “vālāgraśatabhāgasya” [ŚveUp V. 8, 9].

⁴⁴⁷ According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, who regards the unseen force as the quality of the self, if the self were not all-pervasive, the effects of the unseen force could not be established wherever the self does not exist. E.g. “dharmād dharmayor

[Ans.] This postulation is not proper. Nothing can deny that the individual self is atomic; because, [in our view], the unseen force is nothing but the affection and anger of God⁴⁴⁸ and God, the substratum of the two, is all-pervasive.⁴⁴⁹ And if [the self] were all-pervasive, our experience [such as ‘Knowing in a house, I am here’ etc.] would be unnatural. The self, fixed within the body, moves like the organs [when the body goes here and there]; this enables the knowledge and happiness here and there. [You may say that to assume the movement of the self as well as the body is not simpler because the all-pervasive self, as you assume, would not need to move⁴⁵⁰]; but the movement of the self is supported by our experience and the śrūtis,⁴⁵¹ while your assumption that [the self] is all-pervasive is not so. Thus for those who want logical simplicity (laughava), the very [simplicity] results [if they accept our opinion].

2.6.3 The opinion of Yāmuna⁴⁵²

(209,4–210,2)

The Ātmasiddhi⁴⁵³ says in the portion refuting the view that the self is the vital air:

*Though they are devoid of touch, the selves, which are not all-pervasive, are fit for departing, going and coming in accordance with the force of [their own] volition, the unseen power, as the internal organ is⁴⁵⁴. [ĀS 22,6–7]

And in the same [work] in dealing with the question and the answer as to [how] the consciousness spreads, the portion beginning with

*Having abandoned [its] substratum, [how can the consciousness, which is quality, ātmaṅṇatvāt tadāśrayasyāvyāpakatve na syād agner ūrdhvajvalanaṃ vāyos tiryamaṅgamanam aṅumanasos tv ādyaṃ karmeti, tayoh svāśrayasaṃyogāpekshitvāt” [Vyomavati 155,25–156,3]. See Umesha Mishra 1936: 376f. Cf. **SAS** ad **TMK** II. 19c: dharmādharmau svāśrayasaṃyukta evāśrayāntare kriyāṃ janayataḥ, kriyāhetuṅṇatvāt, gurutvavat.

In this regard, see also the fragment of Parāśara Bhaṭṭa cited in 483,8f., which seems to support the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika proof.

⁴⁴⁸ See NySi, TMK V. 81.

⁴⁴⁹ Cf. **SAS** ad **TMK** II. 19d.

⁴⁵⁰ Cf. TMK II. 18b.

⁴⁵¹ The commentators refer to “candramasam eva te sarve gacchanti” [KaushītakiUp I. 2]. TMK II. 18 refers to the pañcāgnividyā.

⁴⁵² Cf. NDy 247,12ff.

⁴⁵³ For the detail of Yāmuna's opinion on the size of the self, see Mesquita 1989.

⁴⁵⁴ avibhor ātmanaḥ sparśaviraḥṇo 'pi prayatnādṛṣṭāpreraṅṇanugūṇyena manasa ivotkrāṅṅatyaṅṅatayo yujyate. Viraraghavacharya's edition of the Siddhitraya reads avibhu-

go to another place^{455?}] [ĀS 64,1 = 79,5]
makes it clear that [the self] is atomic.

The references [to the self] in the śrutis, the smṛtis etc. as ‘all-pervading’ and the like⁴⁵⁶ can be justified, in accordance with the propriety in each case, from the fact that an aggregate [of the selves exists everywhere] or that [the self] can penetrate into a subtle thing through its attributive knowledge **[210]**. The word ‘all-pervasive’ in the passage of the Ātmasiddhi,

*[The self is] eternal, all-pervasive [ĀS 10,4],
is also interpreted in the [Śrī-]Bhāshya as follows:

*It penetrates all non-spiritual things in nature because it is very subtle [ŚrīBh I. i. 1; (1) 174,1].

2.6.4 The view in the Brahmasūtra (210,3–212,1)

And the author of the [Brahma-]sūtra himself explains that [the self] is atomic by means of the sūtras,

*[The self is atomic because the śrutis mention its] departing [from the body],
going [out of it] and returning [to it] [BrSū II. iii. 20]

and so on.⁴⁵⁷ It is appropriate that the individual self, abiding in the part of the heart, presides over various things through its attributive knowledge. In the same way yogins and the like are able to preside over many bodies. It is not proper to assume [the self] to be all-pervasive for this reason **[211]**. Keeping in mind all these, the [Brahma-]sūtra says:

*Through its quality [of knowledge], however (vā), [the self pervades the whole
body], as light [BrSū II. iii. 26].

And in the explanation of the liberated self, [the same work says]:

*The pervasion [by the liberated self] is like that of a lump **[212]**; [the śruti⁴⁵⁸]
shows so [BrSū VI. iv. 15].

tvenāsyātmanaḥ for avibhor ātmanaḥ and °ādayo for °āgatayo (the reading of the Nyāya-siddhāñjana is parenthesized).

⁴⁵⁵ Yāmuna's answer to this objection is: we do not accepted so etc., quoted in NySi 419,7f.

⁴⁵⁶ E.g. “nityaḥ sarvagataḥ sthānuḥ” [BhG II. 24], “tadvaj jīvo nabho 'pi ca” [?], “yathā lshetraññaśaktiḥ sā veshṭitā nṛpa sarvagā” [ViP VI. vii. 62].

⁴⁵⁷ Up to II. iii. 26, according to **R**.

2.6.5 The Jaina view criticized

(212,1–3)

Thus the assumption by the Jainas, who follow the misconception of the body as the self, that [the self] has the same size as that of the body [for the time being] is also disproved. And it is rejected by the following [Brahma-]sūtras:

*And, [if you accepted] in this way [that the self has the size of the body], the self would be imperfect, [because, say, the self which once occupied the body of an elephant cannot take the size of an ant].

*Nor also is there non-contradiction even if [the self] attains the different states (paryāya) [in accordance with the body]; since, [if it were so, the self] would be subject to change and [consequently it would be non-eternal].

*Also because the final [size which the self has when it is liberated] is persistent, both [the self and its size in that stage] are eternal; therefore [this inherent size of the self] is no different [from those in the previous stages] [BrSū II. ii. 32–34].

2.6.6 The statement of Varadavishṇu considered(212,3–213,6)

However, the statement of Varadavishṇu-miśra

*In the stage of the transmigration [213], the self itself is atomic in size because [the self] itself and its [attributive] knowledge are contracted; but in the stage of the liberation, [the self itself], all-pervasive and omnipresent, and the [attributive] knowledge in the expanded form shine forth. This is understood by means of the śruti

“This individual self is to be understood as a part of the hundredth part of the point of a hair divided a hundredfold; yet it is capable of infinity” [ŚveUp V. 9].

So is said by the venerable Parāśra:

“The power of Vishṇu is said to be high, so high⁴⁵⁹ is what is called kshetrajaña (individual self)” [ViP VI. vii. 61]

and so on asserts the individual self as well as [its attributive knowledge] has contraction and expansion. The same opinion is shown in his Mānayaṭhātmyanirṇaya in reference to the phrase in the Ātmasiddhi:

*eternal, all-pervasive [ĀS 10,4].

This is exaggerated statement because it is contradictory to the [Brahma-]sūtra and so

⁴⁵⁸ ŚveUp V. 9.

⁴⁵⁹ Varadavishṇu reads tathā parā; but according to the siddhānta, tathā'parā is

on.

2.6.7 The statements in the Gītābhāshya considered (213,7–17)

But the Śrīmad-Gītābhāshya comments on “Beginningless brahman having Me as the highest⁴⁶⁰” [BhG XIII. 12] as follows:

*Brahman is what is endowed with the nature of greatness (brhattva), namely, the principle called kshetrañña (the individual self) which is the entity different from the body etc. and is by itself devoid of the limitation by the body etc. Indeed, the śruti says:

“Yet it is capable of infinity” [ŚveUp V. 9].

And its limitation by the body is caused by [its] karma; its infinity is when it is liberated from bandage of the karma [GBh XIII. 12; 434,9–12];

on “It exists covering all things in the world” [BhG XIII. 13]:

*Whatever aggregate of things that exist in the world, covering— pervading them, it exists.⁴⁶¹ That is, it is all-pervasive in its pure state as it is devoid of the limitation of space and the like [GBh XIII. 13; 436.9f.];

on “Unmoving and yet moving” [BhG XIII. 15]:

*unmoving by nature but moving when it has the body [GBh XIII. 15; 438,2];

and in other topics also it says:

*Having unlimited knowledge as its sole form [GBh passim].

All these are to be regarded as merely referring to the pervasion of [attributive] knowledge and the like. Because in the [Śrī-]Bhāshya, the [Vedānta-]Sāra and other works [ad IV. iv. 15], [the same author] comments the passage

*Yet it is capable of infinity [ŚveUp V. 9]

in this way; especially in the [Vedānta-]Dīpa ad the sūtra

*The pervasion [by the liberated self] is like that of a lump ; [the śruti] shows so [BrSū VI. iv. 15],

he intentionally takes up the śruti of “the point of a hair” [ŚveUp V. 9] and says:

*The author of the [Brahma-]sūtra think that the essential nature of the inner self is being atomic only, because in the sūtra

proper reading.

⁴⁶⁰ anādi matparam brahma. Śankara reads: anādimat param brahma.

⁴⁶¹ Here Vedānta Deśika changes the word-order of Rāmānuja.

“If [the opponent] hold that [the individual self] is not atomic because the śruti⁴⁶² states what is not so; [our answer is:] no, because the context relates to the other, [namely, Brahman]” [BrSū II. iii. 22],

he refers to only the Supreme as omnipresent⁴⁶³ [VDīpa IV. iv. 15]

Therefore, it is the dogma of the author of the [Brahma-]sūtra and the author of the [Śrī-]Bhāshya etc. that the individual self is always atomic.

2.7 The selves are plural (213,18–219,5)

2.7.1 The proof (213,18–214,1)

And the self in this nature is different from body to body, except a case of [a powerful yogin such as] Saubhari, [who could control fifty bodies at the same time⁴⁶⁴]. Because memory, experience, happiness, pain, volition of the organs and the like are restricted [in each body]. Indeed, the Nyāyasūtra⁴⁶⁵ says:

*The selves are many because of the restriction⁴⁶⁶ [VaiSū III. ii. 16 (20)]

The Sāṃkhya also hold: **[214]**

*The plurality of the selves (purusha) is proved; because birth, death and organs [of each person] are restricted, because there are not simultaneous activities, and because the proportion of three guṇas is different.⁴⁶⁷ [SāKā 18]

2.7.2 The import of the oneness taught in the scriptures (214,2–215,3)

The [scriptural] passages on the non-duality of the individual selves,⁴⁶⁸ however,

⁴⁶² I.e. “sa vā esha mahān aja ātmā” [BṛhUp IV. iv. 22].

⁴⁶³ Following Viraraghavacharya's opinion [fn.1], “iti parsyaiva mahattvavacanāt” is added.

⁴⁶⁴ See van Buitenen's translation of VAS, fn.254.

⁴⁶⁵ Sic! Viraraghavachari adds (vaiśeshika?).

⁴⁶⁶ nānātmāno vyavasthātaḥ. This reading of the sūtra is found in the Kiraṇāvalī [p.99] and the Nyāyakaṇ alī [p.220]. Candrānanda' commentary reads: nānā vyavasthātaḥ; Upaskāra's commentary: vyavasthāto nānā.

⁴⁶⁷ The commenrarors quote the interpretation of the Sāṃkhyatattvakaumudī of Vācaspatimiśra.

⁴⁶⁸ E.g. “yady anyo 'sti paraḥ ko 'pi” [ViP II. xiii. 90]; “tasyātmaparadeheshu sato 'py ekam ayaṃ hi yat” [ViP II. xiv. 32]. The import of these passage is examined in the Śrībhāshya I. i. 1 [(1) 240ff.].

import oneness in mode [such as having knowledge as the sole form or being the body of God]. In fact, the word ‘one or same (eka)’ and the like are used to mean the oneness in mode also; for example, “This rice and that rice are the same,” and also,

*The oneness of Rāma and Sugrīva [Rāmāyaṇa, suṇdra-kā°]

etc. are to be seen. That is summed up as follows:

(32) Statements of oneness are due to the non-contradiction, [say, between two kings], the friendliness, [say, between Rāma and Sugrīva], the non-difference in genus, [say, between two grains], the non-difference in enjoyment, [say, between the liberated selves], and incapability of separate existence so far as space, time, condition etc. are concerned.

[215]

And, though the similarity between the individual selves [in the transmigration] is [merely] as to their essential nature, [their similarity] in the liberation is as to their attributive [knowledge] also, as is established by the Śrutis and the smṛtis,⁴⁶⁹ and also by other [reasons]. Even these statements negating the difference between the individual selves are for negating the difference in being a god etc., caused by the misconception that the body is the self, but are not for negating the difference in their essential nature, proved by means of right knowledge. So it is proper that these [passages] have the same import that the clear expression of the negation of being a god etc.⁴⁷⁰ has.

2.7.3 Advaita view criticized

(215,4–217,1)

Furthermore, for those who argue the oneness of the self without any specific character, there would be the undesirable conclusion that the bandage and the liberation are same; because from the viewpoint of the reality, ignorance is removed even in this [stage of bandage] **[216]**, and from the viewpoint of unreality, the usage of [ignorance] is possible even in that [stage of liberation]. As a matter of fact, [the word] transmigration in the world is used even for liberated persons such as Śuka. Moreover,

If annihilation of all the delusions were caused by delusion, there would be no annihilation in reality. On the other hand, if [it were caused] by real knowledge, there would arise deviation from your theory, abandonment of non-duality and so on; [because

⁴⁶⁹ E.g. “nirañjanaḥ paramam aikyam upaiti” [Muṇ akaUp III. i. 3], “mama sādharṃyam āgataḥ” [BhG XIV. 2].

⁴⁷⁰ E.g. “caturvidho 'pi bhedo 'yaṃ mithyājñānanibandhanaḥ / devādibhede 'padahvaste nāsty evāvaraṇo hi saḥ” [Vishṇudharma]. quoted in ŚBh I. i. 1, Eng. tr. p. 117

you should accept the knowledge as another real existent]. **[217]**

We will reject the theory in detail afterwards.

2.7.4 Bhedābheda view criticized (217,2–218,3)

As for Bhāskara's opinion, it is ridiculous that eternal and all-knowing [Brahman] is associated with limiting adjunct (upādhi). Since Brahman cannot be divided by limiting adjunct, unavoidably Brahman Himself would be in the transmigration. If limiting adjunct moved, there would be an undesirable conclusion that the bandage and the liberation take place one after another at every moment.⁴⁷¹ Even if limiting adjunct were divided like [fifty bodies of] Saubhari, [Brahman] would inevitably recollect [all the experience of the selves as Saubhari recollected all the experience of his bodies]. And if the division [of Brahman] were accepted, it would be contradictory to the opinion that He cannot be cut.

Thus, [the opinion of Yādavaprakāśa] that Brahman, real existent and spiritual, is different and non-different from all the entities should be rejected. For he holds that in the cosmic destruction even the bound [self] becomes real existence without any difference to the liberated one; and, in the creation, even the liberated [self], all-knowing, would be associated with endless transmigration due to his consideration, [caused by his being all-knowing], on the identity with all the inferior beings **[218]**. Therefore, there would be no distinction between the bandage and the liberation.

In our opinion, the cessation of ignorance must be another positive entity which is in the form of expansion of special knowledge or is a kind of acceptance of loving Highest Person and so on. All the other [opinions] are confused.

2.7.5 The meaning of the identity with Brahman (218,4–219,5)

In this way, [the condition mentioned in the passage]

*One who knows Brahman becomes Brahman (brahmaiva bhavati) [MuUp III. ii. 8]

and so on is caused by the direct experience of the identity with Brahman. The identity of the liberated [self] and Brahman is based on the relation of the body and one who possesses the body. And the direct experience of it is eternal, because the direct knowledge

⁴⁷¹ Cf. VAS §55; 104,3f.

of it is continuous as long as the self exists. According to the Nyāyasudarśana [of Nārāyaṇabhaṭṭāraka], however,

*The word ‘eva’ [here] means [mere] similarity, as is stated in the Nighaṇṭu:

“In some cases, eva means similarity.” [219]

And [the usage of eva] to mean similarity is seen in the following [injunction of] performance on the Śrauta ritual:

“One should kill a dwarf [animal] relating to Viṣṇu. Having become Viṣṇu (viṣṇur eva bhūtvā), one who competes wins these worlds” [?].

‘Viṣṇur eva’ means ‘like (iva) viṣṇu.’ That is, becoming Viṣṇu Himself is not intended here, because it cannot be got for ‘one who competes’ by the sacrifice of cattle. Indeed, winning enemies etc. is nothing but worldly fruit, and so on. So the [Śrī-]Bhāṣya refers to only [the opinion that ‘eva’ is] figurative usage:

*And the practical usage ‘This is [the same as] that’ in order to mean that the two have the same character is just primary (mukhya eva). For example, ‘This is [the same as] that cow,’ and so on [ŚrīBh I. i. 1; (1) 153,1f.].

Here ‘just primary (mukhya eva)’ means ‘almost, [but not perfectly], primary.’ And ‘This is [the same as] that cow’ denotes that the two individuals have the same form.

Therefore, it is proved that the individual selves are different from God and they are mutually different.

2.8 Classification of the self (219,6–224,2)

And such self, though it has happiness by nature, is in the transmigration by force of limiting adjunct. It is of two kinds: one who transmigrates (saṃsārin) and one who does not transmigrate (asaṃsārain). The former is one who has the merit and the demerit etc.; the latter is devoid of them.

2.8.1 Transmigrant (saṃsārin) (219,7–222,2)

The former is also of two kinds: one who transmigrates forever (nityasaṃsārin) and one who will be devoid of future transmigration.

2.8.1.1 Eternal transmigrant (nityasaṃsārin) (219,8–220,4)

The former of the two, [namely, nityasamsārin], is [possible according to some opinion⁴⁷²]; for it is possible for its transmigration not to stop because the cause [of his liberation] will not come even afterwards as [they has not come] for beginningless past kalpas. **[220]** The proof for it is the [scriptural] statement that His glory as sport (līlāvibhūti) is eternal. That is supported by the following passages

*I throw continuously [the worst of men] into [demoniacal wombs] [BhG XVI. 19],

*I can never endure [VarāhaP],

and so on.

However, some⁴⁷³ explain as follows. These [passages] intend to mean their excessive delay [for the liberation], but nobody transmigrates foerever. Because [present] non-relation between non-contradictory two things, [namely, the self and cause of the liberation], is pervaded by inevitability of occuring in other time.⁴⁷⁴ Otherwise there would be undesirable conclusion that people do not engage in the means of the liberation for fear ‘May I be so?’

2.8.1.2 Non-eternal transmigrant

(220,4–221,1)

Being devoid of future transmigration is possible due to approaching of its cause like approaching of the present body which has not been acquired till now **[221]**. The proof for it is the [scriptural] statement that one who knows Brahman is liberated.

2.8.1.2 The course of transmigration

(221,1–222,2)

And such transmigrating beings are bound to a chain of their karma and go stray with wasting [karma] and being filled up with [karma] like a vessel of a machine for raising water from a well of time, which is revolving in the interior of the cosmic egg. In this situation, one who does meritorious deed, following the order of night, later half of the month, six months during which the sun moves southward, the world of the fathers, ether and the moon, ascends to the heaven.⁴⁷⁵ And he descends from the position

⁴⁷² This is the opinion of the Mādhva school and Rāmamiśra, according to the Ānandadāyini ad SAS II. 27.

⁴⁷³ Viraraghvacari points out that R's explanation follows the logic shown in the Nyāyakusumāñjali (fn.1).

⁴⁷⁴ Both opinions are accepted by Deśika; see TMK II. 27d.

⁴⁷⁵ See ChUp V. x. 3.

of the moon, following the order of ether, air, smoke, mist and cloud.⁴⁷⁶ There, offerings, [as the scripture figuratively describes], composed of faith [or subtle elements], soma [or a divine body], rain, food and semen are [respectively] associated with positions of the heavenly world, rainy cloud, the earth, a man and the womb.⁴⁷⁷ In this connection, the need for the fifth offering [or conception] is mostly the case; because it is not seen in the [births] of Draupadi, Dhṛṣṭadyumna and so on.⁴⁷⁸ So is [the births] of one who does non-meritorious deed; because in the bodies of insects and the like [222], there is not the fifth offering⁴⁷⁹ and they do not attain to the moon.⁴⁸⁰ There is very terrible way to the hell for them. And the experience of miseries in the hell, explained in Purāṇas⁴⁸¹ and so on, makes a person's hair stand on end like a kadamba-fruit once he remembers the description.

2.8.2 Non-transmigrant

(222,3–224,2)

2.8.2.1 Classification

(222,3–4)

The second [i.e. one who does not transmigrate (asaṃsārain)] is also of two kinds: one who has absolute non-existence of the transmigration and one who has the transmigration destroyed. Of the two, the former, an eternal seer (nityasūri), has, like God, absolute non-existence of [the transmigration] because there is never the cause of it. The latter, on the other hand, is the liberated beings (mukta) as mentioned before.⁴⁸²

2.8.2.2 Transmigrant beings are numberless; so are liberated

(222,5–10)

Time is beginningless and thousand persons have been liberated everyday; still transmigration is not completely destroyed. Because this endless [transmigration] is of such nature. And the Vedārthasaṃgraha says:

*This difference cum non-difference (bhedābheda) doctrine [of Yādavaprakāśa] is worse even than the [Advaita] doctrine that Brahman is ignorant. For [according

⁴⁷⁶ See ChUp V. x. 5–6.

⁴⁷⁷ See ŚrīBh III. i. 1–7, especially the exegesis of ChUp V. iv. 2 – ix. 1 [407,9–14].

⁴⁷⁸ See BrSū III. i. 19.

⁴⁷⁹ See BrSū III. i. 20.

⁴⁸⁰ See BrSū III. i. 17.

⁴⁸¹ The description in the Garu apurāṇa is popular.

⁴⁸² 220,4f.

to the doctrine] immeasurable misery is real and, since those who transmigrate are innumerable, it is hardly overcome [VAS §59; 106,5f.].

As a drop of water pours into ocean having endless water, among a group of one who transmigrates, those who are liberated later enters into those who have been liberated before. Though both one who transmigrates and one who are liberated are innumerable, there is relative difference [between the numbers of the two] due to [the scriptural statement]⁴⁸³ that the former] is [His] one-fourth [and the latter] is [His] three-fourth. And such [difference] is seen between [the number of] muhūrta (1/30 day), [that of] yāma (1/8 day), [that of] a day and night, [that of] kalpa and so on, or between [the number of] substance, [that of] earthy one, [that of] a pot and so on.⁴⁸⁴ Thus it is appropriate that the eternal [seers] are innumerable even in comparison with all the bound beings and the liberated beings.

2.8.2.3 Eternal seers really exist

(222,10–223,5)

Some do not accept the category of eternal seer; **[223]** but it is not correct. Because the passage

*[Which] seers see forever [NṛsiṃhapūrvatāpinīUp V. 10, SubālaUp 6] and so on describes the [highest] place⁴⁸⁵ qualified by plural seers who see forever. For this very reason, it cannot be explained in other ways as referring to a series of the liberated beings, [who cannot see forever], or God, [who is single].⁴⁸⁶

[Obj.] All the individual selves are excluded from absolute non-connection with transmigration; because they are the individual selves etc. [Accordingly eternal seers cannot exist].

[Ans.] Such inferential marks (liṅga) can be rejected respectively since, [so far as the ordinary individual selves are concerned], they merely prove what has been already proved (siddhasādhana) and, [so far as the eternal seers are concerned], they are stultified [by the above-mentioned passage] etc.

As to the eternal seers, their innumerable, secondary classification and so on

⁴⁸³ ChUp III. xii. 6.

⁴⁸⁴ The similar instances are found in 518,1f.

⁴⁸⁵ The meaning of ‘vishṇor paraṃ padam’ is explained in VAS §129.

⁴⁸⁶ See VAS §128.

should be inquired in the Śrī-Pāñcarātra-saṃhitās.

(33) [The eternal seers] such as Ananta and Vishvaksena are brothers of joy with liberated beings, though the former have fixed service, from the viewpoint of their knowledge, joy etc. [224]

App. Condition of God and eternal seers in pralaya (224,1–2)

In this way, those who hold that the condition of the eternal [seers] and God is like that of deep sleep in the universal destruction are thrown away on account of [their] eternal vision and so on. And because they do not have karma contracting their knowledge, such condition cannot be justified.

What is the cause of the liberation, then?

It is particular knowledge which is described by the words ‘upāsana’ ‘vedana’ ‘dhyāna’ and the like attaining to the form of bhakti, is repeated again and again, and is continued till death. So is said in the [Brahma-]sūtra:

*Repetition again and again, on account of the teaching [BrSū IV. iv. 1];

furthermore,

*[Meditation should be done] till death, because in this [scripture] also it is shown [BrSū IV. iv. 12].

But it is not mere knowledge of truth. Because it cannot be enjoined if it is accomplished by mere hearing which is attained through liking for the ascertainment so as to realize the excessive human purpose superficially understood by means of a particular group of letters gained through studying main portions [i.e. Upanishads] along with some subordinate branches, established by the injunction of study. And because liberation is not seen even if mere [knowledge] is established. It is stated by the venerable Āpastamba:

*That there is attainment of pacification on knowledge arising is prohibited by the scriptures. If there were attainment of pacification on knowledge arising, even here one should not experience misery⁴⁸⁷ [Āpastamba-Dharmasūtra II. ix. 21. 14–16]

⁴⁸⁷ Quoted in ŚrīBh I. i. 4 [146,11f.] as disproof of jīvanmukti.

Again it cannot be said that one who removes the mental impression (vāsanā) concerning the distinction [between the self and Brahman] through hearing, thinking and meditation attains the direct perception [of Brahman] born merely from the [scriptural] passages. Because this opinion is spoiled for these reasons: [the removal of the mental impression and the direct perception] are mutually dependent, it is contradictory [on account of the mutual dependence], etc.

Regarding [the Advaita concept of] avidyā, the argument cannot endure the alternatives, as is understood in the [Śrī-]Bhāshya etc., concerning a) [avidyā] itself, b) the relation with it [or being its substratum], c) the knowledge which annihilates it, d) the knower of this knowledge, e) the instruction on its identity and so on⁴⁸⁸ [225]. And unreality can never bring about the knowledge of reality. That is to say, [226]

(34) According to me, the knowledge of reality is brought about through reality; according to you, however, the knowledge of unreality is brought about through unreality! Sometimes the knowledge of unreality, [say, an image in a dirty mirror], is brought about through reality But the knowledge of reality can never be brought about through unreality.

Neither independent ritual action (karma) nor ritual action combined with knowledge can be the cause of the liberation, because [the scripture⁴⁸⁹] enjoins ‘to know’ [as the cause] and prohibits other means. But to introduce ritual action as a subsidiary (aṅga) of [the cause] is not contradictory at all. For, in that case, [ritual action] is not another [independent] means. Indeed, it is not until the mind is purified through rubbing off the past karma, which prevents the direct experience of the Highest Self and is in the form of merit and demerit in the transmigration based on rajas and tamas, that [the ritual action] becomes useful [for the liberation]. In the same way, it is also established that living in special [sacred] places,⁴⁹⁰ a specific vow (vrata), seeking refuge in Viṣṇu etc. and also karmayoga and jñānayoga become the cause of the liberation indirectly [227]. For seeking refuge in Viṣṇu and the like are adopted as

⁴⁸⁸ So-called saptavidhānupapatti in ŚBh I. i. 1 is composed of (1) āśraya-anupapatti [] (= b), (2) tirodhana-a° [], (3) svarūpa-a° [] (= a), (4) anirvacanīya-a° [], (5) pramāṇa-a°, (6) nivartaka-a° [] (= c) and (7) nivṛtti-a°.

⁴⁸⁹ I.e. tam eva viditvāti mṛtyum eti nānyaḥ panthā ayanāya vidyate [ŚveUp III. 8].

⁴⁹⁰ There are 108 sacred spot, according to the Vaiṣṇava tradition, including milky ocean and Vaikuṅṭha.

subsidiaries of the meditation. Or rather, the liberation is established as [sacrificed] cattle and the like go to the heaven with the sacrificer (yajamāna). Indeed,

*They go to the heaven with the sacrificer, lord of men! [MBh XII⁴⁹¹] **[228]**,
says the Mahābhārata.

All that should be mentioned about karmayoga and jñānayoga is clearly stated in the Śrīmad-Gītābhāshya. It is said concerning karmayoga there:

*Since karmayoga is easy to perform, free from careless mistake and independent as it includes the knowledge [GBh III. 33; 130,8f.]
and so on; for these reasons it is explained that mere karmayoga can independently establish the vision of the self (ātmāvalokana). Likewise, to the verse

*Free from desire, with interest and mind controlled⁴⁹² [BhG IV. 21],
it is said:

*The meaning is: He sees the self in the above-mentioned form by mere karmayoga without the intervention of jñānayoga. [GBh IV. 21; 165,3].

To the verse

*Which has Brahman as its instrument to offer with⁴⁹³ [BhG IV. 24],
it is said:

*The ritual action performed by those who want to be liberated is in the form of knowledge because it is associated with the contemplation (anusandhāna) that their self is the Supreme Brahman and it accomplishes the direct vision of the self without the intervention of jñānayoga.⁴⁹⁴ [GBh IV. 24; 167,6f.].

And in the fifth chapter, by the verses

*Both the renunciation [or jñānayoga] and karmayoga lead to the highest excellence. Of the two, however, karmayoga excels the renunciation of actions. [BhG V. 2], **[229]**

*One who resorts to even one [of the two] attains the fruit of both [BhG V. 4],

*That state which is attained by those who resort in the sām̐khya [or jñānayoga] is reached by those who resort in the yoga [or karmayoga] [BhG V. 5],

⁴⁹¹ Found in the critical edition of Poona vol.18, p.440 (App.4, 2688).

⁴⁹² yatacittātmā. Here ātman denotes manas, according to the **GBh**; and citta means ahaṁkāra or buddhi, according to Deśika's Tātparyacandrikā.

⁴⁹³ arpaṇa. arpyate anenety arpaṇaṁ srugādi [GBh].

⁴⁹⁴ jñānanishṭhā. In GBh, °nishṭhā is used synonymously to °yoga [van Buitenen, Rāmānuja on BhG, p.66 fn.116].

its independence is clearly stated. In the verse

*But renunciation [or jñānayoga], Oh mighty-armed [Arjuna], is hard to attain without [karma-]yoga. The meditating sage (muni) who follows [karma-]yoga reaches the self⁴⁹⁵ in no long time. [BhG V. 6],

it is taught that karmayoga operates quickly even than jñānayoga and that it is hard to attain jñānayoga without karmayoga. And it is stated in many passages that both [karmayoga and jñānayoga] are subsidiary of bhaktiyoga. That is, in the commentary to the verse

*If you are unable to do even this [BhG XII. 11],

it is said:

*Then, you should resort to aksharayoga described in the first six chapters (śaṭaka) [of the Bhagavadgītā], which is in the form of the contemplation on the essential nature of the self and generates the high devotion (parabhakti), and as its means, you should renounce the fruit of every action. [GBh XII. 11; 399,7–9].

And to the verse

*The [direct] knowledge [of the self] is better than the repeated practice [of remembrance of God, for one who cannot practice the latter] [BhG XII. 12],

it is said:

*The meaning is as follows. When the mind is peaceful, the meditation on the self is accomplished; from the meditation on the self results the direct experience of [the self]; from the direct experience of [the self] results the high devotion [to God]. Thus, for one who cannot practice bhaktiyoga, the meditation on the self is better. Than the meditation on the self, for one whose mind is not peaceful, karmayoga which includes the knowledge of the self and is devoid of the intention to the fruit, is better so as to accomplish the meditation.⁴⁹⁶ [GBh XII. 12; 401,7–9].

Likewise, it is said in the beginning of the last six chapters:

*The direct knowledge of the inner self, one who attains, is subsidiary to the meditation on God, which is in the form of bhakti and is the means to attain the highest goal, namely, God Vāsudeva, the Highest Brahman. In the first six

⁴⁹⁵ Here brahman means ātman [GBh].

⁴⁹⁶ So the steps are: karmayoga Ḥ manaśśānti Ḥ ātmanishṭhā Ḥ ātmāparokshyaḤ parā bhaktiḥ. What is called aksharayoga in sūtra 11 may be the first four steps (or ātmanishṭhā only?).

chapters it is taught that the direct knowledge is [230] accomplished by the two discipline: karmayoga and jñānayoga. [GBh XIII. 0; 408,3–5].

It is said [by Yāmuna-muni]:

*For one who has purified the mind by means of both [karmayoga and jñānayoga], [the liberation] can be attained through the exclusive and excessive bhaktiyoga.⁴⁹⁷ [ĀS 9,3].

In this regard, the central point is as follows.

Bhaktiyoga is the [chief] means for attainment of the Highest Self. For one who cannot do it, the vision of the self is necessary to establish this bhaktiyoga. And both karmayoga and jñānayoga are the independent means for [the vision of the self]. Of the two, jñānayoga is the inherent subsidiary (antaramṅga) of the vision of the self. Nevertheless it is difficult to practice first. One who is not qualified for it should practice karmayoga, the fruit of which is the same [as that of jñānayoga]. A renowned man, though he is qualified for [jñānayoga], should practice karmayoga so as to lead [ordinary] people. For one who cannot practice [jñānayoga], it is karmayoga that brings about the capacity for jñānayoga. Even if in course of time he abandons karmayoga and practices jñānayoga, that is not defect at all. And these two yogas, according to the motive [of one who practice them], can bring about mere isolation (kaivalya) for someone [who wants it]; as the very meditation of God can bring about [worldly merits] such as lordship (aiśvarya) for someone. That is no defect because it is through the difference in beginningless streaming karma in the form of merit and demerit that there is the difference in capacity and non-capacity [to practice a particular yoga], motive and so on [231].

Thus it is proved that only bhakti is the means for the liberation.

Bhakti (devotion) is love toward an admirable person. The very [bhakti] is divided into parabhakti and so on⁴⁹⁸ according to difference in the condition. The word ‘bhakti’ is used in secondary meaning for praise (stuti), salutation (namaskāra) and the like because they are connected with it. And in the pāda of summing up [various] qualities, [i.e. the Brahmasūtra III. iii], this bhakti is investigated in different forms according to the division [of vidyā] such as sad, madhu, dahara, bhūma, vaiśvānara.

⁴⁹⁷ See the comment on this passage in the VAS [§91; 126,13f.].

⁴⁹⁸ parabhakti: jñānaviśeṣa, parajñāna: sākshātkāra, paramabhakti: bhagavat-prāptitvarāhetubhūtaprītiśeṣa (R).

Like this distinction such as sad, bhaktis in the form of meditations of the fourfold Self⁴⁹⁹ also should be accepted [as is taught in the Pāñcarātrasaṃhitās], because they are not different in being established by the means of valid knowledge, being independent [means of the liberation] etc.

All these [bhaktis] are accomplished by a person who belongs to the upper three caste⁵⁰⁰ and practices the duties in his caste (varṇa) and stage of life (āśrama)⁵⁰¹ as the various scriptures teach, gods, asuras and the like.⁵⁰² Women [such as Maireyī] and one who is devoid of any stage of life (vidhura) [such as Raikva], who are qualified for the subsidiaries such as low-voiced prayer (japa) and fasting, can be qualified for the meditation of Brahman. The [only] difference is that observing the stages of life is better than violating them.⁵⁰³ Those who violate vow of life-long abstinence (naishṭhika) and the like, however, **[232]** cannot be qualified, because the smṛti⁵⁰⁴ says so and they get expulsion from good people. Even if they perform expiatory ceremonies (prāyaścitta), they cannot be qualified for the meditation of Brahman, as is stated in the [Brahma-]sūtra:

*But either case [such person] is expelled because of the smṛti and custom [BrSū III. iv. 43].

[Obj.] The śruti speaks of the liberation of a cowherdess⁵⁰⁵ (gopikā) and the like. Why do you limit it to the upper three caste, then?

[Ans.] The answer is below. Because they do not perform the means of the liberation in their present body, but they did it in their [past] bodies born as a brāhmaṇa etc. Though they have accomplished the means before, their specific karma which has begun to operate (prārabdhakarma) made them enter into the low bodies. Whatever body they have at last does not matter, because their bandage continues till their karma

⁴⁹⁹ Namely, Vāsudeva, Saṃkarshaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. See ŚrīBh II. ii. 41.

⁵⁰⁰ See BrSū I. iii. 33ff.:apaśūdrādhikaraṇa.

⁵⁰¹ See BrSū III. iv. 33.

⁵⁰² See BrSū I. iii. 25.

⁵⁰³ See BrSū III. iv. 19.

⁵⁰⁴ I.e. Atrismṛti 8. 16 (Agnipurāṇa 165. 23) quoted in the commentaries ad BrSū III. iv. 43.

⁵⁰⁵ For example, in the Vishṇupurāṇa.

which has begun to operate ends. Thus Vidura⁵⁰⁶ and the like [were liberated] through the knowledge born from reminding the impression (saṃskāra) in their past lives. Accordingly, nothing is contradictory to the section of ‘except śūdra.’⁵⁰⁷ And the smṛti says:

*Even Dharmavyādha and others, though they are scorned and born in a low caste, accomplished the perfection due to their discipline in the past lives like a female ascetic. [VishṇudharmottaraP 10]

and so on. **[233]** Calling [King] Janaśruti, who want to hear, ‘śūdra’⁵⁰⁸ is due to his sorrow (śocana), as is clear in the [Brahma-]sūtra.⁵⁰⁹

Nyāsavidyā (or prapatti) is qualified by a specific conviction etc.⁵¹⁰ It is not contradictory to the passage:

*There is no other way [to pass over death than knowing Him] [ŚveUp III. 8], because [prapatti] is specific knowledge **[234]**. [Nor is it contradictory] to the passage:

*But only through bhakti [BhG XI. 54]

etc., because [prapatti] is a kind of bhakti. For example, it is stated:

*The firm conviction that the means to attain God is [God] Himself is called sādhyabhakti or prapatti.

On the other hand, the conviction that the means to attain Him is bhakti is [called] upāyabhakti. The above-mentioned [sādhyabhakti] is better than it.

[235]

Upāyabhakti destroys sin other than karma which has begun to operate (prārabdhakarma); but sādhyabhakti is better [because⁵¹¹] it destroys even [karma] which has begun to operate. [?].

Like the divisions [of vidyā] such as sadvidyā, that [prapatti] is also different [from the

⁵⁰⁶ MBh

⁵⁰⁷ BrSū I. ii. 33ff.

⁵⁰⁸ See ChUp IV. ii.

⁵⁰⁹ See BrSū I. ii. 33.

⁵¹⁰ Namely, ānukūlyasaṃkṣhepa, prātikūlyavarjana, mahāviśvāsa, kārpaṇya, goptṛtvavaraṇa and ātmanikṣhepa listed in Ahirbudhnyasamhitā XXXVII. ii. 28f. or Lakshmitantra XVII. 60f. See also Bharatamini's verse quoted by Deśika's works [Singh 135].

⁵¹¹ According to Viraraghavachari's fn.1.

other vidyās] is established owing to its being called by different names etc.⁵¹² and its complete picture is established, according to the maxim of comprehension in all the Upanishads (sarvavedāntapratyaya-nyāya),⁵¹³ through summing up [various] qualities taught in all the contexts concerning prapatti. Thus there is not the undesirable conclusion that [prapatti] is combined with the other vidyās according to the maxim:

*There is option because there is no difference in fruits [BrSū III. iii. 57].

And because to combine [prapatti] with [the other vidyās, which] should be abandoned [in prapatti],⁵¹⁴ is contradictory.

[Prapatti] as a subsidiary (aṅga) to [sādhana-]bhakti and that as an independent means (aṅgin) are distinct, because there is difference in intention [236]. For example, bhakti accomplishing lordship (aiśvarya) is different from that accomplishing the liberation, or jyotiṣṭoma performed as obligatory rite (nitya)⁵¹⁵ is different from that performed as optional rite (kāmya),⁵¹⁶ though ritual action itself is the same.

[Obj.] Why is [prapatti], a kind of bhakti, taken as separate means?

[Ans.] You may think this to be based on the difference that [prapatti] is practiced only once whereas [bhakti] repeatedly, that [the former] is independent whereas [the latter] is dependent [on prapatti], etc.

[Obj.] It is needless to enjoin the difficult means [namely bhakti] while there is the easy means [namely prapatti] accomplishing the same effect.

[Ans.] Not so. Such conviction and the like, [which are necessary for prapatti], is not easy to get; accordingly both are difficult. So is said in the context concerning prapatti:

*My opinion is that [prapatti] is easy [apparently] but, [in fact], difficult to

⁵¹² See BrSū III. iii. 56: nānā śabdādibhedāt.

⁵¹³ Cf. BrSū III. ii. 1: sarvavedāntapratyayaḥ codanādyaviśeshāt. This is the Vedānta version of sarvaśākhāpratyaya-nyāya explained in the śākhāntarādhikaraṇa (MīSū II. iv. 8ff.). That is, even if different qualities are ascribed to one vidyā in different Upanishads, the vidyā is the same.

⁵¹⁴ See BhG XVIII. 66: sarvadharmān parityajya.

⁵¹⁵ The rite which should be done without fail. Non-performance of it brings about defects (nitytve hy akaraṇe doṣaḥ [SAS II. 38; 277,1]).

⁵¹⁶ The rite performed to realize some desirable fruits such as svarga. Prāyaścittā etc. included in naimittika can be regarded as kāmya [TMK II. 40ab].

perform [Lakshmitantra XVII. 105].

Furthermore the following example will make the point clear. Someone accomplishes a king's business with great effort and, when he mistakes, the king punishes him suitably. Another person being contended with private service [for the king], however, accomplishes the same effect or rather more effect with slight effort. The king tolerates his minor mistake and, even if his mistake is great, the king punishes him a little.

[Obj.] Even in the latter, private service is difficult to get for an unfortunate person.

[Ans.] So is in the former case. As in upāyabhakti (or bhakti), though ritual actions are different in their easiness and difficulty according to the difference in Vedic sect and in caste and stage of life [to which the performer belongs], so in [prapatti] also [there is difference in difficulty from person to person].

[Obj.] If it be the case, to the [Brahma-]sūtra

*Indeed (tu) [belonging to a stage of life] is better than [not belonging to any stage] because also of the smṛti (liṅga)⁵¹⁷ [BrSū III. iv. 39],

why is it commented as follows:

*Because that which has much merit (dharma) and that which does not have much merit do not have the same effect [ŚrīBh III. iv. 39; 557,17]? **[237]**

[Ans.] The answer is as follows. This concerns [the performance] of one and the same qualified person in a principal sense and in a secondary sense. Otherwise, there would be undesirable conclusion that the fruit is different even in the other stage of life, the other [ritual] sūtra and so on having much merit; consequently, it would bring about the undesirable conclusion that [having abandoned those of one's own and] entering the others is better.

In upāyabhakti (or bhakti), rite absolutely obligatory (nitya), rite occasionally obligatory (naimittika)⁵¹⁸ and optional rite (kāmya) as is done without any intention to

⁵¹⁷ Śrutaparakāśikā: śruter anumāpakatvāt smṛter liṅgaśabdenocyate. The smṛti “anāśramī na tishṭhet tu dinam ekam api dvija” [Dakshasmṛti I. 10] is quoted here.

⁵¹⁸ The rite done in the special occasions (kartavyam yan nimitte sati tat [TMK II. 40a]). It is of two kinds: the first is performed for expiation, such as prāyaścitta, which can be regarded as kāmya (pāpaśāntyartham ekam tat syāt kāmyena tulyam [40ab]); the second is done in special time, such as śraddhā, which can be regarded as nitya because non-performance of it brings about defects (param akaraṇato doṣhakṛn

the fruits⁵¹⁹ are performed as its subsidiaries, but not as independent means. Avoidance of the prohibitions is equal to both the bhaktis. In sādhayabhakti (or prapatti), however, optional rite is abandoned completely; but not rite absolutely obligatory.

[Obj.] The chief portion (aṃgin) [namely upāyabhakti] is omitted [in prapatti]; consequently, its subsidiary portions [namely ritual rite] also should be abandoned.

[Ans.] Not so, because we cannot neglect our own qualification [namely duties in stage of life].⁵²⁰ All that should be understood in detail from the passages such as:

*Abandoning the means [namely optional rite] and the prohibitions [238], he stands on⁵²¹ the middle way [Lakshmitātra XVII. 58].

[Obj.] Some [sages] such as Saṃvarta, Bharata⁵²² and Vaidura abandon all duties of their own caste and stage of life and, knowing Brahman, walk around. That is talked concerning those who act and desire at will.

[Ans.] It is not right. Because the idea in these contexts is concluded to be the instruction about mere intension etc. [to establish] the knowledge that one should behave like an idiot (ja a), as is understood in the following passages:

*Let [a brāhmaṇa] desire to be childlike (bālya) [BṛhUp III. v. 1],

*Lead life as an idiot [Māñ ūkyakārikā II. 36; Manu II. 110],

*Not spoiling the way of the natures⁵²³ [?],

and so on. And ‘childlike’ means not showing one's own excellence in capacity, knowledge, family and so on, though it exists; but not behaving, talking, enjoying and so on at will. These points are shown in the following [Brahma-]sūtras:

*[‘Childlike’ means] not manifesting [one's own mature], because of its fitness [to the context] [BrSū III. iv. 49],

nityatulyam [40b]). Cf. Srinivasachari: Fundamentals p.300f.

⁵¹⁹ The commentators explain it is because the passage “yajñena dānena” etc. [BṛhUp IV. iv. 22] is applicable to kāmya. Or rather kāmya here may mean the first kind of naimittika such as prāyaścitta; because according to TMK, kāmya cannot be subsidiary to brahmopāsana [Dasgupta HlPh III 293f.; Srinivasachari 300].

⁵²⁰ K quotes BrSū III. iv. 32: vihitatvāc cāśramakarmāpi.

⁵²¹ āsthitaḥ. V. Krishnamacharya ed. of the Lakshmitātra reads āsritāḥ.

⁵²² See ViP II. xiii–xvi; BhāgavataP V. ix–x. [Winternitz, HIL I p.524f.].

⁵²³ satāṃ mārgam adūshayan. R quotes the passage of ViP II. xiii. 42–44, but the reading is: satāṃ vartmāny [dharmam in Vishṇucittīya] adūshayan (43b).

*Only (ca) in the case of danger of life, there is permission to take all kinds of food; because it is shown [in the scripture⁵²⁴]. [BrSū III. iv. 28],

*For the [above-mentioned] reason also the scripture is against doing at will [BrSū III. iv. 31],

and so on.⁵²⁵ Otherwise, there would be the furry of hundreds of śrutis and smṛtis such as:

*One who behaves in this way throughout his life reaches the Brahman-world [ChUp VIII. xv. 1],

*One who has not ceased from evil conduct does not [reach it] [KaṭhaUp I. ii. 24],

*[Vishṇu is pleased] by one who acts according to his caste and stage of life [ViP III. viii. 9]. **[239]**

[In the case of those who know Brahman commit sins] in this way, how can you account for the non-clinging of his future sins and the destruction of his past sins⁵²⁶?

The answer is as follows.

For those who attain the knowledge, their past [sinful] karma other than that the fruit of which has been experienced, that which has been expiated and that which has begun to operate are burned up by force of the means [of the liberation], as the fibres of the ishika-reed laid on fire.⁵²⁷ And their future [sinful karma] done unintentionally does not cling to them as water [does not cling] to the lotus-leaf.⁵²⁸

As for their meritorious [karma] also, the part which is not fit for the knowledge, though it causes happiness, is not different to [the sinful karma] in being opposite to their liberation and resulting in undesirable fruits; thus it can be expressed by the word ‘sin.’ Accordingly, it does not cling to them or is destroyed.⁵²⁹ The passage

⁵²⁴ ŚBh cites the episode of Ushasti in ChUp I. x.

⁵²⁵ ādi denotes III. iv. 29: abādhāc ca (R).

⁵²⁶ Cf. BrSū IV. i. 13: tadadhigame [= brahmavidyāprāptau] uttarapūrvāghayor aśleshavināśau, tadvyapadeśāt.

⁵²⁷ Cf. ChUp V. xxiv. 3: tad yatheshikātulām agnau protaṃ pradūyeta, evaṃ hāsya sarve pāpmāṇaḥ pradūyante.

⁵²⁸ Cf. ChUp IV. xiv. 3: yathā pushkarapalāśa āpo na ślishyante, evaṃ evaṃvidi pāpaṃ karma na ślishyate.

⁵²⁹ Cf. BrSū IV. i. 14: itarasya [= puṇyasya] 'py evaṃ aśleṣaḥ.

*No karma which is not enjoyed perishes [even after hundreds of kalpas]
[BrahmavaivartaP I. xxvi. 70]

and so on relates to the fact that [karma cannot be destroyed by] the other [means] than the knowledge.⁵³⁰

On the other hand, [karma] which has begun to operate cannot be destroyed until [its fruits are] enjoyed, as is said in the [Brahma-]sūtra:

*But having destroyed the other two, [namely, meritorious and sinful karma which has begun to operate], by enjoyment, he reaches Brahman [BrSū IV. i. 19].

And there is no rule that the karma which has begun to operate should end when the present body [in which the knowledge is acquired] dies, because karma has wonderful fruits. For one who abandons his load [to God] in the form ‘[I shall be released] when the present body terminates,’ however, his [karma which has begun to operate] definitely ends when the present body dies. Because even the passage that:

*I shall remain so long as I shall not be released. Then I shall attain [Brahman]
[ChUp VI. xiv. 2]

relates to the termination of various karma which has begun to operate; and the passages that:

*Having risen up from this body **[240]** [ChUp VIII. iii. 4, xii. 3]

etc. also relate to the last body. For this very reason, there is the passage of the [Brahma-]sūtra:

*Those who have office remains so long as the office lasts [BrSū III. iii. 31].

Thus, it is established that there is no restriction of time and place in which the last body ceases, as is mentioned in these [Brahma-]sūtras:

*If it is said that [one who dies] at night cannot [be liberated], no. Because [karma is] connected as long as the [last] body exists and the scripture shows thus [BrSū IV. ii. 18],

*And for the same reason, [one who dies] during the southern progress of the sun also [can be liberated] [BrSū IV. ii. 19],

etc.

⁵³⁰ vidyābhinnavishaya. The translation follows the footnote of Viraraghavachari, who suggests the reading vidyāvihīnavishaya found in Vādāvalikāra's Vidhisudhākara (?). This passage of the purāṇa is explained in ŚBh IV. i. 13 [583,16ff.]: this relates to the confirmation that karma can produce fruits.

In the same way, [karma] intentionally done after [attaining the knowledge] is also exhausted through enjoying it or performing expiatory ceremonies. And, as a rule, he does not intentionally do meritorious or sinful [karma] which is unfavorable to the knowledge. For even meritorious [karma], if it is done with the aim of its fruits, is opposed to the knowledge and he is indifferent to other fruits [than the knowledge]; moreover, as to sinful [karma], he fears violating the command of God. And if he sometimes does it intentionally, being afraid of that, he will spontaneously perform the expiatory ceremony fit for it. If he should not perform it inadvertently, [the karma] would be reduced to karma which has begun to operate; consequently, it respectively fruits somehow or other before [his liberation] but it in itself does not bring about his [further re-]birth and so on. If there happened to be special karma or curse and the like which cause his [further re-]birth and so on, [such karma etc.] could bring about [his further rebirth and so on]. Even in this case, however, his completed means [of the liberation] cannot be weakened. On the contrary, [his completed means] stops his transmigration when [such karma etc.] is concluded, as [it does when] his karma which has begun to operate [is concluded].

[Obj.] Transmigration cannot stop because further karma operates successively.

[Ans.] You cannot say so. Because it is contradictory to the scriptures [teaching the knowledge as the means of liberation] and it would bring about the undesirable conclusion that completed meditation is fruitless **[241]**. That is explained in the [Brahma-]sūtras:

*Likewise there is no restriction [in time] with regard to [the meditation] which has the liberation for its result; because that condition is ascertained, because that condition is ascertained⁵³¹ [BrSū III. iv. 51].

Though the [sūtra] speaks of ritual actions subsidiary to the knowledge, the same logic can be applied to the knowledge.

[Obj.] If all the karma [of one who attains the knowledge] is destroyed in this way, how is it justified that he gets rid of his meritorious and sinful deeds and that his dear relatives and his enemies succeed to [his meritorious ones and sinful ones respectively⁵³²]? _____

⁵³¹ The repetition is because this is the last sūtra of the adhyāya.

⁵³² “tatsukṛtadushkṛte dhūnute [dhunute in Up; vidhūnute in Karmarkar's ed. of

We shall explain this further— Firstly, [what are gotten rid of and succeeded] are not [his deeds] done before [attaining the knowledge]. For some [deeds] have already given fruits and some have been destroyed by means of expiatory ceremonies and the knowledge, because both [expiatory ceremonies and the knowledge] as well as fruiting cease karma (or action) itself. Some [rest deeds] having begun to operate can be removed only through enjoying them. In the same way, concerning [his deeds] after [attaining the knowledge], [his deeds] which are done unintentionally do not cling [to him]. Likewise, [his deeds] helpful to the knowledge are ceased through fruiting the very knowledge and they do not have any aspect of the meritorious deed [as is gotten rid of etc.]. [You may hold] that the karma (or action) done [not by himself but] by his deer relative is gotten rid of by him etc., but it is not appropriate. Because these [karmas] are not his own and because it would be improper to show the succession [of his deer relatives and his enemies] simultaneous with the sharing [of his sons].⁵³³ You may hold that the expression ‘succeed to’ is metaphorical because this is brought about through their friendliness or enmity [242]. But it is not true; because it is contradictory to the statement of the [Śrī-]Bhāshya and the other [two commentaries of the same author] on the passage of the [Brahma-]sūtra that:

*Regarding [the statement of] ‘get rid of,’ however, as it is supplementary to [the statement of] ‘succeed to,’ [BrSū III. iii. 26], and so on.⁵³⁴ And [such metaphorical succession] could not be the object of meditation.⁵³⁵ And it is contradictory to mention the attainment of what is done through his friendliness [by his deer relatives] etc. simultaneous with the sharing [by his sons].

To this [objection], our answer is as follows. Sinful [deed] done before [attaining the knowledge] is of two sorts: that the fruits of which have been given and that the fruits of which have not been given. That the fruits of which have not been given is also [of two sorts]: that which has been destroyed by means of expiatory ceremonies and that [ŚBh] *tasya priyā jñātayaḥ sukṛtam upayanty apriyā dushkṛtam* [KaushītakiUp I. 4]; “*tasya putrā dāyam upayanti suhṛdaḥ sādhuḥkṛtyāṃ dvishantaḥ pāpakṛtyāṃ*” [quoted in ŚBh III. iii. 26 as the text of the Sātyāyanin].

⁵³³ On account of the passage “*tasya putrā dāyam upayanti suhṛdaḥ sādhuḥkṛtyāṃ dvishantaḥ pāpakṛtyāṃ*” quoted before.

⁵³⁴ “*upāyanaśabdasya hānivākyaśeshatvāt / upāyavālyasya hi hānivākyaśeshatvam evocitam / vidushā tyaktayoḥ puṇyapāpayoḥ praveśasthānavācivād upāyanaśabdasya*” [ŚBh III. iii. 26; 488,7f.] etc.

⁵³⁵ Cf. *tac[= hāni etc.]-cinttanam ca vidhiyamānam sarvavidyāṅgam bhavitum arhati* [ŚBh III. iii. 26; 497,13].

which has not. That which has not [been destroyed] is also [of two sorts]: that which has begun to operate and that which has not. Among them, what is to be destroyed by the knowledge is the last one. In the same way, [sinful deed] done after [attaining the knowledge] is also of two sorts: that which is helpful to the knowledge and that which is not helpful. That which is not helpful is also [of two sorts]: that which is done intentionally and that which is done unintentionally. Among them, what does not cling [to him] is that which is done unintentionally. Thus these two collections of karma, the fruits of which have not been given due to the obstruction by the other strong karma [i.e. the will of God], does not cling and is destroyed [respectively]; it is mentioned that [he] gets rid of the two and his deer relative etc. succeed to them. Likewise, on the [Brahma-]sūtra that:

*According to some, [there are many good deed] of the two other than [Agnihotra and the like] [BrSū IV. i. 17],

which is to distinguish the purpose as to the passage that:

*[His] deer relatives [succeed to his] good deed⁵³⁶ [?],

the [Śrī-]Bhāshya comments:

*And the non-clinging and destruction through the knowledge is concerned with these [deeds]. [ŚrīBh IV. i. 17; 589,7f.]

And the non-clinging and destruction mean the obstruction of the capacity of karma and the destruction of it. And this capacity is composed of the particular love and anger of God [243]. And such love and anger reach [his] deer relatives and enemies. Only in this sense, the word ‘succeed to’ is used. On the portion of the [Brahma-]sūtra that:

*But after death [BrSū IV. i. 14],

the [Śrī-]Bhāshya comments:

*But subsequently to the death of the body, meritorious deeds which are helpful to the knowledge and the fruits of which are perceived are destroyed: this is the meaning. [ŚrīBh IV. i. 14; 587,6f.]

Subsequently to the death of the body, meritorious deeds which are helpful to the knowledge and the fruits of which are not perceived, are destroyed [or gotten rid of] and [his deer relatives] succeed to [them]. But other [deeds] do not cling to [him] and are destroyed when he attains the knowledge; and when he departs [from the body], he gets rid of them and [his deer relative etc.] succeed to them. That is the distinction. [244]

⁵³⁶ The passage quoted in ŚBh III. iii. 26 as the text of the Sātyāyanin recension.

Nyāsavidyā (or prapatti), however, can destroy even [karma] which has begun to operate. Nevertheless, a part relating to his attachment and misery accompanied with it still remain; when he is free of his attachment [even to the continuity of the body and happiness accompanied with it], they cease completely. This condition, [namely, being free from all the attachment], distinguishes an impatient aspirant (ārta) from a patient aspirant (dṛpta). And a part relating to the attachment in the case of a patient aspirant cannot be decided to be this much; because the way of intention is peculiar from person to person. Furthermore, this vidyā (or prapatti) does not depend even upon what is thought of at the death.

(36) This [prapatti], composed of the conviction that God accompanied with Lakṣmī is the sole means, prevents the idea that [prapatti] itself is the means; not to mention of [the idea that] its subsidiaries, [such as the thought at the death, are the means]. **[245]**

(37) Of one who meditates like this, [i.e. bhaktiyogin], there is the liberation when his karma which has begun to operate is concluded; of a patient aspirant, when the body is concluded; of an impatient aspirant, when his patience is concluded.

Of every person who intends to depart⁵³⁷ [from the body], first the faculty of speech and, following it, the rest nine become indivisible⁵³⁸ from the mind.⁵³⁹ And this mind combined with all the faculties [becomes indivisible from] the vital air.⁵⁴⁰ And this [vital air] combined with the eleven faculties [becomes indivisible from] the individual self.⁵⁴¹ And this [individual self] combined with the faculties and the vital air [becomes indivisible from] five elements.⁵⁴² And these [five elements] combined with the faculties, the vital air and the individual self [becomes indivisible from] the Highest Self [in the

⁵³⁷ uccikramishataḥ. **R** criticizes the variant reading 'uccikramisata' as grammatical mistake.

⁵³⁸ See the comment of ŚBh on 'avibhāga' [BrSū IV. ii. 15]: aprthagbhāvaḥ pṛthagvyavahārānaraḥ saṃsargaḥ.

⁵³⁹ See BrSū IV. ii. 1: vāṃ manasi; 2: sarvāṇy anu.

⁵⁴⁰ See BrSū IV. ii. 3: tanmanaḥ prāṇe.

⁵⁴¹ See BrSū IV. ii. 4: so 'dhyakshe.

⁵⁴² See BrSū IV. ii. 5: bhūteshu.

heart].⁵⁴³ The above-mentioned is common to both one attains the knowledge and one who does not attain the knowledge⁵⁴⁴ [246].

And the peculiarity of one who does not attain the knowledge has been explained before.⁵⁴⁵ In the case of one who attain the knowledge, everyone easily departs from the body through the pipe named Brahman in the crown of the head⁵⁴⁶; and conducted in succession by the conducting (ātivāhika) persons called light, daytime, former half of the month, six months during which the sun moves northward, year, wind, the sun, lightning,⁵⁴⁷ Varuṇa, Indra and Prajāpati⁵⁴⁸ to their worlds respectively, he is led to the presence of Varuṇa etc. by [the person] of lightning named ‘non-human (amānava)⁵⁴⁹’ in the above-mentioned order; again, he reach the presence of Brahman.

This way beginning with light and the transfer of his karmas to the others are mentioned in the passage that:

*He who knows both union (sambhūti) and destruction (vināśa) crosses over death through the destruction and attains immortality through the union [ĪśāUp 14],

by the words ‘union’ and ‘destruction.’⁵⁵⁰ The meaning is: he crosses over death through the destruction of his karmas and attains Brahman through the union with the way beginning with light. In the expression that:

*He meditates (upāsate) upon the union [?],

‘meditate’ means mere thinking (cintana). And the word ‘sambhūti’ is frequently used in the sense of attainment: for example,

*They attain (abhisambhavanti) light [ChUp IV. xv. 5, V. x. 1],

*On departing hence, I shall attain (adhisambhavitāsmi) him [ChUp III. xiv. 4],

*I attain (abhisambhavāmi) Brahma-world [ChUp VIII. xiii. 1],

⁵⁴³ See BrSū IV. ii. 14: tāṇi pare.

⁵⁴⁴ See BrSū IV. ii. 7: samānā cāsṛtyupakramāt.

⁵⁴⁵ 221,1–222,2.

⁵⁴⁶ See BrSū IV. ii. 16.

⁵⁴⁷ See BrSū IV. iii. 1–2.

⁵⁴⁸ See BrSū IV. iii. 3.

⁵⁴⁹ amānava. After that, he is a conductor and Varuṇa etc. merely assist him. See BrSū IV. iii. 5.

⁵⁵⁰ This is to reject the interpretation of Yādavaprakāśa etc. that sambhūti and

and so on.

Nārāyaṇārya, however, holds that the words ‘union’ and ‘destruction’ indicate knowledge (vidyā) and ignorance (avidyā) through implication (lakṣhaṇā) by way of their fruits. That is,

*Because for he who knows, liberation, accomplished through the knowledge (vidyā), is in the form of proper growth⁵⁵¹ (samyak-abhivṛddhi) [Nītimālā ?] and so on. In that case, this passage would have the same purport as the śruti that:

*He who knows both knowledge and ignorance⁵⁵² [ĪśāUp 11] and so on.

And for that who departs [from the gross body] and travels [the way beginning with light], though all his karma terminates, what is mentioned by the word ‘subtle body (sūkshmaśarīra),’ a certain substance composed of three guṇas, still persists as supporter (upashṭhambhaka) due to the power of the knowledge.⁵⁵³ So is said in the [Vedānta-]sāra:

*A subtle body persists even in the case of that who has departed from the body [VSāra IV. ii. 7: 381,5].

For this reason, his initial direct experience [immediately after travelling the way] is [still] like dawn, [i.e. not very clear]; therefore the way is effective [in accomplishing clearer direct experience].⁵⁵⁴ **[247]** And it is decided through the scriptures referring to the way that the complete destruction of ignorance [or karma] needs travelling the specific places [beginning with light]. Likewise, to the [Brahma-]sūtra that:

*Jaimini thinks [that the way beginning with light carries those who meditate] the Supreme [Brahman] because [the word ‘brahman’ is] used in the primary sense⁵⁵⁵ [BrSū IV. iii. 11],

vināśa indicate the phenomenal world and Brahman in the condition of its destruction (**R**).

⁵⁵¹ Here sambhūti means samyagabhivṛddhi, which indicates moksha, which is the fruit of vidyā. Thus sambhūti indirectly denotes vidyā.

⁵⁵² Here avidyā means varṇāśramavihita karma [ŚBh I. i. 1: (1) 66,2; VAS §91: 127,1].

⁵⁵³ See BrSū IV. ii. 9.

⁵⁵⁴ My translation is in the line of the second interpretation of **R**. The first interpretation regards pratyūshakalpa as apekshita. **K**'s interpretation takes prāthammika as arcirādigateḥ pūrvabhāvin. See also fn. of Viraraghavachari.

⁵⁵⁵ This is the first pūrvapaksha in the kārya-adhikaraṇa [sū° 11–15]; the siddhāta here is, according to Rāmānuja, the opinion of Bādarāyaṇa: the way carries both those who meditate the Supreme Brahman and those who meditate one's own self as distinct

the [Śrī-]Bhāshya comments:

*As the rise of the knowledge needs the duties of castes and stages of life, purity, good conduct, [specific] place and time, which is understood through the scripture that: “[Brāhmaṇas desire to know] Him through reciting the Vedas” [BṛhUp IV. iv. 22] etc.; so it is decided through the scriptures referring to the way that the completion of the knowledge, which in the form of the cessation of all the ignorance [or karma], also needs travelling the specific places [ŚrīBh IV. iii. 11: 623,6–8].

And since the departure, [subtle bodies] endowed with more and more intensive understanding and bliss are successively born. And halfway he can enjoy, roam, converse and so on because he [still] has vital air, sense-faculties and the like. And he becomes liberated since he touches the ‘non-human’ being [on the shore of Vrajā].⁵⁵⁶ Till then, everything is [merely] the intermediate effect⁵⁵⁷ (vyāpāra) of the means [to the liberation] **[248]**. Its [ultimate] fruit is ascending to the bed of the Supreme Abode etc.

At that time, he becomes qualified, like God, by [the eight qualities⁵⁵⁸] such as being free from sin, realizing the desire etc. That is his inherent form manifested through the complete destruction of all the preventions. **[249]** Since then, he never has any repetition composed of transmigration.⁵⁵⁹ Firstly, in the place [where he reaches] there is no dissolution on account of the descriptions that it is not subject to time,⁵⁶⁰ that it is ageless, that it is imperishable etc. [Secondly], his enjoyment described in the passage that:

*If should desire the world of the fathers [ChUp VIII. ii. 1], etc., is immaterial enjoyment which is created without any effort only through his own will **[250]** and fastened to the enjoyment of Supreme Person; accordingly, it is not of from prakṛti whose self is Brahman (14).

⁵⁵⁶ Some hold he must be different from the above-mentioned ‘non-human’ in lightening and that he is another ‘amānava’ based on the description: “gatvā’tho virajāṃ vimuñcati tanuṃ sūkshmaṃ, tato ‘mānavasparśāt kshālitavāsanāḥ sukṛtino gacchanti vishṇoḥ padam” [?]; some hold that there is no proof on the two amānava and that regarding the above-mentioned amānava, vāsanā is destroyed due to his touch to sacred persons immediately after crossing vrajā (**R**).

⁵⁵⁷ vyāpāra. tajjanyatve sati tajjanyajanakah [Tarkadīpikā 47, Nyāyabodhinī 41].

⁵⁵⁸ See ChUp VIII. i. 5.

⁵⁵⁹ See BrSū IV. vi. 22.

⁵⁶⁰ akālakālya. See “kālaṃ sa pacate tatra na kālas tatra vai prabhuḥ” [MBh?], “akshare parame vyoman” [ŚveUp IV. 8], “divyaṃ sthānam ajaraṃ cāprameyam” [?]

transmigratin.⁵⁶¹

By the way, sāyujya (identification) means ultimate equality (sāmya) [to Him] in qualities such as understanding, bliss and realizing desire⁵⁶² with the exception of the unique characters of God such as the activity concerning the world, namely, the creation etc.,⁵⁶³ giving liberation, being meditated by those who want to be liberated and being chief (śeshitva); the other opinions on sāyujya are comparable to the news about honey of sky-flower. Firstly, sāyujya is not mergence (laya) in Brahman; [if it were so], there would be undesirable conclusion that the sāyujya with Agni, Vāyu etc. also means mergence, [though one individual self cannot merge in the other individual self]. Nor does it mean having the same body [that He has]. For regarding the body of the individual self, even in transmigration [having the same body] is same [because every body is His body]; regarding the body of God, even in liberation it is imposible [for the individual self to have the body of God]. The other opinions⁵⁶⁴ are also [rejected] in the same way.

What does this [sāyujya] mean, then?

It means sharing the same qualities of the self. And only in this sense, it is primary. For sāyujya is the condition of sayuj and the word sayuj indicate [the condition] that two different [persons, namely, Brahman and the liberated self], are connected with the same [enjoyment].⁵⁶⁵

And by force of the passages such as:

*He attains supreme equality (sāmya) [MuUp III. i. 3],

*[Those who] attain similarity (sādharmya) with Me [BhG XIV. 2],

the passages such as

etc. (R).

⁵⁶¹ Cf. BrSū IV. iv. 8.

⁵⁶² Cf. BrSū IV. iv. 21.

⁵⁶³ Cf. BrSū IV. iv. 17.

⁵⁶⁴ Eg. svarūpaikya.

⁵⁶⁵ Cf. Rahasyatrayasāra XXII, p.614 (Viraraghavachari ed.): sayukkāvāṇ oru bhogyattile bhoktāvāykkonṭu kūṭa anvayakkumavaṇ; imku saprakārabrahmamākīra bhogyattile brahmamum muktaṇum kūṭa bhoktākkalāy anvayikkaīyālē muktaṇai sayuk aṅkīratu [= sayuk nāma sa ya ekasmin bhogye sahabhokṭṭvenānveti / atra saprakārabrahmarūpe bhogye brhmaṇo muktasya ca saha bhokṭṭvenānvayāt mukta sayug ity ucyate].

*[One who knows Brahman] becomes Brahman (brahmaiva bhavati) [MuUp III. ii. 8]

also import the mere equality [in enjoyment], as is explained before.⁵⁶⁶

In attaining Agni and other [deities], there is difference in sālōkya (sharing the same world) etc. In attaining Brahman, which is in the form of sārūpya (sharing the same form), the previous three, [namely, sālōkya, sārūpya, sāmīpya], are also inevitably implied.

Though [some passages seem not to accept sārūpya and sāmīpya as liberation, that is],

*I never ask for sālōkya and sārūpya as the liberation. I want, O long-armed one, sāyujya with you, virtuous one [Jitāmte II. 36],

*Some live in the worlds of Vishṇu; some gain close contact; some attain such form; some attain sāyujyam, which is liberation [?];

still there is not any defect because they are in regard to attaining wonderful secondary states such as the world of Śrīvishṇu.

[Obj.] Servitude is a source of misery; Because it is servitude.

[Ans.] You should not say so. Because if the subject [of this syllogism] means ‘servitude to those who are other than God,’ [the reason] merely proves what has been already proved [251]; if the subject means ‘servitude to God,’ [the probandum] is sublated [by the scriptures]. And [the reason] is straying (anaikāntya) in view of the servitude to a generous person, which [is servitude but] is of happiness.

[Obj.] [Then, we pose another syllogism:] The servitude distinct from that⁵⁶⁷ is a source of misery; Because it is servitude; Like that servitude.

[Ans.] The distinction suggests two individuals: [the servitude to a cruel person

⁵⁶⁶ 218,4–219,5.

⁵⁶⁷ etadvyatireketi / atra sarvavyaktipakshikāre dr̥shṭāntāsiddhiprasaṅgād etadvyতিরিক্তে বিশেষাণেনaikā vyaktir dr̥shṭāntārthaṃ pariśeshitēti dr̥shṭavyam / atra etadvyatiriktasevātvasya pakshatāvachchedakīkaraṇāt neśvarasevātvam, anīśvarasevātvam vā pakshatāvachchedakam; yena pūrvoktadōshaḥ syāt (R). According to the Hindi commenatry, etad = vadānyasevā.

and the servitude to a generous person⁵⁶⁸]. [In the former case, the reason] merely proves what has been already proved; [in the latter case, the probandum] is sublated [by our ordinary experience]. [Accordingly], even this [syllogism] cannot avoid one of the two partial [defects].

If [the subject means] servitude in general, there is an extra [defect that the syllogism] has no example. If the pure negative concomitance (kevalavyatirekin) [that the non-existence of a source of misery is pervaded by the non-existence of servitude] were intended, [the reason] ‘being servitude,’ which has a similar example⁵⁶⁹ because there is a source of misery other than [servitude such as the death of a son], [but] which does not exist in them, would be of uncommon strayer⁵⁷⁰ (asādhāraṇa). Moreover, pure negative concomitance [itself] will be rejected.⁵⁷¹ Reductio ad absurdum (tarka) also could prove nothing, unless it is supported [by another means of knowledge]. Mere [knowledge of] concomitance, [which does not have any means to exclude a counter-example], is meaningless. And to [the reason] ‘being servitude,’ there is adventitious condition⁵⁷² (upādhi), namely, ‘being concerned with sin.’

For those who relinquish their egoism that they are independent and become servants **[252]**, the servitude to God is in conformity with their own nature, accordingly it can be of happiness.

Thus it is proved that liberation is established through specific knowledge which is qualified by specific object,⁵⁷³ causes⁵⁷⁴ and nature,⁵⁷⁵ and is composed of the direct experience of God, which is in the form of unexcelled bliss free from any misery.

⁵⁶⁸ Hindi commentary: ... and the servitude to God.

⁵⁶⁹ sisādhayishitasajātīyadharmavān sapakshaḥ (YMD II. 10).

⁵⁷⁰ asādhāraṇas tu vipakshasapakshavyāvṛttaḥ (YMD II. 38).

⁵⁷¹ NySi . Deśika has already rejected it in NyP 111ff.

⁵⁷² sādhyā[=duḥkahahetutva]-vyāpakatve sati sādhana[=sevātva]-avyāpakatvam upādhiḥ (YMD II. 5).

⁵⁷³ I.e. Brahman.

⁵⁷⁴ I.e. sādhasaptakas shown in the fragment of Vākyakāra [ŚrīBh (1) 63,4ff.].

⁵⁷⁵ I.e. darśanasamānākāra [ŚrīBh (1) 55,1f.].

The⁵⁷⁶ imaginary conception (vikalpa) of the supreme beatitude (niḥśreyasa) held by the other [schools] such as:

- 1) mere destruction of the body or
- 2) sexual intercourse with thousands of young women [held by Cārvāka],
- 3) destruction of knowledge on unreality⁵⁷⁷ [by Prajñākara],
- 4) total cessation of mental impression⁵⁷⁸ (vāsanā) [by one sect of Buddhist],
- 5) removal of eclipse through [external] objects⁵⁷⁹ [by one sect of Buddhist],
- 6) eternal ascent,
- 7) Arhats' entering into the body,⁵⁸⁰ or
- 8) non-enclosure qualified [by knowledge and bliss] [by Jaina],
- 9) experience of [clear] predominance,
- 10) independence,
- 11) attaining the same form as Śiva [253], or
- 12) remainder of the potentiality of knowledge [by Pāsupata],
- 13) cessation of ignorance [by Advaitin],
- 14) cessation of limiting adjunct [by Bhedābheda],
- 15) removal of all the specific qualities [of the self] [by Vaiśeṣika⁵⁸¹],
- 16) experience of the bliss the isolated self [by Sāṃkhya]

and so on⁵⁸² should be rejected by the reason that:

there is the self other than the body [to Cārvāka],

⁵⁷⁶ NyP 324,8ff. Cf. TMK II. 75.

⁵⁷⁷ jñānālikalaya. samastālikavishayavijñānasantānoccheda [NyP 324,8]. According to R, it is the opinion of Prajñākara. Cf. SAS II. 75: dhīśantānapraṇāśam [75a] tu prajñākaramatasthāḥ / tatrāntimasyārthakriyāvīrahād asattve tatpūrveshām api tatheti śūnya[tā]vādāvatāraḥ (Viraraghavachari ed. 330,5).

⁵⁷⁸ vāsanātyantavīrahā. Cf. vāsanocchedamātram tu bauddhaikadeśinaḥ / tatra sarvajñānasantānenāikatāpattiḥ syān na veti vibhāgaḥ / [SAS II. 75: 330,4].

⁵⁷⁹ vishayoparāgavaidhurya. R: vishayoparāgalakṣhaṇopaplavaśūnyacitsantati.

⁵⁸⁰ Cf. ūrdhavaprayāṇam tu jaināḥ / tatra bhūmyāḥ nityapatanavan nityordhva-gamanam eke / anye tu lokākāśam atikramya sakalalokamastakasthāyiny alokākāśe deham ekam anekam vā parigrhya vasante iti [SAS II. 75: 330,8f.].

⁵⁸¹ This is held by one sect of Nyāya (except the author of Nyāyabhūṣhaṇa, Bhāsarvajña) and Mīmāṃsā (Prābhākara) [SAS II. 75: 330,7].

⁵⁸² TMK and SAS II. 75 refer to: nijamatisukhayor nityayoḥ sannikarsham [by Bhūṣhaṇa; see SAS II. 69: 321,6–322,7]; cittena svātmasaukhyānubhavam [by Bhāṭṭa; see SAS II. 69: 330,8–12]; śūnyādvaitam [by Mādhyāmika]; muktītāratamya [by Ānandatīrtha, according to Ānandadāyini].

external objects are also real [to Buddhist],
 their scriptures have no authority [to Cārvāka, Buddhist, Jaina and Pāśupata],
 Brahman is changeless [to Bhedābheda],
 [Brahman] has no defect [to Advaitin],
 [the scriptures] teach the knowledge, the bliss and other [specific qualities of the self]
 are eternal
 and so on.

Among them, those who argue that the supreme beatitude is like a stone, whose knowledge is [also] like a stone, show the following inference:
 The self is at times devoid of all the specific qualities,
 Because it is the substratum of non-eternal specific qualities,⁵⁸³
 Like a pot in the moment of its origination (utpaadyamāna),
 ether in the universal destruction (pralaya) and the like.

Concerning this [inference], firstly, it is obvious that there is the contradiction to the scriptures.⁵⁸⁴

Moreover, in the view that [‘specific quality’] is the modification of knowledge, the reason is recognized by only one of the two [debaters]⁵⁸⁵ (anyatarāsiddhi). We do not accept that knowledge etc. are qualities as you think [but we regard them as substance (namely dharmabhūtajñāna) and its modifications]; hence [the reason] proves what has been already proved and does not exist in the subject (svarūpāsiddhi) [because the self itself is not the substratum of them but attributive knowledge is the substratum of its modifications such as icchā] **[254]**.

The [two] examples are devoid of its ground and does not have the probandum, because we do not accept ether and other [elements] in the universal destruction, [which

⁵⁸³ According to Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, the guṇas of ātman are fourteen: saṃkhyā, parimāṇa, pṛthaktva, saṃyoga, vibhāga, buddhi, sukha, duḥkha, icchā, dvesha, prayatna, dharma, adharma, saṃskāra (italicized ones are the viśeshaguṇas of ātman).

⁵⁸⁴ E.g. “na vijñātur vijñāter viparilopo vidyate” [BṛhUp IV. iii. 30].

⁵⁸⁵ anyatarāsiddhaḥ kāryatvād anityaḥ śabdaḥ [PrPBh] iti / yady api śabde vastutaḥ kāryatvam asti, tathāpi vipratipannasya mīmāṃsakasyāsiddham iti [Nyāyakandalī (GOS) p.565].

merge into ahaṁkāra at that time], and we accept that even a pot in the moment of its origination has qualities. You cannot pose prakṛti in the universal destruction as the example, because it also has guṇas (or qualities) such as sattva and because [prakṛti itself] is not accepted by the other [schools such as the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika]. Likewise, according to our opinion that [the specific qualities such as icchā etc. are] the modifications of knowledge, whether the knowledge in the liberation is devoid of all the specific qualities or not, it cannot be the example because [the opinion] is not accepted by the other schools. For they do not accept knowledge as substance and its modifications.

[Obj.] The venerable Yāmuna-muni regards even what is called kaivalya (or isolation), which is in the form of the contemplation of bliss of one's own self, as liberation:

*In the eighth chapter, the varieties of the things which are to be understood and acquired⁵⁸⁶ by those who seek for aiśvarya (supernatural lordship), the true nature of the imperishable (akṣarayāthātmya) [or one's own self in pure form, i.e. kaivalya], and the feet of God are mentioned [Gītārthasaṁgraha 12];

likewise,

*[Without the grace of Lakṣmī], it would [never] be possible for people to join worldly enjoyment (saṁsṛti) [or aiśvarya], the imperishable and the abode of Viṣṇu [Catuḥśloki 3].

And the author of the commentaries also follows these contents. That is, to the verse beginning with:

*Four kinds of [men] are devoted to Me **[255]** [BhG VII. 16]

it is commented:

*[The third devotee is] 'jijñāsu,' namely, one who want to attain the true nature of the [individual] self as is distinct from the prakṛti [GBh VII. 16: 248,6f.]

and so on. Also in the introduction of the eighth chapter it is said, in accordance with the content of the seventh [chapter], that:

*And [He has taught] the differences among those who meditate for the sake of aiśvarya, the true nature of the imperishable and the attainment of God in

⁵⁸⁶ What are to be understood are explained in BhG VIII. 3[-5], and what are to be acquired are the meditation of God, final conviction (antimapratyaya) and the meditation of the way [after death] in accordance with each fruit [Deśika's Rakṣhā].

accordance with the degree of their good deeds and the distinction in understanding⁵⁸⁷ [BhG VIII. 0: 262,6]

and so on. Likewise, by saying that:

*[Then He] speaks of the manner of meditation (smaraṇa) of he who seeks for kaivalya⁵⁸⁸ (kaivalyārthin) [GBh VIII. 11: 271,1],

the verse beginning with:

*That which [knowers of Vedas speak of] as imperishable [BhG VIII. 11], is introduced; and in the commentary on the verses beginning with:

*All the doorways [BhG VIII. 12],

it is said that:

*Uttering one syllable ‘om,’ which is Brahman, i.e. which denotes Me, [and] remembering Me, who am denoted [by it], fixing his own vital air in the head, whoever abandons the body and departs reaches the supreme goal. The meaning is: he attains the self as is distinct from prakṛti, which is of similar form to Me and from which there is no return [to transmigration] [GBh VIII. 12–13: 272,2–4].

And immediately afterwards, having said that:

*Thus the method of meditation on God by seekers of aiśvarya and seekers of kaivalya has been said in accordance with the goal they attain [GBh VIII. 14: 274,1–276,1],

the verse that:

*[For that yogins] whose mind is not in anything else [BhG VIII. 14]

is commented. Having said that:

*Hereafter in the remaining portion of [this] chapter **[256]**, [He] explains that the jñānin⁵⁸⁹ and the seeker of kaivalya do not return and that the seeker of kaivalya and that the seeker of aiśvarya returns [GBh VIII. 15: 277,5],

the verses beginning with:

*Having attained Me [BhG VIII. 15]

and ending with:

*[It] rises up [again] at the coming of the day [of Brahmā] [BhG VIII. 19]

⁵⁸⁷ pratipatti. Ānadāśrama ed. of GBh reads: prapatti.

⁵⁸⁸ jijñāsu = kaivalyārthin; see K .

⁵⁸⁹ jñānī ... bhagavaccheshataikarasātmasvarūpavit prakṛtivyuktakevalātmany aparyavasyan bhagavantam prepsuḥ bhagavantam eva paramaprāpyaṃ manvānaḥ [GBh VII. 16: 249,1–3].

are commented; and further, having said that:

*[Now He] explains that there is no return even for those who attain kaivalya [GBh VIII. 20–21: 281,1],

the verses beginning with:

*Higher than this, however [BhG VIII. 20]

and ending with:

*This is My highest abode [BhG VIII. 21]

are also commented. And immediately afterwards, having said that:

*[Now He] explains that the object attained by the jñānin is, however, quite different from this [GBh VIII. 22: 283,5],

the verse that:

*That Supreme person [BhG VIII. 22]

is commented. And immediately afterwards, it is said that:

*[Now He] explains the way beginning with light, which is common to both one who knows the true nature of the self (ātmayāthātmyavid) [i.e. the seeker of kaivalya] and one who are devoted to the Supreme Person [i.e. the jñānin] [GBh VIII. 23: 284,2]

Now the commentary thereof is quoted here:

*It is said in the śrutis that the way beginning with light is common to both these. And [the way] is characterized by non-return. For instance, [it is taught] on the knowledge of the five fires (pañcāgnividyā) that:

“Those who know it in this way, [i.e. those who know the knowledge of the five fires⁵⁹⁰], and those who in forest meditate tapas with faith, [i.e. those who meditate on Brahman with faith⁵⁹¹], go to light, and from the light to the sun” [ChUp V. x.

⁵⁹⁰ See “‘ya itthaṃ viduḥ’ iti pañcāgnividyānishṭhān ... uddiśya ...” [ŚrīBh III. iii. 32: 496,9f.]. Cf. Raṅgarāmānuja's comm. on ChUp.

⁵⁹¹ See ŚrīBh III. iii. 32: “... ye cāmī araṇye śraddhāṃ satyam upāsate ...’ [BṛhUp VI. ii. 15] iti vājasaneyake, ‘... ye ceme 'raṇye śraddhā tapa ity upāsate ...’ [ChUp V. x. 1] iti chāndogye / ... ‘ye ceme’ ityādinā śraddhāpūrvakam brahmopāsīnāṃś codiśya ... / ... satyaśabdasya brahmaṇi prasiddhe tapaśabdasyāpi tenaikārthyāt satyatapaśabdābhyāṃ brahmaivābhīdhīyate” [496,7–497,3]; “atra vājasaneyake ‘śraddhāṃ satyam’ iti śraddhāśabdasya dvitīyāntatvaśravaṇād ihāpi śraddhāśabdo dvitīyāntaḥ / chāndasatvāt [chandasi] sUPām sU-luK-...’ [P 7. 1. 39] iti sUPo luK / tataś ca puraskṛtye 'dhyāhāraḥ / (1) śraddhā puraskṛtya brahmopāsate ity arthaḥ / itis tv avivakshitaḥ / athavā evakāro 'trādhyāhartavyaḥ / (2) brahmety eva ya upāsate ity arthaḥ / tataś cābrahmopāsanavyāvṛttiphalako 'yam itīśabdo drashtavyaḥ / yadvā śraddhātapāśabdāyoh prasiddha evārthaḥ / śraddhātapāparāyaṇānāc ca brahmavidyānishṭhatvam arthasiddham / tataś ca (3) brahmavidyānishṭhā ity arthaḥ” [Raṅgarāmānuja's comm. on ChUp: 628,8–15 (ed. Viraraghavachari)].

1].

And it is said in the scriptures that one who travels the way beginning light attains Brahman and never returns:

“The [non-human person] leads them to Brahman. ... Those who proceed by this [way] do not return to this human condition” [ChUp IV. xv. 6].

Moreover, this śruti regarding the goal described in the portion that:

“Those who know it in this way” [ChUp V. x. 1]

is not with reference to the attainment of the self as is subsidiary to the knowledge of the Supreme [Brahman], which is taught in the instruction of Prajāpati⁵⁹² and the like; for, [if it were so], the śruti teaching the knowledge of the Supreme separately that:

“And those who in forest meditate on faith as tapas” [ChUp V. x. 1]

would be meaningless.

And in the knowledge of the five fires, the passages that:

“Thus, indeed, in the fifth oblation [consisting of semen], [subtle elements described as] ‘water’ become what are called ‘man’” [ChUp V. ix. 1]

[and that:]

“Those whose deed has been good [will attain good birth] ...; but those whose deed has been evil [will attain evil birth]” [ChUp V. x. 7]

teach that the state of human being etc. caused by good and evil deeds refers only to waters mixed with other elements and that the self is merely united with them; consequently, the distinction between spiritual beings and non-spiritual things is declared there. After that, it is understood that the passages that:

“Those who know it in this way ... go to light” [ChUp V. x. 1]

[and that:]

“[Those who proceed by this way] do not return to this human condition” [ChUp IV. xv. 6],

declare that those who knows the distinct spiritual and non-spiritual entities as what is to be rejected and what is to be attained in this way go to the way beginning with light and never return.

Concerning one who knows the true nature of the self and one who are devoted

⁵⁹² The content of Prajāpativākya (ChUp VIII. vii–xii) is summarized in the pūrvapaksha of ŚrīBh I. iii. 18 [42,8–46,8]. It teaches the true nature of the liberated self as is merely helpful to the daharavidyā, one of the paravidyās (prajāpativākye ca muktātma-svarūpayāthātmyavijñānaṃ daharavidyopayogitayoktam) [ŚrīBh I. iii. 19: 47,2f.].

to the Supreme Person, the passage that:

“The [non-human person] leads them to Brahman” [ChUp IV. xv. 6] [257] teaches the attainment of Brahman; accordingly, the [individual] self distinct from non-spiritual things is to be contemplated as having its sole delight in the subordination to Brahman⁵⁹³ (brahmaśeshataikarasa) because of its having Brahman for its [inner] Self. Another reason is the maxim “what you meditate is what you attain⁵⁹⁴” (tatkratunyāya).⁵⁹⁵ And its having its sole delight in the subordination to the Supreme [Brahman] is proved in the śrutis such as:

“He who dwells in the self ... whose body is the self” [BṛhUp III. vii. 22 (Mādhyandina rec.)]

[GBh VIII. 23: 284,3–285,2].

Thus it is established that there is the way beginning with light even for the seeker of the imperishable.

In commenting the verse regarding the purport of this ‘imperishable’ that:

*Which is not destroyed when all the elements are destroyed [BhG VIII. 20],

it is said that:

*[Which] is, when all the elements such as ether are destroyed with their causes and effects, not destroyed, though it exists in each of them [GBh VIII. 20–21: 282,2–3].

[The statement seems to declare that the imperishable or kaivalya is still in the material world, but] it is also with reference to [not kaivalya but] the condition mixed with non-spiritual things. For, otherwise, it would be contradictory to the above-mentioned way [beginning with light].

And in the twelfth chapter, on the verse that:

*But those who [meditate on] the imperishable [BhG XII. 3],

it is said that:

⁵⁹³ Comparing with the phrases ‘śeshataikasvarūpa’ and ‘śeshataikarati’ in BhG, van Buitenen translates it as ‘having as its sole joy and essence the being a śesha of the Supreme Person’ [Rāmānuja on the BhG, p.35 n.349].

⁵⁹⁴ “tatkratuḥ tathopāsīnas tathaiva prāpnotīty arthaḥ / ‘yathākratur asmin loke purusho bhavati tathetaḥ pretya bhavati’ [ChUp III. xiv. 1] ‘taṃ yathā yathopāsate’ [MudgalaUp 3] iti nyāyāt” [ŚrīBh IV. iii. 14: 625,1f.].

⁵⁹⁵ Cf. “pañcāgnivido 'py arcirādinā gatiśravaṇād arcirādinā gatasya brahmaprāpty-apunarāvṛttiśravaṇāc ca, ata eva tatkratunyāyāt prakṛtvinirmuktabrahmātmakātmānusandhānaṃ siddham” [ŚrīBh IV. iii. 14: 625,2–4].

*Even they can (eva) attain Me. The meaning is: Even they can attain the self whose form is similar to Mine and which is free from transmigration [GBh XII. 3–5: 395,6].

Therefore, isn't it that this liberation called kaivalya is in confirmity with our traditional doctrine?

So do hold some [scholars of our sect].

To this, our answer is as follows.

First, such liberation is not accepted by the author of the commentaries, as is clearly stated in the Śārīrakabhāṣya [or the Śrībhāṣya]. That is, to begin with, in the topic that:

*Because of the connection of the sentences [BrSū I. iv. 19],

having said that:

*Because the knowledge (vedana) of the Supreme Person is taught as the only means for the immortality [ŚrīBh I. iv. 19: II 144,11f.],

it is stated that:

*The [knowledge] on the essential nature of the [individual] self, who is the glory (vibhūti) of the Supreme Person and the attainer (prāptṛ), should be understood as being helpful to the knowledge of the Supreme Person, which realizes the liberation, and not as being an independent means of itself [ŚrīBh I. iv. 19: II 144,12f.].

Likewise, in the explanation on the passage that:

*There is the question regarding a man who has departed [KaṭhaUp I. i. 20] **[258]**,

having shown the distinction in the concept of liberation among the various schools, the statement beginning with:

*But those who are well versed in the Vedānta [ŚrīBh I. ii. 12: 305,18]

firstly points out the essential form (svarūpa) and attribute⁵⁹⁶ (svabhāva) of the individual

⁵⁹⁶ On the distinction between the two terms, Deśika poses two interpretations in his Tātparyacandrikā ad GBh XVIII. 55: 1) svarūpa is with reference to dharmin and svabhāva to dharma; 2) svarūpaśabdaḥ svarūpanirūpakadharmaparaḥ, svabhāvaśabdas tu saulabhyaparaḥ iti kecit [587,6ff.]. Cf. Carman, Theology, chap.6 (esp. p.91).

self and the Supreme, and says that:

*... hold that liberation is the direct experience of the Highest Self in inherent nature based on the removal of ignorance by the individual self, whose essential form is concealed by the ignorance composed of the beginningless karma [SṛīBh I. ii. 12: 306,2f.].

In the Vedārthasaṃgraha, it is stated:

*The attainment of the essential form of the [individual] self released from all karma⁵⁹⁷ is implied in the attainment of God. Because the passage:

“Those desires are real [but] concealed by the unreal (asatya)” [ChUp VIII. iii. 1],

teaches one's own karma as concealing the host of the qualities of God by the word ‘unreal’⁵⁹⁸ [VAS §129: 160,12–161,2].

Likewise, Varadavishṇu-miśra also raises the question that:

*Isn't it that [the self] in attaining kaivalya has not be liberated yet? Because all his karma has not been perished, as is explained [?],

and states:

*True, he has not be liberated. Because liberation is composed of the direct experience of the bliss of the Supreme Self and because he does not have the direct experience of the bliss of Brahman but has the mere direct experience of his own self. And concerning the direct experience of one's own self says Venerable Parāśara:

“For the yogins who satisfy with their own self,⁵⁹⁹ there is the immortal state [i.e. kaivalya]”⁶⁰⁰ [ViP I. vi. 38].

The non-transient (anapāyin) [state] different from liberation [i.e. kaivalya] is

⁵⁹⁷ sarvakarmavinirmukta. Van Buitenen's text of VAS: °karmabandhavinirmukta.

⁵⁹⁸ The Tātparyadīpikā of Sudarśanasūri comments: If all the karma that conceals is destroyed, there is the attainment of the self; what conceals the host of the qualities of God is also the karma. Thus in the attainment of the self caused by the cessation of [the karma], the attainment of God is also established because what conceals the host of the qualities of God also ceases at that time (tirodhāyakaśarvakarmavināśe hy ātmaprāptiḥ bhagavadguṇānām api tirodhāyakaṃ karmeti tannivṛttipūrvakātmaprāptau bhagavadguṇatirodhāyakanivṛtter api bhāvād bhagavatprāptiḥ siddhyati) [TD 315,16ff.].

⁵⁹⁹ svātmasantoshinaś ca ye. U reads in parenthesis: svātmasantoshakāriṇām, which is adopted in TC [VIII. 23: 286,15f.].

⁶⁰⁰ The next verse describes the liberation: ekāntinaḥ sadā brahmadhyāyino yoginaś ca ye / teshāṃ tu paramaṃ sthānaṃ yat tat paśyanti sūrayaḥ.

[nothing but] aiśvarya attained by Yogic power [?].

Bhaṭṭa-Parāśara-pāda shows in the Adhyātmakhaṇ advayavyākhyā⁶⁰¹ that aiśvarya and the imperishable is same in being different from liberation:

*It⁶⁰² is based on the indifference [or rather] aversion to the enjoyment of aiśvarya and the imperishable, which are different [from liberation] [Adhyātmakhaṇ advayavyākhyā].

Furthermore, if [kaivalya] were liberation, there is no termination without attaining the inherent form; [hence] if there were the termination [in kaivalya], it should be thought as a kind of eternal transmigration (nityasaṃsāra).

[Obj.] How can [the self] without body be in transmigration? **[259]**

[Ans.] I ask in reply: Why is [the self] fallen in the condition of the universal destruction [in transmigration]?

[Obj.] Because even at that time he is connected with the subtle non-spiritual [entities] fit for the production of his future bodies and the like.

[Ans.] Then even in the case of [one who is in kaivalya], the connection with non-spiritual [entities] is to be accepted.⁶⁰³ Thus, the only difference is whether the [future] bodies will be produced or not.

[Obj.] What is the proof on his connection with non-spiritual [entities]?

[Ans.] Because he has not experienced his own true nature and that of the Supreme. For it is the individual self existing in the curtain of māyā⁶⁰⁴ who cannot know the true nature.

[Obj.] What is the cause of it?

⁶⁰¹ Oberhammer guess that the work is the commentary on the SubālaUp [1979: 217ff.]; but his discussion is not persuasive enough.

⁶⁰² = brahmajñānam? [Oberhammer 1979: 83].

⁶⁰³ In this regard, TC quotes the description on prakṛtilaya in the Sāṃkhyatattvakumudī 44 [286,18ff.]

⁶⁰⁴ Here māyā means prakṛti. Cf. Deśika's commentary on the Catuḥślokī v.1b (yavanikā māyā): māyāśabdo 'yam "māyāṃ tu prakṛtiṃ vidyāt" [ŚveUp IV. 10] iti prakṛtivishayatayā śvetāśvatarair adhītaḥ [ed. V. Srivatasankacharyar 3,2f.].

[Ans.] It is his specific karma. And in the Vedārthasaṃgraha it is stated:

*The attainment of the essential form of the [individual] self released from all karma is implied in the attainment of God. Because the passage:

“Those desires are real [but] concealed by the unreal (asatya)” [ChUp VIII. iii. 1],

teaches one's own karma as concealing the host of the qualities of God by the word ‘unreal’ [VAS §129: 160,12–161,2].

If he had not experience the true nature of the Highest Self, even though all his ignorance (or karma) has perished, so would be the other [meditators of Brahman]: [nobody could not experience His true nature]. That much would be his own nature.

[Obj.] Why doesn't he return to transmigration, though he is still connected with non-spiritual [entities]?

[Ans.] You may think that the will of God born from his karma being the cause of his kaivalya is of such a kind.

[Obj.] Isn't it that one who is afflicted with three kinds of misery **[260]** can attain purity only through the knowledge on God? Then, why can he forget God when he clearly experiences his own self?

[Ans.] You say properly. Still if you persist in the existence of kaivalya, the reason has been said before. And Śrī-Vishṇucitta say in the Saṃgatimālā:

*Why does the meditation performed by a person wishing to attain Brahman make attain kaivalya? Our answer is: As a person who performs sacrifices to attain the heaven (svarga) may become a brahmarākshasa and the like when he does not perform them properly [Saṃgatimālā].

[Obj.] Who longs for his own self, which is like a burnt seed as it lacks even a bit of capability for the direct experience of God in His inherent nature?

[Ans.] What a surprise! Those who long for the heaven, cattle, a son, food as alms etc., which are not of such a kind, are seen; to say nothing of [the self], which is endowed with excellent bliss and is of such a kind. And it is well-known that one's own self is the object of affection. So say the scriptures such as:

*A certain person sees this [self] as a wonder [BhG II. 29].

The recognition in departing from deep sleep is: ‘I slept happily,’ as is said before.⁶⁰⁵

And it is explained in the [Śrī-]bhāshya⁶⁰⁶ and so on. And it is said by Śrī-Vishṇucitta:

*[That the self is of bliss is proved] through the fact that happiness is recognized concerning deep sleep, that people anger when it is interrupted, and that people abandon other things for it; and also through thousands of śruti and smṛti [?].

[Obj.] Why is it called ‘liberation’ [in some texts]?

[Ans.] [Merely] because the body and its faculties, being the cause of misery, are destroyed [there].

[Obj.] Through which way does one who attains kaivalya go on and where does he stay?

[Ans.] Somewhere.⁶⁰⁷ Firstly, the way beginning with light and staying in [the place] beyond prakṛti are not possible for him. Because the two are mentioned in the śrutis only in the contexts regarding one who meditates the Highest Self. The distinction mentioned in the passage:

*Those who know it in this way and those who in forest meditate on faith as tapas [ChUp V. x. 1],

is also based on the difference between the contemplation upon one's own self as has the Highest Self as its self and the contemplation upon the Highest Self as has one's own self as His body **[261]**. And if he went on through the way beginning with light, he would inevitably destroy all his karma and Brahman through the attainment of the particular place. Because the śruti says:

*The [non-human person] leads them to Brahman [ChUp IV. xv. 6].

And the [Brahma-]sūtra says:

*And because it is shown in the śruti⁶⁰⁸ [that one who goes on through the way beginning with light attains Brahman] [BrSū IV. iii. 12].

And if [one who attains kaivalya went through the way], it would be hard to avoid the undesirable conclusion that he becomes all-knowing because his ignorance (or karma),

⁶⁰⁵ 205,1ff.

⁶⁰⁶ See ŚrīBh I. i. 1: (1) 166,4–169,11.

⁶⁰⁷ U adds yena kenāpi in parenthesis before yatrakutrāpi in order to make correspond to the questions.

⁶⁰⁸ I.e. ChUp VIII. iii. 4.

which causes his knowledge contracted, would be completely destroyed. Also Venerable Yāmuna-muni, stating that:

*[Without the grace of Lakshmī, it would never be possible for people to join] worldly enjoyment [or aiśvarya], the imperishable and the abode of Viṣṇu [Catuḥślokī 3],

shows ‘the abode of Viṣṇu’ separately [from the imperishable or kaivalya]. And to the [Brahma-]sūtra that:

*And because of the statement of the way for one who has heard of Upanishads [BrSū I. ii. 17],

which intends to decide that ‘the person within the eyes⁶⁰⁹’ is the Highest Self, the [Śrī-]Bhāshya states:

*The way beginning with light is taught in the other śrutis as having to contemplated by one who has understood the true nature of the Highest Person; that way, which is characterized by non-return and brings about the attainment of the Highest Person, is [taught⁶¹⁰] to Upakosala, who has learned [about ‘the person within the eyes’] [ŚrīBh I. ii. 17: 4–5],

and so on. For this reason also, there is not the way beginning with light for one who contemplates the mere self. Otherwise, this [statement of the way] could not decide [that ‘the person within the eyes’] is the Highest Self.

All that should be explained on this point is clearly stated in the [Śrī-]bhāshya on the [Brahma-]sūtra that:

*[The group of conductors] leads those who are not dependent on the symbols (apratikālabhāna), thinks Bādarāyaṇa [BrSū IV. iii. 14] **[262]**.

There it is affirmed through the maxim ‘what you meditate is what you attain’ etc. that even a person attached to the Pañcāgnividyā contemplates his own self distinct from prakṛti as having Brahman for his Self.⁶¹¹ And it is denied that one who meditates his mere self mentioned by the word ‘prāṇa’ in the Bhūmavidyā⁶¹² goes on the way beginning

⁶⁰⁹ See ChUp IV. xv. 1.

⁶¹⁰ In ChUp IV. xv. 5–6.

⁶¹¹ Cf. pañcāgnivido 'py arcirādinā gatiśravaṇād ārcirādinā gatasya brahmaprāpty-apunarāvṛttiśravaṇāc ca, ata eva tatratunayāyāt prakṛtvinirmuktabrahmātmakātmānusan-dhānaṃ siddham [ŚrīBh IV. iii. 14: 625,2–4].

⁶¹² ChUp VII, explained in BrSū I. iii. 7–8 (adhikaraṇa 2: bhūmādhikaraṇa). The ‘prāṇa’ mentioned in ChUp VII. xv, which denotes the individual self, is different from

with light through the unmistakable declaration (kaṅṭokti):

*For those who are dependent on the symbols beginning with nāma and ending with prāṇa,⁶¹³ however, neither the way beginning with light nor the attainment of Brahman exists, because there is neither meditation such as is established in the śrutis⁶¹⁴ and because the maxim ‘what you meditate is what you attain’ [can be applied to the meditation of that mixed with non-spiritual entities⁶¹⁵] [ŚrīBh IV. iii. 14: 625,4–5]

and so on. And another fruit is shown for those meditate [the symbols] beginning with nāma and ending with prāṇa in the [Brahma-]sūtra that:

*And [the śruti] shows the distinction⁶¹⁶ [BrSū IV. iii. 15].

Additionally in the conclusion of this topic,⁶¹⁷ it is stated:

*Therefore, the conclusion is: The group of conductors does not lead those who meditate the spiritual entity [i.e., the self] as mixed with non-spiritual entities or by itself,⁶¹⁸ regarding it as Brahman or as separated from Him; on the other hand, they leads those who meditate the Supreme Brahman and those who meditate the [individual] self distinct from prakṛti as having Brahman for its Self. [ŚrīBh IV. iii. 15: 626,1–3].

‘bhūman’ in VII. xxiii–xxiv, which denotes the Highest Self: prāṇaśabdanirdiṣṭāt pratyag-ātmano 'dhikatayā nirdiṣṭaḥ satyaśabdābhidheyas tasmād arthāntarabhūta eva, satyaśabdanirdiṣṭa eva bhūmeti satyākhyam param brahmaiva bhūmety upadiśyate [ŚrīBh I. iii. 7: 13,2f.].

⁶¹³ Namely, nāma [ChUp VII. i], vāk [ii], manas [iii], saṅkalpa [iv], citta [v], dhyāna [vi], vijñāna [vii], bala [viii], anna [ix], ap [x], tejas [xi], ākāśa [xii], smara [xiii], āśā [xiv], prāṇa [xv]. See also BrSū IV. i. 4–5: pratikādhikaraṇa.

⁶¹⁴ I.e. the meditation of Brahman as having one's own self for His body and the meditation of one's own self as having Brahman for its self.

⁶¹⁵ acinmiśropāsane before tatkratunyāyāt is omitted in NyS.

⁶¹⁶ I.e. “yāvan nāmno gatam, tatrāsya yathākācāro bhavati” [ChUp VII. i. 5] ityādikā śrutir nāmādi-prāṇa-paryantapratīkam upāsinām gatyānapekṣam parimitaphalaviśeṣam ca darśayati [ŚrīBh IV. iii. 15: 625,8–9].

⁶¹⁷ I.e. kāryādhikaraṇa (IV. iii. 6–15).

⁶¹⁸ acinmiśram kevalam vā cidvastu brahmadṛṣṭyā tadviyogena ca ya upāsate. Kumāradeśika's commentary on the Adhikaraṇasārāvalī v.512 (IV. iii, v.13) suggests the double readings: ‘... vā cidvastu ...’ and ‘vā 'cidvastu’ (kevalam vācidvastu iti sandhiviśeṣhād akāraśleṣa-aśleṣābhyām cid-acitor dvayor api grahaṇam) [749,17f.; ed. Viraraghavachari]. Cf. VSāra IV. iii. 14: pratikāmbanās tv acinmiśram kevalam cidvastu ca ‘simho devadattaḥ’ (itivad) brahmadṛṣṭyā svarūpeṇa vā tadvastu ya upāsate te [151,7f.]. But TC [285,22ff.] quotes the passage with reference to cidvastu only. Cf. RTS XXIX: prakṛtisamśṛṣṭamāyā tal prakṛtivyuktamāyā tal irukkum ātmavastuvai svarūpeṇavā tal brahmadṛṣṭyāvevā tal paṇṇum anusandhānaṃkaḥ nālukkum nāmādyupāsanaṃkaḥkuppōlē arcirādigatiyūm brahmaprāptiyūmillai [1143,9–1144,2].

Moreover, it is stated in the [Vedānta-]Sāra:

*Those who follow the pañcāgnividyā, however, meditate the [individual] self distinct from prakṛti as having Brahman for its Self [as understood⁶¹⁹] through the passage:

“He, who dwell in the self” [BṛhUp III. vii. 22 (Mādhyandina-rec.)].

Therefore, they are included in those who are not dependent on the symbols. And there is no contradiction to the maxim ‘what you meditate is what you attain.’ Both completely meditate Brahman in different ways: some meditate Brahman whose body is the [individual] self; others meditate their own selves whose Self is Brahman [VSāra IV. iii. 14: 398,5–8].

See also the explanation in the [Vedānta-]Dīpa [on this topic].

Now that the above-mentioned is established, the sentences in the Śrīmadgītā-bhāṣya are also to be interpreted in accordance with it. First, there is no dispute that one who follows the pañcāgnividyā go on the way beginning with light. And it has been proved that he meditates his own [individual] self as having Brahman for its Self. It is uncertain whether his end of life is kaivalya only or the experience of Brahman also: it seems that according to the Śārīrakabhāṣya and other [commentaries by the same author on the Brahmasūtras], he experiences Brahman [but] that according to the natural meaning of the Śrīmadgītā-bhāṣya, [he experiences] kaivalya [only]. But we have already shown the interpretation of these works as is not contradictory each other in [my] commentary on the Śrīmadgītā-bhāṣya named Tātparyacandrikā.⁶²⁰ **[268]**

In this regard, some points are mentioned here.

The portion beginning with:

*[Now He] explains the way beginning with light, which is common to both one who knows the true nature of the self (ātmayāthātmyavid) [i.e. the seeker of kaivalya] and one who are devoted to the Supreme Person [i.e. the jñānin] [GBh

⁶¹⁹ NyS om. avagata°.

⁶²⁰ TC VIII. 23: 285,8–288,9; especially 285,10–12: “It is accepted that one who follows the pañcāgnividyā [or kaivalyārthin] also can attain the Highest Self. In attaining Him, what is enjoyed by jñānins is the Highest Self qualified by their [individual] selves. But those who seek for the true nature of the self [or kaivalyārthin] first enjoy their own selves ... and at last they attain Brahman” (pañcāgnivido 'pi paramātmaprāptir asty eveti svikartavyam / tatra prāptau jñānināṃ paramātmā svaviśiṣṭo bhogyam; aksharayāthātmyanishṭhānāṃ tu svasvarūpam eva pūrvaṃ bhogyam, ... antato brahmaprāptiḥ).

VIII. 23: 284,2]

should be thought as not referring to those who seek [only] for kaivalya and those who seek for the Supreme Person only because they are referred (prastuta). On the other hand, this [portion] is with reference to the knower of Brahman divided into two: one who contemplates his own self as having the Highest Self for its Self and one who contemplates the Highest Self as having his own self for His body. [Only] in that case, the word ‘one who knows the true nature of the self’ is well suitable. The unnatural content in the portion of one book [i.e., the Śrīmadgītā-bhāṣhya] should be grasped so as to be fit for the natural content in many books [i.e., the commentaries by the same author on the Brahmasūtras]. And it is not contradictory at all to the statement of Venerable Yāmunamuni. In the Śrīmadgītā-bhāṣhya also, it was clearly taught that one who follows the pañcāgnividyā contemplates his own self as having Brahman for its Self and he attains Brahman according to the maxim ‘what you meditate is what you attain.’ **[269]**

Some hold: What is enjoyed in kaivalya is one's own self being Brahman and there Brahman is merely appeared as the qualifier of one's own self.

But in this case it could not be called kaivalya.

Those who know the true nature of the self⁶²¹ hold: this [kaivalya] is difficult to explain from the viewpoint of its means, its way, its proof and its mode.

(38) This [individual self], [like an actor], having gradually attained beautiful roles [such as a god, a man, an animal and a bird] which are formed due to his various karma **[270]** and delighting a certain rich person (or God accompanied with Śrī) by means of a certain wonderful drama [i.e., his life], directs his mind to the core of the scriptures after considering [miseries such as entering] womb [again and again]⁶²²; and he, attaining wealth due to his completion of the vidyā, shines in the heart.

⁶²¹ = Vādihaṃsābda (or Ātreya Rāmānuja) etc. (K). The portion discussing kaivalya of his Nyāyakuliśa is not extant now, but his commentary on the Mumukshupāṭi named Tātparyadīpikā [MGO No.] also discusses the problem; see Viraraghvachari fn.

⁶²² Here Deśika uses technical terms of Indian dramaturgy: mukha, pratimukha, garbha, avamarśa, and nirvahaṇa, which are known as five sandhis or dramatic divisions (See Sāhityadarpaṇa 330–32).

Here ends the second section on the individual self in the Nyāyasiddhāñjana composed by Śrīmat-Veṅkaṭanātha or Vedāntācārya, who is the lion among poets and logicians and who masters all branches of arts.

Chapter 3 God

Now God (īśvara) is considered.

The definitions of God are: (1) being the lord (īśvara) of all; (2) while pervasive,⁶²³ being intelligent; (3) being the Principal to which all are subordinate⁶²⁴ (sarvaśeṣitva); (4) being to be propitiated by all [ritual] actions; (5) being the bestower of all fruits; (6) being the substratum of all; (8) producing all the effects; (9) having, as the body, all the substances other than its own knowledge and Himself⁶²⁵ [272]; (10) having [auspicious

⁶²³ By this attribute, God is distinguished from the individual self (jīva) (K).

Although our author holds that the individual self is regarded as atomic (aṇu) in the Viśiṣṭādvaita siddhānta (see NySi 208,3–213,17; TMK II. 19–24), some ācāryas' descriptions seem to suggest that the individual self becomes all-pervasive when liberated; thus, Deśika tries to find their *real* imports (See NySi 209,4–210,2 for Yāmuna; 212,3–213,6 for Varadavishṇu Miśra; 213,7–17 for Rāmānuja).

Especially for the size of the individual self according to Yāmuna, whose opinion may be misunderstood due to the lack of the extant text of ĀS, see Mesquita, Yāmunācāryas Lehre von der Größe des Ātman, WZKS 33 (1989): 129–50.

⁶²⁴ The meaning of śeṣin in Rāmānuja is discussed in Carman 1974: 147–57 (summarized in Carman-Narayanan 1989: 136–38).

⁶²⁵ This definition of God is based on an accidental definition (taṭasthalakṣhaṇa) of the body “A body is a substance other than God and His knowledge (īśvaratajjñānavyatiriktaṃ dravyaṃ śarīram)” [NySi 166,5].

In the portion of NySi dealing with the definition of the body, Vedānta Deśika, following Rāmānuja's definition (ŚrīBh II. i. 9; 222.11–223,1: yasya cetanasya yad dravyaṃ sarvātmanā svārthe niyantum dhārayitum ca śakyaṃ taccheshataikasvarūpaṃ ca tat tasya śarīram) and Sudarśanasūri's commentary thereon [ŚP 222,32–223,17], gives following three definitions of the body, that is, (I) “If a substance found in a certain condition is, so long as it exists, unable not to be associated with an intelligent being and, within its capacity, is to be controlled by nature— it is, in this condition, the body of the intelligent being (yasya cetanasya yadavasthaṃ dravyaṃ yāvatsattam asambandhānarhaṃ vvaśakye niyantavyasvabhāvaṃ tadavasthaṃ tasya śarīram)” [NySi 160,1–2]; (II) “If for an intelligent being, a substance found in a certain condition is, so long as it exists, to be supported—it is, in this condition, the body of the intelligent being (yasya cetanasya yadavasthaṃ dravyaṃ yāvatsattam dhāryaṃ tadavasthaṃ tasya śarīram)” [ibid. 164,6]; (III) “If to an intelligent being, a substance found in a certain condition cannot, so long as it exists, be non-subordinate—it is, in this condition, the body of the intelligent being (yasya cetanasya yadavasthaṃ dravyaṃ yāvatsattam aśeshatānarhaṃ tadavasthaṃ tasya śarīram)” [ibid. 163,1–164,1]. Also Deśika shows another definition as what is really intended by Rāmānuja: (IV) “If of an intelligent

qualities] like ‘having will to be realized (satyasamkalpa),⁶²⁶ and so on. [273]

In the Sūtra “[From which] the birth etc. [of this world],⁶²⁷” one unit of the origin etc., [i.e. the creation, the sustenance and the absorption of the world], is said to be the definition, though any one of them alone could be the definition.⁶²⁸ That should be regarded as for repelling the question of a fool that these three are [respectively] done by three [different] doers, [i.e. Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Śiva]. And also in the passage beginning with “[Brahman is] true, [knowledge and infinite⁶²⁹],” while only the word ‘infinite’ could exclude all [other things from Him], there are the previous two qualifiers being, a substance found in a certain condition is an inseparable qualifier—it is the body of the intelligent being (yasya cetanasya yadavastham aprthaksiddhaviśeṣhaṇaṃ dravyaṃ tat tasya śarīram)” [ibid. 165,2–3 TMK IV 83: dhītulyāśrayaṃ yad vapur idam aprthaksiddhamad dravyaṃ asya]. Concerning these definitions, Deśika explains the word “an intelligent being” to point out that the intelligent-ness (caitanya) of an intelligent being is excluded from the body of the intelligent being. In other words, the knowledge, attributive-cum-substantive according to the Viśiṣṭādvaiata, is not the body of the intelligent being (cetanyasya caitanyaviśiṣṭasyety arthaḥ; tena caitanyasya tattadāśrayaṃ prati śarīratvavyavacchedaḥ [ibid. 160,2–3]. Cf. SAS IV. 83: cetanasyeti caitanyaviśiṣṭatayā pratisambandhitayā nirdeśād dharmabhūtajñānasya śarīratvaṃ nirasyate, na hi jñānaṃ jñānaviśiṣṭasyādheyavidheyāśeshabhūtaṃ; ŚP 223,26f.: jñānavyāvṛttyarthaṃ cetanasyety uktam: na hi jñānaṃ jñānaviśiṣṭena niyāmyam, api tu svāśrayeṇa). This is expounded by Raṅgarāmānuja as follows: “If something were controlled by what is qualified by itself, it would be controlled by itself; for what is related to the qualified is invariably related to the qualified. The attributive knowledge, therefore, is not the body of its substratum [or what is qualified by this knowledge]. Yet it can be the body of God. As to the knowledge of God, it is nobody's body (svasya svaviśiṣṭaniyāmyatve viśiṣṭānvayino viśeṣhaṇānvayitvanyamena svasya svaniyāmyatvaprasaṅgāt svadharmabhūtajñānaṃ svāśrayaṃ prati na śarīram; īśvaraṃ prati tu śarīraṃ bhavaty eva, īśvarajñānaṃ tu na kasyāpi śarīram)” [R 160,7–9]. Thus the above accidental definition is achieved.

For further discussion on the definition of the body, see the chapter of śarīralakṣhaṇa in the Nayadyumaṇi of Meghānanda and Viraraghavachari's Skt intro. thereon (ed. V. Krishnamacharya and U. Viraraghavacharya, Madras Government Oriental Ser., 1956).

⁶²⁶ E.g. ChUp VIII. i. 5 etc.: esha ātmāpahatapāpmā vijaro vimṛtyur viśoko vijighatso 'pipāsaḥ satyakāmaḥ satyasamkalpaḥ.

⁶²⁷ BrSū I. i. 2: janmādy asya yataḥ.

⁶²⁸ Cf. NySi 158,9f.: janmāditrayasya brahmalakṣhaṇatva iva tatrāpi na vyavacchedyaṃ siddham asti; śamkitaṃ tu samam.

⁶²⁹ TaiUp II. i. 2: satyaṃ jñānaṃ anantaṃ brahma.

because [these three qualifiers] exclude [non-Brahman] in order of those which might be suspected [to be Brahman].⁶³⁰ The other [definitions of such kind⁶³¹] are to be interpreted in this way. [274]

He is one because the Śrutis state that He is non-dual⁶³² and that He is devoid of the equal and the better.⁶³³

He alone is Brahman. Because only He, who is free from three kinds of limitation,⁶³⁴ [275] is, as one who is made up of all, said in the Śrutis to be ‘excessively great (bṛhat)’ or ‘making [others] great (bṛmhaṇa)’⁶³⁵.

As respects passages [in which other deities are called the highest one] such as “All gods are Agni,⁶³⁶” “All this is Ap,⁶³⁷” “All gods are of Brahmā,⁶³⁸” and “None surpasses you, Indra,⁶³⁹” it is decided that they have another import [namely, praising a particular ritual]. For they are mutually contradictory and are [but] subordinate to the injunction of a ritual; thus, these [deities] cannot have ultimate Brahmanhood and other

⁶³⁰ In this passage, ‘satya’ (or sharing being-ness without any limiting adjunct) excludes non-intelligent things and the non-liberated self (baddha), which may be called by other names due to some limiting adjuncts; ‘jñāna’ (or constantly having non-contracted knowledge) excludes the liberated self, whose knowledge is once contracted; and ‘ananta’ (or having no limitation) excludes eternal seers (nitya). Thus, prakṛti, baddha, mukta and nitya—which are in turn suspected to be God by a student—are excluded in this order. See ŚrīBh I. i. 2: 113,2–116,1.

⁶³¹ R refers to “nityaṃ vijñānam ānandaṃ brahman” [?], “avikārāya śuddhāya nityāya paramātmāne” [ViP I. ii. 1].

⁶³² R refers to ChUp VI. ii. 1: ekam evādvitīyam.

⁶³³ R refers to ŚveUp VI. 8: na tatsamaś cābhyadhikaś dṛśyate.

⁶³⁴ God is devoid of limitation in space, time and entity (deśakālavastupariccheda-rahita). See ŚrīBh I. i. 2: 115,1f. For the further detail, see NySi 322,5ff.

⁶³⁵ Cf. ŚrīBh I. i. 2: 110,5f.: upalakshyaṃ hy anavadhikātiśayabṛhad bṛmhaṇaṃ ca, bṛhater dhātos tadarthatvāt..

⁶³⁶ agniḥ sarvā devatāḥ. To be identified.

⁶³⁷ Mahānārāyaṇa-Up XIV. 1 (= TaiĀr X. 22. 1).

⁶³⁸ brāhmaṇo vai sarvā devatāḥ. To be identified.

⁶³⁹ R̥gveda IV. 30. 1. Other similar passages are cited and interpreted in TMK III. 9.

[qualities of God]. In the context regarding the cause [of the world], one and the same [God] is designated in specific term or general terms⁶⁴⁰ like sat, asat, avyākṛta, brahman, ātman, ākāśa, prāṇa, śiva, nārāyaṇa.⁶⁴¹ **[276]**

[Objection:] Some scorpions are produced from cow-dung, some are from a [mother-]scorpion etc.: [the cause of a scorpion is not fixed]. In the same way, the cause of the creation of the world is not fixed owing to the difference in time and space; [in other words, the cause of the creation is different in each kalpa and cosmic-egg⁶⁴²].

[Replied:] It cannot be said so. Because the difference [in the case of the creation] could not be proved by other means of knowledge [than the Scriptures]. Yet by means of the Scriptures we identify [various descriptions of the creation] as belonging to one and the same context and, accordingly, owing to the interpretational rule of apprehension in all the recensions⁶⁴³ (sarvaśākhāpratyayanyāya) **[277]** and the interpretational rule of

⁶⁴⁰ SAS III. 5 lists sat, brahman, ātman, puruṣa, prāṇa and akshara as having a room for the suspicion that it imports other entities (śaṃkitānyārtha).

⁶⁴¹ R refers to “sad eva somyedam agra āsīt” [ChUp VI. ii. 1], “asad vā idam agra āsīt” [ChUp III. xix. 1, VI. ii. 1], “tad dhedaṃ tarhy avyākṛtam āsīt” [BṛhUp I. iv. 7], “brahma vā idam agra āsīt” [BṛhUp I. iv. 10, 11], “ātmā vā idam eka evāgra āsīt” [AitUp I. 1], “sarvāṇi ha vā imāni bhūtāny ākāśād eva samutpadyante” [ChUp I. ix. 1] (Cf. BrSū I. i. 23), “prāṇam evābhisamviśanti” [ChUp I. xi. 5] (Cf. BrSū I. i. 24), “na san nāsac chiva eva kevalaḥ” [ŚveUp IV. 18], “eko ha vai nārāyaṇa āsīt” [MahāUp 1].

⁶⁴² Cf. SAS III. 14 [66,7f.]: “The [mere] assumption that ‘the three rulers [Viṣṇu, Brahmā and Śiva] take turns at possessing strong ruling power and weak one, like a rim of a wheel, in accordance with the difference of kalpa divided by the dominance of one of the [three] guṇas, namely, sattva, [rajas and tamas respectively]’ is thrown away. (traya īśvarāḥ sattvādiguṇonmeshabhidurakalpabhedāc cakraneminityā nimnonnataiśvarya itī kalpanāpi nirastā).” Ād ascribes this view to one sect of the Śaiva (śaivaikadeśin). According to the verses cited there (to be traced out), Viṣṇu, Śiva and Brahmā correspond to sātṭvika, tāmasa and rājasa kalpa respectively.

⁶⁴³ The sarvaśākhāpratyayanyāya is the principle explained in the śākhāntara-adhi°, MīSū II. iv. 8–33. In this adhi°, against the pūrvapaksha that “When a ruitual is mentioned in difference Vedic recensions, it is regarded as different because of difference in name” etc. (sū° 8), the siddhāntin answers: “[It is], however, one; for there is no difference in connection [with the result], in form, in injunction and in name” [sū° 9] (cited with explanation in ŚrīBh III. iii. 1: 461,2ff.) and so forth. That is, though different qualities and so on are ascribed to one ritual in different Vedic recensions, the ritual is still one and keeps all the qualties and so on together. (For the detail of this nyāya, see HDhŚ IV: 453–455. Cf. ŚP ad III. i. 1: 460,16ff. and ŚrīBh (R-V) I: 30, fn.)

common [rule] and specific [rule]⁶⁴⁴ (sāmānyaviśeshanyāya) [and] because of the direct statement that [the cause] is one⁶⁴⁵ and the like, we can [conclude that these passages describe] the same content [in different ways]. Thus, we cannot assume the difference.

For the same reason, pradhāna and the like cannot be Brahman.

Neither Brahmā, nor Rudra (or Śiva). For they are proved to be the individual selves because of the Śrutis teaching that they are created, that they are dissolved [at the universal destruction], that they are subject to karma etc.⁶⁴⁶

- (39) Those who are directly said to be an effect or to be subject to karma, [e.g., Rudra, Brahmā etc.], cannot be the cause [of the world]. [Although some Scriptures mention of the creation of Viṣṇu as well⁶⁴⁷], for the cause whose sin is destroyed, [i.e., Viṣṇu], it is appropriate to be an effect for sport (līlā)

Likewise the cause of the world, though different names and qualities are ascribed to it, is one and only. The sarvavedāntapratyanyāya mentioned in BrSū III. iii. 1–5 (adhi° 1) [cf. NySi 235,2] is the Vedānta version of this nyāya.

⁶⁴⁴ The interpretational rule that “A general rule, when not clear, shall be restricted to specific one (sāmānyavidhir aspashṭaḥ saṃhriyate viśeshataḥ)” [TV ad III. iv. adhi° 14 (IV 425); quoted in MNP §112]. This rule is discussed in MiSū VI. viii. 30–43 (adhi° 10: paśu-adhi°). TD (ad VAS §96: 211) explains this interpretational rule as follows: “For example, a general word paśu in the sentence ‘paśunā yajeta’ [not an exact quotation; see Edgerton's trans. of MNP, p.68, n.53], which means an animal in general, finally imports a specific [animal, i.e. goat], denoted by the word chāga in the mantra ‘chāgasya vapāyā medasaḥ [anubrūhi]’ [?]”. Cf. Srinivasa Chari 1994: 53f.

For Deśika's application of these two rules, see SAS ad TMK III. 5.

⁶⁴⁵ R refers to “ekaḥ śāstā na dvitīyo 'sti” [MBh II. 57. 8, XII. 219. 8, XIV. 26. 1], “dyāvāpṛthivī janayan deva ekaḥ” [?].

⁶⁴⁶ R refers to: “Viśvakarmā hy ajanishṭa devaḥ” [TaiS IV. vi. 2. 3], “sa Prajāpatir ekaḥ pushkaraparṇe samabhavat” [TaiĀr I. xxiii. 1. 1], “yo Brahmāṇaṃ vidadhāti pūrvam” [ŚveUp VI. 18], “tryakshaḥ sūlapāṇiḥ purusho [= Śivaḥ] 'jāyata” [?], “so 'rodīt // tam prajāpatir abravīt: kumāra, kiṃ rodishi, yac chramāt tapaso 'dhi jāto 'sīti / so 'bravīt: anapahatapāpmā [vā]smy a(vi)hitanāmā / nāma me dhehi (in R the following passages are summarized as pāpmano 'pahatyai) iti // tam abravīt: Rudro 'sīti” [ŚatBr VI. i. 3. 8–10], “eko ha vai nārāyaṇa āsīn na Brahmā neśānaḥ [= Śivaḥ]” [MahāUp 1], “ābhūtasamplave prāpte pralīne prakṛtau mahān / ekas tishṭhati viśvātmā sa tu nārāyaṇaḥ prabhuḥ” [?] etc.

⁶⁴⁷ R refers to “brahma-viṣṇu-rudra-indrās te sarve saṃprasūyante” [AtharvaśikhāUp III (Adyar: III. 4; UVG: II. 15)].

[or to incarnate].⁶⁴⁸ [278]

And in the portion concerning the cause etc. [of the world], it is proved that words denoting various [entities] finally import the Supreme Self alone. Because their final import is One who has these [entities] as the body. Or because, like the words ‘ākāśa,’ ‘prāṇa etc., these [words can be interpreted as directly referring to the Supreme Self] by means of secondary etymology.⁶⁴⁹

To summarize this—

- (40) When [entities other than Him, e.g.], the individual selves, are mentioned in teachings of the Supreme (paravidyā), [we first should try to understand] by means of etymology and others that such a description directly refer to the Supreme. If some of their characteristics cannot be established otherwise,⁶⁵⁰ its object is [the Supreme] as qualified by these [characteristics].⁶⁵¹ [279]

And [in some Scriptures, even other gods] teach to meditate themselves⁶⁵² or shows themselves to be the lord of all⁶⁵³; such [a description] is based on contemplating

⁶⁴⁸ R refers to “ajāyamāno bahudhā vijāyate” [TaiĀr III. xiii. 1. 1], “na me pārthāsti kartavyam” [BhG III. 22], “dharmasamsthāpanārtham” [BhG IV. 8], “icchā-grhītābhimatorudehaḥ” [ViP VI. v. 84].

⁶⁴⁹ I.e., ā samantāt kāśate kāśayati vā ākāśaḥ; prāṇayati sarvāṇi bhūtāṇi prāṇaḥ; hiraṇmayasya paramavyomno garbhaḥ antaḥsthita itī hiraṇyagarbhaḥ; śam bhavati sukharūpo bhavatīti śambhuḥ (R).

⁶⁵⁰ talliṅgānayathāsiddhau. Cf. BrSū I. i. 32: jīvamukhyapraṇalīṅgān neti cen na, etc.

⁶⁵¹ paravidyāsu jīvoktir niruktyādeḥ parāśrayaḥ. In a parallel verse in TṬ [p. 19, v. 132], the first pāda runs: anyoktiḥ paravidyāsu, which V regards better (bhūmikā to UVG ed. of NySi, p. 36). Also Kumāradeśika quotes a parallel verse in his Adhikaraṇacintāmaṇi ad ASĀ v. 77 as the summary of the indraprāṇa-adhi^o (BrSū I. i. 29–32), changing the first two pādas into: vyutpattyā paramātmānaṃ tattaduktiḥ prakāśayet [UVG ed., p. 149].

⁶⁵² R refers to KauUp III. 2: prāṇo 'smi prajñātmā taṃ mām āyur amṛtam ity upāsva.

⁶⁵³ R refers to AtharvaśirasUp 1 (opening): devā ha vai svargaṃ lokam agaman¹ / te devā rudram apr̥cchan: ‘ko bhavān’ iti / so 'bravīt: ‘aham ekaḥ prathamam āsam vartāmi ca bhavishyāmi ca, nānyaḥ kaścin matto vyatiriktaḥ’ iti / ‘so 'ntarād antaram prāvīśat / diśaś cāntaram sa prāvīśat / so 'haṃ nityānityo brahmāhaṃ² prāñco 'haṃ pratyañco 'ham,’ etc. [According to the quotation in VAS §108 and R. The reading of

the Supreme Self whose body is their selves, which is understood in the Scriptures, [as is done by] Prahāda, Vāmadeva and other [saints]⁶⁵⁴ [280]. And for Him who has all as the body, it is possible to be meditated, according to the injunction, even as one who is qualified by intelligent and non-intelligent beings.⁶⁵⁵ [281]

How to interpret the Athavaśiras, the Śvetāśvatara and other [Upanishads,⁶⁵⁶ in which Śiva is said to be the Supreme], is fully explained in the Purushanirṇaya.⁶⁵⁷ And NSP ed. is: 1. āyan; 2. nityānityo 'haṃ vyaktāvyakto brahmābrahmāhaṃ].

⁶⁵⁴ Cf. BrSū I. i. 31: śāstradṛṣṭyā tūpadeśo vāmadevavat; ŚrīBh I. i. 31: ... upadeśo 'yaṃ na pramāṇāntaraprāptasvātmāvalokanakṛtaḥ, api tu śāstreṇa svātmadṛṣṭikṛtaḥ [278,4]. The illustrations of Prahāda and Vāmadeva are found in ViP I. xix. 85 (intepreted in VAS §108) and BṛhUp I. iv. 10 respectively (both are quoted in ŚrīBh I. i. 31).

⁶⁵⁵ Brahman can be meditated in three ways: [1] as itself, [2] as one who has an enjoyer as the body and [3] as one who has the means of enjoyment as the body (nikhilakāraṇasya brahmaṇaḥ svarūpeṇānusandhānam, bhokṭṛvargaśarīrakatvānusandhānam, bhogyabhogopakaraṇaśarīrakatvānusandhānam ceti trividham anusandhānam [ŚrīBh I. i. 31: 279,19f.]; see also ŚrīBh I. iii. 32).

⁶⁵⁶ R in particular takes up the description of the AtharvaśikhāUp.

⁶⁵⁷ This must be an extinct work of Yāmana, though a work of the same title is ascribed to Nāthamuni [Dasgupta: HIPh III, 96; Narasimhachari 1971: 6], which is denied by Mesquita [1973: n.49], and also to Varadaguru [Dasgupta: HIPh III, 352, n.19]. Fragments of this work are collected by Narasimhachari [13–16]; see also Mesquita 1971: 187ff. and 1974: 189ff. For the content of the work, Nṛsimharāja (fl. in 16th cent., acc. to Srinivasa Chari 1988: 11) refers to his Paratvadīpikā (same as the Paratattvadīpikā mentioned in Dasgupta, HIPh III: 122?) (Ānandadāyini ad SAS III. 5, Mysore ed., p.34).

As is pointed out here by our author, how to interpret so-called Śaiva Upaniśads has been disucussed in many Śrī-Vaiṣṇava ācāryas' works such as:

Rānānuja: VAS	§§95–108. Especially §102 on the word śiva; §108 on AtharvaśirasUp; §100 on śambhu.
—: ŚrīBh	Esp. III. ii. 30–36 (adhi° 7) on ŚveUp.
Varadaguru: Tattvasāra	vv. 71–92.
—: Tattvanirṇaya	Throughout [Especially for the interpretation of ŚveUp, see S. Stark, WZKS 26 (1992)].
Sudarśanasūri: ŚP	Esp. ad ŚrīBh I. iv. 29 (pp. 183–201), where Sudarśanasūri closely examines ŚveUp, AtharvaśikhāUp and AtharvaśirasUp.
—: TD	Esp. ad VAS §108 (pp. 241–43) on AtharvaśirasUp.
Vedānta Deśika: TMK	III. 5–6 explains in detail why Viṣṇu is called by well-known names of Śiva; 7 on ŚveUp; 8 on the Purushasūkta; 9 on other deities; 10 on AtharvaśirasUp.

the author of the Commentary [Rāmānuja] also [explains it] in his Vedārthasaṃgraha, [Śrī-]Bhāṣya etc. [284] All these points are summarized in the book entitled Tattvanirṇaya by Vātsya Varadaguru, who was perfectly contemplating Him. And in [his] Tattvasāra, the summary is shown by the following verse⁶⁵⁸:

Who are you?

—I am one who knows the truth.

Who is the supreme entity, then?

—[The supreme entity] is Viṣṇu.

Why?

—Because such Upanishads as the Taittirīyaka⁶⁵⁹ (the aim of which is the [supreme] entity) refer to [the name ‘Nārāyaṇa’].

Why are other words [such as śiva found in some other Upanishads]?

—Because [śiva is] the attribute [of Viṣṇu].

Why does Rudra speak [of himself] in this [connection with the supreme entity]?

—Because [Rudra] regards [himself] as this [supreme entity, Viṣṇu, who is his own inner self].

Why is [Viṣṇu also] born [according to some Scriptures]?

—[Because] He incarnates.

How [should we understand] another [disputable point]?

—Let it be interpreted [appropriately].⁶⁶⁰

Raṃgarānānuja R 280ff.; AthavaśikhāUp-Bh.

⁶⁵⁸Tattvasāra, v. 71.

⁶⁵⁹ R refers to MahānārāyaṇaUp 11. 1 [= TaiĀr X. 11. 1]: sahasraśirshaṃ devam etc. Cf. TMK III. 8 (on which SAS refers to TaiĀr III. 13. 2, X. 11. 1; Vājasaneyisaṃhitā 31. 22).

⁶⁶⁰ anyat kathaṃ nīyatām. This is too simple to determine its purport. Translation here is in the line of Viraraghavachari's comm. (UVG ed.).

If we follow the interpretation of the Ratnasāriṇī ad the Tattvasāra (contained in Madras ed.), translation may be: “How [should we interpret the passage mentioning] the other [higher ‘than Him (tataḥ)’]?” —Let it be interpreted [that tataḥ here means ‘therefore’].” That is, the question is concerned with ‘tataḥ’ in ŚveUp III. 10 “tato yad uttarataram idam” and the answer is: here ‘tataḥ’ means not ‘than Him’ but ‘therefore.’

Thus, it is established that Nārāyaṇa alone is the supreme cause, that He is to be meditated by one who want to be liberated, that He is the inner Self for all beings etc.

Accordingly, it is to be understood that the following four views are also baseless⁶⁶¹: that is, (1) the Triad Forms (trimūrti) [or Viṣṇu, Śiva and Brahmā] are equal,⁶⁶² (2) they are one and the same,⁶⁶³ (3) something beyond them [such as pure-Being is the supreme entity], (4) another individual [is the Supreme Entity].⁶⁶⁴ **[285]**

Indeed, this topic has been discussed in VAS §§101–102 and ŚrīBh III. ii. 30–36 (adhi° 7) and by our author in TMK III. 7 and ASĀ ad the above adhi°. However this interpretation is not satisfactory enough because Varadaguru deals with it in another verse in the Tattvasāra (v. 76cd).

According to R, translation may be: “How is the other, [i.e. śiva, mentioned in the ŚveUp etc. as the Highest Brahman]? —[Because the same attributes that are found in the passages praising Viṣṇu are found even in the Up], let us interpret [in harmony with these passages].” This seems to be mere repetiton.

⁶⁶¹ nirmūlāḥ. UVG ed. reads nirastāḥ and adds this reading in parenthesis.

⁶⁶² Cf. SAS III. 14 [65,15f.]: “And the opinion that the three are ruler different from each other is rejected because of the [description], say, that one presides over all the beings (parasparaṃ bhinnā īśvarās traya iti pakshaś caikasya sarvaprāśāsitṛtvādibhir nirastāḥ).”

⁶⁶³ Cf. SAS III. 14 [65,6ff.]: “The opinion that the One directly has the threefold division in incarnation, as in the case of Rāma, Kṛṣṇa and so forth, is intended in [the verses of Kālidāsa] like “That one form divides itself in three ways” [Kumārasambhava VII. 44]. In this regard, commenting on its original sources like “Supreme Brahman, none but Viṣṇu, is known as threefold here” [?] and “[The names of Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Rudra] to create, to sustain and to destroy [the universe respectively]” [ViP I. ii. 66], [our teachers] has asserted that inasmuch as [these sources] are in accord with the other passages like “The inner Self for you as well as for me” [MBh XII. 339. 4], [Brahman] exists in the two [i.e., Brahmā and Śiva] intervened by [each] individual self and in the one [i.e., Viṣṇu] without intervention (ekasyaiva rāmakṛṣṇādivat sākshādatāre tridhā vibhāga iti pakshaḥ ‘ekaiva mūrtir bibhīde tribhā 'sya [UVG: sā]’ ityādishu vivakshitaḥ / tatra mūlabhūtānām [read as UVG ed.] ‘viṣṇur eva paraṃ brahma tribhedam iha paṭhyate’ ‘sṛṣṭiṣṭhityantakaraṇīm’ ityādīnām ‘tavāntarātmā mama ca’ ityādivākyaṅtarānuvidhānāt kshetrañjāvyavadhānena dvayor ekatrāvyavadhānena ca pratītiṃ vyācakhyuḥ”).

Cf. also VAS §108 [139,1–4]: Mahābhārata ca Brahma-Rudra-saṃvāde Brahmā Rudram pratyāha: “tavāntarātmā mama ca ye cānye dehisamjñitāḥ” [MBh XII. 339. 4; Poona ed. deha°] iti | Rudrasya Brahmaṇas cānyeshāṃ ca dehinām parameśvaro Nārāyaṇo 'ntarātmatayā 'vasthita iti.

⁶⁶⁴ For (3) and (4), see SAS III. 14 [65,12ff.]: “As for the opinion that another personality or the pure existent and spiritual beyond the Trinity is the supreme principle,

And God completely fills the Triad Forms. And [while the form of Viṣṇu is directly filled by Him], the forms of Prajāpati [or Brahmā] and Paśupati [or Śiva] are [filled by God] with the intervention of [their own] individual selves⁶⁶⁵; this difference [is accepted] by force of the means of valid knowledge. That is the way [He] fills everything.

[Objection:] That which exists in one place cannot fill the other place.

[Replied:] By saying ‘fill,’ which do you want to deny, (1) that [He] exists only in this place, (2) that [He] is the object of apprehension as filling there, (3) that [He] is capable of producing effects filling there, or (4) that [He] is qualified by all the qualities?

(1) The first alternative does not hold good because we, [regarding Him as omnipresent], do not accept that [He exists here only].

(2) Nor the second. Its denial is also [of four kinds]: (a) mere denial of the apprehension of [God] Himself, (b) denial of the apprehension of all the parts [of God] **[286]** and (c) denial of the apprehension [of God] as having parts.

(a) The first alternative could not accomplish your purpose. Because the non-apprehension [of God] is due to the non-existence of sufficient condition (sāmāgrī) [for the apprehension]; and if this [condition] be here, He can be apprehended.

(b) The second one would lead to conclusions desirable [for us], no matter if it is proved that [He] has parts or not: [that is, if so, those parts existing in one place cannot be apprehended in the other place; if not, no part can be apprehended].

(c) As for the third alternative, non-apprehension of having parts is quite natural because [He] has no part; accordingly, such [non-apprehension] cannot be denied.

[Objection:] Since [He] is related to many [entities], [He] must have parts by force of limitation by these various relations.

there is sublation even by the passage beginning with “One and only Janārdana assumes the names [of Brahmā, Viṣṇu and Rudra]” [ViP I. ii. 66] (trimūrtyuttīrṇaṃ puruṣhāntaraṃ sac cinmātraṃ vā paratattvam iti pakshe ‘sa saṃjñāṃ yāti bhagavān eka eva janārdanaḥ’ ityādibhir api bādhaḥ”).

According to Viraraghavachari's comm. on SAS (UVG ed., p. 355), the former is of Madhva (read vyāsātīrtha for vyomātīta) and the latter is of Yādavaprakāśa etc.

⁶⁶⁵ See SAS III. 14 [65,6ff.] cited above.

[Replied:] Not so. Because substance, genus (jāti), denial and so on—qualified [respectively] by many attributes (guṇa), [many] individuals (vyakti), [many] counter-correlatives (pratiyogin) and so on—are not accepted so [as having parts] by force of these [attributes etc.] [287]. Likewise, as is experienced, [that entity which is united with many substances] (e.g., conjunction, [disjunction, two-ness]) is not [accepted as having parts]. And even in a thing having no part, existence and non-existence [of something] manage to coexist at the same time.⁶⁶⁶ Otherwise, every kind of relationship would be lost and every kind of causality etc., which are based on it, would be lost; consequently, only voidness (śūnyatā) would remain.

(3) Nor the third. Because it is quite desirable that the production of everything is denied in a limited place. And it is not contradictory if One who has potency (śakti) fit for [producing] everything exists there [in a limited place] also. This does not lead to an undesirable conclusion that everything is produced in a certain place⁶⁶⁷ inasmuch as wherever an effect is found, His potency is accepted⁶⁶⁸ as fit for this [effect] [288]. Otherwise, that which has potency would always produce its effect, though [our experience] is the contrary, and thereby the momentary destruction (kṣaṇabhaṅga) might be introduced. If it were accepted, [production of effects] would be ordered⁶⁶⁹; but [such justification] is rejected because this [momentariness] has been already rejected [by us⁶⁷⁰]. You may assert that there would be desirable that everything is produced, in course of time, in a certain place [289]. But this is contradictory if [‘everything’] means

⁶⁶⁶ E.g., ether is united partially with the existence of sound and partially with its non-existence (R).

⁶⁶⁷ This is the answer to the objection that if Brahman, which exists everywhere, had potency fit for [producing] everything, that Brahman which exists in water could burn (R).

⁶⁶⁸ K reads svīkārāt for svīkāre.

⁶⁶⁹ E.g., only a seed in the field can sprout but that in a granary cannot. Because a seed in a grain is different from that in the field since a seed is momentary, and only the latter has potency for sprouting. See the discussion of Buddhists on the example of a seed and a sprout in NySi 17,1ff.

⁶⁷⁰ NySi 16,3–37,3. For Viśiṣṭādvaitins' refutation of kṣaṇabhaṅga, see also Rāmānuja's commentaries ad BrSū II. ii. 24, TMK I. 25–31, ASĀ v. 194 (ad II. ii. adhi° 3).

all the individuals (vyakti) that are to be produced (bhāvin) everywhere. Because those individuals which have been produced [and] which are produced do not need production (bhavana) here.⁶⁷¹ Because those [individuals] which have been destroyed can neither be produced nor approach here at any time. **[290]** If [‘everything’] means merely [all the individuals] homogeneous to Himself, this would lead to a desirable conclusion. Even⁶⁷² between two kinds of [His] manifestation, there is partial mixture when [He] incarnates (avatāra).⁶⁷³

(4) Nor the fourth. Because various [scholars⁶⁷⁴] accept that such [quality] as color, smell and taste pervades its own substratum and at the same time pervades all the parts in the case of the whole (avayavin), an atom and so on.

The above-mentioned has been fully demonstrated by the author of the Sūtra. That is, having raised the question “Whole [Brahman] would become [the world]; otherwise, there would be contradiction to Scriptural passages that [He] has no part,” he

⁶⁷¹ R: utpannasyotpadyamānasya cotpattyanapekshatvād iti bhāvaḥ.

⁶⁷² This answers the following question: if it were the case, His manifestation as play (līlavibhūti) (or the physical universe) would be homogeneous to His eternal manifestation (nityavibhūti) (or the transcendental realm) because Brahman exists in both (R).

⁶⁷³ Cf. NySi, nityavibhūti-pariccheda, 395,4f.: prākṛtāprākṛtasamṣargo 'pi nānupa-pannaḥ; anyathā prākṛtalokeshu bhagavadavatārāḥ, paramapade 'py arcirādimārgenna sūkshmaśarīrasya vaidikaputrāder vā gamanaṃ kathaṃ ghaṭeta.

⁶⁷⁴ See NySi, adravya-pariccheda (on saṃyoga), 478,2ff, where our author cites VDīpa II. i. 26, 29 and maintains that a part-less entity such as Brahman can, like genus (jāti) as assumed by the Naiyāyikas, exist entirely in a thing conjunct to it. Or this may suggest the import of BrSū II. i. 29: “And because [those who assert that the modification of Brahman is impossible since it has no part] have defects in their own doctrines (svapakshadoshāc ca).” The point of this sūtra is summarized by our author in ASĀ 171 (ad II. i. 26–31, adhi° 9) as follows: “That is, [according to the Naiyāyika] an effect called conjunction does exist between an omnipresent entity [like Brahman] and the contrary [like an atom] or between two atoms. If he asserts that it is not possible either entirely or partially, he will fall into the doctrine of voidness. The Sāṃkhya also declares that the primordial matter is omnipresent. How can a product less than it be created therefrom? The same is to be observed even in the case of māyā and so on. Our interpretation is, however, uninjured as it is uttered in the Scriptures (saṃyogākhyam hi kāryam vibhutaditarayoḥ syād aṇūnām mitho vā; kārtsyenāṃśena vā tad vihatam iti vadan sūnyavāde nimañjet / sāmkyo 'pi prāha vibhvīm prakṛtim iti kathaṃ nyūnaśṣṭhis tataḥ syāt; māyādishv evam ūhyam; nigamanigaditā tv akshatā paddhatir naḥ //).”

rejects it beginning with “However, because of the Śrutis⁶⁷⁵” [292]

Thus God, as is mentioned in the Scriptures, fills everything.

For the same reason, doctrine of [Brahman as] devoid of any characteristic (nirguṇa) is also rejected.

[Objection:] How [should we manage] affirmation and denial [in the Scriptures] regarding [His] characteristics, which are mutually contradictory?

[Replied:] We examine this issue as follows.

First, it is not appropriate to adopt both [affirmation and denial] together, because [the two] are mutually contradictory. For the same reason,⁶⁷⁶ it is not [appropriate] to abandon both. Nor is it [appropriate] to adopt [either of the two] optionally (vikalpa), because this [option] cannot be applied to an established [entity].⁶⁷⁷ Nor is it [appropriate] to abandon either of the two, because there is no criterion as to which is to be abandoned.⁶⁷⁸

[Objection:] According to the interpretational rule of disconnection⁶⁷⁹ (apacheda-

⁶⁷⁵ BrSū II. i. 26–27.

⁶⁷⁶ I.e., because nirguṇa-abhāva and saguṇa-abhāva are also mutually contradictory. Cf. SAS III. 47 (206,7f.): viruddhānyataravidhinishedhayor itaranishedhavidhināntarīyakatvāt.; ŚD LX (256,17–19): parasparaviruddhobhyāṃgīkāravat tadubhayaprahāṇasyāpi virodhakukshinikshepam evopalabhāmahe; na hi ghaṭtvāghaṭatvasamuccayacvad ghaṭāghaṭavilakshaṇayor api samuccayaḥ sambhavati, virodhāviśeshāt.

⁶⁷⁷ See BrSi 40,1–2: vastuni vikalpānupapatteḥ; Śaṅkara ad BrSū I. iv. 14: vastuni ca vikalpasyānupapatteḥ [Ed. Paṅsīkar, Bombay: Nirṇaya Sagar Press, 1938, p. 399]. Cf. NySi 456,1: siddhe ca vikalpāyogāt.

⁶⁷⁸ Cf. SAS III. 47 (206,2f.): na hi vastu vikalpyeta na viruddhasamuccayaḥ / na cobhayaparityāgo vihatim jahataḥ kvacit //.

⁶⁷⁹ The interpretational rule that the later is stronger than the former. See MīSū VI. v. 54 (adhi° 19): “When one[disconnection] occurs after the other, the former is weaker as in the case of the original [and the modification] (paurvāparye pūrvadaurbalyam prakṛtvat).”

The topic under discussion in this ahikaraṇa is expounded in Deśika's own words as follows [TṬ 129,26–]:

“As regards the performance that ‘The five priests creep forth touched from behind by each other: the Prastotṛ touches the Adhvaryu from behind; the Pratiharṭṛ [touches] the Prastotṛ [from behind]; the Udgātṛ [touches] the Pratiharṭṛ [from behind]; the Brahman [touches] the Udgātṛ [from behind]; the patron of the ritual [touches] the

Brahman [from behind] (pañca rtvijah samanvārabdhāḥ sarpanti // adhvaryuṃ prastotānvārabhate prastotāraṃ pratihartā pratihartāraṃ udgātodgātāraṃ brahmā brahmāṇaṃ yajamānam)’ [Āpastamba-śrauta-Sū XII. xvi. 17–xvii. 1 (< Pañcaviṃśa-Br VI. vii. 12); for prasarpaṇa, see Caland: L’Agnisṭoma, p. 171f.], the prāyaścittas in the case of disconnection are enjoined in ‘Among [the priests] creeping towards the Bahishpavamāna, if the Prastotṛ breaks the connection (yadi bahishpavamānam sarpatām prastotāpacchidyeta)’ [Āp.-ś.-Sū XIV. xxvi. 3] and so forth [< P.-Br VI. vii. 13–15]. It is stated therein that ‘If the Pratiharṭṛ [breaks the connection], the patron will be deprived of the cattle; he is to give all the property. If Udgātṛ, the patron will be deprived of the ritual; such ritual is to be finished without fee (yadi pratihartā paśubhir yajamāno vyṛddhyeta / sarvavedasaṃ dadyāt // yady udgātā yajñena yajamāno vyṛddhyeta / adakṣiṇaḥ sa yajñaḥ saṃsthāpyaḥ)’ [Āp.-ś.-Sū XIV. xxvi. 4–5]. These two occasional rites (naimittika) [i.e., giving all the property and giving no fee] are, if in the same performance, in conflict. If [the two priests] break the connection simultaneously in [the same performance], the prāyaścitta for the Udgātṛ or that for the Pratiharṭṛ is to be done optionally [cf. MīSū VI. v. 51]. If [the two] break the connection one after the other, it is fixed that the prāyaścitta for one who breaks the connection later [is to be done]. That is declared: ‘paurvāparye pūrvadaubalyaṃ prakṛtivat’ [VI. v. 54].”

[Cf. ŚP ad ŚrīBh I. i. 1: (1) 86,13–20. Cf. also Srinivasa Chari 1988: 229f., n. 35 and notes of some modern translators on ŚrīBh, e.g., ŚrīBh (R-V): I, 27, fn. 2; ŚrīBh (L): 180, n. 228; ŚrīBh (K), Notes, pp. 6f.]

Based on this interpretational rule, the mahāpūrvapakshin in ŚrīBh asserts that the nirguṇa-passages are stronger than the saguṇa-passages, since, considering nirguṇa presupposes guṇa, the nirguṇa-passages are later (nirguṇavākyaṇām guṇāpekshatvena paratvād valīyastvam) [(1) 87,5]. Cf. ŚD, vāda 52 [230,9–10]: vidhir hy anyānapekshatayā pūrvo bhavati, nishedhas tu nishedhyaprasaṃgasākāṃkshatayā paraḥ.

Probably Rāmānuja here refers to Sarvajñātman's way of interpretation; cf. Saṃkshepaśārīraka II. 114–118: “Or rather, suppose that all the means of knowledge other [than the Scriptures] are valid respecting the Self. And we intentionally accept that they are clearly contradictory to the Upanishads. Notwithstanding, all other means of knowledge that arose before are sublated by the understanding of Brahman that is born later out of the Upanishads for someone (ātmany eva samastam astu yadi vā mānāntaram tena ca spasṭam vedaśiroviruddham iti ca svīkurmahe kāmataḥ / evaṃ saty api pūrvabhāvi sakalam mānāntaram bādhat paścāt kasyacid eva vedaśiraso jātā parabrahmadhīḥ / 114/). Without sublating the erroneous understanding of water in a mirage that was produced before, the following understanding that informs the true nature of a desert cannot arise. Thus, as [this right understanding] originates when the understanding of water in a mirage is rubbed off, the understanding of Brahman, which is born out of the Upanishads, [originates when] the error of difference [is rubbed off] (pūrvotpannamṛgāmbuvibhramadhiyo bādham vinā nottaram vijñānam samudetum ūsharabhuvo yāthātmyam āvedayat / śaknotiti yathā mṛgāmbudhishāṇām unmrīdyad utpadyate tadvad vedaśirovacojanitadhīr bhedabhramam brahmaṇi / 115/). ‘When [disconnections] occur one after the other, the former is weaker,’ says Jaimini in connection with the [MīSū] VI. We shall show all this and tell it to you. Fix your attention properly on it (paurvāparye pūrvadaubalyam

naya), the former [i.e. the affirmation] is to be abandoned.

[Replied:] **[293]** This [rule is to] be applied to [two items that are] not always in conflict and are not always in the relation of prior and posterior. If [two items are] always [in conflict and in the relation of prior and posterior], it follows that the latter cannot be valid by force of the interpretational rule [mentioned in the *adhikaraṇa* of] contradiction (*virodhanaya*).⁶⁸⁰ And it is not appropriate to introduce the interpretational *āha* *shashte 'dhyāye 'vasthito jaiminir yat / vakshyāmas tat sarvam āniya tubhyaṃ buddhiṃ svīyāṃ samayag atrāvadhatsva /116/*). In respect to the case that two disconnections the agents of which are *Udgāṭṛ* and *Pratihartṛ* occur one after the other when the injunction of the ritual action is applied, it is doubtful for us whether all the property is to be lost or [the ritual] is to be finished without fee. To this replies the sage Jaimini: the later is powerful (*udgāṭṛpratihartṛkartṛkatayā jātau viyogau kramād yasmin karmavidhiprayoga-samaye tatraisha naḥ saṃśayaḥ / kim sarvadraviṇavyayo bhavatu vā saṃsthāpanaṃ dakṣiṇāhīnasyeti tadā paraṃ balavad ity ūce munir jaiminiḥ /117/*). For instance, the quality of the original form of a ritual and that of its modification—which are mutually conflicting too much—are regarded as sublated and negating [respectively], because [the original and the modification] are understood in this order. It is true that [the two] may be conversely read [in some Scriptures], but the order of understandings still exists: the understanding of the quality of the original is former, the other understanding is later; because [the two] occur only in such a way (*yadvat prākṛtavaikṛtāv atitarām anyonyasaṃspardhinai dharmāu bādhyanivartakāv abhimatau buddhau krameṇānvayāt / pāṭhavyatyayasambhave 'pi ca tayor buddhikramo vidyate pūrvā prākṛtadharmadhīr itaradhīr antyā tathavottitheḥ /118/*).” Cf. *BrSi* 40,3ff., where *Maṇ ana* (this is *siddhānta*, acc. to *Śaṃkhaṇi*'s comm.) cites *MiSū* VI. v. 54 and *ŚV*, *codanā*, v. 57 in order to prove that the Scripture is stronger than perception. For applications of this interpretational rule in the *Bhāmatī*, the *Nyāyāmṛta* and the *Siddhāntaleśasaṃgraha*, see N. S. Rāmānujātātācaryaḥ, *apacchedanyāyasaṃcāramārgaḥ*, in: R. C. Dwivedi (ed.), *Studies in Mīmāṃsā: Dr. Mandan Mishra Felicitation Volume*, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994, pp. 271–76.

⁶⁸⁰ Cf. *ŚP* (1) 196,1–11: *virodhābhyupagame 'py aniyatavirodhapaurvāparya-vishayo 'pacchedanayo nātra pravartate, api tu virodhādhikaraṇanyāya eva pravartate; tadvishaye hi paurvāparyaniyamō virodhaniyamaś ca vidyate. ... yadvā mā bhūd virodhādhikaraṇanyāyaḥ, atropakramādhikaraṇanyāya eva pravartate; virodhapaurvāparyaniyamāt* (*ŚP* (1) 196,1–12 = R 293,10–294,8).

Though here in *NySi* the author takes up the *virodhādhikaraṇanyāya* (like the first view of *ŚP*), he adopts the *upakramādhikaraṇanyāya* (like the second of *ŚP*) in his other works. That is, *ŚD*, *vāda* 52 [231,14–18] runs as follows: “That is, the interpretational rule of disconnection can be applied [only] if [two items] are not always in conflict and are not always in the relation of prior and posterior. For if each of the two breaks the connection, it is established that [the teaching of each *prāyaścitta*] is valid inasmuch as nothing sublates it; if [the two] break the connection simultaneously, [the teachings of] both [*prāyaścittas*] can be valid because of option [cf. *MiSū* VI. v. 51]. Only when [the two] break the connection one after the other, the former is sublated by force of the rule ‘the later cannot arise if the former is not sublated.’ Yet the validity stands still if [the two break the connection] in different performances. If those which are always in

rule of disconnection, by which either of the two is completely sublated, in case the contradiction [of the two] can be removed through distinguishing each aim. For the statements negating [His] characteristic concern [only] those [characteristics] which are other than [His] auspicious characteristics enjoined [in the Scriptures] according to the interpretational rule of a general rule and a specific rule⁶⁸¹ (utsargāpavādanyāya) [294]; hence, they culminate in the negation of [His] bad characteristics, as is mentioned in the Śrutis.

conflict are in the relation of prior and posterior, however, it follows that the later is impossible by force of the interpretational rule [mentioned] in the upakrama-adhikaraṇa (aniyatavirodhapaurvāparye hy apacchedanayaḥ / anyatarāpacchede bādhakābhāvena prāmānyasiddheḥ, yugapadapacchede vikalpata ubhayoḥ prāmānyasambhavāt / kramenāpaccheda eva kevalam ‘pūrvābādhena notpattir uttarasya hi siddhyati’ iti nyāyena pūrvābādhā / tathāpi prayogāntare prāmānyam siddhyaty eva / niyatavirodhapaurvāparye tūpakramādhikaraṇanyāyena parānutpattir eva).” Cf. Srinivasa Chari 1961: 79. See also SAS III. 57 [260–61]: aniyatapaurvāparye hy apacchedanayaḥ, niyame tūpakramanayāt parānutpattir eveti nītividaḥ.

For virodhādhikaraṇanyāya, see MiSū I. iii. 3 (adhi° 2): “Whenever there is contradiction [between the Śruti and the Smṛti], however, [the later] is to be disregarded. Because [only] when there is no [contradiction], there is inference [that the Smṛti supports the Śruti] (virodhe tv anapeksham syād asati hy anumānam)” and “And because the cause is found (hetudarśanāc ca).” In this case, the understanding of the Śruti comes former and that of the Smṛti later because though the Śruti is an independent means of knowledge, the Smṛti always needs the Śruti and inference on which its authority depends (cf. ŚP 176,4–5: śrutiḥ prathamata eva pramitiḥ janayati, nirapekshapramāṇatvāt; smṛtis tu svamūlabhūtaśrutyanumānāpekshatayā vilambitapravṛttiḥ). Thus it follows that the principle “the former is stronger than the later” is declared in other words in this adhi°.

For upakramādhikaraṇanyāya, see MiSū III. iii. 1–8 (adhi° 1). This also declares the same principle (See also van Buitenen 1956: 200, n. 134).

Although I cannot find the direct statement of the Viśiṣṭādvaitins as to the distinction between the two adhikaraṇas, the reason why Deśika prefers the upakrama-adhi° is probably because Kumārila interprets the virodha-adhi° in such a way in which the real conflict between the Śruti and the Smṛti is not accepted. (Cf. G. Jha, Pūrvamīmāṃsā in its sources, Banaras, 1964, p. 196.)

Note that here the Advaitin fixes the order of the affirmative passages and the negative ones and the Viśiṣṭādvaitin, admitting it for the time being, rejects the Advaita interpretation. Cf. SAS III. 57 [261]: “And in this case, it is you who fix the order that the affirmation is prior and the negation is posterior. So you cannot avoid accepting that the later is less powerful (iha ca tvayaiva prasaṅgakapratishedhakayoḥ paurvāparyaniyamaḥ sthāpitaḥ; ataḥ parasyaiva daurbalyam pratyetyam).”

[For Advaita refutation against using this principle to interpret nirguṇa- and saguṇa-passages, see Advaitasiddhi II. iv, Nirnaya Sagara Press ed., p. 735 (cited in MK 1140).]

⁶⁸¹ The rule that an exceptional rule is stronger than a general one. Same as sāmānyaviśeshanyāya. Cf. ŚrīBh I. i. 1, (1) 195,1–3: nirguṇavākyānām saguṇavākyānām ca vishayaḥ: “apahatapāpmā” ityādi “apipāsaḥ” ityantena heyaguṇān pratishidhya “satyakāmaḥ satyasamkalpaḥ” iti brahmaṇaḥ kalyāṇaguṇān vidadhatīyaḥ śrutir eva vivinaktīti saguṇanirguṇavākyayor virodhābhāvād anyatarasya mithyāvishayatāśrayaṇam

And it is stated in the Tattvasāra⁶⁸²:

There cannot be any contradiction between the affirmations and the negations of characteristic, body, modification, birth,⁶⁸³ karma etc. with respect to Brahman, because they have different purposes. Thus, the affirmations cannot be sublated by the negations.

and so on. [295]

Even though it has been established so, if the former [i.e. the statement that He has characteristics] were sublated by the statement that [He] has no characteristic only because of its being later (which is in nature endowed with the sense of negation⁶⁸⁴), then even this [statement that He has no characteristic] would be sublated by the statement that [everything] is void (śūnya) and, consequently, it would be the thought of the Mādhyamika [Buddhists] that wins at last. For neither statement is accepted as of absolutely real (pāramārthika) authority [296] and both are not different in not being absolutely real.⁶⁸⁵

Thus God has two identity marks⁶⁸⁶ (liṅga): [having no defect and having api nāsaṃkāniyam. Note the expression virodhābhyupagame 'pi (ŚP 196,1) cited above.

⁶⁸² Tattvasāra, v. 69.

⁶⁸³ MGOS ed. of the Tattvasāra reads bheda for janma; UVG ed. also janma- and adds the reading of NySi in parentheses.

⁶⁸⁴ This is because abhāva always presupposes the knowledge of its pratiyogin.

⁶⁸⁵ This is the answer to the question that the nirviśeṣha-statements are based on Vedic authority while the Buddhist statements are heretical. In this regard, R quotes the verse of an expert (abhiyukta): vedo 'nṛto buddhakṛtāgamo 'nṛtaḥ prāmāṇyam etasya ca tasya cānṛtam / buddho 'nṛta buddhibale tathānṛto yūyaṃ ca bauddhās ca samānasamsadaḥ //, which is quoted in SAS III. 59 as of “Yādavaprakāśīyaḥ saṃgrahaḥ” [268,12]. Cf. ŚrīBh I. i. 1 [(1) 182,6–183,1]: “And [your assertion] that later sublation is not found [in the case of nirguṇa-passage] is not certain, because we find its sublation in the [Mādhyamika] statement that ‘the reality is void.’ You may protest that this [statement] is from delusion, but only you hold that it is from delusion though no doubt we never find any sublation in this [Mādhyamika statement] (paścāttanabādhādarśanaṃ cāsiddham; śūnyam eva tattvam iti vākye tasyāpi bādhadarśanāt / tat tu bhrāntimūlam iti ced etad api bhrāntimūlam iti tvayaivoktam, paścātyabādhādarśanaṃ tu tasyeva),” and II. i. 15 [247,16–17]: sarvasūnyatvātirekinishedhāsambhavāt tasyaiva paścāttanabādhādarśanam, doshamūlatvaṃ tu pratyakshādīnām vedāntajanmanaḥ sarvasūnyajñānasyāpy avīśeṣhāt..

⁶⁸⁶ Cf. ŚrīBh III. ii. 11: ubhayaliṅgaṃ sarvatra hi—yataḥ sarvatra śrutismṛtiṣhu

auspicious qualities].

For the same reason the [Advaitic] view that “Brahman, though having no characteristic (nirviśeṣha), concealed by that Ignorance (avidyā) which conceals [the real nature of the Brahman] (ācchādikā) and falsely appears (adhyāsa) as the phenomenal world (prapañca)—that is called creation—by force of that [Ignorance] which projects [the false nature of Brahman] (vikshepikā)⁶⁸⁷” is also rejected. For that [Brahman] cannot have any trace of a defect like Ignorance. It has been explained that [Brahman] is qualified by numbers of [auspicious] quality such as omniscience⁶⁸⁸ and that intelligent beings are constantly many. Even the passage beginning with “Being only,⁶⁸⁹” [which apparently seems to deny plurality in the beginning of the world], just intends to affirm that [Brahman] is the material cause [of the world] and to negate other causes [than Brahman] which are to be imagined in mind [297]. That is established by considering its context.

Further,

- (41) Whether the substratum [of delusion or Ignorance (i.e., Brahman)] is completely manifested or unmanifested, the delusion will not take place. The distinction between a manifested aspect (ākṛti) and an unmanifested one [in the substratum, i.e., Brahman] would prove that [Brahman] has a certain distinguishing characteristic.

paraṃ brahmobhayaliṅgam—ubhayalakṣhaṇam abhidhīyate / nirastanikhiladoshatvakalyāṇaguṇākāratva-lakṣhaṇopetam ity arthaḥ [435,12ff.].

⁶⁸⁷ The concept of the two-fold śakti of avidyā, ācchādikā and vikshepikā, is clearly shown in Sarvajñātman's Saṃkṣhepaśārīraka I. 20: “Having covered the [true] nature of the Self that shines clearly, Non-knowledge projects it illusorily in the form of the individual selves, God and the world because [Non-knowledge] is endowed with the potency of concealment and that of delusion owing to having the pure Self-ness as its object and substratum (ācchādyā vikshipati saṃsphurad ātmarūpaṃ jīveśvaratvajagadākṛtibhir mṛshaiva / ajñānam āvaraṇavibhramaśaktiyogād ātmatvamātravishayāśrayatā-balena)” [cf. Mayeda 1979: 83]. This classification, though not found in Śaṅkara's works, is present in Maṇ ana Miśra's Brahmasiddhi, which is, Thrasher [1993: 70–75] asserts, under the influence of the usages of the Gau apādakārikā.

⁶⁸⁸ Cf. the definition of sarvajña in the Nyāyatattva: yo veti yugapat sarvaṃ pratyakṣheṇa sadā svataḥ (quoted in the ŚarGBh ad st. 5, p.145).

Thus [an entity] without any distinguishing characteristic cannot have such a particular attribute to be concealed. Hence, if [Brahman] itself should be concealed, [Brahman] itself would be lost.⁶⁹⁰ And in that entity whose essential nature [i.e., the pure-Knowledge⁶⁹¹] is quite clear because of its being self-luminous, there is not any distinguishing characteristic to be determined by the mentality⁶⁹² (pratyaya) to sublimate [Ignorance].⁶⁹³ This leads to each of following two undesirable conclusions: none could be liberated [if the Knowledge-as-Brahman cannot annihilate Ignorance] or [otherwise] none would be transmigrated⁶⁹⁴ **[298]**.

⁶⁸⁹ ChUp VI. ii. 1.

⁶⁹⁰ Cf. ŚrīBh I. i. 1 on the second anupapatti of avidyā (tirodhāna°) [(2) 3,10–12]: “Moreover, one who asserts that Brahman, whose essential nature is illumination only, is concealed by Ignorance would maintain the very destruction of [Brahman] itself. What is called ‘the concealment of illumination’ is either the obstruction of the new production of illumination or the destruction of present [illumination]. The concealment of the illumination [of Brahman], [according to you], is nothing but the destruction of the illumination since it is not accepted that the illumination is to be produced anew (kiṃcāvidyayā prakāśaikasvarūpaṃ brahma tirohitam iti vadatā svarūpanāśa evoktaḥ syāt / prakāśatirodhānaṃ nāma prakāśotpattipratibandho vidyamānasya vināśo vā / prakāśasyānutpādyatvābhyupagamena prakāśatirodhānaṃ prakāśanāśa eva).” and also VAS §40. TMK III. 34ab (channatve svaprakāśād anādhikavapuśo brahmaṇaḥ syād abhāvaḥ, bhāvānāṃ chādaṃ hi sphuraṇavilayanam tasya votpattirodhaḥ) is just a summary of Rāmānuja's discussion. For further discussion on tirodhāna-anupapatti by our author, see ŚD, vāda 35 [Cf. Srinivasa Chari 1961: 142f.].

This is a rather typical criticism against avidyā, already found in ŚV, sambandhā-ksheparāhāra, v. 85 “anyenopaplave 'bhīṣṭe dvaitavādaḥ prasajyate / svābhāvīkīm avidyāṃ tu nocchetuṃ kaścid arhati,” to which Maṇ aṇa replies in BrSi 12.

⁶⁹¹ I.e., the Knowledge-as-Brahman/Ātman-itself or the Consciousness (caitanya).

⁶⁹² I.e., the knowledge-as-means (pramāṇajñāna) or vṛtti. Like the later Advaitins Śaṅkara uses the term vṛtti in the sense of modification of the inner-organ (antaḥkaraṇa-vṛtti) and uses pratyaya in this sense [Mayeda 1968/69: 230f.]. Cf. VParī I. 4: caitanyasyānādīte 'pi tadabhivyañjakāntaḥkaraṇavṛttir indriyasannikarshādīnā jāyata iti vṛttivīśiṣṭacaitanyam ādimad ity ucyate; jñānāvacchedakatvāc ca vṛttau jñānatvopacārah: tad uktaṃ Vivaraṇe “antaḥkaraṇavṛttau jñānatvopacārāt” (PPV 41,17). For the Advaita opinion that Ignorance can be sublated not by svarūpajñāna but by pramāṇajñāna, see Sundaram's trans. of Isṭasiddhi, intro., p. 69.

⁶⁹³ R: Does the sublating knowledge illuminate that characteristic [of Brahman] which is not other than [Brahman] itself or that [characteristic which is] other [than Brahman] itself? Not the former; because it is manifested in itself inasmuch as it is self-luminous. Nor the later; because those characteristics which is other than [Brahman itself] are not accepted.

⁶⁹⁴ R: If the knowledge-as-means (pramāṇa), though its objects are not different

In fact, even between cognition (*abhijñā*) and re-cognition (*pratyabhijñā*), [by which you illustrate that the knowledge as Brahman itself and the notion to sublimate Ignorance, though having different effects, have the same content⁶⁹⁵], there is some difference [in content] due to distinguishing characteristics in space, time and so on.⁶⁹⁶

- (42) [Only when] re-cognition has some extra contents in comparison to cognition, the re-cognition is capable of sublating such [delusion of] difference as cannot be sublated by this [cognition]—though you may not accept it.⁶⁹⁷

from that of Brahman-itself, annihilates [Ignorance], we would be constantly liberated because [Brahman-] itself can unavoidably annihilate [Ignorance before the knowledge-as-pramāṇa does]. If [Brahman-] itself cannot annihilate [Ignorance], we are constantly transmigrated because even the knowledge-as-pramāṇa, whose object does not excel that [of the Knowledge-as-Brahman-itself], could not annihilate [Ignorance].

⁶⁹⁵ See ŚP (2) 2,16–19 [on ŚrīBh I. i. 1; (2) 2,3: *etad uktaṃ bhavati*, etc.]: “[The Advaitins argue:] In our experience there is no difference in content between cognition and re-cognition but one type of knowledge is not contradictory to delusion while the other is contradictory to delusion. The cognition ‘This is one Devadatta’ has one [person] as its content, still the delusion ‘There are two different persons’ (that is, ‘This one is different from one who I saw before’) remains. Yet the re-cognition ‘This is that one Devadatta’ is, though its content too is the oneness of Devadatta, contradictory to the delusion ‘There are two.’ Thus it is proper that [only] the knowledge-as-means can annihilate the delusion [i.e., Ignorance], while its content is not different [from that of Knowledge-as-Brahman] (*nanu vishayavaishamyābhāve 'pi kasyacid jñānasya bhramāvi-rodhitvaṃ kasyacid bhramavirodhitvaṃ ca dṛṣṭaṃ abhijñāpratyabhijñayoḥ / ayam eko devadatta ity abhijñāyā ekavishayatve 'pi pūrvadṛṣṭād ayam anya iti purushadvitvabhramāo dṛṣṭaḥ; pratyabhijñāyās tu so 'yam eko devadatta iti devadattaikyavishayatve 'pi dvitvavirodhitvaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ iti vishayavaishamyābhāve 'pi pramāṇajñānasya bhramanivartakatvaṃ yuktaṃ*).” The same discussion is found in ŚD, vāda 43 [203,22ff.] as well.

R points out that here our author referred to the [Pañcapādikā]-Vivaraṇa. That is, PPV ad PP cited below (Varaṇasi ed., p. 636) runs: *devadattaikyasyābhijñāyām eva siddhatvāt tadākāreṇa pratyabhijñāvākyābhyām upajanitena jñānenopādhiparikalpita-bhedanirāseṇa pratyabhijñāvākyayoḥ prāmāṇyam*. The first Advaitin who applies “so 'yam” (a well-known example of a *lakṣhaṇā*) to the knowledge from the Scriptures is Padmapāda (PP 307: *śāstraṃ hi so 'yam ityādilaukikavākyavad brahmaṇi prāmāṇyam*) and this is enlarged to interpret the passage ‘*tat tvam asi*’ by Sarvajñātman [van Buitenen 1956: 62–64; Mayeda 1979: 53–54].

⁶⁹⁶ Rāmānuja clearly negates a *lakṣhaṇā* (implication) in the sentence ‘so 'yam devadattaḥ’; that is, ŚrīBh I. i. 1 [(2) 54,3f.] says: *so 'yam devadatta ity atrāpi na lakṣhaṇā, bhūtavartamānakālasaṃbandhitayaikyapratītyavirodhāt* (See also VAS §25).

⁶⁹⁷ Cf. ŚD, vāda 43 [204,3–6]: Even in that case [of ‘This is Devadatta’ and ‘This

Thus, if [the Knowledge-as-Brahman] itself annihilates [Ignorance], there would be eternal annihilation; if the knowledge-as-means (māna) which is other than [Brahman] itself [annihilates the ignorance], [Brahman] should be accepted as having some distinguishing characteristics [299].

[Objection:] Since we do not find that what is not the knowledge-as-means (amāna) [such as a pot] sublates [delusion], being the knowledge-as-means is essential for sublating. [That is why the Knowledge-as-Brahman cannot sublimate Ignorance].

[Replied:] Why don't you accept, in the same way, that since we do not find that what is not known (ameya) is the substratum [of delusion],⁶⁹⁸ being known is essential for being [the substratum of delusion]? [But Brahman could not be the substratum of delusion according to you because It cannot be known⁶⁹⁹].

[Objection:] Because of the difference between a material entity (ja a) and non-material one (aja a) [300] [or what is manifested by the other and what is manifested by itself,⁷⁰⁰ non-material or self-luminous Brahman do not have to be known so as to be the substratum of delusion, while a material thing like a pot must be known].

[Replied:] Nothing is different. For, [according to you], the knowledge-as-means (which is other than [Brahman] itself) [i.e., the internal organ] is also material [and] the part of this [internal organ] which [Brahman] Itself enters [i.e., the Consciousness] does exist even before [the sublation of Ignorance].

is that Devadatta'], there is difference in representation between the cognition and the re-cognition; difference between cognition and re-cognition could not be established otherwise. None but you imagines that the re-cognition—which has an extra description that—is of the completely same object as that of the cognition—which has a description this only—like continuous streams [of knowledge] (tatrāpy abhijñāpratyabhijñayoḥ prakāśyākārabhdo 'ati; anyathābhijñāpratyabhijñayor bhedāsiddhiprasaṅgāt / ko vā bhavantam antareṇa sa ity adhikollekhinīm pratyabhijñām asāv ity etāvanmātrollekhinyābhijñayā saha dhāravāhikavad atyantasaṁānavishayām abhimanyate).

⁶⁹⁸ E.g., as far as a shell is not known, misconception of it as silver cannot take place.

⁶⁹⁹ Cf. ŚD, vāda 19 [99,14–15]: brahmavishayam vṛttijñānam nivartakam iti cet 'anubhāvyatve ghaṭādivad ananubhūtitvaprasaṅgaḥ' [< Isṭasiddhi 1,5–6: anubhūter anubhāvyatve ghaṭādivad ananubhūtitvaprasaṅgāt (> ĀS 22,10; ŚrīBh I. i. 1, (1) 100,3f. and 134,4f. See Mesquita 1984: 189f.)] iti tvaduktam kiṁ na smarasi.

For further discussion on the Advaita theory of unknowability of Brahman, see 311,1ff. below.

Furthermore,

- (43) Does Brahman have the quality called ‘being without any distinguishing characteristic’ or not? In the former case, It has distinguishing characteristic as It is endowed with this [quality]; even in the later case, It has distinguishing characteristic as It is not endowed with [the quality ‘being without any distinguishing characteristic’]. **[301]**
- (44) [You may say that ‘without any distinguishing characteristic’ could not be denied, according to the previous argument, if ‘without any distinguishing characteristic’ were not existent; but] what we deny is that which is established through delusion by force of your statement [that Brahman is without distinguishing characteristic] [or] that which is stated in supplementary reference (anūḍita) through the implication (lakṣhaṇāvṛtti) of this [statement]. That is, it is denied for the reason that it has no denoting power. **[302]**
- (45) As the statement ‘The city has no speciality (nirviśeṣha)’ cannot be established in respect to one place [which has no distinguishing characteristic]; so all usages terminate in distinguishing characteristic.
- (46) You may say that [Brahman is without any distinguishing characteristic as] distinguishing characteristic, [according to the Naiyāyikas], is without any distinguishing characteristic; then, we reply: Is this [distinguishing characteristic] also [related] to a certain [entity] or not? In the latter case, it should have distinguishing characteristic, [namely, being related to something]. In the former case, it would lose the very nature of distinguishing characteristic [because nothing is distinguished by that which is not related to anything].

[Objection:] It is mere verbal expression (abhilāpa) that Brahman is without any distinguishing characteristic; [so there is not the positive quality ‘without any distinguishing characteristic’].

[Replied:] Were it the case, what we strive for would be proved. For [Its] distinguishing characteristic would not be denied in reality and [It] would be finally accepted to be in the scope of such expression.

[Objection:] Even [being in the scope] is impossible for a pure entity.

[Replied:] Not so.

- (47) For whether an entity is taught as expressible (vācya) or inexpressible (avācya), the entity is expressible in view of its being connected with the word ‘expressible’ or ‘inexpressible.’

Moreover,

- (48) It is decided by powerful means of knowledge such as perception that the world is real. Then, the statement that [Brahman] is without any distinguishing characteristic [should be regarded] as having another meaning⁷⁰¹ as the sentence “The Scriptures post is the sun.”⁷⁰²

[Objection:] Without the Scriptures, the world can be sublated by means of inference such as:

- (A) Cognition (pratyaya) of perception etc. is devoid of objective support (nirālambhana),
Because it is cognition,
Like cognition in sleep⁷⁰³;
- (B) The phenomenal world is false (mithyā),
Because it is seen (dṛśya),
or Because it is excluded (vyāvartamāna),
Like a shell [mistaken] as silver.

⁷⁰⁰ See the definition of ja a and aja a in 38,3: parata eva bhāsamānaṃ ja am; tadanyad aja am.

⁷⁰¹ That It has no inferior quality (R).

⁷⁰² The sentence “ādityo yūpaḥ” [TaiBr?] is quoted in Śābarabhāshya I. iv. 23 and in the Arthasaṃgraha (ed. and trans. G. Thibaut, Varanasi, 1882, p. 26) as an example of the guṇavāda. Cf. YMD III. 5. For the detail of guṇavāda, see Kunio Harikai: On the Three fold Classification of Arthavāda, in: R. C. Dwivedi (ed.), Studies in Mīmāṃsā: Dr. Mandan Mishra Felicitation Volume, Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1994, pp. 299–311 [Originally published in Japanese: Indogaku-Bukkyōgaku-Kenkyū 20-2 (1972)].

⁷⁰³ This syllogism is, as is pointed out by V, same as that of Buddhists; see SAS IV. 24 (526,11f.): yaḥ pratyayaḥ sa nirālambanaḥ, yathā svapnādipratyayaḥ; tathā ca vimatam. Cf. ŚrīBh II. ii. 28: yat paraiḥ [= Yogācāraiḥ] svapnavijñānadr̥shṭāntena

[Replied:] Not so.

[Concerning the syllogism (A)], if apprehension without any object⁷⁰⁴ (nirvishaya^o), apprehension of non-existent⁷⁰⁵ (asat^o), or apprehension otherwise⁷⁰⁶ (anyathā-khyāti) were to be proved, there would be defects such as contradiction,⁷⁰⁷ deviation from your own established theory (apasiddhānta) [of indefinable apprehension (anirvacanīya^o)] etc.⁷⁰⁸

[Concerning the syllogism (B)], if indefinability (anirvācyatva) is to be proved, there would be the defect that the attribute [of the probandum] is not well-known, the contradiction to your own statement [which is definable with the very word ‘indefinable’] etc. **[303]** [You may say that ‘indefinability’ means not ‘the non-existence of definability’ but ‘having the non-existence of reality (sattvābhāva) as well as the non-existence of unreality⁷⁰⁹ (asttvābhāva)’; but the contradiction still remains]: as the coexistence of two opposites, [e.g. reality and unreality], is contradiction; so the coexistence of such negations jāgaritajñānānām api nirālambanatvam uktam [303,13]. So ālambana here means vishaya (See ŚP ad II. ii. 20).

⁷⁰⁴ This is the theory of error by the followers Patañjali [Dasgupta III, 239] or some Buddhists [Srinivasa Chari 175]. (= vishayāsadbhāvapaksha in ŚrīBh (2) 27,5?). Vedānta Deśika rejects it because it is contradictory to our experience and, consequently, it proves to be asatkhyāti, anirvacanīyakhyāti or anyathākhyāti [NyP 54f.; TMK IV. 30]. Cf. Vedavalli 65f.

⁷⁰⁵ This is the theory of error by the Mādhyamika Buddhist. Deśika's criticism of this theory is seen in NyP 52f. and TMK IV. 18–19. See Singh 199f., Vedavalli 60, Srinivasa Chari 173f.

⁷⁰⁶ This is the theory of error by the Naiyāyika. Deśika's criticism of this theory is seen in NyP 44ff. and TMK IV. 12–14. See Singh 186ff., Vedavalli 55–58, Srinivasa Chari 180ff.

⁷⁰⁷ R: [As to nirvishayakhyāti], it is contradictory to the essential nature of cognition that it is dependent (sālambhana). (Cf. SAS IV. 30: bhrāntir nirvishayety avagamābhāvāt, pratyuta savishayatvam eva tasyāḥ sarveshu śāstreshu suvyaktam uktam). [As to asatkhyāti], it is contradictory to being non-existent that non-existent also is the object of knowledge. [As to anyathākhyāti], it is contradictory to cognition that one thing appears the other. Moreover, it would be contradictory to your intention if the cognition born from the inference were also ‘nirārambhana’ because the reason ‘pratyayatva’ exists even in this cognition.

⁷⁰⁸ There is vyabhicāra in view of the mahāvākya: “tat tvam asi” (R).

⁷⁰⁹ E.g. gotva and aśvatva cannot coexist anywhere, yet the non-existence of

of these [two opposites] as are of the nature of the non-existence of each other, [e.g. the non-existence of reality and the non-existence of unreality], is contradiction. Likewise,

(49) Because [some authorities] affirm that [the phenomenal world] is other than both real and unreal and because [some] negate it, [the phenomenal world, which you regard] as other than both real and unreal, is of reality [in the form of the affirmation] and is of unreality [in the form of the negation].

(50) As well, [the proposition] “All are known by knowing one” would not be established for you. Because it is impossible to understand what is other than both real and unreal, [i.e. the phenomenal world], by understanding of the Real, [i.e. Brahman]. **[304]**

(51) One can be understood from the other if the two are identified, similar or dissimilar. In your opinion, however, [the proposition “All are known”] would be sublated [because, according to you, the phenomenal world is negated by knowing Brahman] and [the identity, the similarity and the dissimilarity between the phenomenal world and Brahman] would not be established. Or, you should supplement (adhyāhṛti) [the proposition with the negative particle⁷¹⁰] or [you should regard it as] implication⁷¹¹ (lakṣhaṇā).

Moreover,

(52) While an entity has been defined [as existent] by refuting the second, the third and the fourth alternatives⁷¹² respectively, shameless men assert the indefinability. **[305]**

In addition, if the probandum means ‘being sublated (bādhatva),’ ‘being capable gotva and the non-existence of aśvatva can coexist in a pot and the like (R).

⁷¹⁰ That is, “All are known” is interpreted as “All are negated” or “All are not known.”

⁷¹¹ That is, “All are known” implicates “The substrata of all are known”

⁷¹² I.e., (1) existent (sat), (2) non-existent (asat), (3) both existent and non-existent (sadasat), (4) neither existent nor non-existent (na san nāsat). The Mādhyamika hold that the ultimate reality is śūnya beyond these four (see SDS II. 159: tattvaṃ sat-asat-ubhaya-anubhaya-ātmaka-catushkoṭi-vinirmuktaṃ śūnyam eva). Cf. the verse cited in Prajñākaramati’s Pañjikā ad Bodhicaryāvatāra IX. 2 (ed. P. L. Vaidya, Buddhist Sanskrit Text Ser. 12, Darbhanga 1960: 274,12f.): na san nāsan na sadasan na cāpy anubhayātmakam / catushkoṭivirmuktaṃ tattvaṃ mādhyamikā viduḥ // (= SAS IV.

of [being sublated] (tadyogyatva)' etc., there would be defect that we never apprehend so,⁷¹³ etc.⁷¹⁴ If [mere] 'being destructible' is to be proved, we would have no objection.⁷¹⁵

Furthermore, **[306]**

(53) If the knowledge of the subject etc. [in your syllogism] is valid, there would be sublation [of the probandum 'being false' since the subject etc. should be real]; if not, there would be non-establishment [of substratum (āśrayāsiddhi) because the subject should be unreal]. **[307]**

If you should accept these [defects], the inference would be purposeless, self-contradiction [since those who hold the subjects etc. to be unreal instruct them] and would not stand.

Besides, [you may hold that there would not be sublation etc. because our ordinary perception etc. are not valid; but it is not true. For] there is mutual-dependence: it is not until all perception etc. are proved to be of invalid knowledge that this inference functions but this [invalidity of perception etc.] is established [only] from that [inference].

[Objection:] Because they are rooted in a defect, namely, latent impression (vāsanā) of difference, perception etc. are not valid knowledge.

[Replied:] Not so. For there is mutual dependence between the defectiveness and the invalidity. If either of the two were established from the Scriptures for the reason that they are of high [authority], still there would be circulation: based on the high [authority] of the Scriptures, [either of] the invalidity and the defectiveness [of perception etc.] is decided; after this decision, [the above-mentioned] inference functions; [and based on this inference, it is established that the Scriptures which accords with the inference are of high authority]. **[308]**

[Objection:] The essential nature of each entity (padārthasvarūpa) is the objects of perception etc., whereas its quality named 'being false' etc. is the object of such 18: 508,4f.).

⁷¹³ For instance, a pot is never apprehended as negated in its position (R).

⁷¹⁴ Here 'etc.' means 'being to be negated by knowledge (jñānanivartyatva)' (K). In that case, there would be the defect of siddhasādhana because that much lead to mere 'being destructible' and it cannot sublimate the reality of the phenomenal world (R).

⁷¹⁵ In SAS III. 51, vyāvṛttatva is interpreted as being different from something (kutaściddhinnatva), being to be sublated (bādhyatva) or being destroyed (naśvaratva)

inference as is not contradictory to this [perception]; accordingly, there is no contradiction.

[Replied:] This is not proper. Because the establishment of the essential nature in itself is contradictory to ‘being false,’ [namely, ‘being of non-existence of the essential nature’]. If the quality which is not contradictory to the essential nature and is technically termed (paribhāshita) the word ‘false’ were to be proved, there would be nothing unacceptable for us.

Additionally, **[309]**

- (54) Does the idea of the thesis (pratijñā) asserting ‘false’ extend to your thesis or not? [— in other words: Is ‘being false’ false or not?] In the former case, [your thesis] itself would be annihilated. In the latter, [the very thesis of yours] would be of deviation (vyabhicāra).
- (55) If⁷¹⁶ falsity is false, the falsity will be sublated; if reality is real, the reality will be established.⁷¹⁷ **[310]**
- (56) You may hold that ‘the falsity of the phenomenal world’ is real⁷¹⁸ Brahman and, consequently, [the falsity] must be real; then, we reply: this [phenomenal world] must be real because the phenomenal world is similarly [Brahman].
- (57) You may assert that this [phenomenal world] cannot be that [Brahman] because of its materiality (ja atva); then, its falsity cannot be that [Brahman]. This [falsity] could not be real according to you since it is different from that [Brahman] because it is also [material].
- (58) [Nor] can [the falsity] be different from real and unreal [according to you] because there is mutual contradiction like [that between] reality and unreality. Consider that the notion of one substrates that of the other.

As well, [‘real’] Brahman is also [actually] ‘seen’ in the conditioned (upahita) [229].

⁷¹⁶The same verse is found in SAS III. 49 (218,6f.); SAS reads hi for tu.

⁷¹⁷This is an answer to the quibble that as you deny falsity through the alternative whether falsity is false or not, so we can deny reality through the alternative whether reality is real or not.

⁷¹⁸K reports the variant tat for sat. If so, tat denotes mithyātva, and the meaning of the verse does not change.

form and the like⁷¹⁹ through the cognition of the phenomenal world or in the unconditioned form and the like through the cognition sublating this [phenomenal world]. So [the reason ‘being seen’] deviates [from ‘being false’]. Otherwise, [even] Brahman would be ‘false.’ **[311]**

[Objection:] [Brahman as] Consciousness⁷²⁰ (anubhūti) cannot be known⁷²¹; because it is consciousness.

[Replied:] Not so.

(59) Does the statement that Consciousness cannot be known make any sense (bodhaka) or not? — In the former case, [Consciousness] is known through the very [statement]; if not, what is affirmed, and where?

In addition, if Brahman were totally unknown, it would be contradictory to the following passages:

Now, after that, the inquiry (jijñāsā) into Brahman [BrSū I. i. 1],

The knower of Brahman attains the Highest [TaiUp II. i. 1],

The Self, my dear, is to be known [BṛhUp II. iv. 5],

etc. And teaching would be purposeless. If a teacher is convinced of the non-duality, to whom does he, [knowing the distinction between him and his student is unreal], give the instruction? If, on the other hand, he is not convinced it, what does he teach? None other than a mad teaches those who are decided to be unreal such as [his] image.

[As to the second reason ‘being excluded’], mere exclusion (vyāvṛtti) and constancy (anuvṛtti) cannot be the criterion of falsity and [reality].⁷²² Because,

⁷¹⁹ According to K, ādi after upahita denotes upalakshita or viśiṣṭa.

⁷²⁰ Or pure Knowledge itself beyond the distinction of the knower, the known and the knowing.

⁷²¹ Cf. *Ishtasiddhi*, maṅgala: yānubhūtiḥ ... ameyā [quoted in *ĀS* 27,2].

⁷²² Cf. *ŚrīBh* I. i. 1, the first opinion in the mahāpūrvapakṣa [that of the Vivaraṇa (Mesquita 1984: 185)]: mithyātvaṃ nāma pratiyamānatvapūrvakayathāvasthitavastu-jñānanivartyatvam, yathā rajjvādyadhishṭhānakasarpādeḥ [(1) 79,1f.]; and the second opinion [that of Maṅ anamiśra (Mesquita 1984: 185f.)]: ghaṭo 'sti paṭo 'sti ghaṭo 'nubhūyate paṭo 'nubhūyate iti sarve padārthāḥ sattānubhūtiḥ ghaṭitā eva dṛśyante. atra sarvāsu pratipattisu sanmātram anuvartamānaṃ dṛśyate iti tad eva paramārthāḥ, viśeṣas tu vyāvartamānatayāparamārthāḥ; rajjusarpādivat: yathā rajjur adhishṭhānatayā 'nuvartamānā paramārthasatī, vyāvartamānāḥ sarpabhūdanāmbudhārādayo 'paramārthāḥ

- (60) [When various things, say, a rope, a bamboo and a stick, are mistaken as a snake], it is clear that there is reality in a rope, a bamboo etc., though mutually exclusive, and that a snake, [though] constant [in these misconception], is false. **[312]**
- (61) If [a thing] were proved to be so [false] only because it is excluded, even the real would be so; since we experience, for instance, that the reality of the pot [which exists elsewhere or in different time] is not here and now.⁷²³ **[313]**
- (62) [Objection:] [The real] cannot be negated at that position and at that time [where it exists].
[Replied:] So is a pot.
[Objection:] [Because the pot is negated in another position], it is the position of the pot that is real.
[Replied:] This is not true. For we understand differently, [i.e. “a pot is in this position,” not “the position is”].
- (63) [Objection:] Being (sat) is accepted to be real because of its constancy [in the ideas, say], “[a pot] is,” and “[a cloth] is.”
[Replied:] Were it the case, difference and non-being also would be real because of their constancy [in the ideas, say], “[a pot] is different” [and “a cloth is different”] or “[a pot] is not” [and “a cloth is not”]. **[314]**
- (64) Non-being due to difference in position and time is universal.⁷²⁴ So relative difference of one thing from the others is endless.
- (65) [Objection:] This constancy [of difference] is mere verbal.
[Replied:] So is [the constancy of being]. Being-ness is nothing but knowablity by various means of knowledge, we think. **[315]**
- (66) If it were accepted that being-ness is common to all existents because it is constantly known, still this [being-ness] is established to be their quality, [not as themselves].

[(1) 99,1–4].

⁷²³ Cf. ŚrīBh I. i. 1: (1) 129,3–132,6.

⁷²⁴ E.g. though knowablity (prameyatva) belongs to everything, in the relation of conjunction (saṃyoga) it is not anywhere; even Brahman is not material (R).

Therefore, the truth: ‘false’ is that which is negated in a known position of space and time and nothing beyond that and ‘real’ is not so.

And our counter-inferences are as follows:

(67) The subject under our dispute, [i.e. the phenomenal world], is real; Because it is known, or because it is different from non-real etc.; Like the self.

Cognition, under our dispute, is based on the real (samyak); Because it is not sublated by any knowledge; Like [the knowledge] accepted by [both of] us⁷²⁵ [such as the knowledge of the self].

Here we show the secret of origin of the Vedāntins in the degenerate age (antimayuga)—

(68) [The doctrine of] Śaṃkara was born out of the mixture (saṃkara) of the Sāṃkhya,⁷²⁶ Buddhism⁷²⁷ and the Cārvāka.⁷²⁸ It has not only the defects of these [three schools] but its own extra ones. **[316]**

Thus, it is established that Brahman never errs.

This [Brahman] is not in itself the material of the world.⁷²⁹ Because it is contradictory to [the Scriptural passages] that it never undergoes any modification, that It has no defect etc.

⁷²⁵ Literally, like [our] own doctrine (svatantravat). But if this doctrine were accepted only by one side of the disputers, it could not be an example [see V's fn.2].

⁷²⁶ The Advaita and the Sāṃkhya are same so far as they regard the self (ātman or purusha) as neither knower nor doer or experiencer in true sense (R).

⁷²⁷ For example, both the Advaitins and Buddhists use the same syllogism to prove that cognition is false, as pointed by R.

⁷²⁸ The Advaita and the Cārvāka are same so far as they accept the destruction of I-notion (ahamartha) (R).

⁷²⁹ According to both the commentators, this is the criticism against Yādavaprakāśa. Cf. VAS §9: brahmaiva ... svabhāvataḥ ... viyadādinānāvidhamalarūpapariṇāmāspadam [76,8f.]. Yet Viraraghavachari, based on a passage of the NyKus “brahmapariṇāmater iti bhāskaragotre yujyate [137,3],” approves that it concerns Bhāskara’s doctrine also [fn. 2]. Actually in VAS §57 (105,7f.) and ŚrīBh II. i. 15 (256,11) Rāmānuja ascribes śaktipariṇāma-theory to Bhāskara. Concerning this, van Buitenen [1956: 225, n. 252a] refers to Bhāskara's BrSū-bhāshya I. iv. 25 (cf. Srinivasachari 1934: 31).

Nor does [Brahman become the material of the world] due to conditioning of [Its] potency (śakti).⁷³⁰ For if the potency were non-different [from Brahman], the potency would not be other than [Brahman] Itself [and the above-mentioned defects were unavoidable]; if it were different [from Brahman], [your doctrine] would be same as our doctrine [that Brahman as conditioned by potency named prakṛti is the cause of the world]; if it were different cum non-different (bhedābheda) [from Brahman], in view of the aspect of non-difference there would be the defects due to [Its] modification etc.

Again, it is declined by the above that everything is different cum non-different by nature.

[Such concept of Brahman as is] excluded [from God, e.g. pure-existence], is rejected.⁷³¹

Additionally, in the three doctrines, i.e., those of Śaṅkara, [Bhāskara and Yādava-prakāśa],⁷³² various kinds of grammatical coordination⁷³³ (sāmānādhikaraṇya) [found in the Scriptures] between the phenomenal world, which is composed of intelligent and non-intelligent beings, and Brahman are discrepant and, [as a result, those who hold

⁷³⁰ This is the criticism against Bhāskara, who hold that not Brahman in itself but Its potency undergoes modification. Cf. VAS §57: brahmaṇaḥ śaktipariṇāmaḥ [105,8]; van Buitenen points out that this doctrine is found in Bhāskara's BrSūBh I. iv. 25 [Eng. trans., p.225, n.252a]. Note the difference from the theory of Yādavaprakāśa that Brahman as associated with śaktis in itself is the material cause [Cf. SAS III. 27: 121,7ff.; ŚrīBh II. i. 15: 256,13ff.]

⁷³¹ vyāvṛttam eva dūshitam. R seems to comment this reading (vyāvṛttam iti / īśvarād vyāvṛttam ity arthaḥ / sanmātram eva brahma, īśvaro na brahmety ayam paksha īśvarasya brahmatvasāadhanād dūshita evety arthaḥ).

V shows the variant reading in '4410 kośa' [?]: sanmātasyāṃśino brahmatvam ca vyāvṛttam eva dūshitam (That pure existence in entire is Brahman [because It is] excluded from [God] is rejected). Also V suggests the reading evam for eva.

The variant reading in NySi (M), NySi (Pan) and NySi (VDG) is: sanmātasyāṃśino brahmatvam api nirvikāratvanirdoshatvādivirodhāt pūrvam eva dūshitam. This reading is not supported by R and also 'nirvikāratvanirdoshatvādivirodhāt' is wrongly inserted from the previous portion.

Anyway, because this portion is hardly fit for the context, there is some corruption here.

⁷³² śaṅkarādīpakshatraye 'pi. V shows the variant śaṅkarabhāskarayādavapaksheshu in 'tā° ko°' [?].

⁷³³ For the definition of sāmānādhikaraṇya, see my fn. on 142,5.

these doctrines are to be interpreted them], with great effort, by means of implication (lakṣhaṇā) and so on. **[317]**

- (69) It is just a childish jargon that one and the same [Scripture] asserts that [Brahman] is composed of the world and subsequently negates it,⁷³⁴ because this would be [needless] trouble if, [in reality], there were no difference [between the world and Brahman]. **[318]**
- (70) Indeed, there is not grammatical coordination between a shell and [that] silver [which is superimposed on the shell].⁷³⁵ Nor between two [reflections of] the moon.⁷³⁶ Nor between reflection (pratibimaba) and the original (bimaba).⁷³⁷
- (71) Nor between a pot and the space [in it].⁷³⁸ Nor between the space in one pot and that in another.⁷³⁹ Nor between the space in a pot and the total space etc.⁷⁴⁰
- (72) Nor between lump [of clay] and [its modifications such as] a pot.⁷⁴¹ Nor

⁷³⁴ I.e. ChUp VI, having describing Brahman as being (ii. 1: sad eva somyedam agra āsīt), shows that It is the cause of the world (3: tad aikshata bahu syāṃ prajāyeya). If the Advaita or bhedābheda theory were true, this scripture would negate the content again.

⁷³⁵ So there would not be grammatical coordination between the phenomenal world which is superimposed and that which is regarded as its substratum (R).

⁷³⁶ So in the Vivaraṇa school, which regards the self as the reflection of its original or Lord, there would not be grammatical coordination between the individual selves (R). Note that īśvara in this school is Brahman or caitanya conditioned by avidyā.

⁷³⁷ So in the Vivaraṇa school there would not be grammatical coordination between the individual self and Lord (R).

⁷³⁸ So in the Bhāmatī school, which regards the individual self as enclosed by ignorance or the internal organ like the space enclosed in a pot, there would not be grammatical coordination between the internal organ and the individual self (R).

⁷³⁹ So for those who regard the individual self as a delimited Brahman, there would not be grammatical coordination between the individual selves (R).

⁷⁴⁰ So for those who regard the individual self as a delimited Brahman, there would not be grammatical coordination between the individual self and Brahman (R).

⁷⁴¹ So in the bhedābheda theory, there would not be grammatical coordination between Brahman and intelligent beings, non-intelligent beings or Lord (R). This is especially against Yādavaprakāśa according to K.

between [its two different modifications such as] a pot and a dish.⁷⁴² Nor between lump [of clay] and [its conditioned] portion⁷⁴³. Nor between two pots.⁷⁴⁴ **[319]**

- (73) It is true that there is an idea of grammatical coordination even between different individuals, [say, a pot and a dish], due to [their common] aspect such as clay, but [such an idea] is caused by the identity concerning [their] genera and the like.

Even though [these three] schools do not find any trouble [in explaining some Scriptures passages], the Naiyāyika school and the like are better [because of its logical consistency]. For,

- (74) It is better to postulate troublesome content because [some] statements [whose authority is] accepted [by us] speak of contradictory content as the sentence “The Scriptures post is the sun.”

We are ashamed only to say that difference cum non-difference, which you hold, is contradictory. Nevertheless, we dare say — Non-difference is the non-existence of difference; why can we understand one thing and its non-existence in one and the same place simultaneously⁷⁴⁵? And non-difference is nothing but the non-existence of difference.

[Objection:] From the viewpoint of genus, there is non-difference; [from the viewpoint of individual, there is difference].⁷⁴⁶

[Replied:] Then, non-difference belongs to genus etc. and difference belongs to

⁷⁴² So in Yādavaprakāśa's opinion (according to K), there would not be grammatical coordination between intelligent beings or non-intelligent beings and Lord (R).

⁷⁴³ So in Bhāskara's opinion, there would not be grammatical coordination between Brahman and intelligent beings or non-intelligent (R). Cf. SAS III. 27: bhāskariyās tu cidacidamśavibhaktaṃ brahmadravyam acidamśena vikriyate, tadvikāropahitena cidamśena saṃsaratīti [120].

⁷⁴⁴ So in Yādavaprakāśa's opinion (according to K), there would not be grammatical coordination between the modifications of Brhman (R); consequently, nor between the individual selves (K).

⁷⁴⁵ Cf. ŚrīBh I. i. 4: tayos tathābhāvātathābhāvarūpayor ekatra saṃbhavam anunmattaḥ ko bravīti [159,5f.].

⁷⁴⁶ Cf. ŚrīBh I. i. 4: kāraṇātmanā jātyātmanā cābhedaḥ, kāryātmanā vyaktyātmanā ca bhedaḥ [159,7].

individual etc.,⁷⁴⁷ so one and the same thing is not different cum non-different.⁷⁴⁸

[Objection:] Genus and individual etc. are also mutually different cum non-different.

[Replied:] Is this [difference cum non-difference] brought about by itself or from another aspect? If the former, there would be contradiction⁷⁴⁹ [320]. If the latter, there would be defects such as infinite regress.⁷⁵⁰

To those who are devoted to the [Jaina theory of] seven propositions (saptabhaṃgī),⁷⁵¹ this is our refutation: [321]

⁷⁴⁷ The two 'etc.'s denote kārāṇa and kārya respectively. See the above-cited ŚrīBh I. i. 4 [159,7].

⁷⁴⁸ Cf. ŚrīBh I. i. 4: vyaktigato bhedo jātigataś cābheda iti naikasya dvyātmakatā [159,9f.].

⁷⁴⁹ Cf. ŚrīBh I. i. 4: “How can such two aspects [e.g. jāti and vyakti] as are different from [their substratum] itself and abide in that [substratum] introduce contradictory two qualities [i.e. difference and non-difference] into the very [substratum]? [— If difference and non-difference had the same substratum, there would be contradiction. Such two aspects as introduce non-contradiction could not be the substratum of difference and non-difference; accordingly, these (two) do not introduce non-contradiction. For instance, two aspects belonging to fire, brilliance and tawny-ness, cannot introduce into fire two contradictory qualities, hotness and coolness]” (svasmād vilakṣaṇaṃ svāśrayam ākāradvayaṃ svasmin viruddhadharmadvayasamāveśanirvāhakaṃ kathaṃ bhavet [159,14f.]; ŚP on it: sva-śabdātṛayaṃ apy āśrayaparam / bhedābhedayor ekāśrayatvena hi virodhaḥ / avirodhanirvāhakaākāradvayaṃ hi na bhedābhedayor āśrayabhūtam / ato na tadavirodhanirvāhakaṃ / agnigataṃ paimṅalyam aujvalyaṃ cākāradvayaṃ agnau śītoṣṇatvarūpaviruddhadharmadvayasamāveśanirvāhakaṃ na bhavatīty arthaḥ) [cited in K].

⁷⁵⁰ Cf. ŚrīBh I. i. 4: ākāradvayatadvatoś ca dvyātmakatvābhyupagame nirvāhakaṅtarāpekshayā 'navasthā syāt [160.1f.].

⁷⁵¹ I.e. [1] syād asti, [2] syān nāsti, [3] syād asti ca nāsti ca, [4] syād avaktavyam, [5] syād asti cāvaktavyaṃ ca, [6] syān nāsti cāvaktavyaṃ ca, [7] syād asti ca nāsti cāvaktavyaṃ ca [ŚrīBh II. ii. 31: 309,3f.]. N.B. syāt-śabdaḥ khalv ayaṃ nipātas tiṃantapratirūpako 'nekāntadyotakaḥ [SDS III. 379]. According to the first interpretation of R, the saptabhaṃgīnaya is refuted here for the reason that the bhedābhedavādinś etc. also follow it. In fact, BrSū II. ii. 31, refuting the saptabhaṃgīnaya, is cited in ŚrīBh I. i. 1: (1) 123,1, where the Bhedābhedavāda is rejected. In TMK also, saptabhaṃgī is discussed after the bhedābheda theory [V. 10] and in SAS III. 33, our author describes the bhedābheda view as jainagandhināṃ jalpitāni [138]. Cf. SDS XVI 774f.: bhāskareṇa kshapaṇakacaraṇaṃ pramāṇaśaraṇe bhedābhedavādināṃ.

- (75) You hold that the subject under discussion is non-absolute (anekānta), because it is existing, like another thing. But if this ['non-absolute' in this syllogism] were not non-absolute, there would be deviation (anaikāntya) [because this 'non-absolute,' though existing, is not non-absolute]. And if it were non-absolute, [your syllogism could not stand and] there is no trouble for us.
- (76) [a] [Genus⁷⁵² and individual are] never apprehended [as] same [even in the first indeterminate perception], because [they] are apprehended [even at that time] as qualified and qualifier.⁷⁵³ [b] [The knowledge] “This one pot (eko 'yaṃ ghaṭaḥ)” etc. is like knowledge “There is one person bearing a staff (eko daṇ ṭi),” [where the word ‘one’ concerns the qualified (the person), and it does not mean identity of the qualified and the qualifier (a staff)].⁷⁵⁴ **[322]**
- (77) [c] Grammatical coordination [between genus and individual] does not need a possessive suffix⁷⁵⁵ (matvarthīya) because [the two] are dependent by nature.⁷⁵⁶

⁷⁵² Here begins the refutation against the four reasons to prove difference cum non-difference: (a) in grasping an object for the first time, we do not see it as distinct (from its genus); (b) there is the apprehension associated with the word ‘one’; (c) there is grammatical coordination without a possessive suffix; (d) the two are always apprehended together. Cf. SAS V. 8: (a) prathamapiṅ agrahaṇeṣhu bhedenāpratyayāt, (c) matvarthīyapratyayanirapekshasāmānādhikaraṇyāt, (d) sahopalambhaniyamāt, (b) ekaśabdānuvidhapratyayāc ca bhedābhedaṃ samarthayante [687,10ff.]. The four reasons have been already shown and rejected by Sudaśana in ŚP ad ŚrīBh I. i. 4 [160,17ff.] and TD ad VAS §30 [65,4ff.].

⁷⁵³ Cf. ŚrīBh I. i. 1: idam ittham iti hi sarvā pratītir upajāyate [(1) 118,4], which is quoted in commenting TMK V. 8c: itthamtvadamtvaśūnyam na hi kim api kadāpy arbhako 'pi pratīyāt.

⁷⁵⁴ Cf. ŚP I. i. 4: eko daṇ ṭivad viśeshyaikyavishayaḥ, na tu viśeṣaṇaviśeshyaikyavaishayaḥ [160,21f.]. Cf. also SAS V. 9: 688,17f.: eko daṇ ṭivad ekaśabdasya viśiṣṭavishayatvāt; and TMK V. 9c: dharmyaikyād ekavāk syāt na tu bhavati tato dharmadharmyaikyabiddhiḥ, which is a reply to (c) as well as (b).

⁷⁵⁵ I.e. a suffix which has the meaning of matU(P), ‘belonging to this’ or ‘existing in this’. See P 5. 2. 94: tad asyāsty asminn iti matUP.

⁷⁵⁶ Cf. ŚP I. i. 4: aprthaksiddhaviśeṣaṇatvam matvarthīyapratyayanirapekshasāmānādhikaraṇyahetuḥ / aprthaksiddhiś ca prakāraprakāriṇoḥ saṃbandhaniyamād evopapannam / ataḥ prakāraprakāribhāvapratipannabhedaviruddhābhedakalpanāyā nāvakāśaḥ [160,19f.]. Cf. also VAS §67f. and TMK V. 9c.

[d] For⁷⁵⁷ the same reason, they are always apprehended simultaneously. For this [simultaneousness] is brought about only through distinction.⁷⁵⁸

- (78) And this [simultaneous apprehension] is not established, because smell and so on are recognized without [recognizing] the substance [being their substratum]. Consider the deviation (anaikāntya) in color of light and that of a non-shining [object such as a pot].⁷⁵⁹

To summarize:

- (79) [a] There is not the apprehension of non-difference [between genus and individual when an object is seen] for the first time, because there is the relation of the qualifier and the qualified (vaiśiṣṭya) [even at that time]. [b] The apprehension [associated with the word] ‘one’ is because the dharmin is one. [c] A possessive suffix [is used in grammatical coordination between two things] when [they] are separately established. [d] The simultaneousness [of apprehension] is based on difference.⁷⁶⁰

[Objection:] How is [Brahman] devoid of three kinds of limitation,⁷⁶¹ though the world and Brahman are completely different?

[Replied:] The answer is as follows.

Of these [limitations], being devoid of limitation in space and limitation in time is established as [It] is all-pervasive in all places and in all the time **[323]**.

Now, being devoid of limitation in entity (vastupariccheda) does not mean being identified with everything; nor does it mean being the substratum of all delusions; nor does it mean that everything other than [Brahman] Itself is false and the like. Because [if so], the above-mentioned hundreds of objection [to the Advaitins or the bhedābhedavādins] would rise. Hence we must interpret it otherwise.

⁷⁵⁷ For the detail of the refutation to sahopalambhaniyama, see 11,3–12,1.

⁷⁵⁸ Cf. sahatvatanniyamābhyāṃ bhedasyaiva sthīrīkaraṇena vyāghātāt [11,4].

⁷⁵⁹ Cf. bhāsvarādhvāntābhāsvararūpābhyām anekāntatvāt [12,1].

⁷⁶⁰ bhedataḥ. Or, ‘implies difference’ according to the variant reading bhdakaḥ.

⁷⁶¹ See 274,1f.

In this regard, the author of the Vivaraṇa, [Śrī-Rāmamiśra], says in commenting the topic of ‘birth etc.’⁷⁶² as follows:

Limitation in entity is quantity (pariṇāma) in entity. Limitation in space is based on it⁷⁶³ [Vivaraṇa ad ŚrīBh I. i. 2].

The same explanation is found in [his] Vedārthasaṃgraha-vivaraṇa⁷⁶⁴ also. Varadanārāyaṇa-bhaṭṭāraka, however, states in his Nyāyasudarśana:

Limitation in entity means [1] having such and such (iyat) quality, having such and such magnitude (vibhūti) and the like. Brahman is devoid of it. Or Limitation in entity means [2] existence of another entity. Brahman is devoid of it. Since everything other than Brahman is the body of Brahman, there is no other [entity] than It. [Nyāyasudarśana ad ŚrīBh I. i. 2:]

The [second interpretation] means that the expression ‘A is not B’ is not used concerning that condition.⁷⁶⁵ So is said by the author of the Commentary:

Because there is no other entity than Brahman [ŚrīBh I. iv. 23: 163,2].

The same content is mentioned by Nārāyaṇārya also:

Because [Brahman] is devoid of being such and such in quality, [Brahman] is understood to be unlimited [Nītimālā 37,13f.].

Among [these interpretations], the interpretation that [limitation in entity means] ‘having such and such quality’ etc. is almost acceptable **[324]**. To explain — Limitation in entity means inferiority compared to something in some aspects concerning essential nature, quality and magnitude. The interpretation that [the limitation means] quantity in entity is also a variety of this [interpretation]. So is the interpretation that [the limitation means] ‘existence of another entity.’ This [absence of such limitation] is the culminate of auspicious qualities like controlling etc., since it means being composed of everything, which is based on the grammatical coordination with all entities, as the body of everything.

⁷⁶² ŚrīBh I. i. 2: ananta-padaṃ deśakālavastuparicchedarahitaṃ svarūpam āha [115,1f.].

⁷⁶³ This passage is quoted again in 520,11.

⁷⁶⁴ Not extant. This portion is cited in 520,4f.

⁷⁶⁵ I.e. in the condition “yatra tv asya sarvaṃ ātmaivābhūt” [BṛhUp II. iv. 14] (R).

Thus, though perfectly different and innumerable entities are existent, it is appropriate that Brahman is devoid of three kinds of limitation.

By the [argument] above, the theory of the Yoga (pātañjala), the Śaiva, the Vaiśeshika (kāṇāda) etc. that [God] is merely the efficient cause (nimitta) [of the world] is also rejected. For the Śrutis mention that the very [God] that is qualified by subtle intelligent and non-intelligent beings in the condition of cause is the material cause (upādāna) [of the world].⁷⁶⁶ And that much is not contradictory to the Śruti mentioning that [He] is not modified. Because such [Śruti] concerns only [His] aspect as the controller of all or as one who has [all] for the body (śarīrin). On the contrary, it is acceptable that [He] becomes the substratum of modification in qualified form, as a man qualified by the body of human being and so on, though without any modification by nature, becomes childish, young, old, fat and so on [325].

[Objection:] God is not the material cause of the world; Because He is the efficient cause of the world; Whatever is the efficient cause of a thing is not the material cause of it, as in a pot and a potter.

[Replied:] This is not correct. Because it is contradictory to that which makes us grasp the subject, [i.e. the Scriptures].

[Objection:] The subject here is but such [God] as is inferred as the efficient cause.

[Replied:] Not so, because He cannot be inferred.

[Objection:] The earth and the like have an agent (kartṛ); because of being an effect (kārya); like a pot.⁷⁶⁷

⁷⁶⁶ E.g. TaiUp II. vi. 1, TaiBr II. viii. 9. 6 (brahma vanam brahma sa vṛksha āsīt), TaiUp II. vii. 1, MuUp III. i. 3 (R).

⁷⁶⁷ kshityādikaṃ sakartṛkaṃ, kāryatvāt, ghaṭavat. This is the first proof of the existence of God asserted in Udayana's Nyāyakusumāñjali, the fifth stavaka, i.e. NyKu (Tirupati ed.) 279,9: kshityādikaṃ kartṛpūrvakaṃ kārytvāt. The reason kāryatva first appeared in Uddyotakara's Nyāyavārttika (Calcutta ed.) p.957 (according to Vattanky 1984: 23).

For the further discussion on the subject of the syllogism, see below 351,3ff.

[Replied:] This [syllogism] is not valid. For there is sublation (bādha) if [a bodied agent] as found [in the case of similar examples like a pot] is applied [to the present subject, since the earth and the like cannot have a bodied agent]. Otherwise, [not only a body of the agent of the earth etc. but] also [his] knowledge and desire would be abandoned **[326]**. Since as eternal knowledge, [according to you, does not need] a body and the like, so it is tenable that eternal volition⁷⁶⁸ (prayatna) does not need knowledge and so on.⁷⁶⁹

[Objection:] If [volition] by itself got an object, [it] would be [same as] knowledge.⁷⁷⁰

[Replied:] Not so, because it is appropriate [that volition, even without knowledge, got an object] like volition proceeding from [mere] living⁷⁷¹ (jīvanapūrvaka) [in deep sleep].⁷⁷² **[327]**

[Objection:] In that case [of volition proceeding from living], [its object] is limited due to the unseen power (adṛṣṭa).

[Replied:] Suppose that it is proper even in this case [of the volition of God]. It should be admitted by you also. Otherwise, every effect would be produced at once if [His] object were not limited, because [His] eternal knowledge, desire of making and volition relate to everything at any time; then, it comes about that everyone would be simultaneously liberated without any effort, that [every effect] would be momentarily

⁷⁶⁸ Though the Viśiṣṭādvaitin regards prayatna as an aspect of dharmabhūtajñāna (cf. NySi 426,5ff.; TMK V.68), Deśika here follows the Naiyāyika opinion that buddhi and prayatna are different guṇas. See 329,1.

⁷⁶⁹ Cf. ATV 836,13–15: śarīranivṛttau buddhinivṛtteḥ, buddhinityatve śarīrānupayogavat prayatnanityatāyām jñānecchānupayogāt. According to Śaṅkaramiśra's commentary on ATV (BI ed., p.837), this is the opinion of Kaṇikākāra (or Kāśikā° in v.l.). Cf. NyKus 286,6–8 (Kir 68,9–11) and V. v.3..

⁷⁷⁰ Cf. ATV 836,19–21: na cāsyā [= prayatnasya] svarūpeṇaiva vishayapraṇatvam, jñānatvaprasaṅgāt; ayam eva hi jñānāt prayatnasya bhedaḥ yad ayam arthāpravaṇa iti.

⁷⁷¹ Cf. PrPBh §295: jīvanapūrvakaḥ suptasya prāṇāpānasantānaperakāḥ.

⁷⁷² Cf. ATV 837,5f.: jīvanayoniprayatnavad vishayavyavasthā bhaviṣyati. To this objection, Udayana answers that it is of the other kind (jātyantaravāt), which is ignored by Deśika.

destroyed and that no effect remains at the next moment.

[Objection:] The order of effects [is fixed] in accordance with the order of their operate factors (sahakārin).

[Replied:] This is shameless opinion. **[328]** For, because the operate factors are also included in [His] effect, they [also] would cease at once.

If [His] volition has the same object as [His] knowledge, which relates to every entity, eternal entities⁷⁷³ also would be the objects of such volition and consequently, they also would be subject to the creation and the dissolution. If not, there would be some objects beyond His volition: God would lose Godhood.

[Objection:] Then, suppose God has such mere volition as is limited due to the unseen power only.

[Replied:] This kind of limitation is possible only for the non-eternal volition of the individual self.

[Objection:] Nobody understands the volition [of individual self] as related to a sprout and the like.

[Replied:] This is untrue. For the situation is same regarding volition proceeding from [mere] living. That is, [the existence of] this [volition proceeding from mere living] is postulated only through its effect; so is [the existence] of that [volition related to a sprout etc.].

Moreover, if the unseen power as the efficient cause of everything brings about such limitation, what is the use of your effort (prayatna) at postulating the unseen volition [of God]?

The above is summed in the following [two verses]:

- (80) [His knowledge and so on] are all-pervading, by which it comes about that there is no restriction [in time regarding the production of everything]. They pervade [even] eternal [entities], which leads to the trouble [that eternal entities are also subject to creation and dissolution]. If the restriction were brought about by the unseen power, [His] eternal volition would be [useless like] nipples on the neck of a female goat.

⁷⁷³ E.g. ether, according to the Naiyāyika; though the Vedāntin does not admits so.

- (81) [Although even] the lower [individual] self can be dependent upon [only] his own unseen power, the Supreme [Self] would be always dependent upon the unseen power of others. [329]

We would like you to think the above discussion is done following the opinion of other [schools] that volition is other than knowledge.

Furthermore,

- (82) For you, who prates:
 “There is no contradiction whether [His not having a body] is established or not⁷⁷⁴” and so on,
 [in the same manner], whether contradiction is established or not, the negation of it would be negated: [that is, in the former case what has been

⁷⁷⁴ NyKu V. v.2: na bādhaḥ 'syopajīvyatvāt, pratibandho na durbalāḥ / siddhy-asiddhyoḥ virodho no, nāsiddhir anibandhanā.

In Udayana's own commentary, the c-pāda is commented as follows: “The contradiction in peculiarity [i.e. that between a non-bodied agent and a bodied one], however, is avoided since both would be simultaneously apprehended if the peculiarities were established and because they could not be understood as expelling the substratum of each other if they were not established; so it cannot be question.” (viśeṣhaṇa-virodhas tu viśeṣha-siddhau sahopalambhena tad-asiddhau mithodharmiparihārānupalambhena nirasto nāśaṅkāḥ apy adhirohatīti) [NyKu 282,3f.]. Cf. ATV 831; Kir 66,4ff.

The Nyāyakusumāñjalī-bodhanī [ed. in NyKu-M] of Varadarāja (ca. 1100–50, according to EIPh II, 629) comments this portion as follows: viśeṣhavirodha iti / etat saṅgrahavyākhyānena gatam* / athavā yady ayam kāryatvahetuḥ ghaṭādau śarīrādīmat-kartṛvyāpto dṛṣṭa iti pakshe 'py ūrvīdūrvādau śarīrādīviśiṣṭam eva kartāraṁ sādhayet; tato nāsmākaṁ kvacid virodhaḥ; ko 'bhipramāṇasiddham nāṅgīkuryāt? atha dūrvāṅkurādau yogyānupalambhanirākṛtatvena śarīrādīkaṁ na sādhayet, na hy aśarīratvādīni nirundhyāt / teshāṁ kāryatvahetoś ca mitho gotvāśvatvavad dharmiparihāreṇaivāvasthānasyāsiddher iti [NyKu-M 564,6–11]. (*saṅgrahavyākhyāna = na tāvad īśvarāsiddhau tasya nāstitvam akartṛtvam śarīritvam vā 'vadhārayitum śakyam / āśrayā-siddhiprasaṅgāt [reduplicated in this edition] / tatsiddhiś cānena kāryatvānumāne[na ?] kārya ity asya bādhopajīvyatvān na bādhaḥ; pratyuta teshāṁ eva dharmigrāhaka-pramāṇabādha iti bhāvah [NyKu-M 562,16–19])

R's comment on this verse is almost same as that of Varadarāja. It should be noted, especially, that R shows the optional interpretation of the c-pāda which, though not seen in Udayana's own commentary (See V 330, fn.), follows the saṅgrahavyākhyāna of Varadarāja: yadvā, īśvare siddhe mānāntaravirodho na pravartate; asiddhau cāśrayāsiddhyā mānāntasyāprasarān na tadvirodha iti [R 329,12f.]. Cf. also SAS V. 16c: 75,7ff.

established cannot be denied; in the latter what does not exist cannot be denied]. **[330]**

- (83) Again, the attribute [‘not having a body’] which is understood through the accepted opinion of your school, your own statement or [your] fallacious reasons (hetvābhāsa), is rejected because of the contradiction to the invariable concomitance (vyāpti) [between ‘being an agent’ and ‘having a body’]. **[331]**
- (84) [If in the inference, say, “A sprout has an agent because it is an effect,” a non-bodied agent were postulated by force of the subject], having thought “Snow has fire because it causes grass fade⁷⁷⁵” we could postulate cold fire by force of the subject— it is not the case. **[332]**
- (85) When such feature as exceeds the relation to the subject [e.g. hotness, which cannot belong to snow], is known regarding what is regarded as the pervader (vyāpaka) [e.g. fire], the reason cannot be proper even if it is quality of the subject. **[333]**
- (86) Again you may assert that once the relation [of ‘having an agent’] to the subject [e.g. a sprout] is established [through the reason ‘being an effect’], the extra feature [of the agent, e.g. not having a body etc.], is inferred through the remainder (pāriśeshya) [i.e. that the body of the agent is not found] and so on [i.e. that his knowledge and so on are eternal].⁷⁷⁶ But it is not true, because the remainder is not ascertained [because we cannot deny the possibility that the body of such an agent is beyond our

⁷⁷⁵ Cf. Kir 67,10ff., where an opponent to the Vaiśeṣika illustrates the vyāpakānupalabdhibādha of the reason kāryatva by the inference that himam vahnimat ṭṭṇādivikārakāritvāt. ŚV, anumāna 71f.

⁷⁷⁶ Cf. Ratnakīrtinibandhāvali (ed. A. Thakur, Patna, 1975²) 33,32f.: sāmānyamātravyāptāv apy antarbhāvitaviśeshasya sāmānyasya pakshadharmatāvaśena sādhyadharmiṇy anumānād viśeshaviśayam anumānaṃ bhavaty eva. This is the view of Vācaspatimiśra in the Nyāyakaṇikā (ed. in the Pandit, p.211) according to the footnote of Thakur. Cf. Kir 69,12f.: sādhanasāmānyasambandhabalena sādhyasāmānyavidhāv upakrānte tatsahakāripakshadharmatābalenāpratīte ca viśeshe paryavasānāt.

(The Buddhist refutation against this view is summarized in M-TBh 45,5ff; Kajiyama's Eng. trans., p.109.)

perception].⁷⁷⁷

- (87) If⁷⁷⁸ such [feature] as is found [in similar instances like a pot, i.e. having a body], is completely negated [in the subject], the probandum [i.e. having an agent] cannot be established [since nobody knows an agent without a body⁷⁷⁹]; if not, the extra feature [i.e. not having a body] cannot be grasped. Nor can we prove [a maker] in general, [neither bodied nor non-bodied; since there is invariable concomitance between ‘being an agent’ and ‘having a body’].⁷⁸⁰
- (88) As to the inference through the remainder, outcome is same in so far as the affirmative [concomitance] is concerned [since in affirmative concomitance, we never infer what is not found in similar examples]. And the pure negative [concomitance] will be refuted later.⁷⁸¹ **[334]**

Further we ask: What is meant by ‘agent’ in [your probandum] ‘having an agent,’ (1) one who has the knowledge about all the causes such as material cause, (2) one who has the knowledge about some [causes such as material cause], or (3) [one who has knowledge] in general? In the first [alternative], invariable concomitance would not be established; for a potter and the like do not know [all the causes of a pot and the like,

⁷⁷⁷ The translation is in the line of the interpretation of K.

R: Once, says the opponent, God is proved as one who possesses knowledge as to the material causes of the earth etc., it is proved that His knowledge, which is eternal because of its not being produced from the sense-organs, the subtle-body etc., is not dependent upon a body. Not so, we reply, because neither ‘not being produced from the sense-organs etc.’ nor ‘being eternal’ is not established even now.

⁷⁷⁸ As is pointed out by V (fn.1), K and R respectively interpret this verse as refuting each one of the two doctrines of the Naiyāyika: that the agent is without a body and that his knowledge is eternal. My translation of the verse is basically in the line of K's interpretation (which seems to be natural to the context) and R's interpretation is shown in footnotes.

⁷⁷⁹ R: If non-eternal knowledge and so on, which are actually found in the case of a pot and the like, were negated, even having knowledge etc. could not be established.

⁷⁸⁰ R: Pure knowledge, neither eternal nor non-eternal, cannot be established.

⁷⁸¹ See below 349,4–351,2.

say, the unseen power, God etc.⁷⁸² In the second and the third alternatives, God would not be established; for it would prove what has been already proved in view of the individual selves who know instruments like Scriptures and materials like clay.⁷⁸³ In this manner, it is established that the individual self could be an agent of dyad (dvyaṅka) etc. due to the unseen power. **[335]**

And it is unavoidable that [your] reason ‘being an effect’ is sublated in view of ‘not being produced from a body’ or it has the adventitious condition (upādhi) [‘being produced from a body’⁷⁸⁴].

[Objection:] [In the invariable concomitance between ‘not being produced from a body’ and ‘not having an agent,’ ‘from a body’ is] meaningless attribute⁷⁸⁵ (vyarthaviśeṣhaṇa) [because mere ‘not being produced’ pervades ‘not having an agent’].⁷⁸⁶

[Replied:] Not so, because it has meaning so as to avoid non-establishment [in the subject (svarūpāsiddhi)]. And a mantra, [the authority of which is beyond logic],

⁷⁸² Cf. ŚrīBh I. i. 3: upakaraṇabhūtayāgādiśaktirūpāpūrvādiśabdavācyādṛṣṭa-sākshātkārābhāve 'pi cetanānām na kartṛtvānupapattiḥ; tatsākshātkārānapekshaṇāt kāryārambhasya [122,6–8].

⁷⁸³ Cf. ŚrīBh I. i. 3: ubhayavādisiddhānām jīvanām eva lāghavena kartṛtvābhy-upagamo yuktaḥ / na ca jīvanām upādānādyanabhijñatayā kartṛtvāsambhavaḥ, sarveshām eva cetanānām pṛthivyādyupādānāyāgādyupakaraṇasākshātkārasāmarthyāt [122,4–6]. K refers to the ASĀ v. 41 (ad BrSū I. i. adni° 3): ... laghutvād anumitivaśataḥ karmajaiśvāryayuktaḥ viśvāmitrādīnīyā sphurati

⁷⁸⁴ That is, śarīrajanyatva pervades the probandum sakartṛkatva but does not pervades the reason kāryatva. R here asserts that the vyāpti between akartṛtva and śarīrajanyatva is stronger than that between kartṛtva and kāryatva because the former does not have upādhi and consequently, it is of satpratipakṣa [i.e. kshityādikam akartṛkam, śarīrajanyatvāt].

⁷⁸⁵ An example of vyarthaviśeṣhaṇa is ‘blue’ in the inference “The mountain has fire, because it has blue smoke.” It brings about vyāpyatvāsiddhi. See Bhāshāpariccheda v.77: vyāpyatvāsiddhir aparā nīladhūmadīke bhavet.

⁷⁸⁶ Cf. ATV 834,19f.: asamarthaviśeṣhaṇatvenāsiddhabhedasyātulyabalatvāt; NyKu V. v.2: pratibandho na durbalaiḥ and ibid. 281,4–6: anvaye tu viśeṣhaṇāsāmarthyāt / hetuvyāvṛttimātram eva hi tatra kartṛvyāvṛttivyāptam, na tu śarīrarūpahetuvyāvṛttir ity uktam; Kir 68,6f.: śarīrād anutpatteś cāsmarthaviśeṣhaṇatvāt, sapakṣhe gaganādāv anutpattimātrasyaiva vyāpyatvaniścayāt.

does not read “Attribute in reason must be always for the purpose of avoiding deviation⁷⁸⁷ (anaikāntya).”

[Objection:] Were it the case, meaningless attribute could be faultless in any case.

[Replied:] Not so. Because the criterion of ‘meaningless’ is that [an attribute] is not used for the purpose of avoiding any defect. Or rather, suppose, then, that such [meaningless attribute], which is not useful for the topic under discussion, commits one of the occasions for rebuke (nigrahsthāna) called ‘shifting the topic⁷⁸⁸ (arthāntara).’

[Objection:] Because there is not invariable concomitance concerning the qualified [reason, i.e. ‘not being produced from a body’], one who avoids one non-establishment, [i.e. that in the subject], would fall into another [non-establishment, i.e. that in concomitance (vyāpyatvāsiddhi)].⁷⁸⁹

[Replied:] You cannot say so **[336]**. Because that [qualifier] does not establish the non-existence of this [concomitance]. **[337]** [That is], wherever ‘not being produced from a body’ is, mere ‘not being produced’ also exists; accordingly, wherever the concomitance concerning this [‘not being produced’] is, the concomitance concerning that [‘being produced from a body’] inevitably exists.⁷⁹⁰ **[338]**

⁷⁸⁷ Cf. NyKu V. 2: vyāptaś ca pakshadharmā upayujyate, nānyo ‘tiprasaṅgāt [281,6].

⁷⁸⁸ NyP 149,6: prakṛtānupayuktavacanam arthāntaram. Cf. NySū V. ii. 7: prakṛtād arthād apratisambaddhārtham arthāntaram;

⁷⁸⁹ ekām asiddhiṃ parihārato dvitīyāpattiḥ. Cf. ATV 834,21: ... °āpatteḥ (= SAS 103,3f).

⁷⁹⁰ On this point R remarks: It is true that śarīrajanyatva-abhāva and janyatva-abhāva — which are distinct due to the difference between the qualified pratiyogin [i.e. śarīra-janyatva] and the non-qualified pratiyogin [i.e. janyatva] — coexist in one and the same substratum. But śarīrajanyatvābhāva-tva and pure janyatvābhāva-tva, which are vyāpyatvāvacchedakas as having heavy dharma and light dharma, do not enter into one place. Accordingly, there is not vyāpyatvāsiddhi as in the case of ‘blue smoke.’ For in the latter case, nīladhūma-tva and dhūma-tva enters [into one place]; not so in the former.

This is based on the principle that svasamānādhikaraṇavyāpyatāvachchedakadharmāntarāghaṭitadharmasyaiva vyāpyatāvachchedakatvam [NyKo 843f.]. Cf. Rāmānuja-siddhāntasaṅgraha (Srirangam, 1994), pp.87f.

Otherwise, the inference ‘There is a seed of kalama-rice because there is a sprout of kalama-rice’ would result in failure. For in the negative concomitance [i.e. wherever the non-existence of a seed of kalama-rice is, there is the non-existence of a sprout of kalama-rice], [‘of kalama-rice’ in ‘the non-existence of a seed of kalama-rice’] would be meaningless attribute; because ‘the non-existence of a seed in general’ can establish ‘the non-existence of a sprout of kalama-rice.’

[Objection:] Some sprouts are born without a seed.

[Replied:] Then, even a sprout of kalama-rice could not be inferred, because [a sprout] could be born without [a seed].

Likewise in [the inference ‘this embryo] is black, because [he is] a son of Maitrī,’ ‘the modification of food like a vegetable’ would not be adventitious condition⁷⁹¹ **[339]**. For [in the negative concomitance as to the probandum, i.e. whatever is not ‘the modification of food like a vegetable’ is not ‘being black’], ‘like a vegetable’ would be meaningless attribute; because ‘the non-existence of the modification of food’ alone could bring about the non-existence of blackness.

[Objection:] The blackness of a tamāla-tree and sapphire is found even if this [modification of food] is not existent; [thus, there is deviation in your negative concomitance, i.e. wherever the non-existence of the modification of food is, there is the non-existence of blackness].

[Replied:] Not so. For in these instances [of a tamāla-tree and sapphire], [not only the qualifier ‘like a vegetable’ but] also that which is qualified [i.e. food] is

In negative concomitance, the reason is not invalidated by force of vyarthaviśeṣhaṇa (G. Bhattacharya: Studies in Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika Theism, Calcutta 1961, p.105).

⁷⁹¹ In the inference ‘Maitrī’s embryo in her womb is black, because he is a son of Maitrī,’ ‘the modification of food like a vegetable’ is a doubtful upādhi. For, though it does pervade the sādhyā ‘being black’ (i.e. whosoever is black is the modification of food like a vegetable), its non-pervasion of the sādhanā ‘being a son of Maitrī’ (i.e. every son of Maitrī is not the modification of food like a vegetable) is doubtful; because the present embryo also may be ‘the modification of food like a vegetable.’ See SAS IV. 43: upādhiḥ khalu śaṃgito niścitaś ca / śākādyāhārapariṇatyādiḥ śaṃkitaḥ ... / yatra khalu sādhanāvyāpakatva-sādhyasamavyāptyor anyatararūpasyāśaṃkhā, sa śaṃkito-pādhiḥ; antimagarbhe 'pi śākādyāhārapariṇatisambhavena sādhanāvyāpter āśaṃkitatvāt [564,3–6].

non-existent. Besides, this [modification of food like a vegetable] is not the criterion for the blackness of a body. For there is not the modification of food like a vegetable in the bodies of plants or non-womb-born beings **[340]**.

[Objection:] The blackness of a body caused by the modification of food is based on the modification of food like a vegetable.

[Replied:] Not so. For [‘of a body caused by the modification of food’] would be swallowed up by meaninglessness; because in this case, there is the equal concomitance (samavyāpti) even through the [simple] probandum [i.e. blackness]. That is, this [equal concomitance] is established insofar as whatever is not black is not based on the modification of food such as a vegetable **[341]**.

[Objection:] Supposing that the probandum is that particular genus called blackness which is not conditioned by any qualifier, there is not meaninglessness.

[Replied:] Not so, because this [particularity] would be hardly claimed without any qualifier. For even if the word ‘particular’ alone is mentioned, it is the [very word] that is meaningless.

Furthermore, we could easily point out that there is a meaningless attribute in the [syllogism] “[The earth etc.] has an agent because they are effects” also. That is, there is the absence of ‘being an effect’ whenever there is the absence of mere ‘having a cause.’

[Objection:] [The word] ‘cause’ is not used in this [syllogism].

[Replied:] Not so; because that [‘having a cause’] results [from ‘having an agent’]. Otherwise, **[342]** there would be no room even for you to criticize [that ‘from a body’ in ‘not being produced from a body (śarīrajanyatva)’ is of a meaningless attribute] when we use the words ‘being non-bodied (aśarīratva)’.⁷⁹²

[Objection:] From the analyses of the compound (vighraha), ‘not being produced from a body’ results.⁷⁹³

[Replied:] Then, here also from the analysis of the word ‘agent (kartṛ)’, a particular

⁷⁹² See above 335,1.

⁷⁹³ aśarīratvam = na śarīraṃ janakatvena yasya = śarīrajanyatvam.

cause results.⁷⁹⁴ The relation as cause is expressed in ‘having an agent.’ **[343]**

Likewise from ‘being composed of parts (sāvayavatva)’ in proving ‘being non-eternal,’ ‘being produced from parts (avayavajanyatva)’ results. Here also would be meaninglessness [in view of ‘from parts’]. **[344]** For the reason [‘being composed of parts’] means neither mere relation to parts nor mere inherence to them, because such is possible even for eternal entities like genus and quality. **[345]**

In order to show the sublation [of the reason ‘being an effect’] in a counter-instance (vipakshe bādhakam), you point out the undesirable contingency that an effect would be produced without any cause [if even a counter-instance, i.e. that which has no agent like ether, were an effect]— this is also rejected. For an agent is concluded to be [but] a particular cause⁷⁹⁵ [among the causes including non-intelligent entities like time, the unseen power and so on].⁷⁹⁶

[Objection:] [A intelligent agent] is proved to be general cause owing to the rule that a non-intelligent being begins to act only when controlled by an intelligent being.⁷⁹⁷

[Replied:] Not so. Because there is not such rule; **[346]** for example, we find that an iron is moved by a magnet.

[Objection:] What we wish to establish [using the word ‘only’] is not the delimitation of the relation to something other [than an intelligent being] but the delimitation of the lack of the relation [to an intelligent being].

[Replied:] Not so. Judging from the co-presence and co-absence, it is possible for the very [entity like a magnet] that is other [than an intelligent being] to be the

⁷⁹⁴ An agent or nominative (kartṛ) is a particular kāraka (cf. Pāṇini 1. 4. 54: svatantraḥ [kārakaḥ from 23] kartā) and kāraka is defined as the cause of an action (see Kāśikā ad 1. 4. 23: kārakaḥ hetur ity anarthāntaram / kasya hetuḥ? kriyāyāḥ).

⁷⁹⁵ Cf. 350,3–351,2 below.

⁷⁹⁶ Cf. the Buddhist refutation in ATV 840,7ff.: vipakshe bādhakābhāvāt / deśa-kālaniyamādināḥ svakāraṇāyattasannidhinā kādācitkena pratiniyataśaktinā kāraṇenā-cetanenāpy upapatteḥ (Cf. NKaṇikā 711, cited in JNA 139 and RNA 40f.)

⁷⁹⁷ To the above Buddhist refutation, the Naiyāyika answers that every kārya must be conditioned by kārakas and that among them kartṛ is essential. See ATV 854,1ff.

special cause [of the action]; nevertheless, why can you postulate an invisible [intelligent cause] other than that? And we have explained that there is no sublation in a counter-instance.⁷⁹⁸

Again, of what nature is this ‘control’?

[Objection:] [To control something means] to drive (preraṇa) it.

[Replied:] Not so; because such [control] over shapeless entities (amūrta) is impossible.

[Objection:] [To control something means] to know it as a cause in general.

[Replied:] Not so; because it would lead to the undesirable conclusion that volition is futile.

[Objection:] [It means] mere proximity of one who has the three [factors of production], namely, knowledge, [desire of making and volition].

[Replied:] Not so; for even an effect would be eternal as this [proximity] always exists **[347]**. If there is restriction due to particular unseen power, it comes about that the unseen power acts not depending upon Him because the very [unseen power] restrains Him. If [the unseen power does] not [restrain Him], it comes about that He also acts as long as [He] exists [and the above-mentioned defect is inevitable].

Additionally, by no means [can] an intelligent being control God's knowledge, which in nature is non-intelligent; because another knowledge is not found.⁷⁹⁹

[Objection:] God himself, who is actually (vastutaḥ) intelligent, is established as the substratum of that [knowledge].⁸⁰⁰

⁷⁹⁸ Cf. Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvalī (ed. A. Thakur, Patna, 1959), 285,7f.: kārya-tvasya vipakshavṛttihataye sambhāvayate 'tīndriyaḥ / kartā ced vyatirekasiddhividhurā vyāptiḥ kathaṃ sidhyate //, cited in M-TBh 41,2f. and the commentary on ATV by Śaṅkaramiśra (BI ed.) 841,9f. (reading setsyati for sidhyate).

⁷⁹⁹ The control as ‘driving’ over His knowledge is not possible since it is shapeless. Neither the control as ‘knowing as a cause’ nor that as ‘the proximity of one who has knowledge and so on’ is possible without another knowledge (K).

⁸⁰⁰ Not to have knowledge etc. about something but mere proximity of one who has the knowledge etc. is required so as to control it (R).

To control something is not the relation to one who has knowledge etc. about it but mere relation to an entity implied (upalakshita) by the knowledge etc. (K).

[Replied:] Not so. Because this proves merely what has been already proved in view of the individual self.⁸⁰¹

[Objection:] Even that knowledge [belonging to Him] is understood by itself [as a cause] in general [form] **[348]**. Only by means of [such knowledge in general form], [God] controls it.⁸⁰²

[Replied:] Not so. Because this would lead to the undesirable conclusion that [the knowledge] in specific [form, e.g. ‘This is the material,’ ‘This is the assistant,’ ‘This is the donee’ etc.], would not be the cause. If [it were] not [the cause], every [individual self] could be the creator [of the world] when he gets in any way the knowledge [in general form] concerning everything.

[Objection:] [He] controls it by means of another knowledge.

[Replied:] Not so, because infinite regress (anavasthā) would be brought about.

[Objection:] [He] controls this [following knowledge] by means of that [preceding knowledge].

[Replied:] Not so, because mutual dependence would be brought about if they controlled each other.

[Objection:] There is not mutual dependence because the following knowledge is not the cause of the world **[349]**.

[Replied:] Not so. For if [the following knowledge] were not the cause at all, it would be non-existent.⁸⁰³ If this [following knowledge], which is capable of controlling

⁸⁰¹ Even if the production of a sprout and the like is proved to be dependent upon the relation to a person who has knowledge and so on, nothing negates that the person who has the knowledge and so on is the individual self. Thus, although it is impossible for the individual selves to have the [specific] knowledge concerning the material and so on [of a sprout and the like], it is not [impossible to have] knowledge in general and so on (K).

⁸⁰² To be controlled means to be the object of apprehension as a cause. And God's knowledge can be apprehended by itself as a cause. And this does not lead to the contradiction that the object is same as the subject (karmakartṛbhāva). For there is the contradiction that the object is same as the subject in describing the knowledge as its own cause in specific form like ‘The knowledge of God is the cause’; but not in the apprehension of itself as the cause in general form (R).

⁸⁰³ While even sanmātra can be the cause of something (R).

the cause [of the world or the first knowledge], were not the cause, the first cause⁸⁰⁴ [or the first knowledge] also would not be the cause [of the world]. Likewise, if neither [His] desire of making nor volition were the cause, God could be the agent no longer.

Besides, in the negative concomitance that whatever is not ‘having an agent’ is not ‘being an effect,’ ‘having no cause’ is adventitious condition.

[Objection:] ‘Having no cause,’ [though it pervades the non-existence of the reason, i.e. ‘not being an effect’], **[350]** does pervade [the non-existence of the probandum, i.e.] ‘not having an agent’ [as well]; [accordingly, it cannot be adventitious condition].

[Replied:] That is not true. For it is doubtful whether the subject [such as the earth, which is ascertained not to be ‘having no cause,’ is ‘not having an agent’ or not⁸⁰⁵]; therefore, [‘having no cause’] is inevitably adventitious condition. If [doubtful adventitious condition were] not [defect], ‘the modification of food such as a vegetable’ would not be adventitious condition and consequently, we could infer that Maitrī's son [in her womb] is black [for the reason that he is a son of Maitrī].⁸⁰⁶

Moreover, the non-existence of general thing does not pervade the non-existence of a particular thing; [accordingly, the non-existence of a particular cause such as an agent does not lead to the non-existence of a cause in general]. If so, the non-existence of earthiness would pervade the non-existence of pot-ness and consequently, a jug would not be earthy.

[Objection:] While you have said that [the non-existence of a particular cause does not lead to the non-existence of cause in general], what [kind of particularity] is intended in the statement that ‘an agent is a particular cause’ **[351]**: that it is one of many causes or that it does not commonly exist in all effects? Of them, the former is denied because such [particularity] could be applied to even the unseen power and so on, [the non-existence of which can lead to the non-existence of cause in general]. And the latter alternative is not established.

⁸⁰⁴ V suggests the reading jñānasya for kāraṇasya.

⁸⁰⁵ According to R. Cf. the definition of paksha by the Old Naiyāyika, for instance, in TarS §49: sandigdhasādhyābhāvavān pakshaḥ.

⁸⁰⁶ Cf. SAS IV. 43 cited above in the note on 338,3–339,2.

[Replied:] You cannot say so; for we have already answered this objection in refuting the rule that [a non-intelligent entity begins to act only when] controlled [by an intelligent being].⁸⁰⁷

In addition, does the subject ‘the earth etc.’ include the conjunction between God and a pot and the like or not? In the former case, there is partial non-establishment⁸⁰⁸ (bhāgāsiddhi) [regarding a part of the subject, i.e. God-pot-conjunction]; or, if such [conjunction] as is proved by this very inference forms the subject, there is mutual dependence. In the latter case, there is doubtful non-absoluteness⁸⁰⁹ (sandigdhanāikāntikatā).

[Objection:] Even if it is doubtful whether God-pot-conjunction has an agent or not, [352] it is not contradictory to the proof of God.

[Replied:] It is not true. For we cannot avoid mere doubt that the others might be ‘not having an agent’ like the conjunction between the two; that much is enough to reject that the earth etc. have an agent.

[Objection:] The subject is in the general form, as ‘An effect under dispute has an agent’; then, there is no defect.⁸¹⁰

⁸⁰⁷ See above 345,1ff.

⁸⁰⁸ Vedānta Deśika mentions two kinds of bhāgāsiddhi, namely (1) āśraya-bhāgāsiddhi (NyP 197,19–20: āśrayabhāgāsiddho yathā “avayavāvayavinau nityau, dravyatvāt” iti; na hy avayavasamudāyātriktam avayaviśabdārthaṃ trayyantavida icchanti) and (2) svarūpabhāgāsiddhi (NyP 198,16f.: svarūpabhāgāsiddho yathā “ghaṭavyatiriktam nityam, kāryatvāt, ghaṭavat” iti; na hi pakshīkṛteshv īśvarādishu svarūpataḥ kāryatvam). Just bhāgāsiddhi ordinarily means the latter (see, e.g., Tarkabhāshā of Keśavamiśra [KSS ed.] 248,9f.) and so is the present case.

⁸⁰⁹ In NyKo, sandigdhanāikāntika is defined as: (1) sādhyatadabhāvasaṃśayakatvam; (2a) pakshāṃśe sādhyābhāvasaṃśayātmakam pakshavṛttivāgāhi vyabhicārajñānam, (2b) atha vā hetau vyabhicārasaṃśayaḥ [from Gadādhari]. R notes: Although the substratum (i.e. God) itself has not been proved when the inference concerning Him starts, there is, somehow, the (2a) type of sandigdhanāikāntika held by the Naiyāyika.

⁸¹⁰ Cf. ATV 825,10: vivādādhyāsita kartṛkaṃ sakartṛkaṃ kāryatvāt.

According to Trirocana, the teacher of Vācaspatimiśra, the existent in the world is classified into three kinds: (1) that which is well-known as having an intelligent agent, (2) that which is well-known as not having an intelligent agent and (3) that the

[Replied:] That is not true. For even syllogism regarding a general thing **[353]** should serve for strengthening all particulars; so all the particulars are expected to be established in general. If [God] is proved by means of the other [inference] or this very [inference], it is unavoidable that this inference is meaningless or that there is mutual dependence [respectively].

For what purpose, [asks a student], do we reject the proof of God? And we cannot get along without any purpose. The persons who understand God by means of inference and is devoted to Him may well, hearing our discussion, have the suspicion that [God] does not exist (nāstikya); in this sense, both we and those [who hear our rejection] have great sin.

Oh, [we answer], how compassionate you are! Let's not teach it to such [dull persons]. And hear [our] purpose — Firstly, [our purpose is] to make truth clear as it is, as we reject [the misconception] that smell is grasped with the ear. And [the second purpose is] to remove the disbelief in God from those who have skilful intellect and notice that the inference [of God] is fallacious **[354]**. And that is why the thought of dull persons is not agitated by a man of skillful intellect. Let us have compassion [to them] even in this way. And [thirdly], we can avoid the undesirable contingency that the Scriptures, which make what has not been attained attain, would be mere repetition (anuvāda).

[Objection:] Even if [the Scriptures] be mere repetition, there is no defect. For God is certainly proved [by the inference].

[Replied:] Not so. For God being the material cause as well as the efficient cause [of the world] is not proved.

[Objection:] [The Scriptures] first make supplementary reference to such God as is proved by the inference as the efficient cause and next give the injunction that [He] is the material cause; as [the Scriptures] firstly make supplementary reference to such existence of an agent of which is doubtful; see Nyāyavārttikatātpayaṭīkā ad IV. i. 21: 953,1ff. (Calcutta ed.): etāvad abhipretam ācāryasya— trayo hi khalu bhāvā jagati bhavanti: [1] prasiddhacetanakartṛkāḥ, yathā prāsādāṭṭālagopuroraṇādayaḥ; [2] prasiddhatadvipayayāḥ, yathā paramāṇvākāsādayaḥ; [3] sandigdhetanakartṛkāḥ, yathā tanutarumahīdharādayaḥ. (Cf. Kajiyama, Eng. trans. of M-TBh, p.96, n.257.)

earth and so on as are proved by perception and give the injunctions that they are subordinate (śesha) to God, that they are His bodies and so on.

[Replied:] If [the Scriptures] made supplementary reference [to Him] in this way, we could not assert that the inference negating that [He] is the material cause is sublated by force of [the Scriptures] which make us grasp the dharmin [or God], though if [He] is proved as qualified [by being both the material cause and the efficient cause], we can easily affirm so.

[Objection:] Suppose this [sublation] is also accepted as in the case of the inferences negating that earth and so on are subordinate to God and so on [355].

[Replied:] Not so. For as to this [inference negating that the earth and so on are subordinate to God etc.], [mutual] contradiction is easily pointed out whether [the Scriptures] which make us grasp that which are to be negated, [i.e. the subordination to God etc.], are established or not: [that is, if established, the inference is contradictory to them; if not, the inference cannot be established because what is to be negated has not been known]. Here [in the case of God as inferred to be the efficient cause], on the contrary, as to the syllogism ‘God is not material cause, because He is intelligent or because He is an agent, like a potter,’ such [contradiction] is hardly pointed out. Then, [we could infer] that God is not the material cause as long as it is possible to interpret the Scriptures [asserting that He is the material cause] in the other way [like the passage ‘A Scriptures pole is the sun’]; consequently, the knowledge that [He] is the sole cause of the whole world, as is mentioned [in the sūtra] that:

From whom the creation etc. of this [world] [BrSū I. i. 2],
would be eclipsed. Fearing this, the author of the [Brahma-]sūtra immediately mentions that:

Because the Scriptures [alone] is the source [regarding Him] [BrSū I. i. 3],
by which he negates that [He] is within the scope of the other means of knowledge.

[Objection:] Were it the case, how can you explicate the sūtra that:

[Not what is inferred], because of the impossibility of construction [BrSū
II. ii. 1],

pūrvakam, kāraṇavattvāt, yat kāraṇavat tad buddhimatpūrvakaṃ yathā rathaḥ.

and the [Śrī-]Bhāshya and the other [commentaries by the same author] thereof⁸¹¹? Furthermore, in the section on an agent (kartṛ-pāda) of the Nyāyatattva where it teaches that an intelligent being is an agent, [356] [Nāthamuni] raises the objection that:

Isn't it that wind [independently] makes the multitude of earthy dust? ... [Nyāyatattva],

and gives the answer as follows:

It is answered — A cause is [composed of] the three, namely, an agent (kartṛ), an instrumental (karaṇa) and an object (karman), and is qualified by an action (kriyā). Without any one of these three, an action is impossible ... [Nyāyatattva].

Here also the permission to infer God is found. This [sūtra] “Because the Scriptures is the source” [BrSū I. i. 3], therefore, must be explained in the other way.

[Replied:] Not so. For “Because the impossibility of construction” [BrSū II. ii. 1] and [the commentaries thereof] are of the other meaning. In fact, the intention here is to show [the Sāṃkhya], who teaches that so-called prakṛti not controlled by an intelligent being is the material cause, an example of contradiction and so on regarding [its] specific [aspect, i.e. its independency]. In our opinion, however, these [counter-inferences against the Sāṃkhya] are but mere reductio ad absurdum⁸¹² (tarka) based on possibility;

⁸¹¹ I.e., “‘Inference (anumāna)’ means what is inferred, [i.e. the pradhāna as held by the Sāṃkhya]. The pradhāna accepted by you is not capable of constructing the wonderful world. Because it is, though non-intelligent, not controlled by an intelligent being understanding its nature. Whatever is thus is so, like mere wood and the like in the construction of a palace, a chariot etc. That is, it is experienced that a non-intelligent thing like wood is not capable of constructing an effect if not controlled by an intelligent being and that it begins to construct an effect if controlled by one who understand it. What we say is, therefore, that the pradhāna, not controlled by an intelligent being, is not the cause” [ŚrīBh II. ii. 1: 279,9–13].

⁸¹² Tarka is defined as: “vyāpyāṅgikāre 'niṣṭavyāpakaprasaṅjanam” [SAS IV. 60: 590,6; NyP 214,18; YMD II. 43], namely, leading to an undesirable pervader through accepting a pervaded hypothetically. Mostly it is used as counter-argument (pratikūlatarka) to refute the opinion of an opponent through leading to an unacceptable conclusion; that is why I translate the term with reductio ad absurdum. (Cf. Tarkabhāshā, ed. KSS, p. 242, where the term is defined as anisṭaprasaṅgaḥ).

Opposing to the Naiyāyika, who do not accept tarka as valid knowledge [see NySū I. i. 40 and the commentaries thereof, TarS §64], Deśika accept it as included in inference [NyP 214ff.]; for the detail of his discussion, see VEDAVALLI 1984: 108-13, SINGH 1958: 241–46.

only the Scriptures supported by them is the means of the valid knowledge.

For the same reason, the statement of the Nyāyatattva also should be interpreted [in this line].

It is to be thought that the inference that [God] is merely the material cause of the world is refuted in order to point out the sublation by force of [the Scriptures], which makes us grasp the dharmin [or God], against those who, [as the Sāṃkhya], refer to [such] material cause [as is proved by inference] and deny that it is the efficient cause as well; and that the inference that [He] is merely the efficient cause is refuted in order to point out the sublation by force of [the Scriptures] against those who, [as the Naiyāyika], refer to [such] efficient cause [as is proved by inference] and deny that it is the material cause as well [357].

In addition, if the subject [of the inferences] were God [as proved to be the efficient cause] by the Scriptures [of the Yoga] or [the material cause as proved by that of the Sāṃkhya], we precisely point out the non-establishment of substratum (āśrayāsiddhi) [because these Scriptures have no authority].⁸¹³

[Objection:] The passages mentioning the identity of the material cause and the

It is composed of five members:

- (1) prasañjakasya prasañjanīyena vyāptiḥ,
 - (2) pratitarkaṇa 'pratighātaḥ,
 - (3) prasañjanīyaviparyaye paryavasānam,
 - (4) prasañjitasya 'niṣṭatvam,
 - (5) parapakshasādhakatvam [NyP 222,2f.].
- (Cf. Tārkikarakshā, v. 72: (1) vyāptiḥ, (2) tarkāpratihatīḥ, (3) avasānaṃ viparyaye / (4) anisṭa- (5) ananukūlatvam iti tarkāṃgapañcakam // [summarized by POTTER in EIPH II: 637], cited in MMU, anumāna, §15).

The following example makes the point clear. When someone (A) infers 'The mountain has fire because it has smoke,' another (B) says 'There might not be fire.' The statement of B is rejected by the following tarka which shows that the non-existence of fire brings about the non-existence of smoke. First, (1) the non-existence of fire (= prasañjaka) is pervaded by the non-existence of smoke (= prasañjanīya). And (2) assuming, on the other hand, the existence of fire does not bring about any undesirable conclusion, with which this [pervasion] could be rejected by means of [the pratitarka] (na ca sāgnitve 'py atra kaścid anisṭaprasaṅgaḥ, yena tataḥ pratihanyeta). Moreover, (3) the fact contrary to the non-existence of smoke, [which is to be brought about through the pervasion] (= prasañjanīyaviparyaya), that the mountain actually has smoke, is concluded by means of perception. Accordingly (4) the non-existence of smoke, which is to be brought about through the pervasion, is not acceptable. Thus (5) [the opinion of the other] that the mountain has fire is established [NyP 222,2-8] (Cf. TMK VI. 60 and Srinivasa Chari 1987: 93).

efficient cause [are metaphorical] like the passage “A Scriptures pole is the sun.”

[Replied:] Why?

[Objection:] Because it is contradictory to the definitions [of the two].

[Replied:] Not so. For the definition of efficient cause is not ‘that [cause] which is other than material and non-inherent cause (asamavāyi) is efficient cause⁸¹⁴, nor the definition of material cause is ‘that [cause] which is other than efficient and non-inherent cause is material cause’; it they were so, there would be the contradictions.

[Objection:] What is [the definition], then?

[Replied:] Following the passage of the Vedārthasaṃgraha that:

Being material cause is being the locus of modification [VAS §70; 111,7], we define material cause as the substratum of states (avasthā). State is adventitious (āgantuka) and inseparable (apṛthaksiddha) quality.

Specifically the material cause is, in reference to [an entity] itself (svarūpa) qualified by each succeeding state, the very entity qualified by the state which corresponds to it (tadanugata) and is always anterior to it **[358]**. For example, in relation to that substance clay which is qualified by the state of being a pot, the very substance [clay] that is qualified by the state of being a lump [is the material cause]. The word ‘corresponds to’ excludes the state of the universal dissolution.⁸¹⁵

Efficient cause⁸¹⁶ is that which is required in such form as is other than expectancy

⁸¹³ My translation of this passage follows the interpretation of K. For further explanation on this point, the ŚrīBh (according to K) or Deśika's other works such as TMK and the ASĀ with the commentaries on them (according to V) should be referred to.

R, however, regards the passage as the resume of the above. The translation following R is: “This is the resume — If the subject [of the inference negating that God is the material cause] were God [as proved] by the Scriptures or [God as proved by inference], there would be non-establishment of substratum: [in the latter case, such inference has been already rejected; in the former, the subject, i.e. God as proved to be the material cause, is not open to doubt]”.

⁸¹⁴ Cf. TarS §40: tadubhaya [= samavāyikāraṇa, asamavāyik°] -bhinnam nimittakāraṇam.

⁸¹⁵ Here it is implied that the clay qualified by the state of being a dust (reṇu), which is anterior to the state of being a lump, is not the material cause of a pot (R).

(aunmukhya) of modification⁸¹⁷ [359].

Never do we accept non-inherent cause as the sub-division [of cause], because it is mere technically termed one (pāribhāshika). Otherwise, we could term even another sub-division like ‘the cause near to efficient cause is non-efficient cause.’ The conjunction of threads, for instance, as the non-inherent cause of cloth⁸¹⁸ is by no means established. For we have already reject [the Vaiśeshika concept of] whole [as different from its component parts⁸¹⁹] and only [threads qualified by a particular conjunction] become that [cloth: that is, there is no causality between the conjunction and the cloth]. It is true that urging [the threads] and so on are established as the causes of the conjunction, but they do not surpass the scope of efficient cause.

And, thus, both of the definitions are applicable to God. For it is established that [God] who has as the body those intelligent and non-intelligent entities who have non-divided name-and-forms is, in relation to [God Himself] who has as the body those intelligent and non-intelligent entities who have divided name-and-forms, the material cause⁸²⁰; and also it is established that [He] is the efficient cause in such form as is other than ‘having as the body non-divided intelligent and non-intelligent entities’ — for instance, in the form of having particular will, which is common to a potter and the like.

Other [schools] also should accept that God is an agent-cum-material regarding some objects. That is, there are the conjunction between God and a thing like a pot and so on, of which God is the material cum efficient cause according to [their definitions]; for [He] is inherent in [them] and [He] is an agent of all effects. If [He] were not

⁸¹⁶ According to YMD IX. 3, the nimitta as defined like this includes that nimitta which is defined as kārāṇatayā pariṇāmayiṭṭ and the sahakāri defined as kāryotpatty-upakaraṇaṃ vastu.

⁸¹⁷ K interprets it as upādānāvachedakadharmabhinnadharmāvacchinnakārāṇatāvat.

⁸¹⁸ According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeshika, the conjunction of threads is the asamavāyikāraṇa of cloth as the former is inherent in the object (= the thread) in which the later is inherent (patātmaakāryeṇa sahaikasminn arthe tantau samavetaṃ sat samavāyisambandhena vartamānaṃ sat paṭātmakakāryaṃ prati tantusaṃyogātmakaṃ kārāṇaṃ asamavāyikāraṇaṃ [NyBo §40]).

⁸¹⁹ See above 150,7–155,2.

accepted as the agent, the inference “[The earth and the like] have an agent because of being an effect” would fall into the end (daśamadaśāpanna).

Likewise, it is established that even [an intelligent being] other than God [360] is the material cause cum efficient cause in generating his own knowledge (jñāna), happiness and so on based on [his] will (buddhi).

Thus it is established that the Upanishads teach Brahman having as the body subtle intelligent and non-intelligent entities transforms Himself into One who has as the body gross intelligent and non-intelligent entities.

Hence, it is admitted, in accordance with the means of valid knowledge, that everything different from Him is in the relations [with Him] such as being a supporter and being supported, being a ruler (īśvara) and being ruled, being subordinate and being the Principal (śeshin), being cause and being effect.

(89) And [these relations] are with Śrī or Lakshmī [as well]. The partnership (dāmpatyā) of the Two [i.e. Viṣṇu and Śrī] is permanent.⁸²¹ [Scriptures passages] referring to [Her] equality⁸²² [with Him], [Her] identity⁸²³ [with Him], [Her] being [His] potency⁸²⁴ (śakti),

⁸²⁰ Cf. VAS §74: nāmarūpavibhāgānarhasūkshmadāśāpannaprakṛtipurushaśarīraṃ brahma kāraṇāvastham, ... nāmarūpavibhāgavibhaktasthūlacidacidvastuśarīraṃ brahma kāryāvastham [113,7–9].

⁸²¹ K warns that śriyā saha cannot be connected with dāmpatyam.

⁸²² E.g. ‘asyeśānā jagataḥ’ [TaiS VI. iv. 12 (cited below)] and ‘īśāno bhūta-bhavyasya’ [KāthaUp IV. 12, 13], where both are called ‘Ruler’; ‘viṣṇupatnī’ [Yajur-Sam 4. 4. 12 (cited in ŚarGBh 127,23)] and ‘śriyaḥ patiḥ’ [GBh intro.: 3,1], where both are called ‘Lord’ (R).

⁸²³ E.g. ‘naranārīmayo hariḥ’ [Brahma(-aṅ a)-P (cited in CśBh 5,1)], ‘nārāyaṇātmi-kāṃ daivīm’ [KāśyapīyaP (cited in ŚarGBh 134,19f.)], ‘tvam yādṛśo 'si kamalāṃ api tādrśīm te dārān vadanti yuvayor na tu bhedagandhaḥ / māyāvibhaktayavatītanum ekam eva tvāṃ mātaram ca pitaram ca yuvānam āhuḥ //’ [Śrīviṣṇuvaibhava(-adhikāra) (cited in CśBh 5,23f.)], where it is said that Śrī is Bhagavat qualified by sattā etc., that She is Bhagavat qualified by another eternal body as Śrī, that He occasionally takes up the form of Śrī for enjoyment or that He partially becomes Śrī with a different ego for enjoyment (R) (= the pūrvapakshins in CśBh 4,12–14 & 18f. Cf. Narasimhachari 1971: 31f.).

⁸²⁴ E.g. ‘jagadutpādikā śaktis tava prakṛtir ishyate / saiva nāmasahasreshu (°sahasrais tu in CśBh) lakshmī śrīr iti kīryate’ [? (cited in CśBh 4,6f.)] (R).

[Her] similarity to Him⁸²⁵ and so⁸²⁶ on are justified from this fact. [361]

The references to [Her] equality [with Him] can be clearly justified from the fact that [their] knowledge, bliss and so on are completely equal and that [they] are equal in creating the world,⁸²⁷ being the Principal (śeshin), being able to be a resort (śaraṇyatva), being the goal to be attained (prāpyatva) and so on⁸²⁸ [362].

The references to [Her] identity [with Him] are also justified as follows. [She] is, in the above-mentioned manner, identified [with Him] from the view point of mode as

For the detail of the concept of Śrī as śakti, see Narasimhachari 1971: 25–29.

⁸²⁵ E.g. ViP I. viii. 17cd cited below and ‘ākramya sarvāṃ tu yathā trilokīṃtishṭhaty ayaṃ devavaro 'sitākshi / tathā sthitā tvaṃ varade tathāpi’ [Vishṇusmṛti 99. 6 (cited in CśBh 6,1f.)] (R).

⁸²⁶ E.g. ‘vishṇoḥ śrīr anapāyinī’ [ViP I. viii. 17b (cited in CśBh 5,13; SRBh ad. v.38)] and ViP I. viii. 35 cited below (also in CśBh 6,2), where the difference and the two-ness are mentioned (R).

⁸²⁷ In this regard, R refers to R̥gveda X. 129. 2 (ānīd avātaṃ svadhayā tad ekam) and asserts that svadhā here denotes Lakshmī according to the usage of ViP I. ix. 119 (svadhā tvaṃ lokapāvanī). This is the second interpretation of the passage in Deśika's CśBh 10,16–11,5; esp. 10,24ff. (See also ŚP ad ŚrīBh II. iv. 7: 394,19f.). Cf. Narasimhachari 1971: 40 and Srinivasa Chari 1994: 179f, n.30.

⁸²⁸ R refers to ‘asyā mama ca śeṣhaṃ hi vibhūtir ubhayātmikā’ [Vishvaksena-Sam (cited in ŚarGBh 129,21f.)], ‘lakshmyā saha ḥṛshikeśo devyā kāruṇyarūpayā / rakshakaḥ sarvasiddhānte vedānte 'pi ca gīyate //’ [Lakshmitānta XXVIII. 14 (cited in full in RTS 959,2)], ‘samsārārṇavatāriṇīm’ [Kāśyapasmṛti? (cited in RTS ?)], ‘vācaḥ paraṃ prārthayitā prapadyen niyataḥ śriyam’ [Śaunaka-Sam? (cited in ŚarGBh 127,12 as uktaṃ bhagavatā śaunakena)], ‘ātmavidyā ca devi tvaṃ vimuktiphaladāyini’ [ViP I. ix. 120 (cited in CśBh 15,3f.)], ‘yāmālambya sukhenemaṃ dustaraṃ hi guṇodadhim / nistaranty acireṇaiva vyaktadhyānaparāyaṇāḥ’ [Sāttvata-Sam 12. 84 (cited in CśBh 14,22f.; ŚarGBh 127,13f.)], ‘śṛṇāti nikhilān doṣhān (nikhilaṃ doṣham in CśBh) śrīṇāti ca guṇair jagat // śriyate cākhilair nityaṃ śrayate ca paraṃ padam’ [Ahibudhnya-Sam 51. 61–62] and ‘śrayanātīm śriyamāṇaṃ ca śṛṇtīm śṛṇvatīm api’ [ibid. 21. 8(*)], ‘vaikuṇṭhe tu pare loke śriyā sārḍhaṃ jagatpatih / āste vishṇur acintyātmā bhaktair bhāgavataih saha //’ [Liṃga-P (cited in SRBh ad v.39) and the second half of the Dvayamantra(t)].

*These verses of the Ahibudhnya-Sam are cited in CśBh 3,11f.; ŚarGBh 132,9ff.; SRBh ad v.12: 44,7ff. For the word of śrī, RTS XXVIII [950,4ff.; Skt. p.323] gives the following six etymological interpretations: śriyate, śrayate, śṛṇoti, śrāvayati, śṛṇāti and śrīṇāti. Cf. Srinivasa Chari 1994: 158.

śrīmate nārāyaṇāya namaḥ. For the meaning of the portion, see RTS 1009,9ff.: Skt. p.342ff.

[the Two] are completely equal in the form of a couple⁸²⁹ (dvandva) and [She] is [also] the substratum of being the Principal (śeshin) to whom the whole phenomenal world is subordinate. In addition, [She and He] appear to form the one deity (which is to be mentioned in respect to all the oblations concerning [God] Himself) since Her Husband has the relation to Śrī in a way that agrees with application (yathāvinīyogam) as, for instance, in [the Scriptures of] Mahendra and [that of] Agnishoma⁸³⁰; for this reason or others, [She is identified with Him] **[363]**.

Now, the references [to Her] as [His] potency mean that [She] is [His] attribute in the form of a wife and the like; or they mean that [She] is helpful in driving [His] operations like the creation as [She] has the same sport (līlā) [as He]. And the reference⁸³¹ as ‘potency (śakti)’ is always made to the part of a feminine even in another couple of a masculine and a feminine.⁸³²

The references [to Her], like [His] divine manifestations⁸³³ (vyūha), as a variety of [His] state are concerned with [Her own] incarnations⁸³⁴ (avatāra) and so on. For that [incarnation of Śrī] which becomes, at [Her] own will or at the will of the Supreme, the condition of effect is also a variety of the state of God, since everything forms the

⁸²⁹ R refers to ‘tulyaśīlavayavṛttāṃ tulyābhijanalakṣhaṇām’ [Rāmāyaṇa V. 16. 5].

⁸³⁰ For example, in the sacrifice of Mahendra, the deity is not mere Indra but Indra qualified by greatness; in the sacrifice of Agnishoma, the deity is neither mere Agni nor mere Soma but the two associated each other. Likewise, when ‘asyā mama ca śeṣaṃ hi vibhūtir ubhayātmikā’ [Vishvaksena-Sam (cited in ŚarGBh 129,21f.)], ‘makāras tu tayor dāsaḥ’ (cited below 367,3) and the like are applied, Viṣṇu and Śrī are worshiped as in the Agnishoma; when the dvayamantra is applied, Viṣṇu qualified by Śrī is worshiped as in the case of the Mahendra (R).

⁸³¹ V suggests to read śaktiśabdaḥ for śaktitvavādaḥ.

⁸³² R refers to ‘śivaḥ śaktyā yukto yadi bhavati’ [?] (which is said on Pārvatī) and ‘śakticakrasya nāyikā’ [Sanatkumāra-Sam] (Cf. CśBh 12,1f.: śaktiśabdo 'pi hy atra vihārākhyakāryopayuktaviśeṣaṇatvābhiprāyaḥ patnīvishaya eva).

⁸³³ For the outline of His vyūha, see below 394,5–395,2.

⁸³⁴ Cf. ViP I. ix. 144: Rāghavatve 'bhavat Sītā, Rakmiṇī Kṛṣṇajanmani (cited in R).

nature of God.⁸³⁵

Likewise, [Her other] appellations, say, [1] ‘desire (icchā),’ [2] ‘consciousness (saṃvit)’ and [3] ‘ego⁸³⁶ (ahaṃtā),’ are also to be regarded as intending, for instance, [1] that [She] is favorable to affection, [2] that [She] is self-luminous [364], [3] that [She] has such form as particularly explains [Her] essential nature [as distinct from the other deities].

All that is to be mentioned on this point has been said by Śrī-Rāmamiśra in *Ṣa arthasaṃkṣhepa* immediately after the explanation of the divine abode⁸³⁷ (*divyasthāna*). Now we show this portion—

And from the same logic [as is mentioned in the explanation of divine abode], [His] Consort and the like are also established.

[Objection:] Particularized⁸³⁸ injunction (*viśishtavidhi*) as to [Her] being the Principal [to whom the phenomenal world is subordinate] (*śeshin*) is not possible. Because it is improper that what is subordinate to someone is subordinate to another [i.e. the phenomenal world that is subordinate to God cannot be subordinate to Her]. For the same reason, nor is supplementary reference (*anuvāda*) [possible]. Moreover, His Consort and the like [must] form the body of the Supreme; otherwise, it would be contradictory to [the Scriptures passage ‘He was] alone [in the beginning]’ [ChUp VI. ii. 1]. For [She] is, unlike [His essential nature] such as bliss, not inseparable [to Him]. Thus [both] are equal [in forming His body or in being subordinate

⁸³⁵ My translation of this sentence follows R; while according to K, it means ‘For since everything is the *apṛthaksiddhaviśeṣhaṇa* of God, everything that becomes the condition of effect at its own will or at the will of the others (i.e. His or Her will) is a variety of the state of God.’

⁸³⁶ E.g. *Ahīrbudhnya-Sam* II. 43: *sarvabhāvātmikā lakṣmīr ahaṃtā paramātmanah*.

⁸³⁷ Namely, *nityavibhūti*.

⁸³⁸ Here the passage of *Taittirīya-Sam* IV. iv. 12 ‘*asyeśānā jagato viśṇupatnī*’ is dealt with. According to the objector, the passage can neither give the injunction as to the Consort of Vishṇu as qualified by *śeshitva* [“ *iśānā*] nor make a supplementary reference to the Consort that has been laid down elsewhere, giving Her the attribute *śeshitva*.

to Him]; accordingly, it is impossible that [the world and His Consort] are in the relation of being subordinate and the Principal respectively.⁸³⁹

[Replied:] Not so. It is current in our daily life that [the property] of a husband belongs to his wife also. **[365]** And control by both is single Principal-ness,⁸⁴⁰ because the Smṛtis⁸⁴¹ mention the inseparableness [of a couple]. It is said by one who knows ethics (nīti):

‘Charity (tyāga) cannot take place if not desired by one of a couple’
[Śābara-Bhāshya VI. i. 17].⁸⁴²

In fact, when [the property of a couple] is divided, [charity is] not completed.

And the passage, assisted by the above-mentioned principle, gives the injunction as to the Wife qualified by being the Principal **[366]**. Or rather, having made a supplementary reference to [His Consort or being the Principal, the passage gives the injunction as to being the Principal or being His Consort⁸⁴³].

Besides, though it is impossible that the body [of a husband] is [his] wife in our daily life, it is not contradiction so far as what is not in the scope of other means of knowledge [than the Scriptures] is concerned. And in our

⁸³⁹ samatvān na mithaḥśeṣhaśeṣhitā. The expression presupposes the principle mithosambandhanyāya mentioned in MīSū III. i. 22 (adhi° 12): guṇānām ca parārthatvād asambandhaḥ samatvāt syāt (R).

⁸⁴⁰ This sentence is cited in ŚarGBh 129,22f. as well.

⁸⁴¹ R refers to ‘dharme cārthe ca nāticaritavyā’ [?] (cited in Śābara-Bhāshya VI. i. 17 as dharme cārthe ca kāme ca nāticaritavyā / sahadharmaś caritavyaḥ / sahāpatyam utpādayitavyam) and ‘pāṇigrahaṇād dhi sahatvaṃ karmasu tathā puṇyaphaleshu dravyaparigrahe ca’ [?] as well as the Śruti-passage that ‘patnī hi pārīṇahyasyeṣe’ [Taittirīya-Sam VI. ii. 1. 1] (cited in Śābara-Bhāshya VI. i. 16).

⁸⁴² MīSū VI. i. 6–16 (adhi° 3) deals with the right of women to perform sacrifice and ibid. 17–21 (adhi° 4) deals with the right of wives.

⁸⁴³ In the former case, the passage of Taittirīya-Sam VI. iv. 12 refers to His Consort that has been established in ‘hrīś ca te lakshmīś ca patnyau’ [Taittirīya-Āraṇyaka III. xiii. 2] and gives the injunction as to śeṣhitva. In the latter case, the passage refers to the śeṣhitva that has been established in ‘īśānā devī’ [Taittirīya-Bṛāhmana III. xii. 3. 2] and gives the injunction as to being His Consort (K).

ordinary life, it is because [the body of a husband] is non-intelligent that [it] cannot be [his] wife. Furthermore, if that [injunction as to being his wife were] concerned to himself, it would have the defect of self-dependence (ātmāśraya).⁸⁴⁴ Subordination [of this kind] is found even in the other case⁸⁴⁵ since it is not contradictory [367]. [Ṣa arthasamkshepa]

By this portion, Śrī-Rāmamiśra has justified that the world is in its proper essence⁸⁴⁶ subordinate (śeshataikarasa) to the Couple.

Furthermore, the following Śruti [supports this content]:

The syllable a stands for the Lord of all the world, Viṣṇu or Hari; the syllable u for Lakṣmī, drawn out by Viṣṇu; the syllable m for a slave of the Two — This is the definition of the sacred syllable om⁸⁴⁷ [KāṭhaŚruti?].

In respect to om, like other mantras, various kinds of [other] interpretation can be given in many places.⁸⁴⁸ However, there is not such contradiction in the content [of this Śruti] as would force us into interpreting [this passage] in other way.

⁸⁴⁴ sa ca svasmin ātmāśrayadoshaḥ. Here the translation follows the second interpretation of K: saḥ = patnītvavidhiḥ. K gives another interpretation: that he himself is not his wife (apatnītvam = saḥ; note that vidheyaprādhānyāt puṁstvam) is based on the defect of ātmāśraya. Also he criticizes R's interpretation (saḥ = patipatnībhāvaḥ) as unfit for the context.

⁸⁴⁵ I.e. in our ordinary life, according to the second interpretation of K. R (= the first one of K) illustrates it with sprinkling water (prokṣhaṇa), which is subordinate to the rite (kratu) and is that to which brīhi-rice subordinate.

⁸⁴⁶ This is a favorite expression of Rāmānuja. Van Buitenen notes that °rasa means not only °svarūpa or °svabhāva but also °rati (Rāmānuja on the Bhagavadgītā, rpt. Delhi etc., 1968, p.35, n.92; his Eng. trans. in VAS, p.238, n.349).

⁸⁴⁷ This verse is quoted in the Śrīsūktabhāṣya of Raṅganāthamuni alias Nañjīyar, p.59 (ed. A. Srinivasa Raghavan, 1937) as kāṭhaśruti [the same word found in RTS 837,1 also denotes this verse according to the Sāravistara of Viraraghavacharya]; while it is not found in the extant Vedic texts. Its c-pāda is cited in CśBh (8,2) as well (acc. to Narasimhachari 1971: 37, n.174).

⁸⁴⁸ R refers to another interpretation shown in Aṣṭaślokī (by Parāśara-bhaṭṭa), v.1: akārārtho viṣṇur jagadudayarakṣhāpralayakṛt, makārārtho jīvas tadupakaraṇam vaiṣṇavam idam / ukāro 'nanyārhaṃ niyamayati sambandham anayoḥ, trayīsāraḥ tryātmā praṇava imam arthaṃ samadiśat //.

For the detail of the meaning of om, see RTS XXVII: 827,1–847,4 (Skt. 270–78).

And [it is verified] by the following [Scriptures passages]:

The Wife of Vishṇu, ruling (īśānā) this world [Taittirīya-Sam. IV. iv. 12],

The Ruler (īśvarī) of all beings [Śrīsūkta 9],

and so on. Regarding the former Śruti, some regard it as concerned with Bhū⁸⁴⁹ because [‘the wife’ here] has the same case-ending as the word aditi and so on.⁸⁵⁰ Yet it is wrong opinion that [this passage] is concerned with [mere] direction [for the reason that ‘the wife’ here has the same case-ending as the word dik⁸⁵¹]; for it is contradictory to the mark [i.e. ‘the wife of vishṇu’ indicated] in the Śrutis and other [Scriptures].

So does say the venerable Parāśara [368]:

Oh! Mother. This world, movable and immovable, is pervaded by You and Vishṇu [ViP I. ix. 126],

As Vishṇu is all-pervading, oh the best twice-born, so is She [ViP I. viii. 17],

None is superior to the Two [ViP I. viii. 35],

and so on.

Again, it is said in the teachings of Bhagavat that:

[The two] are mentioned as if they form one entity⁸⁵² [Ahirbudhnya-Sam 3. 26]

The whole phenomenal world, including intelligent and non-intelligent entities, are pervaded by Lakshmī. Her Lord, however, pervades Her as well as everything. Still, the lordship of Śrī is equal to that of Śrī's Lord. The Pair is the Principal [to whom the world is subordinate] (śeshin) forever [?],

⁸⁴⁹ Bhūdevī is also called Bhūmi or Pṛthivī.

⁸⁵⁰ TaiS IV. iv. 12 runs as follows: asyeśānā jagato vishṇupatnī / viśvasyavyacā *ishayat* subhūtiḥ śivā no astu aditir upasthe. And it is well-known that aditi denotes Bhū (R); e.g. TaiS I. v. : bhūmir bhūmnā dyaur variṇāntarikshaṃ mahitvā / upasthe te devi adite 'gnim annādam annādyāyādadhe, cited in K. Here ‘and so on’ denotes ishayaṭī (making send out), which is the cause of modification as food.

⁸⁵¹ I.e. ūrdhvā diśām [TaiSam IV. iv.].

⁸⁵² ekatattvam ivoditau. Deśika adopts this reading in CŚBh 6,2 as well; the Adyar ed. of Ahirbudhnya-Sam reads: tattvam ekam ivoditau.

and so on.

In the *Ahīrbudhnyasaṃhitā*,⁸⁵³ the *Lakshmitāntra*⁸⁵⁴ and so on, the above-mentioned content is emphasized in detail. **[382]**

The above-mentioned content, [i.e. that She is also all-pervasive Principal as He], can justify the description that [His other consorts] like *Bhūmi*⁸⁵⁵ also form Her parts.

In fact, [eternal seers like] *Ananta*, *Vishvaksena* are also said to be of the nature of [His divine manifestations] like *Samkarshaṇa* simply because [these latter] enter into [these former]. It is because there are sub-divisions of meditation (*upāsana*) in accordance with application (*viniyoga*) that there is option (*vikalpa*) as to whether Brahman is accompanied with [His] wife, followers and the like or devoid of them; but not because [the two kinds of description] are [respectively] concerned with, say, [His] being confused and [His] being pure or [His] condition of cause and that of effect. For we have already shown the refutation on this point.⁸⁵⁶ All the relations of cause and effect among [His] divine manifestations (*vyūha*), [His] incarnations (*vibhava*) and so on are, as we shall

⁸⁵³ K refers to II. 62; III. 1, 4cd–5, 7–9 etc., 23–26, 41–42ab, 43–44ab etc.; VI. 2–4; VII. 65; XXI. 7cd, 9cd–10ab etc. (K reads some minor variants which are not found in any manuscript used for the Adyar ed., but I cannot judge whether his reading is based on the Śrīvaiṣṇava tradition or not).

⁸⁵⁴ K refers to I. 39cd–40 etc.; II. 25cd–26ab, 28ab, 29–30ab, 31ab etc.; III. 1–2, 8cd–10ab, 14, 22cd–23ab, 25; IV. 48ab, 51ab etc.; V. 31cd, 35, from 37ab up to 81cd; VIII. 11; XII. 12–14ab; XIII. 22; XVII. 30cd, 31a+31d, 32ab, 34cd–35, 36cd–37; XXVIII. 41, XXVIII. 14 (Likewise K reads some minor variants which are not found in any manuscript used for the Adyar ed.).

⁸⁵⁵ In the Śrīvaiṣṇava theology, *Bhū* (or *Bhūmi*) and *Nīlā* are also accepted as the consorts of *Vishṇu*, though their rank is lower than *Śrī/Lakshmi*. The degree of the importance of the three consorts is, according to *ŚarGBh* (151,2f.; ad st. 5: *evambhūtabhūminīlānāyaka*), *Śrī* > *Bhūmi* > *Nīlā* (*nityaniyataprādhānyatāratamya-krameṇa śrīyā saha ekāsanasthau devyau tacchāyāsaṃkāśatayā darśayati*). See Srinivasa Chari 1994: 176–78. In this regard, *ŚarGBh* (151,3f.) and R refer to the *Śrīguṇaratnakośa* of *Parāśarabhaṭṭa*, v. 26: ... *devī tvām anu nīlayā saha mahī devyaḥ sahasraṃ tathā yābhis tvam stanabāhudṛṣṭibhir iva*.

⁸⁵⁶ Because, says K, we have already reject the Advaita theory that there is *ajñāna* in Brahman, the *Yādava*-theory that Brahman itself is modified, and the *Bhāskara*-theory that Brahman has distinctions due to *upādhi* (K).

explain [in the next chapter⁸⁵⁷], concerned with [His] forms (vigraha).

And [Her] divine manifestations like Lakshmī, which are correspondent to [His] various divine manifestations and so on, are established by the Scriptures.⁸⁵⁸

The positions of [His] divine manifestations and so on, say, mutually being subsidiary and being the Principal (amgāṃgibhāva), are due to [His] own will; for God exists everywhere being the single.

It is true that in particular amulets (yantra) and the like, Vāsudeva and [His] other [manifestations] are sometimes regarded as subsidiary to Lakshmī, Sudarśana and so on⁸⁵⁹ [383]. But there is not any contradiction if [Lakshmī etc.] are contemplated, as [they] really are, to have as the Self Brahman; for only to those who have as the Self [Brahman] itself [e.g. Lakshmī], [Brahman] itself [e.g. Vāsudeva] voluntarily becomes subsidiary. If [Lakshmī etc.] are contemplated with the view that [they] are Brahman, on the other hand, [they] are regarded as the Principal to whom [Vāsudeva etc.] are subsidiary just for the purpose of attaining various particular fruits; accordingly, the order of entities is not violated as in the case of the other injunctions taught in the Upanishads as to [the meditation on such symbol as name] with the view [that it is Brahman⁸⁶⁰].

Yet the above-mentioned is not applicable to such entities [as Rudra] that are taught [as the Principal] in the other Āgamas [like the Śaivāgamas] as well, since we

⁸⁵⁷ See 394,3: īśvaraśarīre ca sūkshmayūhavibhavādibhedāḥ

⁸⁵⁸ R refers to ViP I. ix. 144 cited above.

⁸⁵⁹ E.g. in a yantra towards Lakshmī, Vāsudeva is regarded as subsidiary to Her; in that towards Sudarśana, Nṛsiṃha is regarded as subsidiary to him (K). R refers to a mantra towards S° that: ‘sthāpayet sarvamadhye tu cakrarājaṃ suvigrahaṃ / asṭādikṣhu Nṛsiṃhaś ca sthāpayet susamāhitaḥ //’ [?].

⁸⁶⁰ dṛṣṭīvidhi. See ŚrīBh IV. i. 4–5 (adhi° 3: pratīka°), in which ChUp III. xi. 1: mano brahmety upāsita, VII. i. 5: sa yo nāma brahmety upāste, etc. are cited. The meditation of this kind, called pratīkopāsana, is defined as: abrahmaṇi brahmadṛṣṭyānusandhānam [ŚrīBh VI. i. 4: 576,7f.]. So R here remarks that it does not matter as to dṛṣṭīvidhi if the entity [being its object] is real or not.

Those who engage in it cannot be liberated. See ŚrīBh IV. iii. 14: ye tu brahmakāryāntarbhūtaṃ nāmādikam vastu devattādishu siṃhādīdṛṣṭīvad brahmadṛṣṭyā ... upāsate na tān [arcirādih] nayati [624,13f.].

will explain that these Āgamas have no authority.⁸⁶¹

And the authority of the Pāñcarātra has been explained in the Āgamaprāmāṇya⁸⁶² and in the section of the Śrī-Pāñcarātra of the [Śrī-]Bhāshya⁸⁶³; we have also explained it in the Nyāyapariśuddhi.⁸⁶⁴

It cannot be said that an amulet and so on are generally baseless; for they are found in the [Nṛsiṃha-pūrva- and -uttara-]Tāpanīya-Upanishads and other [Scriptures] and their fruits are grasped by perception.

Therefore, you can suspect neither the conversion of the entities nor the non-authority of the Scriptures on which these statements are based. **[384]**

Thus it is established that Brahman, having all intelligent and non-intelligent entities as Its mode, is one and only Nārāyaṇa accompanied with Śrī.

(90) Having attained to the best bed of the chief serpent [i.e., Ananta] expanded and spreading, the Couple — the Two are our rulers — finds pleasure in the creation, the maintenance and the dissolution [of the world], holding together and laughing with such words pleasant to the ear as om, tat and sat of the lotus-born child [i.e. Brahmā] resting on the lotus of [His] navel.

Here ends the third section on God of the Nyāyasiddhāñjana composed by Śrīmat Veṅkaṭanātha Vedāntācārya, who is the lion among poets and logicians and who masters all the branches of arts.

5. Eternal transcendental dominion

⁸⁶¹ The part of NySi seems to be lost (or not written by the author?).

⁸⁶² As is clear from the title, whole the work contributes to this subject. For the detail of the work, see Narasimhachari 1971: 97ff. and his introduction to the critical edition (GOS 160, Boroda, 1976). Especially for the part in which the pañcarātra-adhikaraṇa of the BrSū is discussed (ĀP 109,7–135,7), see Gerhard Oberhammer: Yāmuna-munis Interpretation von Brahmasūtram 2, 2, 42–45, Wien, 1971.

⁸⁶³ I.e. BrSū II. ii. 39–42, adhikaraṇa 8: utpattayasambhava°.

⁸⁶⁴ See NyP 282,2–284,8: here our author quotes the last portion of ĀP 169,4–170,11 (NyP 283,7ff.) and refers to his work Pāñcarātrarakshā, the first chapter named siddhānta-vyavasthā, for the further exposition (NyP 284,7f.).

Now [His] eternal transcendental dominion⁸⁶⁵ (nityavibhūti) is explained.

Its definition is: while being other than substances made up of three guṇas (triguṇa), having sattva⁸⁶⁶; while being self-luminous (svayaṃprakāśa), having sattva; while being free of tamas, having sattva; being other than what is dissimilar to the place where the ignorance completely disappears,⁸⁶⁷ and so on. **[385]**

It is proved by means of the following passages:

*[This person] of sun-color beyond the tamas [or the material universe⁸⁶⁸] [ŚveUp III. 8; BhG VIII. 9],

*These [powers reached] the heaven⁸⁶⁹ (nāka) [TaiSam III. 5. 11. 5],

*Abiding beyond this rajas [or the material world⁸⁷⁰] [R̥gveda VII. 100. 5; TaiSam II. 2. 12. 5],

*One who watches this [world] in the supreme heaven⁸⁷¹ (vyoman) [R̥gveda X. 129. 7],

*In that imperishable supreme heaven⁸⁷² [MNārUp I. 2],

*In a thousand pillars, immeasurable, strong and brilliant, [where the God of

⁸⁶⁵ Considering the double meaning of vibhūti, i.e. His divine ruling power (aiśvarya [See also the Darśanodaya (Mysore 1933) by Lakshmīpuram Śrīnivāsācārya (ca. 19th–20th Cent., according to Raghavan 1979: 80), p.208, cited in Srinivasa Chari 1994: 243, n.4]) and the territory under His rule (niyāmya), I translate it with the English word ‘dominion.’ For Rāmānuja’s usage of the term, see Carman 1974: 140–46.

⁸⁶⁶ In these definitions, ‘having sattva’ serves to exclude spiritual beings like the individual self and God (R).

⁸⁶⁷ This roundabout definition serves to include the bodies of eternal sages living in the place (R).

⁸⁶⁸ See GBh VIII. 9: ādityavarṇaṃ tamaśaḥ parastād— aprākṛtasvāsādhāraṇa-divyarūpaṃ [270,1] and TC: tamaśa itī sarvakāraṇabhūtataṃdravyavivakṣhā; tamaśaḥ parastād ity anena phalitaṃ aprākṛtatvaṃ [270,11f.]; VAS §131: tamaḥśabdena saiva prakṛtir ucyate [161,13f.];

⁸⁶⁹ The verse runs: te ha nākaṃ mahimānaḥ sacante (R̥gveda X. 90. 16 reads sacanta) yatra pūrve sādhyāḥ santi devāḥ.

⁸⁷⁰ See VAS §131: rajaḥśabdena triguṇātmikā prakṛtir ucyate, kevalasya rajaso 'navasthānāt. imāṃ triguṇātmikāṃ prakṛtim atikramya sthite sthāne kshayantaṃ vasantaṃ ity arthaḥ. anena triguṇātmikāt kshetrañāsya bhogyabhūtād vastunaḥ parastād vishṇor vāsasthānam itī gamyate [161,10–12].

⁸⁷¹ Sāyaṇa’s commentary runs: asya ... jagato yo 'dhyakṣhaḥ īśvaraḥ parame utkṛṣṭe satyabhūte vyoman vyomani etc.

⁸⁷² See VAS §131: tat sthānaṃ avikārarūpaṃ paramavyomaśabdābhidheyam itī ca gamyate [161,17].

gods stays⁸⁷³] [JaiminiyaBr IV. 384],
and so on⁸⁷⁴ [386].

Such⁸⁷⁵ being the case, in the passage that:

*The sages always see this supreme abode of Viṣṇu (tad viṣṇoḥ paramaṃ padaṃ sadā paśyanti sūrayaḥ) [R̥gveda I. 22. 20 etc.],

[the pada is] established as different from [Viṣṇu] Himself because the distinction is indicated [in the genitival ending ‘of Viṣṇu (viṣṇoḥ)’],⁸⁷⁶ thus, this also establishes the particular abode qualified by many seers who always see, because the meaning [‘abode’] is natural to the word pada⁸⁷⁷ and because [it is described as] being always seen. And this is qualified injunction (viśiṣṭavidhi), like the passage that:

*For Agni the [cake] on eight potsherds [TaiSam II. 4. 3. 3];
since there is no other way [to interpret it].⁸⁷⁸

⁸⁷³ The passage runs: sahasrasthūṇe vimite dṛ ha ugre yatra devānām adhideva āste, which is introduced in SAS III. 61 as śātyāyaninaś caivam āmananti [273,11f.], in SRBh 93,13 (ad v.39) as talavakāraśruti and in ŚarGBh 152,23 as talavakārāḥ.

⁸⁷⁴ R refers to ‘hiraṇmaye pare loka (R in his comm. on MuUp adopts the ordinary reading koṣe) virajāṃ brahma nishkalam’ [MuUp II. 2. 10], ‘pādo ‘sya viśvā bhūtāni tripād asyāmṛtam divi’ [R̥gveda X. 90. 3], TaiS III. 5. 11. 5 (cited above), ‘yathā pādodaras tvacā vinirmucyata evaṃ ha vai [SRBh reads evam ihaiva] sa pāpmanā vinirmuktaḥ sa sāmabhir unnīyate brahmalokam’ [PraśnaUp V. 5], ‘vijñānasārathir yas tu manaḥpragrahavān naraḥ / so ‘dhvanaḥ pāram āpnoti tad viṣṇoḥ paramaṃ padaṃ’ [KāṭhaUp III. 9], ‘sa khalv evaṃ vartayan yāvadāyushaṃ brahmalokam abhisampadyate na ca punar āvartate na ca punar āvartate’ [ChUp VIII. 15. 1], ‘ramyāṇi kāmācārāṇi vimānāni sabhās tathā / ākrī ā vividhā rājan padminyāś cāmalodakāḥ // ete vai nirayās tāta sthānasya paramātmanaḥ’ [MBh XII. 196. 6f.], ‘divyaṃ sthānam ajaram cāprameyaṃ durvijñeyaṃ cāgamair gamyamānam (SRBh reads gamyam ādyam) / gaccha prabho raksha cāsmiṃ prapannān kalpe kalpe jāyamānaḥ svamūrtyā’ [MBh XVI. 5. 27], ‘devās ca (SRBh reads °ā hi) yan na paśyanti divyaṃ tejomayaṃ padaṃ / atyarkānaladīptaṃ tat sthānaṃ viṣṇor mahātmanaḥ // svayaiva prabhayā rājan dushprekshaṃ devadānavaiḥ’ [MBh III. 136. 79f.]— these are cited in SRBh ad v.17 in explaining the phrase paramaṃ padaṃ [64,27ff.]; R further quotes ‘tad ekam avyaktam anantarūpaṃ viśvaṃ purāṇaṃ tamaḥ parastāt’ [MBh ?], ‘śīrshakapālaṃ bhinatty aṇ aṃ bhinatty aksharaṃ bhinatti tamo bhinatti’ [MBh ?].

⁸⁷⁵ The following presupposes the objection that paramapada or the nityavibhūti is Viṣṇu Himself. Cf. VAS §128: nanu cātra ‘tad viṣṇoḥ pramaṃ padaṃ’ iti parasvarūpam eva paramapadaśabdenābhidhīyate; ‘samstaheyarahitam viṣṇvākhyam paramaṃ padaṃ’ [ViP I. 22. 53] ityādishv avyati rekadarśanāt [159,13f.].

⁸⁷⁶ Cf. VAS §128: tad viṣṇoḥ padaṃ iti vyati rekadarśanāt [159,16f.].

⁸⁷⁷ Cf. TD (ad §128): (parama-)padaśabdasya ca sthānavācivitavyutpattisambhavāc cedam sthānaparam [313,18f.].

⁸⁷⁸ How to interpret the passage is expounded in VAS. Here I will show the translation of this portion [§128: 158,16–159,5]—

From the statement that ‘tad viṣṇoḥ paramaṃ padaṃ,’ i.e., the supreme abode of Viṣṇu, namely, the Supreme Brahman, is ‘always seen by the sages (sadā paśyanti sūrayaḥ),’ we understand that there are some persons endowed with perfect knowledge who have seen [it] at all times. The construction of the sentence is either that ‘ye

And this particular abode is explained in the Mokshadharmā:

*Boy! These are, indeed, the hells of the abode of the Supreme Self [MBh XII. 196. 6]

and so forth.

And this dominion is infinite in a certain direction [i.e. upwards] and is limited in a certain [direction, i.e. downwards], because we can ignore neither those Scriptures which describe [the dominion] as endless nor those which describe it as beyond tamas [or the material universe]. Although infinity itself is common [to both], this [transcendental dominion] is greater even in comparison to the infinite [material universe] composed of the three guṇas because of the [Scriptural] passage that [the former] is greater and [the latter] is smaller.⁸⁷⁹ And because we have already proved the mutual difference [in number] among infinite entities⁸⁸⁰ [387]. Even concerning area, we will show the following examples: The area of ether upper than the sun is infinite, [that] upper than the Earth is more infinite, and [that] upper than the Pātāla (or the lowest hell) is most infinite. And the designation of one foot and three feet is, though it is said with the other intention,⁸⁸¹ help us to understand the difference in area. And this distinction does not mean four equal divisions. For it is said that:

*[The reference to Its measure] is [only] for the purpose of meditation (buddhi), as in the case of [the reference to Its] ‘feet’ [and other parts of the body] [BrSū III. ii. 32].

And this [dominion] is non-spiritual, because it is different from both the category of the individual self and that of God. Still it is self-luminous (svayamprakāśa) by force of the following passages:

sūrayaḥ te sadā paśyanti’ or that ‘ye sadā paśyanti te sūrayaḥ.’

[Obj.] In either interpretation, more than one element cannot be enjoined, [since it would bring about the defect of vākyabheda (TD 310,13; cf. MNP §33ff.)].

[Ans.] Not so. Since all [these elements] have not been established, here the supreme abode qualified by all [these elements] is enjoined*; as is stated [in the sūtra that] ‘However that [action] as well as its qualifying elements, if not taught by another, should be enjoined because [they] are inseparable for the purpose of the injunction (tadguṇās tu vidhīyerann avibhāgād vidhānārthe na ced anyena śiṣṭāḥ)’ [MiSū I. 4. 9]. For example, the injunction of an action, say, that ‘yad āgneyo 'sṭākāpālah’ [TaiSam II. 4. 3. 3, also cited in the Śābarabhāṣya on this sūtra], the action that is qualified by all [qualifying elements] is enjoined because neither the action nor the qualifying elements have been established. Likewise, the present passage teaches the supreme abode of Viṣṇu, which has not been established, as being always seen by the sages. So there is no contradiction.

*See MNP §12: yatra tūbhayam [= karma tadguṇās ca] aprāptam, tatra viśiṣṭam vidhatte. tad uktam ‘na ced anyena śiṣṭāḥ’ [MiSū I. 4. 9] iti; śiṣṭā upadiṣṭā ity arthaḥ. yathā ‘somena yajeta’ [not found in the extant Vedic texts] ity atra soma-yāgoyor aprāptatvāt somaviśiṣṭa-yāga-vidhānam— somavatā yāgeneshṭam bhāvayed iti. na cobhayavidhāne vākyabhedah, viśiṣṭasyaikatvāt.

⁸⁷⁹ I.e. Ṛgveda X. 90. 3, ChUp III. 12. 6: pādo 'sya viśvā bhūtāni, tripād asya 'mṛtaṃ divi.

*There the world are composed of bliss and enjoyments are of the nature of bliss⁸⁸² [Ahirbudhnya-Sam VI. 23],

*The world named ānanda (bliss) and composed of the supreme bliss [?],

*For both of us [the Lord and Me Lakshmī], there is the supreme heaven, which has no pair and is the supreme happiness. One who manifests (prasara) the six good qualities, at [His] eternal will, has become the space⁸⁸³ [Lakshmītantra XVII. 9],

and so on. Likewise, to the question that:

*Of what is this body (vyakti) of God composed? [?],

the general answer is:

*That of which God composed [?];

and to the further question that:

*Of what is God composed? [?],

the final answer is:

*He is composed of knowledge [?].

Thus [His] form in the divine world is composed of knowledge; so it is proper that the whole eternal dominion, composed of this substance, is composed of knowledge. And here ‘composed of knowledge’ means nothing but self-luminousness.

It is appropriate that this [eternal dominion], though being knowledge, does not have the two properties found in the self, namely, having the object and being the agency. And it is reasonable that [this eternal dominion] is outwards (parāk) because it manifests itself for the others as in the case of the attributive knowledge (dharmabhūtajñāna).⁸⁸⁴ As the attributive knowledge at the time of [unconscious conditions] like deep sleep, it does not manifest itself at the time of bandage. **[388]** Still as that [attributive knowledge] at such situations [becomes the known object of the knower himself at another situation or that of another person], this [eternal dominion] is established as an object of the knowledge. True the knowledge of those who are free of bandage is all-pervasive, but this [eternal dominion] does not depend upon it [so as to

⁸⁸⁰ Cf. 53,1f. (chap.1) and 222,8ff. (chap.2). For the detail of endless number, see chap.6: 517,3–518,2.

⁸⁸¹ As has been explained in chap.2 [222,7f.], the purpose of the passage is to show that though both those who transmigrate and those who are liberated are innumerable, there is relative difference in number between the two.

⁸⁸² tatrānandomayā lokā bhogās cāandalakṣaṇāḥ. The Adyar ed. reads bhogāḥ for lokāḥ and vice versa.

⁸⁸³ tayor nau paramavyamo nirdvandvaṃ sukham uttamam / shā guṇyaprasaro nityasvācchandyād deśatāṃ gataḥ. The Adyar ed. reads nirdukkham for nirdvandvam, padam for sukham (shown as v.l.), divyaḥ for nitya°.

⁸⁸⁴ See below the definition of parāk: parasmai bhāsamānaṃ parāg iti vyavahriyante; tenāja āyā api mateḥ parāktvaṃ siddham [38,3f.].

be manifest] as in the case of the peculiar nature (svarūpa) of the self [or what makes the self as such, i.e., the substantial knowledge]. Even if [an entity] is an object of the knowledge, [its] self-luminousness is also accepted in the other case [i.e. that of the peculiar nature of the self] as well.

Some hold, however, that [the eternal dominion] is called self-luminous, knowledge and the like simply because it is endowed with unexcelled light and because it does not conceal knowledge and that it is called bliss, happiness and the like because it possesses absolutely favorable [qualities] like color, taste and smell [389].

And this [transcendental dominion] is, as is taught in the Pañcapanishad,⁸⁸⁵ composed of the five gross elements and the [eleven] corporal faculties (indriya); it forms the bodies, the corporal faculties, the vital breathes⁸⁸⁶ and the objects of the eternal (nitya), the liberated and God in accordance with their own will.

According to some, it is also composed of the twenty-four principles (tattva) as in the case of [the material universe] made up of the three guṇas.⁸⁸⁷ Yet, these principles are not in the relation of source and modification, because the Śrutis describe the bodies and so forth in the divine universe as constant. As well as [the gross elements] like ether [and the corporal faculties], there exist [the intermediate principles], namely, mahat, [ahaṃkāra and the five tanmātras], though they are not derived from prakṛti (aprākṛta). In fact, there [in the divine universe], [each preceding principle], say, ether, is not the material cause of [each following principle], say, air.

And the configuration and so on of the body and the rest in this [eternal dominion]

⁸⁸⁵ V remarks: Pañcapanishad denotes a particular pañcamantra, which is well-known in the daily routine etc. of the sect. In SRBh ad v.15 [59,2], Deśika cites a phrase from the Rahsyāmnāyabrahmaṇa (according to the editor) that: pañcapanishanmantravigrahaṃ.

Cf. YMD VI. 2: pañcapanishanmantrapratipādyatayā pañcapanishadātmakā; aprākṛtapañcaśaktimattayā pañcaśaktimayīti nigadyate. On this portion, the Hindi commentary by Shiv Prasad Dwivedi says: ‘There are mantras of an Upanishad whose name is secret. They teach the divine form composed of the five divine elements as to this vibhūti. Therefore, the nityavibhūti is said to be composed of pañcapanishad (rahasya nāmaka jo upanishadoṃ ke mantra haiṃ, ve us vibhūti kā divya pañcabhūtātmaka rūpa me pratipādana karate haiṃ, ataeva nityavibhūti ko pañcapanishanmayī kahā jātā hai)’ (Chaukhamba Surbharati Granthamala 160, Varanasi, 1989, p.106). As to the pañcaśakti, A. Govindacarya svamin refers to the Pādmatantra (jñāna-kanda?) XII. 36ff., according to which the five are sarva, niṣṛṭti, viśva, puruṣa and parameshṭhi (Yatīndramatadīpikā or The Light of the School of Śrī Rāmānuja, Madras, 1912, p.91, n.198); Swami Ādidevānanda follows it (trans. in YMD, p.188, n.4).

Cf. also Vedāntakārikāvli VI. 4: svayaṃ prakāśarūpeyaṃ pañcapanishadātmikā.

⁸⁸⁶ As is pointed out by V (fn. 2), the author does not give any explanation as to the vital breathes.

⁸⁸⁷ Cf. avyaktamahadahamkāreshv api prākṛtāprākṛtavibhāgo 'stīti kecid ācāryāḥ [69,4f.].

are almost same as material ones.

It is established that there are the corporal faculties because the Scriptures describe the bodies including the pure object⁸⁸⁸ (śubhāśraya) [or the form of God] as having the feet and other [organs]. For the word ‘eye’ and the like primarily mean [its faculties] but not [the parts of the body] such as the eye-ball.⁸⁸⁹ The statement that:

*[The liberated] are devoid of the faults of corporal faculties and shine forth everywhere⁸⁹⁰ [Lakshmītantra XVII. 16]

and the like, according to the principal of general rule and exceptional rule (utsargāpavādanaya), intend to deny the corporal faculties caused by their karma; as such a passage as:

*Indeed, [pleasure and pain do not touch] one who has no body [ChUp VIII. 12. 1],

negates the body caused by one's karma. The author of the Commentary clearly mentions that there are the sixteen (i.e. the [five] gross elements and the [eleven] corporal faculties) and their fruits⁸⁹¹; for in the topic [beginning with the sūtra] that:

*There are not, says Bādari [BrSū IV. iv. 10],

he examines whether the liberated have the body and the corporal faculties or not.⁸⁹²

Again, Bhaṭṭa-Pārāśara-pāda shows that God and other [inhabitants in this dominion] have the mind (manas). For he himself states, for example,⁸⁹³ as follows:

*Although, as you assert, reasoning (tarka) is incapable of proving the mind independently, it will be still powerful if supported by the Āgama. And the Āgamas read:

⁸⁸⁸ In ŚrīBh I. i. 1, ViP VI. 7 (called śubhāśrayaprakaraṇa) is expounded as follows: dhāraṇāsiddhyartham śubhāśrayam vaktum ... (1) paraśaktirūpam idam amūrtam [= acidvīyuka-jīvaḥ] (2) aparāśaktirūpam kshetraññākhyamūrtam [= cidvīśiṣṭa-jīvaḥ] ca (3) paraśaktirūpasyātmanaḥ kshetraññatāpattihetubhūtatṛtīyaśaktyākhyakarmarūpa-avidyā cety etacchaktitrayāśrayo bhagavadasādhāraṇam ‘ādītyavarṇam’ [ŚveUp III. 8] ityādivēdāntasiddham mūrtasvarūpam śubhāśraya ity uktam [(1) 222,2 ... 223,1–3]. For the interpretation of the portion of ViP, see van Buitenen: ‘The Śubhāśraya Prakaraṇa (Vishṇu Purāṇa 6, 7) and the meaning of bhāvanā,’ in *Studies in Indian Literature and Philosophy* (Delhi etc., 1988), pp.13–24 (= *Adyar Library Bulletin* **19**, 1955) and V. Raghavan: ‘Vishṇupurāṇa and Advaita,’ *ALB* **39**, 1975.

⁸⁸⁹ Yet the aprākṛta-indriyas cannot be defined without mentioning their substrata; see NySi 80,2: tattadadhishṭhānaviśeshādibhiḥ tallakṣhaṇam.

⁸⁹⁰ The Adyar ed. reads sarvataḥ for sarvaśaḥ.

⁸⁹¹ As to their fruits, see the commentary ad BrSū IV. iv. 13 and 14 in the same adhikaraṇa (R).

⁸⁹² I.e. Rāmānuja shows the problem of this adhikaraṇa as follows: kiṃ muktasya dehendriyāṇi na santi, uta santi [ŚrīBh IV. iv. 10; 643,3].

⁸⁹³ It seems that V suggests to omit yathā here.

“Seeing these objects of desire with the mind, he is pleased” [?],
 “His mind is the divine eye” [?],
 “He meditates these other objects of desire with the mind” [?],
 “The world was created with the mind” [?],
 “From Him the vital breath is born, so are the mind and the corporal faculties”
 [?],
 and so on in the topics regarding [His] high [states in the Vaikuṅṭha] as well as
 [His] low [states in the material worlds as incarnation]. [Tattvaratnākara?]

The different opinion, [however], is [also] stated⁸⁹⁴:

*Some of our teachers are of the opinion that here manas means the knowledge (buddhi). Because the usage of ‘having knowledge (buddhimat)’ and that of ‘having mind (mansvin)’ are not different at all.⁸⁹⁵ And because in [the expressions] “My manas is agitated” and “My manas is calm,” the condition of this [manas] is [described as] directly perceived⁸⁹⁶ [Tattvaratnākara?].

Further, the objects are ornaments, arms, arrows, attendants, mansions, gardens, wells, artificial mountains for playing and so forth — they are excessively wonderful and eternal. Some [objects], however, are products and non-eternal. For even there [in the eternal dominion], trees have modifications such as buds, flowers and fruits; rivers [have modifications] such as foam, wave and bubble; and [His] body has [modifications] such as [His] divine manifestations (vyūha) and [His] incarnations⁸⁹⁷ (vibhava). Only those modifications which are caused by time and dependent upon karma are negated there, but not even those caused merely by the will of God. **[390]**

So are the bodies also: some bodies of the eternal seers and God are eternal because of being held with their eternal will; some are non-eternal because of being held with their non-eternal will. [The bodies] of those who are liberated, however, are products and are non-eternal also. For it is taught in the {Śrī-]Bhāshya and the other [commentaries⁸⁹⁸] that some of them have the bodies and some does not.

By the way, all the corporal faculties there are eternal. Because they are, as ether therein, not dependent upon their material causes. Among them, some are eternally held by the eternal seers and God; some are temporarily held. But those who are liberated hold them only temporarily as in the case of the bodies.

⁸⁹⁴ By the same author?

⁸⁹⁵ Both are used to mean ‘wise.’

⁸⁹⁶ If manas meant the mind only, it could not be directly perceived because the mind is beyond the range of the indriyas (R).

⁸⁹⁷ His vyūha and vibhava will be explained later [394,4ff.].

⁸⁹⁸ On BrSū IV. iv. 12.

It is for the enjoyment in the form of service (kaimkarya) of God, which is approved of by Him, that the eternal seers hold the bodies and so on. So does God for His own enjoyment, for pleasing the eternal seers, who are subordinate to Himself, and for establishing [His] being meditated by one who desires to be liberated. And His [holding the body etc.] is merely due to His own will. Of the eternal seers, however, in some cases it is due to the will of the Supreme Person only; in some cases, it is due to their own will which is in accordance with the will of the Supreme Person. So is stated in the [Brahma-]sūtra:

*In the absence of the body, [one who is liberated enjoys] as in dream; because it is possible [BrSū IV. iv. 13],

*When there is [the body], as a waking [person] [BrSū IV. iv. 14]. **[391]**

[Obj.] It is reasonable that the eternal and only one knowledge has a variety of conditions such as happiness, misery, will (icchā), hate etc. in the transmigration because it has a variety of contraction and expansion due to the karma. God might have [various kinds of] volition⁸⁹⁹ (saṃkalpa) causing the unequal modifications of material matter (triguṇa) in accordance with the difference of the operate factor (sahakārin), namely, the karma of the individual self which attains to the condition of fruition. As to the non-material modifications such as the wonderful body, however, why is it possible that the eternal seers, those who are liberated and God — who are devoid of limiting adjuncts such as karma and time, and whose knowledge is free of contraction and expansion [due to these limiting adjuncts] and, [consequently], can grasp all entities — have particular conditions of knowledge such as the temporary will, the [temporary] volition and the [temporary] bliss caused by them?

Our answer is —

(91) [Even] the knowledge of the Omniscient gradually has different contents (ullekha). If not, [He] could, by no means, understand effects as being in past, in future and in present etc. **[392]**

(92) Those who are liberated and the like, though they are free of limiting adjuncts such as the karma, have the will, the volition, the body etc. due to the particular will of God.

(93) And the will of God differs due to the particular karma in the individual creation⁹⁰⁰

⁸⁹⁹ According the commentators, saṃkalpa is a special will in the form ‘Let me accomplish it by performing,’ while icchā means will in general in the form ‘Let it be’ [393].

⁹⁰⁰ The creation beginning with the cosmic egg (R) or that immediately after the pañcīkaraṇa (K).

(vyasṭi) and due to unevenness of the [three] guṇas in the aggregate creation⁹⁰¹ (samasṭi), or rather, due to time causing this [unevenness].

(94) Such condition of time [as causing His will to differ] is due to the stream of moments. Again, this [stream] is due to the stream of limiting adjuncts [for the stream of moments, e.g. the movement of the sun], or [in the dissolution of the world] due to the preceding [modification of time] such as moment.

(95) As it is conditioned by the limiting adjuncts or the preceding [modification of time] such as moment, the stream of will of God can be the cause of each following one.

[393]

(96) And [His] will to create the non-material wonderful things does not need any other limiting adjunct [such as the karma of the individual self]; because its stream is endless [as each preceding will is the cause of each following one].

(97) Or rather,⁹⁰² [His] will, [His] volition and the creation revolve like a wheel. So mental conditions of God should be in the manner of a seed and a sprout.

(98) Let it be accepted, by force of the Āgama, that the potency of God is beyond reasoning: God does not need any other operate factor [even including time] in the beginning of each creation.

(99) [While the above-mentioned answer is based on the opinion that His knowledge is eternal but its condition has variety] and, if so, the non-material eyes and so on are [only] for beatifying Him; some has the opinion that the knowledge of God itself is non-eternal. **[394]**

For example, Varadavishṇuśra says:

*Because the non-eternal knowledge of God grasps what would be grasped by the eternal knowledge whose object is everything [?].

Thus it is established that God and the like have the eternal body etc. and non-eternal ones in accordance with the difference between their eternal will and non-eternal will.

Moreover, speaking of the body of God, we should know its varieties such as the sūkshma [or His transcendental form], the vyūha [or His incarnation in divine form] and the vibhava [or His incarnation as human being and the like] etc., explained in detail by

⁹⁰¹ The creation beginning with mahat (R) or that before the pañcikaraṇa (K).

⁹⁰² This alternative is to avoid the objection that even time cannot be the cause of the modifications in the nityavibhūti according to the passage “kālaṃ sa pacate tatra na kālas tatra vai prabhuḥ” [MBh] (K).

the Śrīmat-Pāñcarātra-[Āgama]. Now we pose an outline—

The sūkshma is the Supreme (para) Brahman, as has been explained before,⁹⁰³ called Vāsudeva, whose body is purely of the six qualities.⁹⁰⁴ The classification into śāntodita and nityodita also should be regarded as concerning the very Supreme.⁹⁰⁵

The vyūha is composed of Vāsudeva, Saṃkarshaṇa, Pradyumna and Aniruddha. Each preceding one is the cause of each following one. Among them, in Vāsudeva all the six qualities such as knowledge are manifested. In [the remainder] beginning with Saṃkarshaṇa, four [out of the six] are not manifested; because a pair of qualities which is fit for [their each moral function] such as spreading śāstras and [their each creative function] such as withdrawing the universe, is predominant⁹⁰⁶ **[395]**. [Nevertheless] all these [six qualities] exist in every [vyūha]. Their each sub-incarnation is innumerable.⁹⁰⁷

Varieties of the vibhava are [about thirty-nine avatāras] beginning with Padmanābha⁹⁰⁸ and the ten avatāras beginning with Mātsya⁹⁰⁹ etc.

⁹⁰³ The commentators refer to the passage of the JaiBr quoted in 385.

⁹⁰⁴ His six qualities are jñāna or knowledge, śakti or potency, bala or strength, aiśvarya or lordship, vīrya or energy and tejas or splendor. For the detail, see S. M. Srinivasa Chari 1994 (Vaishṇavism, Delhi): 187–91.

⁹⁰⁵ R asserts that the nityodita is para-Vāsudeva and the śāntodita is vyūha-Vāsudeva as the cause of Saṃkarshaṇa etc. This view, however, is refuted by V because it is unfit for the Deśika's sentence. Also V quotes Deśika's Stotraratnabhāshya ad v.33 as the support of his opinion [fn.1]. See also V's bhūmikā 39–41. Note that RTS refers to the opinion that the vyūha is composed of three because the vyūha-Vāsudeva is same as the para-Vāsudeva [V: 194,4f.; Skt trans. 50,14f.].

⁹⁰⁶ That is,

Saṃkarshaṇa	has	strength	for	withdrawing the universe
	and	knowledge	for	spreading śāstras;
Pradyumna	has	lordship	for	creating the universe
	and	energy for	for	spreading dharma;
Aniruddha	has	potency	for	maintaining the universe
	and	splendor	for	spreading the truth.

See the Āgama text quoted by the commentators and the Ahirbudhnyasamhitā V. 17–18, 21–24.

⁹⁰⁷ Well-known twelve sub-vyūhas are:

Keśava, Nārāyaṇa, Mādhava	from Vāsudeva;
Govinda, Viṣṇu, Madhusūdana	from Saṃkarshaṇa;
Trivikrama, Vāmana, Śrīdhara	from Pradyumna;
Hrishīkesha, Padmanābha, Dāmodara	from Aniruddha.

The twelve rule the twelve suns of each month. See YMD IX. 20f.

⁹⁰⁸ The thirty-nine avatāras listed in the Ahirbudhnyasamhitā V. 50–56 are: (1) Padmanābha, (2) Dhruva, (3) Ananta, (4) Śaktyātman, (5) Madhusūdana, (6) Vidyāhideva, (7) Kapila, (8) Viśvarūpa, (9) Vihaṅgama, (10) Kro ātman, (11) Ba abāvakra, (12) Dharma, (13) Vāgīśvara, (14) Ekāmbhonidhiśāyin, (15) Kamaṭeśvara,

Varieties of the vibhava as an idol (arcā) are svayaṃvyakta (self-manifest), daiva (of gods), ārsha (of sages) and so on.⁹¹⁰ Note that an idol-incarnation at the request of gods etc. becomes non-material immediately after their particular consecration (pratishṭhā) owing to the will of God, who is disposed to be graceful (prasādonmukha). It is not unreasonable even if material things and non-material things coexist. If it were unreasonable, why could it be possible that God incarnates Himself in the material world, that the subtle body goes even the Supreme Abode⁹¹¹ through the way beginning with light [396] or [sages of extreme yogic power] such as Vaidikaputra⁹¹² go there?

For the Supreme dwelling within the central part of the heart as the inner-ruler [of the individual self], in particular, there is [another] incarnation as subtle inner-ruler (sūkshma-antaryāmi-avatāra).⁹¹³

And not only God but also [His] body has wonderful potency such as pervasion. Counter-arguments, [say, that whatever has the body cannot be all-pervasive etc.], are rejected because of this very [fact], which is proved by [the authority] making the subject [i.e. His body] known (dharmigrāhaka). Also concerning the eleventh chapter of the Śrīmad-[Bhagavad-]gītā, [397] the author of the commentaries clearly teaches that [His] body is all-pervasive, the cause [of everything] etc. — To the verse:

(16) Varāha, (17) Narasiṃha, (18) Piyūshaharaṇa, (19) Śrīpati, (20) Kāntātman, (21) Rāhujit, (22) Kālanemmighna, (23) Pārijātaḥara, (24) Lokanātha, (25) Śāntātman, (26) Dattātreya, (27) Nyagrodhaśāyin, (28) Ekaśṛigatanu, (29) Vāmanadeha, (30) Trivikrama, (31) Nara, (32) Nārāyaṇa, (33) Hari, (34) Kṛṣṇa, (35) Paraśudhṛgrāma, (36) Rāma, (37) Vedavit, (38) Kalkin, (39) Pātālaśayana.

R lists the thirty-nine avatāras, referring to the Vaikhānasa-, the Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā etc. (V. 50–56 of the AhirS; vv. 52, 53 are considerably different and list Ekārṇavaśaya, Kūrma and Amṛtāharaṇa in place of Ekāmbhonidhiśāyin, Kamaṭeśvara and Piyūshaharaṇa).

The Vishvakṣenasāṃhitā lists thirty-six avatāras and YMD [IX. 24] follows it.

Deśika does not fix the exact number of avatāras, only saying “thirty or so” [RTS V: 200,1; Skt. 51,7]. See Srinivasa Chari 1994: 218f.

⁹⁰⁹ I.e. (1) Mātsya (fish), (2) Kūrma (tortoise), (3) Varāha (boar), (4) Nṛsiṃha (man-lion), (5) Vāmana (dwarf), (6) Paraśu-Rāma, (7) Śrī-Rāma, (8) Bala-Rāma, (9) Kṛṣṇa, (10) Kalki [YMD IX. 23]. Deśika's Daśāvatārastotra vv. 2–11 (= the Saṃkalpasūryadaya VII, vv.) explains each of these ten avatāras. Note that Buddha is not included in the list. See Srinivasa Chari 1994: 230, n.48.

⁹¹⁰ YMD IX. 28 classifies the arcāvatāra into (1) svayaṃvyakta, (2) daiva, (3) saiddha and (4) mānusha. In (1), God manifests Himself as an idol at His own will; e.g. the idols in Śrīraṃgam, Tirupati, Badarikāśrama, Vānamāmalai and Melkote. In (2), God manifests Himself as an idol at gods' request; e.g. the idol in the Varadarājasvāmi temple in Kanchipuram. In (3), at sages' request. In (4), at human beings' request [Srinivasa Chari 1994: 225f.].

⁹¹¹ According to the commentators, paramapada here denotes the Vrajā river only, because the subtle body disappears after crossing the river.

⁹¹² The Hindi com meatary refers to the Bhāgavatapurāṇa.

*See now, oh Gu ākeśa, the whole world with movable and immovable things united here in My body and whatever else you wish to see [BhG XI. 7],

it is stated that:

*See the whole world with movable and immovable things united — standing in one spot — here in My one body and even there. And see also whatever else you wish to see only in one spot of the one body [GBh XI. 7: 362,4f.].

Likewise, to the verse⁹¹⁴:

*Again, there in the body of God of gods, Pāṇava saw the whole world, divided many-fold, united. [BhG XI. 13],

it is stated that:

*There in the divine body of God of gods [...],⁹¹⁵ the whole world composed of the material principle (prakṛti) and the individual selves (purusha), divided in many-fold: differentiated in accordance with the difference among the group of enjoyers — various and wonderful gods such as Brahmā, animals, human beings, immovable beings etc.—, places of enjoyment — earth, mid-space, heaven, [hells such as] Pātāla, Atala, Vitala and Sutala etc. —, objects of enjoyment and means for enjoyment [GBh XI. 13: 364,6–365,1].

Again, to the verse:

*This form of Mine, which you have seen, is very difficult to see. Even gods ever long to see this form [BhG XI. 52],

it is stated that:

*This form of Mine — engaging in controlling everything, the substratum of all and being the cause of all —, which you have seen, is very difficult to see — cannot be seen by anyone [GBh XI. 52: 389,11f.],

and so on. Consider also [His] mode of being the substratum of everything, taught in the section [of the Vishṇupurāṇa] concerning ornaments and weapon.⁹¹⁶ In another place, the Venerable Parāśara says:

*That in which all the potencies reside, oh king, is the other great form [or body] of Hari different from all other [His] forms [mentioned before]. With His own

⁹¹³ hr̥tpadmakarṇikāmadhyagatasyāntaryāmiṇaḥ parasya viśeshataḥ sūkshamāntaryāmyavatāraḥ. According to R and the first interpretation of K, the meaning is: Though He is all-pervasive and, consequently, exists in every heart of the individual self also, He takes another incarnation as the subtle inner-ruler within each heart especially (for easy meditation). V's teacher, [Kūrīrāram svāmin], guesses the reading “hr̥tpadmakarṇikāmadhyagato 'syāntaryāmiṇaḥ parasya viśeshataḥ sūkshmo 'ntaryāmyavatāraḥ” and asserts that it is fit for the description of RTS: [sarvaruṭaiyavum hṛdayaṅkaḷile sūkshamāyiruppatoru rūpaviśeshattaik koṭṭu niṛkīra nilai antaryāmyavatāram (203,1ff.; Skt. trans. 51,16f.)].

⁹¹⁴ Unfortunately, the portion of TC XI beginning with the middle of 12 up to the opening of 16 seems to be missing [Viraraghavachari's edition of GBh with TC, p.365, fn.2].

⁹¹⁵ “which is infinite in length and breadth, which has innumerable hands, stomachs,

sport [God in] this [form] where all the potencies are,⁹¹⁷ oh king of people, makes forms movable, [i.e. His incarnations], called gods, animals and men [ViP VI. vii. 70–71],

and so on.

Among all these bodies of God, there is slight difference in giving worldly fruits. But the final beatitude [i.e. the liberation] is easily accessible in all [His bodies] for those who meditate [Him] as all-pervasive.⁹¹⁸ And [the description] “Having attained to the vyūha after reaching the vibhava ...” is to be regarded as concerned with a particular qualified person who do not meditate [Him] as all-pervasive. **[398]**

(100) Knowledge full of spotless bliss and in the form of pure sattva voluntarily becomes the world for the enjoyment of God, the lord of Kamālā [or Śrī]. Let that knowledge, which is beyond imagination, in which one can be liberated from the beginningless darkness [or ignorance], and which is composed of manifestations of the Lord, abide in my mind.

Here ends the fourth section on His eternal transcendental dominion in the Nyāyasiddhāñjana composed by Śrīmat-Veṅkaṭanātha or Vedāntācārya, who is the lion among poets and logicians and who masters all branches of arts.

Chapter 4 Knowledge

Now [attributive] knowledge⁹¹⁹ (mati) is explained.

Its definitions are: while having an object, shining forth (sakarmakāvabhāsatva); while having a subject, shining forth⁹²⁰ faces and eyes, which has immeasurable splendor, which has immeasurable divine weapons, which has immeasurable divine ornaments fit for itself, which has divine garlands and apparel, which is anointed with divine perfume and which is full of infinite wonders.”

⁹¹⁶ The commentators refer to ViP I. xxii. 65: “Vishṇu, the Lord composed of perishable and imperishable [entities], bears all that composed of spritual beings and the non-manifest like the essential nature of ornaments and weapon,” and so on.

⁹¹⁷ samastaśaktīti padacchedaḥ; samastāḥ śaktyaḥ yasmin tat tathoktam [Vishṇucittīya].

⁹¹⁸ Or those who recite the all-pervasive mantra (R, K).

(sakarṭṛkāvabhāsatva) etc. In the first chapter of the Nyāyatattva, however, [Nāthamuni] refutes the other definitions and concludes [its] definitions mentioned by himself—

*The four definitions of knowledge are: 1) being excessively fast,⁹²¹ 2) being extensively subtle,⁹²² **[400]** 3) being without weight, and 4) always illuminating⁹²³ as long as it exists [Nyāyatattva].

There we should guess attributes as are needed [to complete the definitions].

And this [attributive knowledge] is self-luminous only to the self being its own substratum when it illuminates an object. But [knowledge] belonging to the other time or the other [selves] is, for those who are in the transmigration, the object of memory, inference etc. For the others [who are not in the transmigration], however, even [knowledge] belonging to the other time or the others can be the object of their own perception because they are omniscient. So is said in the [Śrī-]Bhāshya:

*It is stated that knowledge (anubhūti) is self-luminous (svayaṃprakāśa). But this is true only for the self being the subject of knowledge (jñātr) when [the knowledge] illuminates an object; there is no rule that this is proper for all [the selves] in every case [ŚrīBh I. i. 1: (1) 134,2f.].

(101) Apprehension ‘I know’ and the like, refutation of [the opinion that knowledge is the object of] mental perception (mānasapratyaksha) etc.⁹²⁴ are the valid means to understand that knowledge (dhī) is self-luminous —
Let it be accepted. **[401]**

⁹¹⁹ In the Viśiṣṭādvaita, buddhi, mati, samvit, anubhūti, dhī etc. are synonymous and denote dharmabhūtajñāna. See ŚrīBh I. i. 1: (1) 145,2; YMD VII. 11.

⁹²⁰ “While ...” is to avoid the over-application to dharmijñāna or the self.

⁹²¹ Because it is conjunct with everything in the world at the time of liberation (R) [the text of K is missing here].

⁹²² Because it can enter even the body of an ant (R, K). As to 1) and 2), see also 414,2f.

Moreover,

(102) Can⁹²⁵ an omniscient [person] perceive even his own particular knowledge or not? In the former case, [its] self-manifestness is established. In the latter, he would not be omniscient.

(103) Is knowledge that knowledge exists concerned with [the knowledge] itself or not? In the former case, [knowledge] is self-luminous. In the latter, everything could not be established consequently.⁹²⁶ **[402]**

To [the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas⁹²⁷] who hold that [knowledge] is inferred due to the manifestness⁹²⁸ (prākāṭya) [of its object], we reply—

(104) If knowledge were merely assumed [to be the cause for the manifestness of its object], it would be enough to assume only the sufficient condition (sāmagrī) [of the manifestness], because it is simpler [than assuming knowledge also in the middle of the sufficient condition and the manifestness].⁹²⁹ [But] if [knowledge], which is perceptible [in our opinion], is assumed to be different from that [sufficient condition], above-mentioned

⁹²³ bhāvyāpti = prakāśaniyama (K).

⁹²⁴ I.e. the refutation the opinion that knowledge is inferred through jñātātā or manifestation (K). R seems to interpret °ādi as °pūrvaka (mānasapratyakshabhaṅgasahitam ahaṃ vevdmīityādyupalambhanam eva ...).

⁹²⁵ V refers to SAS IV. 1: 472,4ff. (ed. Viraraghavachari, Madras 1973).

⁹²⁶ If the knowledge that knowledge exists were not concerned with itself, this knowledge, the existence of which would not be ascertained, would be non-existent; if so, existent-ness of all knowledge, being an object of this [knowledge], would be non-existent and, consequently, knowledge would be non-existent; if so, [its] object would be non-existent; if so, everything would be non-established (R). K poses another interpretation also.

⁹²⁷ See SAS IV. 3: kaumārilās tu kanthayanti— na svayamprakāśa, nāpi mānasapratyakshā buddhiḥ, svaphalena tu vishayaparakāśenānumīyata iti ... arthagataḥ prakāśo liṅgam, purushagataḥ prakāśo 'numeyaḥ [476,1–4].

⁹²⁸ prākāṭya = jñātātā = prakāśa.

undesirable conclusion [that knowledge is needless] would not be brought about; [for perceptible entity cannot be omitted in view of simplicity].

(105) Manifestation (prakāśa) [or manifestness] here [in an object such as a pot], which is nothing but [its] relation to knowledge, cannot be known if this [knowledge] is not established. [Thus we cannot infer knowledge from manifestation].⁹³⁰

[The notion of] knowledge (jñāna) depends upon the verbal activity of [known] object [i.e. to be known] and that of [knowing] subject [i.e. to know]; because there is difference in suffix [in the expression ‘I know a pot (ghaṭam ahaṃ jānāmi)’ and so on]. **[403]**

(106) [Though ‘to know (jñā) and ‘to shine forth (pra- kāś)’ denote the same notion], there is [difference in usage] between ‘[a pot] shines forth (or is manifest) (prakāśate)’ and ‘[a pot] is known (jñāyate).’ This [difference] is caused by difference in verbal root, as [the difference between] instrumental [suffix] and accusative [suffix] in [the usages of] ‘bhinatti’ and ‘pāṭayati’⁹³¹, etc.⁹³²

(107) Verbal expression, restriction of a [known] object and [its] being manifested are caused by knowledge. **[404]** And such restriction of own nature is not violated even in regard to manifestness (prākāṭya).

⁹²⁹ See TMK IV. 3: buddhir yata udayati te syāt tato 'rthaparakāśaḥ, madhye buddhiḥ kimarthā; SAS 476,5ff.: purushagataparakāśakalpane 'pi yady arthagataparakāśam antareṇa vyavahāro na jāyate tadā buddhi-janakatvena 'bhimataiva sāmagrī lāghavād arthaparakāśasya 'vyavahitahetur iti kalpyatām.

⁹³⁰ Cf. Mesquita 1990: 87, Anm.187.

⁹³¹ I.e. ‘paraśunā vṛkṣaṃ bhinatti’ and ‘paraśuṃ vṛkṣhe pāṭayati’ denote the same meaning (He cuts a tree with his axe), but the case-endings are reverse.

⁹³² The translation here is based on V's fn. According to R, the translation of vv.105cd–106 is—

“jñāna is dependent upon the action of known object and that of knowing subject [and has the meaning of prakāśa]. Expression thereof (that ‘prakāśate’ and ‘jñāyate’), based on the difference in suffix [between

(108) [That is], as this [manifestness] operates on [its object] only, so [knowledge] manifests only [its object]. [Thus, manifestness of the object has no *raison d'être*].

[Also], why can manifestness be generated even in a past [object], future one,⁹³³ non-existence [of an object] and also known-ness⁹³⁴ (*jñātātā*)?

In [the portion of] the *Ātmasiddhi* for ascertaining the meaning of the word 'prakāśa (illumination or manifestation),⁹³⁵ to the question that:

*What is the meaning of the word prakāśa, then? [ĀS 81,8],
the author first quotes the passage of the *Nyāyatattva* that:

*[The meaning is] not being remote from direct experience (*anubhavādūra*), or the cause of memory [ĀS 81,10: from *Nyāyatattva* I].

Then, having stated that:

*Prakāśa means not being remote from attributive knowledge (*saṃvit*) [ĀS 81,11],

he states concerning alternatives⁹³⁶ of [the meaning of] 'not being remote (*adūra*):

*Let *anubhavādūra* mean either being different from what is remote [from direct experience] or being opposed to what is remote. And this condition is being prakāśa.⁹³⁷ Why should we be indulged in such useless discussion on this point? [405] [ĀS 82,1f.].

Likewise, the [Śrī-]Bhāshya says:

accusative-ending and nominative-ending] (as [that] between instrumental [suffix] and accusative [suffix] in [using] 'bhinatti' and 'pāṭayati' etc.), is caused by the difference in verbal root."

Though K interprets in the same manner, he does not mention of the underlined portion, as is pointed out by V.

⁹³³ Cf. *atīte 'nāgate cārthe katham prakāṭyasambhavaḥ* [fragment of the *Samvitsiddhi* quoted in *ŚP* I. i. 1: (1) 102,26]. Also *ĀS* 23,7ff. (This argument is omitted in *ŚrīBh* (1) 102,2ff. [Mesquita 1984: 193]).

⁹³⁴ If *prakāṭya* (= *jñātātā*) were generated concerning *jñātātā*, there would be infinite regression (R, K).

⁹³⁵ It is examined in Narasimhachari 1971: 209f.

*And prakāśa is that which is common to all spiritual and non-spiritual entities (padārtha) and makes [them] fit for practical usage [ŚrīBh I . i. 1: (1) 143,1].

Thus, knowledge is not inferred from illumination [or manifestation] (prakāśa) but is self-established.

All this is explained in detail by Bhaṭṭa-Parāśara-pāda in his Tattvaratnākara. For example,

*Knowledge is self-luminous. Because it is perceptible entity; because this [perception] is impossible for the other [i.e. the mind]; because of the process of elimination⁹³⁸ (pāriśeshya); because of the means of valid knowledge⁹³⁹ and so on.

Because there is verbal expression, [say, ‘I know a pot,’ soon] after [its] apprehension [without any interruption by other knowledge], because there is no doubt [whether I know or not at that time] **[406]** and because [each of continuous knowledge] is regarded as established so long as it exists,⁹⁴⁰ it is certain that knowledge shines forth [by itself]. [Tattvaratnākara]

This is a summary—

*[Knowledge is] self-established. (1) Because something else [apprehending each of continuous knowledge, i.e. reflective mental perception], is not seen⁹⁴¹; because⁹⁴² of (2) affirmative concomitance

⁹³⁶ I.e. kim idam adūra iti? [1] dūrād anyah, [2] tadviruddhaḥ, [3] tadabhāvo vā? [ĀS 81,12].

⁹³⁷ According to R, prakāśatva here means prakāśamānatva. He also points out that the reading prakāśo 'tra for prakāśatvam is better.

⁹³⁸ E.g. the object-ness existing in knowledge correlated (nirūpita) to perception ‘I know a pot,’ is correlated to itself; because it is related to something, while not related to the others; like the object-ness of a pot existing in itself (K).

⁹³⁹ E.g. the inference that: knowledge is self-luminous, because it is knowledge, like knowledge of God (R).

⁹⁴⁰ Soon after continuous knowledge, there is recollection ‘I have

and (3) negative concomitance (vyāptād anvayavyairekitaḥ); because of (4) postulation (arthāpatti); because of (5) reduction ad absurdum (yukti); and because of (6) the Scriptural passages. [Tattvaratnākara]

In commenting on the [above-mentioned] phrase that:

*Because of (2) affirmative concomitance and (3) negative concomitance [Tattvaratnākara],

[(2) the affirmative one] is shown [first]:

*Knowledge, under discussion, does not require the relation to [other] homogenous [things] in assistants (kiṃcitkāra) dependent upon itself⁹⁴³ so far as the verbal expression caused by⁹⁴⁴ itself concerned.⁹⁴⁵ Because it is a cause of verbal expression. Like an object, sense-organs, light etc.⁹⁴⁶ **[407]**

seen it for this period'; if knowledge were not self-luminous, such recollection would be impossible because each of continuous knowledge would perish without being experienced (R, K).

⁹⁴¹ If there were reflective perception (anuvyavasāya) of each of continuous knowledge in the middle, its continuity would be interrupted and, consequently, the recollection would be impossible (R, K).

⁹⁴² The following reasons are explained in the words of Parāśara himself.

⁹⁴³ svādhīnakiñcitkāre. K: intermeditate cause (vyāpāra) born immediately after itself; e.g. vishayendriyasannikarsha (R). Though, according R, this is to avoid the objection that the reason is vyabhicāra because the eye needs homogenous light in its verbal expression, this objection is refuted by Parāśara. Then, this adjective is not necessary. If so, this syllogism would be completely same as that of Yāmuna [ĀS 62,8–16] interpreted by Deśika in his Tattvaṭīkā [UVG ed., p.147,15ff.].

⁹⁴⁴ °gata = utpādyā (R) or prayojyā (K).

⁹⁴⁵ The sādhyā is, in short: being the cause of vyāpāra bringing about vyavahāra not dependent upon the relation to itself (K).

⁹⁴⁶ Concerning the proof that the self is self-luminous, the similar argument is seen in ĀS 62,8–16: “All entities need, for their manifestations [siddhiḥ = vyavahārayogyatārūpaḥ prakāśaḥ (Tattvaṭīkā 147,16)], neither an entity which is homogenous to themselves nor that which is manifested (sādhyā) by themselves. Accordingly, the self does not need [anything] for its own manifestation [this verse is quoted in Tattvaṭīkā (147,15f.) with reference to the proof that knowledge is self-luminous (ŚrīBh I. i. 1: (1)

[Obj.] There is deviation (anaikāntya); because the eye, [which the Naiyāyikas regard as fiery], requires light, homogenous to it, [concerning its verbal expression].

[Ans.] Not so. Because this [eye], which is a sense-organ or is derived from ahaṃkāra, is heterogeneous to light, [which is made up of gross elements].

Also, other [inferences] are —

The latent impression (saṃskāra) on knowledge⁹⁴⁷ does not require the direct experience (anubhava) of knowledge inherent to the same object as that of itself.⁹⁴⁸ Because it is latent impression. Like the latent impression on another [object⁹⁴⁹].

The latent impression on an object is generated along with the latent 104,2); also in Nyāyakuliśa 75].— No entity is found, for its own illumination (or manifestation), to be dependent upon another object unique and homogeneous [to themselves]. [For example], a pot, as you know, is not dependent upon another pot for its manifestation (siddhi) but is dependent upon light etc., which is heterogeneous [to it]. Likewise, light illuminating [a pot etc.] is dependent upon neither another light nor a pot etc., the manifestation of which is dependent upon it; but it is dependent upon sense-organ, which is heterogeneous [to it]. So sense-organ is dependent upon neither another sense-organ nor light and a pot etc., the manifestation of which is dependent upon it; but it is dependent upon knowledge, which is heterogeneous [to it]. Similarly, knowledge is dependent upon neither another knowledge nor sense-organ etc., the manifestation of which is dependent upon it, for its manifestation; but it is dependent upon the self, being independent and its substratum, which is heterogeneous [to it]. In the same manner, the self is dependent upon neither another self nor knowledge and sense-organ etc., the manifestation of which is dependent upon it, for its experience. Thus, the manifestation of the self in itself is not dependent upon anything.” See Narasimhachari 1971: 179 and Mesquita 1990: 69f.

⁹⁴⁷ jñānasamskāra = jñānasmṛtījanakasamskāra (R) or jñānavishayakasamskāra (K).

⁹⁴⁸ If this sādhyā is established in [the paksha] ‘jñānasamskāra,’ it is established that knowledge is self-luminous or having itself as its object. For it is inevitable that this samskāra is generated from knowledge as an object and there is a rule that samskāra on something is generated from direct experience of the same thing; accordingly, samskāra on knowledge could not be generated from the same [knowledge] if knowledge had itself for its object. (K)

impression on [its] knowledge.⁹⁵⁰ Because it is the latent impression on an object. Like the latent impression [on the object] born out of knowledge ‘I know this [object]’ [408].

[Obj.] ‘Based on knowledge concerning both [an object and its knowledge]’ is effective [as adventitious condition (upādhi) in the latter inference].⁹⁵¹

[Ans.] Not so. For [‘concerning both’] is meaningless attribute (vyarthaviśeṣhaṇa) because mere ‘based on knowledge’ could establish the concomitance [in this inference].⁹⁵² [Tattvaratnākara]

Immediately after that, having said:

*Moreover [Tattvaratnākara],

the author shows the inference affected by the [Śrī-]Bhāshya⁹⁵³ as follows:

*Knowledge (saṃvit) has its own attribute [and] verbal usage which

⁹⁴⁹ For example, saṃskāra on a pot, which bring about memory of a pot, requires direct experience of a pot in the same substratum [i.e. the self], but it does not require direct experience of knowledge (R).

⁹⁵⁰ Consequently, vishayānubhva is equal to jñānānubhava (R, K).

⁹⁵¹ Because ‘based on knowledge concerning both an object and its knowledge’ pervades the sādhyā ‘being generated along with the latent impression on knowledge’ in the dṛṣhṭānta ‘the latent impression on the object born out of knowledge “I know this object”’; but it does not pervades the sādhanā ‘being the latent impression on an object’ in the pakṣha ‘the latent impression on an object’ (K).

⁹⁵² The attribute ‘concerning both’ in knowledge merely makes the pakṣha excluded. If such attribute were meaningful in the upādhi, all that is other than pakṣha could be upādhi and inference itself would be impossible (K).

⁹⁵³ I.e. ŚrīBh I. i. 1: (1) 104,2–106,3, (where Rāmānuja enlarges the argument of Yāmuna [ĀS 23,13–24,4] based on the description of Vimuktātman [Mesquita 1984: 193f.] — “Knowledge (anubhūti) has its own attribute [and] verbal usage which are independent of anything else. Because it brings about this attribute and verbal usage in another thing through its own relation [to it]. Whatever brings about a certain attribute and a certain verbal usage in another thing through [its] own relation [to it], is found to be independent of anything concerning that [attribute] and that [verbal expression] in reference to itself; like color to visibility. That is, for example, color brings about visibility etc. in earth and the like through its

are independent of anything else,⁹⁵⁴ [Tattvaratnākara] and so on. As to this [inference], you can extract [two] inferences by yourself.⁹⁵⁵

Having said:

*Furthermore, there is (3) a negative inferential mark (liṅga) also [Tattvaratnākara],

the author uses [negative inferential marks] such as being non-material (ja atva) and being knowledge (jñānatva) in syllogisms⁹⁵⁶ and explains them.

Two (4) postulations are explained: that is, [knowledge is self-luminous because, otherwise], its perceptibility would be impossible⁹⁵⁷ and its bringing about particular verbal usage [‘it is manifest’ in another object through its own relation to it] would be impossible.

The author teaches (5) reduction ad absurdum, say, that knowledge is own relation [to them], but it is independent of the relation to color for its own visibility. Therefore knowledge itself is the cause of its own being illuminated as well as of verbal expression ‘It illuminates.’”

⁹⁵⁴ ŚrīBh I. i. 1: anubhūtir anayādhīnasvadharmavyavhārā [(1) 104,2]. Needless to say, Mesquita's German translation “den Denk- und Sprachgebrauch in bezeug auf seine Eigenschaften” [1984: 193, Anm.53] is not correct.

⁹⁵⁵ The syllogism posed by Rāmānuja ‘anubhūtir anayādhīnasvadharmavyavhārā, svasaṃbandhād arthāntare taddharmavyavahārahetutvāt’ [(1) 104,2] shows two different syllogisms inseparately, for fear that the work should be too voluminous [ŚP 104,24 TṬ 146,13]. Sudarśanasūri divides it into ‘anubhūtir anayādhīnasvadharmā, svasaṃbandhād arthāntare taddharmahetutvāt’ and ‘anubhūtir anayādhīnasvavyavhārā, svasaṃbandhād arthāntare tadvyavahārahetutvāt’, and comments them in detail [ŚP 104,25ff.; also Śrutapradīpikā 62–64]. Also Deśika himself shows them in more elaborate form: anubhūtiḥ paragatasvajanyadharmātyntasajātīyāvaśyambhāvidharmayoge svātyantasajātīyāpekshāniyamarahitā, svavijātīye svānantarakālottarakālānuvṛttirahitadharmahetutvāt; anubhūtiḥ svātyantasajātīyāpekshāniyamarahitasvavyavahārā, hetutvāt [TṬ 146,18f.; 147,12f.].

⁹⁵⁶ E.g. knowledge is self-luminous; because it is non-material; whatever is not self-luminous is not non-material, like a pot; knowledge is not so, therefore it is not so.

not illuminated (or manifest) by others because, [if it were illuminated by others], [knowledge] could not illuminate [other] entities such as a pot.

*And (6) the Scriptural passages [Tattvaratnākara], says the author,

*such as:

“Here this person becomes self-luminous (svayaṃjyotis)” [BṛhUp IV. iii. 14],

“The self is, indeed, his light” [BṛhUp IV. iii. 6],

“He rests by his own light⁹⁵⁸” [BṛhUp IV. iii. 9],

“His knowledge, known by itself, is named Brahman” [ViP],

which intend to show that the individual self, called by the word ‘knowledge (jñāna)’, is self-luminous, make it possible that consciousness (saṃvit), which is [also] expressed by the word ‘knowledge (jñāna)’, has self-luminousness in view of possibility and simplicity.⁹⁵⁹ Accordingly, [409] the passage that:

“As one sun illuminates all the world, oh Bhārata, so the individual self (kshetrin) illuminates all the body (kshetra)” [BhG XIII. 33],

and the like, which explain the individual self and its knowledge through their similarity to a jewel, the sun and a lump and their light, make us understand that knowledge and the self are similar in being self-luminous. And no undesirable conclusion is not brought about. [Tattvaratnākara]

The inferences to prove [knowledge] to be cognized (vedya) etc. because of its being expressed (vyvahāryatva), its being an entity (vastutva), its being an object of valid knowledge (prameyatva), its being action (kriyātva) etc. are rejected. The reasons are: [if ‘to be cognized’ means ‘to be cognized by another knowledge’], there is competent non-apprehension⁹⁶⁰ (yogyānupalambha) [as to such knowledge]; [if it means ‘to be cognized in

⁹⁵⁷ Because its mānasapratyaksha has been already refuted, says R. If so, the refutation of mānasapratyaksha in the Tattvaratnākara (quoted in 410,3ff.) is preceding to this portion.

general’], [these inference would] prove what has been already proved [in view of knowledge of God]; [‘to be action’] is not established [in the subject, which we regard as not action but quality of the self] etc. [Nevertheless], the establishment of [knowledge] not being an object of knowledge is justified. Because being temporarily an object of knowledge⁹⁶¹ exists even in knowledge as an unknown pot and the like are existent. And because the objection that [knowledge cannot grasp itself as] a tip of a finger [cannot touch itself⁹⁶²] is rejected **[410]** since we do not accept being an object etc.⁹⁶³

The fear⁹⁶⁴ that if [knowledge] were self-luminous, [knowledge and its known object] have no distinction because [the two] are always apprehended simultaneously (sahopalambhaniyama), is also completely destroyed. For the inference is defective; because the probandum (sādhya) [‘having no distinction’] is sublated (avaruddha) by contradictory perception, [which distinguishes knowledge from its object, in the form ‘I know it’]; [the reason] is contradicted [as simultaneousness presupposes distinction]; because [the inference] is purposeless, etc.⁹⁶⁵

Furthermore, it is stated in the summary of refuting mental perception (mānasapratyaksha) as follows:

⁹⁵⁸ svena jyotishā "ste [for pravapiti in BṛhUp].

⁹⁵⁹ Because another knowledge is not necessary (R).

⁹⁶⁰ See Vedāntaparibhāshā VI. 4–8 (Adyar ed.).

⁹⁶¹ kadācid dhīkarmatvam. Though R comments the reading °adhīkarma-, he regards °dhīkarma- as better.

⁹⁶² Cf. aṅgulyagram yathātmānaṃ nātmanā sprasṭum arhati / svāṃśena jñānaṃ apy evaṃ nātmanā jñātum arhati // [Prakaraṇapañcikā (Benares ed.): 187,4f. etc.], which is a fragment of Kumārila's Bṛhattīkā. See Mesquita 1990: 66, Anm.118.

⁹⁶³ Because we do accept in itself neither svakarmatva in the sense of being its own object, though different from itself, nor svakarṭṛtva in the sense of being its own substratum, though different from itself (K). According to V, ‘different from itself,’ which is not mentioned in the text, is automatically attained because it is accepted that one thing become its own object [i.e. we

*Because there is competent non-apprehension [of mental perception], because [knowledge] can [be manifest] be itself, because there would be infinite regress [if another knowledge were accepted] — are sublating reasons. And because the [above-mentioned] two reasons cannot prove the probandum due to its non-establishment (asiddhi) and deviation (vyabhicāra).⁹⁶⁶ Because of these non-proof and sublation, knowledge cannot be within the scope of mental [perception]. Thus, [knowledge] is self-manifest and this is the way to establish knowledge.⁹⁶⁷ [Tattvaratnākara]

Immediately after refuting [the Advaita opinion that] the [scriptural] passages have an undifferentiated sense (akhaṇ ārthavākya), the author, based on the refutation of manifestness (prākāṭya) and mental perception, teaches the reasons again [411]. There the two reasons are being momentary specific quality (viśeshaguṇa) of the self etc. [i.e. being specific quality of the self compatible (yogyātmaviśeshaguṇa) to the mind]. On this point it is stated that momentariness etc. [i.e. compatibility to the mind⁹⁶⁸] are non-established, [according to us, in knowledge] and also that [the first reason] is of deviation (anaikāntika) in view of merits born out of expiatory rites (prāyaścitta), [which are momentarily destroyed after destroying sin but are not apprehended with the mind]. Consider, in the way, also [deviation of the two reasons] in view of volition proceeding from [mere] living (jīvanapūrvaka) as is assumed in the other schools.

By the way, Varadavishṇuśra says:

*Happiness and pain are aspects of knowledge [?],
and immediately after this, he says that:

*Desire, dislike and volition are perceived with the mind [?].
can accept the two if same as itself] (fn.1).

⁹⁶⁴ This is an objection of the Yogacāra Buddhist. Cf. ĀS 43ff.

⁹⁶⁵ Cf. 11,3ff, where the Vaibhāshika Buddhist theory that there is no dharmin is refuted.

⁹⁶⁶ Parāśara's discussion on this point will be explained immediately after that.

This is, no doubt, based on the assumption that qualities different [from happiness and pain] such as desire exist [in knowledge]; or rather, it is based on the opinion of the other [schools].⁹⁶⁹ And there is no difference between happiness and pain and desire etc. in being an aspect of knowledge.

(109) Happiness or pain must not be the mutual non-existence of the other. For [if they were so], [apprehension of happiness and that of pain] are in mutual-dependence [because apprehension of non-existence needs that of its correlative]; it is sublated by knowledge [which grasps the two as positive]; and neutral condition is apprehended.⁹⁷⁰ **[412]**

And this [knowledge], which differs from person to person, can grasp everything by nature. Nevertheless, it is contracted due to karma at the condition of transmigration and, in degree⁹⁷¹ (tāratamya) in accordance with their each karma, expands depending upon sense-organs. For this very reason, their each object is regulated and it is spoken of differently, owing to difference in its expansion, as rising and setting. So is stated in the [Śrī-]Bhāshya:

*Depending upon the above-mentioned expansion of knowledge through sense-organs, [knowledge] is referred to as rising and setting [ŚrīBh I. i. 1: (1) 160,5].

For this [teaching], to the objection that [knowledge] never depends on sense-organs because it is eternal, our answer has been already given.

Now we consider whether continuous understanding (dhāravāhikavijñāna) is of one single form (ekarūpa) like the sunbeam coming up without any gap, or of the form of series (santatirūpa) like [flame of] a lamp, [each one of which is momentary⁹⁷² but] is made continuous owing to [successive] combination of oil and a wick.

⁹⁶⁷ Here the word samvitsiddhi does not denotes the work of Yāmuna. If it did so, missing portion of the work [e.g. its fragments collected in Mesquita 1988: 195] might be referred to here.

⁹⁶⁸ According to R. According to K, ādi denotes guṇatva.

⁹⁶⁹ This suggests that Deśika himself did not know the whole context

On this point, Varada-Nārāyaṇa bhaṭṭāraka supports the first view. That is to say, it is stated in his Prajñāparitrāṇa, in connection with [the discussion that] memory is not valid means of knowledge,⁹⁷³ that:

*Continuous understanding is a series of successive knowledge, [where each momentary knowledge severally] manifests an object as being in its own time, in the form, [say], ‘a pillar is [now]’ [and at the next moment] ‘a pillar is [now]’ [and] ‘a pillar is [now]’ [at the next]; and it is valid apprehension (pramā) because there is something different from cloud [or something revealing unknown things] and it is independent⁹⁷⁴ — this is the opinion [of the others].

In our opinion, [however], continuous understanding is but one knowledge.

Indeed, eternal knowledge is produced due to the destruction etc. of a part obstructing [the expansion of knowledge; accordingly, sense-organs etc. are helpful only when the obstruction is destroyed but not when eternal knowledge is produced⁹⁷⁵]. **[413]** If there is no obstruction for a long time, [the knowledge] manifests [an object] for a long time. But the knowledge lasting for a long time as to an object is not the above-mentioned continuous [series of knowledge]. Because knowledge of God as is based on the Scripture⁹⁷⁶ would not be accepted.

It is eternal; therefore, knowledge of everyone is also eternal because of the text.

⁹⁷⁰ Cf. TMK V. 74.

⁹⁷¹ Cf. ViP VI. vii. 63.

⁹⁷² See 110,3–112,1.

⁹⁷³ This view is quoted and refuted in NyP 290,15ff. Deśika is of opinion that smṛti is included in pramāṇa. See Singh 1958: 274f. and Vedavalli 1984: 172–75.

⁹⁷⁴ It can grasp something unknown and is not dependent upon original knowledge as in the case of memory (R, K). Cf. the fragment of the Prajñāparitrāṇa [NyP 290,16]: jñātātmajñānasvarūpatvāt svaprameyaprahāṇataḥ / viśayāvyaḥcāratve 'py aprāmāṇyaṃ smṛter matam //.

⁹⁷⁵ According to R and K.

of the Scripture⁹⁷⁷ [Prajñāparitrāṇa],
and so forth.

Bhaṭṭa-Parāśara-pāda says in refuting [the Advaita view that] perception grasps pure-existence (sanmātra):

*Because it is accepted that [knowledge] continues so long as its connection to the organs (karaṇa) even if it is contracted [Tattvaratnākara].

Even in this view, it should be accepted that when the conjunction with sense-organs are momentary, knowledge is also momentary.

But some [is of] the second opinion, because the smṛti,⁹⁷⁸ the [Śrī-]Bhāṣya⁹⁷⁹ etc. show that knowledge is momentary and that meditation is in the form of a series. **[414]**

Classification of this [knowledge], which is by nature directly experienced by itself (svataḥpratyakshasvabhāva), into perceptual one (pratyaksha), inferential one (anumiti) etc. or seeing, hearing, thinking etc. is also conditioned by varieties of its instrument (karaṇa). Even when it expands towards all directions, [knowledge keeps] its nature of manifesting itself directly.

Because [knowledge] is excessively fast and excessively subtle,⁹⁸⁰ [it can be] all at once related to things far off and nothing prevents it. And this relation is characterized as conjunction (saṃyoga). So is said in the [Śrī-]Bhāṣya etc. Because it clearly states:

*The relation is characterized as conjunction; and knowledge is nothing but substance [ŚrīBh II. ii. 27: 303,11],

and so on.

⁹⁷⁶ āgamādikam. Here other pramāṇas are also indicated, according to R. R reports the reading āgmātigam also. In this case, the translation is: “For non-eternal knowledge of God, which is contradictory to the Scriptures, is not accepted.”

⁹⁷⁷ I.e. BṛhUp IV. iii. 23.

There may be following objections—

- [1] What proves the eternity of knowledge?
- [2] If [it] were so [eternal], how are its varieties such as waking state and sleeping state established?
- [3] What proves its expansion?
- [4] Why can knowledge, quality (guṇa) of the self, be substance?
- [5] What proves that it is substance?
- [6] How can this [knowledge], being dharma of the self, go out from its substratum?
- [7] How can [knowledge], not having any increase and decrease, be associated with another size?
- [8] How is [its] conjunction to past or future things possible?
- [9] How [is its conjunction] to quality etc. [possible]?
- [10] Why doesn't [knowledge] manifest intermediate things to which it relates?
- [11] Why can knowledge of the liberated self have conjunction to numberless spots at once or gradually?
- [12] Why does [the liberated self] floating in the moonlight of his own pervasive knowledge — whose conjunction to various parts of knowledge is, like a spider clinging to a net of threads of its own saliva, dependent upon [its own] moving — **[415]** have innate relation to its own knowledge excluding another knowledge⁹⁸¹?

⁹⁷⁸ I.e. ViP VI. vii. 97.

⁹⁷⁹ I.e. ŚrīBh I. i. 1: kṣhaṇabhāṅginyāḥ saṃvidah ... [(1) 145,8].

⁹⁸⁰ Cf. the fragment of the Nyāyatattva quoted in 399.

[1] Among them, to the first [question], our answer is: it is the Scriptures. For example,

*There is no cessation of the knowledge of a knower. There is no cessation of the seeing of a seer. Because [both are] imperishable [BṛhUp IV. iii. 23],

etc. And this is commented in the Ātmasiddhi:

*Teaching that because a knower is imperishable [his] knowledge is also imperishable, this śruti shows that knowledge is caused by the essential nature of a knower. [ĀS 84,12f.]

In this regard, it is stated also in smṛtis:

*As by washing the dirt of a jewel, no brilliance [of it] is produced [anew]; so by the cessation of the ignorance, no knowledge is produced [anew] for the self.

As by digging a well, neither space nor water is produced [anew]; so only an existent is made to become manifest — how can a non-existent be produced?

Similarly, by the destruction of evil qualities [auspicious] qualities such as intelligence are manifest, but not produced [anew]; because those of the self are eternal⁹⁸² [Viṣṇudharma 104. 55–57],

etc. Moreover, the [Brahma-]sūtra says:

*For the same reason, [the self] is but the knower (jñā) [BrSū II. iii. 19];

again,

*There is no defect [in that knowledge denotes the self], also⁹⁸³ because [knowledge] lasts as long as the self exists; for such [usage] is seen [in our daily life] [BrSū II. iii. 30].

⁹⁸¹ When knowledge A moves or not is in accordance with whether the individual self B moves or not, A belongs to B. But, in fact, even if the self moves, it is united with another part of its own pervasive knowledge; it cannot make its own knowledge move. Therefore, particular relation excluding others is hardly attained (R).

[2] To the second [question, our answer is]: it is an obstructing *tamas*. As fire, which can burn [something], cannot burn [anything] in the presence of [a particular kind of] jewel and the like⁹⁸⁴ but it burns independent of any other causes⁹⁸⁵; so [various conditions of knowledge] such as waking state are established owing to the presence or absence of a particular *tamas*. So is said [in the *Brahmasūtra*]:

*Because, however, [knowledge, which is] existent [even in sleeping state], can become manifest [in waking state], as in the case of masculinity (*pumstva*) etc., [which are existent but not manifest in children]. [*BrSū* II. iii. 31].

Hence, it is easily understood that knowledge, the expansion of which is limited to waking state and the like, is manifest only when it manifests an object, but not at other occasions.

However, Śrīrāmamiśra says in his *Ṣadārthasaṃkṣhepa* as follows:

*Of course, [knowledge] is self-established. It is not non-manifest even in deep sleep. For [at that time] it illuminates itself only for its substratum [i.e. the self] — This is peculiarity [for the knowledge],⁹⁸⁶ as we will explain in proper occasion. **[416]** And it is because [its] instruments always rest that there is no verbal expression [at that time]. [*Ṣadārthasaṃkṣhepa*]

The same content is stated also in [his] *Vivaraṇa*. — This should be regarded as an arrogant speech⁹⁸⁷ (*vaibhava*). For otherwise it would be contradictory to the [*Brahma-*]sūtra that:

*Because, however, [knowledge, which is] existent [even in sleeping

⁹⁸² Also quoted in ŚrīBh IV. iv. 3 and ĀS 85.

⁹⁸³ According to Rāmānuja, ‘also (ca)’ indicates the other reason that both knowledge and the self are self-luminous.

⁹⁸⁴ E.g. a particular mantra. Cf. *Mānameyodaya* II. (4) 45.

⁹⁸⁵ This is a well-known example to teach potency (*śakti*). E.g., see *NyBo* §2.

⁹⁸⁶ This answers to the objection that knowledge would be *nirviśeṣa* at that time. R refers to the passage of ŚP: *dharmeṇa dharmī saviśeṣaḥ*,

state], can become manifest [in waking state], as in the case of masculinity (pumstva) etc., [which are existent but not manifest in children] [BrSū II. iii. 31],

and the [Śrī-]Bhāshya thereon. It is no wonder even if knowledge, which can manifest all objects, is devoid of an inner object as it is devoid of all external objects.

And there is not any contradiction in the statement of the [Śrī-]Bhāshya that:

*Likewise, as you know,⁹⁸⁸ the reflection of a person risen up from deep sleep is: ‘I slept well.’ This very reflection makes us understand that even at that time⁹⁸⁹ [of deep sleep] the self, which is the ‘I’ (ahamartha), has happiness and knower-ness [ŚrīBh I. i. 1: (1) 167,2f.]. Because such [description as ‘having happiness’ and ‘having knower-ness’ is done] with the intention of showing that the essential nature [of the self] is favorable and that [it] is inwards⁹⁹⁰ (pratyak) [respectively].⁹⁹¹

[3] To the third [question], Bhagavat-Yāmuna-muni answers.⁹⁹² For example, he says:

*Accordingly,⁹⁹³ consciousness (caitanya) also goes out with the sense-organs and comes in contact with each object; as the faculty of touch [comes in contact with its object] with the hands etc. [ĀS 76,6f.],
dharmaṇā ca dharmāḥ saviśeṣaḥ [114,14].

⁹⁸⁷ To show the greatness of a disputer who is capable of arguing even in the standpoint of opponents.

⁹⁸⁸ hiḥ prasiddham parair apy udāhṛtatvaṃ ca dyotayati [TṬ 215,15f.].

⁹⁸⁹ tadānīm eva. The original text of ŚrīBh reads: tadānīm api.

⁹⁹⁰ Cf. svasmai bhāsamānaṃ pratyak [NySi 38,3].

⁹⁹¹ Cf. TṬ 215,17–20: nātra viśayānubhavasukhaṃ dharmabhūta dhīprasaratvaṃ ca vivakṣhitam; sushuptivyāghātāt, “pumstvādivat” [BrSū II. iii. 31] iti sūtravirodhāt, pūrvāparabhāshyaiḥ pratikṣhptatvāc ca / ataḥ svasyaivānukūlatayā svenaiva prakāśamānatve tātpariyam / yad dhi yasyānukūlatayā bhāti, sa tena sukhīti vyavahriyate; yasya yena yad bhāti sa tena tasya jñātetī ca.

⁹⁹² This portion of ĀS is closely examined in Narasimhachari 199–204.

and so on. After that, having raised the question that:

*If you argue that [the knowledge], being formless (amūrta), cannot have any activity like ether [ĀS 77,18f.],

he rejects it in the portion beginning with:

*What is ‘form (mūrta),’ by which activity would be incapable, then? [ĀS 77,18],⁹⁹⁴

and, as well, explains the way of [its] relation to things not immediately connected⁹⁹⁵ or remote things.⁹⁹⁶ Then, he says:

*As is stated by Bhagavat:

“This [mind] carries away his intelligence (prajñā), as wind [carries away] a ship on water” [BhG II. 67].

And Manu says:

“Among operating sense-organs, if one sense-organ goes astray, his intelligence goes astray through it; as water from a leather” [Manusmṛti II. 99]

[ĀS 78,21–79,3].

And in this regard, there is the śruti also:

*And the ancient intelligence went out through it [ŚveUp IV. 18].

[Obj.] The import of the śruti is different from that of the smṛtis.⁹⁹⁷

[Ans.] [We cite it] because the content naturally understood [from them, i.e. that knowledge goes out], is not sublated. This [difference] belongs only to the portion sublated.

⁹⁹³ atah. The reading in the UVG edition of the Siddhitraya, i.e. atha, must be a misprint.

⁹⁹⁴ Up to 78,6.

⁹⁹⁵ Judging from the content of ĀS, vyavahita here is concerned with atīta-anāgata and asat.

⁹⁹⁶ See ĀS 78,8–14 (examined in NySi 420,8–421,5: the answer to the eighth question).

⁹⁹⁷ I.e., ŚveUp VI. 18 teaches the Highest Self is the cause of awaking

[4] To the fourth [question], we illustrate it with light (prabhā) and [its substrata such as a lamp]. For instance, it is stated in the {Śrī-]Bhāshya:

*It is not contradictory that knowledge, being quality of the self, is substance; as the substance called light, being quality of a lamp.
[ŚrīBh II. ii. 27: 303,11f.]

And what should be explained as to light has been already stated [by us⁹⁹⁸] and it had been examined in the {Śrī-]Bhāshya.⁹⁹⁹

By the way, it is unavoidable for those who assert a whole [as different from its constituents] (avayavin) to accept that substance resorting to some [substance] is, at the same time, resorted to by other [substance], [e.g. a pot resorting to the earth is the substratum of a half-pot (kapāla)].

Moreover, to begin with, we do not accept the restriction, held by the Vaiśeshika school and others, that quality is non-substance¹⁰⁰⁰ as [we do not accept the restriction that] a qualifier (viśeṣaṇa) [is non-substance]. **[417]**

For the definition of quality is: that which is resorted to some [entity] in nature is quality of the latter.

And [the word ‘quality’] is never technical one (pāribhāshika) [as is held by the Nyāya-Vaiśeshika school], because it would be contradictory to our ordinary usage.¹⁰⁰¹

Thus, there is some divisions among qualities, namely, substantive qualities (dravyātmakaguṇa) and pure qualities (kevalaguṇa). These former are knowledge etc.; these latter are sattva, rajas, tamas and so forth. We will explain them later.

for the individual selves, whereas the quoted passages of BhG and the Manusmṛti teach that uncontrolled sense-organs destroy knowledge (R).

⁹⁹⁸ See NySi 112,2ff.

⁹⁹⁹ I. i. 1: (1) 150–53.

¹⁰⁰⁰ Cf. the definition of guṇa in the Tarkadīpikā: dravyakarmabhinnatve sati sāmānyavān guṇaḥ [§4].

¹⁰⁰¹ Because even dāṛṭva and the like are called guṇa (R, K).

In this regard, [some hold¹⁰⁰² that] the word ‘quality’ used for sattva and the like is of primary meaning (mukhya) but [the same word] used for knowledge and the like is of figurative meaning¹⁰⁰³ (gauṇa). To the passage of the [Śrī-]Bhāshya that:

*But¹⁰⁰⁴ [the practical usage of ‘quality’] for this [light is because this (fire) is always its substratum and light is (always) subsidiary to that (fire)¹⁰⁰⁵] [ŚrīBh I. i. 1: (1) 150,6],

this opinion is stated in the Vivaraṇa also, that is,

*[Light] is metaphorically called ‘quality’ by force of [the fact that] it is always dependent [upon fire] [Vivaraṇa].

In this opinion, there is no room for [the fourth] question because [knowledge] is not accepted to be quality [in primary sense].

Others, however, do not accept the assumption that [the word ‘quality’ used for knowledge] is figurative for the reason that it can be primary because the criterion (pravṛttinimitta) [of this word] is but the above-mentioned [definition]. Now, the passage of the [Śrī-]Bhāshya [quoted above] that:

*But ... for this [ŚrīBh I. i. 1: (1) 150,6],

etc. is commonly [natural] (sādhāraṇa) [for both opinion, namely, the opinion that the ‘quality’ for knowledge is primary and the opinion that it is figurative].

The passage of the [Śrī-]Bhāshya [quoted above] that:

*... the substance called light [ŚrīBh II. ii. 27: 303,11f.],

etc. and the passage of the [Śrī-]Bhāshya] that:

¹⁰⁰² R suggests to supplement kecit after tatra and iti vadanti after the quotation of the Vivaraṇa.

¹⁰⁰³ Judging from his way to comment (sattvādishu guṇaśabdasyetyasyānantaraṃ vyapadeśa iti śeṣaḥ), the text used by R may read mukhyaḥ for mukhyatvam and gauṇaḥ for gauṇatvam.

¹⁰⁰⁴ NySi reads ca for tu; but the latter reading is supported by ŚP as well as TṬ.

¹⁰⁰⁵ asyās tu guṇatvavyavahāro nityatadāśrayatvataccheshatvanibandhanaḥ.

*True light is quality of substance possessing the light, but [it is] ... not quality like whiteness and the like¹⁰⁰⁶ [ŚrīBh I. i. 1: (1) 150,4], etc. [418] are natural for the opinion that [the ‘quality’] is primary. It is stated in the [Śrī-]Bhāshya by denying that sattva etc. are substances that:

*And sattva etc. are well-known to be but qualities [ŚrīBh II. ii. 1: 280,1].

This passage is also [natural for the same opinion]. For [the import here is that] nobody accepts [them] to be substances because it is natural for the determination [by the word ‘but (eva)’].¹⁰⁰⁷

As [in the opinion that knowledge is but substance and the usage of ‘quality’ for it is figurative], there is no room for the [fourth] question also in the opinion of Varadanārāyaṇa-bhaṭṭāraka.¹⁰⁰⁸ Because, [according to his opinion, knowledge is but quality and] the word ‘substance’ for knowledge is figurative.

This quality (guṇa) [defined as “that which is resorted to some entity in nature”] is optionally regarded as even genus (jāti), quality (guṇa), action (kriyā) and substance due to another intention of someone.

For instance,¹⁰⁰⁹ that specific dharma which is essential (antaraṅga) to many dharmins is genus — when in an entity expressed (nirūpita) by a certain [dharma] the expectation of particularity (viśeshākamkshā) is mostly satisfied, this [dharma] is called ‘essential’; [that specific dharma which is]

¹⁰⁰⁶ Cf. śauklyādivad iti / adravyatvalakṣhaṇaṃ guṇatvaṃ mā bhūt, āśritasvabhāvatvaṃ tad astīti bhāvaḥ [TṬ 199].

¹⁰⁰⁷ Here ends the opinion that knowledge is both substance and quality and that the usage of ‘quality’ for knowledge is primary (R).

¹⁰⁰⁸ See the fragment of the Prajñāparitrāṇa quoted in 431,10ff. Such opinion is not seen in his Nyāyasūdarśana as far as its published portion is concerned.

¹⁰⁰⁹ Here our author paraphrases ‘the most subtle (sthaviṣṭa) — which, according to R, implies that they are not acceptable — definition’ of the Tattvaratnākara cited below in 541,8–10.

established [as] particularizing the [entity] animated¹⁰¹⁰ (anuprāṇita) by this [genus] is quality (guṇa); [that specific dharma which is] to be established of this kind is action; that which is qualified by these [three] is substance. In this way, words express genus, quality, action and substance.

The word guṇa [used] for this [‘quality’ defined as “dharma established as particularizing an entity animated by the genus” is based on its being] a sub-division [of quality in general defined as “that which is resorted to some entity in nature”]¹⁰¹¹; as the word vāda is used for [talk] in general as well as specific [discussion]¹⁰¹².

And one entity can be optionally regarded [not only as one but also] as two, three or four of these [genus etc. which are defined in this way] **[419]**. For example, knowledge (jñāna) is substance as it is the substratum of conjunction etc.; the same is quality as it particularizes the essential nature of the self which is expressed as inwards; [and it is] action in the description ‘He knows’ etc. Other cases also should be examined in this way.

By the way, [grammarians] assert that substance is existence and non-substance is non-existence.¹⁰¹³ Their intention is that all qualities are included in [the term] substance. So there is no use of [discussing] such trivial matter.

¹⁰¹⁰ Here ‘animated (anuprāṇita) by this’ means ‘the particularizing expectancy (viśeshākamkshā) is satisfied by this genus (R).

¹⁰¹¹ According to the paraphrase of R.

¹⁰¹² Cf. sā [=kathā] dvividhā vītarāgakathā vigigīshukathā ceti / pūrvo vāda iti sāmānyaśabdenaiva viśeshato 'pi nirdiśyate [NyP 131,7–9]; nanu vādaśabdasya kathāsāmānyavācivāt tena katham viśeshābhidhānam ity ata āha — sāmānyaśabdenaiveti / tathā ca vādaśabdo 'yam anekārtha iti nānupapattir iti bhāvaḥ [Śrīnivāsa's commentary ad loc., ed. ChSS, p.135]. The definition of vāda in the Nyāyatattva is: parasya svopadeśanyāyena niścītārtho vyavahāro vādaḥ [NyP 131,10]. Cf. Nyāyasūtra II. i. 1.

¹⁰¹³ sattvam dravyam asattvam adravyam. Also quoted in SAS V. 5. Cf. Kāśikā ad Pāṇini I. 4. 57: sattvam iti dravyam.

[5] To the fifth [question], we answer — Knowledge is substance, because it has expansion and other [conditions], like a thing which everyone accepts so; to the same probandum, because it is knowledge, like the self, and so on. Varadavishṇu-miśra states as follows:

*[Knowledge is substance; because it is the cause of latent impression (bhāvanā), while different from the unseen power; like the self [?].

[6] To the sixth [question], our answer has been already given in the fourth [if it means that knowledge cannot exist out of its substratum]. If it means that [knowledge would] leave aside its own substratum, [our answer is]: we never accept so. For the Venerable sage Yāmuna [rejects] the same objection:

*[Not so] because we do not accept that [knowledge] leave aside the self. Not leaving aside the self, consciousness goes out¹⁰¹⁴ through sense-organs etc. And it is stated in [our] śāstra¹⁰¹⁵ that this [consciousness, if it were once] separated [from the self], could not join again. [ĀS 79,5–7]

[7] The seventh [question] is set aside by the illustration of the coil of a snake.¹⁰¹⁶ And mere [being associated with another size] would not bring about increase and decrease. Because it is unavoidable only in the case of things having separable parts **[420]**.

Or rather, let [knowledge] have increase etc. Even in this case, it cannot be seen so nor touched; because it is beyond sense-organs and

¹⁰¹⁴ niḥsarati. The texts of ĀS read niścalati.

¹⁰¹⁵ I.e. the Nyāyatattva (R). Yāmuna often refers to the work as śāstra [Narasimhachari 1971: 7].

¹⁰¹⁶ Cf. BrSū III. ii. 26: ahikuṇ alavat.

because it is devoid of touch etc. And there is not the restriction, [as in the case of cotton], that something increasing always comes to have some gaps; because it is in nature capable of having conjunction with all directions without any gap.

[Obj.] Why can this [knowledge] be filled in a small space?

[Ans.] Because it is not obstructed due to its being devoid of touch. And that it is said in the Nyāyatattva to be excessively subtle.¹⁰¹⁷

Some [i.e. the Naiyāyikas etc.] hold that one substance cannot have various size even if there is difference in time [because, according to them, when size changes another whole (avayavin) is produced anew]. But this is rejected by the above-mentioned [discussion]. Because it is difference in time that removes the contradiction [in size] and because a whole [as different from its constituents] (avayavin) does not exist.

[Obj.] If it were the case, the objection in the [Brahma-]sūtra that:

*And because the final [size of the liberated self] endures [and] because both [the self and its size at that stage] are eternal; hence, [the size is innate for the self and, consequently], [the previous size] cannot be different [from this size¹⁰¹⁸] [BrSū II. ii. 34],

which is to refute the Jainists (digambara) who hold that the self takes various sizes in accordance with the body, could be applied to [your opinion] also.

[Ans.] Not so. Because the intention in this [sūtra] is rejecting the content which is merely based on reasoning etc.

¹⁰¹⁷ See the fragment quoted in NySi 399f.

¹⁰¹⁸ This translation follows the paraphrase of ŚrīBh, but that of VDīpa or VSāra seems to be easier to understand. According to it, the translation is: “And the final [size of the liberated self] endures, [accordingly, the size is innate for the self]. Therefore, both [the self and its size at that stage] are eternal. Hence [the previous size] cannot be different [from this size]”.

[8] To the eighth [question], our answer has been already given in the Ātmasiddhi. That is, having raised the objection that:

*How can consciousness have conjunction with things in the past and future which are not existent [now]? [ĀS 78,8], **[421]**

the author rejects it with the following counter-replies — [according to the Naiyāyikas], there is subject-object relation (vishayavishayibhāva) [even concerning things in the past and future]; [according to the Bhāṭṭas], there is manifestness (prākāṣya) [even in things in the past and future]; [even things in the past and future] are associated with [the notion of] number etc.¹⁰¹⁹; [according to our established theory], the knowledge [of a person in this cosmic-egg] has quick conjunction with [things] existing in vastly remote regions [such as another cosmic-egg].¹⁰²⁰ Furthermore, saying that:

*Both [things in the past and those in future] exist even now as of past and future. So nothing is untenable¹⁰²¹ if they come to contact with knowledge in these modes [ĀS 78,9f.],

he justifies the probability of the conjunction because this substance is existent. The meaning is as follows. Some [i.e. the Bhāṭṭas¹⁰²²] explain that because [a thing] in past and future, which is not existent now [as an individual (vyakti)], is present even now as genus, it can be the substratum of manifestness. Likewise because [it] is present also as that substance [which is the substratum of past condition (avasthā) etc.],¹⁰²³ conjunction is also possible.

[Obj.] There is not conjunction with [things] qualified [by these

¹⁰¹⁹ See ĀS 78,8f.: katham vā vishayabhāvaḥ, prakāśamānatvam, samkhyādiyogo vā? tayor yas tatra nirvāhaḥ sa evātrāstu.

¹⁰²⁰ See ĀS 78,11f: yathā davīyasi deśe satā dhruva-śiśumārādinā dṛk tu sannikṣhyate, tathā davīyasi kāle satā kalpādyantavartinā svayambhuvādinā.

¹⁰²¹ nānupapattiḥ. ĀS reads kā for na.

¹⁰²² According to Mesquita, it is the opinion of Sucaritamiśra [1990: 90].

¹⁰²³ According to the Viśiṣṭādvaita, dravya as the substratum of various avasthās is eternal and only avasthās on it are changing (R).

conditions].

[Ans.] The situation is same [for the Bhāṭṭas] because these [objects] are not manifested in particular mode.

[9] To the ninth [question], we answer, we do not accept so. That is, the relation [of knowledge] with quality and the like is not conjunction but ‘being in that which is in conjunction’¹⁰²⁴ (saṃyoginishṭhatā). It is like, say, inherence in that which is in conjunction (samyuktasamavāya) in [the theory of] other [schools]. The statement that:

*The relation is characterized as conjunction [ŚrīBh II. ii. 27: 303,11], and the like import that conjunction is prerequisite [for knowledge]. And it is stated by Śrīrāmamiśra in his Śa arthasaṃkṣhepa:

*As to those which are fit for this [conjunction], conjunction brings about [their] object-ness (vishayatā) **[422]**. As to those which are not fit [for conjunction], [conjunction] with those which are related to them [brings about their object-ness] [Śa arthasaṃkṣhepa].

This means — As to entities which are fit for conjunction, conjunction manifests [these] substances qualified with presentness and the like. As to [entities] which are not fit for conjunction, e.g. [qualities] such as color, however, it is each probable conjunction with substrata, causes or effects which are related to them that manifests them.

By the way, it is stated in the Ātmasiddhi that:

*Conjunction (saṃyoga) is synonymous with nairantarya (being without any gap) and is but excessive proximity. This very [conjunction] is, in the Vaiśeṣikas, categorized as inherence (samavāya) when it resorts in an dependent [entity].¹⁰²⁵ Accordingly,

¹⁰²⁴ Cf. vishyendriyasambandhaś ca — dravyeshu saṃyogaḥ, dravyāśriteshu rūpādishu tu saṃyuktāśrayaṇam [NyP 74,4f.]. See also the verse of the Tattvaratnākara cited in NyP 74,6 and NySi 76,5.

¹⁰²⁵ I.e. samavāya is but saṃyoga between two inseparable (ayutasiddha) entities, an independent one and a dependent one (R).

an alternative based on the assumption¹⁰²⁶ that [inherence] is different [from conjunction]¹⁰²⁷ is impossible [ĀS 82,9f.].

This also imports that there is not another relation than [conjunction] because, in our opinion, inherence accepted by other [schools] are not accepted and [inherence is] nothing but a variety of [conjunction] itself; but not that the relation between quality and what has quality (guṇin) is [also] characterized with conjunction. Should one say ‘quality and what has quality are in conjunction,’ this usage should be metaphorical — In order to teach this, the author says “synonymous with nairantarya.” The usage ‘in conjunction’ is merely based on the fact that there is no gap [between the two]. It is stated that this much is categorized by the Vaiśeṣhikas as another entity [i.e. inherence] by means of fallacious reasoning. Otherwise, [that is], if quality had conjunction, it also would be substance because [having conjunction] is the definition of substance. Even if we propose that the definition of substance should be being associated with conditions (avasthā), it is unavoidable that qualities would be substances because they are associated with the condition, namely, the conjunction with knowledge. And it cannot be said that there must not be the classification into substance and non-substance. Because the author of the commentaries himself justifies that sattva, rajas and tamas are non-substances.¹⁰²⁸ Thus, this should be interpreted in the way we have explained. Or rather, this is to be regarded as in accordance with the opinion of those who accept nairantarya only and do not accept even conjunction¹⁰²⁹ **[423]**.¹⁰³⁰

¹⁰²⁶ urarīkṛtya. Viraraghavachari's ed. of ĀS reads ūrīkṛtya and adds the reading of NySi in parenthesis.

¹⁰²⁷ I.e. Which is the relation between knowledge and an object, conjunction or inherence? If the former, knowledge could not be related to qualities. If the latter, it could not be related to substances (R).

¹⁰²⁸ See ŚrīBh II. ii. 1: sattvādayo dravyadharmāḥ, na tu dravyasvarūpam [279,16]. Cf. the passage of ŚrīBh II. ii. 1 quoted in NySi 418,2.

¹⁰²⁹ Cf. NySi 25,1–2.

¹⁰³⁰ In other words, this is not the opinion of Yāmuna himself (R).

[10] The tenth [question] is illustrated with ocular beam, [which spreads all over the world but cannot grasp intermediate space, an atom, ether etc. though it has conjunction with them].

[Obj.] In this case [of ocular beam], capability [of an object for sight] decides [whether it can be grasped or not; accordingly, ocular beam cannot be the illustration].

[Ans.] Not so. Because so [capability of an object for knowledge decides whether it can be grasped or not] in the case [of knowledge].

[Obj.] If conjunction with knowledge exists, the capability other [than the conjunction] is purposeless.

[Ans.] We can even say — if conjunction with sense-organs exists [in the case of ocular beam], [the capability] other [than the conjunction] would be purposeless.

[Obj.] If a certain entity is incapable for [one] knowledge, it would never be manifested by any [other] knowledge.

[Ans.] Not so. Because the same situation would be brought about when [an entity] is incapable for [one of] the agents for knowledge (jñāpaka).¹⁰³¹

[Obj.] One agent for knowledge can [grasp] only some [entities fit for it] due to [its] own nature.

[Ans.] Then, so knowledge [can grasp] only some [entities fit for it].
[424]

[Obj.] It is the nature of sufficient condition (sāmagrī) [of knowledge], we suppose, that restricts objects of each knowledge. Then, an extra relation

¹⁰³¹ E.g. if an object is incapable for a jñāpaka, say, a sense-organ, it would be incapable for all jñāpakas (R).

[i.e. conjunction of knowledge] is needless.¹⁰³²

[Ans.] Not so. For this [sufficient condition] does not exist in the case of the eternal knowledge of God. Accordingly, [if it were the case], His knowledge would have no object; thereby, He would have no knowledge. This would lead the undesirable conclusion that God does not exist.¹⁰³³

[Obj.] Such restriction exists so far as non-eternal knowledge is concerned.

[Ans.] True. Nevertheless, [the conjunction] is allowable [by force of the Scriptures]; as [the Vaiśeṣikas etc.] adopt [particular relations] such as inherence in that which is in conjunction (saṃyuktasamavāya) [merely by force of the confidence on their system], though there is restriction in the nature of [sense-organs], [due to which] the eyes, for example, operate [only] in color by excluding taste etc. while they are not different [from color] in being inherent in that which is in conjunction.¹⁰³⁴ And it is stated in the Nyāyakuliśa:

*And conjunction [of knowledge with an object] is accepted by force of the Scriptures teaching that [knowledge] spreads and [it] is pervasive [Nyāyakuliśa IV: 74,21].

[Obj.] Mere [acceptance of] the capability would lead the undesirable conclusion, say, that [the eyes] grasp even other [concealed] color. To avoid it, we accept the particular relations [as well].

[Ans.] Then, we also adopt the relation [i.e. conjunction of knowledge] in order to avoid [the undesirable conclusion] that [knowledge] would always manifest [things fit for it] if [their] capability alone [were accepted].

¹⁰³² I.e. when knowledge is produced with a sense-organ contacted with an object, the knowledge has the object. So there is no use postulating conjunction of knowledge (R).

¹⁰³³ Because God must be omniscient (R).

¹⁰³⁴ In other words, though the restriction in the nature of the eyes is enough to avoid the over-application that the eyes grasp even taste etc. (R).

[Obj.] The sufficient condition [for knowledge] alone **[425]** could prevent [such] over-application in this case [of knowledge: that is, knowledge manifests things fit for it only when its sufficient condition exists].

[Ans.] Not so. For even in that case [of concealed color etc.], similarly [the sufficient condition for grasping them could prevent such over-application; accordingly, inherence in that which is in conjunction etc. are needless].

[Obj.] The relation [i.e. inherence in that which is in conjunction] is also included in the sufficient condition in this case [of the perception of color].

[Ans.] Why cannot this [conjunction of knowledge] also be included in that¹⁰³⁵ [sufficient condition for the manifestation]? For the very sufficient condition for this relation [i.e. inherence in that which is in conjunction] can enable the restriction [which you assumed to be caused by] this [relation]. That is, [the restriction] that there is the relation only in that [object] is also caused by the nature of the sufficient condition; [therefore, it is unnecessary to postulate the relation in the middle].

[11] To the eleventh [question], our answer is: [due to its] excessive speed, special potency or the will of God. And wonderful speed is accepted in the light of the eyes, the sun etc. So believe that one which reaches the utmost [speed] covers everything immediately or in two or three moments.

[12] As to the twelfth [question], there is not any defect in that [knowledge] belongs to [particular self] and is dependent upon [the self] in nature though [the self] moves [while the knowledge stands still]. For example, for one who asserts that the [individual] self is all-pervasive **[426]**, [though] the

¹⁰³⁵ UVG ed. reads tasyāpi tatra following R. The other editions read tatrāpi tasya.

body, the sense-organ etc. [moves while their self does not, there is not any defect in that they belong to the self]; for one who accept God, [though] those which are ruled by Him [moves while He does not, there is not any defect]; [though] couples of a slave, a servant and the like [moves while their master does not, there is not any defect in that they belong to the master]; according to [those who assert a whole (avayavin) as different from its constituents] such as the Vaiśeshikas, [there is not any defect though] between a whole [e.g. a tree] and its constituents [e.g. branches], which cannot exist separately, [these latter] move and [the former] does not moves¹⁰³⁶; and in our opinion, [there is not any defect] though [the individual self] possessing the body moves in the pericardium¹⁰³⁷ (purītat) and other [places of the body¹⁰³⁸] while the body [does not move].

Thus, for those who follow Upanishads, there is light (or wisdom) against rainy cloud (or the collection of [such] defective [objections]).

Knowledge in itself forms happiness, pain, wish and volition in accordance with the difference of adventitious condition. Because there is no valid means to understand something other than knowledge that [the Vaiśeshikas¹⁰³⁹] regard as causing happiness and so on.

It is dependent upon its object that knowledge forms empirical¹⁰⁴⁰

¹⁰³⁶ You cannot say that a tree also moves with the limitation of its branches, because its root does not move at all (R).

¹⁰³⁷ Cf. BṛhUp II. i. 19.

¹⁰³⁸ See BrSū III. ii. 7.

¹⁰³⁹ The Vaiśeshikas has been regarded sukha, duḥkha, icchā, dvesha, prayatna as different from buddhi since the sūtra [I. i. 5 (Candrānanda)]. As far as present consciousness concerned, the first two are produced from the conjunction, conditioned by the contact of sense-organs with favorable or unfavorable things, between the self and the mind along with dharma or adharma. The next two are produced from the conjunction between the self and the mind along with sukha or duḥkha. [PDhS §§290ff.].

¹⁰⁴⁰ The word is necessary since the innate happiness of dharmibhūti-jñāna

(vaishayika) happiness and pain; accordingly, the object can be also denoted by the word happiness or pain because there is no difference in being favorable or unfavorable [427]. And it is explained in the topic on bhūma.¹⁰⁴¹

So is stated in the Vedārthasamgraha:

*Knowledge is dependent upon its object; therefore, Brahman itself is happiness as [the knowledge on it] is of happiness¹⁰⁴² [VAS §142: 171,2].

Volition does not exist in the condition of deep sleep because such is not perceived. And [breathing] such as out-breath (apāna) is brought about due to unseen power and so on. The other school [i.e. the Vaiśeshikas] also accept unseen power and so on as the cause of volition [proceeding from mere living (jīvanapūrvaka)] in the case [of deep sleep]. Suppose it is [directly] for out-breath etc. So the reason ‘being motion’ etc. [which the Vaiśeshikas regard as] the valid means to postulate volition¹⁰⁴³ in the middle [of the unseen power and breathing] can be established in other way. And because in the topic beginning with [the Brahmasūtra that]:

*[Obj.] ‘The inner [self]’ is concerned with that which has the aggregate of material elements ... [BrSū III. iii. 35],

it is stated in the [Śrī-]Bhāshya that:

*Because the inner self is not the agent of breathing in deep sleep [ŚrīBh III. iii. 35: 503,16],

and that:

*Because it is not the agent of breathing etc. in deep sleep, faint and the like [ŚrīBh III. iii. 35: 503,20].

is not dependent upon its object (K).

¹⁰⁴¹ BrSū I. iii. 7–8. E.g. “Because all that is experienced is of happiness, no misery is not seen” [ŚrīBh I. iii. 7: 18,2] (R).

¹⁰⁴² Following the reading of VAS, read sukharūpatayā (adopted in VDG ed., Pandit ed., Varanasi 1966 ed.) for sukharūpatāyā[ḥ] (adopted in UVG ed., Madras 1934 ed.; based on the reading of R).

¹⁰⁴³ E.g. *suptasya prāṇāpānakriyā prayatnakāryā, prāṇāpānakriyātvāt, jāgrataḥ prāṇāpānakriyāvat* [NyKan §224]; *sushuptasya prāṇādikriyā prayatnapūrvikā, tatkriyātvāt, jāgratas tatkriyāvat* [Kir §175a].

Though [the self] is not an agent at [these occasions], some postulate [volition (prayatna)] as something other than agency (kṛti). But this is rejected because prayatna and kṛti are well-known to be synonymous and because this is complicated.

[Obj.] Happiness and so on cannot be the qualities of the self. On the contrary, they should be varieties of mental function (manovṛtti). And the Ātmasiddhi supports it. That is, having begun with:

*By the way, it has been explained that consciousness (citi) is accidental quality for the reason that it is special quality of the self with the illustration of happiness and so on.¹⁰⁴⁴ This is also done by one who does not understand what quality is. [ĀS 83,8f.],

the author states:

*And happiness and pain are not qualities of the self. Because these conditions are explained as the increase and decrease of the sense-organ [i.e. the mind].¹⁰⁴⁵ And it will be propounded in the section explaining what the last word¹⁰⁴⁶ [of my introductory verse¹⁰⁴⁷] means. Thus, the illustration is devoid of the reason. Also passion, dislike etc. are varieties of mental function [428], but not direct qualities of the self. For it is understood [in the following śruti]:

“Desire, determination,¹⁰⁴⁸ doubt, faith, lack of faith, steadfastness, lack of steadfastness, shame, dhī and fear — all this is just mind”

¹⁰⁴⁴ I.e. āgantukaṃ jñānam, ātmaviśeshaguṇatvāt, sukhādivat [ĀS 66,14].

¹⁰⁴⁵ Cf. ĀS 56,2: indriyapaushkalyanāśayor eva sukhaduḥkhatvāt.

¹⁰⁴⁶ Following ĀS, read pada for pāda.

¹⁰⁴⁷ I.e. svataḥsukhī in v. 3 of ĀS [10,4f]: dehendriyamaṇapṛāṇadhibhyo 'nyao 'nanyasādhanaḥ / nityo vyāpī pratikshetram ātmā bhinnāḥ svataḥsukhī //. The portion of ĀS dealing with the word is not extant.

¹⁰⁴⁸ According to the Raṃgarāmānuja's commentary on BṛhUp, saṃkalpa here means adhyavasāya.

[BṛhUp I. v. 3].

And says the [Bhagavad-]gītā... [ĀS 83,12–84,3].

Thus quoting the [Bhagavad-]gītā that:

*[...], wish, dislike, happiness,¹⁰⁴⁹ pain and a combination supporting spirituality¹⁰⁵⁰ — thus kshetra [has been] briefly [illustrated along with its modifications] [BhG XIII. 6],¹⁰⁵¹

he explains the definition of body for it.¹⁰⁵² Again, having raised the question why the word dhī is read along with [the words desire etc. in the śruti]:

*What is dhī here? [ĀS 84,10],

he says:

*It means conjecture (utpreksha), not imports consciousness (jñapti). Because this [consciousness] is taught in the same śruti to be innate. That is, it is taught that:

“There is no cessation of the knowledge of a knower.” [BṛhUp IV. iii. 23]

[ĀS 84,10–12],

and so on. Likewise, on the [Brahma-]sūtra that:

¹⁰⁴⁹ UVG ed. omits sukham (!).

¹⁰⁵⁰ While Śaṅkara reads cetanā and dhṛtiḥ, Rāmānuja reads cetana-ādhr̥tiḥ in a compound form and interprets it as cetanasyādhr̥ty ādhārah. But ĀS reads cetanā-dhr̥tiḥ: cetanayā dhriyamāṇaḥ saṃghāto hi dehaḥ [84,5]. In this regard, see V's fn.2 and also Viraraghavacharya's note in his edition of GBh with TC [p.429, fn.1].

¹⁰⁵¹ UVG ed. and Madras (1934) ed. read: gīyate ca “icchā dveshaḥ sukhaṃ [om. in UVG ed.] duḥkhaṃ saṃghātaś cetanādhṛtiḥ / etat kshetraṃ samāsenā” iti gītāṃ codāhṛtya. As is pointed out by V [fn.1], this may be corrupted because here ĀS runs: gīyate ca “icchā dveshaḥ sukhaṃ duḥkhaṃ” iti / “cetanādhṛtiḥ” iti kshetralakṣhaṇam... etc. Also the reading of VDG ed., Pandit ed. and Varanasi (1966) ed: gīyate ca “icchā dveshaḥ sukhaṃ duḥkhaṃ saṃghātaś cetanādhṛtiḥ” iti kshetralakṣhaṇam [in brackets (VDG); Pandit ed. adds iti after that] / “etat kshetraṃ samāsenā” iti gītāṃ codāhṛtya, makes no sense. In order to make coincide with ĀS, V proposes the reading: ‘...“icchā dveshaḥ sukhaṃ duḥkhaṃ” iti’ iti kshetradharmatvam uktvā “cetanādhṛtiḥ” iti gītāṃ codāhṛtya. Here I translate this phrase adding iti after gīyate ca.

¹⁰⁵² ĀS 84,5–8.

*[Vital air] is described as having five functions like the mind [BrSū II. iv. 11],

it is stated in the [Śrī-]Bhāshya that:

*As desire and so on are not entities different from mind according to the statement that:

“Desire, [429] determination, doubt, faith, lack of faith, steadfastness, lack of steadfastness, shame, conjecture and fear — all this is just mind” [BṛhUp I. v. 3];

so according to the statement that:

“In-breath, out-breath, diffused breath, up-breath and middle-breath — all this [breathing¹⁰⁵³] is just breath” [BṛhUp I. v. 3],
out-breath and so on are also understood as a variety of the function of breath, not as another entity [ŚrīBh II. iv. 11: 396,7–10].

Why can happiness etc. be qualities of the self, then?

To this, we answer — one who does not study our established opinion falls into such mistake through investigating [only] books. That is, first in the Ātmasiddhi, immediately after:

*By the way, ... with the illustration of happiness and so on [ĀS 83,8],

stating that:

*Dharma conditioning¹⁰⁵⁴ the essential nature [of an entity] lasts as long as its substratum lasts. Happiness and the like are not so, while consciousness (bodha) conditions the essential nature of the self.

And it has been explained how being the self is conditioned on consciousness¹⁰⁵⁵ [ĀS 83,10–12],

the author mentions the difference between pure consciousness and happiness and the like in view of being innate and not being innate; [accordingly], the

¹⁰⁵³ NySi omits anah between samānah and ity etat.

¹⁰⁵⁴ upādhi = prayojaka (R).

¹⁰⁵⁵ See ĀS 66,17f.: tatrāhur ātmatattvajñāḥ svataś caitanyam ātmanah / svarūpopādhidharmatvāt prakāśa iva tejasah.

following statement that:

*And happiness and pain are not qualities of the self. [ĀS 83,12] etc. is said as an arrogant speech (vaibhavavāda) or as an opinion of other schools. Otherwise, why does he state:

*Thus,¹⁰⁵⁶ various verbal expressions as to consciousness, which is the essential nature of the self, such as ascertainment, doubt etc.¹⁰⁵⁷ are concerned with particular contacts to objects.¹⁰⁵⁸ Or rather,¹⁰⁵⁹ [they are] concerned with consciousness [itself] associated with these particular [contacts]. [ĀS 85,17f.],
in the beginning of conclusion? For if [ascertainment etc.] were accidental qualities [of the mind], there would be no difference in having sense-organs as adventitious condition etc. But so is not stated; in fact, it is stated differently [that ‘which is the essential nature of the self’]. **[430]**

[Obj.] It is you who falls into mistake of one who does not study of our established opinion [because the Ātmasiddhi clearly states “happiness and pain are not qualities of the self”].

[Ans.] It cannot be true. In fact, the Ātmasiddhi is an introduction (prakaraṇa) of the ‘scripture’ (śāstra) named Nyāyatattva. And all is clear in the eighth section (adhikaraṇa) of the first part (pāda) of this ‘scripture,’ which is composed of the exposition of knowledge.

So the [Brahma-]sūtra and the [Śrī-]Bhāshya [quoted above] mean: the mind, which is classified into different conditions causing knowledge of various conditions [such as desire, determination etc.], is called by these

¹⁰⁵⁶ Cf. ĀS 62,18f.: ... citiḥ / nānāpadārthasaṃsargāt tattadvitvam aśnute //.

¹⁰⁵⁷ Here ‘etc.’ includes happiness and pain also (R).

¹⁰⁵⁸ vishayasamśleshaviśeshagocara eva. ĀS reads: vishayasamśleshaviśesheshu.

¹⁰⁵⁹ The second alternative is shown because it is knoweldge that forms ascertainment etc. (R). This is siddhānta according to Viraraghavacharya's note on ĀS [p.85, fn.2].

various designations.¹⁰⁶⁰ And similar reasoning is justified in another place — in the topic that:

*[Obj.] [Corporal faculties are] seven, because of movement [BrSū II. iv. 4],

it is stated that:

*The mind itself is designated by the words buddhi, ahaṃkāra and citta according to the difference in function, namely, adhyavasāya (determination), abhimāna (ego) and cintā (thinking). [ŚrīBh II. iv. 5; 391,18–392,1]

In addition, it is stated in the Vedārthasaṃgraha:

*“The dharmas of pain, ignorance and impurity are of prakṛti, not of the self” [ViP VI. vii. 22]

— that is, these dharmas do not belong to the essential nature of the self because of being based on karma caused by the association with prakṛti. By discrimination between what is gotten and not,¹⁰⁶¹ they are said to be dharmas of prakṛti. [VAS §79: 116,16–18]

Also in the same [work], having said that:

*And the word bhakti means a special kind of love (prīti). Love is but a special kind of knowledge. [VAS §141: 170,11f.],

the author shows the objection¹⁰⁶² that:

*But love and happiness (sukha) are not different things. And ordinary people understand that happiness is accomplished by means of knowledge and is different from [knowledge] [VAS §141: 170,12f.];

he answers as follows:

*Not so. Particular knowledge with which that [happiness] is accomplished is in itself happiness.

To explain — Knowledge of an object is common to happiness, pain and neutral emotion. And this [knowledge], the particularity of which is dependent upon an object, becomes so [happiness, pain and neutral

¹⁰⁶⁰ Cf. TC 428,27f.

¹⁰⁶¹ prāptāprāptavivekena = anvayavyatirekābhyām [TD 164,11].

¹⁰⁶² Of the Vaiśeshikas [TD 344,14].

emotion]. Accordingly, when knowledge particularized by a particular object is thought to produce happiness, the knowledge concerning this object is in itself happiness. And nothing other than this [knowledge] is not apprehended. And because only by this [particularized knowledge] the expression ‘happy’ can be accounted for. [VAS §§141–42: 170,13–18],

and so on. Moreover, the description of the Bhagavadgītā that:

*Wish, dislike [BhG XIII. 6],

etc. is justified by the author of the commentaries in [his commentary] thereon as follows:

*Wish, dislike, happiness, pain — these effects of the body are said to be the modifications of the body. Though wish, dislike, happiness and pain are qualities of the self, they are said to be the modification of the body as the effects of the body since they are originated from the association of the self with the body. Concerning their being the dharmas of the self, [He] will state that:

“As to being one who experiences happiness and pain, the self is said to be the cause” [BhG XIII. 20]

[GBh XIII. 6: 428,3–429,2].

Again, Śrī-Rāmāmiśra says in the Śa arthasaṃkṣhepa:

*Happiness is a variety of knowledge dependent upon a variety of a known object, because nothing beyond this is not seen [Śa arthasaṃkṣhepa],

and so on. Also Varadavishṇuśra says:

*First, happiness and pain are but knowledge concerning favorable and unfavorable things. So the two are not included in qualities [as independent items] [?],

and so on. And it is stated by Śrī-Vishṇucitta in the Saṃgatimālā:

*Thus, the essential nature of the individual self, which is compared to light or heat of fire for the Supreme Self, is, in deep sleep and the dissolution, devoid of difference of modification — which distinguishes [the individual self] from the Supreme Self — composed

of endless [varieties of] the expansion of knowledge such as **[431]** doubt, ascertainment, misunderstanding, untrue knowledge, perception, inference, verbal teaching, passion, dislike, greed, delusion, insanity, envy, steadfastness, uncertainty, faith, shame, fear etc. [Saṃgatimālā],

and so on.

Therefore, it is proved that happiness and so on are varieties of knowledge.

[Obj.] How can the knowledge of God, which is eternal and grasps everything, form desire and so on, then?

[Ans.] Suppose it is possible due to particular limiting adjunct, because [He] has another non-eternal knowledge, or in any way. In fact, it is accepted that God has non-eternal knowledge born from sense-organs as well; i.e. Varadavishṇu-miśra says that:

*Because the non-eternal knowledge of God grasps what would be grasped by [His] eternal knowledge whose object is everything¹⁰⁶³ [?],

and that:

*Because this [non-eternal knowledge] is also born from sense-organs [?].

In the topic on the self-establishment [of knowledge] of the Prajñāparitrāṇa, [Varada-Nārāyaṇa bhaṭṭāraka] states that:

*And some hold that happiness and pain are varieties of knowledge. But it is not proper. Because these two are found in [parts] of the body such as legs.

And the self is not present in these [parts] because it is minute. Nor its attributive knowledge is present there. [Prajñāparitrāṇa]

¹⁰⁶³ = 394,1.

Immediately after declaring like this, he justifies that the individual self, either in the state of bandage or of liberation, is minute. And he continues:

*Knowledge under discussion is said to exist only in [the place] where its substratum [i.e. the self] exists;

Because it is consciousness while being attribute; like the knowledge of Brahman.¹⁰⁶⁴ Accordingly, **[432]** knowledge is quality; it cannot be substance.

And even objects of past and future is manifested by force of knowledge. Without depending upon conjunction, [knowledge] brings about the effect [i.e. manifestation] in every kind of object.

Hence, the relation between knowledge and an object is [not conjunction] but subject-object-relationship (vishayavishayibhāva), with which knowledge can be related to everything [including things in past or future and also non-substance].

Such knowledge is [sometimes] called ‘all-pervasive¹⁰⁶⁵ (sarvaga)’ as it is spontaneously related to everything. [That is], it is said to be related to everything and grasp everything without leaving [its substratum].

Because this [knowledge] brings about the effect even in that which is not associated with its substratum, it is different in character from quality (guṇa). That is why it is called substance in the [Śrī-]Bhāshya.¹⁰⁶⁶

To explain — qualities such as touch make effects such as burning and burst only in things to which their substrata are associated; knowledge is not so.

That character of this [knowledge] which is different from quality is

¹⁰⁶⁴ Therefore, according to this syllogism, the knowledge of the individual self is always minute because its substratum, i.e. the individual self, is always minute even in the state of liberation. That is why the knowledge of the embodied self cannot exist in the parts where pain etc. are experienced.

¹⁰⁶⁵ E.g. veshṭitā nṛpa sarvagā [ViP].

¹⁰⁶⁶ E.g. the passage of ŚrīBh quoted in 416,15.

mentioned [in the Śrībhāshya] by the word ‘substance.’ Then, it is proper that knowledge also belongs to another positive [category] like potency (śakti).

[Anyway], knowledge is included in quality or belongs to another [category other than both substance and quality]. For, if the opinion that knowledge is substance is adopted, none could explain what is modified [into knowledge]. And it is needless [to assume knowledge as substance in order to make its conjunction with an object possible; because, as is mentioned above, conjunction is not necessary for knowledge]. **[433]**

Now, happiness and pain, though they are produced in parts of the body, appear so and so for the embodied self by force of knowledge. If it be argued that [the two] are the qualities of the self because they are not experienced in the body without the self, not so. For [the two] cannot be the qualities of the self because they are not experienced in [the self] without body.

The two [i.e. happiness and pain], which are the qualities of the body, is manifest through knowledge having an object,¹⁰⁶⁷ which is the quality of the self — this is established to be accepted by wise persons.

The two appear just as experienced by spiritual being with karma; thus, there is no deviation from manifestation [—in other words, they are always manifest when they exist]. Otherwise, [they would appear] to no purpose.

Desire and the like, [however], do not exist in a part of the body; therefore, they should be the qualities of the self and called varieties of knowledge.

Suppose, [in the case of a yogin and the liberated self], that the self, though minute, is apprehended in many bodies, as [reflected image

¹⁰⁶⁷ ‘having an object (sakarmaka)’ is hetugarbhaviśeṣhaṇa; accordingly, happiness and pain, which are without an object, cannot be kinds of knowledge having an object (R).

of] the sun is apprehended in many ponds. **[434]**

In the case of yogins, many bodies act instantly like one body due to [their] wonderful power or the grace of God.

Since no gap is grasped between these [bodies] and the will of the self, the presence [of the self] in the form ‘I ...’ is also apprehended in each [body].

In the case of yogins, their corporal faculties including the mind are divided in each body and act at the will of God etc.

The liberated self, however, takes many bodies at his own will. He is all-knowing and wonders, eating what he wants and assuming the form he wants.¹⁰⁶⁸

And the expression, say, that the [liberated] self enters all [bodies] with [his] knowledge as a lamp with [its] light¹⁰⁶⁹ is [simply] based on [the similarity in] being manifested.

Though things in past and future are never manifested by light, they are manifested by knowledge. Therefore, do not think [a lamp and knowledge] are thoroughly similar. **[435]**

This [liberated] self, minute in itself, becomes all-pervasive through its quality, [namely, knowledge]. [Thus], both expression, [i.e. minute and all-pervasive], is proper as to the individual self.

The supreme Self, however, in itself pervades everything according to the śrutis. He is thought to be the inner-controller for all, limitless¹⁰⁷⁰ and, consequently, all-pervasive.

It is because sense-organs do not function that knowledge does not manifest an object in deep sleep. [Still] knowledge in itself and the self is independently manifest [even] at that time.

For a person waking up reflects ‘I slept well during this period,’ which clearly shows that the self is manifested even at that time.

5].¹⁰⁶⁸ Cf. imān lokān kāmānnī kāmarūpy apy anusañcaran [TaiUp III. x.

¹⁰⁶⁹ Cf. BrSū IV. iv. 15: prabhāvadāveshas tathā hi darśayati.

¹⁰⁷⁰ Brahman is devoid of three kinds of limitation. See 322,5–324,4.

And the negative consciousness ‘I do not know me as well as other things’ is but concerned with the self qualified by humanity and so on, [which is called me] and outward objects, [which are called other things].¹⁰⁷¹ **[436]**

But the consciousness accompanied with the word ‘I’ does not exist in deep sleep. Still the inward object itself is manifested as qualified by knowledge not grasping an [outward] object. [Prajñāparitrāṇa] Immediately after that, the author justifies that the self is the I-notion (ahamartha) and rejects the opinion that knowledge can be inferred. Then taking up happiness and pain again—

*Pain and the other [i.e. happiness] are [always] manifested as favorable and unfavorable for the enjoyer who has karma. Accordingly, there is no deviation from manifestation concerning the two.

If there were the deviation from manifestation, the existence of these [two] itself would be purposeless. [In other words], if [the two] were not manifested, their appearance for enjoyment would not be enjoyed.

Knowledge is designated by the words desire, dislike, volition etc. These varieties of knowledge are regarded as in accordance with the difference of its objects.

They are manifested not existing in a part of the body like happiness and the like, but as existing the self; [because] no person has the consciousness, say, ‘I have desire in my feet.’

[On the contrary], there is consciousness, say, ‘[I have] pain in my feet,’ ‘[I have] pleasure in my arms.’ [Prajñāparitrāṇa],

he concludes,

*Therefore, desire and so on are the varieties of knowledge whereas happiness and pain are the qualities of the mind [Prajñāparitrāṇa].

Some contents are contradictory to the [Śrī-]Bhāshya and so on, i.e., that happiness and pain are the qualities of the body only because they are

¹⁰⁷¹ Cf. ŚrīBh I. i. 1: (1) 168,4ff.

apprehended only in a part of the body such as an arm and a feet; that it is appropriate that desire and so on are varieties of knowledge because they are not apprehended so; that knowledge does not exist beyond its substratum; that [knowledge] manifests [an object] by means of subject-object-relationship without depending upon conjunction; that [knowledge] is non-substance. They are adopted¹⁰⁷² because [the author] is too lazy to do teeth-to-teeth battle against the elephant of the other school.

In the Nyāyasudarśana, the same author states that happiness and pain are the qualities of the self. That is,

*The meaning is: what is stated as ‘having happiness’ in the [Śrī-]Bhāshya is the self qualified by the body such as that of human being, but not also the body which qualifies the self. Because the self in general is the substratum of happiness. Because the self existing in the body has empirical happiness and so on, it is understood that they belong to the self qualified by this [body] due to [the experience] that this self is happy [Nyāyasudarśana]. **[437]**

In the same way, the unseen power (adṛṣṭa) is also nothing but [a kind of knowledge] composed of love and anger of God. And the fact that the fruit of karma is restricted for each of the individual selves can be justified simply because¹⁰⁷³ they are severally determined to be subject to these [love and anger of Him]. And this [unseen power] is decided to be of such nature because it is understood from the scriptures. So is stated in the Bhāshya of Drami ācārya¹⁰⁷⁴:

¹⁰⁷² parigrhīta. K reports the variant parihṛta.

¹⁰⁷³ I.e. without adṛṣṭa or dharma and adharma of each individual self.

¹⁰⁷⁴ Also known as Dravi a° in the Advaita tradition. His fragments are collected in: H. Nakamura, *Vedānta-tetsugaku no Hatten*, Tokyo 1955 (the original Japanese edition of his *History of Early Vedānta Philosophy* vol.3, not yet translated into English), pp.119–36; van Buitenen, *Rāmānuja's VAS*, Pune 1956, pp.302–11.

*With the desire of attaining fruits,¹⁰⁷⁵ indeed, they seek to please the [Highest] Self by means of action [such as sacrifice and charity] [Drami a-bhāshya],¹⁰⁷⁶

and so on. Also in the [Śrī-]Bhāshya:

*[Merit and demerit] are understood only from the Scriptures [ŚrīBh II. ii. 3: 282,13],

and so on. The author of the [Brahma-]sūtra himself expounds it clearly in:

*Fruits are from Him, because of aptness [BrSū III. ii. 37],

and the following sūtras.

It is accepted by The Vaiśeshika and others¹⁰⁷⁷ that: a body etc. are made up of the gross elements induced by special qualities of the enjoyer [i.e. the self],¹⁰⁷⁸ because they are the means of his enjoyment, like a garland [composed by him]; if [this syllogism] is established, [the special quality] is proved to be unseen power inherent in the individual self through the process of elimination (pariśeṣha) because [it] cannot be [such special qualities of the self which do not exist before the formation of the body] such as knowledge¹⁰⁷⁹ **[438]** — This is not true. Because the restriction [concerning the body] can be justified only due to the unseen power as we have defined and, accordingly, there is no sublation in a counter-example. And this would not lead the undesirable conclusion that [the fruits of someone] are enjoyed by the other. Because what restricts [the enjoyment, namely,

¹⁰⁷⁵ karmaphalasambibhantsayā. Van Buitenen's ed. of VAS reads °sambibhantsayā.

¹⁰⁷⁶ = Fg. 5 [Nakamura 1955: 121f.]; Fg. 1 of the BrhUp-bhāshya [van Buitenen 1956: 302]. Quoted in VAS §124 [152,11] and ŚrīBh II. ii. 3 [282,6]. Rāmānuja expounds the fragment in VAS §124 [152,12–14].

¹⁰⁷⁷ The similar argument is, as is pointed out by V, shown in NyKu, the first stabaka. The completely same inference is found in the Nyāyalīlāvātī 659ff. The prototype of this inference are found in Vyomavātī (2) 229.

¹⁰⁷⁸ The viśeshaguṇas of the self are buddhi, sukha, duḥkha, icchā, dvesha, prayatna, dharma, adharma [TarS §73].

¹⁰⁷⁹ Cf. NyKu I §53: śarīrādeḥ prāk teshām [=buddhyādīnām] asattvāt [48,4].

His] will etc., supervise (adhyaksha) [it].¹⁰⁸⁰

If it be so, it is not any defect to accept even love and [anger] of gods like Agni and Indra as the unseen power by force of the śrutis.¹⁰⁸¹ It is based on God that they also become donors of fruits.¹⁰⁸² In any case, the unseen power is composed of [only] love of God without any exception.

[439] So is stated by [God] Himself:

*Truly I am the enjoyer and the lord (prabhu) [or the donor of fruits¹⁰⁸³] of all sacrifices [BhG IX. 24].

Conditioned with various karma [of the individual selves], the knowledge of God forms anger etc. But it is not his defect. Because [His anger etc.] are [but] good qualities (guṇa) consistent with keeping His own command. Likewise, gracious condescension (sauśīlya),¹⁰⁸⁴ forgiving love (vātsalya),¹⁰⁸⁵ friendship¹⁰⁸⁶ (sauhārda) and so on are varieties of [His] knowledge.

¹⁰⁸⁰ This follows R. According to K: will, [volition and karma of the individual self], which restrict [the enjoyment], are perceived.

¹⁰⁸¹ R and K refer to “ṭṛpta evainam indraḥ prajayā paśubhis tarpayati” [?].

¹⁰⁸² Cf. BrSū II. iii. 40.

¹⁰⁸³ phalapradāṭṛ. See GBh IX. 24, VAS §124 [153,14]; ŚrīBh III. ii. 40 [458,17].

¹⁰⁸⁴ The English equivalent is of Carman. Deśika's definition is: sauśīlyam śobhanaśīlatvam, tac cātrātimahīyaso 'py atihīneshu guhagopālādīshv api sādvasapraśamanānyaprayojananīrandhrasamśleshasvabhāvatvam [Śaraṇāgatigadyabhāshya 146,10f.]. Rāmānuja himself has not defined the term; the definition of the term in Sudarśanasūri's Śaraṇāgatigadyabhāshya and that in Parāśarabhaṭṭa's Vishṇusahasranāmabhāshya are shown in Carman 1974: 194f.

¹⁰⁸⁵ The English equivalent is of Carman. Deśika's definition of the term is: vātsalyam 'śaraṇāgatavatsalaḥ' [Rāmāyaṇa V. 21. 20] ityādybhipretā svalakṣaṇīyatayābhimateśhu doṣataraskāraṇī prītiḥ [Śaraṇāgatigadyabhāshya 146,14f.]. For the definition of the term in Parāśarabhaṭṭa's Vishṇusahasranāmabhāshya and Periya Āccan Pillai's Śaraṇāgatigadyavyākḥānam, and also its significance in the post-Rāmānuja period, see Carman 1974: 196f. and 223–30.

¹⁰⁸⁶ Deśika's definition of the term is: sauhārdam 'suhṛdam sarvabhūtānām' [BhG V. 29] 'urasā pratijñagrāha pārtham samchādyā

As to [the emotions] referred to by [theorists of dramaturgy] beginning with Bharata, the lasting emotions¹⁰⁸⁷ (sthāyibhāva) such as affection¹⁰⁸⁸ (rati) are **[440]** the modifications of this [knowledge]. Among transitory emotions¹⁰⁸⁹ (saṃcāribhāva), nirveda or self-disparagement etc. are the varieties of knowledge; fatigue (glāni) etc. are the varieties of the condition of the body and the like. The word svapna also clearly denotes a variety of knowledge when it means dreaming; when it means deep sleep, it denotes the condition devoid of all the expansion of knowledge in one who does not faint and lives. Consider dulness (jā ya) etc. in the same manner **[441]**.

[Obj.] Whose condition is nidrā (or sleepiness), then?

[Ans.] Of the mind or knowledge oppressed by worry, laziness, tiredness and the like. And it causes deep sleep etc.

[Obj.] How [do you explain] the sūtra of the great sage [Patañjali] that:

*Nidrā is the mental-function (vṛtti) concerned with [tamas], which is the cause of the non-existence [of the other mental-functions in waking or dreaming]¹⁰⁹⁰ [Yogaasūtra I. 10],

then?

mādhavaḥ' [MBh VII. 28. 17] ityādiprasiddham sāmānyato viśeshataś ca hitaishitvam [Śaraṇāgatigadyabhāshya 146,24f.].

¹⁰⁸⁷ For its definition, see Bhāvaprakāśa of Śāradātanaya [fl. the 12 th century], quoted in R. The sthāyibhāvas are eight or nine (including śānti) in number; see V. Raghavan: The Number of Rasa-s, Madras³ 1975, pp.69ff. Cf. ratir hāsaś ca śokaś ca krodha-utsāhau bhayaṃ tathā / jugupsā vismayaś ceti sthāyibhāvāḥ prakīrtitāḥ [Nāṭyaśāstra VI. 17].

¹⁰⁸⁸ Cf. Sāhityadarpaṇa 207: ratir manonukūle 'rthe manasaḥ pravaṇāyitam.

¹⁰⁸⁹ Also called vyabhicāribhāva. They are said to be thirty-three in number. See ? quoted in R.

¹⁰⁹⁰ abhāvapratyayāmbanā vṛttir nidrā. Vācaspati interprets: jāgrasvapnavṛttinām abhāvaḥ tasya pratyayaḥ kāraṇam buddhisattvācchādakaṃ tamas tad evāmbanam vishayo yasyāḥ sā tathoktā vṛttir nidrā [ĀnSS No.47; 15,13ff.].

[Ans.] [It is called *vṛtti* with] the intention that it is to be suppressed like another mental-function¹⁰⁹¹ for one who master meditation, because this section [of the *Yogasūtra*] deals with suppressing.¹⁰⁹² It has been explained in the *Ātmasiddhi*.¹⁰⁹³

Moreover, wrong observations concerning knowledge, say, that it is objectless, that it has no substratum, that it has no dharma are to be rejected by force of [our ordinary] apprehension ['I know it'] and so on.¹⁰⁹⁴ [The wrong theories of error] such as that an object of error is non-existent¹⁰⁹⁵ (*asatkhyāti*), that it is but idea¹⁰⁹⁶ (*ātmakhyāti*), that it is inexplicable¹⁰⁹⁷ (*anirvacanīyakhyāti*) have been rejected by us in the *Nyāyapariśuddhi*.¹⁰⁹⁸

Additionally, all that is necessary for ordinary usage (*vyavahāra*) such as the means of knowledge and the known entities has been expounded there [in the *Nyāyapariśuddhi*]; accordingly, all is not illustrated here. There the real nature of the categories are made clear in accordance with the order of the *Vaiśeshikas*. **[442]**

¹⁰⁹¹ Like *viparyaya*, which is not *vṛtti* at all.

¹⁰⁹² Cf. *Yogasūtra* I. 2: *yogaś cittavṛttinirodhaḥ*.

¹⁰⁹³ *ĀS* 72,14f.: *nirodhaparavāt prakaraṇasya na vṛttisvarūpe tātparyam viparyayavat*.

¹⁰⁹⁴ Concerning this *ādi*, R quoted the verse: *jñātrjñeyavihīnam te brahma jñānātmakam yadi / bhojyabhokṛvihīnā 'pi bhavet tarhi bhjikriyā //* [?].

¹⁰⁹⁵ This is the opinion of the *Mādhyamika* Buddhist. Deśika's criticism of this theory is seen in *NyP* 52f. as well as *TMK* IV. 18–19. See Singh 199f., *Vedavalli* 60, *Srinivasa Chari* 173f.

¹⁰⁹⁶ Of the *Yogācāra* Buddhist. Deśika's criticism is found in *NyP* 48–51 as well as *TMK* IV. 20ff. See Singh 192ff., *Vedavalli* 58ff., *Srinivasa Chari* 173f.

¹⁰⁹⁷ Of the *Advaita Vedāntin*. Deśika's criticism is found in *NyP* 53ff. as well as *TMK* IV. 16f. See Singh 195ff., *Vedavalli* 61ff., *Srinivasa Chari* 175f.

¹⁰⁹⁸ The *viśiṣṭādvaita* view on *khyātivāda* is closely examined in *V's bhūmikā*, pp.42f.

(110) May my knowledge be very fortunately influenced by hundreds of words of the king of ascetics [or Rāmānuja] and, having reached the mansion, namely, the top of the śrutis increasing enjoyment, have fresh idea which is always happy (sadāsāmoda) in proximity with [His] eternal realm of bliss [and] is eager for the voluntary embrace of Dāmodara [or Kṛṣṇa].

Here ends the fifth section on knowledge in the Nyāyasiddhāñjana composed by Śrīmad Veṅkaṭanātha or Vedāntācārya, who is the lion among poets and logicians and who masters all branches of arts.

Chapter 6 Non-substance

Now non-substance [is explained]. Non-substance is that which is devoid of conjunction.

In¹⁰⁹⁹ this regard, the *triguṇa* (or material substance which has all three *guṇas*) has a series of conditions [i.e. continuous modifications] characterized by similarity and dissimilarity¹¹⁰⁰; time also [has a series of conditions] from [being] *kṣaṇa*, [being] *lava*, being *nimesha* up to [being] *parārdha*; and knowledge [has a series of conditions] such as being perception, being inference and being verbal knowledge (*śrauta*); even pure *sattva* has a certain¹¹⁰¹ [series of conditions] similar to that of the *triguṇa* — thus, innumerable modes [of non-substance] are to be considered according to the means of valid knowledge. Keeping this in mind, *Varadavishṇu-miśra* states:

*And quality (*guṇa*) is innumerable [?].

Thus, it is impossible to enumerate such innumerable difference among these [conditions] one by one. Additionally some [of them] which can be [enumerated] have been almost explained in the section on substance [of the present work] and more explanation would not be useful for people, empirical usage (*vyavahāra*), unseen power etc. This is why [we will not explain all these conditions and only] explain the other non-substances which can be clearly counted.

They are only ten: *sattva*, *rajas*, *tamas*, five [qualities] beginning with sound (*śabda*), conjunction (*saṃyoga*) and potency (*śakti*). These [ten] non-substances do, as case be, cover [all other categories which are accepted as non-substance by the other schools], say, weight (*gurutva*), fluidity (*dravatva*), viscosity (*snehatva*), latent impression (*saṃskāra*), number (*saṃkhyā*), size (*parimāṇa*), separateness (*pṛthaktva*), disjunction (*vibhāga*), remoteness (*paratva*), nearness (*aparatva*), action (*karma*), generality (*sāmānya*),¹¹⁰² similarity (*sādṛśya*), particularity (*viśeṣa*), inherence (*saṃavāya*), non-existence (*abhāva*), qualified-ness¹¹⁰³ (*vaiśiṣṭya*) etc. Even among them,

¹⁰⁹⁹ This is an answer to the question why all the *avasthā*, which is same as *adravya* [see the definition in 7,2], is not dealt with in this section.

¹¹⁰⁰ R refers to his own comment on the passage “And [it] begins a similar or dissimilar series of modifications (*vikāra*) in accordance with the difference in time and place” [NySi 41,2].

¹¹⁰¹ I.e. excluding the body of God etc. (R, K).

¹¹⁰² NySi in the present form explains up to this and stops.

¹¹⁰³ This is postulated by the *Mīmāṃsakas* as the relation between existence and non-existence because neither conjunction nor inherence is

some [categories] that are not accepted by our fellows as included [in the ten non-substance] will be explained in suitable places. In the *Tattvamuktālāpa*,¹¹⁰⁴ we have mentioned to varieties of non-substance including oneness (ekatva) along with some [categories] accepted by our fellows [444].

Among them, *sattva* is that non-substance beyond sense-organs and different from potency which causes illumination, happiness, lightness etc. It is of two sorts: pure one and impure one. Pure *sattva* is that *sattva* which exists in substance devoid of *rajas* and *tamas*. It belongs to [His] eternal [transcendental] manifestation (*nityavibhūti*). Impure *sattva* is that *sattva* which coexists with *rajas* and *tamas*. It belongs to the *triguṇa*.

The definition of *rajas* and that of *tamas* are attained by exchanging the attribute of the definition of *sattva* [that ‘which causes illumination, happiness, lightness etc.’] for ‘which causes greed, activity etc.’ and ‘which causes carelessness, confusion etc.’ [respectively].

All these three pervades the entire *prakṛti* and, [though] non-eternal, has a eternally continuing series. They are well-balanced at the time of the dissolution and become uneven at the beginning of the creation; [thus], they serve for the creation, the maintenance and the dissolution in due order.¹¹⁰⁵ Due to the difference among cooperative causes (*sahakārin*) such as God's will, they do cooperation etc. one another [in the form that the one] is dominant and [the other two] is subdued. Because due to the difference among persons associated with their each unseen power [or love and anger of His], [the three] become dominant, equal and [subdued].¹¹⁰⁶ For instance, the Venerable *Parāśara* says that:

*One and the same entity [445] ... [ViP II. vi. 47],¹¹⁰⁷

possible (R). Cf. the *Nyāyalīlāvati* criticizing the view that it is another *padārtha* [ChSS ed. 68,1–75,1].

¹¹⁰⁴ TMK V. 41.

¹¹⁰⁵ R remarks: “the meaning is that ‘they serve for the creation, the maintenance and the dissolution, which take place in due order’; do not think ‘*sattva*, *rajas* and *tamas* cause the creation, the maintenance and the dissolution respectively,’ because there is not such order.” — It should be regard as ‘they cannot be independent causes,’ because *Deśika* says: *sattvarajastamsām sthityutpattilayeshu viśeṣheṇa bhagavatādhishṭhitatvaṃ teshuteshu śāstreshūcyate* [SAS V. 16].

¹¹⁰⁶ As one and the same female body is the cause of pleasure for her husband, of pain for a man having his own wife, of confusion for another woman (R).

¹¹⁰⁷ “One and the same entity serves, [due to the difference of persons],

and that:

*The same, having served for affection, ... [ViP II. vi. 48].¹¹⁰⁸

The detail is to be considered in the Bhagavadgītā and its commentary.¹¹⁰⁹ Also for the classification into of sattva, of rajas and of tamas concerning effect,¹¹¹⁰ course,¹¹¹¹ ritual act,¹¹¹² food,¹¹¹³ charity¹¹¹⁴ etc., see the explanation in these [two].

And these [three] are unambiguously said to be non-substance in the Śārīrakabhāṣya. [That is], to the sūtra that:

*Also because of the impossibility of construction [BrSū II. i. 1], it is stated that:

*By force of the letter ‘also (ca),’ it is added that the continuity (anvaya), [with which the Sāṃkhyas prove the prakṛti to be the primordial cause],¹¹¹⁵ is not absolute [446]

...

Because sattva etc. are qualities of substances, but not substances for happiness, the production of jealousy and anger — how, then, is it possible that one entity is the same in nature?”

¹¹⁰⁸ “[Even concerning one person], the same, once having served for affection, comes to serve for pain and, again, comes to serve for anger and, again, comes to serve for favor”; “Hence, nothing is happy or miserable in nature” [49ab] etc.

¹¹⁰⁹ R refers to BhG XIV. 9–10 and the passage of GBh XIV. 10 that: Owing to the past karma and because of the differences in the food nourishing the body, sattva etc. come to be dominant and subdued. Sometimes sattva is preponderate dominating rajas and tamas; sometimes rajas [is preponderate] dominating sattva and tamas; sometimes tamas [is preponderate] dominating rajas and sattva [464,13–465,3].

¹¹¹⁰ See BhG XIV. 11–13.

¹¹¹¹ See BhG XIV. 18.

¹¹¹² See BhG XVII. 4.

¹¹¹³ See BhG XVII. 8–10.

¹¹¹⁴ See BhG XVII. 20–22.

¹¹¹⁵ This anvaya corresponds to samanvaya in the Sāṃkhyakārikā 15. See Tattvakaumudī: bhinnānām samānarūpatā samanvayaḥ / sukhaduḥkhamohasamanvitā hi buddhyādayo 'dhyavasāyādilakṣaṇāḥ pratīyante / yāni ca yadrūpasamanugatāni tāni tatsvabhāvavyaktakāraṇāni, yathā mṛddhemapiṇ asamanugatā ghaṭamukuṭādayo mṛddhemāvyaktakāraṇakā. Cf. ŚP 279,29–31: kārye 'nvyasya mṛdādeḥ kāraṇatvam dṛśyate, tathā sattvādimayasukhaduḥkhādeḥ kārye 'nvayāt kārye sattvādyanvayaḥ siddha iti sattvādinām kāraṇatvam iti hy uktam.

themselves. In fact, sattva etc. are, being the causes of levity, illumination etc. existing in [substances] such as earth, special natures of these [substances]. But they are never apprehended to be continuous in effects as substances like a lump of clay, gold etc. And sattva etc. are well-known to be but qualities [ŚrīBh II. ii. 1: 279,13; 279,16–280,1].

So is stated in the [Vedānta-]dīpa:

*By force of the letter ‘also,’ it is added that sattva etc. cannot be material causes because they are qualities of substances like whiteness and the like. In fact, sattva etc. are, being the causes of levity, illumination etc. existing in effects, are special natures which belong to its causes such as earth [VDīpa II. ii. 1: 56,7–8].

Varadavishṇumiśra, however, holds that sattva, rajas and tamas are substances, for instance:

*And substance is of twenty-six kinds: ... sattva, rajas, tamas... [?].¹¹¹⁶

This is untenable since it is contradictory to the [Brahma-]sūtras in the topic on the Sāṃkhyas¹¹¹⁷ and the commentaries thereon.

Sound is that which is grasped with the faculty of hearing like ours and exists in the five gross-elements.¹¹¹⁸

It is of two sorts: [1] that which is composed of letters (varṇa) and [2] that which is not composed of letters.

[1] That which is composed of letters is that [sound] which is devoid of an aggregation of the non-existence of the modes such as a, ka, ca, ṭa, ta, pa and ya. This [kind of sound] is manifested by [the parts of a vocal organ] such as a palate of gods, men etc. It is concerning this [kind of sound] that expressiveness (vācakatva) etc. have been considered [in many works of various schools].¹¹¹⁹

It comprises fifty-one modes including ksha.¹¹²⁰ In some cases, it is

¹¹¹⁶ Already quoted in 148,11.

¹¹¹⁷ I.e. racanānupapattiyadhikaraṇa, II. ii. 1–9.

¹¹¹⁸ I.e. not in ether only as is held by the Vaiśeṣikas etc. Cf. TarS §33.

¹¹¹⁹ According to the first interpretation of R. According to the second and K, “Concerning this [kind of sound], it is considered that [a word denoting the body] expresses [that which has the body in the end] etc., [which] has been mentioned [in the first section on triguṇa].”

¹¹²⁰ =.

said to comprise only fifty modes because there is no distinction between la and la¹¹²¹ in the primary list of characters (māṭṛkāpāṭa). Some [letters], say, ya, ra and la, have different forms [due to conjunction]: kya, kra¹¹²² etc. Shorts of diphthongs or the vowels resulting from a vowel-combination [i.e. e, o, ai and au] are possible in the practical usages of spoken languages such as Prākṛt and they are taught in the primary list of characters in Dravidian languages etc. In Sanskrit, however, [447] they are excluded from the primary list of characters because they do not have expressiveness. In this manner, these [letters] are said to be sixty-three in the Mokshadharmā anyway. Also the scriptural passage that ‘There are a thousand letters in the Supreme Heaven’ is justified for the reason that there are the other syllables or that the very syllables [in this world] can be distinguished into a thousand letters, ten thousand letters or so owing to the attribution due to situation, combination etc.

[2] That which is not composed of letters is that [sound] which has an aggregation of the non-existence of all the modes such as a, ka, ca, ṭa, ta, pa and ya. It is manifested with a music instrument, cloud, wind, disjunction etc. [448]

As to the both [kinds of sound], according to the theory that only [the sound] closing to the portion of the ear is manifested by air [and is grasped there by the ear], it is only the [sound] existing in ether that can be grasped. According to the theory that [even the sound] that exists in a musical instrument etc. is grasped, it is justified that [the sound] existing in the five gross elements also can be grasped. In this regard, Varadanārāyaṇa-bhaṭṭāraka, [clearly supporting the latter theory], mentions of the operation [or going out] of the faculty of hearing when it grasps the sound existing far away:

*Owing to our experience that sound is [apprehended as] far, near, in the west etc., the faculty of hearing is capable of going out and grasping sound here and there.

[For] if a series of the sound coming from a far place were grasped due to [its] inherence [to ether], then [only the sound that is near to the ear could be grasped and, consequently, the sound] produced far away would not be grasped so [as the sound far away].

Because of the dulness of sound etc. we can grasp [the sound] as produced far away etc., still we could not grasp [the sound] as in the east, in the west etc. [?]

This sound is produced along with ether and is dissolved along with the dissolution of that [ether]. It is neither produced nor dissolved along with the production or dissolution of the other gross elements because air

¹¹²¹ I.e. l and ḷ.

¹¹²² E.g. k+y = Ky; k+r = [k.

etc. are also the portions [or products] of ether. Or rather, that [sound] which exists in ether is produced or dissolved along with ether **[449]** and that [sound] which exists in air etc. is also [produced or dissolved] along with each gross element.

Sound is constant (sthira). Because, for instance, we identify sound uttered in excessively high tone with those uttered in the other tones, which is opposed to [the cognition that they have] different qualities.¹¹²³ For it is heard that varieties of high pitch etc., e.g. the sixth note and others, are the qualities of air, by which [sound] is manifested, in the following passage:

*As air, which is pervasive without any difference, has varieties such as that called the sixth note owing to the difference of holes in a flute, so [all] the [individual] self¹¹²⁴ [is, though individual selves are different due to their own karma, uniform] [ViP II. xiv. 32].

For this very reason, all the syllables ga existing till the end of kalpa are same, so are the other syllables.

By the way, the statement of Śrī-Vishṇucitta that:

*The ear, like the other sense-organs,¹¹²⁵ also grasps the entities composed of innumerable particularities such as being sound, being ga, being soft, being hard, being low, being medium etc. [?],

[where these particularities are said to be the qualities of sound], also intends to deny the apprehension of an entity without any particularity. Because in [his¹¹²⁶] commentary on the [Taittirīya-]Upanishad ad the passage that:

*[Oh, air!] You, indeed, are the perceptible Brahman **[450]** [TaiUp I. i. 1, xii. 1],

it is stated that air is but that which manifests [sound].¹¹²⁷

[Some] imagine as follows — Owing to the śruti-passage that:

*Salutation to thee, oh air! You, indeed, are the perceptible (pratyaksha) Brahman. I will speak of you, indeed, the perceptible Brahman. [TaiUp

¹¹²³ The same illustration is found in TMK V. 24a, which mentions of the Bhāṭṭa view that sound is eternal.

¹¹²⁴ Here paramātman denotes ātman or the individual self; cf. MBh? (BhG XIII. 22) [Vishṇucittīya].

¹¹²⁵ For itarendriyavishayavat (as in the case of the objects of the other sense-organs), read itarendriyavat which R regards as easier to understand.

¹¹²⁶ This description clearly shows that Vishṇucitta wrote a commentary on the Upanishadḍ also (V), though it is not mentioned by Raghavan [1979: 18f.].

¹¹²⁷ Here ‘but (eva)’ is for denying air's being ‘that which produces such sound.’ If the author intended to mean that hardness etc. are the qualities of sound, he should state that air produces anew such sound (K).

I. i. 1, xii. 1]

and the [above-quoted] supplementary passage that:

*Holes in a flute [ViP II. xiv. 32],

and also in view of the simplicity of assumption,¹¹²⁸ it is particular air, which is regarded as that which manifests [sound] by others, that is apprehended as qualified by various qualities of sound¹¹²⁹ which are produced due to the various vibration (ghaṭṭaṇa) of particular substance [for articulation such as a palate] and the [various] latent impression (saṃskāra) [of previous pronunciation]. [451]

The summary [of the above-mentioned various opinions regarding sound¹¹³⁰] is: all sound has the Supreme Self, who has [any of] particular modification¹¹³¹ of the non-manifest (avyakta) as the body, as the material cause. Again, it is neither eternal nor without material cause as independent substance assumed by the Bhāṭṭas¹¹³² or as the quality [of ether] assumed by the Prābhākaras.

[The theory of the Grammarians¹¹³³] that syllables have sphaṭa¹¹³⁴ etc.¹¹³⁵ as the material cause is contradictory to the Scriptures and

¹¹²⁸ Because it is complicated (gaurava) to assume that which produces (utpādaka) other than that which manifests (vyañjaka) (R).

¹¹²⁹ śabdagaṇaviśiṣṭa. R poses some interpretations: “This means (1a) ‘qualified by the modification in the form of sound-ness’ or (1b) ‘qualified by the qualities of sound such as being high; after all, it means ‘modified into sound.’ According to some, however, (2) this is the opinion that the quality called sound is produced in air due to the function of a palate etc.: [the substratum of sound is only air, neither ether nor the other gross elements (K)].”

¹¹³⁰ (a) the substratum of sound is only ether; (b) it exists in all the five elements; (c) it is substance being the modification of air; (d) air in general is its substratum (K).

¹¹³¹ It does not matter whether the modification is ether or air (R).

¹¹³² See the verse quoted in SAS V. 22: 702,1f.

¹¹³³ Here R quotes Vākyapadīya I. 1.

¹¹³⁴ For the definition of the term, see SDS XIII. 137f.: (1) sphuṭyate vyajyate varṇair iti sphaṭo varṇābhivyamṅyaḥ (2) sphuṭati sphaṭībhavaty asmād artha iti sphaṭo 'rthapratyāyakaḥ. Cf. ŚP I (1) 180,20f.: nādaḥ sphuṭyate iti vyutpattyā sphaṭaḥ.

¹¹³⁵ ādi-padārtho vimṛśyaḥ (V).

perception.¹¹³⁶ And concerning sphoṭa, our perception¹¹³⁷ cannot be valid means of knowledge; [452] yogic perception is doubtful. Nor the Scriptures.¹¹³⁸

Besides, what makes assume [sphoṭa according to you the Grammarians] can be interpreted in the other way.¹¹³⁹ [You try to prove sphoṭa by means of] the alternative question, say, which denotes the meaning [of a word], each of [constituent syllables] or the combination [of the syllables¹¹⁴⁰]. Yet the same alternative holds good concerning that which is manifested by sphoṭa¹¹⁴¹; [accordingly, you cannot blame us because both of us have the same defect¹¹⁴²]. But in your case, there is further [defect] of assuming [sphoṭa in addition to well-established syllables].

In the same way, the sphoṭa of a sentence is also broken (sphuṭita). Also the singular form in the expression ‘I understand the meaning from sound’ is not concerned with the oneness of that which is devoid of part

¹¹³⁶ Or, ‘contradictory to the Scripture that ‘[vāyo tvam eva] pratyaksham [brahmāsi]’ [TaiUp I. i. 1], [which teaches that air manifests sound].’

¹¹³⁷ See SDS XIII. 127ff.: pratyaksham evātra pramāṇam / gaur ity ekaṃ padam iti nānāvārṇātiriktaikapadāvagateḥ sarvajanīnatvāt. R rejects it for the reason that: ekopādhyavacchinnavarṇasamudāyavishayatayā 'py upapatteḥ. Cf. TMK IV. 87.

¹¹³⁸ R refers to the usage of sphoṭa in MBh III. 11. 58 (?) and interprets it etymologically. Cf. TMK IV. 89; SeMī 91,13ff.

¹¹³⁹ Cf. TMK IV. 88.

¹¹⁴⁰ —Not the former because the other syllables would be meaningless; nor the latter because momentary syllables can not form a combination (R). Cf. SDS XIII, 132–135: kiṃ varṇāḥ samastā vyastā vārthapratyayaṃ janayanti? nādyāḥ, varṇānāṃ kṣaṇikānāṃ samūhāsaṃbhavāt / nātyantaḥ, ... [the reason here is different from that posed in R] ... tasmād varṇānāṃ vācakatvānupapatau yadbalād arthapratipattiḥ sa sphoṭaḥ; ibid. 143f.: varṇānāṃ vācakatve dvitīyādivarṇocāraṇārthakyaprasaṃgāt (from Kaiyaṭa ad Mahābhāshya p.12).

¹¹⁴¹ The same refutation is found in SDS XIII. 182f. also. Like SDS, R further examines Bhartṛhari's answer to this refutation in Vākyapadīya I. 85.

¹¹⁴² In this regard, R quotes the Ślokaṽrttika, sūnyavāda v. 252ab: yaś cobhyoḥ samo doṣaḥ parihāro 'pi vā samaḥ (the original reading of the a-pāda is: tasmād yatrobhayor doṣaḥ). Moreover, R takes up the objection to this argument in Vākyapadīya I. 85 and refutes it.

[i.e. sphoṭa], because we apprehend oppositely [that parts are many].¹¹⁴³

Against [your opinion] that Brahman is expressed by the word sphoṭa [453], we have no objection. Nevertheless the superimposition (adhyāsa) etc. [on sphoṭa] are to be rejected like the Advaita opinion.¹¹⁴⁴

The grammatical smṛtis [beginning with the Pāṇinisūtra¹¹⁴⁵] are established even without [accepting] sphoṭa. And you cannot say all is proper that is said by them. Moreover, Pāṇini and so on have not assert so [on sphoṭa]; the others [like Bhartṛhari] who make an effort incessantly¹¹⁴⁶ should not be respected. And it is stated by Bhaṭṭa-Parāśara-pāda:

*[All that] grammarians [should do is to] arrange a stem, an affix and an accent according to old usages and etymologically explain the formation of a word.¹¹⁴⁷ [?]

And for the same reason that is mentioned concerning the guṇas beginning with sattva, sound is proved to be non-substance.

[Obj.] That sound is non-substance and that it is [not produced anew but] manifested cannot be our finally accepted view (siddhānta). Because it is proved to be substance and an effect (or that which is produced anew) according to the śrutis and so on. That is, in the passage that:

*That syllable declared in the beginning of the Vedas¹¹⁴⁸ [MahāNārāyaṇaUp X. 8], and so on, it is stated that syllables are the material causes of the other syllables. And non-substance could not be a material cause. If [the passage]

¹¹⁴³ Cf. SeMī 90,15ff.: ‘śabdād arthaṃ pratīmaḥ’ ity ekavacananirdeśāt ‘ekaṃ padam’ iti kaṇṭhokter anekebhyo gākārādibhyo ‘dhikaṃ śabdān upalabdhavanto vyavahāra iti cet; tan na, etc.

¹¹⁴⁴ Because sphoṭa is, like Brahman, nirviśeṣa and niraṃśa and, hence, it does not have a part known and a part unknown, it cannot be the substratum of adhyāsa.

¹¹⁴⁵ According to K.

¹¹⁴⁶ nīradhra. K shows the variant nirarthaka (in vain).

¹¹⁴⁷ Cf. Vākyapadīya I. 16.

¹¹⁴⁸ The full passage is: “What is meant (para) by that syllable declared in the beginning of the Vedas and established in the end of Vedas [= om-kāra] which is dissolved (līna) in its source (prakṛti) [= a-kāra], is the Highest Lord” (yo vedādaḥ prokto vedānte ca pratītiḥ, tasya prakṛtilīnasya yaḥ paraḥ sa mahēśvaraḥ). The meaning is explained in VAS §103 quoted below.

simply meant that [syllables] are the instrumental causes [of the others], the natural meanings of [the words used here] ‘source (prakṛti),’ [which denotes] a material cause, and ‘dissolved (līna),’¹¹⁴⁹ etc.¹¹⁵⁰ would be spoiled. Because an instrumental cause could be neither the source nor the place of dissolution.¹¹⁵¹ And this [passage should] not be [interpreted as] metaphorical, because nothing sublates [its natural meaning] and because [such interpretation] is contradictory to the statements of the author of the commentaries. So in [his] Vedārthasaṃgraha, starting with the phrase that:

*The syllable om, which is the seed of the Vedas as it is in the beginning and the end of the Vedas¹¹⁵² [VAS §103: 135,7],

he continues:

*The syllable om is the source of all the Veda [454]. And the source of om [or a-u-m] is the syllable a. The Veda, which is the modification of the syllable om, is dissolved in the syllable om, which is its own source. Also the syllable om, which is the modification of the syllable a, is dissolved in the syllable a, which is its own source.¹¹⁵³ The para¹¹⁵⁴, i.e. the import, of this syllable a, which is the source of the syllable om, is the Highest Lord. The meaning is: Nārāyaṇa — who is denoted by the syllable a, which is the source of all denotative [words], and who is the source of all denoted [objects] — is the Highest Lord [VAS §103: 135,9–12].

Further, quoting the passage that:

*The letter a, indeed, is the whole language (vāc) [AitareyaĀraṇyaka II. iii. 6],

he states:

*It is quite clear that all denotative [words] have the syllable a as the source and that all denoted [objects] have Brahman as the source [VAS §103: 136,1–2].

Also in the Śrīmad-Gītābhāshya [ad the verse that]:

*Of letters, I am the syllable a [BhG X. 33],

¹¹⁴⁹ See MahānārāyaṇaUp X. 8 quoted above: ... tasya prakṛtilīnasya yaḥ paraḥ sa maheśvaraḥ.

¹¹⁵⁰ upādānaprakṛtilīnādisvārasyabhaṅga. Here the translation follows R. V interprets: the natural meaning of the word prakṛtilīna etc., which is concerned with upādāna, would be spoiled.

¹¹⁵¹ According to K.

¹¹⁵² See MahānārāyaṇaUp X. 8 quoted above: yo vedādauprokto vedānte ca pratishṭhitah, tasya ...

¹¹⁵³ See MahānārāyaṇaUp X. 8 quoted above: ... tasya prakṛtilīnasya yaḥ paraḥ saḥ ...

¹¹⁵⁴ See MahānārāyaṇaUp X. 8 quoted above: ... tasya prakṛtilīnasya yaḥ paraḥ saḥ ...

[the same author states:]

*Among letters, I am the syllable a, which is well-known in the śruti passage:

“The letter a, indeed, is the whole language” [AitareyaĀraṇyaka II. iii. 6],

as the source of all syllables [GBh X. 33: 351,6–7].

And it is stated that sound is modification in the {Śrī-]Bhāshya that:

*Since Prajāpati, the creator, and sound, which is the modification of the ahaṃkāra named bhūtādi,¹¹⁵⁵ are destroyed in the material (prākṛta) dissolution. [ŚrīBh I. iii. 29: 66,2–3]

So also in the [Vedānta-]dīpa:

*In the Vedas composed of sound which is the modification of the unmanifested (avyākṛta) [VDīpa I. iii. 29: 32,4],

etc. Moreover, the passage beginning with:

*One who has the Vedas as the body¹¹⁵⁶ [?],

also proves [sound] to be substance. Because only substance can be the body, as is established in the definition of the body.¹¹⁵⁷ Also in the Ātmasiddhi it is stated that:

*We experience that even quality such as sound, smell, effulgence of the sun and brilliance of a jewel has movement and goes beyond the substratum. Indeed, sound is very subtle, is of the nature of going far off and is elemental [ĀS 79,7–8];

*This [sound], you know, travels by its special force as long as the velocity (vega) lasts, like a [thrown] stone, even from things, e.g. the conch and the mouth, far away from the range of sight,¹¹⁵⁸ **[455]** though it is devoid of touch. [ĀS 78,4–5],

etc., which clearly justify the denial of sound being the quality of ether,¹¹⁵⁹ that it is aerial,¹¹⁶⁰ that it takes place immediately after pronunciation,¹¹⁶¹ and the refutations of the opinion that sound is manifested.¹¹⁶²

¹¹⁵⁵ I.e. the tāmasāhaṃkāra.

¹¹⁵⁶ yasya vedāḥ śarīram. Such phrase is not found in BrhUp (Mādhyandina-rec. also) and the SubālaUp.

¹¹⁵⁷ 158,5ff.: yasya cetanasya yad dravyaṃ sarvātmanā etc.

¹¹⁵⁸ dṛśām, genitive. If the v.l. diśām, is adopted, it should be taken as accusative and is combined with abhipratitishṭhati (to travel) (R).

¹¹⁵⁹ I.e. ĀS 79,12: atad- [=ākāśa-] guṇatvāt.

¹¹⁶⁰ I.e. ĀS 79,12: vāyaviyaḥ śabdaḥ, etc.

¹¹⁶¹ I.e. ĀS 79,14f.: utpadyate śabdaḥ, kṛtakaś ca; kriyottaram evolabhyatvāt.

¹¹⁶² I.e. ĀS 79,16: na cābhivyañjakatvam, etc.

[Ans.] If it be decided in this way [that sound being non-substance and manifested cannot be our finally accepted view], [the Vedic passages] that syllables are the material causes [of the others] should be interpreted as [1] just literal (yathārtha), [2] imaginary (kālpanika),¹¹⁶³ [3] the injunction concerning meditation¹¹⁶⁴ (dṛshṭividhi) or [4] figurative (aupacārika).

[1] We cannot adopt the first alternative. Because according to the opinion that syllables are eternal, [syllables] can be neither a material cause nor a material effect (upādeya). According to the Naiyāyika opinion, [syllables] are accepted to be [not material causes but] non-inherent causes etc. and they, [being qualities], never produce anything existent anew. Even in the opinion of the Venerable sage Yāmuna, it is air that is the material cause of syllables. The author of the commentaries also mentions of [sound] being the modification of the ahaṃkāra [and] nothing suggests to accept [such] order¹¹⁶⁵ of production [that enables the indirect relation concerning sound] as in the case of the statements [that the world] is the modification of the non-manifest.¹¹⁶⁶ [You may hold that such relation is taught in the Vedic passages, but] the [Vedic] statements show inconstant relation of a material and an effect concerning syllables¹¹⁶⁷ [and] they show contradictory relation of a material and an effect¹¹⁶⁸ **[456]**. Again [you may regard such

¹¹⁶³ Non-literal like the talk of an old bull (R). ‘The talk of an old bull’ is shown as an example of nonsensical statement in Sāyana's introductory commentary on the Ṛgveda.

¹¹⁶⁴ Like “mano brahmety upāsīta” [ChUp III. xviii. 1] (R). This is the so-called pratīkālambhana type of meditation; see BrSū IV. i. 4.

¹¹⁶⁵ paryāyaḥ = paramparā (K).

¹¹⁶⁶ This is against the following objection: as the world can be said to be the modification of the non-manifest because the two are indirectly related by means [of the order of the modifications beginning with the ahaṃkāra], so syllables can be said to be the modifications of the ahaṃkāra because sound, which has syllables as the material causes, is [described in the ŚrīBh as] the modification of the ahaṃkāra (R); or since [the statement of the ŚBh] intends to mean indirect modification as in the statement that the world is the modification of the non-manifest, the statement that [sound] is the modification of the ahaṃkāra is possible because sound is accepted to be the modification of the syllable a, which is the modification of the ahaṃkāra (K).

¹¹⁶⁷ I.e. “In some texts, syllables are said to be the modifications of the a-letter, the u-letter etc., which form the portion of om; in some, [they are said to be] the modifications of the h-letter etc., which form the portion of hṛllekha” [457,5f.].

¹¹⁶⁸ For instance, compare AitĀr II. iii. 6 cited above with AitBr XXV.

descriptions as optional, but] option is impossible as to an established entity.¹¹⁶⁹ Further, if [it be explained that there is not any fixed rule concerning the material cause with] the illustration that [some] scorpions [are produced from] cow-dung and [some are from a mother-scorpion],¹¹⁷⁰ this would bring about complication. And [there is some difference between a scorpion from cow-dung and that from a mother-scorpion, yet] no difference is seen [in the case of sound].

[Obj.] [Though the non-manifest is the material cause, syllables can be] the material causes as those which delimitate (avacchedaka) [the non-manifest being] the material cause.

[Ans.] Not so. If it should be the case, [syllables] could not be the material causes as lump-ness, which belongs to the lump of clay, [cannot be the material cause of a pot]. For even when that which is qualified is a material cause, the qualifiers cannot be so because they are devoid of qualified-ness.¹¹⁷¹

Moreover, the description that [sound] has color etc.¹¹⁷² can be established by no means. Because color is produced only in [entities] following fire. And because this would bring about the undesirable conclusion that [sound] is visible and, consequently, it has touch etc. like a pot. Further, that which is apprehended everywhere cannot have a particular position.¹¹⁷³

[457]

[2] Nor the second. Is this [being ‘imaginary’ concerned] with everything, with the phenomenal world or syllables only? Not the former two. Because the voidness, [which would be brought about if everything were imaginary], the non-duality [of Brahman, which would be brought about if the phenomenal world were so], and the like are rejected because of the contradiction to the very teaching¹¹⁷⁴ and so on. Nor the rest. For vii. 2 cited below.

¹¹⁶⁹ Cf. 292,3: na ca vikalpaḥ siddhe tadayogāt.

¹¹⁷⁰ Cf. 276,1.

¹¹⁷¹ Otherwise, when One which is qualified by spiritual and non-spiritual beings is the cause [of the world], these qualifiers [also] would be the causes (R).

¹¹⁷² E.g. “śvetam śyāmaṃ ca pītam ca piṅgalaṃ nīlaloḥitam / nīlam kanakavarṇam ca varṇāny eṭāny anukramāt //” [?] (R).

¹¹⁷³ See the verses from Mātrikādhyaṇaśloka (?) quoted in R (447,10ff.) and in K (456,-1ff.).

¹¹⁷⁴ In either case, the very teaching that everything or the phenomenal world is imaginary would be false because it is included in either of the two. Cf. v.54 in 309,1.

[being imaginary] could be applied to [the teaching that] prakṛti etc. [are the material cause of the world] because [it] is not different [from the teaching that syllables are the material causes] in being based on the Scriptures. [You may assert that the latter teaching is refuted because it is not appropriate for syllables, devoid of color, touch etc., to be the material causes, but] the inappropriateness can be doubted in every case [including prakṛti etc.]. For that which is based on the Scriptures cannot be sublated in view of appropriateness and their authority is well-established. Further, non-apprehension cannot sublimate [the existence of a thing] if it be incompetent¹¹⁷⁵; otherwise, there would be the over-application [that all is non-existent that is not apprehended].

[3] [Obj.] Then, let us accept the third view. To explain — In some texts, syllables are said to be the modifications of the a-letter, the u-letter etc., which form a portion of om [458]; in some, [they are said to be] the modifications of the h-letter etc., which form a portion of hṛllekhā. Moreover, a Śruti [teaches] in the other order:

*From the R̥gveda, bhūr was born. From the Yajurveda, bhuvaḥ.
From the Sāmaveda, suvaḥ.

These [three vyāhṛtis] having the shining One [as god¹¹⁷⁶] heated up.
From these heating ones, the three syllables were born: the a-letter, the u-letter and the m-letter. These are combined together. That is om [AitareyaBrāhmaṇa XXV. vii. 1–2].

But a smṛti states:

*Prajāpati squeezed the a-letter, the u-letter and the m-letter, bhūr, bhuvaḥ and suvaḥ as well from the three Vedas [Manusmṛti II. 76].

Also, having stated generally that all the mantras have om as the source, the ritual texts (kalpa) mention of the source-letter of each mantra. Moreover, it is explained that the Vedic verses (chandas) keep¹¹⁷⁷ a mantra at the dissolution.¹¹⁷⁸ Additionally, particular colors like white, red and yellow are mentioned regarding various letters; one and the same letter is described as having different colors in accordance with the difference in the application and that in mantra. Likewise, particular positions etc., which are fixed or not, are [mentioned regarding various letters]. Truly, however, syllables do not have any variety of color, position etc.; the only intention [of these descriptions] is that contemplating [syllables] as of such character makes special unseen power as in the case of a story associated with an amulet

¹¹⁷⁵ Cf. Vedāntaparibhāshā VI. 3 (Adyar ed.).

¹¹⁷⁶ śukriya: śuklaḥ tejishṭhaḥ paramātmā, sa eshām devateti tāni śukriyāni (R). But the text of the Brāhmaṇa (ĀnSS ed.) reads śukrāni.

¹¹⁷⁷ saṃchādya. Cf. ChUp I. iv. 2: chandobhir acchādayan etc.

¹¹⁷⁸ Therefore mantras are eternal, which is contradictory to the passages mentioning of their sources (R).

(yantra). Otherwise, these [descriptions] would lose their authenticity because they teach mutually contradictory contents as to the relation of a material and the effect, color, position etc. Therefore, only the injunction concerning meditation is proper in this case.

[Ans.] Such view is also blamed. To explain — Like [the injunction], say, that:

*One should meditate this syllable om as the udgītha [ChUp I. iv. 1], the injunction “One should meditate om as the material of all the syllables” is not found; on the other hand, the [above-cited] statements [as to syllables] are, no doubt, teachings regarding the truth. If they were still the injunctions concerning meditation, so could be even [the statement] that Brahman is the cause of the world and the like. And [the view] that [the statements as to syllables] are the injunctions concerning meditation is quite out of question in the statements of the author of the Commentary,¹¹⁷⁹ which makes us understand the reason [to ascertain] truth.

[Obj.] Depending upon [the maxim that] kāśa-grass is used [as a substitute for] kuśa-grass,¹¹⁸⁰ the relation of original and modification [is established] in the way, say, how syllables are produced in the part of ether delimited by a-letter.

[Ans.] Then, what is qualified by this [a-letter] being original would be figurative so far as this [letter] is concerned. Consequently, the injunction concerning meditation is abandoned.

[4] [Obj.] Let it be in this case.

[Ans.] If it were the case, the statement [of the author of the Commentary¹¹⁸¹] that the syllable a, which is [actually] the source of all denotative [words] denotes the Supreme Self, who is the source of all denoted [objects], would be improper [459]. Hence, the indication of the particularity in the form of the relation of original and the modification [would be] figurative as having the intention of praise or as connected with the potency etc. of various effects, as in the case of the indication of [colors] like red, white and black regarding the three guṇas.¹¹⁸²

¹¹⁷⁹ See the passage of VAS cited above.

¹¹⁸⁰ Cf. ŚrīBh II. i. 15: kāsakuśāvalambenāpi [258,4]; and ŚP thereon: kāsasya kuśatvena kuśasthāne 'valambanaṃ kāsakuśāvalambhanam; amukhyam ity arthaḥ. Although the maxim is sometimes used to mean being driven from one untenable argument to another almost equally untenable [Ranghacharya & Varadaraja Aiyangar, Eng. trans. II, pp.314f., fn.2], here it means only amukhyatva as in the ŚrīBh.

¹¹⁸¹ Cf. the passage of VAS cited above.

¹¹⁸² Cf. ŚveUp IV. 5.

Thus it were established [that the above four views are not acceptable]; then, the fifth view is advocated: [a Vedic passage that syllables are the material causes] is sometimes [1] just literal, sometimes [2] imaginary, sometimes [3] the injunction concerning meditation (dṛṣṭividhi) and sometimes [4] figurative (aupacārika). That is, if [its meaning] is not sublated, [it is interpreted as] the first; if sublated and baseless, the second; if there is the injunction of meditation, almost [the passage is interpreted as] the third; if [its meaning is] sublated but has some base, [it is interpreted as] the fourth.

[Obj.] Even if it were the case, there would be no finally accepted view for us. That is, is sound substance or non-substance? If substance, what is the material cause of what? How is [its] relation with color etc.? If non-substance, how [is its] relation with being material cause, color etc. [interpreted]?

[Ans.] Our answer is as follows. Some of our sect assert (I) sound is substance; some assert (II) it is non-substance.

Even in the view that it is substance, some hold (I-a) it is made up of air and some hold (I-b) it is not made up of air.

Even in [the view] that [it] is made up of air, according to one opinion, (I-a-1) [sound], being the dharma of a drum etc., is manifested by beating as light, being the dharma of a lump etc.; according to the other, (I-a-2) it is produced anew by beating as wind by a fan.

In either view, it is devoid of touch **[460]** because of the statement that:

*Though it is devoid of touch. [ĀS 78,5].
Even if [it] is made up of air, it has no touch because of the non-apprehension.

(I-a-1) The ground of the first opinion is that it is natural to our verbal expression, say, ‘drum-sound (bherīśabda) [or sound of a drum].’

(I-a-2) In the other, this [sound] is produced anew only at that time [of beating] according to the copresence and coabsence because we can [interpret] such expression like ‘wind by waving,’ [i.e. we can interpret it as ‘sound by a drum’].

(I-a) The intent of those who accept [sound] as made up of air is: suppose air [itself] has sound-ness, which is based upon audibility, as we assume the potency of manifesting or [producing], which is not found in the air other [than that which is connected with the drum etc.]; since air, whether manifestor or producer, must be present and it is complicated if we assume the sound other [than air], whether manifested or produced by it. And in this [view], the teaching that [a syllable] is the material cause [of the other] etc. are just [3] the injunctions of meditation or [[4] figurative].

(I-b) If [sound] is not made of air, however, [its] material cause is, as is taught [in various passages], not fixed in accordance with the difference of kalpa or the cosmic egg. For the same reason, nor [its] position etc. are fixed. But [its position etc.] are not apprehended because it is not compatible with color and so on. Or rather, the injunction of meditation etc. are accepted regarding the aspect sublated by the non-apprehension.

(II) Now, the view that [sound] is non-substance is explained. According to this [view], firstly, the reasons which are stated by the author of the Commentary in order to [prove] that sattva, rajas and tamas are non-substances¹¹⁸³ hold good in respect to sound also. Also the designation [of sound] as the modification of the non-manifested or ahaṅkāra¹¹⁸⁴ is justified since it means that [sound] is adventitious quality.¹¹⁸⁵ **[461]** And the statement of the Ātmasiddhi¹¹⁸⁶ is justified as it is mentioned as the opinion of the others or that of one sect [of our school]. Bhaṭṭa-Parāśara-pāda mentions of only [the view] that sound is quality of ether when he expounds ‘sentence’:

*For a series of sentence was previously composed by God — who starts the specific natures and the conditions of [everything] including sound, which is attribute of ether — as purporting contents compatible [with perception]¹¹⁸⁷ [Tattvaratnākara?].

Besides, [the passage] beginning with:

*One who has the Vedas as the body¹¹⁸⁸ [?],
is validated as being concerned with a particular god [presiding the Vedas]. Likewise, verbal expression as to the material cause, color, position etc. [of syllables is validated as it is concerned with a presiding god of each syllable]. In the same way, [the passage] beginning with:

*That which is dissolved into its source¹¹⁸⁹ [MahāNārāyaṇaUp X. 8], [is also validated]. The verbal expression that a [seed] letter of each god is the material cause etc. of each [god] is to be interpreted as figurative or as the injunction of meditation in accordance with its context. That the material

¹¹⁸³ See ŚrīBh & VDīpa II. ii. 1 etc. cited in 445,3ff.

¹¹⁸⁴ See ŚrīBh & VDīpa I. iii. 29 cited in 454,7ff.

¹¹⁸⁵ I.e. being ‘modification’ here means adventitiousness, not the association of one and the same substance with another condition, by which it should be accepted that [sound] is substance (R).

¹¹⁸⁶ I.e. the passages cited in 454,10ff.

¹¹⁸⁷ Sentence is wished by God, who starts everything, to have, in nature, contents not sublated by perception; accordingly, sound is of such nature. It cannot pass such nature (R).

¹¹⁸⁸ Cf. 454,9f.

¹¹⁸⁹ Cf. 453,7ff.

cause is not fixed [in various texts] and the like should be judged from [the discrimination of] the authenticity and the non-authenticity of the [genuine] Scriptures and the pseudo-Scriptures as in the case of the material cause regarding entities which is not fixed [in various text]. Concerning the [genuine] Scriptures, you should interpret from the view point of reason.¹¹⁹⁰

In this manner, the different opinion [as to whether the material cause of everything is] the a-syllable or the h-syllable is rejected.

In this regard, some hold there is not any contradiction. That is, here the ‘a’ suggests the sixteenth letter [i.e. visarga (ḥ)] accompanied with that [a] in front or from behind [462]. It is this [a-ḥ or ḥ-a] that is [said to be] the material cause [of everything]. And that is why this [sixteenth letter], which is of nature of both [vowel and consonant], is read [in the alphabet list] in-between vowels and consonants. It is well-established through our experience that the first syllable and the sixteenth combined reversely, [i.e. ḥ-a], become ha, as, for instance, the syllable i becomes the syllable y [when it is combined with a vowel].¹¹⁹¹ And that is stated in the Lakshmītantra.¹¹⁹² Therefore, what is read in the scriptural passage that:

*a iti brahma [AitĀr II. iii. 8],

is the a-syllable followed by the sixteenth syllable.¹¹⁹³

But the others think as follows — First, this [ḥ syllable] is not listened at all in the om syllable. And it is not read in the Scripture that ‘The letter aḥ, indeed, is the whole language.’¹¹⁹⁴ Besides, the substitute of the o [for the aḥ] is not justified [in the case of the om] because [the aḥ] contains the case-ending.¹¹⁹⁵ It is affirmed by the means of knowledge that Viṣṇu alone is the cause of everything. He is well-known to be denoted by the first [syllable a]. True some authoritative mantras mention of the syllable h [as the cause of everything] [463], but it is to be regarded as stated after accepting this [syllable h] is the [initial] letter for the Supreme Self [named Hari]. Depending upon the Śrutis and so on, you can consider how everything arises from the syllable om through its part,¹¹⁹⁶ [namely, the syllable a].

¹¹⁹⁰ If both are authentic, the one compatible with reasoning is acceptable (R).

¹¹⁹¹ Cf. Pāṇini 6. 1. 77: iKo yaṅ aCi.

¹¹⁹² 調べなくちゃね。

¹¹⁹³ If mere a is intended, the passage would be ‘eti brahma’ (R).

¹¹⁹⁴ Cf. AitĀr II. iii. 6: a-kāro vai sarvā vāk, cited above.

¹¹⁹⁵ If the sixteenth syllable at the end of the nominative singular form aḥ containing the case-ending were included in the om, the form om could not be established (R).

¹¹⁹⁶ K reads deśa for aṃśa.

When this [syllable om] is [said to be] connected with the three Vedas, it is regarded [as] ending with the syllable m; when [the four Vedas] including the Atharva are intended, [the syllable om is regarded as] followed by a certain voice¹¹⁹⁷ (nāda). In the same way, consider the minor difference as to the source[-letter] in the form of the syllable a, gārhapatya, gāyatrī, the first feet, ṛgveda, svarloka etc.¹¹⁹⁸

[Obj.] Why is the syllable om produced from the syllable a?

[Ans.] It is easy to understand the reason that from the Supreme Self, which is denoted by the syllable a, the deity presiding over the syllable om or deities and the like [presiding over] the parts of this [syllable om]¹¹⁹⁹ are produced.

Accordingly, the opinion that sound is non-substance is creditable. And so be the case, you can imagine, as you understand, that the ears functions [after reaching the source of sound, as the eyes]; that air, which manifests sound, reaches [the ears]; that the [subtle] parts of [the source] like a drum, which has sound, reaches [the ears] **[464]**; or that air, which has the sound [as the quality], reaches [the ears].¹²⁰⁰

Thus sound is explained.

Touch is that non-substance which is other than what is dissimilar

¹¹⁹⁷ It is of a half mora and exists after the syllable m of om, as is well-known in the mantraśāstra (R). So a, u, m and this nāda correspond to the four Vedas respectively.

¹¹⁹⁸ R quotes the following passage: tasya ha vai praṇavasya yā pūrvā mātṛā pṛthivy a-kāraḥ sa ṛgbhir ṛgvedo brahma [°mā in UVG] vasavo gāyatrī gārhapatyaḥ sā sāmnaḥ prathamah pādo bhavati / yā [in parenthesis in UVG] dvitīyā [added in UVG] 'ntarikshaḥ sa u-kāraḥ sa yajurbhir yajurvedo vishṇu-rudrās [vishṇū r° in UVG] trishṭub dakshiṇāgnis sā sāmno dvitīyaḥ pādo bhavati / [yā(added in UVG)] ṛtīyā dyauḥ sa ma-kāraḥ sa sāmabhiḥ sāmavedo rudrādityā jagaty āhavanīyaḥ sā sāmnaḥ ṛtīyaḥ pādo bhavati / yā 'vasāne 'sya caturthī ardhamātṛā sā somaloka om-kāraḥ sātharvaṇair mantrair atharvavedaḥ saṃvartako 'gnir maruto vārā ekarshir bhāsavati sā sāmnaś caturthaḥ pādo bhavati [?].

¹¹⁹⁹ According to the second interpretation of R. According to the first: deities [such as Saṃkarshaṇa], who are the parts of this [deity presiding over the syllable om].

¹²⁰⁰ That means: even if sound is non-substance, neither the maxim of vīcītarāṅga nor that of kadambhagolaka is acceptable (R). For these two analogies, see Bhāshāpariccheda v.166.

from that which is grasped with the tactual organs like ours.¹²⁰¹

It is classified into three: cool, hot and neither-cool-nor-hot. Water has cool [touch]; fire has hot [touch]; earth and air have neither-cool-nor-hot touch.

Due to the mixture with another element, [various] touches appear to be confused here and there; [they does] not be really [confused], as is understood by means of copresence and coabsence.¹²⁰² Likewise, in some cases, [an element] appears not to have [its own] touch. That is why the light etc. of a jewel is not grasped with the tactual organ. It is stated in the topic on the connection¹²⁰³ (anvayādhikaraṇa) by the author of the Vivaraṇa [i.e. Śrī-Rāmamiśra], in illustrating the contradiction in the difference cum non-difference theory, as follows:

*For instance, whatever is cool is never hot. And the hotness of air is caused by fire inside of it, not by its real nature. For, according to those who know truth, [if the hotness in air were] an attribute produced through baking (pākaja) [like those of earth, it] could be removed by baking. [Still] the color of fire [in ‘hot air’] is not apprehended because it is overpowered by the equal colors [of earth or water inside of air]. The touch of this [fire], however, is apprehended [in ‘hot air’] because it is not overpowered by the other touches¹²⁰⁴ [465]. All these [facts] are fixed according to our experience. [Vivaraṇa]

‘Neither-cool-nor-hot’ is [an independent variety of] touch, but not mere absence of both cool and hot. [Should it be the case], ether etc. would

¹²⁰¹ On this roundabout definition, R refers to the definition of the nityavibhūti (384,12: niḥśeshāvidyānivṛttideśavijātiyānyatvam).

¹²⁰² I.e. only when there is the connection with fire or sunshine, there is verbal expression ‘hot’ (R).

¹²⁰³ As the Hindi commentary supposes, it may be His Vivaraṇa ad ŚrīBh I. i. 4, samanvayādhikaraṇa (probably 155,9f.: na hi śītośnātamahprakāśādivad bhedābhedau ekasmin vastuni saṃgacchete). Or, it may mention of one chapter of his Śa ārthasaṃkṣhepa; for the names of the chapters of the work, see the verse in the Nayaprakāśikā [ed. ŚrīBh with ten Comms., vol.1, p.25]: jīva-brahma-anvaya-avidyā-taddhvaṃsopāyamocanam (Cf. Raghavan, History, p.17; though he understands the compound in different way: ‘His Śa ārthasaṃkṣhepa is said to contain the main doctrines of Viśiṣṭādvaita on the following six heads: soul, God, nescience, removal of nescience, means to get moksha and the nature of moksha’).

¹²⁰⁴ tatsparśopalambhas tv anyasparśānabhibhavāt. R reports the variant reading that: tatsparśānupalambho 'nyasparśābhibhavāt. In this case, needless to say, tat denotes vāyu.

be apprehended so [like air]. And it is established by the Śruti¹²⁰⁵ that air and earth have touch.

[Obj.] It is touch in general.

[Ans.] You cannot say so. Because there is no general [thing] without any speciality.

[Obj.] It is [touch in general] in which neither speciality as ‘cool’ nor that as ‘hot’ is apprehended.

[Ans.] You cannot say so. Because nothing makes us postulate that speciality which is never apprehended and because there is no support from the Scriptures.

Now, some expound as follows depending upon the general observation that increase is cause by things of the same kind,¹²⁰⁶ that air or wind (vāta) is hot since hot [things] cause the increasing of wind.

But it is not true. For as [some fruits, say, a date-fruit and a jack-fruit] have the same taste but their influence [on the body] differs each other, even in this case varieties of innate nature are possible; accordingly, there is no sublation as to the opposite position (vipaksha) [that air is not accepted as hot].

[Obj.] Coolness would never apprehended in air [if it were not accepted as hot] — this consequence is sublation.

[Ans.] Not so **[466]**; because such consequence is quite acceptable when [air] is not associated with snow or when associated with sunshine. And the apprehension of [air] as cool when associated with snow can be explained in the other way as caused by limiting adjunct. Otherwise, [i.e. the above-mentioned reduction ad absurdum of yours were satisfactory], we could also assume [air] as hot for fear of the consequence that air, [otherwise], could not be apprehended as hot.¹²⁰⁷

[Obj.] What is favored for this [reductio ad absurdum of yours¹²⁰⁸]?

¹²⁰⁵ R refers to: śabdaikaguṇa ākāśaḥ śabdasparsaguṇo 'nilaḥ [?].

¹²⁰⁶ Cf. the Āyurvedic passage cited above in 102.

¹²⁰⁷ anyathoshṇānupalambhaprasaṅgād ushṇasya kalpyatvāt. The variant reported in R that ushṇasyākalpyatvāt is, as is asserted by V, to be regarded as additional or in place of the whole passage, i.e., not only in place of ushṇasya kalpyatvāt.

¹²⁰⁸ kim tatrānugrāhyam. R poses two interpretations: kim ushṇatvasādhakam anugrāhyam, uta śītatvasādhakam. K clears the meaning of the former — “What is favored for the tarka in the form that hotness would never be apprehended in air if hot touch were not accepted, i.e., the

[Ans.] Producing hot things is [favored]. In fact, no non-hot thing can be the material of hot substance. And it is air that is [said to be] the cause of hot fire [in the Scriptures].

Thus air is neither-cool-nor-hot. So is earth.

Again, touch is of two sorts: produced through baking (pākaja) and not produced through baking. The former [kind of touch] belongs to earth; the latter to the other three. Between these [two], varieties of [touch] produced through baking are particular touches of nectar, poison, ‘monkey-itch,’¹²⁰⁹ cotton, a stone, a cow, a Brahmin, an outcaste (caṇ āla) etc. First, earth arises from water as having mere neither-cool-nor-hot touch [467]. Afterwards, difference in baking causes difference [in touch], as is affirmed according to copresence and coabsence.

‘Soft,’ ‘hard’ etc., [which are gained through baking], are also varieties of touch; because they are apprehended with the tactual organ alone. The eyes, however, merely make us infer, through grasping such color etc. which are inseparable to these [touches], not only touch in general but also these [soft touch etc.] properly. The hardness in hail-stone and the like is caused by the mixture with earth. The expression ‘soft wind’ is based on the fact, say, that its speed is slow. Notwithstanding, some hold these [softness etc.] are special kinds of conjunction.

[Obj.] Why do a cow, a Brahmin and an outcaste have [468] different touches?

[Ans.] Because of the difference of purity, impurity and so on, which are based on them.

[Obj.] It is caused by the difference of birth (jāti), isn't it?

[Ans.] How [do we know] the difference of birth?

[Obj.] From the difference in the mode of mixture of a mother and a father.

[Ans.] Not so. Since such [mixture] is not found in the case of a [primeval] Brahmin born [from Brahmā] through the mind¹²¹⁰ etc. Or rather, the purity etc. are established due to the rate of sattva, rajas and tamas, which is based on the graduation of merit and demerit, or due to the graduation of potency; accordingly, [469] there is not such difference of touch.

With respect to touches not produced through baking, however, the means of knowledge proving hotness? For instance, what is favored for the tarka in the form that coolness would never be apprehended in air if cool touch were not accepted, is the inference that: wind has cool touch, because it is increased by cool thing, like phlegm. But such means of knowledge proving that hot touch is never found. Hence, there is no room for the above-mentioned objection since nothing is established only through tarka.”

difference among them is caused by the difference of mixture etc.

[Obj.] Why don't even water and air have touches produced through baking?

[Ans.] Because new touch [which is regarded as] produced through baking does not continue [in water and air] after hotness is apart, while [soft touch etc. produced through baking] in earth [continue even after hotness is apart].

[Obj.] Then, it should be the hotness that is produced through baking in such cases.

[Ans.] Not so, because [the hotness] can be interpreted as figurative like coolness of air. Likewise, the apprehension of earth as cool or hot is also due to limiting adjuncts [such as snow or fire], because it is never apprehended so without the presence of limiting adjuncts. If [the hot touch etc.] were produced through baking, [they] would be continuous afterward like color [of a baked pot].

[Obj.] That which is made up of earth is apprehended as cool or hot even if water is taken away or even if fire is put out.

[Ans.] It is because subtle [water or fire] still remain. Because in a moment, even this much goes away.

Color is that non-substance which is other than what is dissimilar from that which is grasped with the visual organs like ours. It is classified into [1] white, [2] red, [3] black and [4] yellow. Their definitions are [being the object of] the notion or the usage of 'white' etc. Among them, [1] varieties of white [color] are particular colors of water, silver, conch, mother-of-pearl, moon etc. [2] Varieties of red [color] are particular colors of fire, a china-rose, a pomegranate, a bandhujīva-tree, coral, ruby etc. [4] Varieties of yellow [color] are particular colors of gold, a kāñcanāra-flower, yellow-orpiment, turmeric etc. [3] Varieties of black [color] are particular colors of an emerald, a bee, rain-cloud, darkness, a tamāla-tree, a dūrvā-grass etc.

Some are of the opinion that yellow color is also a variety of red [color] **[470]**, because only red, white and black are mentioned in the Scriptures regarding fire, water and food [or earth].¹²¹¹

From another view-point, color is of two sorts: [a] brilliant and [b] non-brilliant. Brilliant [color] belongs to fire; non-brilliant to earth and water. Color in fire is brilliant red, whereas [that] in water is non-brilliant white and [that] in earth is various kinds of non-brilliant [color]. Even this [earth], its appearance etc. are not fixed due to the mixture [with the other

¹²⁰⁹ kapikacchū is a kind of medicine, also known as markatī.

¹²¹⁰ =

elements].

The Vaiśeṣika and other [schools] hold that variegated (citra) [color] is the fifth [category of] color,¹²¹² but it is not true. The reasons are as follows—Such apprehension [as ‘variegated’] and the usage [of ‘variegated’] can be justified only because the very [various colors, e.g. those of different threads], existing united together form one particular unit, [e.g. the color of a many-colored cloth]. [As for a colorful picture], we cannot perceive such [variegated color] as is different from the ground etc. decorated with a heap of various kinds of colored powder. You [also] accept these [various colors] as producing the color of the whole. Even if the whole [as different from its components] were acceptable [471], [the whole] should be differentiated, according to our experience, into the [various] substrata of the various colors [which are not pervasive in the whole]. As, for instance, [when there is a monkey in the top of a tree, one and the same tree] has the conjunction [with the monkey in its top] as well as the non-existence of it [in its root]; so such partial distinction as is apprehended restricts [the color of each part]. If, [as you hold], [this apprehension] were sublated for the reason that [the colors of each part] produce that color which is homogeneous to another [new] color pervasive [in the whole], even the conjunction etc. [in the above-mentioned example] would be [pervasive in the whole tree] merely for the reason, say, that [they] are attributes.

Likewise, variegated taste and smell¹²¹³ are also explained.

Taste is that non-substance which is other than what is dissimilar from that which is grasped with the organ of taste like ours. It is classified into six sorts: [1] sweet, [2] sour, [3] salt, [4] bitter, [5] hot¹²¹⁴ and [6] astringent. Their definitions are like [those] of the above-mentioned [‘red’ and other colors¹²¹⁵]. Among them, [1] varieties of sweet [taste] are tastes of sugar-cane, milk, molasses etc. [2] Varieties of sour [taste] are tastes of mango, tamarind, āmalaka-fruits etc. [3] Varieties of salt [taste] are tastes of rock-salt, sea-salt etc. [4] Varieties of bitter [taste] are tastes of a kimpāka-tree, a nimba-tree etc. [5] Varieties of hot [taste] are tastes of ginger, pepper, mustard etc. [6] Varieties of astringent [taste] are tastes of haritākī-

¹²¹¹ Cf. ChUp VI. iv. 1.

¹²¹² The opinion is, as far as I know, first appeared in the Nyāyavārttika IV. ii. 12.

¹²¹³ citrarasagandhānām. V guesses the reading citrasparśarasagandhānām because it is plural. Cf. YMD X. 10: citragandhasparśarasānām api nirāsaḥ.

¹²¹⁴ NySi mentions of ushṇa in place of kaṭu in YMD X. 11.

fruits, vibhītaka-fruits, a mango-sprout etc. Some has the misconception that hot and [astringent tastes] are included in a variety of bitter [taste]. For the detail of them, see medical scriptures (Āyurveda). [472]

Smell is that non-substance which is other than what is dissimilar from that which is grasped with the organ of smell like ours. It is classified into [1] fragrant and [2] non-fragrant. The definitions etc. of the two are like the previous ones. [1] Varieties of fragrance are smells of sandal, musk, saffron, a campaka-tree etc. [2] Varieties of non-fragrance are smells of a stink, raw meat etc.

This smell belongs to earth only. As in the case of ‘a [hot-]iron burns,’ [in which what really burns is fire associated with the iron], this [smell] is apprehended [even] in water, air etc. because of the mixture with campaka, pāṭala-flower etc. Because it is established through the consideration of copresence and coabsence that [such apprehension] is based on the mixture with them.

Some may say: It has been established before that touch and other [attributes] are admixed in [all] the five elements due to the quintuplication (pañcīkaraṇa); therefore, suppose in this case that an attribute [admixed] in various [elements] is apprehended in manifested mode due to special manifesting power as water in mirage.

Let it be so, we answer. It should be examined whether attributes can exist in the other elements without mixture with their innate substratum; the mixture [should] be done previously or at present. Both are [acceptable] as the case may be. Because the previous [mixture due to the quintuplication] is established by force of the Scriptures and the mixture with pāṭala-flower etc. is established at present by perception.

Now, [we shall show] the explanation of an attribute produced through baking (pākaja) for those who follow Upanishads.

At the time of origination, earth has black color. Because it is natural for the śruti passage that:

*Whatever black is [the color] of food [or earth] [ChUp VI. iv. 1], because the author of the Commentaries states that the darkness of ether is due to a part of earth which is got [in ether] through the quintuplication¹²¹⁶ (pañcīkaraṇa) and because [its color] prior to the quintuplication cannot be produced through baking.

[Obj.] Why does this [earth] come into existence as originally associated with specialities?

¹²¹⁵ E.g. the definition of ‘sweet’ is [being the object of] the notion or

[Ans.] You must be satisfied looking at the special colors and touches in water and fire.

Thus,¹²¹⁷ let earth be originally black. Of what nature are its touch, taste and smell at that time? — We reply. To begin with, its touch is neither-cool-nor-hot like air and is not produced through baking like [the touch of] this [air]. The particular touches of poison, nectar, itch-herb¹²¹⁸ etc. are produced through baking. In fact, mere neither-cool-nor-hot [touch] is apprehended in all the earthy [products]. Therefore, it is appropriate that this much is innate. Concerning [its] taste, sweetness is original. Because it is appropriate that the sweetness belonging to water, the cause [of earth], is continuous so far as no speciality is not found [473]. For this [taste] is also apprehended abundantly like [neither-cool-nor-hot] touch. In fact, almost all the Earth (mahāpṛthivī) is apprehended as sweet. It is due to baking that [the Earth is] sometimes apprehended as having particular tastes such as sourness and saltiness. So [its] particular [kinds of] sweetness [such as ‘very sweet’ and ‘sweetest’] are also [due to baking], because it is based on copresence and coabsence as [in the case of other tastes]. As to [its] smell, fragrance is original. Because it is abundant in the Earth as in the previous case [of its taste]. And [its] non-fragrant smells such as smells of a stink, raw meat etc. are also due to baking as in the previous case.

So earth is originally produced as having neither-cool-nor-hot [touch], sweet [taste] and fragrant [smell] in nature. After that, due to the difference in baking [earth] is combined with varieties of neither-cool-nor-hot touch such as that of itch-herb; varieties of black color such as those of an emerald, a green tamāla-tree and a lotus; non-black [colors] such as white and red; varieties of sweet taste such as those of sugar-cane, milk and molasse; non-sweet [tastes] such as sourness and saltiness; varieties of fragrant smells such as those of a campaka-tree and musk; and non-fragrant [smells] such as those of a stink and raw meat. And sometimes its smell, taste, color, touch and sound are produced together and vanish together; sometimes one of them remains and one of them vanishes. For we must accept the difference in baking in accordance with our experience.

In this regard, some hold that the previous set [of smell etc.] is destroyed by one conjunction of fire and the following [new] set is produced by another [conjunction]. We maintain, however, that one and the same [conjunction] destroys the previous [set] and produces the following one. For instance, production of many effects [through baking, e.g. new color, taste and smell], can be interpreted as caused by single sufficient condition divided into varieties of mere prior non-existence of that [quality] which is

¹²¹⁶ For the color of ether, see 96,1–97,4.

¹²¹⁷ UVG ed. reads *astveyam*...

¹²¹⁸ K reports the reading *dushparimarśa* for *dussparśa*, which

to be produced, [e.g. the prior non-existence of the new color and so on]; likewise,¹²¹⁹ numbers of annihilative non-existence, [e.g. that of the previous color etc.], can be caused by [single sufficient condition] divided into varieties of operate factor in the form of each specific nature of that [quality] which is annihilated. In the same way,¹²²⁰ annihilation of the previous set and production of the following set can be caused by [single sufficient condition] divided into, say, both kinds of prior non-existence, [i.e. the prior non-existence of the annihilative non-existence of the previous qualities and the prior non-existence of the following ones] **[474]**. But, in fact, an effect is not of two kinds since we, [regarding non-existence as just another existence], admit the annihilation [of the previous color] to be the following color. Designation changes due to the difference of varieties of correlative. That is all.

However, in connection with the refutation of manifested-ness [as thought in the Bhāṭṭa Mīmāṃsakas], Bhāṭṭa-Parāśara-pāda says:

*As is known, that which destroys the previous color does not produce the following individual, since conjunctions in the form of baking are different. [Tattvaratnākara?].

We regard it as [stated] following the opinion of others. For [the author] explains that one and the same [thing can] bring about many effects.

And due to the subordinate difference in baking, the subordinate difference in smell etc. is established.

Moreover, there is difference in opinion regarding baking: [the Vaiśeṣikas assert] heating of [individual] atoms (pīlupāka) [while the Naiyāyikas assert] heating of [the whole composite such as] a jar (piṭharapāka).¹²²¹ Neither is accepted by us because, [according to us], there is neither an atom nor the whole [as different from its components]. **[475]** Therefore, what is left to consider is [only] whether heating is done in assemble form or in separated form. In this regard, [we accept] both as the case may be. First, the former, [i.e. baking in assemble form, is acceptable] because that which has no gap, e.g. a pot, is apprehended as having different color in accordance with the difference in baking. Insofar as the apprehension, even the Vaiśeṣikas would have no objection. Nonetheless, they assume that the previous composite is broken into atoms and another new whole is produced again in the order beginning with a dyad since they accept the corresponds to the reading dushparimarśādisparśaiḥ etc. in 473,6.

¹²¹⁹ tadvat. R doubts corruption in this sentence and suggests the reading yathā vā for tadvat here and shifting the latter to the end of the sentence. K reads tadvat but interprets it as mere evam not corresponding to the previous tathā.

¹²²⁰ tathaiva. K reports the variant tayaiva denoting sāmāgryā and V regards it better (fn.1); still K admits tathā to be necessary here.

rule that the [qualities] like color of the whole exist so long as their substratum exists and that particular qualities of the whole is produced by those of its part. The latter, [i.e. baking in separated form, is] also [acceptable] because melting, contraction and the like are apprehended in baking bees' wax. This implies that partial baking is also possible.

Conjunction is that [non-substance] which is the efficient cause the notion that [something] is conjunct [with another].¹²²²

Some are of the opinion that it is in the nature of but [two conjunct] things themselves¹²²³; [some] that it is in the nature of but being-without-space (nairantarya).¹²²⁴ **[476]**

Of the [two opinion], [conjunction is] not [in the nature of] mere [conjunct] things themselves. Because even though two [conjunct] things themselves are existent, there is not the notion that [the one] is conjunct with [the other] before or after the conjunction.

Nor the latter. Because there is no objection for those who, [like us], regard non-existence as another form of existence. That is to say, in our opinion even such [being-without-space, or the non-existence of space, between two things] can be [regarded as the existence of] conjunction in a part [of one thing] proximate to [a part of the other].

[Obj.] Even though partial, there should be being-without-space [between the two] alone.

[Ans.] Not so, because even in this case you cannot pass over the above-mentioned alternative [whether it is the conjunct things themselves or something different]. That is, even if [being-without-space be of non-existence], conjunction has been already established [as the counter-correlative of being-without-space] since such being-without-space as is different from [conjunct] things themselves is in the nature of the non-existence of conjunction in a particular remote part.

And the fact that [conjunction] is apprehended as sharing the same substratum with the non-existence of it does not lead to contradiction because

¹²²¹ Cf. TarD §23.

¹²²² The definition saṃyuktapratyaya of Deśika is same as Praśastapāda's [PDhS §165]. Udayana comments on it: yadviśiṣṭe dravye 'saṃyuktam idaṃ anena' iti matir sa saṃyogaḥ [Kir 143,19f.].

¹²²³ The same objection is found in Vyomavatī [ad PDhS §165] 64,12ff.

¹²²⁴ The latter is of Buddhist. See SAS V. 52: saṃyogasyāntarālābhāvatvavādināṃ bauddham, etc. (cf. NyKan [ad PDhS §165] 346f.). The Buddhist concept of saṃyoga is rejected otherwise in

such is based on difference in portion.¹²²⁵

As regards¹²²⁶ part-less (niravayava) [entities], a portion (amśa) as caused by a limiting adjunct¹²²⁷ (aupādhika) becomes the cause of conjunction [477]. And there is not infinite regress as the limiting adjunct also needs another [for its conjunction]; for nothing other than contact (saṁślesha) with a limiting adjunct is necessary so far as imagination (jñapti) is concerned. Because even if limitation by another [limiting adjunct] is [necessary] when [the contact] is produced, there is no defect like infinite regress in a seed and a sprout.

Or rather, suppose that the difference in portion regarding part-less [entities] is [not due to a limiting adjunct but] innate considering they cannot be indicated in separated form as they cannot be divided.

[Obj.] Were it the case, it would bring about the following undesirable conclusions: [you should accept a part-less entity as] one-cum-many, [in other words, you should accept the difference cum non-difference theory]; [otherwise, you should accept a part-less entity as] the whole [as different from its many components]; or, [you should accept a part-less entity as] but a collection [composed of the many portions like forest composed of trees].

[Ans.] You cannot say so. Because such portion [as belongs to an undivided entity] does not cause the designation by name of difference. Or rather, let being one-cum-many as such be accepted [478] [since] it is hardly denied by force of valid knowledge.

Or rather, suppose whatever part-less exists entirely in all things conjunct [to it] as genus, as is assumed by the Naiyāyika and others, does. Having doubt the above, the author of the [Brahma-]sūtra reject it [in the topic] beginning with [the sūtra]:

*Whole [Brahman] would become [the world]; otherwise, there would be the contradiction to the scriptural passage that [He] has no part [BrSū II. i. 26].

TMK V. 52a–c & SAS, as is expounded in Srinivasa Chari 1988: 351f.

¹²²⁵ E.g. When a monkey hangs on a branch of a tree, one and the same tree has the conjunction with the monkey regarding the branch as well as the non-existence regarding its root and so on. It would be contradiction if conjunction and the non-existence of it coexist in the same part.

¹²²⁶ This is to refute the Jaina opinion that a nirvayavavastu cannot have conjunction. Cf. TMK V. 53.

¹²²⁷ I.e. a portion delimited by an upādhi in the form of another entity. As sound is produced in ether, which is regarded as portionless by some, delimited by a drum, conjunction with a pot and the like is produced in [a part-less entity] like God and time delimited by another entity (K).

And to this [topic], it is stated in the [Vedānta-]dīpa¹²²⁸ that:

*Brahman — which is different from all the other things, is understood only by means of the Śrutis and is endowed with all potency¹²²⁹ — becomes an effect and becomes infinite,¹²³⁰ though It has no part. Therefore, [such] doubt [as can be raised] regarding an entity whose potency is limited, is not applied to It. As, according to those who accept genus, genus [such as cow-ness], [though] shapeless [or unlimited] (amūrta), is wholly pervading even endless things completely different each other such as a broken-horned [cow], a innate-hornless [cow] and so on, [still such] doubt [as can be raised] regarding the other entity [is not applied to it]; so it is possible [for part-less Brahman] to be the cause of the world. [VDīpa II. i. 26: 53,4–6]

To the sūtra in the same topic that:

*And because of the defects in [your] own position [BrSū II. i. 29], it is stated that:

*Moreover because of the defects in [your] own position that the primordial matter (pradhāna) and so on form the cause [of the world], Brahman is the cause of the world. Those defects which have been pointed out regarding the primordial matter and so on would never be attached to this [Brahman] since [It] is different from worldly entities.¹²³¹ [VDīpa II. i. 29: 53,18f.]

It is concluded, therefore, that as portion-less [entities] such as [a] the primordial matter, [b] an atom, [c] latent impression (vāsanā) and consciousness (saṁvit), Brahman and so on are capable of [a] partial modification, [b] being [partially] covered and not covered [by another atom] and [c] having many objects and so on; so it is not inappropriate that conjunction or a conjunct thing in full is connected to many things.

Even [the Vaibhāshika Buddhists], who assert momentary atoms, accept that in the condition of multitude, one atom, without difference in

¹²²⁸ ŚrīBh etc. do not show the example of jāti.

¹²²⁹ Cf. BrSū II. i. 27: śabdāmūlatvāt; 30: sarvopetā.

¹²³⁰ NySi reads anantam instead of the reading in VDīpa anyat, which, according to K. Bhashyam (English Translation by Sri K. Bhaashyam of Sri Bhagavad Ramanuja's Vedanta Deepa, Madras, rpt. 1990, p.82), means the cause.

¹²³¹ NySi reads: tatraiva laukikavastuvisajātiyatvena pradhānāder ukatadoshā naiva prasajyeran; while VDīpa reads: tatra hi laukikavastusajātiyatvena pradhānāder ukatadosho 'nye ca prasajyeran. R seems to read as VDīpa, judging from his comment that tatreti pradhānakāraṇatvavāda ity arthaḥ, which cannot be applied to tatra in the reading of NySi.

portion, has [so-called] being-without-space to many [other atoms]. [Even] for the Vijñānavādins [or the Yogācāra Buddhists], one [knowledge] has images (ākāra) of many [objects]. Now, why does the Mādhyamika [Buddhist] dislike conjunction in particular¹²³²?

[Obj.] This [dislike] is the entity¹²³³ being the gateway to the voidness¹²³⁴ (śūnyatva) **[480]**.

[Ans.] Not so. Because there is contradiction in [your] statement [that everything is void] whether the voidness is existent or non-existent.¹²³⁵

[Obj.] Nothing that is actually seen would be disliked.

[Ans.] Not so. Because this [conjunction] is actually seen.

[Obj.] Since it is not experienced that some [conjunction] are so [actually seen], others also are not so.

[Ans.] This is incorrect, since it would lead to the undesirable conclusion that unique characters fixed in every one are denied.

And such conjunction is of two kinds: effected (kārya) one and non-effected [or eternal] one (akārya).

The former is between limited [entities] or between a limited [entity] and an all-pervasive [entity]. [And it is] caused by action of both [conjunct entities] or action of either: for instance, [conjunction] between two lambs or [that] between a pillar and a hawk.

Conjunction [of a whole] produced from conjunction [of its component] (saṃyogaja) is also expounded by the Vaiśeṣikas.¹²³⁶ This is not the case. Because, [as a matter of fact], there is not a whole [as different from its components]. That is, the conjunction of components is nothing but the conjunction of a multitude [of the components]. Our apprehension is also in the form that ‘Now it is conjunct with a part’ alone.

¹²³² In other words, you should dislike it equally as everything is śūnya for you (R).

¹²³³ V suggests the reading astu for vastu.

¹²³⁴ I.e. if saṃyoga is negated, the relation between an entity as cause and an entity as effect is also negated; therefrom, the śūnyatva is established (R).


¹²³⁵ If the śūnyatva is accepted as existent, everything is not established to be śūnya; if [the śūnyatva is accepted as] non-existent, the śūnyatva itself is set aside (R).

¹²³⁶ See PDhS §§171–74. TarD [§29] gives an example of the conjunction between a book and a body which is produced from the conjunction between the hand and the book.

Even supposing a whole is existent [as different from its components], let the whole be conjunct by force of the same cause that makes its component be conjunct at the very moment in which the component is conjunct. For we never perceive that Devadatta is conjunct with a book soon after his hand is conjunct with the book; [on the contrary, we perceive the two conjunction coincidentally]. The motion of his hand is the non-inherent cause [of not only the conjunction of his hand with the book but also that of Devadatta], since it exists [or inherent] in the [inherent] cause, [i.e. his hand], of the [inherent] cause [of the conjunction of Devadatta, i.e. Devadatta¹²³⁷]; [accordingly], it is appropriate that the conjunction of

¹²³⁷ kāraṇakāraṇavartitvād asamavāyitām āpannena.

According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, *asamavāyikāraṇatā* is of two kinds: (1: *laghvī*) *kāryeṇa saha-ekasminn arthe samavetatve sati yat kāraṇaṃ tattā*; (2: *mahatī*) *svakāryasamavāyikāraṇena sahaikasminn arthe samavetatve sati yat kāraṇaṃ tattā* [see TarS §40 and NyBo; the classification is first found in Vyomavatī (ad PDhS §108) II. 11,15ff.]. The following is well-known as an example— When cloth is made from threads, (1) the thread-conjunction is the *asamavāyikāraṇa* of the cloth, as it is inherent [in *guṇaguṇibhāva*] in that object (= the thread) in which the effect (= the cloth) is inherent [in *avayavāvayavibhāva*]. (2) The thread-color is the *asamavāyikāraṇa* of the cloth-color, as the thread-color is inherent [in *guṇaguṇibhāva*] in that object (= the thread) in which the *samavāyikāraṇa* of the cloth-color (= the cloth) is inherent [in *avayavāvayavibhāva*]; the cloth is the *samavāyikāraṇa* of its color, as it is produced inherent [in *guṇaguṇibhāva*] in the color of the cloth (See TarS §40: *yatsamavetaṃ kāryam utpadyate tat samavāyikāraṇam*).




Let us now return to the present portion.

The opponent asserts that the hand alone can have that conjunction whose *asamavāyikāraṇa* is the hand-motion (R). That is, the hand-motion is (1) the *laghvī*-type of *asamavāyikāraṇa* of the hand-book-conjunction, as it

Devadatta with the book is also produced by force of the very motion [481]. And whenever there is the motion of his hand, the motion of that body which is delimited by this [hand] too is established; then, the conjunction of [Devadatta], or rather, is caused by such [motion of his body itself]. We should accept, according to our experience, that action (karman) also shares the same substratum with its non-existence as, for instance, conjunction.¹²³⁸ Besides, when Devadatta's hand is conjunct with a book brought by another person, for what reason is it unacceptable [that the book is conjunct] with Devadatta as well as [his hand]? For [in that case] the hand is not different is inherent [in kriyākriyāvadbhāva] in that object (= the hand) in which the effect (= the hand-book-conjunction) is inherent [in guṇaguṇibhāva].

To this, our author replies: the hand-motion can be (2) the mahatī-type of asamavāyikāraṇa of the Devadatta-book-conjunction because of its kāraṇakāraṇavartitva (The similar expression regarding the mahatī-type is found in Tarkabhāṣā 38,4f.: samavāyikāraṇasamavāyikāraṇapratyāśannasyāpi paramparayā samavāyikāraṇapratyāśannatvāt). To explain, the hand-motion is the asamavāyikāraṇa of the Devadatta-book-conjunction, as the hand-motion is inherent [in kriyākriyāvadbhāva] in that object (= his hand) in which the samavāyikāraṇa of the Devadatta-book-conjunction (= Devadatta) is inherent [in avayavāvayavibhāva]; Devadatta is the samavāyikāraṇa of the Devadatta-book-conjunction, as it is produced inherent [in guṇaguṇibhāva] in the conjunction.



¹²³⁸ It is clearly stated in the *Daśapadārthaśāstra (勝宗十句義論) by *Candramati (慧月) that karman is vyāpyavṛtti [Chinese trans. in Taisho vol.54, 1265b.26ff.; Eng. trans. by Hakuju U₁ [who was the first professor of Indology of Tōhoku Univ., my alma mater!] (rpt. Varanasi, 1962), p.114].

from him in being devoid of the motion, [in which you may find the reason]. Because the direction of the one towards [the book] is not different from that of the other.

The above [discussion] serves to reject disjunction (*vibhāga*) produced from [another] disjunction too. And we shall make disjunction included [in the annihilative non-existence of conjunction].¹²³⁹

Now, non-effected conjunction is between two substances which have no gap and are motionless. It is denied by the *Vaiśeṣika*¹²⁴⁰ and other [schools]. [To this, we show the following syllogism]: Two all-pervasive [substances] are conjunct each other, because they have no gap, like that which everyone accepts so. If there were not conjunction [between the two], it would lead to the undesirable conclusion that they have gap. And even for those who approve only being-without-space, it is avoidable [to accept the conjunction] in this case. For, in our opinion, being-without-space is nothing but conjunction in a proximate part [482].¹²⁴¹ We,¹²⁴² however, never get the notion of being-without-space regarding [substance and that which is inherent to it] like quality.

[Obj.] Conjunction does not exist [between two all-pervasive substances] because nothing causes it.¹²⁴³

[Ans.] You cannot say so. Because we have mentioned the cause or reason to know it (*jñāpaka*). And it is you who have applied [the principle] that whenever a cause is absent, an effect in general is absent to [not only the relation between non-eternal things but also that between] God's [eternal] knowledge, [His eternal] desire and [His eternal] volition.¹²⁴⁴ Moreover, even regarding all-pervasive [entities], their production of effects and so on are dependent upon God's entrance [or conjunction].

¹²³⁹ See 530,1ff.

¹²⁴⁰ See PDhS §§178–180, esp. §179 where *ajāḥ saṃyogaḥ* between two all-pervasive things is negated

¹²⁴¹ See 476,1ff.

¹²⁴² This is to reply to the objection that if *nairantya* were nothing but *āśannadeśasaṃyoga*, *guṇa* and *guṇin*, [not being in the relation of *saṃyoga*], could not have *nairantya* (R).

¹²⁴³ In PDhS §180, *ajāsaṃyoga* between two all-pervasive objects is negated since there is no *yutasiddhi* between the two, namely, *dvayor anyatarasya pṛthaggatimattvam*.

¹²⁴⁴ Cf. 325,4–326,2. Accordingly, the *Nyāya-Vaiśeṣikas* cannot assert that non-effected or eternal conjunction is not possible since there is no cause (R).

The above is taught in Upanishads. That is, there are Śruti-passages such as:

*And Bhagavat is all-pervading¹²⁴⁵ [ŚveUp III. 11],

*Nārāyaṇa is pervading this everything inside and outside [MahāNārUp XI. 6].

[Obj.] Due to the expression ‘and outside,’ nothing is all-pervasive than God and [His] knowledge.

[Ans.] You cannot say so. Since it is naturally fit even if ‘outside’ denotes only something having outside parts. If not, even His attributive knowledge would not be all-pervasive.

And other syllogisms are as follows. ‘All-pervasive substance, under discussion, is conjunct with all-pervasive substance¹²⁴⁶; because it is substance; like a pot.’ The invariable concomitance would not lead to the undesirable conclusion that it is conjunct with itself, because the probandum can be established by means of the conjunction with another all-pervasive substance as there are many all-pervasive substances. Likewise, ‘that which is under discussion is conjunct with God, because it is substance, like a pot,’ or ‘God is [483] conjunct with time and other [all-pervasive substances], because it is substance, like a pot.’ And [His] conjunction with time would not lead to the undesirable conclusion that [He] is modified due to time. Because the modification [of time] is dependent upon Him and special references are found such as:

*And He cooks time; no time is there [in His eternal manifestation], there is the Lord alone [MBh XII. 25. 9].

By the way, Bhaṭṭa Parāśara-pāda denies non-effected conjunction in explaining that the mind is atomic. We guess that the latent impression of the finally accepted view of these [two schools, namely, the Vaiśeshika and the Naiyāyika] is gloomed there as a consequence of citing the sūtra of Akshapāda that:

*The indicating mark (liṅga) of the mind is that there is no simultaneous production of knowledge [NySū I. i. 16],

and the sūtra of Kaṇabhaksha that:

*The indicating marks of the mind is that knowledge exists or not [even] if there is the connection between the self, sense-organs and the object¹²⁴⁷ [VaiSū III. ii. 1].

¹²⁴⁵ sarvavyāpī ca bhagavān. Radhakrishnan's Principal Upanishads etc. read saḥ for ca.

¹²⁴⁶ Cf. Kir §179: ākāśaṃ kālādīnā saṃyujyate mūrtasamyogitvād dravyatvād vā śarīravat [149,12f.] (NyKan shows the first reason alone [367,5f.]).

¹²⁴⁷ ātmendriyārthasannikarshe jñānasya bhāvo 'bhāvaś ca manaso

For the same reason, it is also stated in the same [work] that time itself is not perceptible.¹²⁴⁸ Likewise, there is statement that:

*And nothing is inappropriate if there is not non-effected conjunction [Tattvaratnākara?];

and [the objection] that:

*What is the valid means to know the conjunction between an all-pervasive [entity] and [a non-pervasive entity] like a tree? Not perception, since it is the conjunction between a perceptible and non-perceptible. Nor inference since there is a rule that it has two shaped or limited things as basis [Tattvaratnākara?],

is replied as follows:

*[Not so]; because the conjunction of an all-pervasive [entity] is inevitable so as to enable remoteness and proximity,¹²⁴⁹ the movement of a body and its modifications,¹²⁵⁰ burning up of fire and so on.¹²⁵¹ [Tattvaratnākara?].

Our response thereon has been already given: [these descriptions are under the influence of the other schools]. Besides, as the conjunction of an all-pervasive [entity] is said [to be inevitable] so as to enable a particular modification of a shaped [entity] **[484]**, so the conjunction [of an all-pervasive entity like time] with God must be inevitably accepted so as to enable modifications of time and other [all-pervasive entities]. Otherwise, it would be impossible for [an all-pervasive entity] like time even to be the body of God.

Now, potency [is explained].

Potency is that particular non-substance which accounts for the causal character of all causes.

liṅgam. Candrānanda's commentary on VaiSū reads jñānasyābhāvo bhāvaś ca. Cf. PDhS §81.

¹²⁴⁸ See above 137,1–141,8.

¹²⁴⁹ In the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, temporal paratvāparatva are proved by means of the conjunction with all-pervasive time and spatial paratvāparatva are proved by means of the conjunction with all-pervasive direction (dik); while both discussions are denied by Deśika (see above 138,2ff. and 146,3ff.).

¹²⁵⁰ They have the self with prayatna as asamavāyikāraṇa (R). This shows that here Parāśara accepts the individual self as all-pervasive, while it is atomic in the Viśiṣṭādvaita siddhānta [see above 208,3–213,17].

¹²⁵¹ Cf. VaiSū V. ii. 14: agner ūrdhvajvalanaṃ vāyoś ca tiryakpavanam aṇumanasor cādyam karmety adṛṣṭakāritāni. The Vaiśeṣika regards them as a result of the conjunction of the adṛṣṭa belonging to an all-pervasive ātman. See above 209,1–4.

It is proved by means of both *reductio ad absurdum* and the scriptures. [The former is illustrated]: that due to the obstacle to which in the presence of preventing [factor] such as gem and mantra, fire does not burn, though there is not non-existence of the absence of [fire] itself and cooperating factors [like fuel], is potency— it is beyond the range of sense-organs. It exists in magnet, the sound of the dandubhi-drum and so on. And it is clearly understood in each case [485].

Such contingencies as make [us] conclude [that potency is but] the non-existence of prevention [would take place, according to the Naiyāyikas, if we accept] the following [assumptions] and others: that the potency [of burning] is destroyed [by the preventing factor]; that [such] attribute of that [potency as is fit for burning] is destroyed; that [another attribute which is opposed to the potency for burning] is produced anew; and that nothing is produced.¹²⁵² These are, however, finally removed by the Scriptures [cited below].

[Obj.] Even supposing that [potency] is established, we friendly ask you which of the following five opinions you accept: [1] that [potency for burning] itself is destroyed by the preventing [factor]; [2] that [such] attribute of this [potency as is fit for burning] is destroyed [486]; [3a] that [another] potency opposed to this [original potency] or [3b] its attribute is produced anew; [4] nothing is effected though [the original potency] is in the same [condition].¹²⁵³

[Ans.] Let us accept any one of them.

[Obj.] Such being the case, the cause which produces the potency again [when it is upheld] could not be constant.¹²⁵⁴ How do you avoid this

¹²⁵² pratibandhakābhāvaparyavasāyinām śaktitaddharmanāśatad-
utpattyanutpattiyādiprasaṅgānām.

This passage is based on the discussion in the NyKu I. 10: pratibandhakena [1] śaktir vā vināśyate, [2] taddharmo vā, [3] dharmāntaram vā janyate, [4] na janyate vā kim apīti pakshāḥ [32,8f.].

R shows dāhviruddhā kācana śaktir utpadyate and prāg eva siddhāyā dāhviruddhāyāḥ śakter dāhapratibandhānukūlaḥ kaścid dharmā utpadyate as the third and the fourth assumption, which seems unfit for the expression utpattyanutpatti. V regards nāśa, utpatti and anutpatti as the content of prasāṅga.

¹²⁵³ Here the author adds [3a] to the four alternatives of the Nyāyakusumāñjali cited above.

¹²⁵⁴ Cf. NyKu I. 10: [4] akīṃcitkarasya pratibandhakatvānupapatteḥ, [3] viparītadharmāntarajanane tadabhāve saty eva kāryam ity abhāvasya kāraṇatvasvikāraḥ / ... [1] tadvināśe [2] taddharmavināśe vā punar-uttambakena tajjanane 'niyatahetukatvam; pūrvam svarūpotpādakād idānīm

undesirable contingency?

[Ans.] [We can avoid it] as follows. [According to the opinion that the original is destroyed], that [new potency] is produced from the very fire that is associated with the non-existence of the prevention; or [according to the opinion that the original one lasts], the [very original] potency that is not prevented produces the effect. Such explanation as is asserted by you [regarding burning¹²⁵⁵] can be applied to potency as well.

[Obj.] Why is it postulated, then?

[Ans.] You cannot say so since our answer has been already given.¹²⁵⁶

[Obj.] Does¹²⁵⁷ potency have potency (śakta) or not? **[487]** If it has potency, there would be infinite regress as potency needs another potency so as to have potency and the latter also needs another. If it does not have potency, the potency could not be a cause since it does not have any potency. If [even such potency] were [a cause], it comes about that oil could be produced from sands, that sprout from stone etc.

[Ans.] Not so. Because that [potency] is, though it does not have uttambhakād utpatteḥ / ... na ca pratibandhakaśaktim evottambhako viruṇaddhi na tu bhāvaśaktim utpādayatīti sāmpratam; tadanutpattiprasaṅgāt [32,9–33,6].

The above discussion is modified in SAS V. 99 as follows: “Moreover, it is to be asked regarding the postulation of potency as different [from pratibandhābhāva]: if [the original] one is destroyed by the preventing factor, what produces [new] potency [of burning] when it is upheld again? If you answers the upholding factor (uttambhaka) does, it leads to the undesirable conclusion that the cause is not constant. If you assert that [new] potency is never produced anew even if it is upheld, burning would not be effected. ... If you hold that [the original] potency is not destroyed by the preventing factor but is hindered, let the fire itself be hindered. It is no use postulating potency as it is complicated” [768,14–769,3].

¹²⁵⁵ According to the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, so-called śakti is but pratibandhakābhāva and that which causes to burn is fire qualified by pratibandhakābhāva. E.g. SAS V. 99: “This is, you know, the way to refute śakti — if fire does not burn due to losing the non-existence of prevention, let the very non-existence of prevention be śakti. And the non-existence of prevention alone is the cause since the fire qualified by the non-existence of prevention causes to burn. So it is not because of the obstruction of such śakti as is other [than the non-existence of prevention] but because of the lack of sufficient condition (sāmagrī) that there is no effect in the presence of preventing factors such as gem and mantra. For the postulation of it would be complicated” [768,10–14]. For the detail of the refutation of śakti in the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika, see NyKan 354–56, NyKus I. 10.

another potency, established for causes as fit for [their own] effects. Otherwise, you cannot avoid even the following contingency and the like: Is hotness hot or not? — If the former, there would be infinite regress; if the latter, it could not produce any effect [of heat] like a cool thing [488].

And the above is stated by the Venerable Parāśara:

*All entities has potencies beyond the scope of explicable knowledge as fire has hotness of fire. That is why Brahman has such inherent potencies as that of the creation, the best of ascetics! [ViP I. iii. 2], and so on. It means that the inherent natures as proved by means of valid knowledge can be abandoned by no means. Likewise, it is stated in the Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā:

*Potencies of all beings are inexplicable and inseparable [Ahirbudhnya Saṃhitā III. 2],

and so on. The same are to be referred to regarding all [potencies]. [489]

Some [i.e. the Śaivas] asserts as follows— Potency is that which is helpful to mere presence of all causes. Without it nothing is useful¹²⁵⁹ because it has no potency and because there is copresence and coabsence. For this very reason, [potency is] actually the most important, though it appears to be an attribute. [It is thought to be] only one everywhere due to the simplicity of postulation. It is stated that:

*The supreme potency is only one and is composed of knowledge, bliss and action [Śaivāgama?].

[It is] devoid of modification since modification belongs to that which has that [potency]. [It] does not need any other potency because it has potency and because there would be infinite regress. And it is of unquestionable greatness since it is established according to [the authority] by which we grasp the subject that it makes what is improbable probable. For the reason that it is only one, it has no limitation in time and space. It is stated that:

*The supreme potency is all-pervasive and all this world is pervaded [Śaivāgama?].

[It] is devoid of limitation in entity since it manifests itself in all forms. As non-spiritual potency, [it] has parts (kalā); as independent spiritual potency,

Note, as is said by R, that the expression ‘asserted by you’ is only based on the similarity in using pratibandhakābhāva.

¹²⁵⁶ I.e. the Viśiṣṭādvaitins accept śakti by force of the Scriptures.

¹²⁵⁷ Cf. Nyāyalīlavatī (Kashi Skt. Ser. 64), p.61: sakter api śaktyantarāpekshāyām anavasthiteḥ, anapekshatve tathaiva vyabhicārāt.

¹²⁵⁸ V refers to the Nyāyakulīśa chap. 10 for the further refutation against Udayana.

¹²⁵⁹ In this regard, R quotes the verse: śivaḥ śaktyā yukto yadi bhavati śaktaḥ prabhavitum na ced evaṃ devo na khalu kuśalaḥ spanditum api.

[it] has no part. One should meditate with devotion¹²⁶⁰ that [potency] which is covered with the phenomenal world in the form of causes and effects [at the time of transmigration] and is endowed with the dissolution of the phenomenal world [at the time of liberation].

The others [i.e. the Viśiṣṭādvaitins] do not think so. To explain— First, [potency] is not the most important since so is that which is qualified by it. For the same reason, it cannot be the material cause [of the world]. Moreover, it is accepted that modification is nothing but the limit of preceding [condition] and that of following [condition]. Nor is [potency] only one everywhere since it is proved to be distinct from entity to entity. Nor is [it] eternal in every [entity] since we have no means to know non-eternal as eternal. Nor is [it] beginningless **[490]** because [potency] itself is attained along with the cause [being its substratum]. Nor is [it] of unquestionable greatness since it has its own limited object. If [potency has beginning and its object is limited], it is also established that [potency] has limitation in entity.

[Obj.] Isn't it that the potency of Brahman forms the potency of everything? Suppose that the others have the potency since they are the objects of that [potency of Brahman] and that they have limited objects, it is needless to accept different potencies in everything.

[Ans.] Not so. Because it is irrefutably natural that each entity is said to be the substratum of potency. It is true that the potency of Brahman is beyond any other potency, still the potency is established as belonging to Him. The passages declaring that this [potency] is important or that [it] is equal [to Him] are also possible considering their intention [of praising His power]. Further, no passage is found that declares [His potency] is superior to [Him]. And [the authority of] the Yāmala and other [Śaiva Tantras,¹²⁶¹ in which His potency is described so], is negated by means of the topic on the Pāśupata.¹²⁶² And the refutations regarding the non-duality of Consciousness¹²⁶³ are to be considered here [regarding the non-duality of potency] again.

Now there is dispute in our sect as to whether this [potency] exists

¹²⁶⁰ According to the first interpretation of R (tatparto bhāvayed iti / tātparyeṇa, bhaktyety arthaḥ). According to the second, 'meditate it as higher than the phenomenal world.'

¹²⁶¹ Cf. Kāraṇatantra I. 122: yāmale māṭṛtantre ca kāpāle pañcarātrke (quoted in Pañcarātrarakshā, p.26).

¹²⁶² BrSū II. ii. 35–38. Deśika's criticism of the Śaiva Āgamas is found in the Pāñcarātrarakshā (ed. M. Duraiswami Aiyangar and T. Venugopalacharya, Adyar Library Ser. 36, Madras, 1942), pp.26–28.

¹²⁶³ See above 292,2–315,5.

only in substance or in non-substance as well. Bhagavat Yāmuna-muni says in the *Ātmasiddhi* that:

*In all substances there is that common attribute (guṇa) called potency having [its effect] as the object which is understood from its effect [ĀS].

On this passage, some accept ‘in all substances alone,’ adding the emphasizing particle to the portion ‘in all substances.’ Others [accept] ‘in all substances there can be (asty eva),’ [as] is stated by Varada Viṣṇumiśra:

*Though potency is an attribute, it can exist in quality (guṇa) and action [as well] [?].

In the previous opinion, [non-substance] such as color [is said to] have potency owing to its having the same substratum as the potency, which belongs to substance; in the latter opinion, there is potency even in color and so on. Thus, in any way, let it exist only in substance or in [non-substance] like color as well. Still, potency itself has been proved to be based on our tradition. The author of the Commentary also mentions potency in explaining a body:

*For instance, fire does not produce hotness due to the prevention of [its] potency [ŚrīBh II. i. 9: 223,2]. **[491]**

[Obj.] The word śakti in the passage that:

*Entity forms entity due to its own śakti [ViP I. iv. 52], is interpreted as ‘assistance’ by the author of the Commentary. For instance, *‘Due to its śakti,’ namely, due to its own karma, the entity (or the form) such as a god is attained [ŚrīBh II. i. 34: 293,2]; likewise,

*To cause destruction of sins means to cause destruction of its śakti which has been produced. The śakti is also nothing but the unhappiness (apṛīti) of God [ŚrīBh IV. i. 13: 584,3].

So the Venerable Parāśara says:

*The¹²⁶⁴ śakti of Viṣṇu (or the liberated self) is called the higher; that known as kshetrajña (or the transmigrating self) [is called] the lower. Another named ignorance or karma is accepted as the third śakti, by which the all-pervasive śakti [known as] kshetrajña is completely enclosed, King! [ViP VI. vii. 61–62],

¹²⁶⁴ Cf. ŚrīBh I. i. 1: “The twofold form of Supreme Brahman, i.e. Viṣṇu, which is denoted by the word śakti, is taught as divided into embodied and non-embodied. Again, it is said that the division named ‘embodied,’ namely kshetrajña which is enclosed by the ignorance known as karma and is qualified by non-spiritual matters, is impure because of its being connected with the three misconception. Again it is negated that the second division named ‘non-embodied,’ which is devoid of the ignorance known as karma, is free of non-spiritual matter and is of the form of knowledge alone, is the śubhāśraya because ...” [(1) 222,2–223,1].

*King! Wherever all these śaktis are established, there is another great form of Hari, which is other than His [phenomenal] cosmic form [ViP VI. vii. 70],

*So the śakti of Supreme Brahman is the whole world [ViP I. xxii. 56],

and so on, where the word śakti is used to denote inseparable attribute in general. Furthermore, in the Vedārthasaṃgraha where the author comments the passage that:

*All entities has potencies beyond the scope of explicable knowledge [ViP I. iii. 2],

having stated that:

*It is meant, therefore, that Brahman is endowed with various and infinite śaktis [VAS §82: 120,2],

the author quotes the following passage:

*So it says:

“With you, eminent one, whose form is this miraculous world, with you, Kṛṣṇa, who is the greatest of miracles,¹²⁶⁵ I am united” [ViP V. xix. 7]

[VAS §82: 120,2–5].

It is understood hereby that the author does not accept the other śakti since he refers to the passage “... whose form is this miracle world...” as the meaning of the word śakti.

[Ans.] You may be right. [Still] that much cannot prove that [the author] does not accept the special quality defined as śakti or potency because he directly mentions śakti as the cause of effects like burning, which can be prevented by [preventing factor] such as gem and mantra.¹²⁶⁶ The usages of the word śakti regarding these various [entities] in figurative meaning or in secondary meaning do not intend to teach that these entities [themselves] are potencies. The statement that karma is the śakti of the individual self and the statement that the happiness and unhappiness of Supreme Person is the śakti of karma mean only that [these former] are dependent upon these [latter] since these [latter] cause to produce [these former]. Because of the very [dependence], kshetrajña, ignorance etc. and the world are also said to be the śakti of Supreme Brahman. Or it is because [they] are based on [His] unexcelled potency. Here¹²⁶⁷ **[492]** Viṣṇu is said to be śakti due to the metaphor that potency and that which has it are

¹²⁶⁵ Some read °pareṇa, some °vareṇa.

¹²⁶⁶ See ŚrīBh II. i. 9 cited above.

¹²⁶⁷ In fact the above-quoted Viṣṇupurāṇa passages do not refer to Viṣṇu as śakti (note that viṣṇuśakti [VI. vii. 61] denotes muktātman according to the interpretation of Rāmānuja). So R mentions the passage ‘brahmaviṣṇuśivā brahman pradhānā brahmaśaktayaḥ’ [?].

non-different. The quotation of the passage “... whose form is this miracle world...” regarding that:

* ... is endowed with various and infinite śaktis [VAS §82: 120,2], is¹²⁶⁸ to explain that [He] is endowed with wonderful potencies as one who creates the wonderful world. Hereby there is not any mistake.

Thus the special quality named śakti is established.

Weight is the nature which causes to fall. It belongs to water and earth. [It] is postulated through fall.¹²⁶⁹

Some¹²⁷⁰ hold that one perceives it with the touch when, say, one weighs something. This [weight] is not known when one touches its side portions or upper portions, which is not any defect¹²⁷¹ because weighing and the like are [but] the assistant causes [of perceiving weight]. If not, [that is, if the perceptibility of something were negated only because of its dependence upon an assistance], we could not perceive, say, that someone is a Brahmin as it is necessary to grasp the relation of his mother and farther.¹²⁷²

On the contrary, the others assert¹²⁷³ as follows: There is not such weight as is other than the very nature of earth or water. It is established that both [earth and water] fall by nature if there is no prevention. Even the weight [which you regard as] distinct from [the very nature of the two] becomes the cause of fall owing to its own nature; then, let this nature [directly] belong to the very nature [of the two], because that is simpler [than postulating such weight in-between]. The fixed rule as to [the weight

¹²⁶⁸ yat tu ... tatra ... should be yat tu ... tac ca, as is pointed out by V.

¹²⁶⁹ Cf. PDhS §297: ... patanakarmānumeyam....

¹²⁷⁰ Vallabha holds that weight is perceptible (Nyāyalīlāvātī, ChSS ed., pp.631ff.), while Deśika (cf. TMK V. 37) as well as most of the Vaiśeṣikas (cf. PDhS §297: apratyakṣham) does not accept the perceptibility of weight; .

¹²⁷¹ Explaining that weight is not perceptible, Śrīdhara says: ye tu tvagindriyagrāhyaṃ gurutvam āhuḥ teshāṃ adhaḥsthitasya dravyasya sparśopalambhavad gurutvopalambhaprasaṅgaḥ [NyKan 608,10f.].

¹²⁷² K asserts that this description is based on others' opinion because our author actually denies the perceptibility of Brahmin-hood. See my note on 559,5ff.

¹²⁷³ āhuḥ is reduplicated in UVG ed.

of each thing] such as pala¹²⁷⁴ and so on, [which is known through] the difference [in speed] of falling,¹²⁷⁵ is also based on the fact that component parts [of each thing] are more or less. Indeed, the authors of smṛtis¹²⁷⁶ also teach the fixed rule regarding [weight] like pala as accordant to it [492]. And it is stated in the seventh section of the prameya chapter in the Nyāyatattva:

*Weight consists of the nature of something falling down.¹²⁷⁷ Levity is the non-existence of it [Nyāyatattva].

Further, if fall made us postulate the [quality] which is different from [the very nature of a falling thing], even the flaming up [of fire] and the horizontal blow [of air] would [make us postulate] such two [qualities] of fire and air as well.¹²⁷⁸

[Obj.] Such [movements of fire and air] are established through their own nature, their unseen power, the will of God or their particular potency.

[Ans.] The same can be applied even in the case [of fall]; since nothing is different. Keeping this in mind, says the same work:

*Weight is classified into three: downward, horizontal and upward. Air, fire and water have [respectively] horizontal weight, upward weight and downward weight [Nyāyatattva].

[Obj.] These [nature and so on, which must be unique to each thing], cannot exist in the two elements [i.e. water and earth].

[Ans.] We ask in return: How can [the ‘weight’] assumed by you [exist in the two]?

[Obj.] Because of [their] own nature.

¹²⁷⁴ 1 pala = 93.312 gr. (L. Renou et al., L'Inde Classique II, Paris, 1953, App.13).

¹²⁷⁵ patanatāratamyapalādiniyamah. Cf. TMK V. 36: pāte bhedāt palādipratiniyatih and SAS ad loc.: pātabhedāt parikalpyeta tad api, etc.

¹²⁷⁶ R and K cite the following Smṛti: gavākshagatamārtaṅ araśmimadhye pradṛśyate / trasareṇupramāṇaṃ tu raja ity ucyate buddhaiḥ // trasareṇvashtakam reṇuḥ; tattrayaṃ rājasarshapaḥ / te 'shtau yavaḥ; sho asha tu yavā māshaḥ, athavā tribhiḥ // rūpyaṃ māsho dvi-guñjo vā; dharaṇaṃ sho ashaiva te / śatamānaṃ tu daśabhir dharaṇaiḥ palam eva ca // [?].

¹²⁷⁷ adhaḥpatanasvabhāvātma gurutvam. V reads °svabhāvāt sa gurutvam and comments that because such nature exists in something heavy, the very nature is gurutva (fn.1).

¹²⁷⁸ The problem on the movements of fire and air in connection to gurutva has been treated in Kir 253,25ff.

[Ans.] The same answer holds good [in this case also]. And it is to be considered that as flaming up exists in secondary varieties of fire belonging to one element, so in this case also [such nature and so on exist in many elements]. [494] Also for the reason that water is but earth in another condition according to our opinion [on modification], nothing is wrong [if one and the same nature and so on exist in the two].

Even when we weigh something, we know [its] pressure from perception; as, for instance, [we perceive] air resistance. Only due to this fact, we practically use the expression ‘weight’ even in the case [of air, which is in fact devoid of weight]. And this [pressure] is known [as weight] because we feel great heaviness when a strong person presses us and we practically use the expression ‘light’ when the same person presses us gently.

Thus, such weight as you assume can be proved neither from inference nor perception.

[Obj.] Then, suppose that [qualities] perceived in both water and earth like taste are the causes of fall.

[Ans.] Not so. Because the difference [in speed of falling] is not in proportion to them and we perceive otherwise, [e.g. all is not heavier that has stronger taste].¹²⁷⁹

[Obj.] What is true weight [for you], then?

[Ans.] Listen. In the opinion that potency is not acceptable, [weight] is the distinctive nature [of a thing]. In the opinion that it is acceptable, [weight] is particular [potency], because it is appropriate to conceive this [potency], which is accepted as causal function for everything, in this case as well.

By the way, the Sāṃkhyas accept the particular quality of earth and water named ‘weight’ being the cause of fall as the result of tamas.¹²⁸⁰ They¹²⁸¹ should accept the particular quality named ‘levity’ being the result of sattva¹²⁸² as the cause of the flaming up of fire and the horizontal blow of air. Rather, suppose that an effect such as fall is fixed due to the very cause due to which, you think, weight and levity are fixed in earth and so on. It is complicated to postulate another quality in-between.

¹²⁷⁹ Cf. Kir 253,23f.: rasāc ca patane pāshāṇāt śarkarāyāḥ pātaviśesho rasādhikyāt [syāt].

¹²⁸⁰ Cf. SK 13: guru varaṇakam eva tamaḥ.

¹²⁸¹ yat tu ... taiḥ As is asserted by V, yat tu should be yais tu or omitted.

¹²⁸² Cf. SK 13: sattvaṃ laghu prakāśakam.

The postulation of the quality ‘weight (gurutva)’ is hereby negated because of the complication (gurutva). **[495]**

Fluidity is the object of the notion of fluidity. And it is the primary cause of flowing.

Not only in water does [it] exist, because it is apprehended even in such earthy and fiery products as milk and gold. And it is of two sorts: inherent one and that which is produced through baking. Water has inherent one; earth and fire have baking-produced one. Or rather, fluidity exists only in water. In such substances as gold,¹²⁸³ that [fluidity] which exists in water is apprehended. For it is established, as everything is composed of five elements [due to quintuplication], that the part of that [water] sometimes emerges [in everything]. That is illustrated by the venerable author of the Commentary with the example of the appearance of water in mirage.¹²⁸⁴ Notwithstanding, this [fluidity] is not mere wateriness. Because when that [water] becomes hail, we apprehend solidity.

The others, however, assert as follows. Your statement that fluidity exists in water is correct. But how is it established as other than mere wateriness?

[Obj.] It is postulated as the cause of flowing.

[Ans.] Why isn't this [flowing] also caused by that [wateriness]?

[Obj.] [Fluidity] is other [than wateriness] since in the expression ‘water is fluid’ it is known as an attribute [of water] as in the expression ‘fire is hot’ and the like¹²⁸⁵ **[496]**.

[Ans.] In spite of that, let us accept this [fluidity] as that particular configuration which is ultimately same as wateriness, as we experience, as in the case of solidity.

[Obj.] Solidity is a particular conjunction.

[Ans.] So is this [fluidity] since there is no distinction. In addition, solidity is not mere a particular conjunction but is that particular touch inherent only in earthiness which depends upon the particular conjunction. And fluidity is that particular conjunction which is devoid of even slight unevenness. And it is stated in the seventh section of the prameya chapter

¹²⁸³ V adds kshīra- in parentheses with a question mark.

¹²⁸⁴ See ŚrīBh I. i. 1: marīcikājalajñāne 'pi tejaḥprthivyor apy ambuno vidyamānatvād indriyadosheṇa tejaḥprthivyor agrahaṇād adṛṣṭavaśāc cāmbuno grahaṇād yathārthatvam [(2) 35,11–13].

¹²⁸⁵ V suggests the reading agner aushnyādivat for agnir ushṇa ityādivat.

in the Nyāyatattva:

*That which has the touch endowed with loose conjunction is soft (mṛdu); that which has the touch endowed with unloose conjunction is solid [Nyāyatattva].

[Obj.] What causes this conjunction devoid of even slight unevenness?

[Ans.] You should believe that wateriness does.

[Obj.] What ever is wateriness?

[Ans.] Alas! Do you want to deny wateriness, adhering to fluidity? Or, do you think that fluidity is established as wateriness? —Both¹²⁸⁶ cannot be correct.¹²⁸⁷ **[497]**

[Obj.] I dare ask you: What is wateriness?

[Ans.] It is a kind of genus.

[Obj.] What manifests it?

[Ans.] Particularity and so on in the form of such particular conjunction do.¹²⁸⁸

[Obj.] Then, let us abandon wateriness as well, accepting them only.

[Ans.] I do not mind. Still that much cannot establish fluidity as independent [quality].

[Obj.] If it had no fluidity, water could hardly be entered like the surface of the earth.

[Ans.] Not so. Because there is inconstancy in view of [that which, though devoid of fluidity or liquidness, can be easily entered] like ether.

[Obj.] [Something cannot be entered, because it is devoid of fluidity] while it has touch.

[Ans.] Not so. Because there is inconstancy in view of wind, sun-heat and so on.

[Obj.] It is because they are of the nature of looseness.

[Ans.] Why?

[Obj.] Because they have some gaps.

[Ans.] Not so because they are not apprehended so. For instance, we

¹²⁸⁶ R reads na cobhayam yujyate for na cobhayam api yujyate.

¹²⁸⁷ Because wateriness is perceptible while fluidity as different quality is not so (K).

¹²⁸⁸ tādrśasaṃyogaviśesharūpaviśeshādi. V suggests to omit viśesharūpa.

never apprehend any gap in the midday sun. If you still admit it, you should accept it even in the case [of water] because there is no distinction.

[Obj.] What causes such particular well-conjunction¹²⁸⁹ as is fit for entrance and the like? [— It must be nothing but fluidity].

[Ans.] Not so. [Because¹²⁹⁰] we can reply by the illustration of wind, sun-heat and so on.

Now, you said that fluidity is other than wateriness because we apprehend solidity when [water] becomes hail [498]. Nor is it true. Since it is due to some particular strengthening factors that we apprehend its solidity as [that] of fiery elements like gold. For fire has neither instinctive solidity nor extrinsic one. Moreover, we never apprehend water when water changes into hail and the like; when it melts, however, we never fail to apprehend both wateriness and fluidity— if any one of the two were not apprehended at that time, the difference [between the two] would be understood.

[Obj.] Why isn't [fluidity] synonymous [with wateriness]?

[Ans.] Due to the difference of the limiting adjuncts such as particular conjunction, as we have said.

That is the fluidity assumed by the Vaiśeshika and other schools [to be independent quality].

Now, viscosity (sneha) is explained. Viscidity is the object of the notion of viscosity. It exists in water only. [It] is found through union with ghee and the like. It is not mere fluidity because fluid things like gold cannot gather dust.¹²⁹¹ Nor is it wateriness because we express separately that 'water is viscid' and because we apprehend 'it is viscid' in bees' wax and so on without apprehending water [499]. Thus some of our sect following the Vaiśeshika hold that there is that quality named viscosity which is established by means of perception, exists in water only and is the cause of gathering dust.

The others, however, assert as follows. No doubt there is the apprehension that 'something is viscid.' But this [apprehension] is concerned with merely particular color, touch and so on. For we never apprehend another quality distinctly. There is the apprehension that 'it is viscid' even in the case of water due to its being shiny. So is it in the case of substances

¹²⁸⁹ I.e. the particular conjunction devoid of even slight unevenness (K).

¹²⁹⁰ V suggests to read samādhānāt for samādhānam.

¹²⁹¹ PDhS §301: samgraha° = parasparam asaṃyuktānāṃ sakyādādīnāṃ piṅ ībhāvaprāptihetuḥ saṃyogaviśeṣaḥ [NyKan 611].

like gold.

Or rather, nobody understands that water is viscid. For it is clay and the like that are understood so. Gathering dust is also caused by wateriness or particular potency inherent in the same object as wateriness. It is, therefore, appropriate that fluid things like gold do not gather it. Moreover, though you accept the quality called viscosity because of gathering dust, why don't you postulate another quality called 'hardness (rauḥshya)' also in fire for the reason that it cracks something? If you admit that cracking and the like in that case [of fire] were caused by [its] hotness and so on, why don't you accept that gathering in this case [of water] is caused by [its] coolness and so on? And it is stated in the seventh section of the prameya chapter in the Nyāyatattva:

*Stickiness (picchilatva) is the touch of such conjunction as is difficult to disjoint; separability (viśliṣṭatva) is the touch of such conjunction as is easy to disjoint [Nyāyatattva].

Further, if viscosity were established because of gathering, it should be postulated even in gum of a jack-tree and the like. Or rather, it is better to postulate it only in them because [they] gather more.

Alternatively, suppose that gathering is caused by particular potency as in the case of magnet. And we never understand that water always gathers something, because we find out even the fact that dry clay splits up when it is dipped with water. So it is to be admitted that, as is experienced, water in itself gathers or splits something, assisted by cooperative causes.

By the way, for spiritual beings sneha means affection or desire to acquire; rauḥshya means misery, desire to give up or anger. The other quality, hereby, is not established.

Latent impression (vāsanā) is that which is produced from direct experience (anubhava) and is the cause of recollection¹²⁹² (smṛti). It is postulated through [its] effect. First, recollection is not caused by [previous] direct experience¹²⁹³ **[500]** because [the direct experience of an object] has been destroyed for long [when the recollection of it takes place]. Nor [is it caused by] the self and so on indicated (upalakshita) by that [direct experience]; because even something destroyed, [which could be the cause

¹²⁹² TMK V. 101 shows more elaborate definition: bāhyākshāder avṛttau ciraviditam api samaryate yena so 'yaṃ saṃskāraḥ.

¹²⁹³ na tāvad anubhavahetuḥ smṛtiḥ; v.l. in R: na tāvad anubhavaḥ smṛtihetuḥ. Though the content is same (the compound in the former should be understood as bahuvrīhi), the latter seems to be better because only smṛtihetu (= bhāvanā or saṃskāra) can be the subject of the following sentences.

as indicator if it were cognized at that time], cannot be the cause as indicator if it is not cognized.¹²⁹⁴ Nor [is it caused by] the annihilative destruction of that [direct experience]; since it would lead to the undesirable conclusion that the latent impression (saṃskāra) does not cease [forever¹²⁹⁵]. Nor [is it caused by] the apprehension of a similar object and the like, because it would lead to the over application¹²⁹⁶ that mere [apprehension of a similar object not experienced before] also [causes recollection¹²⁹⁷] and because that [apprehension of a similar object] which is qualified [by direct experience] is not established [since the direct experience has been destroyed]. If you argue that [recollection is caused by] the particular unseen power produced from direct experience, this means that latent impression is established.

There is different opinions¹²⁹⁸ as to whether this [latent impression] is in the form of merit and demerit or other than these [two]. Of them, the former is not acceptable **[501]** since these [merit and demerit] are not applicable to a thing beyond the range of injunction and prohibition. Thus the latter remains. [There is] also [different opinions as to whether] such [latent impression] is imposed (ādheya) potency or other than that. Anyway the process of causality¹²⁹⁹ and so on is not different.

And there is different opinions in our sect as to whether it belongs to the self or the knowledge-as-substance. Of them, it is proper that [latent impression] belongs to the knowledge-as-substance because [it] is proximate to direct experience and recollection.¹³⁰⁰ Notwithstanding, Varadavishṇu-

¹²⁹⁴ dhvastasyāpy ajñāyamānasyopalakṣhaṇatayāpi
kāraṇatvāsambhavāt. R reports v.l. dhvastasya
jñāyamānasyopalakṣhaṇatāyām pi hetutvāsambhavāt, which means: Though something destroyed can be indicator if it is cognized, [direct experience, which is not cognized], cannot be the cause.

¹²⁹⁵ According to the opinion that abhāva is an independent category. Cf. SAS V. 102: na ca pūrvānubhavapradhvaṃsamātram eva saṃskāra iti vācyam; tasya parapakshe nityatvena saṃskārapramoshābhāvaprasaṃgāt, asmatpakshe dhavaṃsasya bhāvarūpatvena paryāyeṇa bhāvasyaivābhidhānāc ca [771,11–13].

¹²⁹⁶ atiprasaṃgāt. R reads prasaṃgāt and shows this reading as v.l.

¹²⁹⁷ Cf. SAS V. 101: tulyadarśanādikam evādhunikasaṃskāro 'stv iti ca vaktuṃ na śakyate, anavagata 'py arthe smṛtiprasaṃgāt [770,14].

¹²⁹⁸ viśeṣa. V reads viśaya and adds viśeṣa in parenthesis.

¹²⁹⁹ I.e. anubhava Æ vāsanā or saṃskāra Æ smṛti.

¹³⁰⁰ Since direct experience and recollection belong to the knowledge-as-substance as its particular condition, it is proper that mental impression, which is caused by direct experience and produces memory, is in the same

miśra states as follows:

*Since the very means of knowledge that makes us postulate mental impression (bhāvanā) makes us postulate that it has as substratum the self, which is continuous,¹³⁰¹ and because there is no means to teach that it has as substratum the knowledge, which is not continuous [?].

This is no doubt stated with the intention of the opinion of others since he himself explains that knowledge is substance¹³⁰² and is eternal. Again, the author of the Vivaraṇa [i.e. Śrī-Rāmamiśra] comments on the topic of purport (samanvayādihikarāna) in connection to the refutation of the difference cum non-difference view¹³⁰³:

*The [non-spiritual] limiting adjunct (upādhi) [e.g. the internal organ], indeed, cannot be the recollector [of previous experience]. Nor the particular part [of the spiritual being, i.e. Brahman, delimited by the limiting adjunct] because [when the limiting adjunct moves around] the mental impression in one position could not be the cause of recollection in the other position.¹³⁰⁴ Were it possible, there would be no rule [that the mental impression of one person causes the recollection of the person only]. And mental impression has the same substratum as direct experience [Vivaraṇa ad ŚrīBh I. i. 4].

This is, no doubt, stated from the viewpoint of those who do not accept that the knowledge-as-attribute is substance [as well]. In our opinion, however, there is no defect since direct experience, mental impression and memory are particular aspects of knowledge. Accordingly, the meaning of the passage that:

*[The individual self] covered with the dust [called] vāsanā [ViP VI. vii. 19]

and so on¹³⁰⁵ is understood [as ‘covered with vāsanā through the knowledge’] substratum as the two (R). In TMK V. 103 cd, our author positively criticizes the opinion that saṃskāra directly belongs to the ātman for the reason that it is nirvikāra.

¹³⁰¹ Since (bhāvanā or) saṃskāra is postulated as the intermediate cause so as to make it possible for previous direct experience, which is temporary, to be the cause of smṛti, it also would be temporary and could not make the direct experience be the cause if it had as substratum a temporary entity [like knowledge] (R).

¹³⁰² See the fragment of Varadavishṇu in 419,5f.

¹³⁰³ ŚrīBh I. i. 4: 159,1–161,17. The passage is probably the commentary ad 161,4ff.

¹³⁰⁴ Herefrom it is evident that the author regards saṃskāra as directly belonging to the individual self (R).

¹³⁰⁵ anekajanmasāhasrīm saṃsārapadavīm vrajan / mohaśramam prayāto 'sau vāsanāreṇukunṭhitaḥ: “Travelling the path of transmigration

[502].

The Vaiśeṣikas hold that tendency (*saṃskāra*) is of three sorts, namely, speed (*vega*), mental impression (*bhāvanā*) and elasticity (*sthitasthāpaka*).¹³⁰⁶ It is inappropriate.

As for speed, there is no means to make us understand that it is different from a particular kind of action (*karma*). For the notion, say, that ‘it moves quickly’ is also understood as merely based on a special feature (*atiśaya*) of the action. And the special feature of action is accepted by both [of us].¹³⁰⁷ It is stated in the *prameya* chapter in the *Nyāyatattva* in connection with the explanation of time:

*For speed is the proximity in time [taken for] conjunction [Nyāyatattva].

Additionally, the word ‘speed’ is used even concerning action caused by volition in the expression ‘He goes speedily (*vegena*)’ and the like. That speed appears to be an attribute of [moving things] like an arrow is rejected through the notion of slowness; [that is, you should admit speed as well as slowness to be particularity of motion].

[Obj.] Tendency-ness belongs to a thing producing motion, because it is the genus [which belongs to] tendency¹³⁰⁸ [503].

[Ans.] Such¹³⁰⁹ inference is defective because of the over-application,¹³¹⁰ the non-establishment¹³¹¹ and so on.

for many thousands of birth, that [individual self] attains misery of ignorance and is covered with the dust called *vāsanā*”. There the self is taught to be the direct substratum of *vāsanā* but the fact is that it is covered with *vāsanā* through the knowledge (R).

¹³⁰⁶ See PDhS §302. The Naiyāyika view on *vega* is a little different from the Vaiśeṣika one in that it is momentary or not (See EIPh II 129; Umesha Mishra 1936: 43). It is to be noted that Bhāsarvajña does not accept *vega* as a quality and holds that it is included in action (See *Nyāyabhūṣaṇa*, pp.162f).

¹³⁰⁷ Cf. SAS V. 104: *bhavān api karmabhedair vegabhedam kathayati; tathā ca yādṛśakarmabhedād vegabhedah parikalpyate sa eva karmabhedo vega ity ucyatām* [773,4f.].

¹³⁰⁸ The *dr̥ṣṭānta* is *sattā* (R) or *guṇatva* (K).

¹³⁰⁹ TMK V. 104 poses another inference of the Naiyāyika to prove *vega*: *śarādigatam dvitīyādikarma śaraguṇotpannam, tatkāryatvāt, tannishṭaprathamakarmavat* [SAS 773,8f.].

¹³¹⁰ I.e. Tendency-ness belongs to a thing producing color, because it is the genus [which belongs to] tendency (R).

¹³¹¹ I.e. *jāitva* is not established in our opinion (R).

Śrī Vishṇucitta-ārya reads *kriyā* as the meaning [of the word] *vega*¹³¹²: that is, in refuting the inference of God—

*If [the Naiyāyika] argues that every kind of motion [including earthquake] presupposes volition because it is motion, not so; because there is deviation in view of the *vega* of an arrow and flowing of water and because it is contradictory to the postulation of ‘having cause’ if [the *vega* and the flowing] are assumed to be of [their] own nature [?].

Again, elasticity (*sthitasthāpaka*) is but special configuration (*saṁsthānaviśeṣa*). For we find that the difference in coming back is in accordance with that in special configuration [504]. [You may say that] it comes about that the action takes place at any time [if special configuration is its cause], but [the doubt] is [applicable to your opinion] as well; [if you reply that] it is avoidable because [the action] is accompanied with assistant causes like expansion and release, [the answer] is [applicable to our opinion] as well. You should admit that even such difference in elasticity as a different [quality] is based on the difference in special configuration. Then, it is better to accept the very special configuration establishes the coming back to former position than to postulate the unseen new quality. [Its] loss (*pariśuddhi*) [i.e. not coming back] is to be considered in this opinion as well as [in the opinion that elasticity is] a different [quality].

Although some hold that [*saṁskāra*] is of two sorts, that is, tendency of knowledge and tendency of action (*karmasaṁskāra*), what kind of the tendency of action is accepted by them? First, it cannot be of the nature of speed or elasticity because such has been negated. Nor is it the cause of the activity of right action and sinful one. For that [activity] is also explained from each preceding unseen power, own independence [or free will] and so on. Nor is it true that, for instance, when [a drummer] plays the *mṛdangam*, that [tendency of action] which is conditioned by [his] each preceding play is the cause of the manual readiness and so on in [his] each succeeding action [505]. Because the manual readiness and so on in that [action] are based on the fact, say, that the particular hardness [of the drum] is loosened due to [his] each preceding play and because the quickness in [his] driving [his] hands is based on the quickness of that memory [of him fit for] driving which is produced from [his] mental impression (*saṁskāra*) formed after [his experience of] each preceding play.

Still the author of the Commentary states that:

*To cause non-attachment of *sin*¹³¹³ means to cause to obstruct the origination of that potency which is the cause of the unfitness for

¹³¹² *kriyā vegārthatvena paṭhitā*. K reports v.l. *kriyāvegāv ekārthatvena paṭhitau*.

¹³¹³ Cf. BrSū VI. i. 13: *tadadhigama uttarapūrvāghayor aśleshavināśau*.

Vedic ritual, the vāsanā and the sinful course (pratyavāya) [ŚrīBh IV. i. 13: 584,1],

*Though [you are] bound to that beginningless and perverted vāsanā which is the cause and is the effect of these two [i.e. sin and the ego¹³¹⁴] [Śaraṇāgatigadya 17],

and so on; even such passages do not persist upon the postulation of such saṃskāra as is different from the mental impression (vāsanā) of direct experience. And immediately after the passage that ‘... of sin’ and so forth, it is stated that:

*Indeed the sin which are done bring about to a person the unfitness for Vedic ritual, the taste for undertaking further [sinful] action of the same kind and the sinful course. To cause to destroy sin is to cause to destroy that potency of this [sin] which has been produced. The potency also is but the displeasure (aprīti) of the Supreme Person [ŚrīBh IV. i. 13: 584,2–3].

Thus it is established that sinful action produces the taste for undertaking further action of the same kind through the displeasure of the Supreme Person; accordingly, it is implied here that there is not the different kind of saṃskāra. And, for instance, in the topic that:

*But it is the two [earlier actions, i.e. sin and demerit], the fruits of which have not yet begun [that can be destroyed] [BrSū IV. i. 15],

it has been clearly commented as follows:

*Moreover, apart from the pleasure and the displeasure of God which are produced from meritorious action and non-meritorious action, there is no means to know the existence of that saṃskāra which is the cause of the continuity of the body [ŚrīBh IV. i. 15: 588,1–2].

It is to be understood that the same principle [that there is no means to know its existence] is applicable to the other [kind of vāsanā] as well. So is stated in the Śrīmadgītā-bhāṣya. [That is], in commenting the verse that:

*The faith (śraddhā) of [all] embodied beings, which is produced from [their] own nature (svabhāva), is of three sorts: of sattva, of rajas and of tamas. Listen about it [BhG XVII. 2],

it is stated¹³¹⁵ that:

¹³¹⁴ See Deśika's commentary: pāpasyāhaṃkārasya ca, etc. [ed. V. Srivatsankacharyar, Madras, Sri Vedanta Desika Seventh Centenary Trust, n.d.: 170,7]; while R, following the previous two phrases (i.e. anantāsahyāpacārayukto 'py etatkāryakāraṇabhūtānadiviparītāhaṃkāravumū hātmasvabhāvo 'pi), comments: etadubhayety anenāhaṃkāra-asahyāpacārau gr̥hyete.

¹³¹⁵ Though my translation follows R (evam iti / atiriktasaṃskārābhāva ukta ity arthaḥ / kutroktam ity atrāha trividheti / ity asya vyākhyāne iti / asya vakshyamāṇena ity uktam ity anenānvayaḥ), it seems to be better, as is suggested by V, to omit uktam in śrīmadgītābhāṣhye 'py uktam (or uktam

*Svabhāva means their own unique nature (bhāva) [506], namely, each peculiar taste of them caused by the previous vāsanā. For whatever [a person has] taste, he comes to have faith on it. Faith is the zeal (tvarā) in the means with the conviction that it brings about one's desired object. Vāsanā and taste and faith are those qualities of the self which are produced from [its] association with the guṇas. Sattva and other guṇas, which produce these qualities of the self such as vāsanā, are qualities of the particular body, the [particular] sense-organs, the [particular] internal organ¹³¹⁶ and are known only through [their] effects. The meaning is that [vāsanā and so on¹³¹⁷] are produced from the direct experience with such body and so on as are associated with sattva and other guṇas [GBh XVII. 2: 516,10–517,4].

Though the passage of the Ātmasiddhi that

*It is impossible, you know, for liberated one — whose association with the organs, the body, [the tendency] of knowledge and the tendency of action is completely removed — to have the motivation to rise up the consciousness concerning himself and the other¹³¹⁸ [ĀS]

where the Venerable Yāmuna-muni [seems to] put the tendency of knowledge and that of action distinctively, is also to be interpreted in the line of the author of the Commentary.

According to some,¹³¹⁹ the continuity of vāsanā is to be accepted from the fact that when a seed of cotton was soaked in the red color of lac, we find the redness of its flower, fruit and so on even if the redness of this [seed] has gone. In this regard, however, it is to be examined whether the vāsanā arises in its effects like the flower or in parts of the seed transforming itself into the flower and so on. Not the former; for the vāsanā cannot arise [in its effects] because the substratum [of the vāsanā] is different [from that of the color of the lac] and the substratum is not existent [when the lac colors the seed in red]; otherwise [i.e. if the color of the cotton in one thing at the end of the quotation).

¹³¹⁶ dehendriyātaḥkaraṇaviśeshagatā. Most of the editions of the GBh read vishaya for viśesha; V adopts the reading, adding viśesha in parentheses.

¹³¹⁷ Cf. TC 517,21f.: atīndriyāṇām ananubhūtānām katham vāsanāhetutvam ity atrāha sattvādiguṇayukteti. The Eng. trans. of the GBh by M. R. Sampatkumaran (rpt. Bombay, 1985, p.412) and that by Swāmī Ādidevānanda (Madras, 1991, p.525) interpret like this.

¹³¹⁸ Cf. BṛhUp II. iv. 14, IV. v. 15: yatra tv asya sarvam ātmaivābhūt.

R reports the variant reading anirdhūta° for nirdhūta° and anapavṛktasya for apavṛktasya. In that case, svaparasaṃvedana should be interpreted as ‘the direct experience of his own self as well as that of the Highest Self.’

¹³¹⁹ V refers to the verse of Buddhist cited in 188,3–189,2.

produced the vāsanā in the other], there would be the over-application [that anything can produce the vāsanā in a thing]. If the redness is caused by the continuous succession of a part of the cotton in the parts of the seed, on the other hand, the vāsanā is purposeless.

[Obj.] A certain saṃskāra should be admitted from the fact, for instance, that we find the removal of poison in water when the Gāru amantra is recited.

[Ans.] It is inappropriate because these various effects are brought about only through the particular potency conditioned by the power of the mantra [507]. In fact, saṃskāra — which is restricted to producing an effect of the same kind — cannot be the cause of such effect.

The Mīmāṃsakas accepts that saṃskāra or purification belongs to such ritual materials as the brīhi-rice in the ritual action enjoined in the [Scriptural passage] that:

*He sprinkles water over the brīhi-rice¹³²⁰ [Taittirīya-Brāhmaṇa III. 2. 5. 4],

and so on.

The Naiyāyikas, however, assert that it is [but] the saṃskāra of the action, saying that:

*It is admitted that saṃskāra or purification by sprinkling (prokshaṇa), pouring (abhyukshaṇa) and so on¹³²¹ belongs to the agent of the action alone¹³²² [NyKus I. 11].

Against this, [the Mīmāṃsakas argue as follows]. It is to be examined: Of what nature is such saṃskāra [as is accepted by you], that which is called vāsanā (or mental impression) or that which is of the nature of unseen power? Not the former; for this [kind of saṃskāra] cannot produced from action as it is produced from direct experience. Nor the latter. For if [the sprinkling etc.] should produce the unseen power inherent in the self [of the agent] alone without giving anything to the materials, it comes about that [such subsidiary actions like the sprinkling also] directly contribute [to the main action¹³²³] (ārādopakāraka) like fore-sacrifices (prayāja). [508]

¹³²⁰ vrīhīn prokshati; TaiBr reads enān.... (See MNP §71:207, fn.58).

¹³²¹ According to R, abhyukshaṇa is sprinkling to oneself (svaprokshaṇa) and ‘and so on’ denotes avokshaṇa or sprinkling to the ground.

¹³²² saṃskāraḥ kartur (NyKu: puṃsa) eveshtaḥ prokshaṇābhyukshaṇādishu (NyKu: °ādibhiḥ).

¹³²³ The ārādopakāraka means a subsidiary action (aṃga) directly (ārāt = sākshāt) related to the main rite (pradhāna), while sannipatyokāraka or indirectly-contributing one is related directly to a material or an accessory (aṃga) and only indirectly to the main rite by producing utpattyapūrva (Cf.

Furthermore, as a result, [even] in its modified form (vikṛti) where the oblation of nīvāra-rice and so on is employed [in place of vṛihi-rice], it would be [necessary] to sprinkle over vṛihi-rice, not over nīvāra-rice; for the [latter] cannot establish the unseen power inherent in the self as it is not enjoined in its primary form¹³²⁴ (prakṛti). So the saṃskāra is to be admitted only in the vṛihi-rice and so on. **[509]**

To this, we reply: Were it the case, this saṃskāra is becoming the object of the will (abhimati) of each deity or becoming fit for sacrifice by increasing the guṇas like sattva. Accordingly, this cannot establish [the saṃskāra as] independent particular quality.

Now, number (saṃkhyā) [is explained]. Number is the object of the notion and the usage of ‘one’ ‘two’ ‘three’ and so on.

Some hold that it belongs to substance alone; while some hold that [it] belongs to all the categories (padārtha) like substance, quality and so on.

Edgerton's index to MNP, s.v.).

¹³²⁴ R: If the sprinkling brings about the speciality (atīśaya) that belongs to a thing over which [water] is sprinkled, even in the case of the oblation of nīvāra-rice, the sprinkling over the nīvāra-rice instead of the vṛihi-rice is established for the purpose of establishing the speciality of the nīvāra-rice. On the other hand, if the sprinkling in the primary form should not purify the oblation-material but directly contribute [to the main action] like fore-sacrifices, the sprinkling that has as the means vṛihi-rice would be attained [even in that case], as is enjoined regarding the primary form, like the fore-sacrifice which has as the means ghee. Since the sprinkling that has as the means vṛihi-rice alone is enjoined in the primary form and the sprinkling that has as the means nīvāra-rice is not enjoined [there], that [sprinkling] which is not enjoined cannot accomplish the unseen power inherent in the self. And it is implied that if the sprinkling of each entity should directly contribute [to the main action], the śeshi-hood of the vṛihi [to the sprinkling], which is taught by its accusative ending [cf. MNP §71], would be spoiled.

K: If the sprinkling should produce the unseen power belonging to the self but not that [purification] which is belongs to the vṛihi-rice etc., then the vṛihi-rice etc. would be the aṃga of the sprinkling but the latter would not be the aṃga of these former. Then, when the sprinkling is, according to the principle ‘The enjoined pradhāna prevents the aṃgas’ [?; cf. MiSū XII. ii. 27: aṃgaguṇavirodhe ca tādarthyāt], transferred from the primary form to the modified form where the oblation of nīvāra-rice and so on is employed, vṛihi-rice, which is its aṃga, would be also unavoidably attained; accordingly, it comes about that one should sprinkle over vṛihi-rice only.

And [the Vaiśeṣikas], who hold that [it] belongs to substance alone, assert as follows¹³²⁵: The oneness in eternal substances [e.g. an atom] is eternal (or non-produced); [the oneness] in non-eternal substances [e.g. a dyad and so on] is produced by lots of oneness belonging to [their] component parts. Two-ness, three-ness and so forth are produced by lots of oneness belonging to each thing which are assisted by enumerative cognition¹³²⁶

¹³²⁵ The following seems to be not quotation from the Vaiśeṣika works but the summary of their theory by the author. Cf. TarS §24: *ekatvaṃ nityam anityaṃ ca / nityagataṃ nityam anityagataṃ anityam / dvitvādikaṃ tu sarvatrānityam eva*. See also the summary of the Vaiśeṣika view in TMK V. 39.

¹³²⁶ The process of the notion ‘two’ is expounded in PDhS as follows—

“(I) The eye of a knower is related to two substances, homogeneous [e.g. two pots] or heterogeneous [e.g. a pot and cloth].

(II) The knowledge regarding the generality of one-quality (*ekatva*) [i.e. *ekatvatva*], which is inherent in [the one-quality] inherent in [the substances] with which the [eye] is conjunct, arises.

(III) That single cognition having many objects which is on the two one-qualities [i.e. *apekshābuddhi*] arises from the generality of one-quality, its relation [to the two one-qualities (i.e. inherence)] and the [preceding] knowledge [regarding the two one-qualities]. (b) The knowledge regarding the generality of one-quality is to be destroyed [*This is clearly shown in the text read by the *Vyomavatī*].

(IV) In dependence on this [(enumerative) cognition], two-quality (*dvitva*) is produced anew by means of the two one-qualities in their own two substrata.

(V) There arises the knowledge regarding the generality of two-quality [i.e. *dvitvatva*]. (c) The enumerative cognition is to be destroyed by force of this knowledge regarding the generality of two-quality. (vi) The knowledge regarding the two-quality is to arise due to the generality of two-quality, its relation [to the two-quality] and the [preceding] knowledge [regarding the generality of two-quality].— All these occur at one moment.

(VI) Then, (C) by force of the destruction of the enumerative cognition, (d) the two-quality is to be destroyed. (e) The knowledge regarding the generality is to be destroyed by force of the knowledge regarding the two-quality. By force of the two-quality, the knowledge regarding it and its relation, (vii) the knowledge regarding the substances that ‘these are two substances’ is to arise. — All these occur at one moment.

(VII) Soon, the knowledge regarding the substances that ‘these are two substances’ arises. (D) The two-quality is destroyed. (f) The knowledge regarding the two-quality is to be destroyed. (viii) The *saṃskāra* is to arise due to the knowledge regarding the substances. — All these occur at one moment.

(VIII) Soon, (F) the knowledge regarding the two-quality is destroyed.
[IX] (G) The knowledge regarding the substances is also [destroyed] by the saṃskāra.”

(§131: yadā

(I) boddhuś cakshushā samānāsamānajātīyayor dravyayoḥ sannikarshe sati,

(II) tatsaṃyuktasamavetasamaveta-ekatvasāmānyajñāna-utpattau,

(III) ekatvasāmānya-tatsambandha-jñānebhya ekaguṇayor anekavishayiṇy ekā buddhiḥ [= apekshābuddhiḥ] utpadyate,

(b) ekatvasāmānyabuddheś ca vinaśyattā [read in Vyomavatī];

tadā

(IV) tām apekshyaikatvābhyāṃ svāśrayayor dvitvam ārabhyate.

tataḥ punaḥ,

(V) tasmīn dvitvasāmānyajñānam utpadyate;

(c) tasmād dvitvasāmānyajñānād apekshābuddher vinaśyattā,

(vi) dvitvasāmānya-tatsambandha-tajjñānebhyo dvitvaguṇabuddher utpadyamānatā,

— iti ekaḥ kālaḥ.

§132: tata idānīm,

(VI) (C) apekshābuddhi-vināśād

(d) dvitvaguṇasya vinaśyattā,

(e) dvitvaguṇabuddhitāḥ sāmānyabuddher api vinaśyattā,

[read as Kir]

(vii) dvitvaguṇa-tajjñāna-sambandhebhyo dve dravye iti dravyabuddher utapadyamānatā,

— iti ekaḥ kālaḥ.

§133: tadanantaram,

(VII) dve dravye iti dravyajñāsyotpādaḥ,

(D) dvitvasya vināśaḥ,

(f) dvitvaguṇabuddher vinaśyattā,

(viii) dravyajñānāt saṃskārasyotpadyamānatā,

— iti ekaḥ kālaḥ.

§134: tadanantaram,

(VIII) (F) dravyajñānād dvitvaguṇabuddher vināśaḥ,

[IX] (G) dravyabuddher api saṃskārāt.)

Udayana summarizes the process as follows [Kir 128,24–129,7 (SDS X. 83–87, 97–100)]—

tad ayaṃ prakriyāsaṃkṣhepaḥ:

(I) indriyārthasannikarshaḥ, tasmāt (II) ekatvasāmānyabuddhiḥ, tataḥ (III) apekshābuddhiḥ, tataḥ (IV) dvitvam, tasmāt (V) dvitvasāmānyajñānam, tasmāc ca (VI) dvitvaguṇajñānam, tataḥ (VII) dravyajñānam, tataḥ (VIII) saṃskāraḥ— ity utpādakramaḥ / vināśakramas tu— (B) apekshābuddhitāḥ ekatvasāmānyajñānasya dvitvotpattisamakālam [= IV] vināśaḥ, (C) apekshābuddher dvitvasāmānyajñānād dvitvaguṇabuddhisamakālam [= VI],

(apekshābuddhi). [510]

To this [we object]: Firstly, the usages of ‘two’ and so forth are accomplished by the very sufficient condition that [brings about] two-ness and so forth, since they appear to be the object of the enumerative cognition of each [person].¹³²⁷ Even if two-ness and so forth belong to external objects, it should be admitted that they are restrict to one who uses the words (vyavaharṭ) by force of the very [enumerative cognition¹³²⁸]; for, otherwise, it comes about that [number] is generally known like color and so on. Therefore, it is more reasonable to accept the opinion that the usages and their restriction are caused by the very [enumerative cognition].

And [you] admit that when the cognition of this kind ceases, the two-ness and so on [also] cease. So it is more troublesome to postulate the cessation of the effect [i.e. the two-ness etc.] from mere cessation of the cause [i.e. enumerative cognition, which you regard as mere assistant cause of the two-ness etc.¹³²⁹] [511]. Yet it is more reasonable to [accept, like us], (E) *dvitvasāmānyajñānasya dvitvaguṇajñānāt* [= VI], (D) *dvitvasyāpekshābuddhivināśād dravyabuddhisamakālam* [= VII], (F) *guṇabuddher dravyabuddhitāḥ saṃskārotpattisamakālam* [= VIII], (G) *dravyabuddhes tadanantaram saṃskārāt*.

For the reason why *apekshābuddhi* is assumed to continue for three moments, see S. Kuppuswami Sastri, *A Primer of Indian Logic* (Madras, 1961³), pp.91f.

¹³²⁷ *dvitvādivyavahārāṇām dvitvādisāmagryaiva nishpattiḥ tattadapekshābuddhivishayatayaiva teshāṃ sphuraṇāt* (Judging from his comment that *apekshābuddhivishayatārūpayā dvitvasāmagryaiva dvitvādivyavahārāṇām nishpattir iti yojanā*, the text on which R comments seems to omit *teshāṃ sphuraṇāt* or, as is suggested by V, omit *sphuraṇāt* and read *teshāṃ* connected with *dvitvādīnām* in the next sentence).

In other words, ‘If you accept that two-ness and so forth are produced from the object of enumerative cognition, let the usage of ‘two’ and so forth be brought about by the apprehension of those particular entities which are but the objects of the enumerative cognition. It is needless to postulate two-ness and so forth (*yādṛśād apekshābuddhivishayād dvitvādyutpattiṃ vadasi tāḍṛśāpekshābuddhivishayavastuviśeshopalambha eva dvitvādivyavahāram ātanotu, kim anena dvitvādikalapanena*)’ [SAS V. 40: 716,5f.].

¹³²⁸ Cf. SAS V. 39: *apekshābuddhiḥ tattatpurushamātranishṭheti tajjanyaṃ dvitvatritvādikam tattatpurushair eva dṛshyate*.

¹³²⁹ According to the *Vaiśeshika*, two *ekatvas* are the *asamavāyikāraṇas* of *dvitva* and *apekshābuddhi* is its *nimittakāraṇa* (R). Cf. NyKan 282,8 [ad PDhS §131, (IV) cited above]: *ekaguṇayor [= ekatvābhyām] asamavāyikāraṇatvam anekavishayāyā buddheḥ [= apekshābuddheḥ] nimitta-*

that the cessation of the usages is caused by mere cessation of the cognition of this kind.

[Obj.] The peculiar cognition is by no means possible without depending upon the two-ness and so on, whether they are real or superimposed.

[Ans.] How is it possible in your position, then **[512]** ?

[Obj.] Due to special potency.

[Ans.] Not so because, [were it the case], you would be forced to deny [the necessity of] the two-ness.

[Obj.] The potency is the prior non-existence of the two-ness and so on.

[Ans.] Not so; for in the presence of all prior non-existences like that of two-ness and that of three-ness, the fixed rule as to which becomes the potency is not established.

[Obj.] The rule is [established] due to being within the range (parigraha) of the particular will of God or the unseen power.

[Ans.] Then, nothing is different [between our opinions].

[Obj.] There is difference: it comes about that the usage [of ‘two’ etc.] has no object [in your position].

[Ans.] Not so since we have already explain [its] object [i.e. enumerative cognition]. **[513]** Moreover, your answer is unsatisfactory [due to the mutual-dependence]: it is not until two-ness and so on are understood by the valid means of knowledge that the prior non-existences of them are assumed to be the assistant causes of them; it is not until these [prior non-existences of two-ness etc.] are understood by the valid means of knowledge that the two-ness and so on are produced respectively in accordance with the fixed order of them.

Thus it is established that number like two-ness is [but] becoming the object of particular cognition.

Now one-ness is examined.¹³³⁰ First, the effected one-ness [which is, kāraṇatvam; also Vyomavatī (2) 33,23f. And it is stated in PDhS §132 [(C) and (d)] that the destruction of apekshābuddhi causes the destruction of dvitva; in this regard, NyKan says: *ḍṛshṭo guṇānāṃ nimittakāraṇavināśād api vināśo yathā mokshaprāptyavasthāyām atyantatattvajñānasya śarīravināśāt* [288,8f.].

¹³³⁰ V asserts that ekatva is examined here because there is different views in the Viśiṣṭādvaita: that is, some hold that it is another non-substance (Cf. NySi 444,1) and the other hold that it is also mere specific knowledge. Cf. TMK V. 42: *aikyaṃ svābhedaṃ āhuḥ katicana, ... anye tv etat svasattvam*

according to the Vaiśeṣikas, produced anew by lots of one-ness belonging to component parts and belongs to the composite whole] cannot be accepted at all. Since we do not accept the whole [as different from its components], its one-ness is by no means possible. The one-ness of a multitude is [figurative] like the one-ness of a heap [of grains].¹³³¹ In fact, even as to the former case [e.g. cloth] people use the word ‘many’ focusing on the parts [e.g. ‘many threads’].

[Obj.] The condition of ‘one’ is produced at the time of gathering and the condition of ‘many’ is [produced] at the time of separation.

[Ans.] Not so since it would lead to the contradiction of difference cum non-difference. As to [‘one’ or ‘many’ as mere] notion, it is justifiable otherwise just from the viewpoint of multitude or division. As for [‘one’ and ‘many’ as] specific nature [of a thing] **[514]**, on the other hand, the contradiction of difference cum non-difference in reality would follow. And we would cognize one thread in the condition of cloth [if the condition ‘one’ were produced anew when threads gather together].

[Obj.] How about the one-ness of the phenomenal world at the time of the dissolution?

[Ans.] Such cannot happen in any way.

[Obj.] Then, it is contradictory to the Śruti.

[Ans.] No, because [their] intention is on the abandonment of difference.

[Obj.] The very [abandonment] is the one-ness.

[Ans.] Not so, because this [abandonment of difference] is in nature the condition of becoming the primordial matter (prakṛitvāvasthā). For instance, when¹³³² [earth] is transformed into such modifications as grass and stone, people begin to use the expression that ‘[they are] different from earth’; when the same are transformed into another modification, people again begin to use the expression that ‘[it is] earth’ [is produced]. But this much means **[515]** neither the mutual one-ness of each part like grass and stone nor [their one-ness] with the earth. What, then? [It means] mere attaining the homogenous condition through abandoning the heterogeneous conditions. That¹³³³ can be said regarding the primordial matter and so on as The different character of ekatva has been already noticed by Kaṇāda [EIPh III: 119]. Cf. VaiSū VII. ii. 1–2.

¹³³¹ Cf. SAS V. 41: samghātaikyam tu rāśivad aupacārikam eva [717,13].

¹³³² °kalāyām, which means °daśāyām according to R. K reports that the reading °daśāyām is found in most MSS.

¹³³³ Hereafter the text runs: evaṃ prakṛtyādāv apīti / cintyaṃ

well.

The one-ness that belongs portionless entities [like atoms] is also to be examined in the same way. Nevertheless, [we define] one-ness as becoming the object of that cognition of a mere entity which is devoid of the cognition of another entity brought together as of equal importance in relation to one and the same verb.¹³³⁴ **[516]** This [definition] can justify even the practical usage that ‘this [is] one, this [is] also one’; for though [the two] are brought together [in this case], [they] are devoid of being in relation with one and the same verb and having the equal importance¹³³⁵ **[517]**. And there is not contradiction to our cognition and so on [which have been pointed by us in proving the difference between dharma and dharmin¹³³⁶], by which we are forced to bear the complication [in postulating one-ness as different from the specific nature of a thing].

Likewise, in the same manner we can account for the number cognized as to [non-substances] like qualities as well even without [postulating niravayavagatam aikyam apy evam / tathāpy ekakriyānvayena, etc.

V entertains doubts about this punctuation: iti should be connected with cintyam etc. and denotes the reason of the next portion because the discussion on ekatva (beginning with 513,3: ekatvaṃ cintyate...) does not end here; the second evam is unnatural because according to TMK V. 41c: asaṃghātarūpe kvacana nirupadhiḥ syād asāv ekasaṃkhyā (Cf. SAS 717,14f.: asaṃghātarūpe paramāṇvādau niupādhir asāv ekatvasaṃkhyā svīkriyate), the ekatva belonging to a niravayavavastu is to be regarded as different from that belonging to multitude. Thus, respecting the original reading, V suggests to read: ... apīti cintyaṃ niravayavagatam aikyam apy evaṃ tathāpi / ekakriyānvayena, etc., which means: ... accordingly, that one-ness belonging to portionless entities which is [still] to be examined is also [regarded as the buddhiviśeshavishayatva] in the following manner (evam) [i.e. ekakriyānvayena etc.], even though (tathāpi) [it is not figurative like that belonging to multitude]. Or rather, V suggests to read: ... apīti cintyaṃ niravayavagatam aikyam / yady apy evam tathāpy ekakriyānvayena, etc.

As to the reading indicated in R: evaṃ cintyam, V guesses that tathāpi is omitted in this case.

¹³³⁴ By ‘equal importance,’ the cognition of color in a pot is excluded; by ‘one and the same verb,’ the cognition ‘this is one, this is one’ is excluded (R).

¹³³⁵ In view of the cognition of the dharma and the dharmin [i.e. one and this], the two are devoid of samaprādhānya; in view of the cognition of the two dharmins [i.e. this¹ and this²], the two are devoid of ekakriyānvayitva (V). R's comment is of the same content.

¹³³⁶ See chap.1: 7,2–16,1.

‘number’ as] another category.¹³³⁷ It is extra for you, though the cognition is same [even] in this case, to postulate difference [between number in substances and that in non-substances].

The¹³³⁸ practical usage in respect to innumerable [entities] also denies number of this kind [i.e. particular numbers from two to maximum (parārdha)]; [never does it denies the number as defined by us, i.e. becoming the object of particular cognition]. Otherwise, it is contradictory even for you [since you admit that enumerative cognition is indispensable for the origination of number]. Although everything is brought together [as the object] for the [enumerative] cognition of [omniscient ones] like God [i.e. all the entities are countable for them], innumerable-ness is in nature infinite¹³³⁹ because there is not any limit like hundred, thousand, ten thousand and so on [518]. Difference in number does exist even between innumerable things: for instance, [that] between past kalpas and the multitude and so on of stars and the like; [that] between individuals having substance-ness, those having earthiness, those having pot-ness and so on.¹³⁴⁰

By the way, it is stated in the Commentary that:

*One-ness is the limitation by number ‘one’ [ŚrīBh I. i. 1: (1) 143,2]. This also does not presuppose the opinion that number is another category. Because [it] intends to show mere undesirable contingency of particularity against those who maintain an entity without any particularity. Even such number as is assumed by us is not different in being particularity.

It is stated in the Ātmasiddhi by Bhagavat Yāmunā-muni that [number] like two-ness is also continuous as long as [its] substratum exists.¹³⁴¹ This is also stated, we think, merely with the intention of frightening the Vaiśeṣika doctrine [that two-ness and so on are destroyed when enumerative cognition

¹³³⁷ The Prābhākaras regard saṃkhyā as a different category so that it can belong to guṇa and so on as well. Cf. TMK V. 44: adraveye 'py asti saṃkhyā vyavahṛtibalaṭaḥ sā tato 'nyā guṇādeḥ.

The number of guṇas has not been satisfactorily explained in the Prācīna-naiyāyika theory and the problem is first resolved by the Navya-naiyāyika theory of paryāpti [EIPh III: 119]. Later, Raghunātha-śiromaṇi also accepts saṃkhyā as another padārtha (Daniel H. H. Ingalls: Materials for the Study of Navya-Nyāya Logic, HOS 40, p.39, n.38).

¹³³⁸ This is the answer to the objection that: If number is but becoming the object of particular cognition, nothing would be innumerable since everything is within the scope of God's knowledge (R).

¹³³⁹ V suggests to read ānantyarūpam for ānantyam.

¹³⁴⁰ The similar expression is found in 53,1f. and 222,8f. and is referred to in 386.

¹³⁴¹ ĀS 77,9ff.

is destroyed] [519].

In fact, Bhagavat Nāthamuni remarks in the seventh section of the prameya-pāda in his Nyāyatattva that:

*Number is that in which conjunction is included [Nyāyatattva], and that:

*Number is of the peculiar nature (tadātmā) of all [entities] [Nyāyatattva].

The meaning of that [previous passage] is said to be that: The relation to particular cognition is practically called ‘number’; and it is but conjunction.¹³⁴² Or rather, we may think, this [passage] is concerned with the one-ness of a multitude.

Varadavishṇu-miśra and others, following the [above-mentioned] description of the Ātmasiddhi, have admitted the number as different [category]. For instance, it is stated that:

*Those [qualities] which exist in perceptible entities, namely, number, size, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness, nearness, fluidity and similarity, are perceptible [].

Further, the existence of number in qualities is mentioned as follows:

*The number existing in qualities are grasped as existing in an entity existing in a thing conjunct¹³⁴³ [to the sense-organ] [].

It is to be thought that such is also said as the opinion of others.

Bhaṭṭa Parāśara-pāda states in connection with the refutation and so on as to manifested-ness (prākāṭya) that:

*Number is first cognized at the second moment¹³⁴⁴ [Tattvaratnākara]; [and that¹³⁴⁵]:

*And there is no contradiction because this number belongs to an inherent thing [Tattvaratnākara],

and so on, where he practically accepts number [as assumed by the Vaiśeṣika]. But we cannot judge whether [the author said so] as accepted by himself or accepted by others since [the portion of the work] in which

¹³⁴² V suggests to add iti after the sentence.

¹³⁴³ Read saṃyuktāśritāśritatvena (which is mentioned in R as a better reading and is, according to K, found in most MSS.) for saṃyuktāśritatvena. If the latter is adopted, it means ‘as indirectly existing in a thing conjunct’ (K) or ‘since quality, which is the substratum of the number, exists in a thing conjunct’ (V).

¹³⁴⁴ That is, the prākāṭya [of dvitva] must be produced at the third moment by the cognition regarding the dvitva, which is produced at the second moment. But, while the dvitva has been destroyed at that time [i.e. the third moment], on what is the prākāṭya produced? (R).

¹³⁴⁵ According to R, the next passage is cited from the other portion.

prameya is discussed has been lost. [520]

Size (parimāṇa) is the object of the notion of size. It is of four sorts: minute (aṇu), big, long and short. All these four kinds of size forms that which is described (nirūpita) by the correlative (pratiyogin); since we understand ‘This is [more] big than that,’ ‘This is [more] minute than that,’ ‘This is [more] long than that,’ ‘[This is more] short [than that]’ and the like.

As to such [size], some hold that there is not size in all-pervasive substances because [they] are understood as immeasurable (aparimita). In fact, Śrīrāma-miśra states in his Vyākhyā ad the Śrī-Vedārthasaṃgraha, when the word ‘infinite¹³⁴⁶ (ananta)’ is commented, as follows— having said that:

*Limitation (pariccheda) in entity is size in entity; limitation in space is its product [VAS-vyākhyā];

and further:

*Non-limitation is not quality [VAS-vyākhyā],

and so forth. And Bhagavat Yāmuna-muni says in the prima facie view of the Āgamaprāmāṇya that:

*It is illustrated here with the example of the size of ether, but it is also but¹³⁴⁷ what is to be examined. Size means delimitation (avaccheda) of space: ‘this much,’ that is to say, being surrounded by [another] entity all around (paritaḥ).¹³⁴⁸ And it cannot exist in ether. If so, why can this [ether] be shown as an example here? [ĀP 6,5–8].

But the others hold that: Because such size as is in the form that ‘this is bigger’ and the like is possible even in this case, size does exist even in those [all-pervasive substances]; the verbal expression ‘immeasurable’ is to reject contracted size.

And such another quality named ‘size’ is accepted by the author of the Vivaraṇa [i.e. Śrīrāma-miśra]. That is, he states in the Vivaraṇa on the section on ‘origination’ as follows:

*Limitation in entity is size of entity; limitation in space is based on it [Vivaraṇa ad ŚrīBh I. i. 2],

and so on.

¹³⁴⁶ The word in VAS §1 (the maṃgala v.1): ... nirmalānantakalyāṇanidhaye ...; or that in §136: ‘satyaṃ jñānam anantaṃ brahma’ [TaiUp II. i. 1] iti nirdeśāt ... aparicchedyatayā ca sakaletaravilakṣaṇam [166,14f.]

¹³⁴⁷ While NySi reads iva, the critical edition of ĀP reads eva without v.l.

¹³⁴⁸ I.e. parito mānaṃ parimāṇam (R).

Now, the other view¹³⁴⁹ is as follows. Size is not another category. To explain — nothing but particular pervasion of an area in the form described by the correlative of each [entity] is the size of each [entity]. And such [pervasion] is admitted even by those who accept [size] as another category. Then, it would be complicated to postulate something other than that. [521]

[Obj.] Firstly, mere conjunction with an area cannot be size since it is over-applicable [to any kind of size]; accordingly, you should admit that [size is] a particular delimited area. And you should admit the delimitation is made not by everything but by that which is qualified by particular size.¹³⁵⁰ So it is inappropriate to deny that [size] by means of the delimitation of an area, for which that [size] is indispensable. Moreover, there would be infinite regress that the size of an area is dependent upon another area.¹³⁵¹ Thus, it is proved that size is another category.

[Ans.] It is not true; for we explain the delimitation as follows. When A can cover a certain area conjunct with B as well as another area at the same time, A has larger size than B; when A cannot cover the whole area conjunct with B at once, A has smaller size than B [522]. Likewise, being larger from the viewpoint of the straightforwardness in one direction is long-ness; being small from the same viewpoint is short-ness.

By the way, [the Vaiśeṣhika conception of] minimum-ness (aṇutva) as different from those¹³⁵² cannot be established since [we have already] denied atoms (aṇu).¹³⁵³ All these four kinds [of size] can exist even in one entity. For instance, as to a particular plant, the practical usages of ‘big,’ ‘small,’ ‘long’ or ‘short’ are found in comparison to another plant.

Such being the case, the size of the delimitating factor, by which there would be defects such as the contradiction to indispensable factor and the infinite regress, is never shown here [in our definition of size].

By the above argument it is explained that there is small-ness and

¹³⁴⁹ This is the author's own opinion (R). In TMK. 45, however, the similar view (deśādhikyādisiddhāv upadhibhir iha tadyuktasamyogād deśavyāptibhedah parimitih) is refuted.

¹³⁵⁰ parimāṇaviśeshaviśiṣṭeṇa. R, though he shows only up to °viśeṣha, comments this reading: mahattvaparimāṇaviśiṣṭāvacchinnadeśasamyogo mahatparimāṇam etc. ; K holds that °viśeṣheṇa is better.

¹³⁵¹ Cf. SAS V. 45: nanu deśair evopādhināṃ parimāṇam astv iti yadi vadasi, tarhi parasparāśrayah: ākāśādideśair upādhidravyaparimāṇam upādhibiḥ cākāśādideśaparimāṇam iti [721,2f.].

¹³⁵² Cf. PPBh §151: tathā cāṇv api dvividham: nityam anityaṃ ca / nityaṃ paramāṇumanahsu, tat pārimāṇ alyam; anityaṃ dvyaṇuka eva.

¹³⁵³ See chap.1: 50,3–60,3. For aṇutva, see also TMK V. 50.

large-ness even in an area. **[523]**

[Obj.] Without the particular size as different from the specific nature of a thing, there would be no difference between the conjunction with something large and that with small.

[Ans.] Not so, since [such difference] is found even in [aggregate objects] like a heap [of grains, which is not accepted as the whole and, therefore, cannot be the substratum of the quality size].¹³⁵⁴

[Obj.] In this case, this [difference] is based on a large number of [its] component parts.

[Ans.] Not so.¹³⁵⁵ Suppose, then, [the difference] is caused by it only in everything.

[Obj.] We find that the size becomes different, though the number of the component parts does not change, when they are loosely conjunct.

[Ans.] True. Still let only the pervasion of this much area be, for [it] is accepted as producing the particular size only through the loose conjunction. In fact, such is found even in powder when it is gathered and spread.

Like [aggregation], large-ness and many-ness¹³⁵⁶ also produce only particular pervasion of an area; since another intermediate other than that is not known.

And it is stated by Bhagavat Yāmuna-muni that:

*Size means delimitation (avaccheda) of space. [ĀP 6,6].

Bhagavat Nāthamuni also says in the seventh section of the prameya-pāda [of his Nyāyatattva] as follows:

*Size is that in which number is included [Nyāyatattva];

and further,

*The long-ness [of something] is [its end] being far [from its start point].

The short-ness is being near.

The wide-ness is being far obliquely.

¹³⁵⁴ Cf. SAS V. 45: saṃghātarūpeṣhu rāśiprabhṛtiṣhu deśasambandhaviśeṣamātram eva parimāṇavyavahārahāraṇam [721,4f.].

¹³⁵⁵ As is pointed out by V, it is better to omit na.

¹³⁵⁶ The Vaiśeṣikas hold that all the four kinds of non-eterenal size are caused by any one of (1) number (e.g. the number of paramāṇus and dvyāṇukas produce the size and the length of a traṇuka and so forth), (2) size (e.g. the large-ness of components produces the size of the composite) and (3) aggregation (pracaya).

The logic explained so far regarding (3) can be applied to (2) and (1) as well (R).

The narrow-ness is being near obliquely.

The straightforward-ness is its part existing on the end of its own [another] part [524].

The curved-ness is its part existing [in any way¹³⁵⁷] on its own [another] part.

The circle-ness is that the far-ness and near-ness of the final part in one direction from the final part in the opposite direction [i.e. the length of the diameter] is uniform.

The square-ness is that the far-ness and near-ness [of the last part in one direction of the cardinal points¹³⁵⁸] from the last part in the opposite direction of the cardinal points (kevala) [i.e. the length of each side] and that of the last part in one direction of the intermediate points from the last part in the opposite [i.e. the length of each diagonal] are [respectively] uniform [Nyāyatattva].

We may omit the following some items; then, it is stated that:

*The large-ness is the pervasion of many [areas].

The small-ness (mandatva) is its non-existence [Nyāyatattva].

Further, he mentions the specific nature of size in general (or quantity) common to everything, say, space, time, number, height and so on, that:

*Size is of the peculiar nature (tadātmā) of all [entities¹³⁵⁹] [Nyāyatattva].

The point thereof is as follows. Size is of three kinds: length (āyāma), breadth (vistāra) and thickness (ghana). And it culminates in the east and the west, the north and the south, or upwards and downwards accordant with possibility. Among all these three pairs of direction, that in which there is excess is length; that in which there is moderateness is breadth; that in which there is shortage is thickness. As to these three [kinds of size], there are various kinds of practical usage due to the difference in the degree of [their] mixture. In all-pervasive substances there is no size if its fullness is taken into consideration; if its various delimitating factors are taken into consideration, there is the [metaphorical] usage [of the word size], as the case may be. [525]

Separateness (pṛthaktva) is, according to the Vaiśeshika¹³⁶⁰ and other

¹³⁵⁷ svāmśasya svāmśasthiṭḥ. V suggests to read pārsve after svāmśasya. K comments: yathākathamcid iti śeshah.

¹³⁵⁸ Following R, supply kevalaviruddhadigantāmśānām.

¹³⁵⁹ Cf. the definition of number cited in above 519,2.

¹³⁶⁰ See PDhS §161: pṛthaktvam apoddhāravayahārakāraṇam. But the Navya regards it as anyonyābhāva; see NyK 508: atra navyāḥ (= Dīdidhikārāḥ) Mīmāṃsakāḥ [Cf. MMU II, guṇa, 8] cāhuḥ— pṛthaktvam anyonyābhāva

schools, another quality that is the cause of the usage ‘separate.’ But it cannot be distinguished from difference (bheda) in general, since the notion [of ‘separate’] culminates in that much. And what [they assume as] making us postulate it is, [as we shall show later], interpreted otherwise. Moreover, we never find that [the word ‘separate’] is used along with the word ‘different (bhinna).¹³⁶¹ And it is experienced that the notion and the usage of ‘separateness,’ having the same limit as that of ‘difference,¹³⁶² are concerned with not only substances but also non-substances.¹³⁶³

[Obj.] This [notion as to non-substances] is misconception.

[Ans.] Not so, since nothing sublates it.

[Obj.] Suppose the quality that [we] call separateness is the content of the word ‘difference.’

[Ans.] It is not acceptable, since this [content] can be accounted for as a result of such [character of a thing] as the specific nature, the configuration, blue, yellow and other [colors].¹³⁶⁴ For the word ‘difference’ as to all these [mutually different items] is etymologically derived because of the limiting adjunct of the notion ‘not synonymous’ as, for example, the word ‘specific nature’ [as to different items is etymologically derived because of the limiting adjunct of the notion ‘the unique character’]. And the very [difference as to the specific nature etc.] is mutual non-existence **[526]**.

[Obj.] In the [negative expression] that ‘A is not B (idam idam nāsti),’ mutual non-existence is known, [unlike separateness], as not described by the limit.¹³⁶⁵

eva, na tu guṇāntaram iti (Gadādhari, vyutpattivāda) (Dinakarī, guṇa).

¹³⁶¹ Cf. SAS V. 51: yadi pṛthaktvam asādhāraṇadharmarūpatvād bhedād anyat, tarhi tadvācakaśabdasya bhedavācakaśabdena sāmānādhikaraṇyaṃ prasajyate; na ca tathopalambhyate: na hi pṛthag ity uktvā bhinnam iti vadanti, bhinnam iti coktvā pṛthag ity vā [725,14–16].

¹³⁶² bhedāvadhyaavadhikatayā. Cf. SAS V. 51: yad bhinnam iti vyavahriyate, tad eva pṛthag iti; yat pṛthag iti, tad evetarad iti ca vyavahriyate [725,10]. According to the second interpretation of R (= K), here avadhi means pratiyogin. The similar usage of the word avadhi is found in TMK V. 51c: nāpy ajñātāvadhīnāṃ pṛthag idam iti dhīḥ. Cf. Kāśikā ad P 1. 4. 24 (dhruvam apāye 'pādānam): dhruvaṃ yad apāyayuktam apāye sādhye yad avadhibhūtaṃ tat kārakam apādānasañjñāṃ bhavati.

¹³⁶³ Cf. SAS V. 51: na ca pṛthag iti dhīr dravya eva niyatā, guṇādīnām api pṛthaktvenopalambhāt [725,1].

¹³⁶⁴ Cf. SAS V. 51: kiṃca bhedaś ca nilapītādir asādhāraṇo dharmo evābhimataḥ [725,11f.].

¹³⁶⁵ The similar discussion to prove that pṛthaktva is another guṇa is

[Ans.] This cannot [negate our position], since such happens due to the particular word [i.e. pṛthak].¹³⁶⁶

[Obj.] Pāṇini means that the fifth case [is introduced] when synonyms for the word *anya* (other than), which denotes the quality called separateness, are related.¹³⁶⁷

[Ans.] Why [doesn't the word *anya* denote mutual non-existence]?

[Obj.] If [he] intended synonyms for mutual non-existence, even the usage that 'ghaṭāt paṭo na bhavati' would result. **[527]**

[Ans.] Not so, because there is the particularity that [the fifth case is introduced] when [synonyms of *anya*] culminate in that which has the quality (*dharmin*).¹³⁶⁸

[Obj.] How [do you justify] if separate-ness is indicated [e.g. *ghaṭāt paṭasya pṛthaktvam*]?

[Ans.] It does not matter, since [the quality separate-ness] first describes that which has the quality and, then, informs us the quality. On the other hand, [negative particles] like *a*, *mā*, *no* and *na*, having the sense of non-existence (*asattva*),¹³⁶⁹ do not require the limit (or the counter-correlative).

Or rather, the limit in the case of these [negative particles] is shown in the same case ending **[528]**.

Thus, it is established that separateness is but difference in general.

Again, it is stated by Bhaṭṭa Parāśara-pāda, immediately after explaining difference, that:

*Likewise those dharmas which have been already postulated, namely, substance, quality and action, could completely explain distinct¹³⁷⁰ notions, verbal usages (*vyavahāra*) and conducts (*vyavahāra*); accordingly, we do not need postulate another quality named difference found in Kir §161, *Nyāyalīlāvati*, ChSS, pp.368–72, *Tārīkarakshā* v.45.

¹³⁶⁶ See P 2. 3. 32: *pṛthak-vinā-nānābhis tṛṭiyā 'nyatarasyām [+ pañcamī (28)]*.

¹³⁶⁷ See P 2. 3. 29: *anya-ārat-itara-ṛte-dikśabda-añcU-uttarapada-āC-āhi-yukte*, and the *Kāśikā* on it (cited by R): *anya ity arthagrahaṇam, anyārthayoge pañcamīty arthaḥ*.

¹³⁶⁸ According to R: *anyārthayoga eva pañcamyā vidhānād anyaśabdasya ca dharmiparyantatvāt, idam idaṃ nāstīty atra nañāś cānyonyābhāvamātraviśrantatvena dharmiparyantatvābhāvān na pañcamī*.

¹³⁶⁹ Cf. P 1. 4. 57: *cādayaḥ [nipātāḥ (56)] asattve*.

¹³⁷⁰ *apunarukta*, literally, 'non-repeated.'

that has not [been postulated] previously. For the same reason, particular separateness¹³⁷¹ and the like, which are postulated by the Vaiśeṣikas, are also cast away [529] [Tattvaratnākara?], and so on. Further, in refuting the dilemma as to whether difference belongs to one thing or many [or different] things,¹³⁷² he says:

*For we clearly perceive the very two different things that have blueness and whiteness [e.g. a blue pot and a white pot] as differentiating between the thing that has the quality blue and the thing that has the quality white.¹³⁷³

Those who postulate [the difference between the two] depending upon particular separateness and the like must be afraid of such [defect that has been pointed out by you] as self-dependence [and the mutual-dependence, since the particular separateness etc. are dependent upon difference¹³⁷⁴]; we, who accept what is seen (dṛṣṭavādin), are not [afraid of such defect] [Tattvaratnākara?].

Thus, the peculiar nature and the qualifying attribute [of differentiated things] are denoted, as the case may be, by the word ‘separate (pṛthak)’ or the word ‘different (bhinna)’.¹³⁷⁵

¹³⁷¹ E.g. dvi-pṛthaktva (the pṛthaktva that, as dvitva, belong to two different entities, say, ‘dve pṛthak’), tri-pṛthaktva etc. (R). Cf. Tarkakaumudī (cited in NyK 508): dvi-pṛthaktvādi ca nānaikapṛthaktvavishayakāpekshā-buddhijanyaṃ tannāśanāśyaṃ ceti sarvam anityam eva. For further discussion on dvi-pṛthaktva etc., see Kir §162, NyL 372,4–374,2.

¹³⁷² I.e. Does difference belong to one thing or different things? Not the former, since it would be contradictory [to the concept of difference]; nor the latter, because the defect of ātmāśraya would result if this [difference] is dependent upon itself and because a single entity could not belong to two things without partial difference [i.e. difference could not be in two things without other difference] (R).

¹³⁷³ There is the doubt that if the difference between a blue pot and a white pot were the two peculiar colors of each [pot], it would violate our knowledge that single difference is described by the two entities, i.e., ‘there is difference between the two’; the doubt is removed by force of the knowledge in the form of the perception which grasps the very peculiar qualities of each [pot] form differences. Our knowledge as to the oneness, i.e., ‘there is difference between a pot and a cloth,’ is like [that of] the peculiar nature (svarūpa) of a pot and a cloth (R).

¹³⁷⁴ I follow the interpretation of R (= K); while V divides the compound viśeshapṛthaktvādisāpeksham into viśeshapṛthaktvādi sāpeksham and holds that the viśeṣa is not the adjective of the pṛthaktva but means the fifth category because Parāśara does not say pṛthaktvaviśeṣhādi (fn.1).

¹³⁷⁵ Cf. TMK V. 13: dharmāḥ kvāpi svarūpaṃ kvacid iti ca yathādṛṣṭi.

In addition, it is also stated in the seventh section of the prameya-pāda of the Nyāyatattva as follows:

*Difference is of two sorts: atireka and vyatireka [Nyāyatattva]. Here atireka means such quality as does not exist in another dharmin; vyatireka means the peculiar nature of a dharma, a dharmin and so on.

As to the passage in the same section that:

*Oneness is perfect conjunction; difference is its non-existence [Nyāyatattva],
this ['difference'] means disjunction. **[530]**

The other schools [like the Vaiśeshika] hold that disjunction (vibhāga) is [another] quality opposite to conjunction.¹³⁷⁶ But it is not true, because the destruction of conjunction is brought about only by such [actions] as pushing and splitting. It is possible for those [actions] which are accepted as producing disjunction to destroy that [conjunction].¹³⁷⁷

[Obj.] It is impossible for such actions and [the unseen power] as are favorable for being similar to those [actions and the rest] which produce

The alternative of svarūpa and dharma is used in the mahāpūrvapaksha of ŚrīBh in order to deny bheda: bhedas tāvan na vastusvarūpam... nāpi dharmah... [I. i. 1: (1) 97,5–98,5]. This is based on the assertion in Brahmasiddhi, chap.2, esp. pp.47ff. (also Sambandhavārttika, vv.917–86, Ishtasiddhi, GOS ed., pp.2–24); judging from Deśika's interpretation of the Nyāyatattva cited below, Nāthamuni also knows this alternative. Deśika refutes this alternative in ŚDū, vāda 13 also. See Srinivasa Chari 1988: 32–35; Mesquita, Erkentniss, S.119–28.

¹³⁷⁶ saṃyogavirodhī guṇo vibhāgaḥ. Cf. Kir 152,20: saṃyogavighātakogūṇo vibhāgaḥ (TarS §28: saṃyoganāśako guṇo vibhāgaḥ). For the reason why TarS does not accept such definition as is found in PDhS (vibhāgo vibhaktapratyayanimitam [§182]), see Athalye's Notes to TarS, p.166.

It is to be noted here that some logicians denied vibhāga as another guṇa even at the time of Vācaspati Miśra and that Bhāsarvajña clearly denied it (Nyāyabhūṣaṇa, pp.161f.), which was criticized by Udayana (Kir 151,10–152,2) and by Vallabha in detail (Nyāyalīlavatī, ChSS, pp.849–58); cf. EIPh II: 122–23.

¹³⁷⁷ Cf. SAS V. 56: saṃyogavināśakatvena vibhāgaṃ svīkurma iti cet tan na, saṃyogavināśasya vibhāgakāraṇatvena kalpitāt karmaṇa eva siddhiḥ syāt [730,2–4]. The same discussion is found in the Nyāyabhūṣaṇa: karmaṇa eva saṃyoganivartakatvāt [161,5] etc., which is paraphrased by Udayana as follows: karmaiva saṃyogavināśakam astu; tasmin sati tannivṛttidarśanāt, anvayavyatirekagamyatvāc ca vastusāmarthyasya. na hi guṇāntarasyāpi guṇavināśakatve 'nyat pramāṇam asti [Kir 151,10f.].

conjunction¹³⁷⁸ to destroy it [as well].

[Ans.] You cannot say so; since [conjunctions with fire] are admitted to destroy color and other [qualities] even if they are similar to such conjunction with fire as is accepted as producing [these] color and others. Nothing is wrong if an individual that is produced by A is destroyed by A, not to mention another [individual that is not produced by A].

[Obj.] A certain quality is postulated as producing the sound of split things like a pot.¹³⁷⁹

[Ans.] Not so. For even in this case it is possible for those [actions] like splitting which produce the disjunction to produce that [sound]; and [in opinion] such [an action] is in the nature of a kind of conjunction.¹³⁸⁰

In addition, the notion ‘[two things are] disjunct’ can be understood as having the non-existence of the conjunction [between the two] as the object **[531]**.

[Obj.] If [disjunction were mere non-existence of conjunction], there should be the notion ‘disjunct’ even between Mt. Meru and the Vindhya Range.

[Ans.] Not so, because that [which forms the object of the notion ‘disjunct’] is in the nature of annihilative non-existence (pradhvaṃsa) [of conjunction].¹³⁸¹ And even in this case, some may entertain the notion ‘disjunct’ based on mere non-existence of the conjunction; you also interpret this [notion] as metaphorical. That notion ‘disjunct’ in some cases [e.g. between a pot and cloth even when they are conjunct, between color and taste etc.] which is based on difference in specific nature is to be justified in

¹³⁷⁸ saṃyogajanakajāṭīyatvādinānukūlasya karmādeḥ. I follow the interpretation of R that here ādi denotes the same function of the adṛṣṭa; while, according to K, it denotes ‘destroying the conjunction with [each] preceding part which is opposite to the conjunction with [each] succeeding part’.

¹³⁷⁹ Cf. PDhS §182: śabdavibhāgahetuś ca.

¹³⁸⁰ Although Deśika admits two different views as to karman, namely, that it is a kind of saṃyoga and that it is another category (see below 543,1), the present passage seems to indicate that the former is his favorite. In this connection, V shows another interpretation presupposing the latter opinion (fn.1).

¹³⁸¹ tasya vidhvaṃsātmakatvāt. This reading is adopted by VDG, M, V in parenthesis and H, while R reads tasya vidhvaṃsātmakatvābhāvāt and V adopts it (the printed reading °tvābhāvāt must be a simple misprint). K comments both the readings. In the latter reading, tasya denotes the non-existence of conjunction between Meru and Vindhya.

the same manner.

[Obj.] Disjunction, which is momentary,¹³⁸² cannot possibly be in the nature of annihilative non-existence, which is continuous.

[Ans.] Your discussion is not proper. For there is no valid means to know its momentariness apart from [your] technical concept [i.e. disjunction], because the notion ‘A is disjunct from B’ can [remain] till the next conjunction [of the two] so long as, say, we remember the counter-relative [B].

[Obj.] If [disjunction] were in the nature of annihilative non-existence, the knowledge ‘[A is] disjunct [from B]’ would [still] exist even when [the two] are conjunct again [because the annihilative non-existence of the previous conjunction between the two is present even at that time].

[Ans.] Not so; since even in your position it comes about that the notion ‘non-conjunct’ [still] exist [at that time], because the non-existence of the previous conjunction is present.¹³⁸³

[Obj.] Every time conjunction that has been produced is destroyed, we entertain the notion of that [‘non-disjunct’] whose counter-correlative is each [conjunction] alone **[532]**.

[Ans.] [We also reject your objection] in the same way.¹³⁸⁴

[Obj.] It is appropriate that disjunction is a quality [since] it is, like conjunction, understood as existing in two substances.

[Ans.] Oh, what a great Vaiśeshika you are! For you insist so though [the Vaiśeshikas also] admit that such [antecedent or annihilative] non-existence as is present in the substratum where the counter-correlative [will exist or existed] is, by nature, combined [with the other substrata of the counter-correlative] as well¹³⁸⁵ **[533]**. In fact, you must accept the notion

¹³⁸² Cf. PDhS §193: vināśas tu sarvasya vibhāgasya kṣaṇikatvād uttarasamyogāvadhīsadbhāvāt kṣaṇika iti etc.

¹³⁸³ Cf. TMK V. 56: tvannirdiṣṭe vibhāge gatavati ca satoḥ syāt vibhaktapratītir bhūyaḥsamyogasiddhau.

¹³⁸⁴ Cf. SAS V. 56: bhūyaḥsamyogapradhvamsakāle tasyaiva samyogasya pradhvamsena tasminn eva kāle vibhaktapratītir astīti mamāpi samānam [730,11f.].

¹³⁸⁵ yad abhāvasya pratiyogyādhāriṇaḥ svato militatvam abhyupagachatām evam abhimanyase. I adopt the reading commented by K and translate it almost in the line of K (for abhyupagachatām, I follow the second interpretation of V: anādare vā shashṭhī, tadanādaraṇān mahāvaiśeshikatvam). Though VDG, Pan, M and H add avagraha before milita° and it is supported by R, I cannot adopt the reading because it would make the interpretation more roundabout and, moreover, R seems to read this

that the annihilative non-existence of conjunction is present in the two things [which were conjunct] because it has the counter-correlative [i.e. the conjunction] that [was] present in both. [And in some cases, the notion] ‘non-conjunct’ is caused by the anterior non-existence of conjunction.

[Obj.] In your opinion, the annihilative non-existence of something is but the existence of another; that is, you accept disjunction in another term.

[Ans.] Not so, because [the non-existence of one conjunction] is merely in the nature of another conjunction and the like.

[Obj.] How do you explain that an entity is contradictory to another entity of the same kind, [in other words, why is the preceding conjunction oppose to the succeeding one]?

[Ans.] Don't forget this question till non-existence is explained.¹³⁸⁶

As to the notion [of disjunction], the same content is produced in [various words like] ‘disconnected (viyukta),’ ‘disunited (vighaṭita),’ ‘separated (viśliṣṭa),’ ‘having destructed conjunction (vinashtasamyoga),’ ‘disjunct (vibhakta),’ ‘removed (viprakṛṣṭa),’ and ‘belonging to another part (deśāntaragata)’ [534].

Keeping all these in mind, [Nāthamuni] says in the seventh section of the prameya-pāda of the Nyāyatattva that:

*Disjunction (viyoga) cannot be said [as another quality] [Nyāyatattva].

He says even in the following portion of the same [work] that:

*Conjunction is complete proximity; disjunction is farness [Nyāyatattva].

[Obj.] It would follow that conjunction is also negated by this [word ‘proximity’ as disjunction is negated by the word ‘farness’].

[Ans.] Proximity can be explained only as ‘being in the nature of the conjunction with a proximate place’; such being the case, there is no difference between that which [is assumed by you to be] a substitute [for conjunction, i.e. proximity] and the substituent [i.e. conjunction] in proving conjunction. Farness is also but conjunction with a particular place. Thus there is no disjunction as another [quality].

Other [schools] hold that remoteness (paratva) and nearness (aparatva) is qualities causing the notion of ‘remote’ and [that of] ‘near’ [respectively] portion differently. That is, R's comment runs: ‘svato 'militatām iti. amilitatvam anubhayavṛttitvam. vastuto 'nubhayavṛttitvam abhimanyase kim ity arthaḥ,’ from which V guesses the reading: ... svato 'militatām kim abhimanyase. Anyway, the text seems to be a little confused syntactically;

in relation to space and time. [But we hold that] both are not different from a particular spatial or temporal relation [535] because it is simpler.¹³⁸⁷

[Obj.] How can we perceive the conjunction with imperceptible [entity like space and time]?

[Ans.] You are not right since we have already explained that both time and space are perceptible.¹³⁸⁸ You assume that spatial or temporal relation delimited by a certain condition (upādhi) produces remoteness and nearness; such [relation] of this kind [directly] forms, in our opinion, the object of our verbal usages [‘remote’ and ‘near’].¹³⁸⁹ Hence, there is no room for the over-application.¹³⁹⁰ Moreover, if you postulate the other qualities simply because of the notion of ‘remote’ and that of ‘near’ though the verbal usages can be justified [without them], it comes about that you should postulate similar qualities even in respect to such [verbal usages] as (1) higher and lower genus (parāparajāti), (2) higher and lower size (parāparapariṃāṇa), (3) higher and lower knowledge (parāparajñāna) and (4) [higher K still finds some difficulty in interpreting the passage and suggests to read svato militatvam abhyupagataṃ nābhimanyase or ... abhyupagacchann evam abhimanyase.

¹³⁸⁶ Unfortunately the portion discussing abhāva in NySi has been lost.

¹³⁸⁷ According to the Vaiśeṣikas, paratva and aparatva are produced depending upon the apekshābuddhi whose object is sannikṛṣṭatva (= saṃyuktasaṃyogālpatva or ādityaparivartanālpatva) or viprakṛṣṭatva (= saṃyuktasaṃyogabhūyastva or ādityaparivartanabhūyastva) [See PDhS §§202f. and NyK or Kir thereon]. Such being the case, it is simpler to regard paratva and aparatva as being the object of the apekshābuddhi because we never find paratva and aparatva over and above this relation and because it is complicated if we postulate that which is not required (apekshābuddhivishayarūpatvam antareṇādihikaparatvāparatvayor adarśanād anapekshitakalpane gauravāc ca apekshābuddhivishayabhāva eva paratvāparatve staḥ) [SAS V. 58: 732,10f.].

It is to be noted here that Bhāsarvajña does not accept paratva-apatva for the same reason (Nyāyabhūṣaṇa, p.162). Udayana rejects his view in Kir 164,1ff.

¹³⁸⁸ For time, see 137,1–141,8; for space, see the fragment of Varadaviṣṇu in 148,12–149,2.

¹³⁸⁹ Cf. SAS V. 58: kālakṛtaparatvāpatve sūryaparivṛṭtyādibhedena kālādihikyādimātrāt param aparam iti pratyayau staḥ. dikṛtaparatvāparatve saṃyuktasaṃyogālpīyastvabhūyastvamātrāt paratvāparatvabuddhī bhavataḥ. itham anyathāsiddhau buddhivyavahārau samadhikaparatvāparatve vidhātum na śaknuyātām [732,11–14].

and lower] potency, since there is no difference.

[Obj.] In those cases, we can explain them through (1) existing in more [entities] and existing less [entities], (2) delimitating wider space and delimitating smaller space and [(3) having more objects and having less objects].

[Ans.] We have said that even in these cases [i.e. remoteness and nearness] we can justify those [verbal usages] through relation to much space and that to little space, that to much time and little time. You also explain that [directions] like east-ness and west-ness or [temporal distinctions] like past-ness and future-ness are in the form of mere conjunction with space and time¹³⁹¹ **[536]**. Then, what kind of difference do you find in these [remoteness and nearness], due to which you are eager to postulate the other quality¹³⁹²?

[Obj.] Without remoteness and nearness, we could hardly explain the abundance and the scantiness of the conjunction of something conjunct [with our sense-organs].

[Ans.] Were it the case, there would be mutual-dependence. That is to say, those two [i.e. the abundance and the scantiness] which are described [or understood] distinctively are the efficient causes of the remoteness and the nearness; the remoteness and the nearness which are produced from these [abundance and scantiness] describe them.

[Obj.] Those [abundance and scantiness] which are not described [or which are not understood distinctively] produce [the remoteness and the nearness] **[537]**.¹³⁹³

[Ans.] It comes about that, for instance, stars and the moon are also apprehended so [i.e. as remote and near respectively].¹³⁹⁴

¹³⁹⁰ That paratva and aparatva are confused (K). Cf. Kir 165,4f.: yadi hi dikpiṅ asaṃyogāt paratvam aparatvaṃ cotpadyate, sarvatra sarvatdā sarvathotpadyeta, aviśeshāt.

¹³⁹¹ The apekshābuddhi which is assumed by the Vaiśeshika as the cause of paratva and aparatva occurs only between two things existing in one direction (ekasyāṃ diśy avasthitayoḥ piṅ ayoh) or in the present (vartamānakālayoh) [PDhS §§202f.].

¹³⁹² Cf. SAS V. 58: kiṃca kālena pūrvaḥ paścādbhāvī vartata iti deśenāpi prāgbhāvī paścādbhāvītyādivyavahārāḥ sahasraśo 'pi dṛśyante. na ca tatra guṇabhedā bhavadbhir api kalpyante. kevalaṃ deśakālasambandhamātreṇa vyavahāraviśeshāḥ pratīyanta iti hi bhavanto 'pi vadanti. tad anyatrāpi na daṅ avāritam [732,17–733,1].

¹³⁹³ Cf. Kir 165,8–10: saṃyuktasaṃyogālpavabahutvalakṣaṇayoḥ sannikṛṣṭatva-viprakṛṣṭatvayor apekshābuddhiviśeshayoś ca svakāraṇād

[Obj.] Not so because we never [actually] grasp the gap [between stars and the moon] as they are [too] far.

[Ans.] Then, give up [the idea that the abundance and the scantiness] in reality (sattayā) cause [remoteness and nearness]. That means what we desire is established.

As to the statement of Śrī Viṣṇucitta in his Prameyasamgraha that:
*You may argue ‘How about a distant [object]?,’ but [the above-mentioned¹³⁹⁵] is quite all right [even] in this case. In fact, we perceive all that are fit for sense-organs including such [qualities] as size, separateness, spatial and temporal remoteness and nearness as well as the form (rūpa) distinct from other [entities], say, the sun and ether [Prameyasamgraha],

nor does it intend [remoteness and nearness as] independent principles; it only intends that [perception] is related to qualified [entities]. And that [an entity] is qualified [by remoteness or nearness] is satisfactorily justified even in the way we have explained. Therefore, you cannot say that it teaches independent principles simply because they are referred to [individually]. For it is stated in the same work as follows:

*[Even] doubts in darkness as to, for instance, whether [a present tall object] is a pillar, a demon, a man or a woman are of this kind [i.e. doubts as to the distinction from some specific entities]. In fact, it cannot be said that at night we do not know even the distinction from such [evident entities] as the sun, a light, the earth, ether and ourselves **[538]**. For we never confuse one who see with that which is seen except for the misconception regarding the self as the body [Prameyasamgraha].

Why can a pillar, a demon etc. form independent categories owing to their being referred to individually here? Or rather, [the above] expression is based on the opinion of other schools or a sect of ours; still there is no defect, since it intends to teach the apprehension of a qualified [entity].

Now action (karma) [is explained]. Action is the object of the notion of movement (calana).

It is perceptible since we apprehend so regarding [the parts of our body] like palm.

Still it is not inferable because it would not be established [if it were inferable]. That is, [such] product [of action as conjunction and disjunction, which you regard as the inferential mark of action], can be explained merely utpatteḥ svapramāṇāt pratiteś ca parasparānapekshatvān na parasparāśrayadoshaḥ.

¹³⁹⁴ The star-orbit (maṅ ala) is further than the moon as is known from VID II, 7, 6 (D)

through the sufficient condition of action that is accepted by both [of us]. Further, [such inference] would lead to over-application. That is, from the conjunction between a mountain and a cloud, which is product [of action], we could infer action even on the part of the mountain.

[Obj.] This conjunction is produced from one of the two.

[Ans.] What proves it? What establishes the rule that this [conjunction] is produced from the action of the cloud even in this case?

[Obj.] Our [direct] apprehension regarding the cloud and the mountain as moving and not moving [respectively] does.

[Ans.] It follows that what we desire, [i.e. the perceptibility of action], is admitted.

[Obj.] Action is inferred from conjunction [with one place] preceded by disjunction [with another].

[Ans.] Were it the case, we could infer action on the part of the mountain which is conjunct with one cloud having been disjunct with another cloud [539]. Moreover, if action were inferred after the product takes place and is known to us and concluded to be pervaded [by action], we could not have present understanding like ‘it is moving’; because [the inferential knowledge] would be accomplished after delay. In our opinion, however, [action] is related to our sense-organs the moment [it] enters into existence and apprehension is possible just for this reason even in this case as in the case of other categories.

Thus, [action] is mostly perceptible if [it] is fit for perception and it forms the object of the notion of moving.

There is different opinions in our sect: some hold that it is in the nature of conjunction preceded by disjunction, which is acceptable for everyone; others hold that [action] is something else being the cause of this [conjunction preceded by disjunction].

Of them, the former view is as follows.

Suppose that what is regarded [by the Naiyāyikas] as the cause of action (for instance, volition and the unseen power) produces only conjunction preceded by disjunction, which is regarded [by them] as the product of that [action]. We never distinctly apprehend anything in-between, by which [our reproach as to] complication [in postulating action] could be refuted.¹³⁹⁶ Although there is conjunction preceded by disjunction between the moon and a star, we do not entertain a notion that they move since we do not

¹³⁹⁵ Here the author tries to prove that perception in general has an object which is qualified by distinction from others (R).

¹³⁹⁶ Cf. SAS 775,6f.: yā khalu deśāntaraprāptiḥ karmajanyeti pareshām

apprehend immediate succession of a series of the conjunction. For instance, you also admit that even if something is wandering, you never entertain a notion that it wanders in each moment but you [entertain the notion] when you consider [each action] as successive. Likewise you should be satisfied even in this case [of the moon and a star].

[Obj.] The difference [between conjunction and action] is established because of the distinct designation that ‘It is conjunct by action.’

[Ans.] Not so. Because what is denoted by the word ‘action,’ which is nothing but separation from a preceding conjunction, produces a following conjunction and, hence, the difference [between the action and the following conjunction] is possible [540].

[Obj.] It comes about that if the following conjunction is continuous, the notion ‘it moves’ persists until this [conjunction] is destroyed.¹³⁹⁷

[Ans.] Not so, because [the notion of] action is [concerned with] either the very moment when conjunction preceded by disjunction is produced or a successive series of that [conjunction] which is momentary. [541]

And it is stated in the first chapter of the Nyāyatattva that:

*If [you assert] that such [actions] as going and cooking are known as momentary, It is not true. In fact they are not momentary because they are particular conjunction [preceded by] disjunction [Nyāyatattva],

and so on. And it is stated in the second chapter that:

*‘Going’ means attainment from one place to another [Nyāyatattva].

It is stated incidentally in the pramāṭṛ-pāda that:

*We hold that action is perceptible [Nyāyatattva],

and says the author:

*Therefore, we do not regard attainment from one place to another as the inferential mark [of action]; on the contrary, we hold that this [attainment] itself is that [action] because postulation is simpler [Nyāyatattva],

and so on.

However, Bhaṭṭa Parāśara pāda says that:

*That which is known is called an object (artha) because it is attained (aryamāṇa) by sense-organs.¹³⁹⁸ Object is of four kinds: substance, genus, quality and action [Tattvaratnākara];

and that:

*As to genus, quality and action, [the sense-relation called] ‘inherence ishṭā, na punas tadariktaṃ karmopalabhyata iti bhāvaḥ; lāghavaṃ cātra kāraṇam.

¹³⁹⁷ yāvat tadvināśakālam. For the usage of yāvat and the accusative form, see P 2. 1. 8 and 2. 3. 8. R reports the v.l. tadvināśakālam yāvat.

in what is inherent in a thing which is conjunct' is possible when if we accept generality [e.g. going-ness in a moving cows conjunct with eyes] [Tattvaratnākara], and so on. But [it should be regarded as intending the opinion of other schools] as the statement of the same author in which generality, which is included [in a particular configuration], is listed separately. In fact, that is why the very author says as follows:

*That¹³⁹⁹ particular dharmas which is essential to the dharmin, i.e. substance, is genus; [that specific dharma which is] established [as] particularizing the [entity] animated by this [genus] is quality (guṇa); [that specific dharma which is] to be established of this kind is action; that which is qualified by these [three] is substance. These are most rough definitions; we will explain them in detail in [the portion] on prameyas¹⁴⁰⁰ [Tattvaratnākara]. [542]

The other view is as follows.

Action is not mere conjunction preceded by disjunction; because it comes about that we entertain the notion of moving as to a mountain which was disjunct with one cloud and is conjunct with another or with the same cloud again.

[Obj.] Conjunction and disjunction [of something] with a certain position [i.e. its substratum] are called action.

[Ans.] Not so, since it comes about that we entertain the notion of moving as to a fish which is fallen into a powerful stream but keeps unshaken.¹⁴⁰¹

[Obj.] The stream cannot be a position; ether, the earth and the like [can be so].

[Ans.] [Not so¹⁴⁰²] because attainment to a position and verbal usage [regarding it] are not different even in these cases.

¹³⁹⁸ I.e. artha = ṛ + thaN. See Uṇādisūtra II. 4: ushI-kushI-gā-ṛtibhyas thaN.

¹³⁹⁹ For the detail of the meaning of this passage, see NySi 418,4–7, where this description has been given by our author as an example of the definitions of jāti etc. with some comments. The similar description is found also in SAS V. 112.

¹⁴⁰⁰ Which had been lost; see above 519,10.

¹⁴⁰¹ In this case, the substratum of the fish, namely, the flowing water of the river, is not constant; accordingly, the fish is always disjunct with one water and is conjunct with another. See SAS V. 107: na hi jalapravāhas-thiravapushi matsye santataṃsamāgacchatpravāhasambabdhe 'pi karma-pratītiḥ [775,7f.].

[Obj.] Conjunction and disjunction with a steady position are called action.

[Ans.] It follows that action is established as different [from conjunction and disjunction] because the distinction between a steady thing and an unsteady one can be explained [only] through something different from conjunction and [disjunction].

And it is stated by Varadavishṇu Miśra in the Mānayāthātmyanirṇaya immediately after defining perception that:

*And this [perception] is concerned with substance, quality and action; because all the entities (padārtha) are included in these three. Of them, substance is defined as ‘that which has conjunction’; quality is defined as ‘that which has no conjunction while it is different from action’ [Mānayāthātmyanirṇaya],

and so on. The same author states that action is perceptible in the other portion that:

*But action which exists in visible substance is visible [Mānayāthātmyanirṇaya],
and so on. **[543]**

According to us, it does not matter whether that [action] is different from conjunction and [disjunction] or not.¹⁴⁰³ Yet we assert that it is not proper to introduce the third category (koṭi) [as different from either substance or quality]. For anything can be defined [as an independent item] by means of the negation of that which is accepted [as not included¹⁴⁰⁴].

[Obj.] That which has neither an effect in the form of conjunction nor that in the form of disjunction, while having generality, is quality¹⁴⁰⁵ [— which does define quality as different from action].

[Ans.] You are not right. For if we give the definition ‘that in which both of these [effects] are non-existent and both “producing something

¹⁴⁰² V adds na in parenthesis with ?.

¹⁴⁰³ TMK V. 107 also shows the two opinions without judging which is correct. But such description is, according to R, not the real intention of the author and he supports the opinion that karma is included in saṃyoga. In this regard, V points out the fact that the author has listed the ten adavyas only [fn.1]. In fact, he has clearly stated that tasya [= karmanah] ca saṃyogaviśeshatvāt [NySi 530,6].

¹⁴⁰⁴ According to the comment of R revised by V: yeshāṃ yatrānantarbhāvaḥ (the original: antarbhāvaḥ) isṭas tān pṛthakkṛtya lakṣhaṇasya sarvatra kartuṃ śakyatvāt.

¹⁴⁰⁵ The definition is derived from the definition of karman in VaiSū I. 1. 15 (dravyāśrayī aguṇavān saṃyogavibhāgeshv akāraṇam anapeksha iti

similar to its own producer” and “being dissimilar to that [producer]” are no-existent is quality,’ it comes about that even latent impression (saṃskāra) is regarded as different [from quality; that is, latent impression produces memory, which is similar to its producer, i.e. direct experience, but is dissimilar to direct experience]. **[544]** Another definition [of quality that has such an attribute as excludes action] is also to be examined in this way.

Thus, [every entity] is classified into substance and non-substance only.

Now, generality¹⁴⁰⁶ (sāmānya) is explained.

The Vaiśeṣhika and other [schools] assert that generality is one and eternal and is inherent in many.¹⁴⁰⁷ Their discussion is as follows.

We¹⁴⁰⁸ could not satisfactorily explain our verbal usage [associated with] our notion of single [idea (ākāra)] as to many things without any specific cause [i.e. generality].

And¹⁴⁰⁹ it cannot be true that [generality] is, [as is held by the Yogācāras], [mere] idea in our knowledge (jñānākāra). Because [the theory of] cognition of self (ātmakhyāti) has been rejected [in the Brahmasūtra¹⁴¹⁰]. **[545]** And [if it were the case], our activity towards [such] an [external] object [as is different from our knowledge, say, silver] could not be explained. Moreover, non-apprehension of the difference [of the ‘silver’ (which is assumed as the substratum of silver-ness) from the knowledge (which is the real substratum of silver-ness), through which the Yogācāras may explain this activity], would be impossible.¹⁴¹¹

Nor can it be true that [generality] is, [as is held by the Mādhyāmikās], non-real (alīka). Because cognition of non-real (asatkhyāti) is sublated [by guṇalakṣhaṇam] and I. 1. 16: (ekadravyam aguṇam saṃyogavibhāgeshv anapekṣhaṃ kāraṇam iti karmalakṣhaṇam). Cf. V, fn.2.

¹⁴⁰⁶ As to Deśika's discussion of jāti, see also TMK V. 111–122, Tattvaṭīkā 170–72 and NyP 308–10.

¹⁴⁰⁷ nityam ekam anekasamavāyī sāmānyam. TarS §77: nityam ekam anekānugatam sāmānyam (= Tarkabhāṣā, KSS ed., p.213). Cf. Tārkikarakṣhā, v.53: sāmānyam nityam ekam syād anekasamavāyī.

¹⁴⁰⁸ For the Vaiśeṣhika proof of jāti, see also TMK V. 113.

¹⁴⁰⁹ Buddhist refutation against jāti is also summarized and rejected in TMK V. 114. Cf. also Kajiyama's Eng. trans. of TBh, pp.126–30.

¹⁴¹⁰ I.e. II. ii. 27–29 (adhi° 4).

¹⁴¹¹ Cf. TMK V. 113: na cāsiddham āropaṇīyam. For the proof of the

our ordinal perception]. And our activity [towards an object] could not be explained if we understand [it] so [i.e. if we understand it as unreal]; if we do not understand so, it comes about that cognition otherwise (*anyathākhyāti*) is admitted. [Moreover] non-apprehension of the difference [of what is unreal from what is real, through which the *Mādhyāmikās* may explain this activity], would be impossible in this [opinion]; since such [difference] is proved to be unreasonable in examining the alternative whether it is real or unreal [— the difference cannot be real because it belongs to an unreal thing; if it were unreal, there would not be the difference and even what is real would be real] **[546]**.

Nor is [generality] in the nature of discrimination¹⁴¹² (*apoha*). Since we always understand a thing in positive form. And our activity could not be possible as in the former cases. If you explain A as different from non-A and the latter as different from the former, it is mutual-dependence. And [the mutual-dependence is inevitable inasmuch as] no discrimination is possible without counter-positive. When you say discrimination from non-A, if the word A denotes an individual, it comes about that [the discrimination] is continuous it comes about that another individual is heterogeneous; if [the word A] denotes that which is homogenous to this [A], it comes about that you admit genus (*jāti*).

Nor is [generality] in the nature of similarity (*sādṛśya*) of configuration (*samsthāna*) **[547]**. Because it cannot stand for the alternative whether it is continuous or discriminative: [if the former, it is nothing but genus; if the latter, it cannot bring about continuous knowledge¹⁴¹³].

Therefore, let generality be one and continuous.

To the above-mentioned, we answer as follows.

Which is ‘notion of single [idea]’ said by you, [1] notion of single-individual-ness, [2] notion of single-genus-ness (*ekajātitva*), [3] notion of homogenous-ness (*ekajātiyatva*), [4] notion of having quality of a single form (*ekākāradharmavattva*), or [5] notion that is always associated with one-word (*ekāśabdānuviddha*)?

[1][2] Neither the first nor the second. Since there are undesirable contingency that only one of the two remains, [i.e. individual and genus cannot coexist], and other [defects; e.g. that notion of a single individual never proves genus, that notion of a single genus does not take place in a present object].

[3] Nor the third, since it is not established. Because determinative [perception] never takes place in the form that ‘this is continuous in them.’ difference between *grāhaka* and *grāhya* against the *Yogācāra*, see *TMK* IV. 20 and *NyP* 50ff.

¹⁴¹² Cf. *TMK* V. 115. For the Buddhist concept of *apoha*, see Kajiyama's

The verbal usage of pot-ness that belongs to a pot [does not force us to accept genus; because it] is possible like [the verbal usage of what is not accepted as genus by you¹⁴¹⁴], say, time-ness belongs to time.

[4] Nor the fourth, since it comes about that such [genus] as cow-ness is rooted out **[548]**. Because only configuration, which is accepted by us, does so [bring about this notion]. For you also explain [the notion of a single form] in an earthen pot, a golden pot and so on in this way [by means of their common configuration]. In fact, you cannot accept pot-ness continuous in them for fear of¹⁴¹⁵ the mixture of genera.¹⁴¹⁶ If you accept exclusive genera [i.e. earthen-pot-ness and golden-pot-ness] or even if you do not accept [pot-ness in a golden pot¹⁴¹⁷], the continuous notion and the [continuous] verbal usage [concerning them] are based on the similarity of [their] configurations. If you accept such [explanation in this case], let it be accepted in every case.

[Obj.] Continuous notion and [continuous] verbal usage as to the wholes [e.g. pots] is explained through the continuity of the generality of its component [e.g. half-pot-ness of half-pots].

[Ans.] Not so. Since the above-mentioned defects like the mixture [of genera] are common to a half-pot and so on.

[Obj.] Suppose, then, that there is continuous generality by accepting the mixture.

[Ans.] This is [still] incorrect since it is not proper to postulate [another entity 'generality'] though the notion can be explained otherwise.

[Obj.] [We should postulate generality] because if exclusive configurations and the like [of various cows] caused continuous notion [of a cow], there would be over-application **[549]**.

[Ans.] How [do you explain] that there is not over-application when Eng. trans. of TBh, pp.122–26, esp. fn.333.

¹⁴¹³ See the pūrvapaksha in TMK and SAS V. 118.

¹⁴¹⁴ Those which cannot be jāti according to the Vaiśeshika are summarized in the following verse of Udayana: [1] vyakter abhedah [2] tulyatvam [3] saṅkaro 'tha [4] anavasthitiḥ / [5] rūpahāniḥ [6] asambandho jātibādhakasamgrahaḥ // [Kir 23,3f.]. Time-ness is an example of [1]. See Kuppaswami Sastri, A Primer of Indian Logic, pp.33–36.

¹⁴¹⁵ jātisamkara-bhayāt; K reports the reading °prasamgāt.

¹⁴¹⁶ E.g. that of pot-ness and gold-ness in a golden pot. Such mixture is not accepted by the Vaiśeshika [See the third item in the Udayana's verse cited above]; Deśika, however, accepts it [TMK V. 111].

¹⁴¹⁷ Cf. SAS V. 111: suvarṇādighatādaḥ ghaṭatvam eva nāstīti teshām

exclusive configuration manifest continuous¹⁴¹⁸ [generality]?

[Obj.] It is because that much [of configuration] has such specific nature [as manifests the continuous generality].

[Ans.] Our answer is same. For it can be said that very much [of configuration] causes the continuous notion. In your opinion, there are mere violation of perception and complication [in postulating the generality between the configurations and the notion].

[5] The fifth (pañcamah) has been also explained (pañcatām gataḥ) likewise. That is, which is intended there, [a] notion that is always associated with the word ‘one’ or [b] notion that is always associated with a single word like ‘cow’?

The former is not selected. Because if this intends ‘one individual,’ it is non-established¹⁴¹⁹ [in many]; and because the verbal usage of ‘being of one genus (ekajātīya)’ is possible [even] based on various specific adjunct, like the verbal usage of oneness as to [mere collection of many things] like a heap, an army, an assemble and a forest. And the adjunct here means superimposition of many things on one concept.

Nor is the second, because such is common even to words having many meanings.¹⁴²⁰

[Obj.] There is something special [in a word go (cow)] excluded from [words having] many meanings.

[Ans.] It does not [prove genus] because such [speciality] is also possible [without genus] as in the case of words like ‘specific nature (svarūpa)’ and ‘object (vishaya).’ In fact, we find that the words like ‘specific nature’ and ‘object’, signifying various items, are common in some forms and are peculiar in some forms [550]. Likewise the word go are also common to water, speech, lays, the sun etc. and attains to speciality owing to the context. So there is no room to postulate the distinctive cause [i.e. genus].

[Obj.] If generality were but configuration, you could not possibly explain [generality like color-ness and taste-ness] in those which are devoid of that [configuration¹⁴²¹] like color and taste.

[= keshāṃcit nyāyavādinām] āśayaḥ [779,1f.].

¹⁴¹⁸ For jātivyañjaka, see TMK V. 117.

¹⁴¹⁹ ekavyaktir iti vivakshāyām asiddheḥ; K reports the reading vivakshāyām api siddheḥ.

¹⁴²⁰ R illustrates it by an example of aksha; e.g. videvanāksha meaning a spot of a dice, vidhītakāksha meaning a myrobalan, śakaṭāksha meaning an axle.

¹⁴²¹ In SAS V. 121, saṃsthāna is defined as avayavaracanāviśeṣha

[Ans.] Then, how do you explain [genera] in those which are devoid of the [configuration] indicative (upalakshana) [of genus].

[Obj.] Indication [of the genera] in them is [their] characteristic (lakshana).

[Ans.] What is this?

[Obj.] This is apprehension; [that is, being-an-object of the apprehension of color etc. is indicative of color-ness etc.].

[Ans.] Not so, because self-dependence would follow; [for the apprehension of color etc. is dependent upon the indicative knowledge in the form of being-an-object of the apprehension of color etc.]. **[551]** In our opinion, however, the very [being-an-object of the apprehension of color etc.] itself is what brings about the identity [of various kinds of color etc., i.e. color-ness]; accordingly, there is no defect.

[Obj.] [Such color-ness etc.] are not dependent upon the indication. **[552]**

[Ans.] Even in our opinion, [they] are not at all dependent upon the configuration.

That is, similarity is of two kinds: similarity in property (dharma) and similarity in specific nature (svarūpa).

Mostly in the case of substance, the notion and verbal usage in single form is caused by the similarity in property. And keeping that much in mind, Śrī Vishṇucitta says that **[554]**:

*Sameness of majority of components is to be denoted by the word 'similarity' in reference to counter-correlatives [?].

As to those which are devoid of another property, [the notion and verbal usage in single form] is caused by the similarity in specific nature. Intending this much, the Venerable author of the Commentary says that:

*Configuration means nature peculiar to [an entity].¹⁴²² So¹⁴²³ configuration is to be considered in accordance with the entity [ŚrīBh I. i. 1: (1) 126,3–127,1].

It is commented in the Vivaraṇa as follows:

*For those who observe various entities appears the configuration defined as particular composition (vinyāsa) of their components.

[Obj.] How is [the word samsthāna (configuration)] cannot be possibly derived [etymologically¹⁴²⁴], since the configuration of each entity is

[788,5].

¹⁴²² svāsādhāraṇam rūpam. SP: rūpam apr̥thakviśeṣhaṇam; Tṭikā: nirūpakam ity arthaḥ [171].

¹⁴²³ itir hetau (R).

different from that of every other entity. If [it] were common, [it] would lose peculiarity.

[Ans.] This is not right. Because it can be derived from an adjunct as well, as the word ‘animal’ [is derived] from [the adjunct ‘having] a tail’. And the adjunct [in the present case] is similarity [Vivaraṇa ad ŚrīBh].

Here the phrase ‘composition of [their] components’ intends to give an example; otherwise, it comes about that verbal usages as to color and the like, say, that ‘color-ness is genus,’ is negated. Although the description ‘and the adjunct is similarity’ etc. is natural for the opinion that [similarity] is a different [entity], [this ‘similarity’ must] denote only specific nature because this opinion is inappropriate [555].

[Obj.] If similarity were but specific nature (svarūpa), everything would be similar to everything because there is no difference in being mere specific nature.¹⁴²⁵ And [‘nature (rūpa)’ and ‘similar’] would never used simultaneously like ‘this nature is similar to other nature.’

[Ans.] Such would be common even if [similarity] were accepted as a different [entity]. [556] That is, if this [thing] have similarity, it would be similar to everything because there is no difference [in having similarity¹⁴²⁶]. [For fear of this], you may assert that this is to be individually established, owing to our perception, as having the similarity whose correlative is that much. Then, let it be admitted that the very specific nature is to be individually established, owing to the same [perception], as having that much as its correlative; for there is no difference. And the simultaneous usage is not impossible, because [nature] becomes the object of the word ‘similar’ in the form that is described by its correlative. Otherwise, it could no be used along with [such] a word [denoting specific nature of a thing] as ‘object (vishaya).’

[Obj.] If generality were mere similarity, it would follow that not only a cow (go) but also a gaval (gavaya) is denoted by the word go.

[Ans.] It cannot be so, because extreme-similarity¹⁴²⁷ (sausādrśya) is generality. For the fixed rule is established that when certain extreme-similarity is indicative of generality, this [extreme-similarity] itself is that

¹⁴²⁴ I.e. sam-sthānam = samena sthānam.

¹⁴²⁵ E.g. a ghaṭa would be similar to a paṭa since there is no difference between ghaṭasvarūpa and paṭasvarūpa in being svarūpa.

¹⁴²⁶ If a gavaya is the substratum of the similarity to a go, it would be the substratum of the similarity to a mahisha (buffalo) as well because there is no difference in being the substratum of similarity. If the similarity in a gavaya has a go as its correlative, it would have a mahisha also as its correlative because there is no difference in being similarity (R).

[generality] **[557]**.

[Obj.] What is extreme-similarity as different from [mere] similarity?

[Ans.] It is, at the first sight, the excess of same properties; ultimately, it is a kind of specific nature.

However, it is stated by Nārāyaṇārya that:

*Genus is but configuration. Though each [configuration of an individual] is different from that of every other [individual], it is recollected in the second individual and so on by force of extreme-similarity, and brings about a single notion and word regarding the entities that is its own substrata. The very recollected (configuration, namely) extreme-similarity,¹⁴²⁸ is also called continuity (anuvṛtti) [Nītimālā].

And it is stated by Varadavishṇu Mīśra that:

*Those which exist in perceptible substratum, namely, number, size, separateness, conjunction, disjunction, remoteness and nearness, fluidity and similarity are perceptible. We have already explained that comparison (upamāṇa) is an independent means of knowledge. And this similarity is a quality, because it is proved by the following inference: effected number, potency and similarity are qualities; because they are effects related [to a thing], while different from substance and action; like whiteness in a pot [?]

Such statements are to be regarded as the opinions of one sect, since they do admit so.¹⁴²⁹ **[558]** As to the verse of Bhaṭṭa Parāśara pāda that:

*Many persons understand similarity to be sameness of the majority of components. We will show that it is an independent prameya in [the section on] prameya [Tattvaratnākara],

we do not understand what is his [real] intention because the following part discussing prameya had been lost. Or rather, let us admit that similarity is a different [entity] even in his opinion. Still the above is favorite for us.¹⁴³⁰

Therefore, saṁsthāna here [in our opinion] is a synonymous of ākṛti (configuration). The very [ākṛti] is called saūsādṛśya (extreme-similarity), jāti (genus) and sāmānya (generality) in the form of [being] described by each other; nothing beyond this is apprehended.

¹⁴²⁷ saūsādṛśyam atyantasādṛśyam [SAS V. 116: 784,7].

¹⁴²⁸ V, following the reading of the text of the Nītimālā, adds saṁsthānam in parenthesis before saūsādṛśyam.

¹⁴²⁹ teshāṁ tathābhimatam ity ekadeśimatam mantavyam. R interprets the sentence as: 'it is to be thought that such is the opinion of one sect and therefore they admit so' and shows the reading teshāṁ na tathābhimatam mantavyam as better.

¹⁴³⁰ In this regard, R cites the verse that: yuliyuktaṁ vaco grāhyam na

But it is stated by Bhaṭṭa Parāśara pāda that:

*[Obj.] If [you] do not accept such generality as substance-ness and earth-ness [belonging to substance], whiteness [belonging to quality] and baking-ness [belonging to action], how [do you explain] that those which are [directly] expressed [by a word] (vācya) and causes of the application [of a word] (pravṛttinimitta) — for instance, lineage [in a word like Brahmin-hood] and condition [in a word like pot-ness] — are designated by a single word, while they are many and have no single causal factor (prayojaka)?

[Ans.] How do you [explain] it? For this is not a burden only to us. In fact, everyone (sarvaḥ lokāḥ) admits that a single word is used even regarding many things in such an expression as ‘all (sarvam)’. [Tattvaratnākara];

and further,

*People regard those which are expressed as one owing to the oneness of their specific nature, that of their forms (tadyarūpa) and, finally, that of their adjuncts, or because of their similarity and the non-apprehension of their difference¹⁴³¹ [559].

[It is] due to the oneness of their specific nature in the case of the sun, the moon and the like; due to the oneness of their forms (ākāra) in the case of a pot, cloth and the like [Tattvaratnākara],

and so forth. First it is not intended here that ‘the oneness of forms’ is non-figurative, because genus [as an independent category] is negated. We think hereby that what is meant here is ‘having such particular configuration as is fit for the determinate [perception] in single form.’

And such generality is directly perceived¹⁴³² in some cases — for example, pot-ness; in some cases [it is perceived] with the help of particular cooperative factors — for example, ghee-ness in melted ghee, [which is apprehended] with the help of grasping [its] smell; Brahmin-hood, [which is apprehended] with the help of remembering the relation of the fathers and the mothers.¹⁴³³ It is stated by Venerable Yāmuna muni in the Āgamaprāmāṇya that:

*Hence Brahmin-hood does not escape perceptibility as it is understood by means of vision assisted with the memory of the lineage. [560] So

tu purushagauravam [MBh?].

¹⁴³¹ V asserts that iti after this verse is to be omitted (fn.1).

¹⁴³² Cf. the verse of the Prakaraṇapañcikā III, p.17: jātir āsrayato bhinnā pratyakshagocarā / pūrvākārāvamarśena Prabhākaraguror matā (cited in the footnote * in Dr. Narasimhachari's ed. of ĀgP, p.145).

¹⁴³³ The similar description is found in 492,6 as well. According to K, however, it is not the siddhānta of Deśika. As to the nature of Brahmin-hood, K refers to SeMī ad I. ii. 1 [pp.145ff.], Tṭikā [], ŚP ad I. iii. adhi° 7

it is experienced, as is mentioned [in the verse cited above¹⁴³⁴], that vision¹⁴³⁵ produces the knowledge of genus with the help of various cooperatives [ĀgP 145,3–6], and so on. ...¹⁴³⁶

Here stops the work Nyāyasiddhāñjana composed by Śrīmad Veṅkaṭanātha or Vedāntācārya, who is the lion among poets and logicians and who masters all branches of arts.

(devatā°, sū° 23–29) [].

¹⁴³⁴ I.e. Ślokavārtika, sambandhākshepavāda, v.37, cited in ĀgP 145,1f.

¹⁴³⁵ Read cakshushaḥ (adopted in Dr. Narasimhachari's ed. of ĀgP), not cakshushā (supported by R but not found in any MS. of ĀgP).

¹⁴³⁶ Even Raṅgarāmānuja did not know the continuation of the work: he said at last that: ‘The remainder of the work after this was not found anywhere. To supplement it would cause derision. Other items to be known had been settled properly by the same [author] in his other works. Accordingly, nothing is to be considered now.’

References and Abbreviations

ABORI	Annals of the Bhandarkar Oriental Institute.
AhirS	Ahirbudhnyasaṃhitā.
AK(Bh)	Abhidharmakośa(bhāshya) of Vasubandhu.
ĀnSS	Ānandāsrama Sanskrit Ser. (-saṃskṛtagranthāvali), ed. by Pandits of the Ānandāsrama (if not specified), Poona (Pune).
ĀP	Āgamaprāmāṇya of Yāmuna.
AR	Amṛtāsvādinī Rahasya-s of Vedāntadeśika.
ASĀ	Adhikaraṇasārāvali (or °āvali) of Vedāntadeśika.
ARR	Amṛtarañjani Rahasya-s of Vedāntadeśika.
ĀS	Ātmasiddhi of Yāmuna. See Siddhitraya.
ĀTV	Ātmatattvaviveka.
BĀUp-BhV	Bṛhadārāṇyakopanishadbhāshyavārttika.
Bh-BSūBh	Bhāskara's Commentary on the Brahamsūtra.
BhG	Bhagavadgītā.
BI	Bibliotheca Indica, Calcutta: Asiatic Society.
BrSi	Brahmasiddhi of Maṇana Miśra.
BSū	Brahmasūtra [References are to the numbers of sūtra and adhikaraṇa (shown under §) in ŚrīBh, not those in Śaṃkara's commentary etc.].
ChSS	Chaukhamba [Choukhamba] Sanskrit Ser., Varanasi (Benares).
CśBh	Catuḥślokiḥbhāshya.
EIPh	Karl H. Potter, General ed. Encyclopedia of Indian Philosophies.
GAS	Yāmuna's Gītārthasaṃgraha.
GBh	Rāmānuja's Gītābhāshya.
GOS	Gaekwad's Oriental Ser., Baroda (Vadodara): Oriental Institute.
HDhŚ	Pandurang Varman Kane, History of Dharmaśāstra.
HIPh	Surendranath Dasgupta, A History of Indian Philosophy, 5 vols.
IPh	S. Radhakrishnan, Indian Philosophy, 2 vols.
IS	Ishtasiddhi.
ĪS	Īśvarasiddhi. See Siddhitraya.
IBK	印度學佛教學研究 (Indogaku Bukkyōgaku Kenkyū or Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies).
IJJ	Indo-Iranian Journal.
ITB	印度哲学仏教学 (Indo-tetsugaku Bukkyōgaku or Hokkaido Journal of Indian Philosophy and Buddhist Studies).
JA	Journal Asiatique.

JAOS	Journal of the American Oriental Society.
JBBRAS	Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.
JNA	Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali.
JORM	Journal of Oriental Research, Madras.
JRAS	Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.
Kir	Kiraṇāvali of Udayana.
KSS	Kashi Sanskrit Ser., Varanasi: ChSS Office.
LT	Lakshmitantra.
MGOS	Madras Government Oriental Ser., Madras: Government Oriental MSS Library.
MLBD	Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi etc.
MMU	Mānameyodaya of Nārāyaṇa.
MNP	Mīmāṃsānyāyaprakāśa.
MSū	Mīmāṃsā- or Jaimini-sūtra.
NaiS	Naishkarmyasiddhi.
NBh	Nyāyabhāshya.
NBhū	Nyāyabhūshaṇa.
NDy	Nayadyumaṇi.
NiM	Nītimālā.
NKandali	Nyāyakandalī.
NKaṇikā	Nyāyakaṇikā.
NKul	Nyāyakulīśa.
NKus	Nyāyakusumāñjali.
NM	Nyāyamañjarī.
NP	Nyāyapariśuddhi of Vedānta Deśika.
NSP	Nirnaya Sagar Press, Bombay.
NSū	Nyāyasūtra. References are to the sūtra number(s) of Calcutta ed. (see NV).
NV	Nyāyavārttika.
NVTT	Nyāyavārttikatātparyāṭikā.
NVTP	Nyāyavārttikatātparyapariśuddhi.
NySi	Nyāyasiddhāñjana.
PAIOC	Proceedings of the All-India Oriental Conference.
Pd	Pañcadaśī.
PR	Pāñcarātrarakshā.
PañcP	Pañcapādikā.
PDhS	Padārthadharmaśaṅgraha or Praśastapādabhāshya.
PMBh	Paramatabhaṅga.
PPV	Pañcapādikāvivarāṇa.
PrakP	Prakaraṇapañcikā.
R- —°Up	Raṅgarāmānuja's commentaries on Upanishads.
RG	Śrī Bhagavad Rāmānuja Granthamālā: Śrī Bhagavad Rāmānuja's Nine Valuable Works, ed. P. B. Kāñci Aṅṅangarā-

	cārya, Kāñcī: Granthamālā Office, 1956.
RNA	Ratnakīrti-Nibandhāvali.
RTS	Rahasyatrayasāra.
ŚāBh	Śābarabhāshya.
SamV	Sambandhavārttika.
Ś-BSūBh	Brahmasūtra-Śāṅkarabhāshya.
Ś- °Up	Śāṅkara's commentaries on Upanishads.
SAS	Sarvārthasiddhi.
SbÖAW	Sitzungsberichte der Philosophisch-Historische Klasse der Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften.
ŚDū	Śatadūshaṇī [The number of vāda is shown in Roman].
ŚDī	Śāstradīpikā.
SDS	Sarvadarśanasamgraha.
SeMī	Seśvaramīmāṃsā.
ŚGBh	Śaraṇāgatigadyabhāshya.
SK	Sāṅkhyakārikā.
ŚP	Śrutaprakāśikā of Sudarśanasūri.
SRBh	Stotratnabhāshya.
ŚrīBh	Śrībhāshya.
SŚ	Samkshepaśārīraka of Sarvajñātman.
ST	Siddhitraya.
ŚV	Ślokavārttika.
SVOS	Sri Venkatesvara Oriental Ser., Tirupati: Tirumalai Tirupati Devasthanams Press.
TaiUpBhV	Taittirīyopanishadbhāshyavārttika of Sureśvara
TarS	Tarkasamgraha of Annaṃbhaṭṭa.
TBh (M)	Tarkabhāshā of Mokshākaragupta.
TC	Tātparyacandrikā. See GBh.
TD	Tātparyadīpikā.
TMK	Tattvamuktākālāpa.
TNir	Tattvanirṇaya.
TS(P)	Tattvasamgraha(-pañjikā).
TSāra	Tattvavsāra.
Tṭīkā	Tattvaṭīkā of Vedānta Deśika.
TV	Tantravārttika of Kumārila Bhaṭṭa.
°Up	Upanishad.
UVG	Ubhayavedāntagrānamālā, pub. and ed. with comm. by Abhinava Desika Uttamur T. Viraraghavacharya, Madras.
VaiSū	Vaiśeshikasūtra. [Referencea are the sūtra number in Candrānanda's comm. and that in Śāṅkaramiśra's is added in parenthesis].
VAS	Vedārthasamgraha.
VDG	Śrīmad-Vedāntadeśika-grānamālā.

VDīpa	Vedāntadīpa.
ViP	Vishṇupurāṇa.
VizSS	Vizianagram Sanskrit Sries, Benares.
VPari	Vedāntaparibhāshā of Dharmarāja.
VPP	Swami Satchidanandendrasaraswati 1964.
VSāra	Vedāntasāra of Rāmānuja.
WZKM	Wiener Zeitschrift für des Kundes Morgenlandes.
WZKS(O)	Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Südasiens (Süd- und Ostasiens).
YMD	Yatīndramatadīpikā.
ZDMG	Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft..

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 of Nārāyaṇa.

ĀS

= Ātmasiddhi.

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GBh = Rāmānuja's Gītābhāshya.
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yāyi-Nārāyaṇa-kṛta-Prakāśikā-sameta-Īsopanishat,
 Raṅgarāmānuja-varacita-Prakāśikā-sametāḥ Kena-
 ādi-Muṇ ka-antāḥ, Rāmānuja-mata-anuyāyi-
 Kūranārāyaṇa-racita-Prakāśikā-upetā
 Māṇ ūkyopanishat, Raṅgarāmānuja-varacita-
 Prakāśikā-upete Ānadavallī-Bhṛgu-Upanishadau,
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iii. 40–52 and the YMD; Word index of VAS and Yatirājavaibhva].

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Muṇ Up = Muṇ aka-Upanishad.

MiPā = Mīmāṃsāpādukā.
See SeMī.

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NyBo

Nyāyabodhini. See TarS.

NyKośa

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NyKus

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NyP

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NyP^{AU}

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NyP^{ch}

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NyP^H

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NySi

= Nyāyasiddhāñjana.

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NySi^H

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NySi^M

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NySi^p

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NySMuk

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Śrīraṃganātha-Pādukāsahasraṃ Śrībhāradvāja-
Śrīnivāsācārya-kṛta-Parīkshā-ākhyā-vyākhyā-sametam
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Pāṇini

= Pāṇini's Ashtādhyāyī

Sumitra M. Katre, Ashtādhyāyī of Pāṇini, Delhi etc.: Motilal Banarsidass, 1989 [originally published by the University of Texas Press, 1987].

PMBh

= Paramatabhaṅga.

Paramatabhaga with Anapāya prabhā, ed. Abhinava Desika T. Viraraghavacharya, Madras: Ubhayavedāntagranthamālā, 1978.

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R = Raṃgarāmānuja's Vyākhyā on Nyāyasiddhāñjana. See NySid.

Raghavan 1979.

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RG Śrī Bhagavad Rāmānuja Granthamālā: Śrī Bhagavad Rāmānuja's Nine Valuable Works, ed. P. B. Kāñcī Aṅṅangarācārya, Kāñcī: Granthamālā Office, 1956.

RTS = Rahasyatrayasāra.
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SAS Sarvārthasiddhi.
See TMK.

SDS = Sarvadarśanasamgraha of Mādhava.
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*Srinivasa Raghavan, A.: Parāśara's comm. on 1000 names. H245-1 VS x= Par Sri.

SS = Saṃvitsiddhi.
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Sundaram 1968

P. K. Sundaram, Advaita Epistemology with Special Reference to Ishṭasiddhi, Madras, Univ. of Madras [Second ed. 1984].

ŚDū = Śatadūshaṇī of Vedānta Deśika.
Tattvateeka (a Commentary on Śrībhāshya) and Satadooshani by Srimad Vedantadesika, ed. Sri Uttamur Viraraghavacharya, Ubhayavedāntagrāthamālā, Madras 1974.

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corrections) of 1967 edition of Ubhayavedānta-granthamālā].

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[#] Appendices contain:

1. Summaries of each adhikaraṇa (with brief notes in Skt.):
 - 1) (Śārīraka) Nyāyikalāpasamgraha of Seneśvara [Raghavan 21],
 - 2) Tattvasāra of Vātsya Varadācārya [Raghavan 22],
 - 3) Adhikaraṇasārāvali of Vedānta Deśika,
 - 4) Adhikaraṇārthasamgraha (or Śrībhāshyopanyāsa) of Do ayācārya or Mahācārya [Raghavan 57],
 - 5) Nayasamgatimālikā of Śrīnivāsācārya;
2. Index of quotations (with explanatory notes in Skt.) From:
 - 1) Śrutis, 2) Smṛtis and 3) other works;
3.
 - 1) Index of technical terms (with their definitions) found in the ŚrīBh and in 2) the commentary;
 - 3) Index of some notable words in the Brahma-sūtras (with their meanings in the line of Rāmānuja);

the Nyāyikalāpasamgraha of Senesvara, the Tattvasāra of Vātsya Varadācārya, the Adhikaraṇasārāvali of Vedānta Desika, the Adhikaraṇārthasamgraha (or Śrībhāshyopanyāsa) of Do ayācārya or Mahācārya, the Nayasamgatimālikā of Śrīnivāsācārya, and the Vedāntakārikāvali of Bucci Vemkaṭācārya], 4vols, The Academy of Sanskrit Research Ser. 4, Melkote: Academy of Sanskrit Research, 1985–91.

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- ŚrīBh (RG) Ed. P. B. Annangaracharya, in RG., 1956.
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4) Index of sentences in the **ŚrīBh** stated as the siddhānta, 5) the lokoktis and 6) the prayogas;

7) Index of the names of the works quoted;

8) Index of the names of the authors quoted;

9) List of the abbreviations used in this edition;

10) List of the quoted texts;

4. [In vol. I only]

1) Explanation of all sūtras,

[verses in order to memorize (1) the number and the name of the adhyāyas, (2) the number of the adhikaraṇas, (3) the number of the sūtras in each adhyāya, (4) the number of the adhikaraṇas in each pāda, and (5) the number of the sūtras in each pāda];

2) Summaries of the entire work, each adhikaraṇa and each pāda;

3) Import of each adhikaraṇa;

4) The names of God as referred in each adhikaraṇa;

5) Alphabetical index of the vidyās;

6) List of the adhikaraṇas concerning the vidyās;

7) Verses in order to memorize where each vidyā is found;

8) Alphabetical index of the adhikaraṇas;

9) The names of the saints referred to in the Brahmasūtras;

10) Alphabetical index of the sūtras.

5. [In vol. I only]

1) Important ślokas of the Vishṇupurāṇa;

2) Vedāntakārikāvali of Bucci Vemkaṭācārya;

3) Alphabetical indices of (1) the names of adhikaraṇas, (2) the Nyāyikalāpasamgraha, (3) the Tattvasāra, (4) the Adhikaraṇasārāvali, (5) the Nayasamgatimālikā, (6) the Brahmasūtrapadyamālikā, (7) Rāmānuja's own verses;

4) Variant readings (supplement);

5) Errata.

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TarD

Tarkadīpikā.

See TarS.

TarS

= Tarkasaṃgraha.

Tarkasaṃgraha of Annambhaṭṭa with the author's Dīpikā and Govardhana's Nyāyabodhinī, ed. Yashwant Vasudev Athalye and trans. Mahadev Rajaram Bodas, Second ed., Bombay Sanskrit Ser. 55, Poona: Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute, 1988⁴.

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Tattvasāra with Ratnasāriṇī, ed. Kārappaṃkā u Venkatachariyar svāmi, Madras Government Oriental Ser. LXXVI, Madras, 1951.

- TC = Tātparityacandrikā.
See GBh.
- TD = Tātparityadīpikā.
Vedarthasangraha of Sri Ramanujacharya with the Commentary Tatparyadīpika of Sri Sudarsanabhatta, ed. T. K. V. N. Sudarsanacharya, Vaishnava Sampradaya Granthamala No. 5, Tirupati: Sri Venkatesvara Oriental Institute, 1953.
Ed. with Vedarthasangraha by S. S. P. S. Rama Misra Sastri, Pandit ns. 15–16 (1893–94) [2nd ed. 1924].
- TT = Tattvaṭīkā of Vedānta Deśika.
Tattwateeka (a Commentary on Śrībhāshya) by Srimad Vedantadesika, ed. Sri Uttamur Viraraghavacharya, Ubhayavedāntagrānṭhamālā, Madras 1974.
- TMK = Tattvamuktākālāpa.
Srimad Vedanta Desika's Tattva mukta Kalapa and Sarvartha Siddhi with Sanskrit Commentaries [Vādhūla-śrīnivāsa's Sarvārthasiddhigū hārthavivṛtti, Saumyavaradarāmānuja's Sarvārthasiddhigū hārthaprakāśa and Viraraghavācārya's Alabhyalābha], [Madras]: Ubhayavedāntagrānṭhamālā, 1973.
- TMK(A) [III and IV only] Śrīmad-Vedāntadeśika viracitaḥ Tattvamuktākālāpaḥ, Sarvārthasiddhi-vṛttiḥ, Hindī anuvāda tathā prasāda samalaṃkṛta, 2 vols. (nāyakasara and buddhisara), ed. and Hindī trans. Śivaprasād Dvivedī, Ayodhya: Tattvamuktākālāpa Prakāśan, 1983–84.
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[II. jīva-sara 1–24] Ibid., vol. II, ed. S. Narasimhachar, Univ. of Mysore ... vol. 81, 1940.
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TMK(p) Tattvamuktākalāpa with Sarvārthasiddhi by Venkaṭanātha Deśika, ed. Rāma Miśra Sāstrī, reprint of the Pandit, Kāśī, 1900.

TMK(v) Tattvamuktākalāpa of Śrīmad-Venkaṭanātha Mahādeśika with three commentaries, Sarvārthasiddhi by Śrīmad-Venkaṭanātha, Ānandadāyanī by Nṛsiṃhadeva and Aksharārtha by Devanāthātātācārya, 2 vols., ed. N. R. Śrīkr̥ṣṇatātācārya, Sarasvatībhavana-Granthamālā 128, Varanasi, 1990–96.

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VAS

= Vedārthasaṃgraha.

Rāmānuja's Vedārthasaṃgraha, Introduction, Critical Edition and Annotated Translation, by J. A. B. van Buitenen, Deccan College Monograph Ser. 16, Poona, 1956 [rep. 1992].

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VDG

= Śrīmad-Vedāntadeśika-granthamālā.

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2) Vedānta-v^o I: Adhikaraṇasārāvalī, Śatadūshaṇī.

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4) III: Tattvamuktākālāpa with Sarvārthasiddhi.

5) Kāvyanāṭaka-v^o: Hamsasandēśa, Subhāshitanīvī, Yādavābhyaudaya, Saṃkalpasūryodaya.

6) Vyākhyāna-v^o I: Īshāvāsyopanishadbhāshya, Catuḥślokībhāshya, Stotraratnabhāshya, Gadyabhāshya.

7) II: Gītārthasaṃgraharakshā, Gītābhāshya-Tātparyacandrikā.

8) III: Tattvaṭīkā, Nīksheparakshā, Saccaritarakshā, Pañcarātrarakshā etc.

VDīpa

= Vedāntadīpa.

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ViP

= Viṣṇupurāṇa.

The Viṣṇumahāpurāṇa [with the commentaries, the Viṣṇucittīya and the Ātmaprakāśā], ed. Rājendranāth Śarman, Delhi: Nag Pub., 1985 [rep. of Veṅkaṭeśvara edition].

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VSāra

= Vedāntasāra.

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YMD

= Yatīndramatadīpikā.

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KSS

Catuḥślokībhāṣya:

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(6) Vyākhyāna-v^o I: Īśāvāsyaopaniṣadbhāshya, Catuṣślokībhāshya, Stotratnabhāshya, Gadyabhāshya.

(7) Vyākhyāna-v^o II: GAS-rakshā, GBh-TC.

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